Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don'T - The Eisenhower Administration and The Aswan Dam

Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don't: The Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan
Dam
Author(s): Silvia Borzutzky and David Berger
Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter, 2010), pp. 84-102
Published by: Middle East Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20622984
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Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don't: The
Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan Dam
Silvia Borzutzky and David Berger
This article analyzes the Aswan Dam decision in terms of the interaction between
individual perceptions and institutional priorities in the formulation of US foreign
policy. The conceptual framework is drawn from the work of Richard Cottam and
Richard Herrmann. After a background discussion of the history of both the Eisen
hower and Gamal (Abd al-Nasser Administrations, the article presents an analysis
of the Eisenhower Administration's deliberations regarding the Aswan Dam deci
sion. This analysis shows that US decision-makers interpreted Egypt and Nasser's
actions according to a set of pre-established perceptions which clearly resulted in
policies that contradicted the best interests of the US.
In July 1956, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the United States'
refusal to fund the Aswan Dam in a manner that was intentionally humiliating to Egyptian
President Gamal 4Abd al-Nasser. After explaining his decision to Egyptian Ambassador Dr.
Ahmad Husayn, Dulles patronizingly suggested that "Egypt should get along for the time
being with projects less monumental than the Aswan Dam."1 This decision and its execution
began a chain of events that would see war break out three months later, the severe decline
in international prestige of Britain and France (two of America's closest Cold War allies),
and the growth of Soviet influence over Egypt that would last until the early 1970s.
This episode in US-Egyptian relations is considered to be critical to understand
ing the subsequent Suez Crisis and the Eisenhower Doctrine.2 Existing analyses of the
Silvia Borzutzky is Teaching Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Carnegie Mellon
University. She has written extensively on Latin American politics, social policies, and international rela
tions. She is the author of Vital Connections: Politics, Social Security and Inequality in Chile (Notre Dame
University Press, 2002) and co-editor of After Pinochet: The Chilean Road to Capitalism and Democracy
(University Press of Florida, 2006) and The Bachelet Government: Conflict and Consensus in Post-Pinochet
Chile (University of Florida Press, forthcoming 2010). Her current research deals with the socioeconomic
effects of globalization on social policies, poverty, and women. David Berger has a master's degree in
Public Policy and Management from the Heinz College at Carnegie Mellon University. He has studied at
the American University in Cairo and the Qasid Institute in Amman. He completed a State Department
Critical Language Scholarship to study Arabic in Amman. He has worked for the independent Palestinian
Ma'an News Agency in Bethlehem and with Search For Common Ground in Jerusalem. He is currently an
independent researcher whose interests include the media, organizational cognition, and political behavior
in international relations.
1. "Memorandum of a Conversation: Department of State, Washington, July 19, 1956." Partici
pants: Sec. State John Dulles, Und. Sec. State Herbert Hoover Jr., Amb. of Egypt Dr. Ahmed Hussein,
George V. Allen, William M. Rountree, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1955-1957. Arab-Israeli dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, Volume XV (1955-1957),
p. 868.
2. M.A. Fitzsimons, "The Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy," The Review of Politics, Vol.
19 (1957), pp. 419-45. William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 2004), p. 310. Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doc
trine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 46-7.
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL VOLUME 64, NO. 1, WINTER 2010
DOI: 10.3751/64.1.15
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE ASWAN DAM * 85
policy have explored this decision in terms of the greater US reaction towards revolu
tionary Egypt, Cold War strategic considerations, and with respect to the relationship
between Secretary Dulles and Congress.3 Literature addressing the adverse outcomes of
US policy towards Egypt or the Middle East at large tends to focus on the failures of US
officials to interpret the local concerns of actors in the Middle East and the tendency of
US officials to view Arabs as an "Oriental" and inherently emotional group of people,
while others focus on the undue deference to Israeli interests in the region.4 This article,
on the other hand, endeavors to explore the Aswan Dam decision on its own. Though
we acknowledge that other factors may have contributed to US policy towards Egypt,
this article will argue that in the case of the Aswan Dam, the Eisenhower Administra
tion was primarily bound by conflicting international and domestic priorities which
encouraged decision-makers to adopt a conceptualization of the situation which eased
these differences by selectively interpreting available information regarding Nasser and
Egypt. Decision-makers, in short, developed a schema to describe Nasser in terms that
would provide a rationale for US policy towards Egypt that was geared to prevent that
policy from conflicting with other domestic and international priorities. Because the
schema was at odds with the objective facts of the situation, the resulting policy deci
sions led to disastrous consequences for the United States.
This article will analyze the Aswan Dam decision in terms of the interaction be
tween individual perception and institutional priorities in the formulation of US foreign
policy. The conceptual framework is drawn from the work of Richard Cottam and Rich
ard Herrmann. After a background discussion of the history of both the Eisenhower
and Nasser Administrations, the article will present an analysis of inter-administration
deliberations regarding the Aswan Dam decision. This analysis will show that US de
cision-makers adopted a particular schema to interpret Egypt and Nasser despite avail
able evidence that clearly contradicted the terms of the schema. The article analyzes
3. Anna Kasten Nelson, "John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress," Political Science Quar
terly, Vol. 102 (1987), pp. 43-64. Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism; Edward Said, Orientalism
(New York: Random House, 1979).
4. Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (Berke
ley: University of California Press, 1999). "From talks with the Egyptians I believe that while they realize
chaos and destruction of their regime would inevitably be an aftermath of open hostilities they will choose
that alternative rather than make concessions to the British which they consider would publically be
looked upon as infringing Egyptian sovereignty. Their emotions are so great they would rather go down
as martyrs than concede." The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State. Cairo, May 13,
1953, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. The Near
and Middle East (in two parts),Yohime IX, Part 1 (1952-1954), p. 25. Also: "Mr. [Evelyn] Shuckburgh [of
the U.K. Foreign Office]... recalled his opening statement that the West should not throw itself across the
stream of Arab emotions, especially those concerning Arab unity." "Memorandum of Conversation De
partment of State." Subject: U.S. - U.K. Interests and Objectives in the Middle East in Light of the Threat
Posed by Current Soviet Strategy in the Area. Participants U.S.: Allen, Rountree, Bowie, Matthews, Mer
chant, Byroade, Russell, Cyr, Baxter, Jones, Wilkins, Geren, Dixon, Ogburn, Wilson, Lister, Blake. Par
ticipants U.K.: Evelyn Shuckburgh, Geoffrey Arthur, Ian Samuel, J.E. Coulson, William Barker, Willie
Morris. Washington, January 13, 1956 (Morning), United States Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1955-1957. Near East; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII (1955-1957), p. 221. "Untalented
Children who have the advantage of external support and advice" appears in Fig. 3, Richard Herrmann,
"The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy for Drawing Inferences about Percep
tions," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1988), p. 191.
86 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
the Eisenhower Administration's initial strategy of engagement with the Third World,
the discussions on how to execute this strategy vis-?-vis the Aswan Dam, and finally
the institutional awareness of adverse consequences to US interests should the Dam not
be funded. This article concludes that the decision-makers adopted a particular view or
schematic understanding of Egypt because it would justify a course of action primar
ily motivated by unrelated domestic and bureaucratic constraints on policy, rather than
outcomes in Egypt. This article does not contend that decision-makers consciously
adopted this view or interpretation of Egypt, but rather that they were more open to
accepting arguments within their point of view, or schematic constraints as a means of
reconciling conflicting personal, institutional, and national priorities.
MOTIVATION AND SCHEMATIC IMAGING
When making critical foreign policy decisions, decision-makers have limited infor
mation, and as a result they are forced to make assumptions and decisions based on indi
vidual perceptions of the situation. These perceptions will often contain significant biases.
It is also clear that decision-making and perception biases occur in predictable patterns.
The analytic approach adopted here falls within the general purview of the For
eign Policy Analysis (FPA) methodology, rather than the traditional realist international
relations framework. In the field of FPA, Valerie M. Hudson writes that, "states are not
agents because states are abstractions and thus have no agency. Only human beings can
be true agents, and it is their agency that is the source of all international politics and
change therein," she continues,
The humans involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, were not inter
changeable generic rational utility maximizers and were not equivalent to the states
for which they served. Not just general and abstract information, but specific and
concrete information about the decision makers in all three countries (the Soviet
Union, the United States, and Cuba) would be necessary to explain that crisis.5
The utility of the FPA approach is intuitive. Individuals are entrusted to make decisions
on behalf of states, thus the individual (and the interaction between individuals and
institutions) must be the primary, indivisible unit in seeking to understand the behavior
of states. Though the importance of the individual must be of primary importance to
the analyst, the analyst must remember that individuals as policymakers often interpret
states or unitary rational actors as the base unit of interpretation.6
The decisive role of the perceptions of policymakers in assessing the motivations
of others was explored by Richard Cottam in Foreign Policy Motivation: A General
Theory and a Case Study. Cottam writes,
The motivations attributed to others are only rarely ? and then only partially ? ex
5. Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory and the Ground of Inter
national Relations," Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 1 (2005), pp. 2-3.
6. For empirical work on this phenomenon, the work of Robert Jervis on "representativeness" is
highly recommended. See Robert Jervis, "Representativeness and Foreign Policy Judgments," Politi
cal Psychology, Vol. 7 (1986), pp. 483-505.
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE ASWAN DAM 87
plicated. Consequently, debate among adversaries typically will focus on compet

ing policy proposals rather than on what may be the entirely contradictory assump
tions on which the proposals rest. The task of the analyst is to infer motivational
attributions largely from policy preferential statements.7
Cottam lays out a series of motivational and perceptional ideal types. The motivational
types are economic, communal, messianic, governmental, and defense. Each motivational
type prompts policymakers and decision-makers to adopt various positions regarding policy
towards other states. The economic type includes motivations stemming from domestic and
international trade and investment, as well as "loot" and demands stemming from popula
tion consumption. The communal ideal type relates to less tangible motivations such as the
desire for national grandeur, participation, excitement, and "frontier dynamics." Cottam
describes the messianic motivation as encompassing religious, cultural, and ideological
factors. Governmental and defense ideal types are related to one another. Governmental
motivations draw from vested bureaucratic and military interests, as well as domestic and
international considerations. The defense ideal type is a reaction to a perceived threat.8
In Cottam's view, motivation operates in tandem with historical identity, politi
cally relevant values, role interests, and "idiosyncratic socialization patterns" to inform
individual perception. The perceived ideal image types, according to Cottam, are: en
emy, complex, allied, imperial, non-formal colonial, and formal colonial. Perceived
image is informed by an individual's motivation and, in turn, informs an individual's
determination of a state's motivation. Cottam writes,
The ideal typical patterns ... provide a device for mapping images held by individu
als, images held by modal members of particular groups, and prevailing views at
various moments. This device therefore offers the analyst a means for juxtaposing
the prevailing world views and the world views of those whom the analyst regards
as influential in foreign policy decision-making.9
Cottam theorizes that perception and motivation are interdependent and interacting,
and he argues that analysts can use the concept of ideal types to reassess motivations
and perceptions before undertaking action.10
The work of Richard Herrmann owes a great deal to Cottam's theories. Her
rmann's work is geared towards understanding what "determine^] the perceptions of
important actors and to identify how they define the situation."11 Herrmann and others
build from Cottam's concept of ideal type images into formalized cognitive schema
ta.12 In the empirical work Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test
7. Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pitts
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 7.
8. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, pp. 34-43.
9. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, p. 78.
10. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, pp. 78-9.
11. Herrmann, "The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy for Drawing
Inferences about Perception," p. 176.
12. Richard Herrmann, James F. Voss, Tonya Y. E. Schooler, and Joseph Ciarrochi, "Images in In
ternational Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata," International Studies Quarterly,
Vol.41 (1997), pp. 403-33.
88 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
of Cognitive Schemata, schema implies "not only that a person's knowledge about a
given actor is organized, but that it influences the selection, interpretation, and memory
of information pertaining to the actor in question." Furthermore, schema are "a cluster
of knowledge that permits individuals to process information under the constraint of
a limited working memory."13 In other words, schemata are cognitive tools that allow
decision-makers to form a complete image of an actor based on limited knowledge.
This process is ripe for bias and such bias may be magnified in attempts to reconcile
conflicting institutional priorities.
In their study of schemata, Herrmann and his fellow researchers examine ideal
types, which closely resemble those advanced by Cottam. The four types identified by
Herrmann et al are: enemy, ally, degenerate, and colony. Each type is summarized below
according to Herrmann's description of motivation, capability, and decisional process.
With the enemy ideal type, motives are perceived as evil and unlimited, and focused on
domination. Enemies are judged to be "paper tigers" if met with sufficient opposition.
They are monolithic and able to plot and execute complex plans. In terms of the ally
ideal type, motives are judged to be altruistic and colored by a willingness to cooperate
in peaceful joint efforts. The ally's military is defensive and the population is willing to
make sacrifices for higher causes. The decisional system is well organized but slow mov
ing because of its many services and complex economy. The leaders of the degenerate
ideal type are perceived to be motivated by a desire to hold onto power. Military power in
the degenerate ideal type is judged to be less effective because of an unwillingness to de
fend itself or enter into confrontations. Its decision-making process is confused and lacks
discipline. Finally, the colony ideal type is perceived as being led by the motives of a
paternal leader or a radical demagogue. The colony is either composed of capable "well
meaning children" who require supervision, or "untalented children" and agitators. The
colony is either unable to make decisions, or organized in top down decision-making.
These ideal types can be adjusted and applied to real world situations. Further
more, empirical testing among subjects in the United States revealed that individuals
constructed approximations of three of the above ideal type schemata from certain lim
ited-information scenarios and that these schemata affected information interpretation.14
Thus, in the context of US views of the world, the above schemata hold validity.
In order to better understand policies regarding the Aswan Dam, we contend that
the multi-tiered interests of decision-makers facilitate the adoption of schemata for
purposes of convenience. Decision-makers are confronted with political and economic
constraints, as well as personal and career repercussions for any major decision or
change in policy. This being the case, individuals adopt certain schemata, even in the
presence of unambiguous counter-information, in order to maintain institutional iner
tia. A close reading of the inter-administration deliberations leading up to the refusal to
fund the Aswan Dam shows a shift from a nuanced understanding of Egyptian public
aspirations and Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser as leader of Egypt to the adoption of a "colony"
schema type in order to reduce threats to the institutional stability of the Eisenhower
Administration. Furthermore, it will be shown that this schematic shift occurred with
the full knowledge of exculpating information. Finally, it is important to note that we
13. Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi, "Images in International Relations," p. 406.
14. Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi, "Images in International Relations," pp. 414-17.
do not contend that policymakers consciously adopt schemata for convenience, but
that institutional constraints and personal motivations encourage and often incentivize
individuals to adopt a framework of perception that calls for actions most aligned with
pre-existing institutional priorities and capabilities.15
BACKGROUND: EISENHOWER AND NASSER
The Free Officers' Revolution was some three months old when Eisenhower as
sumed office in January 1953. The Truman Administration had taken a cautiously favor
able view of the new regime and hoped to aid pro-Western head of state General Mu
hammad Naguib.16 The Eisenhower Administration shared a similar sense of optimism
about the new regime but became locked in a contradictory position towards Egypt early
on. Secretary of State Dulles visited Cairo in May 1953 and privately described British
"colonial and imperialistic policies" as "millstones" around the proverbial neck of the
United States.17 Furthermore, Egyptian leaders Naguib and Nasser stressed to Dulles
their view that the unresolved status of British control in the Suez Canal Zone remained
the outstanding obstacle in Egypt pursuing a comprehensive settlement with Israel.18
Egyptian political discourse was overwhelmingly concerned with British imperialism
and continuing hostilities with Israel. The United States, however, was primarily con
cerned with securing access to Middle Eastern oil and preventing Soviet penetration into
the region, in addition to reaching a peaceful Arab-Israeli settlement.19 To this end, the
administration envisioned a policy towards Egypt based on the following formulation:
Too rapid a withdrawal of British power and influence would leave those countries
susceptible to Soviet blandishments and pressure. The United States might then
have to step into the breach, an unwelcome prospect for an administration seeking
to control government spending, avoid complications with Congress, and concen
trate on more pressing international questions.20
The administration had constructed a dubious dichotomy for itself. It desired to prevent
Soviet penetration in the region and it argued that to achieve that goal a Western power
had to retain direct influence in Egypt. Dulles ignored an opportunity presented to the
United States by Muhammad Hussanyan Haykal, a close aide to Nasser, which Barry
Rubin paraphrases as, "Arabs wanted a defense against America's friends as well as
against its enemies."21 In the face of this ambiguity between a trusted ally, Britain, with
the perceived stability of "soft" imperialism, or a potential ally, Egypt, with the pos
15. For further work on the adverse foreign policy incentives within the US government, see Rob
ert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S. - GVN Performance in
Vietnam, RAND, 1972, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R967.
16. Barry Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 97, No.
1 (Spring 1982), pp. 73-90.
17. Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution," p. 79.
19. Central Intelligence Agency, "National Intelligence Estimate Number 36-54: Probable Devel
opments in the Arab States," September 7, 1954, pp. 7-8, http://www.foia.cia.gov.
20. Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, p. 29.
sibility of Soviet backing, the US balked. No significant aid was given to Egypt's new
leadership to express trust, solidify an alliance, or express a willingness to be an unam
biguous advocate to Britain for Egyptian national interests. In the face of this political
reality, Egypt's new leadership began a strategic calculation of its own: If they could
not depend on the United States for military and economic aid, perhaps they could ben
efit from a limited relationship with the Soviet Union ? limited so as not to completely
alienate the US and invite Soviet political domination, but substantive enough to ensure
that the material needs of localized policy priorities could be met.
Following Nasser's formal assumption of power in Egypt in 1954, the United
States attempted alternate strategies to consolidate its interests in Egypt. Anti-Commu
nist propaganda efforts expanded from US-run libraries and radio programs to encom
pass a more direct relationship with the 'ulama of al-Azhar. With American backing, the
respected Sunni center of learning began holding English classes with an eye towards
developing a broadly pro-Western and specifically pro-American bloc of imams.22 This
development came as Nasser was attempting to confront the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt, who benefitted from a strengthened religious constituency. In the midst of these
covert machinations, Nasser concluded a formal treaty with Britain, defining its role in
Egypt. With a major source of tension out of the way, he undertook a charm offensive
to encourage the American public to support US aid to Egypt. In an interview with
U.S. News and World Report quoted by Rubin, Nasser explained that Arabs retained a
suspicion of the West due to the legacy of European imperialism, and therefore "Too
close of an alliance would give the Communists the chance to take an Ultranationalist
line and to overthrow existing governments." Furthermore, Nasser advised the US to be
more flexible in its policy towards emerging states that might accept some Soviet aid to
pursue their independence in order to eventually allow these states to break from direct
Soviet influence.23 However, American policymakers failed to heed these very direct
appeals in their handling of the Aswan Dam project.
Mistrust had been growing steadily between the US and Egypt as American dip
lomats consistently promised aid packages that were never delivered and Egyptian of
ficials were forced to receive needed supplies from the Eastern Bloc. Perhaps the most
contentious of these purchases were arms purchased by Nasser from Czechoslovakia in
1955 as an attempt to balance the escalating tensions with Israel in the Gaza Strip. In
light of this development, the top advisors to the Eisenhower Administration saw an op
portunity to pull Egypt solidly back into the Western camp by financing the Aswan Dam.
The Dam would provide predictable and controllable irrigation for Egypt's agriculture
based economy and electricity for its rapidly expanding urban centers. The investment
would be substantial, and the United States wanted to gain the most political capital
abroad for its support. Still reeling from Nasser's decision to buy Soviet and Czech arms
earlier in the year, Dulles prolonged negotiations, publicly challenged Egyptian leaders,
and demanded visible, unambiguous statements of pro-Western support from Nasser
despite the fragile Egyptian political reality. Despite the public humiliation and threat
to domestic legitimacy that the US approach brought Nasser, the Egyptian leader still
22. W.H. Weathersby to U.S. State Department US Information Agency, "English Classes for
Al Azhar Sheikhs," February 2, 1955, Embassy Correspondence, US Embassy in Cairo (National
Archives in College Park, College Park, MD).
seemed willing to strike a deal with the US. By the end of 1955, the World Bank had
approved a loan package, and it appeared that the Dam would be built with American
support.24 The package, however, would be rescinded several months later.
In consolidating his rule in Egypt, Nasser had to contend with three general po
litical groups: the Wafd, the old nationalist party that emerged from the 1919 upris
ing and became the standard-bearer for Egyptian nationalism; the Ikhwan or Muslim
Brotherhood; and the Communists. These internal dynamics limited the leader's ability
to adopt the outwardly pro-Western rhetoric which some in the US administration de
sired as a precondition for further US assistance. These three Egyptian parties varied
in size, influence, and demographic appeal. However, all three pierced the illusion that
either Nasser or his co-revolutionary Free Officers were the uncontested stewards of
political ideology in Egypt during the 1950s.
From the Free Officers' Coup in 1952 to the nationalization of the Suez Canal in
1956, Nasser had a delicate and difficult relationship with the Ikhwan. Unlike the Wafd,
against which he took restrictive measures almost immediately, the Ikhwan enjoyed
broad support and effective political organization. Indeed, several of the Free Officers
themselves were also members of the Ikhwan. Nasser at times attempted to court the
Ikhwan, for instance by not including its leaders in a 1954 decree which banned the
leaders of the Wafd and Liberal Constitutionalists from participating in politics for ten
years.25 Nasser also resisted retaliation against the Ikhwan after its leaders began a Pan
Arab campaign slandering the Egyptian leader as a traitor to the Arabs for signing a
treaty with the British that expelled their military from the Canal Zone, but allowed the
British to return to the Canal Zone if Turkey or the Middle East came under attack from
the Soviets.26 During this campaign, members of the Ikhwan referred to Nasser's rival
in the ruling regime, General Naguib, as the true advocate of Arab interests. However,
the final straw came when a member of the Ikhwan attempted to assassinate Nasser
during a rally in October 1954. The government responded by imprisoning some 4,000
members of the organization and executing several "ring-leaders" after show trials.27
The organization was brutally suppressed and the members who were detained were
subjected to vicious torture. The organization was forced underground once again;
however, it retained a large popular following. Incidentally, during this time, Sayyid
Qutb ? a member of the Ikhwan ? underwent a radical transformation and began
writing his theories of jihad while in prison. These writings continue to inspire radical
Islamists throughout Egypt and beyond.
Communists did not enjoy a wide following in Egypt during the 1950s, but, none
theless, they had some influence and were able to challenge the new regime shortly
after it came to power. In August 1952, Communists encouraged labor riots and seized
two textile mills, which they intended to run on the Soviet model. Police killed nine ri
oters in their attempt to restore order, and later two of the riot's leaders were executed.28
Communists also entered a relationship of convenience with the Ikhwan to denounce
24. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, p. 302.

25. Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir, p. 32.
28. Said Aburish, Nasser, The Last Arab: A Biography (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004), p.
44.
Nasser following the aforementioned treaty dispute. However, Nasser took efforts not
to crack down on Communists so as not to increase their prestige.29
The Communist Party was banned throughout Nasser's Egypt, but retained influ
ence due to global and regional events. Soviet representatives often raised the issue
of the Party ban to Nasser; however, the USSR was more concerned with establishing
a presence in the region than with ideology.30 Nasser felt threatened by the potential
popular appeal of the Communists should his regime appear too close to the Americans
or the British. During a 1954 meeting with US Ambassador to Egypt Jefferson Caffery,
Nasser expressed his concern "that communism is making great headway in Egypt
through the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda activity and the ineptitude of American
policy in the Near East."31 Furthermore, the attempts of Nuri al-Sa'id of Iraq and King
ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia to attain regional prominence through close relationships
with the Western camp motivated Nasser to appeal to leftists throughout the region
to strengthen his own position. By doing so, the Egyptian leader walked a fine line
between bolstering the Arab left writ large and empowering formal Arab Communist
parties (such as that of Syria), which potentially could increase the prestige of the op
position Egyptian Communist movement.
Nasser also faced challenges within his own movement. Under Nasser's direc
tion, many members of the RCC were subject to "transfers, dismissals, and assign
ment ... to civilian posts"32 under suspicion of disloyalty. The sitting President of
post-revolution Egypt, Muhammad Naguib, and those close to him became wary
of Nasser's heavy hand. Fearing a counter-coup, Nasser had Naguib briefly placed
under detention in February 1954; however, he reinstated Naguib as President fol
lowing large scale demonstrations throughout the country.33 By November 1954,
Nasser's machinations against Naguib culminated with the President's resignation
under duress. Nasser, however, remained acutely aware of challengers within his
movement as well as those among the Wafd, Ikhwan, and Communists.
Apart from internal political divisions, Nasser also was forced to contend with a num
ber of regional issues as he assumed leadership of Egypt. Israel maintained a well-equipped
and well-trained military force on the Gaza frontier. The Israeli ability to easily conduct
large-scale raids against Egyptian targets in Gaza in retaliation for fedayin raids was a re
gional liability for Nasser as an aspiring leader of the Arab world. These retaliatory raids
highlighted the weakness of the Egyptian army against Israel, and thus provided fodder for
Nasser's regional rivals and weakened the Egyptian government's leverage with Israel.
Nasser's leadership in the first years following the revolution was by no means so
lidified. Wealthy, landowning Egyptians remained loyal to the Wafd, a wide segment of
Egyptians were motivated by the ideology of the Ikhwan, and the Communists retained
a dynamic minority in both Egypt and the greater Middle East. Furthermore, Nasser
29. Aburish, Nasser, The Last Arab, p. 46.

30. Robert Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy since the Invasion of Afghani
stan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 18.
31. "The Ambassador of Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State." Cairo, March 23, 1954,
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. The Near and
Middle East (in two parts),Volume IX, Part 2 (1952-1954), p. 2242.
32. P.J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 139.
33. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation, pp. 142-45.
had to contend with regional threats to his status as an Arab leader. Though a great deal
of evidence points to Nasser's desire to build a relationship with the United States, the
Egyptian leader was constrained in his ability to do so overtly by his desire to prevent
political rivals from gaining influence in the country. By forming a greater understand
ing of the political landscape in early revolutionary Egypt, the factors motivating Nass
er's behavior ? which engendered Dulles' suspicions ? become clear. The Eisenhower
Administration, for its part, desired a partnership with Egypt but also was constrained
by domestic concerns as well as other international obligations. The interaction between
Nasser's constrained behavior and the varied and sometimes contradictory interests of
decision-makers in the Eisenhower Administration led to perceptional dynamics that
prevented a cooperative relationship from being formed. The counterproductive percep
tional dynamics of the Eisenhower Administration can be illustrated through an analysis
of the inter-administration discussions regarding the philosophy of engagement with the
developing world, and the debate over its operationalization through the Aswan Dam.
INTER-ADMINISTRATION DELIBERATIONS:
EISENHOWER AND STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT
In December 1955, as the first firm offer of assistance regarding the Dam was be
ing made to Nasser, President Eisenhower sent a meditative letter to Secretary of State
Dulles. In it, Eisenhower describes the Soviet Union as challenging US interests with
"economic weapons." In response, the President called for long-term economic plans
with developing states. Eisenhower writes,
Long term planning would give every individual nation a stake in cooperation with
the United States. The power of the Soviets to move in with a startling type of in
ducement would be far less effective. In the absence of such long planned coopera
tion between the United States and other countries (or associations of countries),
the Soviets can move in with a very tempting offer and on a basis that makes it
exceedingly difficult for us to counter the effect they create.34
A similar sentiment was put forward by CD. Jackson in a personal letter to Eisenhow
er's Special Assistant Nelson Rockefeller. Jackson was a former presidential Special
Assistant who specialized in "international affairs, cold war planning, and psychologi
cal warfare."35 He describes, like Eisenhower, the "economic" threat posed by the So
viet Union and decries the United States for "not doing much more than responding to
economic fire alarms on an 'ad emergency' basis."36 He specifically notes that, "Soviet
34. "Letter from the President to the Secretary of State." Gettysburg, December 5, 1955, United
States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Foreign economic
policy; foreign information program,Volume IX (1955-1957), p. 11.
35. "Jackson, CD.: Records, 1953 - 1954," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS, http://
www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/listofholdingshtml/listofholdingsJ/JACKSONCDRecordsl95354.pdf.
36. "Letter from CD. Jackson to the President's Special Assistant (Rockefeller)," New York, No
vember 10, 1955, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955
1957. Foreign economic policy; foreign information program, Volume IX (1955-1957), p. 8. It is
important to note that this letter was forwarded to the President on December 2, 1955.
agents are working night and day to get Nasser to give them the Aswan Dam contract."37
In encouraging the US to pursue a more ambitious foreign aid plan, Jackson writes,
An element of such a plan is that it should not be niggardly ... there is a "threshold"
short of which the money had better not be spent at all, but at which or slightly
beyond which money achieves maximum effective impact.38
He closes his letter by recognizing the high cost of such a program, but, citing the
higher costs of conflict in the Korean Peninsula and Indochina, states "If we act before
crisis is upon us it will not only cost us less, but we have a better than even chance of
moving these areas forward as strong elements in the Free World alliance."39
That the economic aspects of Soviet containment were an issue of primary con
cern to the Executive Branch is also shown by an April 1956 National Intelligence
Estimate addressing "Sino-Soviet Policy and its Probable Effects in Underdeveloped
Areas."40 The estimate echoes many of the concerns voiced by Eisenhower and Jackson
as to the powerful political and propaganda effects of Soviet economic aid to "underde
veloped countries." The estimate ends with a powerful warning:
The lasting political effects of the new Bloc policies on underdeveloped countries
will depend heavily upon the degree to which the West is genuinely interested in
their problems, understands their motives, and responds to their needs.41
Throughout late 1955 and into 1956, it is clear that the highest echelons of the Eisen
hower Administration desired a policy that would expand US interests by providing
substantial economic and development aid in target areas of the globe. It must be noted
that in these statements of strategic vision, the targets of policy are not leaders, such
as Nasser, as much as the populations whom they lead. It was recognized that the US
would need to reach these people in order to expand its meaningful influence in the
world. The Aswan Dam project appeared to fit this agenda perfectly; it would be a very
public collaborative project on a massive scale. It would respond not only to the physi
cal and economic needs of Egyptians, but to their national pride and aspirations as well.
Despite this apparent diplomatic coup, the plan did not go forward.
CONSTRUCTION OF "COLONY" EGYPT
During deliberations on the Aswan Dam question, US decision-makers construct

ed a unified schema of Egypt and Nasser that is approximated by the colony ideal type
37. "Letter from CD. Jackson to the President's Special Assistant (Rockefeller)."
40. Central Intelligence Agency, "National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-3-56: Sino-Soviet
Policy and its Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas," April 24, 1956, http://www.foia.cia.gov.
41. Central Intelligence Agency, "National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-3-56: Sino-Soviet
Policy and its Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas," p. 12.
described by Herrmann.42 This ideal type is sub-divided into two categories that can be
summarized as compliant and non-compliant colonies. In the eyes of US decision-mak
ers, Egypt came to resemble the non-compliant colony. In the perceived ideal type, the
state is motivated by a radical, fanatic demagogue. It is xenophobic, racist, and extremist
and is often the puppet of a great power enemy. In terms of capability, the non-compliant
colony is perceived as "untalented children who have the advantage of external support
and advice."43 Furthermore, they are perceived as terrorists whose actions reveal their
moral weakness, immature agitators who are arrogant and close-minded and confuse
slogans and dogmas with intelligence. They are perceived as conspirators who are cun
ning and clever at deception and terror, and finally, their capabilities are perceived to
be derived from ties to foreign masters. The decisional process of the non-compliant
colony is perceived to be well organized into a disciplined top-down structure. American
decision-makers adopted this general framework, with a few exceptions in details, to
understand Egypt. They adopted the perceived framework in spite of information indi
cating that these assumptions did not accurately reflect the situation on the ground.
Decision-makers adopted this framework due to their personal motivations re
lating to domestic political issues, relationships with other states, and the perceived
slight of Nasser receiving an aid offer from the Soviet Union. These motivations were
manifestations of the multi-faceted environment in which the decision-makers func
tioned. Because of these motivations, and the resulting perceptional framework applied
to Nasser and Egypt, US decision-makers deviated significantly from the philosophi
cal underpinnings and intended populist outcomes of US foreign policy as put forth by
Eisenhower. Specific objections to funding the Dam project fell into several categories;
fear of offending regional allies, such as Iraq and Iran, who would become key members
of the Baghdad Pact, was an important objection. It is interesting to note that the Pact
was formed in 1955 under the auspices of the Eisenhower Administration, which did not
formally join the pact until 1958.44 Other objections focused on concerns over Egypt's
ability to undertake the project, fears of domestic political backlash, and finally, dis
trust of Nasser. Notably, none of these concerns directly addressed the project's impact
on the intended target: the Egyptian public, and public opinion throughout the region.
These concerns did reflect institutional and bureaucratic concerns. Furthermore, con
cerns stemming from perceptions of Egyptian inability to build the Dam and the cynical
motives of Nasser's behavior align perfectly with the non-compliant colony schema.
During early discussions of the Aswan Dam project in January 1956, concerns were
raised regarding potential problems arising from spending lavishly on a non-Baghdad
Pact participant. Particularly, there were concerns regarding how US funding for the proj
ect would affect the rivalry for Arab leadership between Egypt and pact-member Iraq.45
42. Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi, "Images in International Relations."

43. Appears in Fig. 3 of Herrmann, "The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A
Strategy for Drawing Inferences about Perceptions," p. 191.
44. U.S. Department of State, "The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO)," http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/time/lw/98683 .htm.
45. "Memorandum of Conversation Department of State." Subject: U.S. - U.K. Interests and Ob
jectives in the Middle East in Light of the Threat Posed by Current Soviet Strategy in the Area. Par
ticipants U.S.: Allen, Rountree, Bowie, Matthews, Merchant, Byroade, Russell, Cyr, Baxter, Jones,
Wilkins, Geren, Dixon, Ogburn, Wilson, Lister, Blake. Participants U.K.: Evelyn Shuckburgh, Geof
[Continued on next page]
Absent from the discussion was the extent of the actual influence of Egyptian or Iraqi
leaders as perceived by the Arab public. However, it was noted during the discussion that
more money was spent yearly on arms for pact countries than was anticipated to be spent
yearly on the Dam. As discussions progressed, representatives of the British government
became more vocal regarding supporting "friends in the M[iddle] E[ast] rather than some
who had shown no real disposition to cooperate with the West."46 Concerns over Baghdad
Pact repercussions moved the conversation into different areas regarding the reliability
of Nasser. A framework was established through this line of questioning which valued
spending political capital on allies, rather than building alliances. Furthermore, institu
tional desire to maintain unity in an abstract alliance between governments (the Baghdad
Pact) began to overwhelm the considerations of the outcomes of policy decisions among
the actual target ? the Arab population. This was a departure from the overall policy
objectives as laid out by Eisenhower and the National Intelligence Estimate.
Domestic opposition to US support for the project was profound. A number of
Congressmen believed that Egypt had thrown its hat in with the Eastern Bloc after pur
chasing arms from Czechoslovakia, and did not want to appear soft on Communism
by approving money for the project. Additionally, Southern Senators opposed funding
agricultural development projects in Egypt, which could lead to greater competition for
their cotton farming constituents.47 Furthermore, in December 1955 Treasury Secretary
George Humphrey did not wish to put the administration in a position in which "every
congressman who wanted a dam for his district would press against giving a big dam to
the Egyptians."48 Given these circumstances, the Senate appropriations committee made
it clear that it would not appropriate funds for the project, nor give the President a sti
pend of $100 million per year in discretionary funds from which to fund the project.49
The battle to receive funding would come during a presidential election year,
and nobody in the administration appeared willing to expend political capital for the
cause of Egyptian-US relations. Researcher Anna Nelson paraphrases Senator Walter
George, a ranking Georgian Democrat, as warning Dulles "that an election year was no
time for new ideas on economic aid and had urged him not to press the [Aswan Dam]
issue at the coming session of Congress."50 The inability of the administration to get
Congress to support the project proved to be a critical factor in the decision to refuse to
fund the project. Without a financial appropriation, the US government could not hold
up its end of the joint World Bank, British, and US funding program. Domestic factors,
unrelated to the reality in Egypt informed the decision. Institutional factors, such as
[Continued from previous page]

frey Arthur, Ian Samuel, J.E. Coulson, William Barker, Willie Morris. Washington, January 13, 1956
(Morning), United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957.
Near East; Iran; Iraq,Volume XII (1955-1957), p. 227.
46. "Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State." London,
June 7, 1956, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957.
Arab-Israeli dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, Volume XV (1955-1957), p. 720.
47. "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State." Washington, July 19, 1956, United
States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Arab-Israeli dispute,
January 1-July 26, 1956, Volume XV (1955-1957), p. 868.
48. Quoted in Nelson, "John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress," p. 57.
49. "John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress," p. 58.
50. "John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress," p. 58.
Congress' control over the purse-strings of government, made it politically expedient

for administration decision-makers to operate under the unsubstantiated perception of
Nasser as a simplified anti-Western agitator, rather than as a nuanced and potentially
cooperative leader. For, if the latter understanding was widely accepted, a vitriolic bat
tle with Congress to receive necessary appropriations would follow.
In light of congressional resistance, the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitry
Shepilov to Cairo in July 1956 provided convenient evidence for many in the Eisenhower
Administration as to Nasser's "true" motivations. From our standpoint, Nasser came to
encompass aspects of Hermann's non-compliant colony leader, such as being a "puppet
of a great power enemy," a "demagogue," a "cunning conspirator," and "agitator" to deci
sion-makers such as Dulles and Treasury Secretary Humphrey. However, conclusions re
garding Nasser's willingness to work with the Soviets were at odds with evidence derived
from high level contacts between the US and Egyptian governments. Shepilov visited
Egypt on July 21,1956. The US State Department had been preparing interpretive memos
concerning his visit as early as June 12. All assessments speculated that Shepilov would
offer Nasser a competitive bid to finance the Aswan Dam. A CIA intelligence report after
the fact stated that Shepilov had offered a $400,000,000 interest free loan with repayment
over 60 years. Repayment would come partially in the form of cotton and partly in pounds
sterling. Additionally, the USSR would build a new steel factory in Egypt.51
Despite this generous offer, reports from the CIA, the President of the World
Bank, the Iraqi Ambassador to Egypt, the US Ambassador to Egypt, and the National
Security Council indicated that the Egyptian government was highly embarrassed by
Shepilov's visit and skeptical of his offer. Shepilov had been invited to attend Indepen
dence Day celebrations in Cairo before he had been promoted to the position of Foreign
Minister. After his promotion, he still insisted on attending, prompting Nasser to invite
the Foreign Ministers of all Arab states "to prevent Shepilov from occupying a position
of honor as the ranking foreign diplomat."52 Furthermore, the reports from the CIA, the
US Ambassador to Egypt, and the Iraqi Ambassador to Egypt indicate that Nasser was
apprehensive about accepting any Soviet offer, including the extremely favorable one
put forward by Shepilov. Additionally, during the period of Shepilov's visit, Nasser and
other high ranking officials found time to meet with Eugene Black, President of the
World Bank, in order to reiterate their desire to proceed with the Dam without accept
ing Soviet assistance.53 Clearly, these are not the actions of a leader eager to work with
the USSR or one that typifies the non-compliant colonial type.
Despite the ample evidence suggesting Nasser's disinclination to accept a more
favorable Soviet offer, high-level US officials used the existence of a more favorable
Soviet offer as reason to distrust the motivations of the Egyptian government. Among
51. "Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to Secretary of State." Sub
ject: Shepilov's Visit to Egypt, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1955-1957. Arab-Israeli dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, Volume XV (1955-1957), p. 752.
52. "Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to Secretary of State," p. 752.
53. "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State." Subject: Aswan Dam, Iran, Saudi
Arabia. Participants: Eugene Black (President of IRBD), Andrew Overby (Assistant Secretary, Trea
sury Department), John Foster Dulles, Herbert Hoover Jr., Mr. Rountree (NEA), Mr. Burnett (NE),
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Arab-Israeli
dispute, January I-July 26, 1956, Volume XV (1955-1957), p. 748.
the most vocal critics of the offer was Treasury Secretary Humphrey. The minutes of a
June 28, 1956 NSC meeting record that the Secretary "said he was glad to hear of the
Soviet offer to build the High Aswan Dam, and [he] hoped the Egyptians would accept
it."54 During an earlier NSC meeting, on June 15, Humphrey expressed "the wish that
the United States were out of the High Aswan dam project all together. While Egyptians
are holding an option on our assistance on the dam project, they are shopping around to
see if they can get a better bargain elsewhere."55 Secretary of State Dulles soon adopted
Humphrey's resentment of a Soviet offer. On July 9, Dulles sent a scathing Top Secret
telegram to the US Embassy in Cairo decrying Egyptian policy "as one of maintain
ing US expectations of future Egyptian cooperation while demanding immediate US
assistance and in fact pursuing policies detrimental [to] US objectives."56 Egypt, for
its part, had made a slightly revised counter-offer to the one put forward by the US
in December 1955, and had discussed a few minor changes with Eugene Black. The
Egyptian government had then waited for over six months without any US response,
and in the meantime received an apparently unsolicited offer from Moscow. Dulles and
Humphrey appear to have had their pride insulted when the USSR made a more gener
ous offer. However, as early as January 13, 1956, joint British and US policy planners
issued a statement declaring that "If we should say to the Egyptians that we will not
consider any enterprise for which the Russians are bidding, the Russians would have an
easy weapon with which to drive us away from any project."57 Incidentally, it is impor
tant to recognize the courage of US Ambassador to Egypt Henry Byroade, who replied
to Dulles' scathing telegram on July 19, 1956 by stating, "we believe the facts them
selves are expressed in a misleading manner. Reference telegram ignores developments
in and around Egypt during period under discussion."58 The telegram highlights the fact
that Dulles and Humphrey perceived only the information that confirmed a specific
schematic understanding of Nasser, rather than the nuanced understanding necessary to
build successful country-specific policy. The complacency of this approach manifested
itself not only in the reversion to a schematic framework, but also in the hope that with
time the project as a whole would disappear.
54. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council." Wash
ington, June 28, 1956, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957. Arab-Israeli dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, Volume XV (1955-1957), p. 755.
55. "Editors Note: 288th Meeting of the National Security Council." June 16, 1956, United States
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Arab-Israeli dispute, Janu
ary 1-July 26, 1956, Volume XV (1955-1957), p. 729.
56. "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt." Washington, July 9, 1956,
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Arab-Israeli
dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956,Volume XV (1955-1957), p. 795.
57. "Memorandum of Conversation Department of State." Subject: U.S. - U.K. Interests and Ob
jectives in the Middle East in Light of the Threat Posed by Current Soviet Strategy in the Area. Par
ticipants U.S.: Allen, Rountree, Bowie, Matthews, Merchant, Byroade, Russell, Cyr, Baxter, Jones,
Wilkins, Geren, Dixon, Ogburn, Wilson, Lister, Blake. Participants U.K.: Evelyn Shuckburgh, Geof
frey Arthur, Ian Samuel, J.E. Coulson, William Barker, Willie Morris. Washington, January 13, 1956
(Afternoon), United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957.
Near East; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII (1955-1957), p. 229.
58. Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to th Department of State." From: Amb. Byroade, Cairo,
July 19, 1956, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957.
The United States and Britain discussed the implications of the Dam on other
"Riparian States." The Riparian States in this context refer to all the countries along the
Nile River. These states constitute the majority of East Africa and the Great Lakes re
gion. In early June 1956 the US and UK developed an idea for a "Riparian Conference,"
whereby all states through which the Nile runs would develop a joint water-sharing and
development plan. Despite the noble-sounding intent of this plan, it was actually meant
as a delaying tactic, which would "be used as a device to block an Egyptian-USSR
agreement on the dam,"59 as well as allow the Dam project itself to "languish."60 Brit
ish government representatives were the most supportive of this course of action and
spent considerable time lobbying the US to adopt this approach. British and American
policymakers intended to preserve the status quo by delaying and creating obstacles
for Egypt, all the while giving assurances that they did intend to help Egypt fund the
project. British and American policymakers sought to preserve Western influence in
Egypt by simply denying the Soviet Union an opportunity to gain influence. By this
approach, US decision-makers also hoped to avoid a congressional battle and offend
Baghdad Pact allies, while not bringing on the criticism inevitable in making a deci
sion. This approach did not work in regards to potential arms transactions with Egypt
in 1955, and had dubious merit in terms of economic partnerships.
Another line of criticism against US involvement in the Aswan Dam project
pertained to the strains that it would place on the Egyptian economy. State Depart
ment officials worried that taking part in the project would place the United States in
a difficult position that would require the US to exert control over Egyptian economic
policy. State Department decision-makers worried that the US would begin to receive
bad press in Egypt if public austerity measures needed to be implemented in order to
retain the fiscal solvency of Egypt during the years of the Dam construction. Rather,
these officials thought it would be better to allow the USSR to fund the Dam, in the
hope that the Soviets would have to enforce such policies in Egypt, thus negating the
prestige they might gain from supporting the project. The US policy, as noted by Dulles
in the introduction, should focus on aiding Egypt in undertaking "less monumental"
projects. This line of objection is another indicator of the presence of a colony schema
at work. Dulles, Humphrey, and other decision-makers perceived Egyptians as being
fundamentally incapable of planning the Dam project and making beneficial economic
policy. Though this line of criticism did take into account the actual Egyptian people, it
did so by severely discounting their abilities and capacity.
Criticism of the Aswan Dam project arose out of domestic, institutional, and per
sonal considerations, rather than the capacity of the project to achieve its proposed
outcome, which was to win the hearts and minds of the people in a country in a strategi
cally important and contested geographic area. Consideration of Baghdad Pact govern
ment objections had no direct bearing on the policy and its outcomes, but would indeed
59. "Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian,
and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State." Washington, June 6, 1956, United States
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Arab-Israeli dispute, Janu
ary 1-July 26, 1956, Volume XV (1955-1957), p. 718.
60. "Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State." London,
June 2, 1956, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957.
be more of a headache to foreign policy decision-makers who might have to respond

to Baghdad Pact needs. The same dynamic was at play with the looming congres
sional battle that would be necessary to obtain funding. Because of these factors, US
decision-makers found themselves incentivized to perceive Nasser in terms of the "col
ony" schema and construct a policy from the underlying assumptions such a schema
entailed. The policies that decision-makers opted for were characterized by the desire
to retain inertia, by letting the Dam "languish," or by simply undertaking more of the
same small scale economic programs that already had been in place without great suc
cess. Institutional considerations incentivized decision-makers to adopt a schematic
understanding of the situation and maintain bureaucratic placidity, rather than under
take a meaningful policy action in line with administration priorities and focused on
outcomes in the target population.
AWARENESS OF CONSEQUENCES
US contingency planning for the eventual refusal to fund the Dam is notable
for two aspects: first, policymakers foresaw a considerable decrease in US prestige
throughout the Arab world with an accompanying rise in anti-Westernism and greater
opportunities for Soviet political and economic penetration. Second, no one ever con
sidered the possibility that Nasser would nationalize the Suez Canal. For the purposes
of this analysis, the most important insight is the fact that despite awareness of the high
probability of adverse consequences, decision-makers opted to refuse funding simply
because it satisfied the terms of their perceptional construction of Nasser's Egypt.
A memo from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs advocated
for a withdrawal of the US offer, while at the same time predicting the following fall
out:
Nasser's reaction to a U.S. withdrawal of its offer will be sharp with cries of "bro
ken promises" and "betrayal" coming from Egyptian propaganda organs ... He is
likely to step up anti-western activities in Saudi Arabia and Libya, adding to them
a marked anti-U.S. note ... The Suez Canal problem and Middle East oil will also
be considered as fertile fields for Egyptian action against us ... The situation would
present a temptation to him to whip up the war fever against Israel to an increased
pitch as a means of making disappointment on the Aswan High Dam more nearly
tolerable. Failure to carry through on the Aswan High Dam would not hurt Nasser
significantly with the other Arab states, where his leadership rests on Arab unity
around an anti-Israel principle rather than on economic development.61
These predictions came, once again, in a document advocating the withdrawal of the
US offer of project assistance. The profound cost in local support would be worth it,
according to the author, because he did not believe that the USSR actually could de
61. "Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and Af
rican Affairs (Allen) to Secretary of State," Washington, July 17, 1956, United States Department of
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Arab-Israeli dispute, January 1-July 26,
1956, Volume XV (1955-1957), pp. 852-53.
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE ASWAN DAM * 101
liver a quality Dam: "we believe that an accentuation of Western pressures offers the
best prospects of bringing home to him [Nasser] and the Egyptian people the fallacy of
hoping to play off the West against the USSR."62 Rather than concentrating on spread
ing popular support for the West among Arab citizens, US policy was more focused on
scoring potential political points against the Soviet Union and those who might rely
on it if denied Western aid. This is of particular interest, as it directly contradicts the
policy aims initially advanced by Eisenhower, his special assistants, and the national
intelligence community in considering the Aswan Project.
Projects such as the Aswan Dam were under consideration inasmuch as they might
answer the physical needs and political aspirations of the Egyptian people, and by and
large, the region as a whole. Decision-makers were aware that their decision to refuse
funding for the Dam would lead to the direct opposite effect among the population of
Egypt and the region. The decision was made with a different political calculation in
mind, one that would placate inter-institutional pressures and perceptions. Not funding
the Dam would defuse a possible budget battle with Congress and it would placate the
governments (if not the citizens) of Baghdad Pact states. These considerations created
the environmental conditions in which decision-makers like Dulles had incentive to
perceive Nasser to be a "non-compliant colonial leader" with Soviet sympathies. Once
this perceptional framework was accepted, the administration could justify decisions
that were more institutionally expedient than capable of producing beneficial policy
outcomes.
CONCLUSION
The Aswan Dam project was an opportunity to enact foreign policy priorities
held by the highest levels of the Eisenhower Administration. However, less than a year
after the administration's initial offer of support to Egypt, foreign policy decision-mak
ers decided not to fund the Dam, with significant near- and long-term adverse conse
quences for the region and for US standing there. This decision came from high-level
decision-makers, such as Secretary of State Dulles and Treasury Secretary Humphrey,
who had adopted schematic perceptions of Nasser and his motivations. The adoption
of this schema was facilitated by the personal, political, and institutional motivations
of these decision-makers. Dulles and Humphrey encountered a number of domestic
institutional constraints, as well as conflicting international priorities. They faced a
Congress hostile to the idea of supporting agricultural competition, particularly in a
state they perceived to be friendly with the Soviet Union and bent on the destruc
tion of Israel. Internationally, Dulles feared criticism from Middle Eastern states in
the Baghdad Pact who would question why a non-Pact state received such generous
aid. Furthermore, the close relationship between Britain and the US inclined Dulles
to accept the UK's reticence to support an influential post-colonial leader. Finally, the
perception that Egypt was playing the US off the Soviet Union in order to reach a more
favorable deal engendered a great deal of personal resentment from Secretary Dulles
and others. Despite the exculpating evidence and Nasser's consistent support of a deal
62. "Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and Afri
can Affairs (Allen) to Secretary of State)," p. 850.
with the United States, Dulles still attributed a number of negative character qualities
to the leader after the Soviet Foreign Minister visited Egypt. As a result of conflicting
institutional, diplomatic, and personal pressures, Dulles and others found themselves
adopting a schematic understanding of Egypt. Nasser became the leader of a "non
compliant colony." The US perceived him as a xenophobic demagogue and a puppet of
a great power enemy. Dulles and others wrote Nasser off as an immature agitator with
more slogans than ideas, and at the same time cynically attempting to play the US off
the USSR. Perhaps most importantly, the US saw Egyptians as "untalented children" in
need of external support and advice, and perhaps it is due to this schematic element that
no analysis of the situation anticipated an Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal as
part of an attempt to carry out the Dam project without foreign aid.
Foreign policy decision-making is a multi-tiered process. Policymakers must
optimize state, bureaucratic institutional, and indeed personal and professional level
outcomes. The interests and priorities of these different tiers can easily be at odds with
one another. These situations provide an incentive to foreign policy decision-makers to
adopt schematic understandings of international situations. No one consciously adopts
schemata; rather, in the presence of contradictory pressures, individuals are more likely
to agree with interpretations that reduce tensions between various competing institu
tional interests. Further research into this area should include a study of the perceptions
of the US held by ranking members of Nasser's government, which would be of critical
value in understanding Nasser's own behavior regarding the Aswan Dam project.

Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don'T - The Eisenhower Administration and The Aswan Dam

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Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don'T - The Eisenhower Administration and The Aswan Dam

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Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don't: The Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan

MOTIVATION AND SCHEMATIC IMAGING

plicated. Consequently, debate among adversaries typically will focus on compet

BACKGROUND: EISENHOWER AND NASSER

24. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, p. 302.

29. Aburish, Nasser, The Last Arab, p. 46.

During deliberations on the Aswan Dam question, US decision-makers construct

42. Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi, "Images in International Relations."

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Congress' control over the purse-strings of government, made it politically expedient

be more of a headache to foreign policy decision-makers who might have to respond

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