Zhou Yongkang and the

Recent Police Reform in China

Fu Hualing
University of Hong Kong, PR China

T his article is an attempt to understand the conflicting imperatives of

police reform and the underlying constraints affecting it in a one-
party state. When China entered the 21st century, police abuse of
powers was a conspicuous national problem. Facing mounting public
outcry, as crystallised in the series of scandals before 2003, the police,
under the leadership of the powerful new Minister, started a nationwide
campaign to control police abuses. The article analyses the competing
explanations for police abuses in China and the conflicting demands
placed on the police in Chinas social and economic transition.The article
concludes that the ultimate restriction on police reform in China is its
politicisation. As long as China remains an authoritarian state, which uses
police to maintain its political stability, the police will still be unable to be
truly responsive and accountable to public need.

Since 1978, the police in China have undergone continuous reform. The scope of
the reform is broad, covering not only the relationship between the police and the
ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the substantive and procedural aspects of
police powers, and the mechanisms of accountability, but also police budget alloca-
tion and internal organisations. While these reform programs vary in their speed,
scope and intensity, they have become a constant, perpetual and permanent feature
of the police in post-Mao China. Police reform intensified when Zhou Yongkang, a
powerful leader of the CCP, became the Minister of the Ministry of Public Security
(MPS) in late 2002 and started his crusade against police abuse of power. His
crusade gained greater impetus in 2003 as a result of several police scandals.
Police abuse of powers was a conspicuous national problem in China at the start
of the 21st century. Largely due to the frequent exposure of police scandals on
Chinas active Internet, the police became the least liked institution in China and
frequently ranked at the bottom of all government institutions. The public treated
police with ridicule and hostility. Like police in other societies in transition
(Shelley, 1996; Wolfe, 1992), Chinas police have been experiencing an identity
and legitimacy crisis.
This article is an attempt to understand the conflicting imperatives and the
underlying constraints affecting police reform in a one-party state. Through the

Address for correspondence: Fu Hualing, Associate Professor and Director, Centre for
Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, PR
China. E-mail: hlfu@hku.hk

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 241

VOLUME 38 NUMBER 2 2005 PP. 241253
Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015
 FU HUALING

examination of the continuing police reform under Zhou Yongkang, the article
analyses the demands placed on the police in Chinas social and economic transi-
tion as well as the competing explanations for police abuse. This article also studies
the process by which the police strategically use police scandals to manipulate
public opinion to their own institutional interests, and effectively turn police
reform into police empowerment.

Police Reform in a One-Party State

There are competing imperatives in reforming Chinas police. On the one hand,
continuing social and economic reforms over the past 20 years have placed increas-
ingly heavy pressure on the political and legal systems. While the political and legal
institutions have undergone significant changes during the reform years, these insti-
tutions, the police included, are strained and barely able to adapt to the vibrant
economy and society today. Social and economic progress in China has given rise to
an increasing demand for professionalism, institutional autonomy and procedural
justice in the criminal justice system and to a growth in the general public cogni-
sance of their rights. On the other, China remains a Communist authoritarian state,
and ultimately, the CCP rules by force. The police play a critical role in maintain-
ing social order and political stability under the CCP rule.
Over the past two decades, the police have undergone important reform. First, the
CCP has been distancing itself from the police, allowing police professionalism and
autonomy to grow. Broadly, the nature and functions of the police are being shifted
from police suppression under a dictatorship to law enforcement and public services.
The rhetoric of police as a dictatorial instrument of the CCP is openly criticised as
leftist and there is a consensus that as society becomes more pluralistic, the role of the
police needs to be diversified (Brewer et al., 1996; Fu, 1994; Tanner, 2005).
As the CCP shifts its priority from revolution to modernisation, the police are
bound to play a supporting role in protecting economic development. Power is being
redistributed within the CCPs political and legal portfolio, and the political status of
the police has been declining. The direct result is that the police have become less
influential within the political and legal system and have gradually become more
accountable to other legal institutions, such as the procuratorate and court.
The CCP is well aware of the broad police powers, the prevalence of the abuses,
and the strong public anger and hostility toward the police, and has taken several
decisive measures to control the police over the last two decades. It has restricted
the jurisdictions of the police in political, economic and moral matters; placed
limits on the extensive powers of detention; imposed procedural constraints on
police powers; and created limited rights for criminal suspects and their legal
advisors. The CCP has also given the procuratorate and the court limited supervi-
sory powers over the police and allowed citizens certain legal remedies against
police abuse of powers through judicial reviews and state compensation (Chen,
2004; Fu, 1994, 2001).
China is developing a regularised policing and criminal justice system, in which
the emerging bureaucratic system operates according to legal procedures and institu-
tional positions. This system, despite the drawbacks and abuses, is characterised by
relative institutional autonomy and increased professionalism. Police powers are

242 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015

 ZHOU YONGKANG AND THE RECENT POLICE REFORM IN CHINA

increasingly contained and police are made accountable to constitutional and legal
institutions. The growing economy is creating a middle class and a vibrant society
that demands rights. International pressures, through the mechanism of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and others, will, in the long term, add momentum to the development of
accountable and democratic policing.
There is, however, an arbitrary policing and criminal justice system, alongside
the regularised system, which is periodically superimposed by the CCP on the
routine criminal justice process. When that occurs, the criminal justice institutions,
police in particular, lose their institutional autonomy, and the institutional mandate
gives way to the political imperatives. There is a sudden political takeover of the
criminal justice system.
Political control of the police is a key feature in Communist states (Bayley,
1985). Police are a highly politicised institution in China and put under the
CCPs absolute leadership (Fu, 1994). While the police may have been able to
develop a limited degree of autonomy, they are still in the firm grasp of the CCP.
The CCP controls the appointment of the chief of police and his management
team, determines the priority of police work and sets the agenda in police work.
Whenever the CCP perceives that crime and disorder are posing threats to social
stability and challenging the Partys legitimacy, it will mobilise the police to act
swiftly and harshly to combat these challenges, disregarding most of the legal
requirements developed by the routine system (Tanner 2000; Trevaskes, 2003).
The police have traditionally performed this role and can be expected to maintain
this role in the future.

The Minister, the Scandals and the Reform

Zhou Yongkang holds multiple key positions within the CCP and the govern-
ment, unprecedented in post-Mao China. A powerful Minister in the MPS is
important in three aspects. First, he has access to key CCP/State leaders so that
his reform agenda and policies would be endorsed by the highest authorities in
China. Public security has been a sensitive issue, especially when stability is the
overriding consideration. Important reform involving the police will need the
endorsement of the highest authority before implementation, and this necessitates
direct and efficient communication between the MPS and the higher authorities.
Second, police reform touches upon a wide range of issues and requires coordi-
nation and support from other central institutions, if only to avoid possible
intransigence. Key to Chinas legal structure of the criminal justice system is insti-
tutional pluralism, in the sense that no institution is superior to the others. The
Supreme Peoples Procuratorate and the Supreme Peoples Court could exert
meaningful control over the police if the laws were to be closely followed. Reform
of the police will inevitably affect other institutions and a powerful Minister
could prevent the other institutions from interfering with the reform process.
Third, and most importantly, centrally made reform policies need to be enforced
at the local level. The political accountability of the police is complicated. In
essence, the police are directly accountable to the local CCP committees. Local
CCP committees appoint and remove police officers and local government finances

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 243

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015
 FU HUALING

the police. Public security is a local matter. Therefore, the successful enforcement of
centrally made reform policies depends on the support of, or at least compliance of,
the CCP committees at the local levels.
The catalyst for Zhou Yongkangs reform was the exposure of a series of police
scandals after he assumed office as Minister. The media, the Internet in particular, have
become particularly active in exposing police scandals. In 2002 and 2003, media
exposures of police scandals were unprecedented in both quantity and quality: they
were extensive, ranging from petty corruption and routine brutality to the most
conscience-shocking abuse and dereliction of duties, and were also in-depth, penetrat-
ing, thought-provoking and highly critical. The public outcry generated by the exposure
of scandals was indeed overwhelming. The cases of Sun Zhigang and Li Siyi in particu-
lar enraged the public and attracted the attention of the central authorities. These were
rare occasions in which public opinions led directly to government actions.
Sun Zhigang was a 27-year-old graphic designer at Guangzhou. On March 17,
2003, Sun went to an Internet bar. On the way, local police stopped and detained
him because he did not have a temporary residence permit as required by the
provincial and the citys regulations. He was interrogated in the police station by an
officer named Li Yaohui, who also denied Suns request to have his identity verified.
In the following three days, Sun was moved to three different places. On March 20,
Sun Zhigang was beaten to death by cellmates (The Truth, 2003).
Li Siyi was a 3-year-old girl who lived with her mother in Chengdu, Sichuan
province. Her mother was a drug addict, who supported herself and Siyi by stealing
from supermarkets. In the afternoon of June 4, 2003, her mother abandoned Siyi at
home and went to a supermarket to steal. As usual, she locked the door from the
outside. The mother was caught by the security guards of the supermarket for stealing
and picked up by two police officers. During police interrogation, the police suspected
that Li took drugs and a urine test supported their suspicion. Under Chinese law, a
person who tests positive will be deemed a drug addict and will be subjected to
compulsory drug rehabilitation at the persons own cost. With the approval of an
officer in charge, Wan Xin, the police decided to commit Li for compulsory drug
rehabilitation, without making effective arrangements for Siyi as her mother
requested. Sixteen days later, Siyis neighbours reported to the police that a stench
was emanating from the apartment where Siyi lived. The police entered and found
the highly decomposed body of the 3-year-old girl on the floor, and scratch marks
from her fingers on the door. She died of starvation (Xu, 2003).
The death of Sun Zhigang and Li Siyi caused emotional outbursts nationwide.
Most especially, Siyis death shocked the conscience of the nation. Under tremen-
dous public pressures and direct instruction of senior Party and state leaders, includ-
ing Zhou Yongkang, the local CCP moved quickly to punish officers who were
implicated in the cases, leading to the reprimand, demotion and dismissal of dozens
of police officers. Li Yaohui and Wang Xin, the two officers directly responsible for
the respective cases were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.

The People Factor

Zhous reforms are fundamentally consistent with those initiated by his predecessors,
and there is no radical departure from the reform predating Zhous appointment.

244 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015

 ZHOU YONGKANG AND THE RECENT POLICE REFORM IN CHINA

The CCP, and to a lesser degree, the police management, takes an individualistic
approach, the people factor, in explaining police abuses.
The people factor, that is, the individual education, characteristics and quality a
police officer has, becomes the focal point in explaining police abuse of power. The
low quality of individual officers at the basic level is blamed for the steady decline of
the reputation and authority of the police. Much of the reform effort in 2003
focused on the poor quality of individual officers: their incompetence, their sense of
privilege, their indifference and hostility to the public they are expected to serve,
their corruption and their neglect of duties.
The first reform measure taken by Zhou was the enforcement of the Five
Prohibitions1 in early 2003. The Five Prohibitions aimed at misconduct most likely
to be gateways for crimes and most likely to offend the general public. The combi-
nation of alcohol, cars and guns is recipe for trouble. Gambling, often chronic, has
also become fertile ground for police corruption and a leading cause of the decline
in police quality. As the MPS noted in its explanations of the Five Prohibitions, the
five prohibited behaviour problems were a deep-rooted disease of the police that
has led to systemic police misconduct (Wang, 2003).
The Five Prohibitions are referred to as iron rules because they are short, precise,
unqualified and allow little discretion in implementation. They differ from other
normative rules in China, which are normally general, abstract, ambiguous, largely
discretionary and difficult to enforce. The punishment provided under the Five
Prohibitions is harsh, certain and mandatory, with dismissal being the mandatory
penalty for most of the offending activities. The massive Five Prohibitions
campaign led to the investigation of 738 cases, involving 988 officers for violating
the Five Prohibitions in 2003. Three hundred and eighty-seven officers were
dismissed for their violations (988 Police Officers, 2004).
The continuing Five Prohibitions campaign has been successful largely due to
the ability of Zhou to gather political support outside the police force and to
demonstrate to the police that he can make a difference. The Five Prohibitions
received endorsement from the highest CCP authorities before implementation.
The support the police received from regional CCP committees and government
authorities was also impressive. In cases in which the police met resistance from the
local authorities, the personal intervention of Minister Zhou, armed with the
endorsement from the key political leaders in China, became crucial in actually
meting out the punishment.
As the Five Prohibitions campaign continued, Zhou Yongkang expanded his
rectification campaign within the police. After securing support from the CCP, the
MPS issued the order in August 2003 to remove nonpolice personnel from law
enforcement posts. Within the three months from August to November 2003, the
police removed more than 30,000 auxiliary officers from law enforcement duties,
effectively banning nonpolice from performing many types of police work. Most
significantly, the police also terminated the contracts of more than 10,000 auxiliary
officers who were of low quality and deemed not suitable for police work (988
Police Officers, 2004).
A momentum was created to tame the police, and measures taken by the MPS
were replicated and amplified in the provinces. While the Five Prohibitions targeted
the most offensive individual behaviours, provincial public security departments

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 245

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015
 FU HUALING

promulgated, mostly in August 2003, more rules aimed at preventing both abusive
and profiteering activities of the police, including torture and unlawful detention.
The pressure that police have to bear has been tremendous. Especially after the
exposure of the Sun Zhigang case and other scandals, the police in each province
started to look for scandals in their own forces, and use them as examples for their
local rectification campaigns. As the chief of police in Sichuan said, every officer in
the province would have to look hard at his or her own past and no stone would be
left unturned in the exercise. The rectification was immediately followed by another
campaign, which subjected every police officer to a period of off-duty political, legal
and physical training.
The effect of the individualistic approach to police reform is fundamentally
limited. China has approximately 1.8 million police officers, most of whom would
be regarded as unqualified by ethical standards, academic qualifications, or health
conditions, according to polices own standard. The summary dismissal of a few
hundred may have a short-term effect in better disciplining the police but, given
the general quality of the police in China, it is doubtful that the heavy-handed
approach could change police behaviour in the long term.

Institution Factor
While the CCP seeks an individualistic explanation of police corruption, ordinary
police officers tend to blame their poor performance on a more institutional factor:
the inadequate funding of the police. According to this explanation, police abuse
and corruption occurred because of the inconsistency between the political and
legal powers and the weak institutional autonomy. As powerful as they are politi-
cally and legally, the police are poorly financed by the government and are forced to
rely on extrabudgetary financing.
China does not have a national police force; there is no centralised political
leadership over the police. Each police force in a province, a city or a county, is
highly autonomous, paid by the local budget and accountable directly to the respec-
tive local CCP committee. The area control exerted by a local authority is substan-
tial, indeed overwhelming, thereby negating any centralised line command at the
national or even the provincial level (Fu, 1994; Lieberthal, 1995).
It has been well known that the police are underfunded (Fu & Choy, 2003), but
the extent of such underfunding remains a mystery. After the series of scandals, the
police started to publicise their embarrassing financial difficulties and the ways they
balanced the budget. Sichuan province produced the most systemic figures to
demonstrate the seriousness of underfunding. On average, the budget provided by
the government only covers a third of the police expenditure. Common practice is
that the government provides the basic salary of the officers, leaving all the other
costs to be covered by the police themselves.
Facing a large shortfall, the police had to seek alternative sources for financial
support. In the 1980s, the police tended to plead with the government for more
funding, leaving ample opportunities for local authorities to interfere with police
work by requesting the police to perform a large amount of nonpolice work, such as
enforcing the one-child policy or collecting fees and levies. The police complained
that by doing nonpolice work illicitly imposed by the local political authority,

246 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015

 ZHOU YONGKANG AND THE RECENT POLICE REFORM IN CHINA

scarce police resources were diverted from crime control and other real police
work, straining policepublic relations and discrediting the police (Fu, 1994).
In the 1990s, the police went directly to the public to fill the income gap,
principally through corporate sponsorships, imposition of fees and levies and collec-
tion of fines. Imposing and collecting fines has become the principal source of
income for the police. Once the size of the budgetary shortfall is determined, a
police department issues a quota to each of its subunits, and every officer, ranging
from the chief to the support staff, would have a duty to collect a specific amount of
fines. They fight very hard to be allocated a lesser share of the burden. But once the
share is determined, they pursue potentially profitable cases with a vengeance. An
informal survey of police officers revealed that police in most parts of China have
this obligation to collect fines, ranging from 20,000 RMB to 50,000 RMB, with the
highest reaching 100,000 RMB per year (Hu & Sun, 2003).
As the CCP is aware, the heavy reliance on extrabudgetary funds by the police
leads to numerous detrimental consequences for the police themselves and Chinas
criminal justice system as a whole. In order to collect more money, the police are
readily imposing fines in lieu of punishment in handling cases. This is a particularly
serious problem in fine-generating offences, principally traffic offences, gambling
and prostitution. Similarly, because of the lack of resources for criminal investiga-
tions, the police will only conduct serious investigations in commercial and
economic crimes in which the victims can afford to finance the necessary investiga-
tion. Overzealous enforcement has also led to the deliberate wrongful detention of
citizens, such as intentional framing of innocent citizens as prostitutes so the police
could fine them, or as drug smugglers so that the police could claim a reward from
the government. At the same time, the police are ready to offer special protection
for vice and entertainment businesses, nightclubs in particular, for a fee, and inter-
vene in commercial disputes and debt collection for a service charge or even a
contingent fee (Fu & Choy, 2003).
Obviously, the heavy reliance on extrabudgetary funds by the police does not
simply lead to selective policing, but also creates room for institutional corruption
and the commercialisation of the police, which would ultimately drive the profes-
sionalisation, specialisation, and respect for the law agenda off course(Dutton,
2000, p. 62; see also Bakken, 2004). Given the limited resources of local govern-
ments in most parts of China, it is unlikely that they will be able to fully finance
their police in the near future. The police will continue to rely on extrabudgetary
income and remain a predatory force.

System Factor
The most critical view attributes police abuse to the special political status of the
Chinese police and their intimate relationship with the ruling CCP, a view shared
by dissidents, liberal scholars and some police officers. According to this view,
China is a one-party state, and the CCP rule lacks legitimacy. An illegitimate
government tends to rely particularly on the coercive powers of the police to
maintain domestic order. In addition, China is a society in transition, so crime and
disorder would aggravate the CCPs legitimacy crisis. The police in China are a
powerful institution and play a pivotal role in maintaining order.

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 247

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015
 FU HUALING

A tacit understanding has been reached between the CCP and the police. So
long as the police strengthen the CCPs status as the ruling political party in China,
the CCP will maintain the privileged political status of the police and their leading
role in society. Given the challenges that face the CCP and Chinas fragile stability,
the CCP is prepared to tolerate, or even implicitly encourage, some abusive and
predatory behaviours by the police. An essay on the death of Li Siyi states
succinctly: The Chinese police become the murderer fundamentally because of
Chinas political need, or the Chinese politics must pay such a price for the police.
Politics requires police protection. Illegitimate politics necessitates the unlawful
police protection. To purchase this additional service, politics must offer the
police unlawful payment. (Ren, 2003). Because of the special relationship,
police can put themselves effectively above the law.
This view is also shared by some police officers who regard the rectification
campaigns as a betrayal by the CCP of this tacit understanding. At the technical level,
the campaigns lack the necessary legal basis. Internal police orders replaced legal or
formal rules. Dismissal and other disciplinary measures taken against delinquent officers
were based on mere political, instead of legal, considerations. When the police are
victimised, they see the value of the rule of law and the importance of independent
remedies. At a more political level, the police tend to argue that the loyalty of the
police belongs to the CCP and the CCP only, but this loyalty is ultimately inconsistent
with the rule of law. For the police, there is irreconcilable conflict between politics and
law. The police cannot be more accountable than the Party/state they serve and they
cannot be legitimised unless the CCP achieves legitimacy.
The police of course are well versed with the politics of law and order and the
importance of stability. Immediately after the publicity of Sun Zhigangs case, the
Guangdong police announced a sharp increase in robbery and snatching cases in
Guangzhou and other cities in the province (Criminal Kidnapping, 2004). The
police made it known that their morale was low as a result of political pressure and
public criticisms, that criminals are openly challenging state authority and many
officers no longer knew how to do their work because of the new policy constraints.
In reaction, some officers became extremely cautious in performing their duties; and
reluctant in maintaining order, allegedly for fear of making any errors (Explaining
the Cause, 2003). Effectively, police started their informal industrial action by
slowing down their work.
The police have been quick to indicate the risk of instability in China, the
potential vulnerability of the CCP in facing challenges from every direction, and
the protections that the police may offer in upholding the rule of the CCP (Review
of the Pubic Security Work 2003, 2004).2 While the police stress the importance of
the absolute leadership of the CCP, they also remind the CCP of their importance.
The CCP is supreme, but the police are indispensable. The police have resorted to
the scare tactic of reporting increasing crime rates whenever their powers are to be
constrained or they are under scrutiny. The CCP, facing a legitimacy deficit,
ultimately relies on the police in securing its monopoly of power, and is unwilling
and unable to initiate fundamental police reform.

248 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015

 ZHOU YONGKANG AND THE RECENT POLICE REFORM IN CHINA

From Taming the Police to Strengthening the Police

The CCP reacted to placate the police, fearing that a further demoralised police force
will aggravate social instability. The MPS, in a politically inspired move, seized this
opportunity to further entrench their political and financial positions. While public
outrage may have been instrumental in publicising scandals, attracting the attention
of senior CCP/state leaders, the reform itself is a matter left to the police. The police,
under the leadership of Zhou, have actively and strategically used the scandals to
achieve their own reform agenda to their institutions advantage.

Political Repositioning
The first step to empower the police is to reconsider and enhance the political
status of the police. The MPS left the national political scene in China in the late
1970s, and the ministers of the MPS were normally professional police officers
without close ties with top CCP leaders. At the same time, the influence of other
legal institutions, the procuratorate and especially the court, started to grow. There
have been serious efforts to delink the police from the larger politics at both
national and local levels. Therefore, the police chief should be a career police
officer who would not be a member of the local CCPs standing committee, to
ensure certain neutrality in coordinating different institutions in the legal system.
This was widely celebrated as an early sign of maturity of Chinas legal system and
progress towards developing the rule of law in China. A rule-of-law system is by
definition not a police-centred system.
As Zhou Yongkang has pushed through the tough reform policies, he has also
enhanced the political status of the police throughout China. In a national police
conference held in late 2003, Zhou announced that the chief of the police should
be appointed as a core member in the respective CCP committee or government.
The justification is that when the concern of order and stability prevails, resources
should be concentrated in the hand of the police in order to combat crimes and
other threats more effectively. This can only be achieved when the chief of the
police is a political strongman (Hu & Sun, 2003).
Provincial CCP committees followed the instruction expediently. Notably, in
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), for example, the CCP Secretary,
Wang Lequan, instructed expressly in early 2004 that chiefs of the police in the 15
cities and more than 80 counties must join the standing committee of the CCP of
the respective level (The XUAR Party Committee Decided, 2004). Chiefs of the
police throughout China, as a matter of principle, have been admitted to the centre
of the power of the respective jurisdiction.
Given the increasing political authority of the police, the question of who is to
police the police naturally comes to the fore, even among the police. The change in
the political status of the police is significant for the development of Chinas legal
system. An accountable police force allows other legal institutions, the court in
particular, to grow, as they did in the 1990s, facing a relatively weakened police
force. Conversely, a strong police force will undermine this fragile balance of power.

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 249

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015
 FU HUALING

Centralised Control
Having secured a powerful position within the core of the local CCP committees,
the police moved to create a hierarchical structure. One important goal of the
police in the past two decades has been to strengthen the vertical control over the
police forces, thus undermining the control by the local CCP committee to prevent
fragmentation of authority. Zhou Yongkang has started to disturb the existing
balance between local and central accountability of the police and in redistributing
the powers in favour of the public security bureau at the superior level. In a limited
sense, he is replacing the area control with vertical line control.
The MPS designed two additional mechanisms to ensure centralised account-
ability. One was to centralise control of police intake criteria in the hands of the
provincial police, depriving the local government or local police of the authority to
recruit police officers. The scandals gave the MPS a golden opportunity to reassert
control over police intake. The MPS and the provincial police believed that the
police were incompetent and misbehaving because the higher level of the police
could not take proper control over their recruitment. The MPS is in a process of
designing a nationwide system of recruitment criteria and ranking for a more effec-
tive and efficient police force.
There is also a gradual and more fundamental shift in police accountability from
area to line, where the police at the superior level are asserting control over their
subordinate forces, displacing the local CCP committees and governments. This
shift has been most evident in places where a sole command centre surrounding the
citys chief of police is developing, effectively marginalising city district CCP
committees. This significant development from fragmentation to centralisation will
reduce office bureaucrats, putting more officers in the front line, and at the same
time will centralise control (Fujian Province, 2003). The MPS appears to have
reinterpreted the meaning of CCP leadership over the police, although it is cautious
not to mention the term vertical leadership. According to the new understanding,
CCP leadership is strengthened when the police are centralised.

More Resources
The third step to empower the police is to improve the budget situation. Formal
prohibitions of profiteering activities in the police are not new, but it was not until
the late 1990s that the government was able to stop all politicallegal institutions,
including the police, from operating business enterprises. The police nonetheless
continued to generate income through fines, fees, levies and sponsorships (Fu &
Choy, 2003).
There are three reform initiatives taken by the government to limit the money-
generating ability of the police. First, as part of the effort to reduce the powers and
responsibilities of the government, the number of social and commercial activities
that require police approval has been reduced, and fees collectable by the police will
be reduced correspondingly; second, unlawful fees and fines are strictly prohibited;
and finally, no quota of fines to be collected may be imposed on individual officers.
The above three initiatives, if seriously enforced, will significantly reduce police
income. Indeed, without the income generated from the extrabudgetary sources, the
police would have to stop operations. Of course, the police must be financed. Once

250 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015

 ZHOU YONGKANG AND THE RECENT POLICE REFORM IN CHINA

the backdoor is effectively shut, the second step is to force the local CCP commit-
tee to fully fund the local police. If, as many are hoping, the police could be effec-
tively prohibited from generating income for their own operations, the burden
would then be shifted to the local CCP committees to justify the failure to fund
police fully and also to bear the corresponding consequences if the underfunding
has adversely affected local social order. According to this reasoning, a local CCP
committee would have no choice except to give full budget funding to the police.
There were, for example, a series of actions taken by the Sichuan provincial
CCP committee and government. At the beginning of 2004, Sichuan became the
first province in postreform China to pledge a full budget for the police conditional
on economic performance and social order. Zhou Yongkang spoke highly of
Sichuans mandatory financing during his subsequent visit to the province, and
expressed his intention to expand police financing to the rest of China. In certain
economically prosperous regions, the government has not only given police
adequate funding, but also increased the size of the police and improved the welfare
of the police in general. Officially, local governments compete with each other to
treat police favorably, increasingly diverting scarce economic resources to pay their
police. Even poorer provinces pledged increases in manpower and investment and
preferential treatment of police officers in terms of their annual leaves, medical care
and insurance (Yang, 2004, p. 16).
Certainly, only a few provinces could promise real increases in funding, and
fewer could materialise their undertakings. But a more serious concern relates to the
sources of funding which the CCP committees have promised the police. Given the
limited financial capacity of the local government and the strong political power of
the police, an enlarged budget for the police will necessarily shrink those for other
more vulnerable sectors, such as education.

Conclusion
Police reform in China is predominantly an internal matter for the police, and is
well orchestrated and controlled. While there are increasingly independent voices,
the police are able to limit and manipulate external influences on the reform
process. Facing mounting public criticism and outcry as crystallised in the series of
scandals in and before 2003, the police, under the leadership of a powerful new
Minister, started a nationwide campaign to control police abuses. The police
responded to public and political pressures and initiated reform to restore the confi-
dence of the CCP and the public in the police.
Police abuses in China have been explained from three perspectives. The
individualistic perspective focuses on the poor quality of individual officers; the
institutional perspective attributes the abuses to the lack of government funding;
and the systemic perspective takes the one-party state and the arbitrary political
system as the root cause of police abuses. There are specifically prescribed remedies
and proposed reforms for each perspective.
Police reform in China is, however, a fundamentally political process and relates
directly not only to social stability but also to the political legitimacy of the one-
party state. As this article suggests, the relationship between the CCP and its
police, which defines the nature and scope of police reform in China, is rather more

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 251

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015
 FU HUALING

complicated and is based on a certain reciprocity of political support. During the

reform process, the police were able to play the trump card of crime and disorder
strategically to gain more political power from the CCP. By bargaining with the
CCP, the police are able to transform the campaign to control and discipline the
police into one to empower and strengthen the police. But in the bargaining
process, the Minister himself, not the police as an institution, plays a pivotal role.
In the end, successful police reform depends on the personal influence of a Minister.
Police reform in China is ultimately limited by the politicisation of the police
and the close relationship between the police and the CCP. The police cannot be
truly responsive to public need and accountable to any institutions other than the
CCP as long as China remains an authoritarian state, which uses the police to
maintain its monopoly of power. Improving the quality of the individual officers
with better training and discipline and improving the funding of the police are not
enough for police reform.

Endnotes
1 They are prohibitions on using firearms in violation of rules; drinking while
armed; drink-driving; drinking on duty; and gambling.
2 The MPS reported that in 2003 alone, 474 officers died and 6076 officers
suffered injuries on duty (Review of the Public Security Work 2003, 2004).

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Pinky Choy, Richard Cullen, Lison Harris, Stephen
D. Mau and Sophia Woodman for their comments on earlier versions of this article.

References
Bakken, B. (2004). Moral panics, crime rates and harsh punishment in China. The Australian and
New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 37(Suppl.), 6789.
Bayley, D.H. (1985). Patterns of policing: A comparative international analysis. New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutger University Press.
Brewer, J.D., Guelke, A., Hume, I., Moxon-Browne, E., & Wilford, R. (1996). The police, public
order, and the state: Policing in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic, the USA, Israel,
South Africa, and China. London: Macmillan.
Chen, Albert Hung-yee. (2004). Introduction to the legal system of the Peoples Republic of China.
Hong Kong: Lexis/Nexis.
Criminal kidnapping and other crimes are increasing drastically, Shenzhen plans to recruit 4200
more politicallegal cadre police. (2004, January 13). Nanfang Dushi Bao [Nanfang Metropolis
News]. Retrieved June 13, 2004, from http://www.njga.gov.cn/cps/site/njga/2004/gaxw-
mb_a2004011312378.htm
Dutton, M. (2000). The end of the (mass) line? Chinese policing in the era of the contract. Social
Justice, 27(2), 61105.
Explaining the cause of abnormity in public order. (2003, September 19). Renmin Gongan Bao
[Peoples Police Daily], p.1.
Fu, Hualing. (1994). A bird in the cage: Police and political leadership in post-Mao China. Policing
and Society, 4, 277291.

252 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015

 ZHOU YONGKANG AND THE RECENT POLICE REFORM IN CHINA

Fu, Hualing. (2001). After dictatorship: The nature and function of the police in post-Mao China.
In S. Einstein & M. Amir (Eds.), Policing, security and democracy: Theory and practice (pp.
259285). Huntsville, TX: OICJ Press.
Fu, Hualing, & Choy, D.W. (2003). Policing for profit: Fiscal crisis and institutionalized corruption
of Chinas police. In S. Einstein & M. Amir (Eds.), Police corruption: Paradigms, models and
concepts Challenges for developing countries. Huntsville, TX: OICJ Press.
Fujian Province will abolish the district level PSBs in five years. (2003, December 31). Xiamen
Wanbao [Xiamen Evening Post]. Retrieved June 12, 2004, from http://www.njga.gov.cn/
cps/site/njga/2004/gaxw-mb_a2003123110961.htm
Hu, Kui, & Sun, Zhan. (2003, August 4). The storms of police control. Xinwen Zhoukan
[Newsweekly], p. 142. Retrieved June 12, 2004, from http://www.chinanewsweek.com.cn/2003-
08-07/1/1978.htm
Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China: From revolution through reform. New York: W.W. Norton.
988 police officers in China were investigated for violation of the Five Prohibitions of the MPS.
(2004, January 15). Retrieved June 11, 2004, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-
01/15/content_1277934.htm
Ren, Bumei. (2003, October 7). Who turned the police into murderer: On the death of Li Siyi.
Dajiyuan [The Epoch Times]. Retrieved June 12, 2004, from http://www.boxun.com/hero/
renbm/99_1.shtm
Review of the public security work 2003. (2004, January 21). Retrieved June 12, 2004 from
http://www.njga.gov.cn/cps/site/njga/2004/gaxw-mb_a2004012113204.htm
Shelley, L.I. (1996). Policing Soviet society: The evolution of state control. London: Routledge.
Tanner, M.S. (2000). State coercion and the balance of awe: The 19831986 stern blow anti-
crime campaign. The China Journal, 44, 93125.
Tanner, M.S. (2005). Rethinking law enforcement and society: Changing police analyses of social
unrest. In Neil J. Diamant, Stanley B. Lubman, & Kevin J. OBrien (Eds.), Engaging the law in
China: State, society, and possibilities for justice (pp. 193212). Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Trevaskes, S. (2003). Public sentencing rallies in China: The symbolizing of punishment and
justice in a socialist state. Crime, Law & Social Change, 39(4), 359382.
The truth about Sun Zhigangs death. (2003, June 2). Xinwen Zhoukan [Newsweekly]. Retrieved
April 17, 2005, from http://www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-06-11/26/313046.html
Wang, Jianliang. (2003). Zhou Yongkang stressing rigorous implementation of Five Prohibitions.
In Ministry of Public Security (Ed.), Wutiao jingling xuexi duben [Five Prohibitions reader].
Beijing, China: China University of Peoples Public Security Press.
Wolfe, N.T. (1992). Policing a socialist society: The German Democratic Republic. New York:
Greenwood Press.
Xu, Baike. (2003, October 11). Who ended the life of a three year old girl? Zhongguo Qingnian Bao
[China Youth Daily], p. 3.
The XUAR Party Committee decided: Head of the PSB should be member of the Standing
Committee of the CCP. (2004, January 19). Xinjiang Jingji Ribao [Xinjiang Economic Daily].
Retrieved June 12, 2004, from http://www.big5.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c/483868.htm
Yang, Anhe. (2004). Seriously implementing the spirits of The 20th Police Conference and
propelling the development and progress of police enterprises. Gongan Yanjiu [Policing
Studies], 2004(2), 1416.

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 253

Downloaded from anj.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on June 7, 2015