CASES CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 10

THIRD DIVISION

RAFAEL BAUTISTA and G.R. No. 148361

LIGAYA ROSEL,
Petitioners, Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES, Promulgated:

INC.,
Respondent. November 29, 2005

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision[1] and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 24, 2000 and
May 30, 2001, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 43574.

The facts are:

Spouses Rafael and Ligaya Bautista, petitioners herein, are the registered owners of
a 3,856-square meter lot located at Natipuan, Nasugbu, Batangas, as evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1436 issued in their names on January 15,
1989 by the Register of Deeds, same province.

On May 13, 1996, Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc. (MMCI), respondent, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas a complaint for cancellation of
petitioners title and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction, docketed
as Civil Case No. 371. Respondent alleged inter alia that without any color of right
and through dubious means, petitioners were able to obtain OCT No. P-1436 in their
names.

On May 29, 1996, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it does not state a cause of action. They averred that respondent is a private
corporation, hence, disqualified under the Constitution[2] from acquiring public
alienable lands except by lease. Respondent cannot thus be considered a real party
in interest.

In its Order dated August 30, 1996, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss,
holding that since the property is an alienable public land, respondent is not qualified
to acquire it except by lease. Thus, it has no cause of action.

Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for leave to file an
amended complaint for quieting of title. Respondent alleged that the technical
description in petitioners title does not cover the disputed lot.

Thereupon, petitioners filed their opposition, contending that the amended complaint
does not also state a cause of action and if admitted, respondents theory of the case
is substantially modified.
On November 18, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners motion
to dismiss, thus, reversing its Order of August 30, 1996 dismissing the complaint in
Civil Case No. 371.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43574. They alleged that
the amended complaint does not cure the defect in the original complaint which does
not state a cause of action. Clearly, in admitting respondents amended complaint,
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

On November 24, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court
in its Resolution of May 30, 2001.

Hence, the instant petitioner for review on certiorari.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting respondents amended complaint.

Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his
pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a
responsive pleading is servedor, in the case of a reply, at any
time within ten (10) days after it is served.

The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any responsive
pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of
whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. It is settled that a
motion to dismiss is not the responsive pleading contemplated by the Rule.[3]Records
show that petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint
in Civil Case No. 371. What they filed was a motion to dismiss. It follows that
respondent, as a plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after the original
complaint was ordered dismissed, provided that the order of dismissal is not yet
final,[4] as in this case.
Verily, the Court of Appeals correctly held that in issuing the assailed Order
admitting the amended complaint, the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion.
Hence, neither certiorari nor prohibition would lie.

As to petitioners contention that respondent corporation is barred from acquiring the

subject lot, suffice it to say that this is a matter of defense which can only be properly
determined during the full-blown trial of the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43574 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED
 SECOND DIVISION

GAUDENCIA NAVARRO VDA. DE G.R. No. 160214

TAROMA, BENEDICTO N. TAROMA,
ANGELINA T. GUARDION,
CONSOLACION T. CABUTE, OFELIA
N. TAROMA and NOEL N. TAROMA, Present:
P e t i t i o n e r s,

- versus - PUNO,
Chairman,
SPS. FELINO N. TAROMA and LYDIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
MARTINEZ, SPS. JOSE N. TAROMA
and IMELDA NOVERO and THE CALLEJO, SR.,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE TINGA, and
PROVINCE OF TARLAC,
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
R e s p o n d e n t s.

Promulgated:

December 16, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x
 DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Court has said quite often enough that although a party may avail himself of
the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court, he is not free to resort to these
remedies simultaneously lest he be guilty of forum shopping. Neither is he free to
wage a battle already long lost as this is proscribed by the rule on finality of
judgments.

Before us is a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
nullification of a Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 03 0ctober 2003 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 70017 which noted without action petitioners Brief Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that it had already lost jurisdiction over the case
upon the filing by petitioners of a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court.

As culled from the records of the case, the facts are as follows:

On 25 August 1997, herein petitioners Gaudencia Navarro Vda. De Taroma,

Benedicto N. Taroma, Angelina T. Guardion, Consolacion T. Cabute, Ofelia N.
Taroma and Noel N. Taroma instituted a complaint for annulment of title and
damages against herein private respondents before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Moncada, Tarlac. After trial on the merits, the MCTC dismissed the
complaint. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be DISMISSED. With

costs against plaintiffs.[1]

Petitioners appealed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac.
On 26 March 2002, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC, Presiding Judge
Cesar M. Sotero disposing that:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is

AFFIRMED.[2]

A copy of the RTC decision was received by petitioners, thru counsel, on 27

March 2002. A motion for extension of time to file petition for review was
thereafter filed. On 24 April 2002, within the period of extension, petitioners,
through their counsel Atty. Leonel L. Yasay, filed a Petition for Review.[3] In a
Resolution dated 30 May 2002, the Court of Appeals directed private
respondents to file their comment to the petition without necessarily giving
due course thereto.[4] On 13 June 2002, petitioners, through collaborating
counsel, Atty. Esmeraldo U. Guloy, filed an Urgent Motion Ex-Parte to amend
the petition attaching therewith the said Amended Petition. [5] On 12 July
2002, private respondents filed their Comment to the original petition.[6]

In a Resolution dated 06 August 2002, the Court of Appeals, among other

things, required counsel for private respondents to comment on the
Amended Petition.[7] Private respondents filed their comment to the
amended petition on 06 September 2002.[8]

On 27 February 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision,[9] the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack

of merit and the assailed 26 March 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. 556 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[10]

A copy of the decision was received by petitioners, through their counsels, on 06

March 2003. On 19 March 2003, they filed a motion for reconsideration of said
decision before the Court of Appeals essentially arguing that the decision was
invalid as it was based on the original petition for review and not on the amended
petition filed soon thereafter.[11]

The next day, or on 20 March 2003, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a
Petition (Ex-Abundante Cautela) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the very same decision under reconsideration in the Court of
Appeals.[12] This case was docketed as G.R. No. 157393 and was raffled to the First
Division of this Court.

On 28 April 2003, the First Division resolved to deny the petition for failure to
submit proof of authority to sign the verification and certification on non-forum
shopping.[13] Petitioners moved for reconsideration on 03 June 2003.[14] On 25 June
2003, the petition was denied with finality.[15]

Refusing to accept the Courts ruling, petitioners filed on 29 July 2003 a Motion for
Referral of the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc in the Interest of Justice and for
the Maintenance of the Rule of Law.[16] Among the reasons cited by petitioners for
their request was the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the 27
February 2003 Decision before the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution dated 13
August 2003, the First Division noted without action the motion for referral, the
petition for review on certiorari having been denied in the resolution of April 28,
2003 and the motion for reconsideration thereof denied with finality in the
resolution of June 25, 2003.[17]

In the meantime, on 20 August 2003, the Court of Appeals resolved the motion for
reconsideration filed therein by declaring the same as abandoned in accordance
with Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.[18]

Still undeterred by the resolutions of both the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, petitioners subsequently did the following:
1. Before the Court of Appeals: On 04 September 2003, petitioners filed a Brief
Motion for Reconsideration of the 20 August 2003 Resolution essentially
arguing that in filing a petition for review in the Supreme Court, they cannot
be deemed to have abandoned their motion for reconsideration before the
Court of Appeals as different subject matters were involved;[19] and

2. Before the Supreme Court en banc: On 17 September 2003, petitioners

transmitted a copy of the 13 August 2003 Resolution of the First Division in
the hope that the Court en banc will accept their motion for referral.[20]

In response to this latest barrage by petitioners, the First Division of this

Court held in a Resolution dated 01 October 2003 that:

The transmittal of counsel for petitioners of the resolution of August

13, 2003 to the Court En Banc for referral thereto is NOTED WITHOUT
ACTION.

Let an ENTRY of judgment in this case be made in due course.

NO FURTHER pleadings shall be entertained herein.[21]

In the meantime, on 22 July 2003, the Decision in G.R. No. 157393 became final and
executory and was thereafter recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.[22]

For its part, the Court of Appeals resolved petitioners Brief Motion for
Reconsideration in this wise:

Petitioners filed an Amendment Petition for Review and respondents

were made to comment thereon, but the Court has taken no action on said
prayer for admission of the Amended Petition for Review.

Moreover, Sec. 15 of Rule VI of the IRCA clearly provides that if a

petition is filed with the Supreme Court subsequent to the filing of a Motion
for Reconsideration with this Court, the latter should be deemed
ABANDONED. Clearly, when petitioner filed the Supreme Court Petition, on
the justification that it has to be filed within 15 days otherwise the decision
will become final, the pending Motion for Reconsideration is deemed
ABANDONED.

The Motion for Reconsideration seeks for the nullification of the 27

February 2003 Decision rendered by the Former Sixth Division. The Petition
for Review on Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court likewise prays for the
nullification of the same decision. Thus, the Brief Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioners is NOTED without action
considering that this Court already lost jurisdiction over the case upon filing
of the petition with the Supreme Court by herein petitioners.[23]

The aforecited Court of Appeals Resolution, dated 03 October 2003, is the

subject matter of the instant petition whereby petitioners replicate their argument
that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, their filing of a petition for
review on certiorari in the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 157393 did not result in the
abandonment of their motion for reconsideration filed before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners contend that

With all due respect to the Honorable Court of Appeals, the herein
petitioners sincerely believe that they have never abandoned their
AMENDED PETITION FOR REVIEW dated May 30, 2002, which was filed on
June 13, 2002, neither has the Court lost jurisdiction over it. They also
contend that the Court rendered a wrong decision on February 27, 2003,
because it was a decision of the Petition for Review dated April 24, 2002,
which has been earlier amended.[24]

In support of their arguments, petitioners argue that under Section 2, Rule 10 of

the Rules of Court, they can amend their petition as a matter of right before a
responsive pleading is served upon them or, in case of a reply, at any time within
ten (10) days after it is served. Thus, they alleged that the Court of Appeals failure
to admit their amended petition was probably due to the clerk of courts
inadvertence and that abandonment as a ground for dismissing their motion for
reconsideration was merely an afterthought.

We are not convinced.

The Brief Motion for Reconsideration partakes of a second motion for

reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 27 February 2003 as the
first motion for reconsideration of said decision was already denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated 20 August 2003. The Court of Appeals thus correctly
noted without action the Brief Motion for Reconsideration considering that under
Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, such motions shall not be entertained by
the Court.[25]

Be that as it may, and if only to disabuse the minds of petitioners, we shall

state, once and for all, that from a perusal of the records, it is starkly clear that the
Court of Appeals never admitted the Amended Petition, which explains why its
Decision of 27 February 2003 was based on the original Petition. That private
respondents were asked to comment to the Amended Petition does not mean that
the same was given due course. If at all, the records are deafeningly silent as to the
action taken by the Court which legally means that the Amended Petition was
denied. Thus, petitioners reliance on Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court[26] is
misplaced as this refers to an amendment made before the trial court. The
applicable provision is Section 6, Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTC in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction which states:

Section 6. Due Course. If upon the filing of the comment or such

other pleadings as the court may allow or require, or after the expiration of
the period for the filing thereof without such comment or pleading having
been submitted, the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the lower court
has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modification of the appealed decision, it may accordingly give due course
to the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals, therefore, is vested with discretion to admit or deny the
Amended Petition filed before it. In herein case, when it passed upon the
matter sub-silentio, such can only be construed as a denial of the said Amended
Petition.

Our discussion does not end here, however. We need to stress that
notwithstanding the foregoing discussion on the issue presented for resolution by
petitioners, which is but a mere concession to petitioners in the interest of
substantial justice, the present case must be denied on a more fundamental level.

Under the undisputed facts of the case, the existence of forum shopping is
self-evident and seals the fate of the petition as a lost cause. It must be
remembered that from the Decision dated 27 February 2003, petitioners sought
reconsideration with the Court of Appeals. Twenty-four hours later, the same
petitioners sought the reversal of the same decision, this time before this Court on
petition for review. As the records would reveal, petitioners actively pursued both
actions before the two courts so much so that they were filing pleadings in both
courts with the same end-view in mind, i.e., to reverse the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 27 February 2003. When the First Division of this Court declared that
no further pleadings by petitioners would be entertained in G.R. No. 157393,
petitioners went around the proscription by filing instead the instant case.

There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails himself of several

judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or
already resolved adversely by, some court.[27] A party should not be allowed to
present simultaneous remedies in two different forums for it degrades and wreaks
havoc to the rule on orderly procedure.[28] Thus:

. . . A party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court

for the myriad reliefs from the court. However, such party is not free to
resort to them simultaneously or at his pleasure or caprice. Such party must
follow the sequence and hierarchical order in availing such remedies and
not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and loose with the said
rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with
the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades
the administration of justice. It the act of the party or its counsel clearly
constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall constitute
direct contempt, and a cause for administrative sanctions, as well as a
ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice.[29]

Finally, it is also to be pointed out that at the heart of the instant petition is
an attempt to resurrect the issue of the validity of the 27 February 2003 Court of
Appeals Decision which was already sought to be annulled in petitioners
dismissed Petition (Ex-Abundante Cautela), a dismissal by this Court which had
already attained finality; hence unassailable. We thus remind petitioners that by
choosing their forum, and by unfortunately losing their claim thereat, they are
nevertheless bound by such adverse judgment on account of finality of judgment,
otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.[30] Litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause therein should be
laid to rest.[31]
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-5711. December 29, 1953.]

PEDRO PAESTE and FELIX CARPIO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RUSTICO JAURIGUE, Defendant-

Appellee.

Jose T. Cajulis for Appellants.

De Mesa & De Mesa and Felipe T. Lopez for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ANNULMENT TO COMPLAINT. Amendments to pleadings are favored and
should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice. (Torres v. Tomacruz, 49 Phil., 913). Under section 1
of Rule 17, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course, that is, without leave of court, at
any time before a responsive pleading is served. A motion to dismiss is not a "responsive pleading." (1
Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 376.)

2. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; ACTION FOR ANNULMENT. Where the
complaint alleges that the plaintiffs have executed the documents in question through force and
intimidation, that defendant has been threatening plaintiffs with death if they take the matter to the
authorities, and that these threats lasted until 1951, prescription does not begin to run until the party
affected is perfectly free to go to court as he wishes.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

On June 28, 1951, Pedro Paeste and Felix Carpio brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
Province against Rustico Jaurigue for the annulment of two documents, copied in the complaint, which, it is
alleged, Felix Carpio and his son Maximo Carpio had been compelled to sign through force and intimidation
and against their will. One of the documents purports to be an affidavit executed by Maximo Carpio on
March 12, 1945, certifying to the fact that his father, Felix Carpio, was indebted to defendant in the sum of
P3,900 and that his father had agreed to execute a deed conveying 4 hectares of coconut land by way of
sale with pacto de retro to the said defendant; while the other document purports to be a deed executed by
Felix Carpio on May 3, 1945, conveying to defendant, by way of sale with pacto de retro, a piece of land in
barrio Ilayang Rizal, Unisan, Tayabas, for the sum of P1,000. The complaint also alleges that, since the
execution of the documents above referred to, defendant with the aid of armed men has repeatedly entered
another piece of land described as "lot No. 1488, Cad. 251" in the same barrio, which was in the possession
of plaintiffs but different from the one mentioned in the documents in question, and against plaintiffs will,
gathered coconuts therefrom of the total value of P7,000. In addition to the annulment of the documents,
plaintiffs, therefore, asked that defendant be sentenced to pay them the said sum of P7,000 plus P2,000 for
damages and attorneys fees.

On motion of the defendant, the court dismissed the case on the grounds that plaintiffs action had already
prescribed, since "Under Article 1301 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 as well as under Section 43,
Paragraph 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 1391 of the new Civil Code, an action for nullity in
cases of intimidation or duress must be brought within 4 years from the date the cause of action accrued."
libra ry
cralaw virt ua1aw

Plaintiffs asked for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal and, to meet the defense of prescription, also
filed an amended complaint alleging that since the execution of the pacto de retro deed of May 3, 1945 by
Felix Carpio, "defendant, with aid of armed men has continuously committed and employed threat,
intimidation and duress against plaintiffs and with warning to the latter or to bring this incident and matter
to the proper authorities under pain of death." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

But the court denied reconsideration and disallowed the amended complaint whereupon plaintiffs brought
the case to the Supreme Court by way of appeal, alleging that the appeal involves a purely legal question.

Appellants contend that the lower court erred in not admitting their amended complaint and in holding that
their action had already prescribed. Appellants are right on both counts.

Amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice. (Torres
v. Tomacruz, 49 Phil. 913). Moreover, under section 1 of Rule 17, Rules of Court, a party may amend his
pleading once as a matter of course, that is, without leave of court, at any time before a responsive pleading
is served. A motion to dismiss is not a "responsive pleading." (Moran on the Rules of Court, vol. I, 1952 ed.,
p. 376). As plaintiffs amended their complaint before it was answered, the motion to admit the amendment
should not have been denied. It is true that the amendment was presented after the original complaint had
been ordered dismissed. But that order was not yet final for it was still under reconsideration.

As to the question of prescription, it is evident that, with the allegations in the amended complaint that the
plaintiffs had executed the documents in question through force and intimidation, that defendant had been
threatening plaintiffs with death if they took the matter to the authorities, and that these threats lasted until
1951, plaintiffs action does not appear to have prescribed, for, in these cases prescription does not begin to
run until the party affected is perfectly free to go to court as he wishes. As Manresa says: jgc:chanrob les.com .ph

"El principio fundamental es, que comience la prescripcion cuando el vicio cesa, y, o se recobra la libertad
cohibida, o se conoce la realidad ignorada o falseada. Por eso, tratandose de la violencia o intimidacion,
comienza el plazo cuando cesan estas, cuando la libertad del contratante reaparece; de donde se deduce
que si despues de cesar la intimidacion o violencia que arranco el consentimiento, se emplean otras para
impedir el ejercicio de la accion de nulidad solo cuando estas fuerzas o amenazas posteriores desaparecen,
comienza a transcurrir el plazo, y que al ejercerse aquellas (cuya prueba siempre incumbe al que las sufre),
se interrumpe la prescripcion comenzada." (8 Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, Manresa, pags. 797-
798).

We also observe that the original complaint claims damages for fruits gathered from 1945 to 1951 from land
held by defendant but different from the one covered by the documents in question. Not all of this claim is
barred by prescription.

In view of the foregoing, the order dismissing the case and rejecting the amended complaint is hereby set
aside and the case remanded to the court below for further proceedings. With costs. So ordered.
---Amendment to correct a jurisdictional defect before a responsive pleading is served --- CELESTINA
GUMABAY, assisted by her husband, DIOSDADO MABBORANG, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIANA
BARALIN, SANTIAGO BUNAGAN, LORETO BUNAGAN, BASILIO MAMBA, BALBINO CATABAY, ARCADIO
MAGGAY, LUPO GUIYAB and FRANCISCO CALIMARAN, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-30683 May 31,
1977 FACTS: Celestina Gumabay sued defendants in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan to recover
possession of a parcel of cornland assessed in her name. She alleged that the defendants forcibly
entered the land. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, inasmuch as it
alleged a cause of action for forcible entry, which occurred within one year before the complaint was
filed, the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the case. It should be filed the proper inferior
court. Without awaiting the resolution of that motion, Celestina Gumabay filed an amended complaint
wherein she alleged that the defendants claimed to be the owners of the land. She transformed her
forcible entry action into an action to quiet title. A copy of that amended complaint was personally serve
on defendants' counsel. The lower court admitted the amended complaint, ordered the defendants to
answer it, and denied the motion to dismiss. Celestina in her motion asked that the defendants be
declared in default for not having answered her amended complaint. The defendants contend that the
lower court erred in not dismissing the original complaint, in admitting the amended complaint, in
assuming that it acquired jurisdiction over their persons on the basis of the amended complaint even
without service of new summons, in declaring them in default, and in not granting them relief from the
judgment by default.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in not dismissing the original complaint, in admitting the
amended complaint, in assuming that it acquired jurisdiction over their persons on the basis of the
amended complaint even without service of new summons, in declaring them in default, and in not
granting them relief from the judgment by default.

RULING: Those contentions cannot sustained. The original complaint for forcible entry contained the
basic prayer "that the plaintiff be declared the absolute owner of the land in question". That relief was
retained in the amended complaint. The only difference between the original and amended complaints
is that the latter contained the additional allegation that the "defendants are now asserting and claiming
title and absolute ownership over the land in question which is adverse and against the interest of the
plaintiff". The plaintiff explained that she had to amend her complaint in order that the "real matter in
dispute", which is "the question of ownership", may be "determined in a single proceeding, thereby
avoiding multiplicity of suits" (16 Record on Appeal). We hold that the trial court's order admitting the
amended complaints is in consonance with the object of the Rules of Court to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding (Sec. 2, Rule 1). To
dismiss the original complaint and to require the plaintiff to file another action to quiet title would have
resulted in circuitour, dilatory and expensive proceeding which, in the case of pauper litigant like
Celestina Gumabay, should have been avoided, as it was a prudently avoided by the trial court. For the
same reasons, defendants' theory that new summons shoud have been issued for the amended
complaint is untenable. The trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants when they were served with summons on the basis of the original complaint and when they
appeared and filed a motion to dismiss. Defendants' two lawyers were given plenty to time to answer
the amended complaint. Their failure to answer was inexcusable. The answer attached to their petition
for relief form judgment does not contain any meritorious defense. Therefore, to set aside the judgment
by default and grant a new trial would be an Idle ceremony. There is no probability that defendants;
evidence would justify a reversal of the judgment by defauld. (Vda. de Yulo vs. Chua Chuco, 87 Phil. 448.
449; Gonzalez vs. Amon, 98 Phil. 587; Miranda vs. Legaspi, 92 Phil. 290; Baquiran vs Court of Appeals,
112 Phil. 764, 771).
 epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-62082 February 26, 1992

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. TEODORO N. FLORENDO, Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, 12th Regional
Disctrict, Branch IV, Dumaguete City, VIVIENNE B. VILORIA, SOCORRO MISA, GERMELIN
ESTORCO, PABLO BENDOLO, REWEL CABUAL, BONIFACIO VALEROSO, ET.
AL., respondents.

Juan J. Diaz, Benjamin C. Del Rosarion and Pedro L. Lazo for petitioner.

Maria Corazon C. Locsin and Edwin E. Torres for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking to annul and set aside the: (a) order
of the respondent judge dated May 21, 1982 admitting private respondents' "First Amended
Complaint" in CAR Case No. 532 entitled "Vivienne B. Viloria, et al. vs. Philippine National Bank, et
al." for declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings in violation of P.D. Nos. 27 and 946; (b)
order dated June 3, 1982 denying PNB's opposition to the first amended complaint; and (c) order
dated June 28, 1982 denying PNB's motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Plaintiffs are tenants of four (4) parcels of land located in the municipality of Mabinay, Negros
Oriental, whose previous owner Ricardo Valeroso, mortgaged the same to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB, for short). In 1971, said parcels of land were bought by spouses Agripino and Soledad
Viloria who assumed the mortgage with PNB (Rollo, Comment, p. 90).

In 1974, defendant PNB requested defendant Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental to foreclose the
mortgage on the aforesaid parcels of land after the failure of the owners thereof to pay certain
amortization and the same was sold at public auction to the defendant bank as the highest bidder
(Rollo, Brief for Private Respondents, p. 147; Annex "2", p. 3). Notwithstanding the fact that said
lands were already brought under the Land Reform Program of the government, the PNB caused the
titles to said parcels of land transferred in its name to the prejudice of plaintiffs (Rollo, Ibid.).

On September 8, 1981, plaintiffs Vivienne B. Viloria, et al. filed a complaint for "Declaration of Nullity
of the Foreclosure Proceedings in Violation of P.D. Nos. 27 and 946" against the defendants PNB, et
al. in the Court of Agrarian Relations, 12th Judicial District, Branch IV, Dumaguete City.
On October 7, 1981, defendant PNB answered the complaint with counterclaim for damages.
Plaintiffs, in turn, filed their reply to the counterclaim dated October 10, 1981. Defendant PNB then
moved for leave of court to file third party complaint dated October 20, 1981 against the registered
owners-mortgagors of the subject parcels of land.

Plaintiffs Vivienne Viloria, et al. moved for the amendment of their complaint to implead the heirs of
the deceased plaintiff-Agripino Viloria which respondent Judge admitted in an order dated February
26, 1982.

On May 28, 1982, private respondents Vivienne Viloria, et al. moved to further amend their amended
complaint. Notable amendment introduced in the First Amended Complaint is the inclusion of
another parcel of land as subject matter thereof, described as follows:

E Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42836, a parcel of land (Lot 787-B-2-A of the
subdivision plan, Psd-54375, being a portion of Lot 7887-B-2 described on plan Psd-
956, L.R.C. Record No. 9465), with all improvements thereon situated at Cebu City.
Bounded on NE., along line 1-2 by lot 785, Cebu Cadastre; on the SE., along line 2-
3, by lot 787-A, Cebu Cadastre; on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot 787-B-2-B of the
subdivision plan; and on the NW., along line 4-1 by lots 788-A-1 and 788-A-2 of plan
Psd-17436. Containing an area of TWO HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR square meters
(294) more or less.

Said property belongs to the spouses Agripino and Soledad Viloria and mortgaged also with PNB. It
is further alleged that:

While letter "E" is the property located in Cebu City and mortgaged with defendant
Bank should be considered as one and indivisible with the mortgage executed upon
the four (4) parcels of land situated at Mabinay (Negros Oriental) and were put under
Land Reform by virtue of the real estate mortgage executed and signed by the
spouses land owner Agripino and Soledad Viloria which portion of the Real Estate
Mortgage document specifically paragraph No. 2 which states "That for and in
consideration of certain loans, overdrafts and other credit accommodations obtained
from the mortgage, which is hereby fixed at P115,449.61 Philippine Currency, and to
secure the payment of the same and those others that the mortgage may extend to
the mortgagor including interest and expenses and other obligations owing by the
mortgagor to the mortgagee whether direct or indirect or secondary. . . (Rollo,
Petition, p. 5).

PNB opposed the admission of the aforesaid private respondent's First Amended Complaint on the
grounds that there was no proper notice of hearing as required by the Uniform CAR Rules of
procedure, the impropriety of including TCT No. 42836 a residential land situated in Cebu City as
subject matter of the complaint, and the failure of private respondents to attach a copy of the real
estate mortgage contract upon which the action was based (Rollo, Annex "I", pp. 37-38).

In an order dated May 31, 1982, respondent Judge Florendo granted private respondents' Viloria, et
al. motion and thus, admitted the First Amended Complaint. Said order states among others:

Acting on the "Motion to Amend Amended Complaint" dated May 28, 1982, filed by
Ma. Corazon C. Locsin, counsel for plaintiffs, wherein the First Amended Complaint
(pp. 285 to 290 inclusive) of the records, was attached thereto, and it appearing that
Atty. Norberto Denura, counsel for the defendant PNB, has received a copy of
aforestated motion and also a copy of the First Amended Complaint thereto attached,
 the "Motion To Amend Amended Complaint" is hereby GRANTED and the First
Amended Complaint is likewise hereby ADMITTED.

Petitioner PNB's motion for reconsideration of the above order was denied by respondent Judge
Florendo in an order dated June 28, 1981.

Hence, the petition.

As prayed for in the petition, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court pursuant to its
resolution dated October 25, 1982 enjoining the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing
of the case.

The First Division of this Court resolved to give due course to the petition in the resolution of March
16, 1983.

The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not the respondent Judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in admitting the First Amended Complaint which adds another parcel of land not within
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Upon the abolition of the Court of Agrarian Relations by BP 129 enacted on August 10, 1981 and
fully implemented on February 14, 1983, jurisdiction over agrarian disputes is now vested in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 19(7) of the said law (Locsin v.
Valenzuela, 173 SCRA 454 [1989]; Enrique v. Fortuna Mariculture Corporation, 158 SCRA 651
[1988]);

In view of such supervening event, it is now the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental that has jurisdiction over the case. Be that as it may, the same law provides that
whenever a Regional Trial Court takes cognizance of agrarian cases, the special rules of procedures
applicable under the present laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless amended by
law or by rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court (Sec. 24, BP 129).

Coming back to the case at bar, petitioner contends that Lot No. 787-B-2-A (formerly covered by
TCT No. 42836, now TCT No. 75805-PNB) being a residential/commercial and non-agricultural land
situated at Cebu City is not within the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer, thus not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Jurisdiction, in general, is either one over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the
person of the defendants or over the issue framed in the pleadings (Balais v. Balais, 159 SCRA 37
[1988]). Jurisdiction over the subject matter, on the other hand, is conferred by law and does not
depend on the consent or objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or any one of them
(Republic v. Sangalang, 159 SCRA 515 [1988]). The law which conferred jurisdiction on the Court of
Agrarian Relations, now transferred to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court,
concerning agricultural lands, is P.D. 946 which provides, among others:

Sec. 12. Jurisdiction Over Subject Matter The Court of Agrarian Relations shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over:

a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons in the

cultivation and use of agricultural land . . .;
 b) Questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by
laws, presidential decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules and
Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform
program;

xxx xxx xxx

e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-

emption and redemption of tenanted agricultural land; . . . (emphasis
supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, the Court of Agrarian Relations (now RTC sitting as an agrarian court) could only
entertain disputes over lands that are the subject of agrarian cases. Corollarily, lands that are not the
subject of agrarian disputes should not be brought before it as an agrarian court. It has been the
legislative policy to confine to the CAR exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian cases as well as their
incidents (Depositario v. Hervias, 121 SCRA 756 [1983]).

The following factors indisputably established questioned land is beyond CAR's jurisdiction:

First, private respondents Viloria, et al. admission in their Comment dated November 19, 1982
(Rollo, pp. 90-97) that Lot No. 787-B-2-A is a residential lot located at Cebu City.

Second, the certification by the Agrarian Reform Team No. 215 to the effect that subject lot is not
within the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27 (Annex Rollo, p. 54). Such
''official certification can be considered as correct, if only because of the presumption of regularity
that is stamped on it as an official document" (San Mauricio Mining Co. v. Ancheta, 105 SCRA 371
[1981]).

Indeed, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally construed (PNB v.
CA, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]), however, where the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case (Lot 387-B-2-A being a residential lot not covered by Operation Land Transfer under PD
27), it is evident that the amendment of the complaint could not be allowed so as to confer
jurisdiction upon the court over said property.

It being apparent that the Court of Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction over Lot No. 787-B-2-A
aside from the fact that said court has already been abolished by BP 129, the issue as to its
territorial jurisdiction has become moot and academic.

The propriety of the petition for certiorari is beyond question.

The order of the respondent Judge admitting the First Amended Complaint including therein said
questioned Lot 787-B-2-A which is a residential lot not falling within the ambit of PD 27, hence,
beyond CAR's jurisdiction, was issued in excess of jurisdiction. The term excess of jurisdiction
signifies that the court, board or officer has jurisdiction over a case but oversteps such jurisdiction
while acting thereon (Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Caleda., et al., 122
Phil. 355 [1965]). Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted "to keep an inferior court within the bounds of
its jurisdiction . . ." (Aguilar v. Tan, 31 SCRA 205.[1970]. It is the proper remedy "where it clearly
appears that the trial court is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction . . ." (Baloria v.
Abalos, 32 SCRA 368 [1970]; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303 [1971]; Ablan, Sr. v. Madarang, 41
SCRA 213 [1971]). Since the "office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of
defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose" (Albert v. CFI of
Manila, Br. VI, 23 SCRA 948 [1968]), said remedy is available in the instant case to keep the trial
court from proceeding in the case in excess of its jurisdiction.

The private respondents Viloria, et al.'s contention that the petition for certiorari is premature since
the order of the respondent judge could have simply been assigned as an error in the appeal by the
petitioner in case of adverse judgment is not persuasive. Even when appeal is available and is the
proper remedy, this court has allowed a writ of certiorari when the orders of the lower court were
issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar v. Tan, supra).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the orders dated May 31, June 3, and
June 28, 1982 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The trial of CAR Case No. 532 on the
merits is hereby ordered to be conducted in the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental in view of the abolition of the Court of Agrarian Relations by BP 129 and the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court dated October 25, 1982 enjoining the hearing of
CAR Case No. 532 with respect to Lot No. 787-B-2-A (formerly covered by T.C.T. No. 43836
covering a parcel of land situated in Cebu City ) is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

 Versoza v CA (299 SCRA 100)
Facts:
Fe Uson is the owner of a parcel of land in Sual, Pangasinan. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo
Versoza. For failing to pay her obligation, Versoza foreclosed the property. The Provincial Sheriff set the
foreclosure sale.

To prevent from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Uson filed for annulment of mortgage with a prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint of Uson was dismissed on the ground that it
was not personally verified by Uson. The court granted Usons Motion for Reconsideration and filed an
amended complaint with the required verification.

In the meantime, Versoza asked the Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure. Uson requested that the sale
be deferred since there was a pending action (annulment of mortgage) in court. However, the sale
continued and the property was sold to Versoza.

After the redemption period, Sheriff issued the Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale. The lot is now under
Versozas name. Sometime after, Versoza sold the lot to Pilar Martinez.

Uson filed her an application for preliminary injunction in her 2 nd amended complaint impleading Martinez
and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan as defendants to the case.

Trial Court granted the injunction and ordered Martinez to cease and desist from performing acts of
ownership over the lot.

Versoza and Martinez now claims that the status quo to be preserved refers to the point before the filing
of the 2nd complaint and before Martinez acquired the property. They also contend that consummated
acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. The judge of the case clarified that the status quo being
maintained in this case is the possession of Uson of the land and does not refer to Martinez being the
registered owner of the lot.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Uson is entitled to an injunctive writ.
2. What is the status quo ante that the writ seeks to preserve?
3. Wherher or not consummated acts can be restrained by injunction in this case?

Held:
1. YES. The requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ are:
The invasion of the right is material and substantial;
The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

The requisites are all present in the case. Uson had title to and possession of the property. She also
claimed to have paid her obligation except for a nominal unpaid balance which she agrees to consign
judicially. Hence, she has a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title and possession of the
mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale.

2. Status quo maintained is from Usons possession of the land. As defined, status quo is the last
peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. Its preservation is the function of the
injunctive suit. When the amended complaint does not introduce new issues or causes of action, the suit
is deemed to commence on the date when the original complaint was filed.

3. YES. While the general rule is that injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already
done, there is an exception where the acts performed after an injunction suit is brought, a defendant
may not as a matter of right proceed to perform the acts sought to restrained and then be heard to assert
in a suit that the injunction will not lie because he has already performed the acts before the final hearing.

The court said that, a court should not (by means of preliminary injunction) transfer the property from the
possession of a party to another where legal title is in dispute and the party having possession of the
property asserts its ownership. One who does the act sought to be restrained, does so at his own peril.

In the case, when Uson filed the complaint, she had title to and was asserting ownership of the lot. An
action was brought to enjoin Versoza from proceeding with the sale but he continued it. In doing so,
Versoza was acting at his own peril