An Institutional Analysis of Organizational Change-The Case of The H Kong Police-Lau y Lui

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An Institutional Analysis
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The Case of the Hong Kong Police

Allan Y. Jiao
Rowan University
Raymond W. K. Lau
Percy Lui
The Open University of Hong Kong
After 156 years of British colonial rule, Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty on July 1,
1997. This article examines the change of the Hong Kong Police (HKP) and related issues during
this transition. Based on an institutional perspective, it is argued that the HKPs paramilitary tra-
ditions greatly constrain changes. Where change has occurred, it has been induced by an
extrainstitutional impetus that is strong enough to overcome institutionalized obstacles. The
analysis examines the HKPs paramilitary traditions, how it has been transformed from a sys-
tematically corrupt and oppressive colonial force to a professionalized agency at the time that the
above transition process began, and how it has responded to its changed environment. The insti-
tutional perspective is used to explain the challenges the HKP faces during the transformational
process and to discuss the general implications of the HKP experience for understanding
organizational change.
Keywords: institutional perspective; the Hong Kong Police; policing; police reform; organiza-
tional change
W e conducted this study with the intent to further our understanding of changes in a
police organization from an institutional perspective. We use the Hong Kong Police
(HKP) for analysis because of its potential to serve as a significant case to illustrate the utility
of institutional theory to the study of police organization. The HKPs environment has
changed substantially since China declared its intention to resume sovereignty over Hong
AuthorsNote: The research on which this article is based was partially supported by Grant No. 01-00247 from the
Fulbright Program, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Grant No. 275460
of Separately Budgeted Research from Rowan University. The authors would like to thank the Hong Kong Police
(HKP) for their kind support in this study. They also would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments and suggestions. Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent the official posi-
tion of the U.S. Department of State, Rowan University, or the HKP.
38
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Jiao et al. / Analysis of Organizational Change 39
Kong in the early 1980s, especially after Britain appointed Chris Patten to be Hong Kongs
last colonial governor in 1992. How has such a change affected the HKP? How has the HKP, a
powerful institution in Hong Kong, responded to such a significant change in its institutional
environment? The data we collected to answer these questions suggest that there has been a
strong institutionalization of paramilitary rituals and practices that has undermined the
inculcation of a service culture in the HKP.
Questions might be raised, however, as to the appropriateness of using the HKP to advance
the institutional theory. The HKP may be viewed as a unique case, as organizational scholars
have argued about the importance of cultural factors on organizational scholarship
(Birnbaum & Wong, 1985; Lincoln, Hanada, & Olson, 1981). Because of the cultural differ-
ences, some may argue that the institutional environment in Hong Kong is significantly dif-
ferent from that in Western countries. We believe, however, that the HKP shares more simi-
larities with than differences from its Western counterparts. Similar to many U.S. police
forces, for instance, the HKP was heavily influenced by the London Metropolitan Police and
has operated and continues to operate in the common law system. The HKP officers work in a
society where citizens enjoy in large part the same basic freedoms and rights as citizens in
Western countries. The HKP has also, in response to changes in its institutional environment,
adopted more community-oriented and service-oriented approaches similar to those in
American and British police during the past three decades.
The reform in the HKP, although occurring in different political and cultural contexts,
bears resemblance to its Western counterparts from an organizational and institutional
change perspective. Similar to many large police organizations in the United States, for
example, the HKPs institutionalized values and traditions may create great obstacles to any
reform effort. The change of the HKP, therefore, should not be regarded as sui generis, and
lessons from it are of theoretical value and should enhance our understanding of organiza-
tional change in police organizations.
An Institutional Perspective of Organizational Change

We adopted an institutional perspective to examine the case of the HKP. Our framework is
drawn mainly from two streams of institutional theories: (a) institutionalism in an organiza-
tional study, developed by DiMaggio (1991), DiMaggio and Powell (1991), March and
Olsen (1984, 1989, 1996), and Meyer and Rowan (1991), and (b) institutionalism in policing,
by Crank and Langworthy (1992) and Katz (2001). These two streams of literature provide a
useful conceptual framework for us to study the case of the HKP. Below, we examine each
stream of these institutional theories in more detail.
Institutionalism in Organizational Study

Meyer and Rowan (1991) assert that organizations are driven to incorporate the practices
and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work. Institu-
tionalized techniques, policies, and programs of successful organizations function as power-
ful myths, which are adopted by many new and growing organizations to increase their legiti-
macy and their survival prospects. As Meyer and Rowan observe, many myths are generated
by particular organizational practices and diffused through relational networks. These myths
have their legitimacy based on the supposition that they are effective. For example, a particu-

40 International Criminal Justice Review / May 2005
larly effective practice can be codified into a myth-like form. The laws and public opinion
then make it necessary or advantageous for organizations to incorporate the new practice in
their operation. Many myths also have official legitimacy based on legal mandates. Accord-
ing to Meyer and Rowan, the stronger the rational-legal order, the greater the extent that ratio-
nalized rules and procedures become institutionalized requirements. Moreover, Meyer and
Rowan assert that organizations, though influenced by their institutional contexts, do play
active roles in shaping those contexts. This is especially the case with powerful organizations
that would attempt to build their goals and procedures directly into society as institutional rules.
Above all, Meyer and Rowan (1991) argue that isomorphism with environmental institu-
tions has some significant consequences for organizations: They incorporate elements that
are legitimated externally, they employ external or ceremonial assessment criteria to define
the value of structural elements, and their dependence on externally fixed institutional prac-
tices reduces environmental turbulence and maintains the stability of context within which
they operate. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) also contend that the concept of institutional
isomorphism is a useful tool for understanding the politics and ceremony that pervade much
modern organizational life. They identify several mechanisms through which institutional
isomorphic change occurs: coercive isomorphism, stemming from political influence and the
problem of legitimacy; mimetic isomorphism, resulting from standard responses to uncer-
tainty; and normative isomorphism, developing along with the process of
professionalization.
March and Olsen (1984) also study the influence of the institutional environment in the
decisions and actions of organizations. They claim that human actions, social contexts, and
institutions work upon each other in complicated ways, and these complex, interactive pro-
cesses of action and the formation of meaning are important to political life (March &
Olsen, 1984, p. 742). To them, institutions are neither neutral reflections of exogenous envi-
ronmental forces nor neutral arenas for the performances of individuals driven by exogenous
preferences and expectations. They disagree with the contextual and individualistic theories
of action in the institutional context, which regard organizational membersinterests as being
exogenously given. They see instead an organizations past policies, past outcomes, and the
like as being institutionalized into structures, procedures, and practices that would endoge-
nously shape members interests and identities. Members are seen as being coopted into the
organizations beliefs and commitments and socialized into organizational roles, norms,
rules, aspirations, and expectations.
How organizations plan organizational changes and whether such changes can be success-
fully implemented are greatly influenced by their institutional environments. Powell (1991)
explores four avenues of institutional reproduction that explain why institutions have the ten-
dency to resist changes. The four avenues are (a) the exercise of powerskilled institution
builders who gain power from a system of control and reproduction will typically expend
considerable effort to maintain their dominance; (b) complex interdependenciesinstitu-
tional structures and practices are very much embedded in a network of procedures and pro-
grams, the altering of which involves high switching costs; (c) taken-for-granted assump-
tionssocial patterns may reproduce themselves without active intervention when
structures and practices come to be taken for granted; and (d) path-dependent development
processesorganizational procedures and forms may preserve because of path-dependent
patterns of development in which initial choices preclude future options, including those that
would have been more effective in the long run. As Powell (1991) points out, once a particu-

lar sets of social arrangements are in place, they embody sunk costseconomic and
psychologicalthat cannot be recovered (p. 194).
In sum, Meyer and Rowan (1991) focus on how external factors force organizations to
embark on organizational changes, whereas March and Olsen (1984, 1989, 1996) and Powell
(1991) focus on how internal factors throw up obstacles and resistance to organizational
changes. These external and internal factors in ensuring the success or failure are also found
in police agencies. Below, we review two policing studies that use the institutional perspec-
tive. These studies have yielded empirical evidence to support the theoretical formations
advanced by the institutional theorists examined here. They illustrate the usefulness of insti-
tutional concepts, such as sovereigns, legitimacy, myth building, and ceremonial and ritual
activities, for explaining why police organizations adopt certain practices and establish new
units even when these practices and units would not enhance their efficiency.
Institutionalism in Policing
Crank and Langworthy (1992) see the influence of a police agency by other powerful
actors or sovereigns in the institutional environment. The survival of a police agency often
depends on whether it receives legitimacy from these sovereigns (Crank & Langworthy,
1992, p. 342). An effective way for a police agency to secure the resources for its long-term
well-being, therefore, is to establish its legitimacy by conforming to the sovereigns concep-
tualization of a police agency. As Crank and Langworthy show, the police had to use tradi-
tional titles, ranks, insignia, and uniforms because these are important symbols that provide
legitimacy in their institutional environment. Crank and Langworthys study provides empir-
ical support to Meyer and Rowans (1991) observation that organizations adopt powerful
myths to increase their legitimacy.
Specifically, the myth-building processes that ordinary organizations underwent were
also manifested in police agencies. First, many aspects of police activity and organizational
structure are linked to institutional myths derived from legal mandates. For example, deci-
sions such as Miranda v. Arizona have emphasized the individuals constitutional protections
as a legal element that police must formally incorporate into arrest activity (Crank &
Langworthy, 1992). Second, institutional myth can be derived from the interaction between a
police department and the institutional environment. Powerful police departments, police
professional associations, and executive police leadership are actively engaged in construct-
ing and shaping myths in their institutional environment. An example of how a powerful
police executive can contribute to the institutionalization of particular police practices is that
of August Vollmer and his efforts to institutionalize the Uniform Crime Reports.
Katzs (2001) study of a police departments response to its communitys gang problem
further demonstrates the potential of institutional theory in police study. Katz notes that it
was the institutional environment of the city, not the professional judgment of the chief of
police, that was responsible for the creation of the police gang unit. As many people in the
city began to see a local gang problem when public policy discussion surrounding gangs
became commonplace, city residents and community leaders (i.e., sovereigns of the police)
and certain segments of the police force began to recognize publicly that the city had a gang
problem. Consequently, it became difficult for the chief of police to ignore this problem. This
case reinforces the assertion that organizations do not create structures or engage in opera-
tional activities simply because they are more efficient or more effective . . . [instead] organi-

zational structures and operational strategies reflect the values and beliefs that are shared by
powerful actors, called sovereigns (Katz, 2001, p. 39).
We believe that an institutional perspective would also contribute to understanding the
change or attempted change of the HKP. The following theoretical formations of the institu-
tional perspective are of particular relevance to our study. First, the institutional perspective
contends that an organizations past policies, past outcomes, and the like can be institutional-
ized into structures, procedures, and practices, which endogenously shape members inter-
ests and identities. In other words, members are coopted and socialized into the organiza-
tions beliefs, commitments, roles, norms, rules, aspirations, and expectations. Second,
organizations incorporate certain practices because they are considered legitimate in the gen-
eral institutional environment, not because they are considered efficient internally by organi-
zational leaders. Related policies, programs, and ceremonies are then institutionalized.
These institutionalized policies, programs, and ceremonies function as powerful myths and
eventually become taken-for-granted means to accomplish organizational goals. Third, the
notions of institutional isomorphism and sovereigns further explain the phenomenon of orga-
nizational changes and limitations to such changes. Among the various isomorphic changes,
coercive isomorphic change sheds light on why institutions would one way or another
embark on reforms that would address the changes in their institutional environments. The
concept of sovereigns, however, demonstrates that an organization would only undertake
changes that are in conformity with values and beliefs shared by its sovereigns and would
resist changes that are in conflict with the sovereigns values and beliefs.
The thrust of institutional perspective is that organizational changes are induced externally,
and if such external factors are strong enough, changes will indeed take place. However, if they
are not strong enough, then internal institutionalized factors will succeed in obstructing the
changes. In the case of the HKP, both external environments and internal institutionalized
values have influenced its development. The public protest against police corruption in the
1970s and the recent change of sovereignty serve as examples of external impetuses for
change in the HKP. The paramilitary policing tradition and public order management orien-
tation exemplify the internal institutionalized values that have had a significant impact on its
law enforcement practices, community policing programs, and the Service Quality Initiative
(SQI). In all of these instances, we find the institutional perspective highly appropriate for
understanding the organizational changes and limitations of such changes in the HKP.
Methods and Data

The methods used for this research included mainly personal interviews and documentary
research. These methods were determined on the basis of the nature of this study, which con-
cerns organizational reforms and related changes of cultures and values institutionalized in
history. A study of this nature focuses on deeply held values and beliefs and historical analy-
sis that are not subject to questionnaire surveys. The basic approach for this study, therefore,
is qualitative and involves an analysis of HKP traditions and their impact on its current prac-
tices. For this purpose, we conducted in-depth face-to-face interviews with police officers to
obtain firsthand information about their views. We also conducted an extensive search of
HKP records and documents. Because there is a dearth of research and literature on the HKP,
much of our data on the HKP traditions were based on information developed from
interviews of veteran and retired police officers.

The research began when one of us approached the HKP for this study and asked about the
possibility of a quota sample of police officers in different divisions and ranks for interviews.
Although the sample is not random, we believe that given the opportunity to interview offi-
cers in different divisions and ranks, we would be able to develop a data representative of the
views of the HKP. This request was granted and a police officer of the rank of senior superin-
tendent from the Service Quality Wing (SQW) served as the liaison for our study. One of us
provided the liaison with a list of the divisions and stations we were interested in studying.
The liaison then provided the name and phone number of the contact person in each division
and station through whom appointments were made for interviews. We made sure that offi-
cers of all ranks, from patrol constable to assistant commissioner, were included in our sam-
ple. Although the higher ranking officials were contacted directly by one of us for interviews,
the constables were asked by their immediate supervisors to participate in the interviews.
Their supervisors, often in the rank of inspector or superintendent, helped explain the
research to them and asked for their cooperation. All constables were selected from the day
shift, but they also work in the afternoon and night shifts regularly because the HKP practices
a weekly shift rotation policy. The interviews were conducted during a 10-month period from
September 2001 to June 2002. Most of the interviews of police managers were conducted at
police offices, the Police Officers Club, or police cafeterias, with a few at one of our own
offices. Interviews with police constables occurred either during lunch breaks or immedi-
ately after work at the police stations where they reported for work. All together, 135 offi-
cially arranged interviews were completed. Among them, 53 were at the rank of inspector
and above, and 82 were constables, including 4 female police managers and 11 female street
officers. They came from 10 frontline police districts that cover all three territories of Hong
Kong and 5 management wings, including the Operations Wing, Crime Wing, Personnel
Wing, Training Wing, and SQW. The diversity in their posting, rank, and experience allows a
broad spectrum of views to be included.
In addition, we developed a subsample of 39 police managers on our own to complement
the interviews arranged through official channels. Among these officers, 12 were selected
through personal networking, and 27 were selected through snowball sampling. They either
are currently in managerial positions or have retired from the force. We differentiate personal
networking from snowball sampling because some of our informants were personal acquain-
tances and others were not. We believed that it was necessary to include this subsample
because it might provide us with a chance to compare their views with those of officers in our
quota sample, thereby informing us of the reliability of the information provided. Snowball
sampling is likely to produce a biased sample, however, as police officers are more likely to
forge a professional relationship with other officers in their cohorts. We were able to reduce
this bias by having included in the subsample both serving and retired police managers, both
expatriate and local officers, and officers with experiences working in different divisions.
Different interview guides were prepared with consideration to respondents divisions,
ranks, and experiences in the HKP. They were usually two pages in length, with about 15
open-ended questions each to remind us of the issues on which we needed to focus. To under-
stand police orientations, for instance, we asked officers to explain the Police Tactical Unit
(PTU) and their experiences serving in this unit. Although our focus is on understanding the
HKP from an institutional perspective, we did not ask any questions such as What are the
institutionalized premises of the HKP? Such questions would make hardly any sense to our
informants and therefore serve no purpose to our study. To achieve our goal, we asked them to

talk about their experiences in the force, various aspects of police work in which they have
been involved, and changes in Hong Kong society and their effects on their work. Questions
were asked also to obtain information about routine police practices, police organizational
structures, police procedures and processes, public order management, law enforcement, and
service functions.
We did not put too strong an emphasis on the interview instruments because two other
things in our view are of greater importance for in-depth interviewing in this research: estab-
lishing rapport and flexible probing. In the fieldwork for this research, real rapport was
unsurprisingly not possible with every officer, even when he or she was a casual acquain-
tance, and the degree of rapport established differed from one respondent to another. We used
probing questions liberally to clarify points and solicit further data. The extent of probing
also differed from one respondent to another not only because of the degree of rapport estab-
lished but also due to how well we were able to pick up leads and seize the moment to follow
them up. Thus, some questions raised with some respondents based on their personality,
intellectual capacity, as well as the degree of rapport established were not raised with others.
Forced probing would have been counterproductive according our experience and was
therefore not pursued.
It was made clear at the beginning of each interview that this was a study aimed at under-
standing the HKP organization and operations, its transition process during the change of
sovereignty, and the various issues related to it. The purpose of the study was to learn about
HKP experiences, inform other agencies experiencing changes and reforms, and advance
knowledge in policing in general. No information that might lead to the identification of
interviewees would be used, and only aggregative data would be analyzed. Respondents were
also informed about matters of sponsorship and funding sources. It was quite clear from the
interviewers observations that constables and lower ranking police supervisors were more
concerned about confidentiality and anonymity, as many of them explicitly enquired about
these issues before answering questions. The mid- and senior police managers were more
confident and comfortable about the interviews. All interviews were conducted at a
scheduled time and lasted anywhere from 1 to 3 hours.
As we conducted our research with an institutional perspective, we see the HKPs tradi-
tions as being institutionalized into myths, ceremonial activities, structures, processes, prac-
tices, and attitudes, and we see some changes as driven by extrainstitutional impetuses.
Hence, at the end of our fieldwork, we organized our data in accordance with these ideas.
Analysis of the data follows the usual qualitative procedure of transcribing interview notes
and organizing the data into themes and patterns that emerged during the fieldwork. The
opinions of individual officers presented in the following sections, therefore, are representa-
tive of the sample we used, unless noted otherwise. We have identified three broad themes as
a result: organizational continuities, organizational changes, and limitations to organiza-
tional changes. Organizational continuities include the traditions of the HKP and their
impact on police practices throughout time. Organizational changes include the reforms of
the HKP and the SQI. Limitations to organizational changes involve mainly the resistance
from or tensions among the rank and file during the change process.

Organizational Continuities
We find the ideas of institutionalized structures, procedures, practices, cooption, social-
ization, rationality, ceremony, myth, legitimacy, and so forth to be highly relevant for
explaining certain HKP traditions and their continuities throughout time. Most notably, these
include the paramilitary policing style, public order management emphasis, and their later
influence on law enforcement and community relations.
For more than a century, up to the early 1970s, the HKP had been a colonial force, with
overt paramilitary features and traditions. The paramilitary model is based on the control of a
hostile, usually indigenous population by an alien colonial power with the coercion of armed
forces. The principle of policing strangers (i.e., the indigenous population) by strangers (i.e.,
the police staffed by aliens) was practiced (Crisswell & Watson, 1982; Endacott, 1964,
1977). Under this principle, the HKPs primary mission was to maintain public order, and the
function of law enforcement was secondary (Anderson & Killingray, 1992; Andrade, 1985;
Tobias, 1972).
The HKPs paramilitary traditions were institutionalized through elaborate and clearly
structured units, training, and practices. In terms of organizational structure, the emergency
unit (EU) and the anti-communist squad, which was later named the special branch (SB),
were established in the wake of the 1925-1926 communist-led general strike. The EUs func-
tion was to deal with civil disturbances and to take control at the scene of major incidents. It
remains in existence today, equipped with state-of-the-art military hardware. Besides the EU,
the police training contingent (PTC) was created to provide antiriot instructions. According
to the officers interviewed, all new recruits underwent PTC training early in their career, and
serving officers received refresher training regularly. PTC graduates were assigned to serve
at local police divisions, but in an internal security (IS) situation, divisions could instantly
mobilize PTC graduates into antiriot squads. Police division stations also underwent regular
station attack dry runs.
After the 1966-1967 riots,1 the PTU was formed to replace the PTC. Today, instead of
returning to local divisions, graduates are deployed to have a tour of duty at the PTU. Thus,
the PTU has become a permanent antiriot unit, with the EU as a backup. As one superinten-
dent stated,
the career pattern for a police officer goes like this: Street police constables go to the PTU and
then to EU or traffic unit. So all EU officers have served in PTU. Every police constable has the
chance to go to the PTU at least twice. All sergeants and inspectors go there once. I have been to
the PTU and EU once as an inspector, and now I have been back to PTU and EU as a
superintendent.
Station attack dry runs have continued. Divisions continue to have the ability to be mobilized
instantly into the IS structure. Discipline, loyalty, and group solidarity are emphasized in
PTU training and deployment. Officers tend to recall with pride their PTU class and opera-
tional experiences. The sense of power gained from group patrol and militarized tactics, such
as sweeps and searches, are clearly contributors to a public order mentality among our inter-
viewees. As a respondent stated, PTU training and deployment constituted a police officers
baptism into the force. The institutionalization of the public order priority in the form of the
PTU and in the rookies socialization process reinforces the paramilitary tradition and is
inimical to a service culture.2 Throughout the decades, though the daily activities of the HKP,

3
except in politically turbulent times, were civilian in nature, its paramilitary features have
hardly been undermined. These features are reflected in such areas as structure and organiza-
tion (e.g., EU, SB, PTC, and PTU), processes (e.g., militarized training), and practices (e.g.,
station attack dry runs).
From the 1950s up until the early 1970s, despite Hong Kongs rapid economic growth, law
enforcement still generally took a backseat to public order maintenance. This was strikingly
evidenced in the tolerance of the police-Triad symbiosis by the HKPs top brass (Gaylord &
Traver, 1995; Sinclair, 1983), in which the police kept crime under control by protecting
Triad-operated vice in return for bribes paid in an organized manner and shared by locals and
Europeans alike.4 The HKPs shift later to a law enforcement orientation as part of the effort
to professionalize the police had not diluted the paramilitary traditions. The force has devel-
oped instead heavy-handed anticrime tactics, such as PTU saturation patrol, random stop and
search, and roadblocks. Carpet search of nightspots is also used, which involves in some
cases hundreds of police officers. In 1990, the commissioner reported the success of these
operations during which thousands of premises were visited by the police. The police
believed that the crime preventive and deterrent value of such measures is incalculable
(HKP, 1990, p. 5).
During discussion with a retired officer, it was mentioned to him that many ordinary
patrons were being affected by these operations. He replied that from a retrospective vantage
point, he could understand that much of what the force did is legal but not always very rea-
sonable. Most serving officers, however, share the view that such measures are necessary
and appropriate. For example, one respondent who has had extensive experience in checking
nightspots said that sometimes, we have information that certain particular patrons have
drugs on them, and if we did not forcefully take control of the situation right from the begin-
ning, it would be very difficult for us to seize the evidence. Another informant defended
such tactics by saying the following: If the police are able to pick up some criminals, I dont
think inconveniencing some innocent persons is a big deal.
Another area in which we see the impacts of institutionalized traditions is police-commu-
nity relations. The HKP has placed great emphasis on community policing by using police
substations and deploying neighborhood officers. The paramilitary tradition, however, has
cultivated a mentality that community relations are not real police work. Thus, as late as the
early 1990s, there was a virtual consensus [among senior commanders] that . . . the Force
should reduce its commitments in the Community Relations field to save its resources for
other programs (Grant, 1992, p. 109). This disregard of community relations was and still is
shared by officers of many ranks. Consequently, the mentality against police-public relations
turned the police community relations officer (PCRO) post into a sinecure (Grant, 1992).
Despite structural overhaul of the HKP in the early 1980s, the PCRO remained at chief
inspector rank, which indicated a relative demotion because other posts of the same rank
were upgraded to superintendent. As a result, the myth about what constitutes core and
noncore police duties has been developed. Operational duties that are related to public order,
crime, and law enforcement are considered core; duties in the area of community policing
and service are regarded as noncore.
One of the processes that generates rationalized myths is through laws and external pres-
sure. We find this also to be true for explaining the continuities of the HKPs traditions
throughout the years. Demonstrations, for example, had been subject to stringent restrictions
stipulated in the colonial Public Order Ordinance. Permission had to be obtained for assem-

blies of three (subsequently increased to 20) or more persons, and the use of loud hailers was
often forbidden. In terms of external pressure, the change of Hong Kongs political environ-
ment has demanded the continuity of the public order management tradition. Both Britain
and China, since they started negotiations of the handover of Hong Kong in the early 1980s,
emphasized the need to maintain Hong Kongs sociopolitical stability. The Hong Kong pub-
lic generally holds that Hong Kong has thrived economically on the basis of its post-1960s
sociopolitical stability and comparatively low crime rate. Thus, the sovereigns of the HKP
demand that it do whatever it takes to keep Hong Kong safe and stable. This demand is clearly
understood and widely accepted by the HKP. One officer stated, for example, that maintain-
ing stability is a priority because Hong Kong relies on a stable environment to develop its
economy. Another said the following:
Hong Kong people have always considered that Hong Kong should do everything it can to keep
its economy growing. Because social stability is the foundation of a good economy, maintaining
public order is a primary concern of the Hong Kong Police.
Because paramilitary police practices have been credited to the stability of Hong Kong, even
the harshest critics have been more or less acquiescent over these practices. As Ng (1995)
observes, when it comes to law and order, Hong Kong people favor a strong police force (p.
70). Ward (1989) also points out that Hong Kong people focus more on the ends of effective
policing and much less on procedural propriety. Thus, public order management has not only
been institutionalized into a basic goal of the HKP, but it has also been demanded by its
external environment.
Organizational Changes
We find the concepts of isomorphic change and sovereigns appropriate for understanding
some of the reforms and changes of the HKP, particularly the effort in fighting corruption,
professionalizing the police, and creating a service culture. The concepts of coercive isomor-
phic change and normative isomorphic change are clearly relevant to understanding the cre-
ation of an independent body against corruption and the change to professional law
enforcement in the HKP.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, several significant events occurred in the institutional
environment of the HKP. The first major event was the 1966-1967 riots. Official enquiry into
the riots revealed that widespread and syndicated police corruption was a social time bomb.
Although the Anticorruption Branch (ACB) was created within the criminal investigation
department (CID) in 1952, organized police corruption reached its peak in the 1950s and
1960s, resulting in a deep antipathy against the police (Scott, 1989). Against this back-
ground, the British government appointed Murray McLehose as the new governor in 1971.
His appointment signified Britains intent to establish the colonial regimes legitimacy.5
McLehose initiated a series of social reforms for this purpose (Lo, 1993). Under the govern-
ments pressure, the HKP was forced to separate the ACB from the CID and upgrade it to the
Anticorruption Office (ACO). Given 3 years to produce results, the ACO was much more
assertive than its predecessor and discovered a major corruption case involving Chief Super-
intendent Peter Godber, then deputy commander of Kowloon. But Godber managed to flee
Hong Kong, an escape that sparked massive public outcry and street protests (Lo, 1993).

Meanwhile, in 1972, the management consultants McKinsey and Co. were engaged to
look into civil service reform in Hong Kong. Its report revealed that a sizable portion of the
community hated the police (Grant, 1992, p. 70). Hence, if the colonial regime was to suc-
cessfully establish its legitimacy, reform of the HKP was imperative. The sovereigns of the
HKP, most notably the colonial government and the general public, all saw the need to reform
the HKP. Governor MacLehose saw no reason to further delay the reform process and pro-
ceeded on two fronts. First, taking advantage of the Godber scandal, he set up the Independ-
ent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974 despite the HKPs objection (Lo, 1993).
Soon after its establishment, the ICAC adopted a zero tolerance policy and prosecuted orga-
nized corruption syndicates one police station after another. Second, the HKP was pushed to
adopt several major reform schemes borrowed from the London Metropolitan Police.
With the ICAC taking a more proactive approach, the police-Triad symbiosis began to dis-
integrate. For this reason, among others, the violent crime rate soared (Traver, 1991). In
1973, the government set up the Fight Violent Crime Committee at the district level, which
became the Fight Crime Committee (FCC) in 1975. As a policy steering group whose deci-
sions are binding on the HKP, the FCC continues to function at present. The importance
attached to fighting crime by the government was a direct result of the breakup of the police-
Triad symbiotic relationship. This breakup obviously did not mean the disappearance of the
Triads; it only meant that the Triads would now have to be kept under control by normal law
enforcement means.
Consequently, because of these major events in the HKPs institutional environment, law
enforcement, previously a secondary priority, acquired increasing importance in the HKP.
Taking advantage of the communitys concern of the increased crime rate, the HKP was also
able to increase its manpower significantly.6 With increased resources and emphasis on law
enforcement, the HKP began a long campaign to further professionalize its capabilities. In
the early 1980s, the HKP overhauled its organizational structure. The previous territorial
structure that comprised the district (three land and one marine), division, and subdivision
was replaced by region (six land and one marine), district, and division. The rank structure
was also expanded with a general upgrading of posts. The professionalization of law enforce-
ment, which involves fighting corruption, fighting crime, and upgrading personnel and
equipment, has been a subtle but significant change process. By the 1980s, the HKP has
steadily transformed itself from a force with organized corruption to a professional force that
emphasizes law enforcement. As one police commander commented, The force experi-
enced great changes over the years. The 70s are anticorruption years, the 80s are equipment
years with modernization and pay rises, and the 90s are the service years.
The HKPs institutional environment changed again in 1989 when the government
embarked on a government-wide public sector reform. The colonial governments effort to
reform its public sector reached its peak when Chris Patten, a veteran British politician, was
sworn in as the last colonial governor in 1992. To exit the Hong Kong political scene with dig-
nity and glory, the Patten administration intended to speed up the pace of Hong Kongs politi-
cal reform on one hand and make the government more accountable to the public and more
responsive to its needs on the other. Patten expected his administration to treat the public as
clients, not supplicants, and campaigned for a customer-based service culture in public
administration (Hui, 2001). All government departments, including the HKP, were obliged to
conform to Pattens reform program. Pattens public sector and political reform initiatives
have significantly altered the HKPs institutional environment. First, the Legislative Council,

with a greater number of directly elected legislators, has become a far more assertive and
aggressive legislature and was more ready to challenge the practices of the HKP. Second, the
more open Hong Kong society has facilitated the growth of civil societies, from the relatively
moderate to the street-fighting radicals. These civil societies demanded the relaxation of the
HKP control on peoples right to public procession and assembly. Third, the Hong Kong pub-
lic has become more willing to complain about the HKP. Thus, the number of formal
complaints received by the HKP has risen in recent years. As one officer said,
we get all sorts of complaints now, from people being searched, for being stuck in a traffic jam,
for bad manners, for foul language, for sitting in a restaurant for more than 15 minutes, for not
getting directions, and so on.
One of the police practices that causes the most public complaints is street-level stop and
search conducted routinely by patrol officers.
In this climate, the goal of the HKP reform was to transform itself from a force to a service.
Faced with increased street-level political activities and public complaints against the HKP,
the HKP top management believes that the SQI can serve as one of the measures that would
enable the HKP to maintain confidence from one of its sovereigns, the Hong Kong public. A
view shared throughout the ranks in the HKP is that the SQI is needed because of the publics
increasing concern about democracy and human rights. As the former commissioner under
whom the SQI was launched stated, in a free society like Hong Kong, it is crucial that the
police operate with the consent and trust of the people (Hui, 2001, pp. 168-169). As one offi-
cer observed, Hong Kong people were ready for democracy during the 1980s. . . . People
started to complain about mistreatment by the government and became more vocal about
police abuse. As a result, the Hong Kong Police have become more courteous. Another said
the following: Hong Kong society has become more democratic. . . . Members of the public
no longer accept uncivil and authoritarian police attitudes and behaviors. And another
agreed, saying that in todays society, people are more educated and more concerned about
their civil rights. They will not simply obey the police.
The concepts of superstructure and substructure and sovereigns are clearly applicable to
the changes of the HKP in this context because the changes have occurred mostly in its
superstructural level to meet the substructural objective of acquiring resources and protecting
domain and because they reflect the values and beliefs of some sovereigns that are strong
enough to influence police policies and decisions. The SQW, which can be viewed as a super-
structure, was created for developing and implementing a series of SQIs. The SQW devel-
oped the Force Strategy on Quality of Service and a series of awareness road shows and video
presentations. Two documents, Force Vision and Statement of Common Purpose and Values
(HKP, 1996), collectively known in the force as the values, were promulgated. Until the time
of this study, the SQW had held three force-wide series of living the values workshops.
To institutionalize the values in the force, especially among new recruits, the recruit police
constable syllabus was revised. Previously, the focus was on legalistic education, weapons
training, IS, and military drills. Only a few percentage of the syllabus was devoted to subjects
of police-public relations, effective communication, volunteer community work, and current
affairs. In the new syllabus, new or extra sessions were added to cover such subjects as the
values, the Bill of Rights, and current affairs discussion. There are also plans to add one ses-
sion on Customers We Are Facing, Internal and External and another on Conflict Man-

agement. The subject communication skills would also be revised to focus on practicing cus-
tomer service (HKP, 1998, 1999, 2002). In the meantime, the police have adopted a new
motto: We serve with pride and care.
As a result of these SQIs, the HKPs internal communication system has become more
transparent. Local commanders reserve regular time periods to allow police officers to walk
in and talk about issues of their concern. Senior commanders also make unannounced visits
to formations during which junior officers can skip the hierarchy and directly express their
views. Democracy walls, boards where staff can post their views, have been installed in
police stations. Force-wide surveys have been done to gauge officer perceptions and concerns
of the HKP. As one divisional commander stated, When I first joined the force, theres no
intracommunication. Its a disciplined force and we received orders. Now we have open
forums. An inspector also said that
the Hong Kong Police have changed a lot culturally from a paramilitary force to a service-ori-
ented force. . . . We created a lot of new jobs for ourselves because of the changes. Whatever
crimes are mentioned in the media must be attended to immediately. Whatever the public com-
plains on paper must be dealt with immediately. We are doing a lot more work than we used to.
We have a lot more paperwork, too. . . . There are things in the force that I couldnt even imagine
when I first joined the police, such as communication, customer service, etcetera. Its like
running a business now.
Externally, three public opinion surveys and two customer satisfaction surveys have been
conducted to evaluate the level of public confidence in the force and satisfaction with its per-
formance. Changes such as these, however, have occurred largely at the superstructural level
in response to the real or perceived demands of sovereigns of the HKP.
Limitations to Organizational Changes

In our analysis, we find institutional complexity, taken-for-granted assumptions, and psy-
chological sunk costs, as well as rationalized myths and sovereigns, particularly relevant for
understanding the limitations and resistance to change. In the HKP, as discussed earlier, the
paramilitary traditions have been institutionalized into premises, structures, processes, and
practices. Frontline operational duties are embedded in these institutionalized elements.
Many officers, therefore, continue to see their traditional public order and law enforcement
duties as the core part of their police work. The institutionalization of the paramilitary orien-
tation into the HKPs organizational structures and practices has resulted in a heavy-handed
law enforcement approach. This approach in turn has nurtured rituals that are antithetical to
the establishment of a service culture and has created taken-for-granted assumptions and
psychological sunk costs that hinder the formation of a police personality favorable to the
service orientation.
Because institutionalized values, rituals, and practices are followed by police officers
without question, they are difficult to change. One officer said, for instance, that the Station
Improvement Project7 is cosmetic only. Thats the easy part, changing police attitude towards
the public is the hard part. Another agreed, saying that were now polite towards ordinary
citizens. . . . But thats only on the surface. Deep down, theres no concept of service. Its
something thats very hard to acquire. A third informant put it in this way: Were a very
severe force. If we dont like you, we take you off the street. We are very effective in taking

out the bad guys. The attitude of most police officers, according to a fourth informant, is that
the police are the police, if we have to arrest you, we arrest you, and nothing more needs to
be said. Overall, skepticism about the viability of consumerism in policing and the cog-
nitive inability to change among some high-ranking and experienced police officers are well
documented (So, 1999, pp. 75-77). The resistance to change is in a certain way quite similar
to difficulties in reform experienced by many other police agencies (Bennett, 1994; Dixon &
Stanko, 1993; Guyot, 1991; Lurigio & Rosenbaum, 1994).
The SQI, therefore, has not been viewed favorably and has not enjoyed wide support from
the rank-and-file members of the HKP despite the superstructural adoption of this strategy.
From our interviews, we have learned that many officers at the frontline, inspectorate, and
superintendent levels are skeptical about SQI. Frontline officers are often more vocal about
their criticisms of the emphasis on service. One officer stated, for instance, that the police
should first fight crimes. If serving the community becomes the most important goal, its like
putting the cart in front of the horse. Another said the following: Most officers do not
believe theyre there to provide services. A third remarked that policing should never
become a form of service industry. A fourth commented that its not realistic to say all are
our clients. Criminals are clearly not our clients. A fifth added that we should go back to
more traditional police practices. Service quality reduces law and orders importance.
The HKP management also experiences great difficulties in changing the police culture.
As one police inspector stated, Were all adjusting to this greater emphasis on service . . . but
how to win the hearts and minds of officers is a serious challenge. One of the strategies used
for this purpose is to democratize internal police communication. This strategy, however, has
adversely affected discipline according to some police managers. One divisional commander
complained, for example, that new recruits now only know about their right to input without
understanding their duty to follow orders. He said that the force will have to strike a balance
between discipline and staff input.
It appears that increased public complaints in recent years have also hurt the police morale,
especially at the street level, because the frontline officers stand the highest risk of being
complained against. Repeated complaints have led many of them to feel that they have lost
respect and authority from the public. One officer said, for example, that citizens today no
longer regard police as authorities. Another added that even children have less respect for
the police now and treat us as ordinary citizens. A third lamented that we have become ser-
vants on the street, have no respect, no power. In addition, some frontline officers feel
demoralized because they believe that the force management is not defending them against
frivolous complaints because of its focus on the SQI. As one officer stated, No matter which
way the complaint turns out, our upper level does not like it. Another, Sometimes, its the
publics fault. Some people just want to challenge the police and create problems. Top man-
agement shouldnt pay too much attention to complaint figures. They should look at the sub-
stance of the complaints. A third said that we had higher morale in the past, but lots of con-
cerns and fears now due to more complaints and less support.
Instead of appreciating the significance of the SQI at a time of change, many frontline offi-
cers see the increased difficulty in their job as being brought about by the SQI. In their view, it
has weakened police authority because of the many complaints and other problems associ-
ated with it. One officer expressed the view of many when he said the following: Weve
increased service quality, but paid a price at the same time. We arent as proud of being police
officers as we used to. Commenting on the disciplinary and morale problems, one chief

superintendent stated that I think the policy has gone too far. Its undermining the force. Its
not good for the policeand not for the public, either.
Besides the issues of discipline and morale under the SQI, the HKP has to face up to the
tension between law enforcement and the SQI. Being committed to the SQI, the top manage-
ment may see no disagreement between them. Expressing this view, one senior officer said
that we enforce the law and provide services. These are two essential elements of police
work. They arent contradictory at all. Another concurred that we provide quality service to
some and law enforcement to others. In reality, however, the distinction between those who
should receive service and those who should have the law enforced on them is not always
clear cut. Many officers seem to have experienced serious stress between these two empha-
ses. As one officer stated, Police officers are enforcers. We offend people no matter how
good our service quality is.
As far as the concept of sovereigns is concerned, there is a paradox between the current
prevalence of complaints and the publics dispositional deference to police authority in law
enforcement. As a senior expatriate officer stated, People in Hong Kong generally hold
police officers in high regard. Once we are on the scene, people usually calm down and are
obedient. Another recently retired British officer remarked that in Britain, the police
address the public as sir, here, to the contrary, its the public who address the police as ah
sir [a Cantonese way of speech]. One striking illustration of this concerns illegal street
vending. Arresting hawkers was once done by the police but has long been transferred to
hawker control teams of the government department responsible for food and hygiene.
Although these teams have full legal power in making an arrest, they sometimes meet with
vigorous and even violent resistance from the hawkers. Hence, police escort is sometimes
requested in such operations. Though police possess no more power than the hawker control
teams, when police escort is present, the operations invariably proceed more smoothly. The
prevalence of complaints, therefore, does not indicate a significant change in the publics
dispositional deference to police authority or a serious demand for a service culture.
Further evidence to this point is offered in the HKPs public opinion surveys in 1999 and
2001, in which respondents were asked to indicate the three most important police functions.
The top five areas mentioned in both years were all related to law and order, crime, and public
order. Given that the HKP is held in high regard by the majority of respondents in its law
enforcement performance, it is appropriate to say that the HKP enjoys the consent and trust of
its sovereigns, at least in the core areas of policing. In todays Hong Kong society, the police
must be careful not to abuse their powers in ordinary daily encounters with the public. This
requires politeness and patience, but this is not the same as treating the public as customers.
To the extent that complaints against the police are part and parcel of the wider complaint cul-
ture perhaps more incurred by the larger political and economic environment, the SQI may
not be the most critical factor in reducing the public complaints.
Discussion
This article analyzed the transformation or attempted transformation of the HKP from an
institutional perspective. We began with an introduction of the paramilitary foundation of the
HKP, with reference to the general features of the paramilitary policing model. There existed
in the early days certain fundamental principles, such as policing strangers by strangers. Pub-
lic order management was institutionalized as a primordial mission of the HKP. But many of

HKPs institutional myths evolved through a long process of institutionalization. One source
of its institutional myths is the interplay between HKPs early fundamental principles and its
external environmental impetus. For instance, the creation of the EU was triggered by the
1925-1926 general strike.
The institutional perspective sees institutionalization as constraining change and empha-
sizes the role of external impetus in inducing change, with change being understood as a
result of the interplay between these two aspects. Our account of the HKP renders further
support to this relationship. For instance, we noted that the HKP vigorously rejected the idea
of creating an independent body to investigate police corruption. Instead, it created the ACB
under the CID unit. In response to the increasing public demand for stronger anticorruption
measures, the HKP later separated ACB from CID and upgraded it to the ACO. However,
such a tactic was no longer adequate to meet the public demand in the early 1970s because of
a huge public outcry sparked by the Godber scandal. The HKP had to concede eventually to
the idea of establishing an anticorruption institution independent from the HKP. The HKPs
concession supports the notion of coercive isomorphism, which states that institutional iso-
morphic changes take place when an institution is suffering from a severe legitimacy problem
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). The legitimacy of the HKP, especially its credibility in fighting
police corruption, was severely undermined by the Godber scandal, a vivid example of syndi-
cated police corruption. Riding on the huge public outcry, the colonial government exerted
tremendous political pressure on the HKP to give in to the idea of an independent
anticorruption organization. Consequently, the ICAC, which was directly accountable to the
governor, was created in 1974.
When the external pressure to change is of less magnitude as fighting police corruption,
however, there would be more room for the police in which to maneuver. A case in point is
how the HKP meets the demand for better police-public relations on one hand and more
crime prevention on the other. Following its paramilitary traditions, the HKP developed coer-
cive anticrime practices. The HKPs approach to crime control eventually led to the degrada-
tion of its police-public relations campaign, despite the importance placed on it by the Hong
Kong government. Such a process is commonly referred to as sedimentation (Tolbert &
Zucker, 1996), and it reflects the HKPs effort to defend its myth as much as it possibly can.
Of the four kinds of resistance to change from the institutional perspective (Powell, 1991),
we found neither the exercise of power nor complex interdependencies nor path dependency
to be of great significance in understanding the HKPs transformation or attempted transfor-
mation. Taken-for-granted assumptions, however, are clearly evidenced in our fieldwork;
although some respondents show normative commitment to such things as what constitutes
real police work. The effect of institutionalization on the mentality of organizational mem-
bers, which is not considered by Powell (1991) and March and Olsen (1984, 1989, 1996), has
also been illustrated in our analysis by the officers inimical attitude toward the SQI.
In Brint and Karabels (1991) view, much of institutional analysis focuses on institutional
form and functioning to the point where institutional origins and transformations (p. 338)
are overlooked. Our study provides a rare case that encompasses all of these aspects, from
origins (i.e., the process of institutionalization itself), transformation and resistance to trans-
formation, and form (e.g., structures and processes) to functioning (e.g., the shaping of police
mentality). The HKP was created originally to protect the colonial regime and manage public
order. Crime control was not a priority. The transformation occurred when the HKP engaged
in changes to a modern professional law enforcement agency and later to a service-oriented

policy agency. Because of its origins and the developed structures and processes, such as the
EU, the PTU, and quasi-military training, there has been great resistance to the
institutionalization of a service-oriented culture. In short, the police officers remain more
committed to public order and crime control and view them as core police work.
The institutional perspective also sheds light on why the HKP has only limited success at
introducing the SQI at the superstructural level. The SQI can be interpreted as the manifesta-
tion of a police organizations tactic to acquire resources and protect its domain (Mastrofski,
Ritti, & Hoffmaster, 1987). In the changing environment of the HKP, the police would either
take the initiative to make the necessary changes themselves or be compelled by their sover-
eigns to adopt institutional forms and practices that may be antithetical to their values. HKP
management has the foresight to take the former approach: to be proactive in developing a
culture of service. Many rank-and-file police officers, however, see the SQI as cosmetic or
not legitimate police work. Some fear that the strong emphasis placed on the SQI would take
away their authority and even cause them to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Crank &
Langworthy, 1992).
It is clear that the HKPs traditions have been institutionalized into basic values, beliefs,
goals, and attitudes. The rank-and-file officers anxieties regarding the SQI can be attributed
to the institutionalized paramilitary traditions of the HKP. Every officer of the HKP has
undergone PTU training and served at the PTU at least twice throughout his or her career.
Although PTU deployment normally does not involve dealing with serious disorder, the
sense of power gained from group patrol and militarized tactics, such as sweeps and searches,
has sustained a strong public order mentality among officers. A police officer is thus effec-
tively socialized into the traditional values and practices of the HKP. HKP management
needs to make substantial changes to the contents of this socialization process to develop a
culture of service.
Because of the limited scale of the present research in comparison to the broad scope of its
subject matter, it is natural that our analysis remains coarse grained. Much further research on
the concepts and theories used in this research is necessary. For instance, although the exter-
nal impetuses for change in both 1974 and 1995 are clearly laid out, we could not examine the
exact manner in which this external impact occurred. Moreover, in analyzing how the HKPs
institutionalized traditions shaped the adoption of paramilitary anticrime tactics, the present
study is confined to examining the issue related to the outcome of that process. A finer
grained analysis, following the contention of March and Olsen (1984), would require
detailed archival research and oral histories from key individuals involved in the process. The
accounts of these key individuals would shed light on how the police officers are being insti-
tutionalized into the norms, rules, and aspirations of the HKP. Furthermore, as noted by insti-
tutional theorists (Meyer & Rowan, 1991), powerful organizations do play active roles in
shaping their institutional contexts. They would attempt to build their goals and procedures
directly into society as institutional rules. As the largest government department in Hong
Kong and the dominant force in maintaining domestic law and order, the HKP is certainly a
powerful organization. The accounts of key HKP officials, if available, would yield further
insights into how a powerful institution attempts to shape its institutional environment.

Conclusion
This study uses the institutional perspective to study how the HKP responded to changes
in its institutional environment. We noted that the paramilitary traditions of the HKP were
institutionalized when it was a police force on which the colonial regime relied for public
order management. These institutionalized myths of the HKP have always been influential in
the later stages of its development. When the HKP incorporated the law enforcement func-
tion into its mission in the 1970s, it adopted a coercive crime control approach. When Gover-
nor Pattens customer-based public service reform and the SQI of the HKP were launched,
the HKPs paramilitary rituals and practices undermined the prospect of a service culture. It
can be concluded also that the change in the HKPs environment from a British colony to a
Chinese special administrative region has not had a significant impact in altering these
institutionalized values.
Overall, the institutional perspective as applied to the case of the HKP illustrates how the
institutional environment affects the practices and behaviors of a major police organization
and its responses to external challenges. Nonetheless, this study has been constrained by the
lack of a better understanding of the manners in which external impact actually occurred, the
process of institutionalization, and the role of the HKP in shaping its institutional contexts.
Because institutionalized myths and external impetuses may be different in different loca-
tions, researchers and practitioners should use caution in generalizing the responses of the
HKP to changes and challenges in its institutional environment to other police organizations.
Notes
1. These riots were triggered originally by the increase in the fare of the Star Ferry and later directed at the
authoritarian colonial regime. They resulted in bloody clashes between the protesters and the police before the
unrest was quelled.
2. Ip (1990, pp. 68-69) found that police officers having gone through PTU training are more likely to opt for
the use of power and authority.
3. We define civilian police work negatively to include all work that is not related to public order and crime.
4. The highest ranking officer subsequently charged with and convicted of a corruption offence was an expatri-
ate assistant commissioner who was commander of one of the three land districts into which the colony was then
divided.
5. McLehose was appointed from the Diplomatic Corps, unlike his predecessors, who were all appointed from
the colonial service bureaucracy, and he was a committed member of the British Labor Party, which was a socialist
party in the early 1970s.
6. The HKPs size was increased by 71% from 1971 to 1981 in comparison to the increase of 62% from 1961 to
1971 and 63% from 1951 to 1961 (calculated from figures cited in Gaylord & Traver, 1995). This compares to a
population growth of 30.7% from 1961 to 1971 and 27.3% from 1971 to 1981 (calculated from official
statistics).
7. This refers to the refurbishing of police stations beginning in 1997 as part of the effort to become more ser-
vice oriented.
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Allan Y. Jiao is a professor and chair of the department of law and justice studies at Rowan University. He has
recently published articles on policing models, police orientations, police culture, and planned change. His cur-
rent research interests include policing and comparative criminal justice issues.
Raymond W. K. Lau is an assistant professor at the School of Arts and Social Sciences at The Open University of
Hong Kong, China. His published papers range from Bourdieus concept of habitus to sociopolitical control in
China. He has been researching policing since 2000.
Percy Lui is a lecturer at the School of Arts and Social Sciences at The Open University of Hong Kong. His cur-
rent research interests include organization theory, bureaucratic accountability, ethics in public administration,
comparative civil service systems, and government and politics in Hong Kong.

An Institutional Analysis of Organizational Change-The Case of The H Kong Police-Lau y Lui

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The Case of the Hong Kong Police

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An Institutional Perspective of Organizational Change

Institutionalism in Organizational Study

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Methods and Data

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Limitations to Organizational Changes

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