Republic of the Philippines On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of
SUPREME COURT Camarines Norte an Information dated October 17, 1987 docketed as
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44723 August 31, 1987
STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY, petitioner
vs.
ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA, in his
capacity as OFFICER-IN-CHARGE of the Provincial Fiscal's OFFICE
of Camarines Norte, and GIL ALAPAN et. al., respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case No.
821 of the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte until the same
is terminated.
The facts of the case are not disputed. On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed
a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the
installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial
Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for
preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a
resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommending that an information for
Attempted Theft be filed against private respondents on a finding of prima
facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin
Ilustre. Private respondents sought reconsideration of the resolution but
the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated October 14,
1974.
Criminal Case No. 821, charging private respondents with the crime of
Attempted Theft.
In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the
Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal dated August 26, 1974 and October 14, 1974.
On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial
Fiscal by telegram to "Please elevate entire records PFO Case 577
against Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings
pending review."
The letter-request for review was opposed by petitioner in a letter to the
Secretary of Justice dated November 23, 1974 alleging, among other
things, that an information for Attempted Theft had already been filed
against private respondents for which reason the request for review has
become a moot question as the Provincial Fiscal has lost jurisdiction to
dismiss the charge for attempted theft.
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records,
reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and
directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of
the criminal case. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter dated June
11, 1975.
A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the
Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground that there
was a prima facie evidence against private respondents and set the case
for trial on February 25, 1976.
Private respondents sought reconsideration of the court's ruling but in an
Order dated February 13, 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was
likewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to April 23, 1976.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First
Instance of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge
of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte.
On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the
case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in an
order dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested that
he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor
to appear therein. Hence, this petition for mandamus.
In this action, petitioner prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus
"commanding respondent fiscal or any other person who may be assigned
or appointed to act in his place or stead to prosecute Criminal Case No.
821 of the Court of First instance of Camarines Norte" (Petition, Rollo, p.
27).
There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addresses to
the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file
the information according to whether the evidence is in his opinion
sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
(Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and when he decides
not to file the information, in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be
compelled to do so (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However, after the
case had already been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power,
without the consent of the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal
actions actually instituted and pending further proceedings. The power to
dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court" (U.S. vs. Barredo, 32
Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, supra).
However, the matter of instituting an information should be
distinguished from a motion by the fiscal for the dismissal
of a case already filed in court. The judge may properly
deny the motion where, judging from the record of the
preliminary investigation, there appears to be sufficient
evidence to sustain the prosecution. This is, as it should
be, because the case is already in court and, therefore,
within its discretion and control (Abela vs. Golez, 131
SCRA 12).
This ruling is just being consistent with the principle first laid down in U.S.
vs. Valencia (1 Phil. 642) where it was held that "after the complaint has
been presented, and certainly after the trial has been commenced, the
court and not the fiscal has full control of it. The complaint cannot be
withdrawn by the fiscal without the consent of the court." It is discretionary
on the court where the case is pending to grant the motion to dismiss or
deny the same (Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, 103 Phil.
914).
In the case at bar, the court below denied the fiscal's motion to dismiss on
the ground that there was a prima facie case against private respondents.
The question presented for determination now is-after a case has been
filed in court, can a fiscal be compelled to prosecute the same, after his
motion to dismiss it has been denied?
This court is of the view that the writ prayed for should issue.
Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must
proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the
court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the
accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility much less
leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor. At
all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and
control (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, the entire
proceedings wig be null and void (People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361).
In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to
appear for the government since an offense is an outrage to the
sovereignty of the State." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
IV, 1980 Ed., p. 10). This is so because "the prosecuting officer is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a
sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer
(Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556).
Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case
exists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when
denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and
prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. At least what he can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution
and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a
private prosecutor subject to his direction and control (U.S. vs.
Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where
there is no other prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his
duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the court
decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by
both parties.
The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the
records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the
dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said
directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the
fiscal to prosecute the case. It is the court where the case is filed and not
the fiscal that has full control of it. Very recently, this Court in Mario Fl.
Crespo vs. Hon. Leodegario L. Mogul (G.R. No. 53373, promulgated June
30, 1987) ruled:
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court,
the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby Granted. Public respondent or any other
person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, is
hereby ordered to continue prosecuting Criminal Case No. 821 until the
same is terminated.
SO ORDERED.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a

complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.
It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001]
Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the
residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches,
Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who
testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams
of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguits room, and
Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet
inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant
was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30
p.m. of said day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one
civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the
warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguits door, but
nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently
panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and
entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the
occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching
the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also
containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried
leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint
having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the
items seized was prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the
search, the police operatives took Salanguit with them to Station 10,
EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated
evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77
grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37
grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one
weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be
marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of
Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana,
(Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed
on 28 December 1995. After hearing, the trial court rendered its
decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-
95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum
of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his
conviction on the grounds that (1) the admissibility of the shabu
allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on
the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the
admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from
Salanguit to the plain view doctrine; and (3) the employment of
unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing
evidence to support the seizure of drug paraphernalia, and
whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the
plain view doctrine.
Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity
of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing
probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause
to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does
not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact
would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by
the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search
warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid
as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence.
In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguits
residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant
being founded on probable cause personally determined by the
judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. With respect to, and in light of the plain view doctrine, the
police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e.,
whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the
warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguits person or in an
area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably
during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered
from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was
invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-
95-64357 only.
Sta. Rosa Mining Company vs. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Zabala [GR
L-44723, 31 August 1987]
En Banc, Bidin (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 21 March 1974, Sta. Rosa Mining Company filed a
complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part
of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte against Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by
Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The case was assigned to third
Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who,
after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated 26
August 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Theft
be filed against Garrido and Alapan on a finding of prima facie case
which resolution was approved by Fiscal Ilustre. Garrido and Alapan
sought reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied by
Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated 14 October 1974. On 29 October
1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Camarines Norte an Information dated 17 October 1987 (Criminal
Case 821), charging Garrido aand Alapan with the crime of
Attempted Theft. In a letter dated 22 October 1974, Garrido and
Alapan requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of the
Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated 26 August 1974
and 14 October 1974. On 6 November 1974, the Chief State
Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to elevate
entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido et al., review in five days
and defer all proceedings pending review. On 6 March 1975, the
Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings
of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said
prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the
criminal case. The Company sought reconsideration of the directive
of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter
dated 11 June 1975. A motion to dismiss dated 16 September 1975
was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion
on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against Garrido
and Alapan and set the case for trial on 25 February 1976. Garrido
and Alapan sought reconsideration of the courts ruling but in an
Order dated 13 February 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was
likewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to 23 April 1976. Thereafter,
Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the CFI of Albay and Fiscal
Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscals Office of
Camarines Norte. On 19 April 1976, Fiscal Zabala filed a Second
Motion to Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 23 April 1976. Whereupon, Fiscal
Zabala manifested that he would not prosecute the case and
disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, the
Company filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the fiscal can refuse to prosecute the case if the
Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of prima facie case by the
fiscal.
Held: If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists,
he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when
denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to
proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue
appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of
evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his
direction and control. Where there is no other prosecutor available,
he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence
to the best of his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case
on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties. The mere fact
that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the
case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is
denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal
to prosecute the case. Once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should he addressed to the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.