RULE 58 by agreement of the parties, the principal issue was limited to
whether RBN will suffer irreparable injury if the writ of preliminary
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
What is the purpose of PI? To maintain the status quo until the
merits can be heard. It is an order granted at any stage of an
action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court,
agency, or person to refrain from a particular act/s.
What is the nature? It is a preservative remedy to ensure the
protection of a partys substantive rights or interests pending the
final judgment in the principal action.
What is status quo ante? The last, actual, peaceful, and
uncontested status that preceded the actual controversy. The way
things were before.
G.R. No. 164548 September 27, 2006
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs.
RJ VENTURES REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and
RAJAH BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC.,respondents.
Facts:
On 27 May 1999, the RTC issued an Order, 49 granting the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, enjoining PNB from foreclosing all
collaterals pledged or mortgaged by respondents to PNB, in
particular those described in Exhibits A to L thereof, after the
posting of a bond in the amount of P5,000,000.00.50 According to
the court, the right of PNB to foreclose the chattel mortgages is
still challenged by the respondents and therefore, is not yet clearly
established. Hence, if PNB is allowed to foreclose the subject
chattel mortgages, the determination of the right of PNB to
foreclose the subject properties will become moot and academic.
Subsequently, on 28 May 1999, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was issued.
On 9 June 1999, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration51 of the
Order of 27 May 1999. PNB averred, inter alia, that RBN failed to
produce any evidence to substantiate and support its claim that it
is entitled to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in order to enjoin
PNB from foreclosing on the subject chattels. According to PNB, it
was able to show that RBN failed without justifiable cause or
reason to service the credit facilities extended to it. PNB advanced
the argument that RBN has no clear right in esse; therefore, it
cannot seek relief from the court. PNB claimed that they were
able to prove irreparable damage to the bank if PNB will be
enjoined from foreclosing on the chattel mortgages. PNB
maintained that proceeding with the auction sale of the subject
properties would lower the bank's "past due ratio" approximately
by 2%; hence, with the decrease in the bank's "past due ratio
percentage," there would be no legal impediment to PNB's
resumption to full lending operations since the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas' recommendation for stoppage of grants of new loans is
anchored on PNB's current high "past due ratio." In support of its
Motion for Reconsideration, PNB further theorized that
decreasing its "past due ratio" would improve investors'
confidence; hence, substantially enhancing the viability of PNB in
its move to attain full privatization by the year 2000.
In its Opposition,52 respondents submitted that during the hearing
of the application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the court
expressed its position that it will not receive evidence relative to
the merits of the case as the same would pre-empt the resolution
of the merits or dispose of the main case without trial; therefore,
injunction is not issued. According to respondents, the damage to
RBN's image, loss of listenership, advertisers, staff and employees
is unquantifiable in monetary terms. Irreparable damage would be
caused to RBN if PNB is allowed to foreclose its equipments. It
would also disrupt, if not, paralyze, the operations of RBN's
stations. They further asserted that there is no reason to disturb
the injunction issued by the court absent a showing of manifest
abuse.
ISSUE: WON respondents RJVRD and RBN are entitled to the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.
HELD:
It is for this reason that we shall address and concern
ourselves only with the assailed writ, but not with the merits of
the case pending before the trial court. A preliminary injunction
is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to
the latter's outcome.62 It is not a cause of action in itself.63
This Petition has no merit.
PURPOSE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION:
Foremost, we reiterate that the sole object of a preliminary
injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be
heard. 64 A preliminary injunction65 is an order granted at any stage
of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party,
court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It
is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party's
substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the
principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the
existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which
should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation
would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is
concerned.66
GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE; prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court. [SEE CODAL]
Otherwise stated, for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the
following requisites must be present, to wit:
(1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that
must be protected, and
(2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.67
Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that the very
foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in
the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of
irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the
prevention of multiplicity of suits.68 Sine dubio, the grant or denial
of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in the
sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since
the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end
involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive
determination.69 Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a
court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except
when there is grave abuse of discretion.70 Grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.71
In the case at bar, we proceed to make a determination of
whether there is a factual and legal bases for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to issue.
First, respondents were able to establish a clear and
unmistakable right to the possession of the subject collaterals.
Evidently, as owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be
extrajudicially foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the
possession and protection thereof. RBN as the owner and
operator of the subject radio equipment and radio stations have a
clear right over them. The instant case does not involve abstract
rights, or a future and contingent rights, but a right that is already
in existence. To our minds, petitioner's claim that respondents
have lost their rights to the subject collaterals in the face of their
admission of default is best threshed out in a full-blown trial a
quo where the merits of the case can be tried and determined.
Significantly, to give the trial court a fair idea of whether a
justification for the issuance of the writ exists, only a "sampling"
of the evidence is needed, pending a decision on the merits of the
case.74 Hence, the determination of respondents' default and the
legality of the defenses they adduced are matters appropriately
subject of the trial on the merits.
Second, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent
serious damage. Indeed, an injunctive remedy may only be
resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation.75 PNB assails the existence of this ground by raising
the argument that there is, in actuality, a pecuniary standard by
which RBN's damage can be measured, as evidenced by the
testimony of RBN's witness that it will suffer a loss of P1.2 Billion
for the next ten (10) years.
To be sure, this court has declared that the term irreparable injury
has a definite meaning in law. It does not have reference to the
amount of damages that may be caused but rather to the difficulty
of measuring the damages inflicted. If full compensation can be
obtained by way of damages, equity will not apply the remedy of
injunction.76The Court of Appeals declared that the evidence
adduced by respondents more than satisfies the legal and
jurisprudential requirements of irreparable injury. It behooves this
court to appreciate the unique character of the collaterals that
stand to be affected should the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
dissolved as PNB would have it. The direct and inevitable result
would be the stoppage of the operations of respondents' radio
stations, consequently, losing its listenership, and tarnishing the
image that it has built over time. It does not stretch one's
imagination to see that the cost of a destroyed image is
significantly the loss of its good name and reputation. As aptly
appreciated by the appellate court, the value of a radio station's
image and reputation are not quantifiable in terms of monetary
value. This conclusion can be gleaned from the testimony of
respondents' witness, Jose E. Escaner, Jr., General Manager of RBN
Evidently, there exists in the case at bar a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences to respondents which cannot be
remedied under any standard compensation.
STATUS QUO ANTE
G.R. No. 144499 February 19, 2002
FIRST GLOBAL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
CHRISTOPHER SAN AGUSTIN, respondent.
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued pendente lite to
preserve the status quo. To be entitled to one, the applicant must
show a prima facie right to the relief demanded in the complaint.
In the present case, the applicant has sufficiently demonstrated
that, indeed, he has such right and that grave and irreparable
injury would befall him and his family, unless the injunctive relief
is granted while the main case pends in the trial court.
FACTS:
Here, the CA issued an order enjoining FGRDC from taking
possession of the subject property until Civil Case No. 97-2678,
which is pending before the court a quo has been heard and
finally resolved."5
Lilian Sales-San Agustin together with his parents, brothers and
sisters have been in possession of the subject property since 1967
up to the present.
The property was sold to spouses Camacho in 1994 for the
amount of 2.5 million pesos, net of capital gains tax,
documentary stamp tax, transfer taxes and the remaining balance
of the Agustins loan with DBP.
Camacho succeeded in convincing petitioner to accept a partial
payment of 100,000.00 pesos upon the execution of a deed of
absolute sale in their favor over the subject property. The balance
of 2.4 million pesos would be paid once they would secure a loan
from a bank or financial institution with the subject property as
collateral.
"On May 24, 1994, DBP released the subject property to Agustin
upon full payment of the latters outstanding loan. DOAs was
issued to Camacho thus they obtained a TCT afterwards. FGRDC
granted Camachos loan application with the subject property as
collateral, in the amount of P1.190 million with petitioner .
However, despite receipt of the loan and petitioners demand to
pay the balance of the purchase price of the subject property,
spouses Camacho did not pay the same.
"In the ensuing period, Agustin discovered that FGRDC filed a
special civil action for the foreclosure of the subject property
inasmuch as spouses Camacho defaulted in the payment of their
loan obligation. The property was then subject to foreclosure and
Consequently, FGRDC filed a motion for execution which was
granted on February 7, 1997.
"The sale of the subject property at public auction was,
nevertheless, thrust aside in view of the dacion en pago which
spouses Camacho executed in favor of FGRDC. On April 29, 1997,
the dacion en pago was registered before the Register of Deeds of
Makati City, which paved the way for the issuance of TCT No.
209050 in the name of FGRDC.
Agustin filed a motion for intervention but later opted to file a
separate complaint for rescission of the deed of absolute sale,
annulment of the dacion en pago and cancellation of title and
issuance of a new title with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of injunction against FGRDC,
seeking to enjoin the latter from taking possession of the subject
property.
RTC denied the application of respondent for a preliminary
injunction to prevent petitioner from evicting him from the
subject property. The trial court held that under the facts alleged
in the Complaint, respondent had sold the property to the
Camacho spouses for 2,500,000. The spouses initially gave him
100,000, with the balance to be paid after they would have
secured a loan using the property as collateral. The lower court
added that cause of action of respondent was to demand payment
of the balance from the Camachos.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and granted the injunctive
relief prayed for by respondent. It held that petitioner should not
be given possession of the property pendente lite, because it knew
of the agreement between respondent and the Camachos.
Moreover, the fact that the property remained in the possession
of respondents mother at the time the couple sold it to petitioner
should have warned it of a defect in its claims.
ISSUES whether respondent is entitled to the possession of the
property while the main case for rescission is pending in the RTC.
HELD: Yes.
Possession Pendente Lite
Petitioner seeks to dispossess respondent of the subject property
on the strength of a dacion en pago executed in its favor by the
Camacho spouses who, in turn, had purportedly bought it from
herein respondent.
Respondent, on the other hand, claims that petitioner failed to
show a clear right to possess it. To dispossess him pendente
lite would be clearly unjust. We agree.
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates various
grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may
resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the pendency of an action. It is issued to preserve
the status quo ante -- the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested
status that preceded the actual controversy.10
In Saulog v. CA, the Supreme Court ruled thus:
"A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a
particular act. It may be granted at any time after the
commencement of the action and before final judgment, when it
is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually; that the commission or continuance of some act
complained of during the litigation or the non-performance
thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or that the
defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the
plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending
to render the judgment ineffectual.
"A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely
temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal action
and its purpose is to preserve the status quo of the things subject
of the action and/or the relation between the parties, in order to
protect the right of the plaintiff respecting the subject of the
action during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise or if no
preliminary injunction were issued, the defendant may, before
final judgment, do or continue the doing of the act which the
plaintiff asks the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the
final judgment rendered afterwards granting the relief sought by
the plaintiff. Its issuance rests entirely within the discretion of the
court taking cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered
with except in cases of manifest abuse."11
Likewise, in Paramount Insurance v. CA, this Court held that
"[i]njunction is an extraordinary remedy calculated to preserve the
status quo of things and to prevent actual or threatened acts
violative of the rules of equity and good conscience as would
consequently afford an injured party a cause of action resulting
from the failure of the law to provide for an adequate or complete
relief x x x. Its sole purpose is not to correct a wrong of the past, in
the sense of redress for injury already sustained, but to prevent
further injury."12
The purpose of a preliminary injunction, then, is "to prevent
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the
merits of the case can be heard fully." 13 Thus, it will be issued only
upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated.
Moreover, an urgent and permanent necessity for its issuance
must be shown by the applicant.14
In the present case, the status quo that is sought to be preserved
is the possession of the property by respondent and his right to
use it as his dwelling, pending determination of whether or not he
had indeed sold it to the Camachos and, consequently, whether
the latters transfer of its ownership to petitioner via dacion en
pago should be upheld.
Prima Facie
Right to Possess
Respondents Complaint in the trial court seeks the following: the
rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale between himself and the
Camacho spouses, the annulment of the dacion en pago executed
by the latter in favor of petitioner, and the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of title to it as well as the issuance of a new
one in favor of respondent.
The factual findings of both the trial and the appellate courts
show that respondent intended to sell the subject property to the
Camacho spouses for the sum of 2,500,000. The couple initially
paid 100,000, with the agreement that the balance would be
paid when they would have secured a loan using the subject
property as collateral. To facilitate their procurement of a loan, the
title to the property was transferred to them.
Using the subject property as collateral, the Camachos were able
to obtain a loan of 1,190,000 from petitioner. Upon the formers
failure to pay the loan, the latter sought to foreclose the mortgage
over it. However, before the property could be foreclosed,
petitioner and the couple allegedly agreed on a dacion en pago, in
which the latter ceded ownership of the property in favor of the
former in consideration of the payment of the loan. Respondent
contends that when petitioner conducted an on-site investigation
of the property in connection with the couples application for a
loan, the latter learned that the former was living in the subject
premises and was thus in actual possession of it. The CA found, in
fact, that petitioner was aware that respondent -- the previous
owner -- remained an unpaid seller.
Moreover, respondent argues that the dacion en pago is riddled
with a number of irregularities. He maintains that the Camachos
executed it way back in 1994 when they were still applying for a
loan, not immediately prior to the supposed foreclosure in 1997.
At the same time, they also executed a promissory note and
mortgage for the same amount. As respondent points out,
a dacion en pago that cedes property in favor of the creditor is not
compatible with a mortgage wherein property is foreclosed in
case of failure to pay the principal loan.
Indeed, the records show that the dacion en pago signed in 1994
was registered only in 1997.1wphi1 It was executed in lieu of the
foreclosure of the property when the Camachos failed to pay their
loan obligations. The amount stated in the dacion as consideration
was the 1,190,000 loan that they had obtained from petitioner. It
is therefore strange that the couple would buy a parcel of land for
2,500,000, obtain a loan to help finance payment for the same,
and finally cede the same property for an amount much lower
than that for which they purchased it. Moreover, by executing
a dacion, the sellers effectively waived the redemption period
normally given a mortgagor.
In sum, we hold that respondent was able to show a prima facie
right to the relief demanded in his Complaint. The Camachos
nonpayment of the purchase price agreed upon and the
irregularities surrounding the dacion en pago are serious enough
to allow him to possess the property pendente lite.
Grave Injustice in a
Transfer of Possession
In addition, respondent has shown that to allow petitioner to take
immediate possession of the property would result in grave
injustice. As we have stated above, the ownership of the property,
the validity of the sale between respondent and the Camachos
and the legitimacy of the dacion en pago executed by the latter in
favor of petitioner are still subject to determination in the court
below. Furthermore, there is no question that respondent has
been in possession of the premises during all this time -- prior to
and during the institution of the Complaint. He and his family have
long owned, possessed and occupied it as their family home since
1967. To dispossess him of it now would definitely alter the status
quo to their detriment.
RULE 58
Preliminary Injunction
Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. A
preliminary injunction is an order granted
1. at any stage of an action or proceeding
2. prior to the judgment or final order,
a. requiring to refrain from a particular act or
acts a party or a court, agency or a person
b. It may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts, in which case it shall
be known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction. (1a)
G.R. No. 169304 March 13, 2007
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT,
USEC. MA. MARGARITA GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M.
LOPEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC., Respondent.
Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (respondent) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of manufacturing and supplying
pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the
Philippines. They submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the
inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products,
including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." Despite the lack
of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondents request
for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products,
respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine
contract. When the bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only
two companies participated, with respondent submitting the
lower bid at 82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS
Laboratories (YSS) bid of 95.00 per unit. In view, however, of the
non-accreditation of respondents Penicillin G Benzathine product,
the contract was awarded to YSS.
Phil. Pharmawealth thus filed a complaint10 for injunction,
mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order praying,
inter alia, that the trial court "nullify the award of the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct defendant
DOH to declare plaintiff Pharmawealth as the lowest complying
responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they
accordingly award the same to plaintiff company
ISSUE: Can a government agency or official be enjoined? YES
HELD:
part of the reliefs prayed for by respondent is the enjoinment of
the implementation, as well as the nullification of the award to
YSS, the grant of which may not be enforced against individual
petitioners and their successors except in their official capacities
as officials of the DOH.22
As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will
not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the
government, for the only causes of action directed against it are
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule
5823 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed
against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the
defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of
action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability
against the State.24
As regards individual petitioners suability for damages, the
following discussion on the applicability of the defense of state
immunity from suit is relevant.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now
embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one
of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we
have now adopted as part of the law of the land.25
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. 26 The suit is
regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the
judgment against the officials will require the state itself to
perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount
necessary to pay the damages awarded against them.27
The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable
under all circumstances. Shauf v. Court of Appeals28 elucidates:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account
in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the
rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen,
etc., et al.,29 Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by
its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or
officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by
such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the
same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity
against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or
invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he
does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged
in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful
and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where
the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity
but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may
have been committed while he occupied a public position.30
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal
capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of
"illegal[ly] abus[ing] their official positions to make sure that
plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine
contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge
of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law" 31 is
permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an
officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot
hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the
liability personally.32
It bears stressing, however, that the statements in the
immediately foregoing paragraph in no way reflect a ruling on the
actual liability of petitioners to respondent. The mere allegation
that a government official is being sued in his personal capacity
does not automatically remove the same from the protection of
the doctrine of state immunity. Neither, upon the other hand,
does the mere invocation of official character suffice to insulate
such official from suability and liability for an act committed
without or in excess of his or her authority. 33 These are matters of
evidence which should be presented and proven at the trial.
G.R. No. 138900 September 20, 2005
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., & LEVI STRAUSS (PHILS.), INC., Petitioners,
vs. CLINTON APPARELLE, INC., Respondent.
This case stemmed from the Complaint7 for Trademark
Infringement, Injunction and Damages filed by petitioners LS &
Co. and LSPI against respondent Clinton Apparelle, Inc.* together
with an alternative defendant, Olympian Garments, Inc
The Complaint alleged that LS & Co., a foreign corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware,
U.S.A., and engaged in the apparel business, is the owner by prior
adoption and use since 1986 of the internationally famous
"Dockers and Design" trademark. This ownership is evidenced by
its valid and existing registrations in various member countries of
the Paris Convention.
LS & Co. and LSPI further alleged that they discovered the
presence in the local market of jeans under the brand name
"Paddocks" using a device which is substantially, if not exactly,
similar to the "Dockers and Design" trademark owned by and
registered in the name of LS & Co., without its consent. Based on
their information and belief, they added, Clinton Apparelle
manufactured and continues to manufacture such "Paddocks"
jeans and other apparel.
The Complaint contained a prayer that reads as follows:
1. That upon the filing of this complaint, a temporary restraining
order be immediately issued restraining defendants, their officers,
employees, agents, representatives, dealers, retailers or assigns
from committing the acts herein complained of, and, specifically,
for the defendants, their officers, employees, agents,
representatives, dealers and retailers or assigns, to cease and
desist from manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale,
advertising, or otherwise using denims, jeans or pants with the
design herein complained of as substantially, if not exactly similar,
to plaintiffs "Dockers and Design" trademark.
2. That after notice and hearing, and pending trial on the merits, a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining defendants,
their officers, employees, agents, dealers, retailers, or assigns
from manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale,
advertising, jeans the design herein complained of as substantially,
if not exactly similar, to plaintiffs "Dockers and Design"
trademark.
Xxx
On 4 June 1998, the trial court issued another Order19 granting the
writ of preliminary injunction xxx RTC:
let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining or
restraining the commission of the acts complained of in
the verified Complaint in this case, and specifically, for
the defendants, their officers, employees, agents,
representatives, dealers and retailers or assigns or
persons acting in their behalf to cease and desist from
manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale,
advertising, or otherwise using, denims, jeans or pants
with the design complained of in the verified
 Complaint in this case, which is substantially, if not
exactly, similar to plaintiffs "DOCKERS and DESIGN"
trademark or logo as covered by the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer Certificate of
Registration No. 46619, until after this case shall have
been decided on the merits and/or until further orders
from this Court.20
The evidence considered by the trial court in granting injunctive
relief were as follows:
(1) a certified true copy of the certificate of trademark
registration for "Dockers and Design
(2) a pair of DOCKERS pants bearing the "Dockers and Design"
trademark;
(3) a pair of "Paddocks" pants bearing respondents assailed
logo;
(4) the Trends MBL Survey Report purportedly proving that
there was confusing similarity between two marks; (5) the
affidavit of one Bernabe Alajar which recounted petitioners
prior adoption, use and registration of the "Dockers and
Design" trademark; and (6) the affidavit of one Mercedes
Abad of Trends MBL, Inc. which detailed the methodology
and procedure used in their survey and the results thereof.21
Clinton Apparelle thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss22 and
a Motion for Reconsideration23 of the Order granting the writ of
preliminary injunction. Denied. It filed with the Court of Appeals
a Petition28 for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, assailing the orders of the trial court
CA granted Clinton Apparelles petition. It held that the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction is questionable. In its opinion,
herein Levis failed to sufficiently establish its material and
substantial right to have the writ issued. It considered that the
injury petitioners have suffered or are currently suffering may be
compensated in terms of monetary consideration, if after trial, a
final judgment shall be rendered in their favor. 31 In addition, the
CA strongly believed that the implementation of the questioned
writ would effectively shut down respondents business, which in
its opinion should not be sanctioned. The Court of Appeals thus
set aside the orders of the trial court dated 15 May 1998 and 4
June 1998, respectively issuing a temporary restraining order and
granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
by the trial court was proper and whether the Court of Appeals
erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court. NO. Injunction
was not proper.
HELD:
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary
injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or
a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Injunction is
accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to
be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties,
and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its
extreme necessity. An extraordinary remedy, injunction is
designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is
generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the
merits of the case can be heard.34 It may be resorted to only by a
litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests
and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal
action.35 It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied under
any standard compensation. The resolution of an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an
emergency or of a special recourse before the main case can be
heard in due course of proceedings.36
Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
Under the cited provision, a clear and positive right especially
calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a
remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future
rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may
never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a
cause of action. There must exist an actual right.37 There must be a
patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed are violative of said right.38
THERE ARE GENERALLY TWO KINDS OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION:
(1) a prohibitory injunction which commands a party to refrain
from doing a particular act; and
(2) a mandatory injunction which commands the performance
of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.39
The Court of Appeals did not err in reviewing proof adduced by
petitioners to support its application for the issuance of the writ.
While the matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
this discretion must be exercised based upon the grounds and in
the manner provided by law. The exercise of discretion by the trial
court in injunctive matters is generally not interfered with save in
cases of manifest abuse.40 And to determine whether there was
abuse of discretion, a scrutiny must be made of the bases, if any,
considered by the trial court in granting injunctive relief. Be it
stressed that injunction is the strong arm of equity which must be
issued with great caution and deliberation, and only in cases of
great injury where there is no commensurate remedy in
damages.41
In the present case, we find that there was scant justification for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners anchor their legal right to "Dockers and Design"
trademark on the Certificate of Registration issued in their favor
by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer.* According to Section 138 of Republic Act No. 8293, 42 this
Certificate of Registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of
the registration, the registrants ownership of the mark and of the
exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods or
services and those that are related thereto specified in the
certificate. Section 147.1 of said law likewise grants the owner of
the registered mark the exclusive right to prevent all third parties
not having the owners consent from using in the course of trade
identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical
or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered
if such use results in a likelihood of confusion.
However, attention should be given to the fact that petitioners
registered trademark consists of two elements: (1) the word
mark "Dockers" and (2) the wing-shaped design or logo. Notably,
there is only one registration for both features of the trademark
giving the impression that the two should be considered as a
single unit. Clinton Apparelles trademark, on the other hand, uses
the "Paddocks" word mark on top of a logo which according to
petitioners is a slavish imitation of the "Dockers" design. The two
trademarks apparently differ in their word marks ("Dockers" and
"Paddocks"), but again according to petitioners, they employ
similar or identical logos. It could thus be said that respondent
only "appropriates" petitioners logo and not the word mark
"Dockers"; it uses only a portion of the registered trademark and
not the whole.
Given the single registration of the trademark "Dockers and
Design" and considering that respondent only uses the assailed
device but a different word mark, the right to prevent the latter
from using the challenged "Paddocks" device is far from clear.
Stated otherwise, it is not evident whether the single registration
of the trademark "Dockers and Design" confers on the owner the
right to prevent the use of a fraction thereof in the course of
trade.
It is also unclear whether the use without the owners consent of
a portion of a trademark registered in its entirety constitutes
material or substantial invasion of the owners right.
It is likewise not settled whether the wing-shaped logo, as
opposed to the word mark, is the dominant or central feature of
petitioners trademarkthe feature that prevails or is retained in
the minds of the publican imitation of which creates the
likelihood of deceiving the public and constitutes trademark
infringement.43 In sum, there are vital matters which have yet and
may only be established through a full-blown trial.
From the above discussion, we find that petitioners right to
injunctive relief has not been clearly and unmistakably
demonstrated. The right has yet to be determined. Petitioners also
failed to show proof that there is material and substantial invasion
of their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ. Neither
were petitioners able to show any urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Petitioners wish to impress upon the Court the urgent necessity
for injunctive relief, urging that the erosion or dilution of their
trademark is protectable. They assert that a trademark owner
does not have to wait until the mark loses its distinctiveness to
obtain injunctive relief, and that the mere use by an infringer of a
registered mark is already actionable even if he has not yet
profited thereby or has damaged the trademark owner.
Trademark dilution is the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of
the presence or absence of: (1) competition between the owner
of the famous mark and other parties; or (2) likelihood of
confusion, mistake or deception. Subject to the principles of
equity, the owner of a famous mark is entitled to an injunction
"against another persons commercial use in commerce of a mark
or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark."
This is intended to protect famous marks from subsequent uses
that blur distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it.44
Based on the foregoing, to be eligible for protection from dilution,
there has to be a finding that: (1) the trademark sought to be
protected is famous and distinctive; (2) the use by respondent of
"Paddocks and Design" began after the petitioners mark became
famous; and (3) such subsequent use defames petitioners mark.
In the case at bar, petitioners have yet to establish whether
"Dockers and Design" has acquired a strong degree of
distinctiveness and whether the other two elements are present
for their cause to fall within the ambit of the invoked protection.
The Trends MBL Survey Report which petitioners presented in a
bid to establish that there was confusing similarity between two
marks is not sufficient proof of any dilution that the trial court
must enjoin.
The Court also finds that the trial courts order granting the writ
did not adequately detail the reasons for the grant, contrary to
our ruling in University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal
Jr., 45 wherein we held that:
The trial court must state its own findings of fact and cite
particular law to justify grant of preliminary injunction. Utmost
care in this regard is demanded.46
The trial court in granting the injunctive relief tersely ratiocinated
that "the plaintiffs appear to be entitled to the relief prayed for
and this Court is of the considered belief and humble view that,
without necessarily delving on the merits, the paramount interest
of justice will be better served if the status quo shall be
maintained." Clearly, this statement falls short of the requirement
laid down by the above-quoted case. Similarly, in Developers
Group of Companies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,47 we held that it was
"not enough" for the trial court, in its order granting the writ, to
simply say that it appeared "after hearing that plaintiff is entitled
to the relief prayed for."
In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals in its holding that
the damages the petitioners had suffered or continue to suffer
may be compensated in terms of monetary consideration. As held
in Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo:48
A WRIT OF INJUNCTION SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ISSUED
WHEN AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES WOULD ADEQUATELY
COMPENSATE THE INJURIES CAUSED. The very foundation of the
jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction rests in the probability
of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary estimation and the
prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not
shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of
injunction should be refused.49
We also believe that THE ISSUED INJUNCTIVE WRIT, IF ALLOWED,
WOULD DISPOSE OF THE CASE ON THE MERITS AS IT WOULD
EFFECTIVELY ENJOIN THE USE OF THE "PADDOCKS" DEVICE
WITHOUT PROOF THAT THERE IS BASIS FOR SUCH ACTION. The
prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the main
case without trial.50 There would be a prejudgment of the main
case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it
would assume the proposition which petitioners are inceptively
bound to prove.51
Parenthetically, we find no flaw in the Court of Appeals
disquisition on the consequences of the issued injunction. An
exercise of caution, we believe that such reflection is necessary to
weigh the alleged entitlement to the writ vis--vis its possible
effects. The injunction issued in the instant case is of a serious
nature as it tends to do more than to maintain the status quo. In
fact, the assailed injunction if sustained would bring about the
result desired by petitioners without a trial on the merits.
DOCTRINE OF NON-JURISDICTION
Section 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the
action or proceeding is pending. If the action or proceeding is
pending in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, it may
be issued by said court or any member thereof. (2a)
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863 October 22, 2004
ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS,
FUND FOR ASSISTANCE TO PRIVATE EDUCATION (FAPE), vs
JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Marawi City, respondent.
FACTS: On February 26, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum filed Special
Civil Action No. 690-01 for mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction against FAPE. He alleged that
FAPE was required by law to pay subsidy to Pacasum College, Inc.
under the Educational Service Program of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS); that although the DECS has
already released to FAPE the total amount of P746,000,000.00 for
payment to different participating schools, FAPE refused to release
to Pacasum College, Inc. the sum of P1,845,040.00 which
represented the remaining unpaid collectible of the said
institution for the school year 2000-2001; that the continued
refusal by FAPE to release the said amount has caused the school
to fail in its obligation to pay the salaries of its teachers for 3
months.
On the same day the petition was filed, respondent judge
granted1 the application for preliminary mandatory injunction
upon the posting by the petitioner of a surety or property bond in
the amount of P200,000.00.
On February 28, 2001, the respondent judge issued another order
directing the president of FAPE, Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, "to
prepare and issue a check for P1,845,040.00 representing the
payment to the Pacasum College, Inc. x x x payable to its president
and chairman Saripada Ali Pacasum, the petitioner herein." 2 On
the same day, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto served upon FAPE, throught
its president, summons and a copy of the petition.
Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining the respondent judge
from enforcing the orders of February 26, 2001. Despite the TRO,
respondent judge ordered the arrest of Dr. Borromeo and certain
FAPE employees for failure to comply with his directive. Two of
FAPEs employees, namely: Evangeline Domondon and Nenita
Torres, were subsequently arrested and detained.
On March 12, 2001, Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum filed a letter
complaint before the OCA charging the respondent judge with
gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. On March 22,
2001, a similar letter-complaint was filed by Atty. Jose Gomos on
the same ground that the respondent judge violated the hearing,
notice and jurisdictional requirements of the Rules of Court in
issuing the questioned orders of February 26 and 28, 2001.
In his Comment, respondent judge claimed that he took
cognizance of Special Civil Action No. 690-10 after it was raffled to
his court. He found that the pleadings were in order; that after a
careful examination of the pleadings submitted by the petitioner,
he saw an extreme necessity to resolve the case expeditiously;
and that all the pending incidents has been rendered moot and
academic with the dismissal of Special Civil Action No. 690-10.
OCA found that the respondent judge was liable for gross
ignorance of the law, oppression and abuse of authority; that the
respondent, as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Marawi City, has no
authority to enforce a preliminary injunction in Makati City where
the principal office of FAPE was located
ISSUE: WON the court of Marawi can enforce a PI in Makati
City? NO.
HELD: Respondent judge granted Saripada Ali Pacasums
application for preliminary mandatory injunction on the very same
day the Special Civil Action No. 690-01 was filed on February 26,
2001. Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure9 is very explicit that the writ of preliminary injuction
may issue only after prior notice and hearing upon the adverse
party. In issuing the subject writ on the very same day the
application was filed and considering that the person against
whom the same was to be served was located in Makati,
summons could not have been served upon them or a hearing
conducted in evident disregard of the due process requirements
of the Rules of Court.
Respondent judges failure to comply with procedural due process
is aggravated by his total inattention to the parameters of his
jurisdiction. As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should
have known that Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of
his territorial jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary
injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in
any part of their respective regions. The rationale, as explained in
Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 10 is "that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin acts being performed or about to be performed outside its
territorial jurisdiction."
In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction is not a mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of
judgment on the part of respondent judge but a blatant disregard
of basic rules constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. The
responsibility of judges to keep abreast of the law and changes
therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court,
is a pressing need. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory
acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of
the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one not
even judges.11
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong, Presiding Judge
of Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is found GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law for issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction in violation of Section 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
and Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and for citing FAPE employees in contempt of court in
disregard of Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from office without
salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS with WARNINGthat
a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857 November 23, 2004
GABRIEL DELA PAZ, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, RTC, Branch 8, Marawi
City, respondent.
Gabriel dela Paz, Officer-in-Charge of (FAPE),2 charged Judge
Santos B. Adiong of the (RTC) of Marawi City of gross ignorance of
the law and/or abuse of authority.
Pacasum College, Inc., represented by Saripada Ali Pacasum, filed
with the RTC, a petition for mandamus with application for a
preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as Special Civil Action
No. 813-02, against FAPE, represented by Roberto T. Borromeo,
Secretary Raul S. Roco, Ramon C. Bacani and Carolina C. Porio.
On March 4, 2002, respondent judge issued an Order, to wit:
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION
Considering that the petition herein is sufficient in form
and substance, a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction is hereby issued requiring the respondents,
specifically FAPE and its officials, including its Chairman
respondent RAUL S. ROCO, to prepare and issue a
check in the amount of P4,000,000.00 representing the
entitlement of the petitioner for School Year 2001-
2002, payable to its President/Chairman DATU
SARIPADA ALI PACASUM, under pain of arrest and
contempt.3
The following day, March 5, 2002, respondent issued another
Order, thus:
Finding the ex-parte motion of the petitioner to be
impressed with merit, it is hereby approved.
WHEREFORE, the appropriate Sheriffs of Makati and
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, are hereby ordered to
serve the attached Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction upon the respondents, and make a return
on their actions taken thereon. 4
On March 12, 2002, FAPE, through counsel, filed an omnibus
motion set aside orders of March 4 and 5, 2002 and to dismiss the
case.5 In its motion, FAPE claimed that it was not served with
summons but received copies of the questioned orders on March
8, 2002; that the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which
was intended to be enforced in Makati is outside the jurisdiction
of the Twelfth Judicial Region of RTC Marawi City; that Section 21
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the
RTC has jurisdiction to issue writ of injunction which may be
enforced in any part of its respective regions; that the writ was
granted without hearing and notice; neither was there a showing
of an affidavit that would establish that great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard nor
was there a showing that a bond had been filed.
On May 6, 2002, another Order was issued by the respondent,
thus:
It appears on record that despite service to the
respondents copies of the Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction issued by this Court on March 4,
2002 and until date respondents failed to obey or
comply (sic) the Writ as directed and considering that
funds due to the petitioner has been deposited in the
bank, the assigned Sheriff of Makati City is ordered to
take custody of the said funds/check in the name of
PACASUM COLLEGE INC., in the amount of 4 million
pesos. Collectible for the school year 2001-2002 and
release the same to SARIPADA ALI PACASUM,
President/Chairman of the said school thru
garnishment proceedings at the (BPI), Bank of
Philippine Islands, Benavidez St., Legaspi Village,
Makati City or BPI main at Ayala Ave., Makati City
and/or any other banks including LANDBANK of the
Philippines, Ortigas Center Branch which is the official
depositary bank of the DECS out of the deposit of
Funds for Assistance for (sic) Private Education (FAPE)
in order not to defeat the purpose of the said Writ. 6
On May 8, 2002, Makati Sheriff Melchor C. Gaspar issued notices
of garnishment to Land Bank Head Office in Ortigas Center Branch
and BPI-Far East Bank in Pasay Road Branch,
Makati.7 Subsequently, FAPE, through counsel, wrote Sheriff
Gaspar a letter asking the latter to rectify his act of issuing notices
of garnishment considering that the same was made pursuant to a
patently illegal and void order of the respondent.8
In his letter-complaint, dela Paz claims as follows: Respondent's
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated
March 4, 2002 was in glaring disregard and defiance of Section 21
of B.P. Blg. 129 which limits the authority of RTCs to issue writs of
mandamus within their respective regions. The issuance of the
writ was in disregard of the notice and hearing requirements
under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Respondent continues to
issue orders directing FAPE to release the amount of
P4,000,000.00 to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum even in a case where
it was not a party thereto as in Corporate Case No. 010 filed by
Sultan Sabdullah Ali Pacasum against Datu Saripada Ali
Pacasum,9 et al., respondent issued an Order dated April 22, 2002,
wherein he stated the following:
In view of this order there exists no legal impediment
to the enforcement of the previous orders of this Court
particularly a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
issued in Special Civil Action No. 813-02 dated March 4,
2002 directing the respondent FAPE to release to the
petitioner the sum of P4,000,000.00 representing the
petitioner's entitlement for the School Year 2001-2002
and the order of the Court in Special Civil Case No. 878
dated March 4, 2002 directing the defendant DR.
CARMEN DOMMITORIO to immediately release to the
plaintiff SARIPADA PACASUM the sum of P1,000,000.00
under pain of arrest and contempt.10
Respondent explains in his second indorsement dated July 29,
2002 that he had ordered the dismissal of Special Civil Action No.
813-02 per his resolution dated June 21, 2002 and that he had
recalled and set aside his questioned orders dated March 4 and 5,
2002. He submits that with the dismissal of the said case, the
herein complaint has become moot and academic and should no
longer be given due course.11
Complainant, in a letter dated August 23, 2002,12 informed us that
FAPE's counsel was not furnished with a copy of the respondent's
resolution dismissing the case; and that there is still a pending
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the said case and
FAPE's manifestation with comment and opposition thereto.
Complainant claims that aside from the Orders dated March 4 and
5, 2002 ignorantly issued by respondent judge, his order dated
May 6, 2002 which directed the garnishment of the funds of their
office and followed by a writ of garnishment issued by a Makati
sheriff really paralyzed FAPE's operations until a temporary
restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals.13 Complainant prays that their complaint be treated
better than just being dismissed for being moot and academic as
respondent would want it to be.
Both parties manifested that they are submitting the case for
resolution based on the pleadings filed.14
The Court Administrator submitted his Report finding respondent
judge guilty of gross ignorance of law and grave abuse of authority
and recommending that he be meted with the penalty of
suspension from office for a period of six (6) months without pay
with a warning that the commission of a similar act in the future
will warrant his dismissal from the service. In arriving at his
findings and recommendations, the Court Administrator stated:
As correctly claimed by the complainant, respondent
judge had indeed issued the two (2) orders of March 4
& 5, 2002 without complying with the mandatory
requirement of notice and hearing under Section 5,
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides that: "No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party
or person sought to be enjoined x x x." Because of his
total disregard of the rules, respondent judge is clearly
ignorant of the rules. The subsequent dismissal of
Special Proceeding No. 813-02 per order dated 21 June
2002, which also recalled and set aside the orders of
March 4 and 5, 2002, does not render the instant
administrative complaint moot and academic
considering that the issue involved in the instant case is
administrative and not judicial in character. Specifically,
the issue is with regard to respondent judge's violation
of the law or procedure which is tantamount to
ignorance of the law or procedure. Undoubtedly,
respondent judge violated the above-cited rules
because the records are bare that prior to the issuance
of the subject writ, he notified the respondent FAPE
and conducted a hearing. For this reason, there is no
doubt that respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of
the rules.
Concerning respondent judge's issuance of an order
dated 22 April 2002 in Corporate Case No. 010
directing FAPE to issue a check in the sum of P4 million
pesos pursuant to the order dated 04 March 2002 in
Special Civil Action No. 813-02, such an act is
tantamount to an abuse of his authority. Records
revealed that FAPE was not a party to Corporate Case
No. 010. Nonetheless, respondent judge still directed
FAPE to comply with an order in a case, which they
have nothing to do.
Aside from the fact that respondent judge issued an
order against a non-party to Corporate Case No. 010,
he also had no authority to issue said order because he
already inhibited himself from trying the case. Records
revealed that on 21 November 2001 respondent judge
inhibited himself from trying and hearing Corporate
Case No. 010 (SEC Case No. 10-99-6437). Respondent
judge even caused the forwarding of the records of the
said case to the Office of the Court Administrator so
that the court in Iligan City, which was designated as
special court to try and decide corporate cases (SEC-
related cases) would be designated in lieu of
respondent judge. Acting on the said request, the
Court, per Resolution of 10 June 2002 in A.M. No. 02-4-
207-RTC, designated Judge Amer R. Ibrahim, Pairing
Judge, RTC, Marawi City to try and decide Corporate
Case No. 010.
Despite said inhibition and the subsequent designation
of another judge, respondent judge still issued the
order of 22 April 2002. Respondent judge's justification
for the issuance of the said order was because the
Office of the Court Administrator returned the records
of Corporate Case No. 010 to his sala for further
proceedings. While it is true that the records were
indeed returned to his sala, there is no showing that
respondent judge was given the authority to handle
the case. The Court's directive was for Judge Ibrahim,
the pairing judge of Branch 8, to continue the trial and
hearing of Corporate Case No. 010. Thus, respondent
judge was fully aware of his lack of authority to handle
the case. For lack of authority to do so, respondent
judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.
Worse, respondent judge issued the subject
extraordinary writ to be enforced outside his judicial
region, in gross violation of Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129
which provides that Regional Trial Courts exercise
original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced
in any part of their respective judicial regions.
The Honorable Court in the case of PNB versus Pineda,
197 SCRA 1 (1991), held that: "Regional Trial Courts can
only enforce their writs of injunction within their
respective designated territories." Likewise, in the case
of Embassy Farms, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (1990), it
was held that: "Generally, an injunction under Section
21 of the Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 is enforceable
within the region. The reason is that the trial court has
no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin acts being performed or about to be
performed outside its territorial boundaries."
Similarly, the Court, in the case of Martin vs. Guerrero,
317 SCRA 166 (1999), penalized then Assisting Judge
Eleuterio F. Guerrero, RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City
with a fine of P1,000 pesos and admonition with
warning for issuing a writ against a party who is a
resident of Paraaque City, an area which is outside of
his judicial jurisdiction. Specifically, the Court held that:
"Under the foregoing clear provisions of B.P. 129 and
the Rules of Court, regional trial courts have
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus only when
such writs can be enforced within their respective
judicial districts, as extraordinary writs issued by them
are limited to and operative only within such areas.
Clearly then, respondent judge had no authority to
issue writ of habeas corpus against herein
complainant, who was a resident of Paraaque, an area
outside his judicial jurisdiction".
Thus, consistent with the aforesaid rulings of the court,
it follows then that respondent judge, being a presiding
judge of RTC, Marawi City, has no authority to enforce
the subject preliminary mandatory injunction in Makati
City. The subject writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction just like the subject writ of habeas corpus in
 the aforesaid case of Judge Guerrero cannot be
enforced by respondent judge against a party who is in
Makati City, an area outside of his judicial jurisdiction.
Clearly, respondent judge had grossly violated the
provisions of Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129.
From all the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
authority.
Under Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC
dated 11 September 2001, gross ignorance of the law
or procedure is considered a serious charge with the
following sanctions: (a) dismissal from the service; or
(b) suspension from office without pay for more than 3
months but not exceeding six months; or (c) a fine of
more than P20,000.00 pesos but not exceeding
P40,000.00 pesos.
Record in the Docket and Clearance Division, OCA
shows that respondent judge had been previously
penalized in the following cases:
1. FINED in the sum of P20,000.00 pesos (sic) for
Ignorance of the Law in A.M. No. RTJ-98-1407 per
Resolution of 20 July 1998;
2. FINED in the sum of P5,000.00 pesos (sic) for Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion in
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581 per Resolution of 02 July 2002.
In determining the penalty to be imposed, it is
important to note that this is respondent judge's 3rd
offense involving the same act, which is gross
ignorance of the law, hence he may be meted with a
severe penalty of either DISMISSAL from the service or
SUSPENSION from office without pay for more than 3
months but not exceeding 6 months, at the discretion
of the Court.15
HELD:
The OCA's findings and recommendations are well-taken.
The rule on injunction as found under Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court provides that the same can only be granted upon a verified
application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief
demanded and upon the filing of a bond executed to the party or
person enjoined.16 It is also provided that no preliminary
injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the
party or person sought to be enjoined unless shown that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter
can be heard on notice; that a temporary restraining order may be
issued effective for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
the party sought to be enjoined.17
A perusal of the Order dated March 4, 2002 failed to show that
respondent conducted a hearing before the injunction was
granted or that complainant was given prior notice thereof. In
fact, complainant stressed that FAPE was not at all served with
summons before the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
was issued. It was not also shown whether the applicant posted a
bond and the same was approved before the order granting the
preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. A bond is required
unless exempted by the court. The Order merely stated that the
petition was sufficient in form and substance without even stating
the facts which would support the granting of the injunction. This
is a clear violation of the rule.
Moreover, Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129, provides:
SEC. 21. Original Jurisdiction in other cases. Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their
respective regions;
Respondent's court is in Marawi City which falls within the twelfth
judicial region. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued by respondent requiring FAPE, which is holding office in
Makati City, and its officials who have their residences in Metro
Manila, to issue a check in the amount of P4,000,000.00 payable
to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, is outside the territorial jurisdiction
of respondent's court. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the respondent is void considering that his
authority to issue an injunction is limited only to and operative
only within his respective provinces or districts.18
Consequently, the Order dated March 5, 2002 directing the sheriff
of Makati and Mandaluyong to serve the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to FAPE, et al. is a jurisdictional faux pas as
the respondent can only enforce his orders within the territorial
jurisdiction of his court.19
Likewise, respondent has also shown abuse of his authority in
issuing his Order dated April 22, 2002 in Corporate Case No. 010
requiring FAPE, a non-party to the case, to comply with the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued in Special Civil Action No.
813-02. Notably, respondent in his Order dated November 21,
2001 inhibited himself from hearing the corporate case and
forwarded the entire records to the OCA for further assignment to
other designated corporate courts of the RTC in Lanao and
Cagayan de Oro City. Despite this pending matter, respondent
acted on a motion to set aside his Order of inhibition citing the
fact that the records of the case which he forwarded to the OCA
were returned to his court for further proceedings. He then
concluded that there exists no legal impediment to the
enforcement of the previous orders of this Court particularly a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in Special Civil
Action No. 813-02 dated March 4, 2002 directing the respondent
FAPE to release to the petitioner the sum of P4,000,000.00
representing the petitioner's entitlement for the School Year
2001-2002. Although the respondent in Corporate Case No. 010 is
the petitioner in Special Civil Action No. 813-02, (where the
subject preliminary mandatory injunction was issued and now the
basis of this administrative complaint) FAPE, however, was not a
party in the Corporate Case.
Moreover, respondent has no authority to issue the Order in
Corporate Case No. 010 since the matter of his inhibition was still
pending with the OCA. In fact, because of respondent's Order of
inhibition with further assignment to other corporate courts of
RTC, Lanao and Cagayan de Oro City, the plaintiff in Corporate
Case No. 010 filed with OCA a motion to retain the corporate case
with the RTC of Marawi City, which we granted in our Resolution
dated June 10, 2002. In the same resolution, we authorized Judge
Amer R. Ibrahim,20 Pairing Judge, RTC of Marawi City, Lanao del
Sur, Branch 9, to try and decide Corporate Case No. 010; and
reminded respondent of Supreme Court Circular No. 10.
Circular No. 1021 provides that with respect to single sala courts,
only the order of inhibition shall be forwarded to the Supreme
Court for appropriate action; the records of the case shall be kept
in the docket of the court concerned while awaiting the
instruction and/or action of the Supreme Court thereon. This aims
to avoid needless moving of the records in order to prevent the
possibility of the records being lost in transit. Thus, the return of
the records of Corporate Case No. 010 to respondent's court is not
an authority for respondent to proceed with the case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and abuse of authority and is hereby
suspended for a period of six (6) months without pay, effective
immediately, with a warning that the commission of a similar act
in the future will warrant his dismissal from the service.
SO ORDERED.

It has been held that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or

corruption, erroneous acts of a judge in his juridical capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action, for no magistrate is infallible.
The lack of malicious intent however, cannot completely free the
respondent from liability specially so when the law is so
elementary, thus not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.22 We reiterate what we said in a case 23 which also involved the
herein respondent, thus:

A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain

professional competence. When a judge displays an
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes
the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the
law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a
judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.

In his Comment, respondent contends that Special Civil Action No.

813-02 had already been dismissed per his Resolution dated June
21, 2002, thus the instant administrative complaint has become
moot and academic. In dismissing the case, respondent explained
that in the course of the inventory of all his pending cases, he
found an unresolved omnibus motion to set aside the orders
dated March 4 and 5, 2002 and to dismiss the case filed by FAPE's
counsel and since the allegations were found to be well-taken, he
granted the motion by setting aside his earlier orders and
dismissed the case.

We are not persuaded. We find the belated action on

complainant's omnibus motion as a mere afterthought because
the same was filed as early as March 12, 2002. Respondent could
have easily reconsidered his previous Orders dated March 4 and 5,
2002. In fact, the Order dated April 22, 2002 in Corporate Case No.
010, which we found to have been issued when respondent had
no authority to do so because of his Order of inhibition, had even
reiterated his previous order for FAPE to release the
P4,000,000.00 to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum. Moreover, the
issuance of respondent's Order dated May 6, 2002, directing the
sheriff of Makati City to take custody of the funds/check in the
name of PACASUM COLLEGE, INC., in the amount of 4 million
pesos for release to SARIPADA ALI PACASUM, President/Chairman
of the said school through garnishment proceedings, was already
tantamount to a denial of the omnibus motion. Thus, the fact that
the omnibus motion was subsequently granted by respondent and
Special Civil Action No. 813-02 was dismissed, would not absolve
respondent from administrative liability.

Finally, this is respondent's third offense. He had previously been

fined and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future will be dealt with most severely. We find the
penalty recommended by OCA to be reasonable for respondent's
offense.
G.R. No. 157866 February 14, 2007
AUGUSTO MANGAHAS and MARILOU VERDEJO, petitioners,
vs.
Hon. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES, Presiding Judge, Br. 124,
Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City; SHERIFF ERLITO BACHO, Br.
124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City; and AVELINO
BANAAG,Respondents.
FACTS:
private respondent Avelino Banaag filed complaint for Ejectment
filed before MeTC Caloocan City, vs Mangahas. On 23 April 1997,
petitioners filed their answer denying having unlawfully deprived
private respondent possession of the contested property.
Petitioners claimed that they have resided in the subject lot with
the knowledge and conformity of the true owner thereof,
Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO),
as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed by PIADECOs
president in their favor.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation And Motion To Suspend
Proceedings on the ground that the subject property is part of the
Tala Estate and that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85, in Civil
Case No. Q-96-29810 issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated
10 November 1997, enjoining the MeTCs of Quezon City and
Caloocan City from ordering the eviction and demolition of all
occupants of the Tala Estate. They posited that the injunction
issued by the Quezon City RTC is enforceable in Caloocan City
because both cities are situated within the National Capital
Region.
MeTC denied and ratiocinated that the injunction issued by the
Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the territorial
boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan City is not within
the territorial area of same, the injunction it issued is null and void
for lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
The petitioners postulate that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated November 10, 1997 which emanated from the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City should have prompted the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City to suspend the ejectment proceedings then
pending before it. It was the petitioners contention that the
injunction writ issued in Quezon City is enforceable also in
Caloocan City inasmuch [as] both cities are situated within the
National Capital Region.
Under Sec. 17 of B.P. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts and their judges is basically regional in scope
(Malaoan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249), but under Sec. 18,
it may be limited to the territorial area of the branch in which the
judges sits (OCA vs. Matas, August 2, 1995).
Sec. 18 of B.P. 129 states:
"Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch.
The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a
branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The
territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of
the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of
all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well
as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said
branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. xxx"
Taking Our bearings from the above pronouncement, the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City could not be deemed to have
committed a reversible error when it denied the petitioners
Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the
enforceability of an injunction writ issued by the Regional Trial
Court is defined by the territorial region where the magistrate
presides.11
Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the
injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC became the law of the
case between the parties. Under this legal principle, whatever is
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the parties in the same case continues to be the law of
the case, so long as the facts on which the decision was
predicated continue.12 Stated otherwise, the doctrine holds that
once an appellate court has declared the law in a case that
declaration continues to hold even in subsequent appeal. 13 The
reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations
must be terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing
party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some
subterfuge devised by the losing party.14
Petitioners are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the
injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has no binding effect to
the courts of Caloocan City as this issue had already been passed
upon with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at some point;
otherwise there would be no end to litigation.
Quite conspicuously, the instant petition assailing the order of the
RTC denying petitioners motion to suspend execution is a ploy to
deprive private respondent of the fruits of his hard-won case. It
must be stressed that once a decision becomes final and
executory, it is the ministerial duty of the presiding judge to issue
a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when subsequent
events would render execution of judgment unjust.16 Petitioners
did not allege nor proffer any evidence that this case falls within
the exception. Hence, there is no reason to vacate the writ of
execution issued by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City, denying petitioners Motion
to Supend Execution dated 14 February 2003 in Civil Case No. C-
19097 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
EXCEPTIONS TO NON-JURISDICTION
1. When the act sought to be enjoined will be exercised
w/I the territorial jurisdiction although the person who
issued the order holds office outside the courts
jurisdiction [Decano vs Edu]
2. Where the act sought to be enjoined at another
jurisdiction, yet the residence of both parties are w/I
the jurisdiction of the court that issued the writ.
[Dagupan vs Pano]
G.R. No. L-30070 August 29, 1980
FEDERICO DECANO vs.
ROMEO F. EDU, as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation
and CIPRIANO POSADAS, as Acting Registrar, Land Transportation
Commission, Dagupan City Agency, respondents-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this appeal, the Court upholds the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan over the petition for "Mandamus and
Injunction" filed by herein DECANO VS EDU, although the official
station of the first named respondent, whose official actuation is
assailed, is in Quezon City which is outside the jurisdictional
district of the said court. The main issue raised is the correctness
and legality of said national official's order dismissing petitioner
from the service of the Land Transportation Commission, and the
power of judicial review of the administrative decisions of national
officials is not confined to the courts of first instance of
Metropolitan Manila where their offices are maintained to the
exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where
the aggrieved parties reside and the questioned decisions are
sought to be enforced. The Court further affirms the decision of
said court adjudging the order of removal from office as null and
void for having been issued by said respondent who was not the
appointing authority and had no authority to remove, since under
the applicable law, the power to remove petitioner was vested in
the department head as the appointing authority.
On September 12, 1962, the then Undersecretary of Public Works
and Communications issued to Federico Decano, herein
petitioner-appellee, a temporary appointment to the position of
janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office, 1 Dagupan City Agency, with
compensation at the rate of P1,440.00 per annum. The
appointment having been approved by the Commissioner of Civil
Service, the said appointee assumed office on September 10, 1962
and he served therein for almost four years, or until April 29, 1966
when herein respondent-appellant Cipriano Posadas, as Acting
Registrar, Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City,
received a telegram from respondent-appellant Romeo F. Edu, in
his then capacity as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation
Commission (LTC), terminating his (Decano's) services effective as
of the close of business on that day.
Shortly thereafter, the aggrieved DECANO filed before the Court of
Pangasinan a petition for "Mandamus and Injunction" claiming
that the aforementioned officials of the LTC acted without power
and in excess of authority in removing him from the service, and
therefore praying of the court to declare as null and void the order
for his removal, to declare him entitled to the position, to compel
his reinstatement and payment of his regular salary, and to enjoin,
preliminary, and then permanently, respondents from disturbing,
molesting or otherwise ousting him from his position as janitor.
As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the
trial court at the commencement of the proceedings commanding
respondents "to desist and refrain from disturbing, molesting or
otherwise ousting the petitioner from his position as janitor in the
Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City Agency, and to
pay the petitioner his corresponding salary from the date of notice
of said preliminary injunction, until further orders from the
Court."
After trial, while agreeing with respondent Edu that petitioner's
appointment as janitor was temporary and therefore the latter
could be ousted from his position at any time with or without
cause, the lower court nevertheless declared in its judgment of
October 29, 1968 that petitioner's removal was null and void upon
the ground that under the law, respondent Commissioner of Land
Transportation was not the appointing authority insofar as the
position of petitioner and an other minor positions in his office
were concerned; and thus lacking the power of appointment, said
respondent had neither the power of removal.
HELD:
Hence, this appeal interposed by respondents-appellants which
we find to be not well taken.
In seeking reversal of the trial court's decision, respondents make
capital of the fact that the petition for mandamus with injunction
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan while
respondent Edu holds office in Quezon City which, they claim, is
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the said court.
Respondents cite the long line of cases from the 1960 case
of Acosta vs. Alvendia 8 where this Court, pursuant to sec. 44 (h) of
the Judiciary Act, jointly or alternatively with sec. 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and/or section 2 of Rule 58, ruled that a court of
first instance has no jurisdiction to require or control the
execution of an act committed beyond the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. These cases invariably involved petitions for writs of
injunction seeking to control the actions of courts or officers
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent courts of first
instance where said petitions had been filed. THE ACOSTA RULING
OF NON-JURISDICTION DOES NOT APPLY, HOWEVER, TO THE
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AT BAR.
Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal
order issued by respondent Edu, mandamus and injunction being
then merely coronary remedies to the main relief sought, and
what is prayed to be enjoined, as in fact the trial court did enjoin
by preliminary injunction, is the implementation of the
termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the order
of dismissal was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be
implemented in Dagupan City by his subordinate officer,
respondent Acting Registrar of the LTC stationed at Dagupan City.
Insofar, therefore, as respondent Edu is concerned, the order
terminating the services of respondent was a fait accompli and
this he had done without authority, as earlier discussed. The
injunction is question, consequently, must be taken only to
restrain the implementation of respondent Edu's order by his co-
respondent whose official station at Dagupan City is within the
territorial boundaries of the trial court's jurisdictional district.
As in the above-cited case of Aligaen, the national official
stationed at Quezon City, namely, respondent Commissioner Edu,
was impleaded as respondent in the Pangasinan court for a
complete determination of the issues involved, the legality of
Edu's order of dismissal being the pivotal issue to determine the
merits of the mandamus and injunction aspects of the petition. In
other words, Mr. Edu was joined as respondent not for injunction
purposes but mainly for testing the legality of his dismissal order G.R. No. L-49510 January 28, 1980
and his transmittal thereof to his corespondent registrar at DAGUPAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ISABELITA L. LLAMES, PRIMO
Dagupan City to implement the same and terminate the services C. NARVAEZ and JOSE T. APIGO, petitioners,
of the petitioner in Dagupan City. vs.
THE HONORABLE ERNANI CRUZ PANO, DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XVIII and MC
ADORE FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
INCORPORATED, respondents.
Luis E. Serafica & Associates for petitioners.
Arthur Lim for private respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is an original special civil action for certiorari and prohibition

to, annul the proceedings in Civil Case No.. Q-26502 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City, entitled "MC
Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., plaintiff, versus Dagupan
Electric Corporation, et al., defendants" on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and to prohibit the respondent judge from proceeding
further in the case, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction filed by Dagupan Electric Corporation,
Isabelita I. Llames, Primo C. Narvaez and Jose T. Apigo against Hon.
Ernani Cruz Pano, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XVIII, and MC Adore Finance and Investment,
Incorporated. The pertinent allegations of the petition are:

petitioner DECORP is a legislative franchise holder to operate and

maintain for profit electric services within its franchised area
comprising the City of Dagupan and the towns of Sta. Barbara,
Calasiao, San Jacinto and San Fabian, an in the province of
Pangasinan, and that its generating plant is located in San Miguel,
Calasiao, Pangasinan;

private respondent MC Adore is the owner of the MC Adore

International Palace Hotel which is located in the City of Dagupan
and which became operational in March, 1978. MC Adore filed a
complaint for damages with writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the petitioner corporation in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. on the same date December 6, 1978, the judge,
issued ex parte Order for a preliminary mandatory injunction,
commanding the petitioner corporation as well as its agents in
Dagupan City to "restore immediately not later than 5-M p.m.,
December 7, 1978, the electrical power of the MC Adore
International Palace Hotel and resume the electrical supply of an
the electrical services and facilities to said hotel to enable plaintiff
to operate it fully, under pain of contempt for violation thereof"
and in the same Order, the respondent judge set the application
for preliminary mandatory injunction for head on December 11,
1978

on December 11, 1978, the petitioners filed a motion for

reconsideration of the questioned orders dated December 6, 1978
and December 8, 1978 on jurisdictional ground;

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Branch

XVIII at Quezon City, has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-26502
entitled "MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. vs. Dagupan
Electric Corporation, et al." and, as a corollary issue, whether the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the
Dagupan Electric Corporation. to restore the connection of the
electric power to the hotel in Dagupan City owned and operated
by MC Adore Finance and Investment Corporation.

HELD:
The pertinent provision of the Judiciary Act of 1948 reads:
Sec. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance
shall have original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall
have the power to issue writ of injunction, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas
corpus in their respective provinces and districts, in the
manner provided in the Rules of Court.
The DAGUPAN ELECTRIC contend that the Court of First Instance
of Rizal at Quezon City has no jurisdiction over the case because
the act of disconnecting the power to the hotel of the MC Adore
Finance and Investment, Inc. took place in Dagupan City, outside
the Province of Rizal and Quezon City.
The respondents submit that the act of disconnection was the
result of an order issued by the Dagupan Electric Corporation from
its business office in Quezon City.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AT QUEZON CITY HAS
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. Q-26502.
The Dagupan Electric Corporation has its principal office in Quezon
City where the business of the corporation is managed by the
Board of Directors. Decisions of the said corporation are made in
Quezon City. The employees of the Dagupan Electric Corporation
in Dagupan City merely carry out the orders issued by the officials
of said corporation in Quezon City. Hence the acts sought to be
restrained are being committed in Quezon City.
The respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the questioned order directing the Dagupan Electric
Corporation to restore the connection of the electric power to the
hotel owned by MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. The
record shows that the respondent judge conducted hearings and
gave the parties full opportunity to present their evidence before
issuing the orders sought to be set aside. The questioned order
dated December 19, 1978 which is self-explanatory reads:
On the question of jurisdiction, both parties
are residents of Quezon City, as they have
their principal offices in Quezon City. The
disconnection order was initiated and had
its life and source in Quezon City. The
mandatory injunction is addressed to the
corporation in Quezon City. The Dagupan
plant acts only upon order of its officers in
Quezon City.
It is clear from the foregoing order that the respondent judge did
not act capriciously or whimsically in ordering the Dagupan
Electric Corporation to restore the connection of the electric
power to the hotel in Dagupan City of the MC Adore Finance and
Investment, Inc..
G.R. No. 15929 February 10, 2006
ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC., Petitioner,
vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., HONORABLE N. C. PERELLO,
Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-MUNTINLUPA,
BRANCH 276 and SHERIFF FELIX FALCOTELLO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The appellate courts denial of petitioner Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie
Phils., Inc.s petition to enjoin the implementation of a writ of
possession issued by Branch 276, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City in favor of private respondent Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Co. (Metrobank) is the subject of the present petition
for review.
On October 21, 2000, as AAHI defaulted on its loan obligation,
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), to which the
banking operations of Solidbank were integrated, filed before the
Muntinlupa RTC a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of the
Real Estate Mortgage.15
AAHI not long after filed on October 30, 2000 also before the
Muntinlupa RTC a complaint16 against Solidbank, for Specific
Performance with Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-196,
and raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC.
On October 31, 2000, the mortgaged properties were sold at
public auction to the highest bidder, Metrobank, to which a
Certificate of Sale was issued.17
On January 24, 2002, Metrobank filed an Ex-Parte petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession 19 of the properties subject of the
foreclosed mortgage.
Also on April 9, 2002, petitioner filed before Branch 256 of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 00-196 (AAHIs complaint against Solidbank for
Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction) a motion for
intervention,21 to which it attached a complaint-in-
intervention22 with prayer for the annulment of the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining Metrobank to consolidate its title
and to take possession of its properties.
In the meantime, the Motion for Reconsideration of the April 9,
2002 Order of Branch 276 filed by AAHI was denied by
Order25 dated May 13, 2002, prompting it to file before the
appellate court a petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed on June 18, 2002 a separate petition for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction with the appellate court,26 docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 71217, also to enjoin the implementation of the writ
of possession issued by Branch 276 of the Muntinlupa RTC. In its
petition, petitioner alleged that its complaint-in-intervention in
Civil Case No. 00-196 pending in Branch 256 is its principal action
but as the said court could not enjoin Branch 276 from
implementing the writ of possession, both courts being of equal
jurisdiction, it had no choice but to file the petition with the
appellate court.27
ISSUE: Does the CA have jurisdiction to maintain an action for
injunction? NO.
HELD:
The petition fails.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and
hence, the jurisdiction of a court, are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.33 Petitioners
only prayer in CA-G.R. No. 71217 is "for the preservation of
the status quo, that is, petitioner, having in possession over the
subject properties for several years, shall retain such possession
until the controversy [Civil Case No. 00-196 before the said trial
court [Branch 276, RTC of Muntinlupa City] has been finally
resolved and respondents be prevented from taking over such
possession."34
Clearly, what petitioner filed with the appellate court was an
ORIGINAL ACTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION which is a
provisional and extra-ordinary remedy calculated to preserve or
maintain the status quo of things and is availed of to prevent
actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be
heard.
AN ORIGINAL ACTION FOR INJUNCTION IS OUTSIDE THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, however. Under B.P.
129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions
for annulment of judgments of the RTCs and has original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes
whether or not they are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.35
THE APPELLATE COURTS JURISDICTION TO GRANT A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS LIMITED TO ACTIONS OR
PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE IT, as Section 2 of Rule 58 of the
Rules clearly provides:
SECTION 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction may be granted by the court
where the action or proceeding is pending. x x x
(Emphasis supplied),
or in a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
under Section 7 of Rule 65, thus:
SECTION 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief.
The court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also
grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights
of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the
public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners complaint-in-intervention in Civil
Case No. 00-196 was pending before Branch 256 of the
Muntinlupa RTC, not with the appellate court. Petitioners petition
before the appellate court does not show, nay allege, that in
issuing the writ of possession, the Muntinlupa RTC acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion for
it to be treated as either one for certiorari36 or prohibition.37
Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate
court should have been dismissed outright.
At all events, it is well-settled that an order granting or denying a
preliminary injunction is not appealable. 38
G.R. No. 159696 November 17, 2005
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RIMANDO A.
GANNAPAO,* Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
"On December 22, 1995, a Complaint for Grave Misconduct and
Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and
Disarming was filed by the stockholders and board members of
United Workers Transport Corp. (UWTC) against SPO1 Rimando
Gannapao before the Philippine National Police, Inspectorate
Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Philippine National Police Chief Recaredo A. Sarmiento II rendered
a Decision imposing the three (3) months suspension of
[respondent] and this decision was upheld by NAPOLCOM and
DILG. Modified by CSC to dismissal from service. Hence, his appeal
to CA.
CSC through the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment
on the Petition specifically stating among others that Gannapao
was not entitled to a preliminary injunction.
CA granted respondents prayer for a preliminary injunction
enjoining the CSC from enforcing the latters assailed Decision
pending appeal. The CA based its ruling on the probability that the
immediate execution of the CSC Decision might cause injustice
and irreparable damage to petitioner.
ISSUE: Can the CA issue WPI enjoining the decisions of the CSC?
Yes.
HELD:
The Petition has no merit.
Petitioner attacks the CA for issuing the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction despite the Commissions finding that private
respondent was guilty of misconduct. The OSG adds that the
injunctive relief violates the Administrative Code and the CSC rules
stating that administrative disciplinary penalties shall be
immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of an
appeal.10
NEITHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE NOR THE CSC RULES
DEPRIVE COURTS OF THEIR POWER TO GRANT RESTRAINING
ORDERS OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS TO STAY THE
EXECUTION OF CSC DECISIONS PENDING APPEAL.11 Moreover, a
courts issuance of a preliminary injunction, when proper, is
expressly authorized by Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
which we quote:
"Sec. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. -- A
preliminary injunction may be granted by the court
where the action or proceeding is pending. If the
action or proceeding is pending in the Court of Appeals
or in the Supreme Court, it may be issued by said court
or any member thereof."
Furthermore, Section 82 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular
19-9912 recognizes the authority of the CA and the Supreme Court
to issue restraining orders or injunctions, as follows:
"Section 82. Effect of Pendency of Petition for
Review/Certiorari with the Court. -- The filing and
pendency of a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not
stop the execution of the final decision of the
Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order
or an injunction. (Emphasis provided.)
Having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC,13 the CA
clearly has the discretion to issue an ancillary writ of preliminary
injunction to secure the rights of private respondent pending
appeal of his dismissal. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion, the exercise of judgment by the courts in injunctive
matters should not be interfered with.14
Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise defined,
grave abuse is the exercise of power in an arbitrary or a despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty, or a refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.15
Certiorari will not issue to cure errors in proceedings or to correct
mere erroneous conclusions of law or fact. The burden is upon
petitioner to demonstrate that the questioned writ constitutes a
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. As long as a court
acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the
exercise of that jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than
errors of judgment which, as a rule, are reviewable by a timely
appeal16of the final disposition of the case.
Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction Justified
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court prescribes the grounds
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
Based on the foregoing, the requisites for the issuance of the writ
are the following: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable
right that must be protected and (2) an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 17 In taking
cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, a court
has the duty to determine whether the requisites for the grant of
the injunction are present in the case before it.18
In the present controversy, however, the assailed Order does not
state the basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA made no findings of fact or law indicating that any of the
elements essential for the grant of an injunctive writ existed. After
merely stating that it took "into consideration the allegations and
the arguments set forth" in the Urgent Motion filed by Gannapao,
the CA immediately concluded afterwards that respondent was
entitled to the relief demanded.
In this connection, the Court reiterates its pronouncement
in Garcia v. Burgos:19
"It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise
of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution,
deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a
doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong
arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of
great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages."
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and fair play, this Court
scrutinized the records of the case and, indeed, found sufficient
grounds for the grant of the injunctive Writ. Prior to the finality of
the CSC Decision dismissing him, private respondent has a clear
and unmistakable right to his current position in the police
service. Unquestionably, the right to employment, oftentimes the
lowly employees only noble source of bread and butter, is entitled
to protection by the State.20
Moreover, the immediate implementation of the not yet final
penalty of dismissal from the service would surely cause private
respondent (and his family) irreparable damage. As pleaded in his
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction,21 his salary and benefits as a
policeman are his familys only source of income.
Furthermore, in the said Urgent Motion, as well as the
Petition22 filed by private respondent before the Court of Appeals,
he incessantly asserted that the case against him had already
been dismissed in an earlier PNP pre-charge investigation. When
the case was reopened by the PNP Office of Legal Service, he
allegedly moved for the dismissal of the suit on the ground of res
judicata.
.
G.R. No. 180206 February 4, 2009
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO CITY, represented by
REINALDO BAUTISTA, JR., City Mayor; THE ANTI-SQUATTING
COMMITTEE, represented by ATTY. MELCHOR CARLOS R.
RAGANES, CITY BUILDINGS and ARCHITECTURE office,
represented by OSCAR FLORES; and PUBLIC ORDER and SAFETY
OFFICE, Represented by EMMANUEL REYES, Petitioners.
vs.
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional Officer-National Commission
on Indigenous People-CAR, ELVIN GUMANGAN, NARCISO
BASATAN and LAZARO BAWAS, Respondents.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by
the City Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the
demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas,
Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of
the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio
City,
Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated
September 19, 2006 were issued informing the occupants thereon
of the intended demolition of the erected structures
Consequently, private respondent) filed a petition for injunction
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City
Mayor of Baguio City petitioners before the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-
CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad, Benguet
In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the
lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral
lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and
continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof
have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April
27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of
the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus, contended that the
demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their right of
possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the
Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained.
Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated
November 10, 2006 granting the private respondents application
for preliminary injunction subject to the posting of an injunctive
bond each in the amount of 10,000.00.3
Petitioners assert that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide main actions for injunction such as the one filed by private
respondents. They claim that the NCIP has the authority to issue
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction
only as auxiliary remedies to cases pending before it.
Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by
its Charter. Thus, private respondents cannot claim their alleged
ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA.
respondents defend the jurisdiction of the NCIP to take
cognizance of and decide main actions for injunction arguing that
the IPRA does not state that the NCIP may only issue such writs of
injunction as auxiliary remedies.
ISSUE: Can the NCIP have jurisdiction to issue WPI? YES.
HELD:
We shall first dispose of the elemental issue of the NCIPs
jurisdiction.
The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs
to protect and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous
cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the
recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights
thereto.12 In order to fully effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is
vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the
rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the NCIPs
assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties
thereto shall have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws and have obtained a certification from the Council
of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved.13
In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9,
2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure
Before the NCIP, reiterates the jurisdiction of the NCIP over claims
and disputes involving ancestral lands and enumerates the actions
that may be brought before the commission. Sec. 5, Rule III
thereof provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP through its Regional
Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the
implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371,
including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional
Hearing Office (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes and
controversies over ancestral lands/domains
of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the
requirement of free and prior and informed
consent of ICCs/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of
ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary
laws or desecration of ceremonial sites,
sacred places, or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance
under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the
foregoing.
(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession, and
settlement of land disputes, between and
among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled
under customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any
violation of Republic Act No. 8371.
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the
Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of
Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged
to have been fraudulently acquired by, and
issued to, any person or community as
provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371.
Provided that such action is filed within one
(1) year from the date of registration.
THE IPRA, FURTHERMORE, ENDOWS THE NCIP WITH THE POWER
TO ISSUE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND WRITS OF
INJUNCTION. Sec. 69 thereof states:
Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.The NCIP shall have
the power and authority:
a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the
hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well
as those pertaining to its internal functions and such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this Act;
b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a
controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance
and testimony of witnesses or the production of such
books, papers, contracts, records, agreements, and
other document of similar nature as may be material to
a just determination of the matter under investigation
or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Act;
c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or
indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor;
and
d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any
case pending before it which, if not restrained
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to
any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social
or economic activity. [Emphasis supplied]
NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-quoted
provision in Sec. 82, Rule XV, which provides:
Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
A writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order may be
granted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Sections
59 and 69 of R.A. [No.] 8371 when it is established, on the basis of
sworn allegations in a petition, that the acts complained of
involving or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, may
cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties,
or seriously affect social or economic activity. This power may also
be exercised by RHOs in cases pending before them in order to
preserve the rights of the parties.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may
issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without
any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main
action is for injunction. The power to issue temporary restraining
orders or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over which
the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which
may cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury.
In this case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ
because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect and preserve
the rights of private respondents who are undoubtedly members
of ICCs/IPs.
Parenthetically, in order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the
IPRA even provides that no restraining order or preliminary
injunction may be issued by any inferior court against the NCIP in
any case, dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to the
interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and
ancestral domains.17
CHARTER OF BAGUIO MUST YIELD TO IPRA. Petitioners argue that
Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA, and
necessarily the jurisdiction of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78
thereof, which states:
SEC. 78. Special Provision.The City of Baguio shall remain to be
governed by its Charter and all lands proclaimed as part of its
townsite reservation shall remain as such until otherwise
reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land
rights and titles recognized and/or acquired through any judicial,
administrative or other processes before the effectivity of this Act
shall remain valid: Provided, further, That this provision shall not
apply to any territory which becomes part of the City of Baguio
after the effectivity of this Act.lavvphil.net [Emphasis supplied]
The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed
by its own charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot
ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of
prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process
before its effectivity. THE IPRA DEMANDS THAT THE CITYS
CHARTER RESPECT THE VALIDITY OF THESE RECOGNIZED LAND
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
ISSUE: WON THERE EXISTS A RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED?
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private
respondents ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by
Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be
protected by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that
there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which
injunction is directed are violative of said right.18
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents ancestral land claim. The
proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as
claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does
not acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact,
Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest
Reservation from sale or settlement. It provides:
Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and
twenty-six of Act Numbered Twenty-seven Hundred and eleven[,] I
hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation to be administered
by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and
protecting water and timber, the protection of the water supply
being of primary importance and all other uses of the forest are to
be subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale
or settlement the following described parcels of the public domain
situated in the Township of La Trinidad, City of Baguio, Mountain
Province, Island of Luzon, to wit:
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was
declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court
of Appeals.19 The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as
such precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the
courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to
adjudicate forest lands.
ALL TOLD, ALTHOUGH THE NCIP HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND WRITS OF INJUNCTION,
WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF GRANTED BY THE COMMISSION.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
[A.M. No. CA-01-32. January 14, 2003]
REYES vs. DEMETRIA
EN BANC
A.M. No. CA-01-32 (Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes vs.
Justices Demetrio G. Demetria, Ramon A. Barcelona and Roberto
A. Barrios [Special Third Division]; Atty. Teresita A. Marigomen,
Division Clerk of Court, Special Fourth Division and Mr. Efren R.
Rivamonte, Special Sheriff, Mailing Section.)
FACTS: This refers to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent Demetrio G. Demetria praying that the Resolution en
banc dated January 23, 2002 be reconsidered and that he be
absolved of all administrative charges leveled against him. In
compliance with our Resolution dated July 16, 2002, Division Clerk
of Court Caroline G. Ocampo-Peralta, of the Court of Appeals, and
complainants Heirs of the late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, filed their
respective Comments.
Demetria was found guilty of gross *misconduct: (a) by issuing a
temporary restraining order with the signature of only two out of
three justices of the Court of Appeals; (b) by enforcing the
decision of the appellate court notwithstanding the fact that the
same is pending appeal with the Supreme Court and (c) by
showing his keen interest in the immediate execution of the
decision despite the lack of authority of the Court of Appeals to
appoint a Special Sheriff.
In support of his motion, respondent claims that: he was denied
due process; he is not guilty of gross misconduct for the failure of
one of the Justices of the Court of Appeals to sign the Resolution
granting the issuance of a temporary restraining order; and, he is
not guilty of misconduct "in allegedly directing the appointment of
a special sheriff".
ISSUE: Does the CAs issuance of WPI or TRO always have to be a
collegiate decision? NO
HELD:
motion for reconsideration is partly meritorious.
Respondent was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
disregarding existing rules of procedure in issuing a temporary
restraining order which bore the signatures of only two justices of
the Court of Appeals. We are constrained to rectify the same
considering the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
"Section 5. xxx xxx xxx
"xxx. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is
not extendible without need of any judicial declaration
to that effect and no court shall have authority to
extend or renew the same on the ground for which it
was issued.
"However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a
member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall
be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the
party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court or a member
thereof shall be effective until further orders."
(emphasis supplied)
and Sections 9 and 10, Rule 3 of the then prevailing Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals which provide:
"Section 9. Action by a Justice. - The following may be
considered and acted upon by the Justice to whom the
case is assigned for study and report:
"xxx xxx xxx;
"b. Motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, restraining order, and other
auxiliary writs;
"xxx xxx xxx"
"Section 10. Absence of the Justice Assigned to the
Study and Report. -When the Justice to whom the case
is assigned for study and report is absent, the motions
and incidents enumerated in the proceeding
section may be acted upon by the Chairman or by the
other member of the Division to which that Justice
belongs. If the members of the division are all absent,
any motion for the issuance of a restraining order
shall be referred to the Presiding Justice for
appropriate action.
"All other matters not mentioned in the proceeding
section shall be cognizable by the Division." (emphasis
supplied)
CLEARLY THEREFROM, EVEN ONLY ONE (1) MEMBER OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS * MAY ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER. Thus, on this matter, respondent ** could not be held
guilty of gross misconduct.
Nevertheless, we maintain that the issuance of temporary
restraining order by only one or two justices of the Court of
Appeals must be exercised sparingly, that is, only in case of
extreme necessity where there is compelling reason to abate or
avoid a grave injury to a party.
However, we find no justifiable reason to sustain respondent's
claim that he was not given due process when the Court found
that he is guilty*** of gross misconduct in directing the
appointment of a special sheriff in the absence of any hearing or
investigation. Movant-respondent insist that he merely inquired as
to the possibility of the appointment of a sheriff and points to the
fact that the directive to the Chief of the Mailing Section to
appoint a special sheriff to carry out the writ of execution pending
appeal was made by all three members of the Division and not
solely by him.
An examination of the record reveals that the directive referred to
by respondent is Annex "B" attached to the Comment of Justices
Ramon Barcelona (now retired) and Roberto Barrios which reads
as follows:
"Sirs:
"Quoted hereunder for your information is a resolution of this
Court.......SECOND.........DIVISION) dated....September 21, 1998....
"CA. G.R. SP No. 47156 METRO MANILA BUILDERS, INC.,
"CA-G.R. SP NO. 47720 versus HON. Cesar_____ ET.AL..
"In view of the letter of Justice Demetrio Demetria (Ponente)
dated September 21, 1998, the Chief of the Mailing Section is
hereby directed to appoint a special sheriff to execute the decision
of this Court dated August 21, 1998.
"WITNESS the Honorable...EMETERIO C. CUI...Chairman,
Honorable..RAMON A. BARCELONA...and the
Honorable...DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA...Members this
21st .of..September.1998.
"Very truly yours,
"(Sgd.) CAROLINE G. OCAMPO-PERALTA
"Division Clerk of
Court"1
Respondent, in his present motion for reconsideration, does not
refute the letter mentioned in the about-quoted minute resolution
of the former Second Division showing indubitably that it was
upon his instruction that a special sheriff is appointed. Instead,
respondent merely insists in his present motion for
reconsideration that the appointment of a special sheriff was
authorized by all three (3) Justices of the Court of Appeals which
however does not justify the wrongful appointment of a sheriff in
said court.
Needless to emphasize, respondent had been given the
opportunity to be heard and as pointed out by complaints in their
Comment, respondent had been explicit in his Comment dated
June 18, 2001 that he "does not see the need for him to file his
Comment to the instant complaint considering that he had already
been dismissed from office in A.M. No. 00-7-09 and, even in the
event that said dismissal is reconsidered, he would nevertheless
resign or retire from the service, hence, this case has been or will
be rendered moot and academic"2.
* Considering that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct in
enforcing the decision of the Court of Appeals despite knowledge
of the designation of the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme
Court and in causing the designation of a special sheriff despite
utter lack of authority to do so thereby showing unusual interest
therein, the imposition of a fine of P20,000.00 is in accordance
with the prevailing jurisprudence in 19983, when the complained
resolution were issued.
SECTION 3
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or
in requiring the performance of an act or acts
either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. (3a)
G. R. No. 118249 February 14, 2003
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EDITA M. MULINGTAPANG, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Metro Manila, Branch
115, and K SERVICES COMPANY, respondents.
FACTS: K Services began providing porters for the domestic
passenger terminal of the Manila International Airport (now the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport) under a provisional permit for
the period from January 1, 1976 to April 30, 1976. MIAA and K
Services subsequently executed a contract effective from May
1976 to April 30, 1977 that was renewed yearly until December
1984.
Although the parties did not renew their contract for the
succeeding year, K Services continued as porterage contractor
from January 1985 until February 1987. Sometime in February
1987, however, MIAA gave notice that the services of K Services
would be terminated on February 20, 1987. In response, K
Services filed a petition for injunction on February 26, 1987 with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No.
4692-P.
On December 26, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 113, rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 4692-P ruling
that MIAA could terminate its contract with K Services at any time.
On April 12, 1991, K Services appealed the decision of the trial
court to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the appeal in CA-
G.R. SP No. 23053. The Court of Appeals also denied K Services
subsequent motion for reconsideration. As K Services did not
appeal, the decision of the Court of Appeals became final and
executory. Thus, the issue as to whether MIAA could terminate
the contract with K Services became res judicata.4
Shortly after, K Services received a letter dated May 31, 1991 from
then MIAA General Manager Eduardo Carrascoso, the relevant
portion of which stated:
"Due to certain administrative problems that are preventing us
from taking over, please continue operating said service until
further notice from us.
In connection thereto, please be advised also that PAL Authorities
and the MIA Authority have come to an agreement whereby the
latter shall operate and manage the Domestic Terminal II which
necessarily includes the operation of the porterage and other
concessions therein. In this regard, you may take over the
operation of the porterage service therein since the flights being
operated in this Terminal II used to be a part of your contract.
Please coordinate this with the Manager of the Domestic
Passenger Terminal and the PAL Authorities concerned.
Please understand however that in continuing the operation of
the porterage service, you will be charged the monthly Concession
Privilege Fee in the amount of 45,000.00 for each Terminal or a
total of 90,000.00 per month; further, you will also abide by the
terms and conditions of your expired contract." 5 (Emphasis
supplied)
K Services alleged that it was initially hesitant to accept MIAAs
offer. However, it continued to provide porters for Domestic
Terminal I and expanded its operations to cover Domestic Terminal
II upon the alleged verbal assurance of MIAAs officers that MIAAs
policy was to relinquish porterage operations to the private sector.
K Services likewise claimed that MIAA officers also gave verbal
assurance that K Services would not be replaced with another
porterage contractor without a public bidding in which K Services
could participate.6 In support of its contention, K Services cited the
memorandum dated August 28, 1992 from General Manager
Guillermo G. Cunanan to the MIAA Board of Directors. The
memorandum stated that "Management has decided to relinquish
the management of these concessions and award them to the
private sector at fair and reasonable fees x x x."7 The
memorandum recommended to the MIAA Board of Directors the
approval of a schedule of concession fees chargeable to
concessionaires of porterage and other services.
However, on December 1, 1992, General Manager Cunanan gave
written notice to K Services to "wind up" its operations as
"Management has decided to take over the aforecited services at
the Domestic Passenger Terminals I and II."8
K Services opposed the takeover. It filed on December 18, 1992 a
Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order9 with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 115, docketed as Civil Case No. 9500. Finding
the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court
issued on December 28, 1992 a temporary restraining order
against MIAA. On January 20, 1993, the trial court granted the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by K Services, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court, after careful evaluation and
consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, so finds
that this is a proper case where a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
should issue and let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued to
restrain and prevent the respondent Manila International Airport
Authority or anyone acting for in (sic) its own behalf, from
terminating the porterage services of the petitioner K Services
Company until further order from this Court provided, however,
that the petitioner files before this Court a bond with sufficient
sureties in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSANDS (sic) PESOS
(500,000.00), Philippine Currency, executed to the respondent to
answer and pay for whatever damages the respondent may
sustain pending the hearing on the merits of the main case by
reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decided (sic)
that the petitioner was not entitled thereto."10
MIAAs legal department duly received a copy of the trial courts
order. However, the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG" for
brevity) did not receive a copy of the injunctive writ, despite
having already entered its appearance as counsel for MIAA during
previous hearings before the trial court.
On February 11, 1993, the OSG filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint filed by K Services on the grounds that: (1) the
complaint failed to state a cause of action; or (2) assuming the
existence of a cause of action, a prior judgment barred the same.
At the time MIAA filed the instant petition before the Court, this
motion to dismiss, opposed by K Services, was pending
consideration by the trial court.
On July 7, 1993, K Services filed a motion to cite MIAAs General
Manager Cunanan for contempt as the latter ostensibly attempted
to oust and replace K Services with another porterage contractor.
It was only upon receipt of a copy of the contempt motion that
the OSG supposedly learned of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court. On July 23, 1993, the OSG filed an
Omnibus Motion11 which mainly alleged that: (1) the injunctive
writ lacked legal and factual basis; and (2) K Services was using the
injunction as a shield to violate the terms of the porterage
agreement by charging fees in excess of the amount authorized by
the contract. The Omnibus Motion prayed for reconsideration of
the order of January 20, 1993 and for the lifting of the injunction.
On August 5, 1993, the trial court denied MIAAs Omnibus Motion,
ruling that:
"2. The allegations that the complaint states no cause of action,
and that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction has no
factual and legal basis to the mind of this Court, are not tenable. A
hearing on the question of whether or not a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction should be issued was held wherein the parties and their
counsels were allowed to go on oral arguments and this Court
after a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced thereat found
that there is a case where a writ of preliminary injunction should
issue. Evidence adduced shows that the petitioner is servicing the
respondent as a porterage contractor and that a notice of
termination was sent to the petitioner. The allegation of the
petitioner and presented before this Court is one for which a
Court can make a valid judgment. Certainly, this Court has to issue
a writ of preliminary injunction to avoid any irreparable loss that
might be caused to the plaintiff. Nonetheless, to legally equate the
respondent, this Court directed the petitioner to file a
500,000.00 bond to answer for whatever damage the
respondent might sustain pending hearing of the case on the
merits."12
The OSG, on MIAAs behalf, filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 to the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts orders of
January 20, 1993 and August 5, 1993. The OSG argued that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary
injunction and denied the Omnibus Motion without sufficient
factual and legal basis.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of December 22, 1993,13 the Court of Appeals set
aside the questioned orders of the trial court for lack of sufficient
basis, to wit:
"In the case at bar, while the right of petitioner to terminate the
lease contract is clear, and in fact ruled upon with finality or is res
judicata, private respondents mere claim of an
extended/expanded contract is unclear and disputed, to the effect
that the granting of the writ of preliminary injunction at this stage
of the proceeding, being based on the doubtful genuineness and
validity of the alleged extended agreement, has not been
successfully established."
xxx
"Thus, the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned orders.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and the
questioned orders hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE."
While the motion for reconsideration filed by K Services before
the Court of Appeals was pending, MIAA attempted to oust K
Services based on the appellate courts decision. Upon motion of
K Services, the trial court issued an order to preserve the status
quo ante by reinstating K Services as the porterage contractor of
Domestic Passenger Terminals I and II.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the trial court from implementing the status quo ante
order. The Court of Appeals denied MIAAs motion in its
Resolution of March 10, 1994.
On December 2, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated an
Amended Decision reversing its earlier decision of December 22,
1993 and dismissing MIAAs petition for certiorari. Citing
"misapprehensions of fact," the Court of Appeals ruled:
"In the case at bar, the evidence submitted by both parties, as well
as the issues raised in the oral arguments, also by both parties,
were the very bases upon which the writ of preliminary injunction
was issued "to avoid any irreparable loss that might be caused to
the plaintiff." Thus, it has been ruled that it is well-established that
no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to a judge or
body in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction where a
party was not deprived of its day in court as it was heard and had
exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses (Santos vs.
CA, 214 SCRA 162).1awphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 22, 1993, object of
respondents motion for reconsideration, is hereby
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE, and a new one rendered
DISMISSING the instant petition."14
On January 26, 1995, the OSG filed with the Court a petition for
review and prayed for: (1) the reversal of the Amended Decision
of the Court of Appeals; (2) the annulment of the assailed orders
issued by the trial court; and (3) the issuance of a restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the trial court from
implementing its assailed orders.
The Issue
The MIAA raises this sole issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSTAINING THE ISSUANCE OF A
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The central question for resolution is whether K Services was
entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the trial
court. The Court shall deal only with the questioned writ and not
with the merits of the case pending before the trial court.
ISSUE: WON K Services is entitled to WPI?
HELD: NO
MIAA asserts that K Services has not shown any clear and
unmistakable right to the protection of a writ of preliminary
injunction. MIAA calls attention to the trial courts order of
January 20, 1993, which failed to state in particular the basis for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of K
Services. MIAA argues that the effect of the injunction is to force
MIAA to extend the life of a contract that already expired by
operation of its own provisions. For these reasons, MIAA contends
that the trial court, in granting the injunctive writ, acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, K Services maintains that it has the right to
continue as the porterage contractor of MIAA under the extension
conferred on it by MIAA through General Manager Carrascoso. K
Services further alleges that MIAA officers verbally assured K
Services that MIAAs policy was to privatize the porterage and
other services, and in any case, K Services would not be replaced
without a public bidding.
Section 3, Rule 58, of the old Rules of Court, which was applicable
at the time, prescribed that a preliminary injunction could be
granted provided:
"(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance
of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an
act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act
complained of during the litigation or the non-
performance thereof would probably work injustice to
the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights respecting
the subject of the action, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual."
The requisites necessary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction are:
(1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that
must be protected; and
(2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.21
The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites
necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case
before it.
In the instant case, however, the trial courts order of January 20,
1993 was, on its face, bereft of basis for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. There were no findings of fact or law in the
assailed order indicating that any of the elements essential for the
grant of a preliminary injunction existed. The trial court alluded to
hearings during which the parties marked their respective exhibits
and the trial court heard the oral arguments of opposing counsels.
However, it cannot be ascertained what evidence was formally
offered and presented by the parties and given weight and
credence by the trial court. The basis for the trial courts
conclusion that K Services was entitled to a writ of preliminary
injunction is unclear.
In its order of August 5, 1993, the trial court stated that it issued
the injunction to prevent irreparable loss that might be caused to
K Services. Once more, however, the trial court neglected to
mention what right in esse of K Services, if any, was in danger of
being violated and required the protection of a preliminary
injunction. The trial court stated merely that K Services was
servicing MIAA as a porterage contractor and that a notice of
termination was sent to K Services. Absent a preliminary finding
by the trial court that K Services possessed the right to continue as
MIAAs concessionaire, MIAAs termination of K Services was not
sufficient in itself to establish that there was an invasion of K
Services right.
Considering the far-reaching effects of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the trial court should have exercised more prudence
and judiciousness in its issuance of the injunction order. We
remind trial courts that while generally the grant of a writ of
preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be observed
in the exercise of such discretion. 22 The discretion of the court a
quo to grant an injunctive writ must be exercised based on the
grounds and in the manner provided by law. 23 Thus, the Court
declared in Garcia v. Burgos:24
"It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise
of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution,
deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a
doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong
arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of
great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages.
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation
upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be
granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the
court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency
demands it." (Emphasis supplied)
THERE WAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE. The records before the Court do
not reveal a clear and unmistakable right on the part of K Services
that would entitle the latter to the protection of an injunctive writ.
The available records show, and the parties do not dispute, that
the last contract between MIAA and K Services had already
expired. K Services claim to an "Extended/Expanded Contract" is
anchored on the letter of May 31, 1991 from General Manager
Carrascoso. However, this letter expressly stipulated that the
extension would only be "until further notice"25 from MIAA.
"While it may be conceded that private respondent was allowed
to continue operating the porterage service after the expiration of
the contract as the above letter shows, there is no question,
however, that private respondent was only allowed to operate up
to a certain time, specified therein as "until further notice from
us." Indeed, there is nothing in said letter to indicate that private
respondent has until forever to operate the porterage service as
private respondent would like to make it appear. The fact that the
authority to continue the porterage service was specified up to a
certain period is a clear indication that petitioner did not intend to
allow private respondent to operate the porterage service for as
long as it pleases. Perforce, it limited such privilege to a certain
period or until further notice. x x x"26 1a\^/phi1.net
Significantly, MIAA General Manager Carrascoso also explained in
his May 31, 1991 letter that the extension was being offered
because MIAA had administrative problems that prevented it from
taking over the porterage operations of the domestic passenger
terminals. Further, K Services itself admitted in its initial petition
for prohibition filed before the trial court that it hesitated to
accept the offer "because of the transiency and impermanence of
the extension."30 Taken together, these factors indicate that the
parties intended and understood that the extension was merely a
temporary arrangement.
Both the trial court, in its order of August 5, 1993, and the Court
of Appeals, in its Amended Decision, found that the injunctive writ
was necessary to prevent serious damage or irreparable loss to K
Services.
The Court has ruled, however, that the possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for
an injunction.33 Where the complainants right is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. Absent a clear legal right, the
issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.34
Thus, the trial court's grant of the injunctive writ in favor of K
Services despite the lack of a clear and unmistakable right on the
part of K Services constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. A finding that the applicant for preliminary
injunction may suffer damage not capable of pecuniary estimation
does not suffice to support an injunction, where it appears that
the right of the applicant is unclear or disputed.
Finally, in deciding to dismiss MIAAs petition for certiorari, the
Court of Appeals cited the Courts pronouncement in Santos v.
Court of Appeals.35 We clarify that Santos does not constitute an
exception to the requirement of a clear and unmistakable right
before an injunction may issue. On the contrary, the Court in
Santos expressly declared that all the requisites for the proper
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction were present, and
the right of the government to the injunctive writ was clear, well-
defined and certain.
WHAT IS A RIGHT IN ESSE?
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE
CITY ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY
ENGINEER OF PARAAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY
CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY
VITALEZ, PARAAQUE CITY, TERESITA A. GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R.
ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M. ARGOTE,
CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L.
GONZALES, ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA
P. ROSALES, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V.
EBIO, EDUARDO V. EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E.
MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V. EBIO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
January 31, 2007 Decision1 and June 8, 2007 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being
contrary to law and jurisprudence. The CA had reversed the
Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch
196, issued on April 29, 2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155.
Below are the facts.
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel
of land consisting of 406 square meters, more or less, located at
9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Paraaque City and
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of
respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut
creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and
possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather,
Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son,
Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively
occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an
affidavit declaring possession and occupancy, 4 Pedro was able to
obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name. 5 Since
then, respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes
for the said property.6
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros
daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedros advice, the couple established
their home on the said lot. In April 1964 and in October 1971,
Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Paraaque
municipal office for the construction of their house within the said
compound.7 On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized
Transfer of Rights8 ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in
favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under
Pedros name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario
Ebios name.9
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of
Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1999 10seeking
assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the
construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the
said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be eight (8)
meters wide and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive
to the main road of Vitalez Compound 11 traversing the lot
occupied by the respondents. When the city government advised
all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents
immediately registered their opposition thereto. As a result, the
road project was temporarily suspended.12
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when
several officials from the barangay and the city planning office
proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.
Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director
of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior and Local
Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor. 13 On June 29, 2003,
the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting to discuss
the construction of the proposed road. In the said meeting,
respondents asserted their opposition to the proposed project
and their claim of ownership over the affected property. 14 On
November 14, 2003, respondents attended another meeting with
officials from the city government, but no definite agreement was
reached by and among the parties.15
On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to
the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next
thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said
property.16 Respondents sent a letter to the Office of the City
Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim over the subject
property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. 17 The
request remained unheeded.1avvphi1
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of
Paraaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners.18 In the course of the
proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that
they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales patent
before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).19
On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 20 denying the petition
for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents were
not able to prove successfully that they have an established right
to the property since they have not instituted an action for
confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not
yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead the Republic
of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was
denied.21
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals. On January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued its
Decision in favor of the respondents. According to the Court of
Appeals--
The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of
the lands adjoining Cutcut Creek particularly Road Lot No. 8
(hereinafter RL 8) and the accreted portion beside RL 8.
The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8
containing an area of 291 square meters is owned by Guaranteed
Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No. S-62176. The same RL 8 appears
to have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City
Government of Paraaque on 22 March 1966 and which was
accepted by the then Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April
1966. There is no evidence however, when RL 8 has been intended
as a road lot.
On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO
VITALEZ possessed the accreted property since 1930 per his
Affidavit dated 21 March 1966 for the purpose of declaring the
said property for taxation purposes. The property then became
the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the year 1967
and the real property taxes therefor had been paid for the years
1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004.
Sometime in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were issued in
favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for the subject property. On 21
April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the accreted
property to MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest.
Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing
documentary evidence, it could be concluded that Guaranteed
Homes is the owner of the accreted property considering its
ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which the accretion attached.
However, this is without the application of the provisions of the
Civil Code on acquisitive prescription which is likewise applicable
in the instant case.
xxxx
The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the
accreted portion which [was] duly proven by the Appellants. It is
clear that since 1930, Appellants together with their predecessor-
in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in exclusive possession of
the subject property and starting 1964 had introduced
improvements thereon as evidenced by their construction
permits. Thus, even by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,]
Appellants have acquired ownership of the property in question
since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was subsequently registered
in the name of Guaranteed Homes. x x x.
xxxx
Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to
have RL 8 registered in its name, which is almost fifty years from
the time PEDRO VITALEZ occupied the adjoining accreted property
in 1930. x x x.
xxxx
We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of
Appellants which bolster their right over the subject property. x x
x.
xxxx
In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants
[have] amply proven their right over the property in question.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The challenged Order of the court a quo is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 22
On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition raising the following
assignment of errors:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A
RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE[;]
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS
AVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS IN ACCORD WITH
THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO
THE COMPLAINT FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER
COURT.23
The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally,
whether the State is an indispensable party to respondents action
for prohibitory injunction; and substantively, whether the
character of respondents possession and occupation of the
subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory
injunction.
HELD:
The petition is without merit.
AN ACTION FOR INJUNCTION IS BROUGHT SPECIFICALLY TO
RESTRAIN OR COMMAND THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT.24 It is
distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which
cannot exist except only as part or as an incident to an
independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for
injunction, the auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or
mandatory injunction may issue.25
In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to
prevent the local government of Paraaque City from proceeding
with the construction of an access road that will traverse through
a parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of
acquisitive prescription.
Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary
of the river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that
may have formed along its banks through time should also be
considered as part of the public domain. And respondents should
have included the State as it is an indispensable party to the
action.
We do not agree.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from
the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of
Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership
over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, which remains in effect,26 in relation to Article 457
of the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers
ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It
reads:
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to
creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.27
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial
deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only
restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.28
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by
prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties
has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding
property of public domain.29 Even a city or municipality cannot
acquire them by prescription as against the State.30
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public
dominion,31 the land which is formed by the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not
form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.
Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the
controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect
his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their
presence.32 In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence
in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole
controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final
decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.33
In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the
city government of Paraaque from proceeding with its
implementation of the road construction project. The State is
neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where
no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation
shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would
it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be
divested nor any of its rights infringed.
ISSUE: WON the character of possession and ownership by the
respondents over the contested land entitles them to the avails
of the action ? YES
HELD:
A RIGHT IN ESSE means a clear and unmistakable right.34 A party
seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she
possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing.35 It
should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which
may never arise.36
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-
interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot
as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit
from the local government of Paraaque for the construction of
their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an
affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the
property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also
in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of
Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the
respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Paraaque.
From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than
thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity
sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents
are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property
through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite
the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It
must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not
the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the
applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never
intended as a means of acquiring ownership. 37 A decree of
registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership. 38
ISSUE:
Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents,
which remains pending before the DENR, estop them from filing
an injunction suit?
HELD:
Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be
done either through judicial proceedings or through
administrative process. In the instant case, respondents admitted
that they opted to confirm their title over the property
administratively by filing an application for sales patent.
Respondents application for sales patent, however, should not be
used to prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as their
vested right over the subject property. The sales patent
application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity
particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy
from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of
acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any
authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or
a patent if the land is no longer a public land.39
Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not
have. Such principle is equally applicable even against a sovereign
entity that is the State.
G.R. No. 179892-93 January 30, 2009
ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO, Petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA T. DY and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, Respondents.
FACTS:
ISSUE: WON RESPONDENTS EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA T. DY
AND NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC) ARE ENTITLED TO
[PRELIMINARY] INJUNCTION AS THEY HAVE MATERIAL AND
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS, WHICH ARE CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE,
i.e. rights of being clients to question the reasonableness of the
attorneys fees of a lawyer.
HELD: NO
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of respondents because petitioner
allegedly violated respondents material and substantial right as
petitioners clients to pay only reasonable attorneys fees.
Petitioner asserts that none of the respondents is his client in the
present case; that even respondents themselves have not alleged
or claimed that they are his clients; that the amount of attorneys
fees he claimed was chargeable on a portion of the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund due his clients, the non-EPIRA separated employees;
that if anyone would be injured by his claim of attorneys fees, it
would be his clients, the non-EPIRA separated employees, and not
respondents; that none of his clients has questioned or
complained about the amount of attorneys fees he is claiming;
that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest and at most
are merely nominal parties-in-interest; that as mere nominal
parties-in-interest, respondents are not entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction under the Rules of Court; and that the
requisites for the proper issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction are lacking in the instant case.33
In its Resolution, Court of Appeals granted respondents
application for a writ of preliminary injunction based on the
following reasons:
This Court finds that [herein respondents] have prima
facie established [their] compliance with strict
requirements for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in this case. Under the leading case
of Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 72 (2001),
the requisites of preliminary injunction are as follows: (
a) the invasion of the right of [herein respondents]
is material and substantial;
b) the right of [herein respondents] is clear and
unmistakable; and
c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious irreparable damage to
[herein respondents].
The right of [herein respondents] alleged to have
been invaded is that a client has the right to pay only
a reasonable amount of attorneys fees and only for
services actually rendered which is clearly and
unmistakably available to all clients. What [herein
respondents] are claiming is a material and substantial
right. This Court finds that [herein respondents]
have prima facie established an urgent and paramount
necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for, to avoid irreparable injury to
[herein respondents]. x x x.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the basis of the Court of
Appeals in granting the writ was petitioners alleged violation or
invasion of respondents right, as petitioners clients, to pay only a
reasonable amount of attorneys fees to, and only for services
actually rendered by, petitioner.
The Court of Appeals is clearly mistaken.
It should be made clear that petitioner is the counsel for the non-
EPIRA separated members in the latters quest to claim their
shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Petitioner was never hired
or employed by respondents as their counsel in the cases at bar.
Respondents themselves do not claim or allege that they are
clients of petitioner. In fact, petitioner is representing the non-
EPIRA separated members, the opposing party to the respondents
in the present cases.
Further, the amount of attorneys fees being claimed by petitioner
is chargeable to the 119,196,000.00 corrected earnings
differential of his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members.
Respondents have actually partially distributed such amount to
some non-EPIRA separated members pursuant to the Compromise
Agreement. In other words, the non-EPIRA separated members
are the lawful owners/beneficiaries of the amount from which
petitioners attorneys fees had been and shall be taken.
Hence, if anyone would be injured by petitioners claim for
attorneys fees, it would be his clients, the non-EPIRA separated
members, and not respondents. It appears, however, that none of
the non-EPIRA separated members has questioned or complained
about petitioners claim for attorneys fees.
A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS AN ORDER GRANTED AT ANY
STAGE OF AN ACTION OR PROCEEDING PRIOR TO THE
JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER, REQUIRING A PARTY OR A COURT,
AGENCY OR A PERSON TO REFRAIN FROM A PARTICULAR ACT OR
ACTS.34 A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to
preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the
relations between the parties during the pendency of the
suit.35For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the applicant is
tasked to establish and convincingly show the following:
(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected;
(2) a violation of that right; and
(3) there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.36
A CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT MEANS ONE CLEARLY FOUNDED ON OR
GRANTED BY LAW OR IS ENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF
LAW.37 The existence of a right violated is a prerequisite to the
granting of a writ of preliminary injunction. 38 A writ of preliminary
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which
may never arise.39 It may be issued only if the applicant has clearly
shown an actual existing right that should be protected during the
pendency of the principal action. 40 In the absence of a clear legal
right, or when the applicants right or title is doubtful or disputed,
preliminary injunction is not proper.41
In this case, It is evident from the foregoing that respondents do
not have a clear right or right in esse to pay only a reasonable
amount of attorneys fees to the petitioner because such right
belongs solely to petitioners clients, the non-EPIRA separated
members. There can be no violation of a right which does not exist
in the first place. Also, there was no necessity for the writ of
preliminary injunction since the non-EPIRA separated members do
not claim any damage or injury caused by the execution of the RTC
Order dated 15 May 2006. Even assuming that respondents would
probably suffer damages as administrators or custodians of the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund if the writ of preliminary injunction was
not granted, our ruling would still be the same. We have held that
thE POSSIBILITY OF IRREPARABLE DAMAGE WITHOUT PROOF OF
AN ACTUAL EXISTING RIGHT IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 42Given these
considerations, we hold that the issuance by the Court of Appeals
of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents in its
Resolution, dated 31 October 2006, was improper.lawphil.net
G.R. No. 169802 June 8, 2007 a. There will be no displacement of existing regular
employees;
OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE ADMINISTRATION, represented
by Administrator Marianito D. Roque,petitioner, b. There will be no temporary appointments; and
vs.
ATTY. CESAR L. CHAVEZ, OPHELIA N. ALMENARIO, ELVIRA ADOR, c. There will be no hiring of casuals, contractuals or
REYNALDO TAYAG, TORIBIO ROBLES, JR., ROSSANE BAHIA, consultants in the new structure.
RACQUEL LLAGAS-KUNTING, MA. STELLA A. DULCE, ROSSANA
SIRAY, EDUARDO MENDOZA, JR., PRISCILLA BARTOLO, ROSE
RESOLVED further, that the OWWA Structure be immediately
VILLANUEVA, CHERRY MOLINA, MARY ROSE RAMOS, MA.
submitted for the appropriate actions of competent authorities,
MINERVA PAISO, RODERIC DELOS REYES, RENATO DELA CRUZ,
particularly the DBM and CSC.6
MARIVIC DIGMA, JESSIE BALLESTEROS, DONATO DAGDAG, MARK
TUMIBAY, CYNTHIA FRUEL, DEMETRIO SORIANO, MILAGROS
GUEVARRA, ANGELITA LACSON, BERT BUQUID, JUN On 24 March 2004, DBM Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin (Boncodin),
SAMORANAS, TEODORO TUTAY, LEAH YOGYOG, MARIE CRUZ and approved the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the
CONCEPCION BRAGAS REGALADO, respondents. OWWA.7 In her approval thereof, she stated that the total funding
requirements for the revised organizational structure shall be
107,546,379 for four hundred (400) positions. Moreover, DBM
The RTC granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
Secretary Boncodin underscored that the funding shall come
restraining OWWA from implementing its new organizational
solely from the OWWA funds and that no government funds shall
structure.
be released for the implementation of the changes made.

FACTS:
On 31 May 2004, OWWA Administrator Virgilio R. Angelo (Angelo),
OWWA is a government agency tasked primarily to protect the
issued Advisory No. 01,8 advising the officials and employees of
interest and promote the welfare of overseas Filipino workers
the OWWA that the DBM had recently approved OWWAs
(OFWs).3 OWWA traces its beginnings to 1 May 1977, when the
organizational chart, functional statements, and the staffing
Welfare and Training Fund for Overseas Workers in the
pattern. Advisory No. 01 also announced that a Placement
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) was created by
Committee will be created to evaluate and recommend placement
virtue of Letter of Instructions No. 537, with the main objective,
of all regular/permanent incumbents of OWWA in the new
inter alia, of providing social and welfare services to OFW,
organizational chart and staffing pattern. All employees were
including insurance coverage, social work, legal and placement
asked to indicate in writing their interest or preference in any of
assistance, cultural and remittances services, and the like. On 1
the approved plantilla item, especially for promotion to the
May 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1694 was signed into law,
Human Resources Management Division, not later than 11 June
formalizing the operations of a comprehensive Welfare Fund
2004. Further, Advisory No. 01 emphasized that the OWWA Board
(Welfund), as authorized and created under Letter of Instructions
of Trustees, thru its Resolution No. 001, Series of 2004, had
No. 537. Presidential Decree No. 1694 further authorized that
declared the policy that there will be no displacement of existing
contributions to the Welfare and Training Fund collected pursuant
regular/permanent employees. Qualified casual and contractual
to Letter of Instructions No. 537 be transferred to the Welfund. On
personnel may apply for any vacant item only after all
16 January 1981, Presidential Decree No. 1809 was promulgated,
regular/permanent employees of OWWA had been placed.
amending certain provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1694.4 Subsequently, Executive Order No. 126 was passed which
reorganized the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Executive Subsequently, on 3 June 2004, DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas issued
Order No. 126 also renamed the Welfare Fund as the OWWA. Administrative Order No. 171, Series of 2004, creating a
Placement Committee to evaluate qualifications of employees;
and to recommend their appropriate placement in the new
From the records, it is undisputed that on 9 January 2004, as there
organizational chart, functional statements and staffing pattern of
was yet no formal OWWA structure duly approved by the
the OWWA. Administrative Order No. 171 was partially amended
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Civil
by Administrative Order No. 171-A, issued by DOLE Acting
Service Commission (CSC), the OWWA Board of Trustees passed
Secretary Manuel G. Imson (Imson), authorizing the Placement
Resolution No. 001,5 Series of 2004, bearing the title "Approving
Committee to recommend to the OWWA Administrator their
the Structure of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration,"
evaluations, which shall thereafter be endorsed to the DOLE
and depicting the organizational structure and staffing pattern of
Secretary for consideration.9
the OWWA, as approved by Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (Sto. Tomas),
then Chair of the OWWA Board of Trustees and then Secretary of
the DOLE. According to Resolution No. 001, the structuring of the The Placement Committee was directed to comply with the
OWWA will stabilize the internal organization and promote pertinent CESB/CSC/DBM rules and regulations on its
careerism among the employees. It will also ensure a more recommended placement of all personnel of OWWA based on the
efficient and effective delivery of programs and services to following parameters, to wit10 :
member-OFWs. Resolution No. 001 resolved, thus:
1. There would be no diminution nor displacement of
RESOLVED therefore, to approve as it is hereby approved, the permanent/regular employees of OWWA.
OWWA Structure which is hereto attached and made an integral
part of this Resolution, comprising mainly of the approved 2. Qualified casuals and contractual personnel may
organizational chart, functional descriptions and staffing pattern, likewise be considered in the staffing pattern only after
subject to the following: ensuring that the regular(s)/permanent employees of
OWWA have already been placed.
 3. Decentralization of functions to bring OWWA
services closer to the public shall be adopted. Thus,
priority in some promotions shall be given to those
who opt to be assigned in the regional offices, aside
from performance.
4. Deployment in the overseas posts shall be made on
rotation basis from both the frontline and the
administrative staff, based on performance.
5. Regular/permanent incumbents interested for
promotion should indicate their interest in writing to
the Placement Committee: Attn: The Chairperson.
6. Those who may opt to retire should submit to the
HRMD, their application for retirement, copy furnished
the Budget Division for budget allocation purposes.
The Placement Committee should complete its task not later than
June 30, 2004.
On 8 June 2004, OWWA Administrator Angelo issued Advisory No.
02, inviting OWWA officials and employees to an orientation on
the new structure, functions and staffing pattern of the OWWA.
Moreover, Advisory No. 02 required the holding of elections for
the First and Second Level Representatives who will elect from
among themselves the regular official representatives and
alternates in the Placement Committee deliberations. On 11 June
2004, Advisory No. 03 was issued, announcing the conduct of an
election for representatives and alternates representing the
employees in the first [Salary Grades (SG) 1-9] and second level
(SG 10-24), pursuant to Administrative Order No. 171, dated 3
June 2004, as amended by Administrative Order No. 171-A.
On 18 June 2004, DOLE Acting Secretary Imson issued
Administrative Order No. 186, Series of 2004, 11 prescribing the
guidelines on the placement of personnel in the new staffing
pattern of the OWWA.
On 29 June 2004, herein respondents filed with the RTC, a
Complaint for Annulment of the Organizational Structure of the
OWWA, as approved by OWWA Board Resolution No. 001, Series
of 2004, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction12 against herein petitioner OWWA and its Board of
Trustees.13 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0415-CFM.
In their Complaint, respondents alleged that the OWWA has
around 24 consultants, 29 casual employees, 76 contractual
workers, and 356 officers and employees, which number does not
include the 85 contractual employees in the Office of the
Secretariat of the OWWA Medicare. 14 Respondents posited that
the approved Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern of the
OWWA increases the number of regular plantilla positions from
356 to 400; however, the increase of 42 positions will not absorb
the aforementioned consultants and casual and contractual
workers. They further averred that the plantilla positions in the
Central Office will be reduced from 250 to 140, while the regional
offices will have an increase of 164 positions. According to the
respondents, the resulting decrease in the number of employees
in the Central Office will result in the constructive dismissal of at
least 110 employees. Meanwhile, the deployment of the regular
central office personnel to the regional offices will displace the
said employees, as well as their families.
Respondents challenged the validity of the new organizational
structure of the OWWA. In fine, they contended that the same is
null and void; hence, its implementation should be prohibited.
Respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain petitioners from: 1) implementing its
organizational structure as approved by the OWWA Board of
Trustees in its Resolution dated 9 January 2004; and 2) advertising
and proceeding with the recruitment and placement of new
employees under the new organizational structure.15
Further, respondents prayed that after trial on the merits,
OWWAs organizational structure be declared as unconstitutional
and contrary to law; and the OWWA Board of Trustees be declared
as having acted contrary to the Constitution and existing laws, and
with grave abuse of discretion in approving Resolution No. 001,
dated 9 January 2004.16
The Ruling of the RTC
On 30 September 2004, the RTC rendered an Order 17 granting
respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction upon the
filing of a bond in the sum of 100,000.00. In the grant thereof,
the RTC reasoned that any move to reorganize the structure of the
OWWA requires an amendatory law. It deemed Resolution No.
001 was not merely a "formalization of the organizational
structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA," but a disruption of
the existing organization which disturbs and displaces a number of
regular employees, including consultants and casual and
contractual employees.
The RTC ratiocinated in this wise:
x x x All told, what is being done now at OWWA is a reorganization
of its structure as originally conceived under P.D. No. 1694
[Organization and Administration of the Welfare for Overseas
Workers] and P.D. No. 1809 [Amending Certain Provisions of
Presidential Decree 1694, Creating the "Welfare Fund for Overseas
Workers"]. In the (sic) light of Section 11 of R.A. No. 6656 which
provides that "the executive branch of the government shall
implement reorganization schemes within a specified period of
time authorized by law", this court doubts whether a
reorganization of OWWA can be effected without an enabling law.
Further, defendants do not dispute the fact that while the
mechanics of the reorganization is still being forged, the DOLE
already processed applications and eventually hired employees
not from among the existing employees of the OWWA. This
appears to be in contravention of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656 which
provides:
"Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments
shall be given preference for appointment to the new positions in
the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former position
or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to positions
next lower in rank.
"No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers
and employees have been appointed, including temporary and
casual employees who possess the necessary qualification
requirements, among which is the appropriate civil service
eligibility for permanent appointment to positions in the approved
staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be filled, unless
such positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical in nature."
Furthermore, defendants (sic) do not dispute the fact that the
Placement Committee was hastily constituted, that its members
were not educated of their task of job placement, that there was
no real to goodness (sic) personnel evaluation and, finally, the
Chairman of the Committee was simply hand-picked by the DOLE
Secretary contrary to the explicit injunction of Section 8 of the
Implementing Rules of R.A .No. 6656 that "the members shall
elect their Chairman."18
The RTC also cited the protection afforded by the Constitution to
workers, specifically, officers or employees of the Civil Service in
ruling that the existing organization of the OWWA need not be
disturbed in any way and no single worker will be removed or
displaced. Thus:
This court entertains no doubt that as workers, plaintiffs enjoy a
right that is protected both by the Constitution and statutes. Thus,
"(n)o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law. "(Sec. 2, par. 3, Art.
IX, Constitution). "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1, Art. III; ibid.). A
persons job is his property. In many cases, as in the Philippine
setting, ones job also means ones life and the lives of those who
depended on him. Hence, it is a policy of the State to "free the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and
an improved quality of life for all." (Sec. 8, Art. II, ibid.) Any act
that, contrary to law, tends to deprive a worker of his work,
violates his rights.19
Finally, the RTC defended its jurisdiction over the controversy
despite petitioners protestations that jurisdiction over
respondents complaint is lodged in the administrative agencies
tasked to implement the new OWWA structure. It ruled that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or administrative
function; but, where what is challenged is the constitutionality of
a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative functions, regular courts have
jurisdiction over the matter.20
Therefore, the RTC, in its Order, dated 30 September 2004,
granted respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, upon plaintiffs (sic) filing of a bond in the sum of
100,000.00, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue in: 1)
restraining the defendants from implementing the new
organizational structure of OWWA approved by the Board of
Trustees on January 9, 2004 and 2) restraining the defendants
from advertising and proceeding with the recruitment and
placement of new employees under the new organizational
structure.21
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner, thru the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),22 filed with the Court of
Appeals, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the RTC
Order of 30 September 2004.23
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On 22 September 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision, which dismissed the petition. It affirmed the
court a quos findings that respondents possess a clear and legal
right to the immediate issuance of the writ. It resolved that it was
proper for the RTC to restrain, for the meantime, the
implementation of OWWAs reorganization to prevent injury until
after the main case is heard and decided.24 It found respondents
allegations sufficient to prove the existence of a right that should
be protected by a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus:
Petitioner averred, too, that majority of the casuals, contractuals
and consultants have been employed for more than ten (10) years,
if not twenty (20) years, and were not regularized simply due to
lack of regular positions in the plantilla or the freezing of
recruitment thereto.
To be sure, private respondents have convincingly adduced
evidence of specific acts to substantiate their claim of impending
injury and not merely allegations of facts and conclusions of law,
but factual evidence of a clear and unmistakable right of being
displaced or dismissed by the planned reorganization. These
allegations are substantial enough to prove the right in esse. At
best, the anxiety of being dismissed or displaced is not premature,
speculative and purely anticipatory, but based on real fear which
shows a threatened or direct injury[,] it appearing that the
reorganization of the OWWA is already slowly being put into
motion.
Apropos, having successfully established a direct and personal
injury as a consequence of the new reorganization[al] structure, it
was only proper for the court a quo to grant the writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain, for the meantime, the
implementation of the reorganization to prevent injury on
respondents until after the main case is heard and decided. Truly,
as correctly observed by the trial court, private respondents enjoy
a right that is protected both by the Constitution and statutes. A
persons job is not only his property but his very life. The
constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection
of the right to be alive or to the security of ones limb against
physical harm. The right to life is also a right to a good life (Bernas,
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
Commentary, Volume I, First Edition, 1997) which includes the
right to earn a living or the right to a livelihood. A fortiori, the
requisites for preliminary injunction to issue have adequately
been established: the existence of a clear and unmistakable right,
and the acts violative of said right.
While the evidence to be submitted at the hearing on the motion
for preliminary injunction need not be conclusive and complete,
We find that private respondents have adequately shown that
they are in clear danger of being irreparably injured unless the
status quo is observed, in the meantime x x x.25
The appellate court was likewise of the opinion that the
substantial issues raised before the court a quo anent the validity
of the organizational structure of the OWWA; the alleged lack of
authority of the DBM to approve the same including the alleged
violation by the OWWA of relevant statutes; the lack of
consultation prior to the reorganization; and the supposed illegal
constitution of the Placement Committee, are matters which the
RTC is behooved to resolve. In finding no error on the part of the
RTC, the Court of Appeals said that without an injunctive relief,
any decision that may be rendered in the suit would already be
ineffective, moot and academic.26
Aggrieved, petitioner through the OSG,27 filed the instant petition.
In the instant petition, petitioner prays that the appealed Decision
of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside, and that Civil
Case No. 04-0415-CFM before the RTC be dismissed for lack of
merit.28
ISSUE: whether the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
FACTS:
Case for Petitioners. First, in support of their petition, petitioner
posits that the OWWA has already implemented the new
organizational structure as the advertisement, recruitment, and
placement of OWWA employees have been accomplished; and in
the process, none of the respondents have been dismissed.
Moreover, the act sought to be prevented has long been
consummated; hence, the remedy of injunction should no longer
be entertained.
Second, petitioner adduces the proposition that the
reorganization of the OWWA does not require an amendatory law
contrary to the holding of the court a quo. The OSG maintains that
there was no previous OWWA structure in the first place; and
neither did Presidential Decree No. 1694 29 nor Presidential Decree
No. 1809,30 provide for an organizational structure for the OWWA.
Third, petitioner disputes the existence of the rights of
respondents to be protected by the preliminary injunctive writ
sought on the ground that the latter did not shown any legal right
which needs the protection thereof, nor did they show that any
such right was violated to warrant the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. Petitioner asserts that respondents did not claim that
they are the consultants or casual or contractual workers who
would allegedly be displaced; and neither did respondents show
that there is only one right or cause of action pertaining to all of
them. Neither was there a violation of their rights because
respondents have all been given appointments in the new OWWA
organizational structure.31
Finally, on respondents allegation that the reorganization of the
OWWA will reassign permanent employees to its regional offices,
and consequently, displace them and their families, petitioner
counters that an employee may be reassigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency, provided that
such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or
salary.32
The Case for the Respondents
Respondents argue that the petitioner railroaded and raced
against time to implement the new OWWA organizational
structure. They claim that in the process, petitioner exhibited
manifest bad faith and injustice. What existed was a hasty
reorganization and restructuring of the OWWA without adequate
study and consultation, which was thereafter submitted and
immediately approved by the Board of Trustees. They insist that
the creation of an organizational structure of the OWWA would
require a presidential fiat or a legislative enactment pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6656.33
Further, respondents maintain that their right in esse was
established during the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, as their complaint sufficiently showed the
rights and interests of the parties. They alleged that at no stage in
the proceedings did petitioner question such rights. In fact,
petitioner made a waiver in open court to the effect that it was
not presenting testimonial evidence. According to the
respondents, such an act was constitutive of an admission by
petitioner of the existence of a right in esse in their favor.
HELD: NO RIGHT IN ESSE.
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, defines a preliminary
injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency
or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. 34 Section 3,
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as follows:
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance
of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order.35 It persists until it
is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the
court issuing a final injunction.36 To be entitled to an injunctive
writ, petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. 37 A writ of preliminary injunction
is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. 38 The
evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a
"sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of
the case on the merits.39 In fact, the evidence required to justify
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the hearing
thereon need not be conclusive or complete.40 It must also be
stressed that it does not necessarily proceed that when a writ of
preliminary injunction is issued, a final injunction will follow.41
Moreover, the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is
discretionary on the part of the trial court. 42 Thus, the rule is, the
matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, unless the
court commits grave abuse of discretion.43 In Toyota Motor Phils.
Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. Court of
Appeals,44 this Court pronounced that grave abuse of discretion in
the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion
amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
It is clear that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involve findings of
facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive
determination.45 The duty of the court taking cognizance of a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether
the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present
in the case before it.46 However, as earlier stated, if the court
commits grave abuse of its discretion in the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, such that the act amounts to excess or lack
of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified through a writ of
certiorari or prohibition.
More significantly, a preliminary injunction is merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latters
outcome, the sole objective of which is to preserve the status quo
until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. 47 The status
quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the
case.48 The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary
injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status
which preceded the actual controversy.49 The status quo ante
litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs which is existing at the
time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not
make use of its injunctive power to alter such status.50
We hold that the RTC, in granting the assailed writ of preliminary
injunction, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the RTC did not maintain the status quo when it
issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Rather, it effectively
restored the situation prior to the status quo, in effect, disposing
the issue of the main case without trial on the merits. What was
preserved by the RTC was the state of affairs before the issuance
of Resolution No. 001, which approved the structure of the
OWWA, and the subsequent administrative orders pursuant to its
passing. The RTC forgot that what is imperative in preliminary
injunction cases is that the writ can not be effectuated to establish
new relations between the parties. Hence, we find herein an
application of the lessons that can be learned from Rualo v.
Pitargue.51 In Rualo, this Court determined, among others, the
propriety of the writ of preliminary injunction which was issued
restraining the Bureau of Internal Revenue from further
implementing its reorganization, and enforcing the
orders52 pursuant thereto. This Court, in lifting the therein assailed
writ, underscored the legal proscription which states that courts
should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would
in effect dispose of the main case without trial. 53 According to the
Court in Rualo, the trial court, in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction, did not maintain the status quo but restored the
situation before the status quo, that is, the situation before the
issuance of the Revenue Travel Assignment Orders. 54 The Court
further declared that what existed was an acceptance of therein
respondents premise of the illegality of the reorganization, and a
prejudgment on the constitutionality of the assailed
issuances.55 As in Rualo, we find herein a similar case where the
RTC admitted hook, line and sinker the mere allegations of
respondents that the reorganization as instituted was unlawful
without the benefit of a full trial on the merits. It also did not
maintain the status quo but restored the landscape before the
implementation of OWWAs reorganization. In thus issuing the
writ of preliminary injunction, the substantive issues of the main
case were resolved by the trial court. What was done by the RTC
was quite simply a disposition of the case without trial. This is an
error in law and an exercise of grave abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, we find that the RTC similarly prejudged the validity
of the issuances released by the OWWA Board of Trustees, as well
as the other governmental bodies (i.e., DBM, DOLE), which
approved the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the
OWWA. In Rualo, this Court asserted the presumption of
regularity of the therein assailed government issuances. In this
case, we accentuate the same presumption.
Ineluctably, this Court is compelled to rule against the propriety of
the grant of the assailed ancillary writ of preliminary injunction on
the material ground that the records do not support respondents
entitlement thereto.
NO RIGHT IN ESSE.
We do not find attendant the requisites for the issuance of a
preliminary injunctive writ. This Court is not convinced that
respondents were able to show a clear and unmistakable legal
right to warrant their entitlement to the writ. A mere blanket
allegation that they are all officers and employees of the OWWA
without a showing of how they stand to be directly injured by the
implementation of its questioned organizational structure does
not suffice to prove a right in esse. As was aptly raised by the
petitioner, respondents did not show that they were dismissed
due to the challenged reorganization. There was no showing that
they are the employees who are in grave danger of being
displaced. Respondents were similarly wanting in proving that
they are the consultants and contractual and casual employees,
who will allegedly suffer by reason of the re-organization. This
Court is consistently adamant in demanding that a clear and
positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be
established.56 As has been reiterated, injunction is not a remedy to
protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not
issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or
to restrain an action which did not give rise to a cause of
action.57 In contrast, the rights of OWWA are accorded to it by law.
The importance of the reorganization within the body and the
benefits that will accrue thereto were accentuated by the Board of
Trustees in its Resolution No. 001. The aforesaid resolution
declared, inter alia, that the structuring of the OWWA will stabilize
the internal organization and promote careerism among the
employees, as well as ensure a more efficient and effective
delivery of programs and services to member-OFWs. 58 However,
we go further to opine that even the question of whether the
OWWA requires an amendatory law for its reorganization is one
that should be best threshed out in the disposition of the merits
of the case. Indeed, the question as to the validity of the OWWA
reorganization remains the subject in the main case pending
before the trial court. Its annulment is outside the realm of the
instant Petition.
Assuming arguendo that respondents stand to be in danger of
being transferred due to the reorganization, under the law, any
employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal
to the CSC.59 Even then, administrative remedies must be
exhausted before resort to the regular courts can be had.
Finally, as aptly pointed out by the OSG, the acts sought to be
prohibited had been accomplished. Injunction will not lie where
the acts sought to be enjoined have already been accomplished or
consummated.60 The wheels of OWWAs reorganization started to
run upon the approval by the Board of Trustees of its Resolution
No. 001 entitled, "Approving the Structure of the Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration." Subsequently, a series of
issuances which approved the organizational structure and staffing
pattern of the agency was issued by the DBM, the OWWA
Administrator, and by the DOLE. Resolution No. 001 has already
been implemented. Case law has it that a writ of preliminary
injunction will not issue if the act sought to be enjoined is a fait
accompli.1avvphi1
A writ of preliminary injunction being an extraordinary
event,61 one deemed as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent
remedy,62 it must be granted only in the face of actual and existing
substantial rights. In the absence of the same, and where facts are
shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions
for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having
been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 131442 July 10, 2003
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK ET AL petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII, THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES ET AL respondents.
FACTS: On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G.
Principe ("RED Principe") of Region IV, ("DENR"), issued an
Environmental Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of respondent
("NAPOCOR authorizing it to construct a temporary mooring
facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto
Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto
Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding
ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.3
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of
NAPOCOR's power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its
former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required
relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts
power barge would provide the main source of power for the
entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a
land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for
the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date
of issuance or until 30 June 1999.4
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro,
Puerto Galera,5 sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED
Principe, however, denied petitioners' plea on 15 July 1997. On 21
July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for
the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the
mooring facility.
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents
ORMECO and the provincial officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to
dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the
complaint without cause of action. They also asserted that the
Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the
mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila
RTC's territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no
need to exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that the
issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1605, 8 Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,9 and the
provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37
("DAO 96-37") on the documentation of ECC applications.
Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of the ECC was
in patent violation of its terms.
RTC dismissed the petition saying :This Court is likewise aware and
cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction in the enforcement of Writ
of Injunction. That truly, [a] writ of injunction can only be enforced
within [the] territorial jurisdiction of this Court but not for acts
which are being or about to be committed outside its territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, in Philippine National Bank vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA
1, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled: "Regional Trial Courts can
only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective
designated territories. Furthermore, we find the issuance of the
preliminary injunction directed against the Provincial Sheriff of
Negros Occidental a jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from Black
Dictionary means jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court[s], can only enforce their writs
of injunction within their respective designated territories.
And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square
application in the case at bar of Presidential Decree No. 1818,
Executive Order No. 380 dated November 27, 1989, and Circular
No. 2-91 of the Supreme Court that the National Power
Corporation (NPC) is a public utility, created under special
legislation, engaged in the generation and distribution of electric
power and energy. The mooring site of NPC in Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro is one of its infrastructure projects falling within
the mantle of Executive Order No. 380, November 27, 1989 x x x.
And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power
Corporation vs. Honorable Abraham P. Vera, et al., 170 SCRA 721,
courts are without jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against
[the] National Power Corporation. The latter enjoys the protective
mantle of P.D. 1818, (Circular No. 2-91).
xxx xxx xxx
Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the
main action itself together with the Annulment of the
Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC). Even assuming
arguendo that the court [can] annul the ECC how can the latter
enforce the same against the Provincial Government of Oriental
Mindoro which was impleaded by the petitioners as a necessary
party together with the Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative and
the government officials of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro,
whose acts and functions are being performed outside the
territorial jurisdiction of this court? x x x Indisputably, the
injunction and annulment of ECC as prayed for in the petition are
inseparable x x x.
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have
failed to exhaust all the available administrative remedies and this
Court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ prayed for in
the Amended [Complaint].10
ISSUE: The issue is whether the trial court is correct in dismissing
petitioners' complaint for lack of cause action and lack of
jurisdiction? YES
HELD:
Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS TO ISSUE INJUNCTIVE
WRITS IS LIMITED TO ACTS COMMITTED OR ABOUT TO BE
COMMITTED WITHIN THEIR JUDICIAL REGION.13 Moreover,
Presidential Decree No. 1818 ("PD No. 1818") prohibited14 courts
from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure
projects like the mooring facility in the present case. Republic Act
No. 8975 ("RA No. 8975"), which took effect on 26 November
2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the
coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to issue such writs
exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its
violation.15 Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental
Mindoro RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction
of the mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under PD No.
1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether
the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint considering
that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is
academic.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an
injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the
construction of the mooring facility could not proceed without a
valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue
in resolving petitioners' complaint.
On July 5, 1993 FEBTC filed with the trial court a motion to direct
PBC's liquidator to execute the deeds of sale with application for
issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order to prevent the liquidator from further offering to sell to
third parties the subject fixed assets.
The RTC initially issued a temporary restraining order directing
PBC's liquidator to desist from proceeding with the bidding. After
hearing, the trial court nevertheless denied the application of the
petitioner for a writ of preliminary injunction. Aggrieved,
petitioner went to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On October 23, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered
its decision likewise denying petitioner's application for injunction.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 praying that
the decision of the Court of Appeals be set aside and a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction be issued against
the respondent liquidator to prohibit him from disposing of the
subject fixed assets to other buyers.

G.R. No. 123569 April 1, 1996

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is entitled to the injunctive relief
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
prayed for.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO, II and
HELD: NO
VITALIANO NANAGAS, II, respondents.
Petitioner submits that having met all the conditions and
performed all its obligations under the Memorandum of
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
Agreement as well as the Purchase Agreement, it follows, as a
matter of course, that petitioner has obtained a clear right over
Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) was placed under receivership the subject fixed assets, which right is being jeopardized by the
by the Central Bank under Monetary Board Resolution No. 699 stubborn refusal of the respondent liquidator to execute the
dated July 5, 1985, and thereafter placed under liquidation. Banks deeds of sale covering these fixed assets.
were invited to submit proposals for the purchase of PBC's assets.
On November 14, 1985, petitioner Far East Bank and Trust On the other hand, respondent liquidator maintains that, contrary
Company (FEBTC) submitted its formal offer to purchase all the to petitioner's claim, the petitioner herein has not acquired
assets of PBC. Subsequently, a Memorandum of Agreement ownership over the subject fixed assets because the same were
(MOA) was entered into by and among the petitioner as buyer, submitted as collaterals with the Central Bank, and pursuant to
PBC through its liquidator as seller, and the Central Bank (CB). Section 1(a) of the Memorandum of Agreement, these properties
are excluded from among the assets that can be purchased by the
On December 18, 1986, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31 of petitioner. Said section provides:
Manila where the liquidation proceeding was pending, approved Sec. 1 Purchase Agreement
the Purchase Agreement executed by and among the same parties
pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) earlier a. Within ninety (90) calendar days from the
entered into by them. Alleging compliance with its obligations date of the execution of this Memorandum
under the MOA and the Purchase Agreement, petitioner then of Agreement, subject to such extension of
requested PBC's liquidator to execute the proper deeds of sale time as shall be mutually agreed upon by
involving PBC's fixed assets located in the following branches, to the parties, the BUYER shall purchase all the
wit: assets of the SELLER as shall be defined and
specifically described in the corresponding
1. Soler (Arranque) Purchase Agreement to be executed by the
2. Bacolod City parties, inclusive of the SELLER's authority
3. Cabanatuan City to operate its forty-three (43) banking
4. Laoag offices/branches, but exclusive of the
5. San Pablo City following items:
6. Cebu-Manalili
7. Davao-Sta. Ana xxx xxx xxx
8. San Fernando, La Union
9. Legaspi City
vii. Assets submitted as collaterals
10. Iloilo City - Central Market
with the Central Bank; and
11. Units in Pacific Bank Condominium
Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati City
The issue whether or not injunction in favor of the petitioner
should issue hinges on the important question: Whether the
PBC's liquidator consistently refused to execute said deeds of sale
disputed fixed assets were collateralized with the Central Bank?
and proceeded to offer for bidding to third parties the subject
Apparently however, this is a sole issue of fact. The rule is settled
fixed assets.
that pure questions of fact may not be the proper subject of an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This mode of appeal is generally limited only to questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth in the petition. 1 The Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are
received with respect and are in fact binding on the Supreme
Court subject only to certain exceptions 2 none of which are
present in the instant petition.
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent Court of
Appeals, found that the subject fixed assets were indeed
submitted as collaterals with the Central Bank, and therefore were
among the items not covered by the Purchase Agreement signed
by the parties pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement.
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is the petitioner never acquired
ownership over these properties. The trial court observed, viz:
A cursory perusal of the MOA will indicate
that the PBC fixed assets were expressly
excluded from (sic) the PBC for purchase of
the FEBTC as they are collateralized assets
with the Central Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [t]he latter [FEBTC] could not have
ignored the fact that PBC fixed assets were
collateralized with the Central Bank
notwithstanding the allegations that
document to that effect were not shown by
the Central
Bank. . . . 3
We are not about to set aside this factual finding of the trial court.
Time and again we have upheld the rule that findings of fact of the
trial court should not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court
has ignored or overlooked certain facts or circumstances of weight
and significance which, if considered, would alter the result of the
case, for trial judges are in the best position of weighing
conflicting declarations of witnesses in the light of the court's
opportunity to observe and examine the witnesses' conduct and
attitude at the trial and in the witness chair. 4
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on Preliminary Injunction
provides:
Sec. 3 Grounds for issuance of
preliminary injunction. A preliminary
injunction may be granted at any time after
the commencement of the action and
before judgment, when it is established:
(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the acts complained of, or
in the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of
some act complained of during the litigation
or the non-performance thereof would
probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens,
or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act probably in violation
of the plaintiff's rights respecting the
subject of the action, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.
We find that the instant petition does not satisfy any of the
grounds abovementioned.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 23, 1995 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 166337. March 7, 2005]
BAYANIHAN MUSIC vs. BMG
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated MAR 7 2005.
G.R. No. 166337 (Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. vs. BMG
Records (Pilipinas) and Jose Mari Chan, et al.)
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision
dated December 14, 2004[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 69626, upholding the Order dated August 24, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 90, which found no
merit in petitioner's application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, along with the Order dated January 10,
2002, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On July 16, 1973, Jose Mari Chan (Chan) entered into a contract
with petitioner Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. (Bayanihan),
whereunder the former assigned to the latter all his rights,
interests and participation over his musical composition "Can We
Just Stop and Talk A While". On March 11, 1976, the parties
entered into a similar contract over Chan's other musical
composition entitled "Afraid For Love To Fade".
On the strength of the abovementioned contracts, Bayanihan
applied for and was granted by the National Library a Certificate of
Copyright Registration for each of the two musical compositions,
thus: November 19, 1973, for the song "Can We Just Stop and Talk
A While" and on May 21, 1980, for the song "Afraid for Love To
Fade."
Apparently, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner
Bayanihan, Chan authorized his co-respondent BMG Records
(Pilipinas) [BMG] to record and distribute the aforementioned
musical compositions in a then recently released album of singer
Lea Salonga.
In separate letters both dated December 7, 1999, petitioner
Bayanihan informed respondents Chan and BMG of its existing
copyrights over the subject musical compositions and the alleged
violation of such right by the two. Demands were made on both to
settle the matter with Bayanihan. However no settlement was
reached by the parties.
Hence, on August 8, 2000, Bayanihan filed with the Regional Trial
Court at Quezon City a complaint against Chan and BMG for
violation of Section 216 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise
known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, with a
prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent BMG
from further recording and distributing the subject musical
compositions in whatever form of musical products, and Chan
from further granting any authority to record and distribute the
same musical compositions.
In its answer, BMG contended, among others, that: (1) the acts of
recording and publication sought to be enjoined had already been
consummated, thereby rendering moot Bayanihan's prayer for
TRO and/or preliminary injunction; and (2) there is no clear
showing that petitioner Bayanihan would be greatly damaged by
the refusal of the prayed for TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
BMG also pleaded a cross-claim against its co-respondent Chan
for violation of his warranty that his musical compositions are free
from claims of third persons, and a counterclaim for damages
against petitioner Bayanihan.
RTC: After carefully going over the pleadings and the pertinent
portions of the records insofar as they are pertinent to the issue
under consideration, this Court finds that the plaintiff has not
been able to show its entitlement to the relief of preliminary
injunction as prayed for in its verified complaint (see Section 4,
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence,
this Court is of the considered and humble view that the ends of
justice shall be served better if the aforecited application is
denied, (see also Order dated July 16, 2001).
ISSUE: WON petitioner has a right in esse to justify the issuance
of an injunction? None
HELD: It is petitioner's submission that the appellate court
committed reversible error when it dismissed its petition
for certiorari and upheld the trial court's denial of its application
for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner insists that as
assignee of the copyrights over the musical compositions in
question, it has a clear legal right to a writ of preliminary
injunction; that respondents BMG and Chan violated its copyrights
over the same musical compositions; that despite knowledge by
respondent BMG of petitioner's copyrights over the said musical
compositions, BMG continues to record and distribute the same,
to petitioner's great and irreparable injury.
We have constantly reminded courts that there is no power, the
exercise of which is more delicate and requires greater caution,
deliberation and sound discretion, or which is more dangerous in
a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. A court
should, as much as possible, avoid issuing the writ which would
effectively dispose of the main case without trial.
In this case, nothing is more evident than the trial court's abiding
awareness of the extremely difficult balancing act it had to
perform in dealing with petitioner's prayer for injunctive reliefs.
Conscious, as evidently it is, of the fact that there is manifest
abuse of discretion in the issuance of an injunctive writ if the
following requisites provided for by law are not present: (1) there
must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;
and (2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a
violation of such right,[5] the trial court threaded the correct path
in denying petitioner's prayer therefor. For, such a writ should only
be granted if a party is clearly entitled thereto.[6]
Of course, while a clear showing of the right to an injunctive writ
is necessary albeit its existence need not be conclusively
established,[7] as the evidence required therefor need not be
conclusive or complete, still, for an applicant, like petitioner
Bayanihan, to be entitled to the writ, he is required to show that
he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its
complaint.[8] Here, the trial court did not find ample justifications
for the issuance of the writ prayed for by petitioner.
Unquestionably, respondent Chan, being undeniably the
composer and author of the lyrics of the two (2) songs, is
protected by the mere fact alone that he is the creator thereof,
conformably with Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as
the Intellectual Property Code, Section 172.2 of which reads:
172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation,
irrespective of their mode or form of expression, as well as of their
content, quality and purpose.
An examination of petitioner's verified complaint in light of the
two (2) contracts sued upon and the evidence it adduced during
the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, yields
not the existence of the requisite right protectable by the
provisional relief but rather a lingering doubt on whether there is
or there is no such right. The two contracts between petitioner
and Chan relative to the musical compositions subject of the suit
contain the following identical stipulations:
7. It is also hereby agreed to by the parties herein that in the
event the PUBLISHER [petitioner herein] fails to use in any manner
whatsoever within two (2) years any of the compositions covered
by this contract, then such composition may be released in favor
of the WRITER and excluded from this contract and the PUBLISHER
shall execute the necessary release in writing in favor of the
WRITER upon request of the WRITER;
xxx xxx xxx
9. This contract may be renewed for a period of two-and-one-
half (2 1/2) years at the option of the PUBLISHER. Renewal may be
made by the PUBLISHER by advising the WRITER of such renewal
in writing at least five (5) days before the expiration of this
contract.[9]cralaw
It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired
on October 1, 1975 and March 11, 1978, respectively, there being
neither an allegation, much less proof, that petitioner Bayanihan
ever made use of the compositions within the two-year period
agreed upon by the parties.
Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the
selfsame two (2) contracts, suffice it to say 'that such purported
copyrights are not presumed to subsist in accordance with Section
218[a] and [b], of the Intellectual Property Code,
[10]
cralaw because respondent Chan had put in issue the existence
thereof.
It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along
with others, on July 30, 1997, or almost two years before
petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort of complaint/demand letter
dated December 7, 1999 regarding the recent "use/recording of
the songs 'Can We Just Stop and Talk A While' and 'Afraid for Love
to Fade,'" or almost three (3) years before petitioner filed its
complaint on August 8, 2000, therein praying, inter alia, for
injunctive relief. By then, it would appear that petitioner had no
more right that is protectable by injunction.
G.R. No. 138900 September 20, 2005
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., & LEVI STRAUSS (PHILS.), INC., Petitioners,
vs.
CLINTON APPARELLE, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
[SUPRA]
RULING FROM FULL TEXT:
At issue is whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction by the trial court was proper and whether the Court of
Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court.
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary
injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or
a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Injunction is
accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to
be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties,
and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its
extreme necessity. An extraordinary remedy, injunction is
designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is
generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the
merits of the case can be heard.34 It may be resorted to only by a
litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests
and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal
action.35 It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied under
any standard compensation. The resolution of an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an
emergency or of a special recourse before the main case can be
heard in due course of proceedings.36
Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the
act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or
is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some
act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
Under the cited provision, a clear and positive right especially
calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a
remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future
rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may
never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a
cause of action. There must exist an actual right. 37 There must be a
patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed are violative of said right.38
There are generally two kinds of preliminary injunction: (1) a
prohibitory injunction which commands a party to refrain from
doing a particular act; and (2) a mandatory injunction which
commands the performance of some positive act to correct a
wrong in the past.39
The Court of Appeals did not err in reviewing proof adduced by
petitioners to support its application for the issuance of the writ.
While the matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
this discretion must be exercised based upon the grounds and in
the manner provided by law. The exercise of discretion by the trial
court in injunctive matters is generally not interfered with save in
cases of manifest abuse.40 And to determine whether there was
abuse of discretion, a scrutiny must be made of the bases, if any,
considered by the trial court in granting injunctive relief. Be it
stressed that injunction is the strong arm of equity which must be
issued with great caution and deliberation, and only in cases of
great injury where there is no commensurate remedy in
damages.41
In the present case, we find that there was scant justification for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners anchor their legal right to "Dockers and Design"
trademark on the Certificate of Registration issued in their favor
by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer.* According to Section 138 of Republic Act No. 8293, 42 this
Certificate of Registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of
the registration, the registrants ownership of the mark and of the
exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods or
services and those that are related thereto specified in the
certificate. Section 147.1 of said law likewise grants the owner of
the registered mark the exclusive right to prevent all third parties
not having the owners consent from using in the course of trade
identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical
or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered
if such use results in a likelihood of confusion.
However, attention should be given to the fact that petitioners
registered trademark consists of two elements: (1) the word mark
"Dockers" and (2) the wing-shaped design or logo. Notably, there
is only one registration for both features of the trademark giving
the impression that the two should be considered as a single unit.
Clinton Apparelles trademark, on the other hand, uses the
"Paddocks" word mark on top of a logo which according to
petitioners is a slavish imitation of the "Dockers" design. The two
trademarks apparently differ in their word marks ("Dockers" and
"Paddocks"), but again according to petitioners, they employ
similar or identical logos. It could thus be said that respondent
only "appropriates" petitioners logo and not the word mark
"Dockers"; it uses only a portion of the registered trademark and
not the whole.
Given the single registration of the trademark "Dockers and
Design" and considering that respondent only uses the assailed
device but a different word mark, the right to prevent the latter
from using the challenged "Paddocks" device is far from clear.
Stated otherwise, it is not evident whether the single registration
of the trademark "Dockers and Design" confers on the owner the
right to prevent the use of a fraction thereof in the course of
trade. It is also unclear whether the use without the owners
consent of a portion of a trademark registered in its entirety
constitutes material or substantial invasion of the owners right.
It is likewise not settled whether the wing-shaped logo, as
opposed to the word mark, is the dominant or central feature of
petitioners trademarkthe feature that prevails or is retained in
the minds of the publican imitation of which creates the
likelihood of deceiving the public and constitutes trademark
infringement.43 In sum, there are vital matters which have yet and
may only be established through a full-blown trial.
From the above discussion, we find that petitioners right to
injunctive relief has not been clearly and unmistakably
demonstrated. The right has yet to be determined. Petitioners also
failed to show proof that there is material and substantial invasion
of their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ. Neither
were petitioners able to show any urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Petitioners wish to impress upon the Court the urgent necessity
for injunctive relief, urging that the erosion or dilution of their
trademark is protectable. They assert that a trademark owner
does not have to wait until the mark loses its distinctiveness to
obtain injunctive relief, and that the mere use by an infringer of a
registered mark is already actionable even if he has not yet
profited thereby or has damaged the trademark owner.
Trademark dilution is the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of
the presence or absence of: (1) competition between the owner
of the famous mark and other parties; or (2) likelihood of
confusion, mistake or deception. Subject to the principles of
equity, the owner of a famous mark is entitled to an injunction
"against another persons commercial use in commerce of a mark
or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark."
This is intended to protect famous marks from subsequent uses
that blur distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it.44
Based on the foregoing, to be eligible for protection from dilution,
there has to be a finding that: (1) the trademark sought to be
protected is famous and distinctive; (2) the use by respondent of
"Paddocks and Design" began after the petitioners mark became
famous; and (3) such subsequent use defames petitioners mark.
In the case at bar, petitioners have yet to establish whether
"Dockers and Design" has acquired a strong degree of
distinctiveness and whether the other two elements are present
for their cause to fall within the ambit of the invoked protection.
The Trends MBL Survey Report which petitioners presented in a
bid to establish that there was confusing similarity between two
marks is not sufficient proof of any dilution that the trial court
must enjoin.
The Court also finds that the trial courts order granting the writ
did not adequately detail the reasons for the grant, contrary to
our ruling in University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal
Jr., 45 wherein we held that:
The trial court must state its own findings of fact and cite
particular law to justify grant of preliminary injunction. Utmost
care in this regard is demanded.46
The trial court in granting the injunctive relief tersely ratiocinated
that "the plaintiffs appear to be entitled to the relief prayed for
and this Court is of the considered belief and humble view that,
without necessarily delving on the merits, the paramount interest
of justice will be better served if the status quo shall be
maintained." Clearly, this statement falls short of the requirement
laid down by the above-quoted case. Similarly, in Developers
Group of Companies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,47 we held that it was
"not enough" for the trial court, in its order granting the writ, to
simply say that it appeared "after hearing that plaintiff is entitled
to the relief prayed for."
In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals in its holding that
the damages the petitioners had suffered or continue to suffer
may be compensated in terms of monetary consideration. As held
in Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo:48
a writ of injunction should never have been issued when an
action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries
caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ of
injunction rests in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy
of pecuniary estimation and the prevention of the multiplicity of
suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within
these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.49
We also believe that the issued injunctive writ, if allowed, would
dispose of the case on the merits as it would effectively enjoin the
use of the "Paddocks" device without proof that there is basis for
such action. The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing
a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the
main case without trial.50 There would be a prejudgment of the
main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it
would assume the proposition which petitioners are inceptively
bound to prove.51
Parenthetically, we find no flaw in the Court of Appeals
disquisition on the consequences of the issued injunction. An
exercise of caution, we believe that such reflection is necessary to
weigh the alleged entitlement to the writ vis--vis its possible
effects. The injunction issued in the instant case is of a serious
nature as it tends to do more than to maintain the status quo. In
fact, the assailed injunction if sustained would bring about the
result desired by petitioners without a trial on the merits.
Then again, we believe the Court of Appeals overstepped its
authority when it declared that the "alleged similarity as to the
two logos is hardly confusing to the public." The only issue
brought before the Court of Appeals through
respondents Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court involved
the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the trial
court in granting the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction.
The appellate court in making such a statement went beyond that
issue and touched on the merits of the infringement case, which
remains to be decided by the trial court. In our view, it was
premature for the Court of Appeals to declare that there is no
confusion between the two devices or logos. That matter remains
to be decided on by the trial court.
Finally, we have no contention against the procedure adopted by
the trial court in resolving the application for an injunctive writ
and we believe that respondent was accorded due process. Due
process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard. And in
applications for preliminary injunction, the requirement of hearing
and prior notice before injunction may issue has been relaxed to
the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction must
undergo a trial-type hearing, it being a hornbook doctrine that a
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process. Due process simply means giving every
contending party the opportunity to be heard and the court to
consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor.
Accordingly, this Court has in the case of Co v. Calimag,
Jr.,52 rejected a claim of denial of due process where such claimant
was given the opportunity to be heard, having submitted his
counter-affidavit and memorandum in support of his position.53
After a careful consideration of the facts and arguments of the
parties, the Court finds that petitioners did not adequately prove
their entitlement to the injunctive writ. In the absence of proof of
a legal right and the injury sustained by the applicant, an order of
the trial court granting the issuance of an injunctive writ will be
set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.54 Conformably, the Court of Appeals was correct in
setting aside the assailed orders of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 21 December 1998 and
its Resolution dated 10 May 1999 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115758 March 19, 2002
ELIDAD C. KHO, doing business under the name and style of KEC
COSMETICS LABORATORY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SUMMERVILLE GENERAL
MERCHANDISING and COMPANY, and ANG TIAM
CHAY, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS: On December 20, 1991, petitioner Elidad C. Kho filed a
complaint for injunction and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-91-10926, against the respondents Summerville General
Merchandising and Company (Summerville, for brevity) and Ang
Tiam Chay.
The petitioner's complaint alleges that petitioner, doing business
under the name and style of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory, is the
registered owner of the copyrights Chin Chun Su and Oval Facial
Cream Container/Case, as shown by Certificates of Copyright
Registration No. 0-1358 and No. 0-3678; that she also has patent
rights on Chin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated
cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, the
registered owner thereof in the Supplemental Register of the
Philippine Patent Office on February 7, 1980 under Registration
Certificate No. 4529; that respondent Summerville advertised and
sold petitioner's cream products under the brand name Chin Chun
Su, in similar containers that petitioner uses, thereby misleading
the public, and resulting in the decline in the petitioner's business
sales and income; and, that the respondents should be enjoined
from allegedly infringing on the copyrights and patents of the
petitioner.
The respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their defense that
Summerville is the exclusive and authorized importer, re-packer
and distributor of Chin Chun Su products manufactured by Shun Yi
Factory of Taiwan; that the said Taiwanese manufacturing
company authorized Summerville to register its trade name Chin
Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent Office and
other appropriate governmental agencies; that KEC Cosmetics
Laboratory of the petitioner obtained the copyrights through
misrepresentation and falsification; and, that the authority of
Quintin Cheng, assignee of the patent registration certificate, to
distribute and market Chin Chun Suproducts in the Philippines had
already been terminated by the said Taiwanese Manufacturing
Company.
RTC granted.
CA set aside and declared null and void. The registration of the
trademark or brandname "Chin Chun Su" by KEC with the
supplemental register of the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer cannot be equated with registration in the
principal register, which is duly protected by the Trademark Law.
ISSUE: WON PETITIONER HAS A RIGHT IN ESSE? NONE.
HELD: We rule in favor of the respondents.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, one of the grounds for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is a proof that the applicant is entitled to
the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists
in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. Thus, a
preliminary injunction order may be granted only when the
application for the issuance of the same shows facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded.10 This is the reason why we have
ruled that it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought
to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable, and, that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.11
In the case at bar, the petitioner applied for the issuance of a
preliminary injunctive order on the ground that she is entitled to
the use of the trademark on Chin Chun Su and its container based
on her copyright and patent over the same. We first find it
appropriate to rule on whether the copyright and patent over the
name and container of a beauty cream product would entitle the
registrant to the use and ownership over the same to the
exclusion of others.
Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual
property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A
trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods
(trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall
include a stamped or marked container of goods. 12 In relation
thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying
or distinguishing an enterprise.13 Meanwhile, the scope of a
copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are
original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain
protected from the moment of their creation. 14 Patentable
inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution of a
problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an
inventive step and is industrially applicable.15
PETITIONER HAS NO RIGHT TO SUPPORT HER CLAIM FOR THE
EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE SUBJECT TRADE NAME AND ITS
CONTAINER. The name and container of a beauty cream product
are proper subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same falls
squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively
use the same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user
must sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before
anybody else did. The petitioner's copyright and patent
registration of the name and container would not guarantee her
the right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they
are not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights.
Consequently, a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for
the reason that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear
right over the said name and container to the exclusion of others,
not having proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or
used the same before anyone did.
We cannot likewise overlook the decision of the trial court in the
case for final injunction and damages. The dispositive portion of
said decision held that the petitioner does not have trademark
rights on the name and container of the beauty cream product.
The said decision on the merits of the trial court rendered the
issuance of the writ of a preliminary injunction moot and
academic notwithstanding the fact that the same has been
appealed in the Court of Appeals. This is supported by our ruling
in La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals16, to wit:
Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional
remedy which may be granted at any time after the
commencement of the action and before judgment
when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the
relief demanded and only when his complaint shows
facts entitling such reliefs xxx and it appearing that the
trial court had already granted the issuance of a final
injunction in favor of petitioner in its decision rendered
after trial on the merits xxx the Court resolved to
Dismiss the instant petition having been rendered moot
and academic. An injunction issued by the trial court
after it has already made a clear pronouncement as to
the plaintiff's right thereto, that is, after the same issue
has been decided on the merits, the trial court having
appreciated the evidence presented, is proper,
notwithstanding the fact that the decision rendered is
not yet final xxx. Being an ancillary remedy, the
proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand
separately or proceed independently of the decision
rendered on the merit of the main case for injunction.
The merit of the main case having been already
determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary
determination of its non-existence ceases to have any
force and effect. (italics supplied)
La Vista categorically pronounced that the issuance of a final
injunction renders any question on the preliminary injunctive
order moot and academic despite the fact that the decision
granting a final injunction is pending appeal. Conversely, a
decision denying the applicant-plaintiff's right to a final injunction,
although appealed, renders moot and academic any objection to
the prior dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction.
G.R. No. 162716 September 27, 2006
Honorable Secretary EMILIA T. BONCODIN of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED
UNION (NECU), respondent.
Injunction is an extraordinary peremptory remedy available only
when the claimant can show a clear and positiveright that must
be protected. When the alleged right is unclear or dubious, the
injunctive writ cannot be granted. As the present respondent has
not proved a clear legal right to the salary step increments in
question, the lower court is deemed to have gravely abused its
discretion when it issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The Case
The assailed Decision upheld the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued by the Regional Trial Court. The questioned writ enjoined
the implementation of National Power Corporation's Board
Resolution No. 2002-81 passed on July 24, 2002, and confirmed
on August 14, 2002; Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin's Letter
Memorandum dated May 8, 2002; and Corporate Auditor
Norberto Cabibihan's Memorandum Circular dated June 5, 2002.
The Facts
"On [October 8, 2001], the Board of Directors of NAPOCOR issued
Board Resolution No. 2001-113 amending Board Resolution No.
99-35 which granted the Seniority in Position Pay. Board
Resolution No. 99-35 granted a step increment to all qualified
NAPOCOR officials and employees who have been in their position
for ten (10) years effective calendar year 1999. On the other hand,
Board Resolution No. 2001-113 reduced the ten (10) year
requirement to three (3) years.
"On [November 12, 2001], then President of NAPOCOR, Jesus
Alcordo, issued Circular No. 2001-51 providing for the
implementing rules and regulations of Board Resolution No. 2001-
113. On May 6, 2002, the NAPOCOR Officer-in-Charge, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Roland Quilala, issued Circular No.
2002-22 providing for additional guidelines relative to the
implementation of the step increment based on length of service
in the position to qualified NAPOCOR officials and employees.
"On [November 26, 2001], petitioner furnished a letter addressed
to Mr. Alcordo informing the latter that NAPOCOR's request for
clearance to implement Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, s. 1990
which is the basis of Board Resolution No. 2001-113 cannot be
given due course for lack of legal basis. In essence, petitioner
holds that the grant of step increment based on length of service
is an additional benefit under a different name since NAPOCOR
has already been granting seniority pay based on the length of
service as embodied in the Collective Negotiation Agreement
(CNA). In addition, petitioner said that the grant of step increment
is not applicable to the salary plan of NAPOCOR considering its
higher salary rates [compared with that of the existing
government pay plan]. Lastly, petitioner told Mr. Alcordo of the
budget implication of the grant of said proposal which she
estimated to cost as high as Eighty Four Million Pesos
(P84,000,000.00).
"Based on the petitioner's foregoing letter, the Corporate Auditor
of NAPOCOR, Norberto Cabibihan, issued a Memorandum [dated
June 5, 2002] to Roland Quilala, NAPOCOR Officer-in-Charge,
enjoining him to suspend/stop payment of the step increment as
embodied in NPC Circular No. 2001-51 dated [November 12,
2001], [effective July 2002]. He also requested the suspension of
the implementation of NPC Circular No. 2002-22 dated [May 6,
2002]. He warned that succeeding payments of the step
increment shall be automatically disallowed.
"Believing that NPC Circular Nos. 2001-51 and 2002-22 are within
the bounds of law and that they have already acquired a vested
right in it, [respondent National Power Corporation Employees
Consolidated Union (NECU) filed a Petition for Prohibition with
Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction before the Regional
Trial Court in Quezon City on [August 27, 2002].
RTC granted the TRO and WPI. Public respondent held that at that
stage of the proceedings, respondents therein have not shown
that Circular No. 2001-51 and Board Resolution No. 2001-113,
which were implemented effective [July 1, 2001], are in
contravention of [any] law. He further held that a 'roll back' of the
salaries of all the NAPOCOR employees, while the merits of the
case is yet to be heard, would result to a grave and irreparable
damage to them. Thus, public respondent granted [NECU's] prayer
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction subject to its
filing of the Injunction Bond in the amount of Eighty Four Million
Pesos (P84,000,000.00) which is the budget implication of the step
increment as manifested by petitioner.
ISSUE: WON issuance of WPI was proper? NO
HELD:
A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law
or is "enforceable as a matter of law."18
Absent any clear and unquestioned legal right, the issuance of an
injunctive writ would constitute grave abuse of
discretion.19 Injunction is not designed to protect contingent,
abstract or future rights whose existence is doubtful or
disputed.20 It cannot be grounded on the possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an actual existing right.21Sans that proof,
equity will not take cognizance of suits to establish title or lend its
preventive aid by injunction.22
In the present case, respondent anchors its entitlement to the
injunctive writ on its alleged legal right to the step increments. It
contends that under Republic Act No. 6395 (Revised Charter of
the National Power Corporation),25the Napocor board was
empowered to fix the compensation and benefits of its
employees; and to grant step increments, based on Memorandum
Order No. 198 issued by then President Fidel Ramos and on
Republic Act (RA) No. 7648 (otherwise known as the "Electric
Power Crisis Act of 1993").26
On the other hand, petitioner contends that the pertinent
provision of the Napocor Charter,27 upon which respondent bases
its claimed authority from the board, has already been
superseded or modified by Section 16 28 of Republic Act No.
6758.29 This provision mandates the DBM's review and approval of
Napocor Board Resolution No. 2001-113 and Circular No. 2001-51
prior to their implementation. Hence, because these issuances
were implemented without the DBM's mandatory review and
approval, they cannot be made the source of any right
whatsoever.
In its Resolution dated September 25, 2002, the trial court noted
that at that stage of the proceedings, petitioner had not shown
that Circular No. 2001-51 and Resolution No. 2001-113, which
were already being implemented by Napocor, were in
contravention of any law. What the RTC perceived to be clear was
that a rollback of the salaries of all the Napocor employees, while
the merits of the case were yet to be heard, would result in grave
and irreparable damage to them. Hence, the trial court concluded,
its issuance of the injunctive writ was justified.30
We disagree.
From the foregoing conflicting claims of the parties, it is obvious
that the right claimed by respondent as its basis for asking for
injunctive relief is far from clear. The validity of the circulars and
board resolution has been put into serious question; more so, in
the light of Napocor Board Resolution No. 2002-81, which was
issued precisely to rectify the previously issued resolution and
circular. While respondent's claimed right is not required to be
conclusively established at this stage, it is nevertheless necessary
to show -- at least tentatively -- that it exists and is not vitiated by
any substantial challenge or contradiction as that raised by
petitioner.31 In our view, respondent has failed to comply with this
requirement.
The enforcement of the suspension order and Resolution No.
2002-81 would effect the rollback of the salaries of Napocor
employees receiving more than the two-step increments. True,
their enforcement would be prejudicial to respondent members'
interest, but merely showing this fact is not sufficient. It must also
be established that the party applying for the writ has a clear
legal right that must be protected. Thus, a finding that the
applicant for preliminary injunction may suffer damage not
capable of pecuniary estimation does not suffice to support an
injunction, when it appears that the right to be protected is
unclear or is seriously disputed.32
No Vested Right to the
Suspended Step Increments
Respondent contends that its members have already acquired a
vested right to the suspended step increments, which they have
been enjoying after the issuance of Circular No. 2001-51 in
October 2001. It alleges that the suspension or revision of the
circular (by virtue of Board Resolution No. 2002-81 issued on July
24, 2002, and confirmed on August 14, 2002) constitutes a salary
diminution, which is clearly prejudicial to them.
A vested right is one that is absolute, complete and unconditional;
to its exercise, no obstacle exists; and it is immediate and perfect
in itself and not dependent upon any contingency.33 To be vested,
a right must have become a title -- legal or equitable -- to the
present or future enjoyment of property.34
As has been held, there is no vested right to salary
increases.35 There must be a lawful decree or order supporting an
employee's claim.
In the present case, because the validity of their implementation
was fundamentally assailed, the step increments enjoyed by the
Napocor employees could not have ripened into vested rights. In
brief, it is seriously contended that, because they were granted
without the required DBM approval, no vested rights to the step
increments could have been acquired.
The terms and conditions of employment of government
employees are governed by law.36 It is the legislature and -- when
properly given delegated power -- the administrative heads of
government that fix the terms and conditions of employment
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and
regulations.37
While government instrumentalities and agencies are trying their
best to alleviate the financial difficulties of their employees, they
can do so only within the limits of budgetary appropriations. The
exercise of management prerogative by government corporations
are limited by the provisions of the laws applicable to
them.38 Subject to state regulation in particular is a public utility
like Napocor, its income, and the amount of money available for
its operating expenses including labor costs.
Moreover, Article 100 of the Labor Code on "non-diminution of
benefits" does not contemplate the continuous grant of
unauthorized or irregular compensation. The application of the
principle presupposes that a company practice, policy and
tradition favorable to the employees has been clearly established;
and that the payments made by the company pursuant to it have
ripened into benefits enjoyed by them.39
In Baybay Water District v. COA,40 a substantially similar
contention was resolved in this wise:
"x x x. The erroneous application and enforcement of
the law by public officers does not estop the
Government from making a subsequent correction of
such errors. More specifically, where there is an
express provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain
benefits, the law must be enforced even if it prejudices
certain parties due to an error committed by public
officials in granting the benefit. x x x Practice, without
more, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise
to any vested right if it is contrary to law."41
An Injunctive Writ, a Virtual
Disposition of the Main Case
While the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction generally rests
on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the
case, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of that
discretion.42 A court should, as much as possible, avoid issuing the
writ, which would effectively dispose of the main case without
trial and/or due process.43
In the present case, it is evident that the only ground relied upon
for injunctive relief is the alleged nullity of petitioner's May 8,
2002 Memorandum and Auditor Cabibihan's June 5, 2002
suspension order. Respondent contends that petitioner and
Cabibihan exceeded the limitations of their authority.
By issuing a writ premised on that sole justification, the trial court
in effect sustained respondent's claim that petitioner and Auditor
Cabibihan had exceeded their authority in ordering the
suspension of the implementation of the step increments; and
that the suspension was patently invalid or, at the very least, that
the memorandum and circular were of doubtful validity. Thus, the
lower court prejudged the main case and reversed the rule on the
burden of proof, because it assumed to be true the very
proposition that respondent-complainant in the RTC was duty-
bound to prove in the first place.
Furthermore, the RTC's action ran counter to the well-settled rule
that acts of public officers are presumed to be regular and valid,
unless sufficiently shown to be otherwise. 44 A court may issue a
writ or preliminary injunction only when the respondent has made
out a case of invalidity or irregularity. That case must be strong
enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of
validity; and it must show a clear legal right to the remedy
sought.45
Petitioner has gone to great lengths in arguing her position on the
merits of the prohibition case, but this is neither the time nor the
opportunity for that kind of debate. The validity of respondent's
Complaint is a matter that must be addressed initially by the trial
court; that issue cannot be resolved at this time by this Court.
In fine, we hold that respondent has not justified the issuance of
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction by proving its clear and positive
legal right to the step increments. The Court of Appeals thus erred
in affirming the Resolutions of the trial court dated September 25,
2002 and October 29, 2002.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision
and Resolution REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.The Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City is directed to proceed speedily with the trial on the
merits of Civil Case No. Q-02-47615 and to decide it with all
deliberate dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 183367 March 14, 2012
AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS GARCIA, and
LYDIA MARCIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS
PROVINCE, Respondent.
FACTS:
In 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of
respondent Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas. The municipal
government, through its then Municipal Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez,
invited petitioner Australian Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to
rebuild the public market and construct a shopping center.
On 19 January 1995, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 2 was
executed between petitioner APRI and respondent, represented
by Mayor Gutierrez and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Under the MOA, APRI undertook to construct a shopping complex
in the 5,000-square-meter area. In return, APRI acquired the
exclusive right to operate, manage, and lease stall spaces for a
period of 25 years.
In May 1995, Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of
respondent. On 6 February 2003, respondent, through Mayor
Reyes, initiated a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Memorandum of Agreement with Damages before the Regional
Trial Court . RTC issued an Order declaring petitioners in default
and allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte. The MOA
was nullified. A Writ of Execution was thus
After learning of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a Petition
for Relief from Judgment dated 18 July 2005. This Petition was
denied. Petitioners later filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition and later a Motion for the Issuance of
Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.4
CA denied: not of extreme urgency and that there is no clear and
irreparable injury that would be suffered by the petitioners if the
prayer for the issuance of a Status Quo Order, Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
not granted
Petitioners claim that the amount of APRIs investment in the
Padre Garcia Shopping Center is estimated at 30,000,000, the
entirety of which the RTC declared forfeited to respondent
without just compensation. At the time of the filing of the
Petition, APRI had 47 existing tenants and lessees and was
deriving an average monthly rental income of 100,000. The
execution of the allegedly void judgment of the RTC during the
pendency of the Petition before the CA would probably work
injustice to the applicant, as the execution would result in an
arbitrary declaration of nullity of the MOA without due process of
law.
ISSUE: whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo Order
and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Motion for Injunction).
HELD: NO
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs
and preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights
and interests.12 An application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing
of a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to
the relief demanded.
Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an
urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage.
A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that
grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued
immediately.13 Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court, 14 a
TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable
injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of
preliminary injunction could be heard.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show
that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to
be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.15
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending
case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance
of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence
towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for
its conclusive determination.16 Hence, the exercise of judicial
discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered
with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.17
Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.18 The burden is thus on petitioner to show
in his application that there is meritorious ground for the issuance
of a TRO in his favor.19
In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the
CA. It did not exercise judgment in a capricious and whimsical
manner or exercise power in an arbitrary or despotic manner.
NO CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT
A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law
or is enforceable as a matter of law.20 In the absence of a clear
legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.21 The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of
an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.22
A perusal of the Motion for Injunction and its accompanying
Affidavit filed before the CA shows that petitioners rely on their
alleged right to the full and faithful execution of the MOA.
However, while the enforcement of the Writ of Execution, which
would nullify the implementation of the MOA, is manifestly
prejudicial to petitioners interests, they have failed to establish in
their Petition that they possess a clear legal right that merits the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Their rights under the
MOA have already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation
to respondent in the RTC case, under a judgment that has become
final and executory.23 At the very least, their rights under the MOA
are precisely disputed by respondent. Hence, there can be no
"clear and unmistakable" right in favor of petitioners to warrant
the issuance of a writ of injunction. Where the complainants right
or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.24
The general rule is that after a judgment has gained finality, it
becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution.
No court should interfere, by injunction or otherwise, to restrain
such execution.25 The rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as
the following: (1) when facts and circumstances later transpire
that would render execution inequitable or unjust; or (2) when
there is a change in the situation of the parties that may warrant
an injunctive relief.26
In this case, after the finality of the RTC Decision, there were no
supervening events or changes in the situation of the parties that
would entail the injunction of the Writ of Execution.
NO IRREPARABLE INJURY
Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by which
their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. 27 In this
case, petitioners have alleged that the loss of the public market
entails costs of about 30,000,000 in investments, 100,000
monthly revenue in rentals, and amounts as yet unquantified
but not unquantifiable in terms of the alleged loss of jobs of
APRIs employees and potential suits that may be filed by the
leaseholders of the public market for breach of contract. Clearly,
the injuries alleged by petitioners are capable of pecuniary
estimation. Any loss petitioners may suffer is easily subject to
mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by
damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. 28 With
respect to the allegations of loss of employment and potential
suits, these are speculative at best, with no proof adduced to
substantiate them.
The foregoing considered, the CA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion for Injunction.1wphi1 In any
case, petitioners may still seek recourse in their pending Petition
before the Court of Appeals.
THERE IS RIGHT IN ESSE RTC granted and issued the assailed Order granting Petron's
G.R. No. 180884 June 27, 2008 petition for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, in her capacity as the Provincial
Treasurer of the Province of Bataan, petitioner, ISSUE: WON the trial correctly granted respondent's petition for
vs. issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction? YES
HON. REMIGIO M. ESCALADA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 3, and PETRON
HELD: YES
CORPORATION, respondents.
The requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
DECISION
are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must
be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the
RTC granted the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
writ to prevent serious damage.22
injunction filed by private respondent Petron Corporation (Petron)
thereby enjoining petitioner Emerlinda S. Talento, Provincial
The urgency and paramount necessity for the issuance of a writ of
Treasurer of Bataan, and her representatives from proceeding
injunction becomes relevant in the instant case considering that
with the public auction of Petron's machineries and pieces of
what is being enjoined is the sale by public auction of the
equipment during the pendency of the latter's appeal from the
properties of Petron amounting to at least P1.7 billion and which
revised assessment of its properties.
properties are vital to its business operations. If at all, the
repercussions and far-reaching implications of the sale of these
FACTS: On June 18, 2007, Petron received from the Provincial
properties on the operations of Petron merit the issuance of a writ
Assessor's Office of Bataan a notice of revised assessment over its
of preliminary injunction in its favor.
machineries and pieces of equipment in Lamao, Limay, Bataan.
Petron was given a period of 60 days within which to file an
We are not unaware of the doctrine that taxes are the lifeblood of
appeal with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA).2 Based
the government, without which it can not properly perform its
on said revised assessment, petitioner Provincial Treasurer of
functions; and that appeal shall not suspend the collection of
Bataan issued a notice informing Petron that as of June 30, 2007,
realty taxes. However, there is an exception to the foregoing
its total liability is P1,731,025,403.06,3 representing deficiency real
rule, i.e., where the taxpayer has shown a clear and unmistakable
property tax due from 1994 up to the first and second quarters of
right to refuse or to hold in abeyance the payment of taxes. In the
2007.
instant case, we note that respondent contested the revised
On August 17, 2007, Petron filed a petition 4 with the LBAA
assessment on the following grounds: that the subject assessment
(docketed as LBAA Case No. 2007-01) contesting the revised
pertained to properties that have been previously declared; that
assessment on the grounds that the subject assessment pertained
the assessment covered periods of more than 10 years which is
to properties that have been previously declared
not allowed under the LGC; that the fair market value or
replacement cost used by petitioner included items which should
On August 22, 2007, Petron received from petitioner a final notice
be properly excluded; that prompt payment of discounts were not
of delinquent real property tax with a warning that the subject
considered in determining the fair market value; and that the
properties would be levied and auctioned should Petron fail to
subject assessment should take effect a year after or on January 1,
settle the revised assessment due.6
2008. To our mind, the resolution of these issues would have a
direct bearing on the assessment made by petitioner. Hence, it is
Consequently, Petron sent a letter7 to petitioner stating that in
necessary that the issues must first be passed upon before the
view of the pendency of its appeal8 with the LBAA, any action by
properties of respondent is sold in public auction.
the Treasurer's Office on the subject properties would be
premature. However, petitioner replied that only Petron's
payment under protest shall bar the collection of the realty taxes G.R. No. 159696 November 17, 2005
due,9 pursuant to Sections 231 and 252 of the LGC. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RIMANDO A.
GANNAPAO,* Respondents.
With the issuance of a Warrant of Levy 10 against its machineries
and pieces of equipment, Petron filed on September 24, 2007, an
urgent motion to lift the final notice of delinquent real property Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
tax and warrant of levy with the LBAA. It argued that the issuance Court, seeking to reverse the January 14, 2003 Resolution 2 of the
of the notice and warrant is premature because an appeal has Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 70605, granting
been filed with the LBAA, where it posted a surety bond in the respondents Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
amount of P1,286,057,899.54.11 Injunction. Also assailed is the July 29, 2003 Resolution 3 of the CA
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The first assailed
On October 3, 2007, Petron received a notice of sale of its Resolution states in full:
properties scheduled on October 17, 2007.12Consequently, on
October 8, 2007, Petron withdrew its motion to lift the final notice "This treats of the Urgent Motion for Issuance of Preliminary
of delinquent real property tax and warrant of levy with the Injunction dated December 2, 2002 filed by [respondent] through
LBAA.13 On even date, Petron filed with the Regional Trial Court of counsel with this Court.
Bataan the instant case (docketed as Civil Case No. 8801) for
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining "No Comment on the same was ever filed by the Office of the
order (TRO) and preliminary injunction.14 Solicitor General which is handling this case for and in behalf of
the [Petitioner] Civil Service Commission despite opportunity
given it, per Resolution dated November 8, 2002.
"This Court, after taking into consideration the allegations and the
arguments set forth in this motion filed by [respondent] to
support his stand, opted to grant [respondents] application for
the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction at this stage of the
proceedings considering that he is entitled to the relief demanded
and that the implementation of the assailed Resolution dated
April 3, 2002 of x x x Civil Service Commission and the Order
implementing it issued pursuant thereto, would probably work
injustice and would cause irreparable damage to [respondent].
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Motion for the
Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by [herein
respondent] is hereby GRANTED. Let [the] Writ of Preliminary
Injunction be issued enjoining, restraining and prohibiting public
respondents [herein petitioner], their representatives and/or
anybody acting in their behalf, from implementing CSC Resolution
dated April 3, 2002 and to recall the order implementing it, if any
issued pursuant thereto, upon the posting of a bond in the
amount of One Hundred Thousand (100,000.00) Pesos, to be
executed to the [petitioner] or parties enjoined, to the effect that
[herein respondent] will pay to [herein petitioner] or parties all
damages which he or they may sustain by reason of the injunction
if the Court should finally decide that [herein respondent] is not
entitled thereto."4
The Facts
The factual antecedents are narrated by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), as follows:
"On December 22, 1995, a Complaint for Grave Misconduct and
Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and
Disarming was filed by the stockholders and board members of
United Workers Transport Corp. (UWTC) against SPO1 Rimando
Gannapao before the Philippine National Police, Inspectorate
Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
"Pursuant to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 dated
July 21 1996, a Summary Hearing was conducted by the Office of
the Legal Service of the National Headquarters PNP against
[respondent] for the alleged moonlighting. [Courts comment:
Records show that prior to the investigation conducted by the
Office of Legal Service, however, another pre-charge investigation
had been held for the same case by the Headquarters Support
Services also of the National Headquarters of the PNP. The
investigation appears to have been dismissed upon the
recommendation of Atty. Joselito Casugbu, who found the
complaint to be one of pure harassment.5]
"On November 26, 1997, the Philippine National Police Chief
Recaredo A. Sarmiento II rendered a Decision imposing the three
(3) months suspension of [respondent], the dispositive part of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Headquarters finds
respondent SPO1 RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO GUILTY of the charge
of serious irregularities in the performance of duties, thus, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months
suspension from the police service without pay.
"On February 6, 1998, [respondent] filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the PNP Director General
Santiago L. Alio in [a] Resolution dated April 14, 1998.
"[Respondent] appealed the PNP Resolution to the National
Appellate Board (NAB), National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).
The appeal was dismissed in a Resolution dated December 29,
1999.
"On February 10, 2000, [respondent] filed a Petition for Appeal
with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
The appeal was denied and the penalty of three (3) months
suspension of petitioner was affirmed in a Resolution dated July
18, 2000.
"Thereafter, [respondent] appealed to the Civil Service
Commission praying the setting aside of the penalty of three (3)
months suspension and/or for the Commission to conduct a
hearing or a reinvestigation alleging lack of due process.
"On April 3, 2002, the Civil Service Commission rendered
Resolution No. 020487, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Rimando A. Gannapao is hereby
DISMISSED. However, the order dated February 26, 2001 of then
DILG Secretary Alfredo S. Lim affirming the suspension of
Gannapao for a period of three (3) months is modified to dismissal
from the service.
"On May 30, 2002, Gannapao filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals assailing the Resolution of the Civil Service
Commission.
"On January 8, 2003, CSC through the Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Comment on the Petition specifically stating
among others that Gannapao was not entitled to a preliminary
injunction.
"On January 14, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
granting Gannapaos motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining, restraining and prohibiting CSC from
implementing its assailed CSC Resolution No. 020487 dated April
3, 2002 dismissing [respondent].
"[Respondent] filed its motion for reconsideration which was
denied in a Resolution dated July 29, 2003."6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals granted respondents prayer for a
preliminary injunction enjoining the CSC from enforcing the
latters assailed Decision pending appeal. The CA based its ruling
on the probability that the immediate execution of the CSC
Decision might cause injustice and irreparable damage to
petitioner.
ISSUE: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
in favor of Respondent Gannapao.
HELD: NO
Petitioner attacks the CA for issuing the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction despite the Commissions finding that private
respondent was guilty of misconduct. The OSG adds that the
injunctive relief violates the Administrative Code and the CSC rules
stating that administrative disciplinary penalties shall be
immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of an
appeal.10
We hold, however, that neither the Administrative Code nor the
CSC rules deprive courts of their power to grant restraining orders
or preliminary injunctions to stay the execution of CSC decisions
pending appeal.11 Moreover, a courts issuance of a preliminary
injunction, when proper, is expressly authorized by Section 2 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction Justified
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court prescribes the grounds
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, [SEE CODAL]
Based on the foregoing, the requisites for the issuance of the writ
are the following: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable
right that must be protected and (2) an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 17 In taking
cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, a court
has the duty to determine whether the requisites for the grant of
the injunction are present in the case before it.18
In the present controversy, however, the assailed Order does not
state the basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA made no findings of fact or law indicating that any of the
elements essential for the grant of an injunctive writ existed. After
merely stating that it took "into consideration the allegations and
the arguments set forth" in the Urgent Motion filed by Gannapao,
the CA immediately concluded afterwards that respondent was
entitled to the relief demanded.
In this connection, the Court reiterates its pronouncement
in Garcia v. Burgos:19
"It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise
of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution,
deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a
doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong
arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of
great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages."
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and fair play, this Court
scrutinized the records of the case and, indeed, found sufficient
grounds for the grant of the injunctive Writ. Prior to the finality of
the CSC Decision dismissing him, private respondent has a clear
and unmistakable right to his current position in the police
service. Unquestionably, the right to employment, oftentimes the
lowly employees only noble source of bread and butter, is entitled
to protection by the State.20
Moreover, the immediate implementation of the not yet final
penalty of dismissal from the service would surely cause private
respondent (and his family) irreparable damage. As pleaded in his
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction,21 his salary and benefits as a
policeman are his familys only source of income.
Furthermore, in the said Urgent Motion, as well as the
Petition22 filed by private respondent before the Court of Appeals,
he incessantly asserted that the case against him had already
been dismissed in an earlier PNP pre-charge investigation. When
the case was reopened by the PNP Office of Legal Service, he
allegedly moved for the dismissal of the suit on the ground of res
judicata.
Instead of ruling on the issue of whether the prior dismissal was in
fact a bar to the reopening of the case, the PNP Office of Legal
Service merely considered the filing of the Motion to Dismiss as a
waiver of his right to file an answer. Then it proceeded to rule on
the case on its merits. He subsequently appealed to the CSC his
three-month suspension, which had been affirmed by the DILG.
Specifically, he claimed lack of due process and requested the CSC
to grant him a hearing. Not only did it affirm the assailed Order of
the DILG, it moreover increased the penalty to dismissal from the
service.
Under the above circumstances, it appears that private
respondent, without prejudging his case on its merits, has raised a
prima facie defense of lack of due process. We hasten to add that
the question of whether or not he was denied due process is one
of fact that the CA is better equipped to determine. That the CA
saw it fit to issue the questioned Writ to protect his rights in the
interim was within the reasonable exercise of its judicial
discretion. We find no arbitrariness or capriciousness -- much less
personal bias, hostility or animosity -- in the exercise of its
prerogatives.
G.R. No. 176898 December 3, 2012
GEORGE S. H. SY, doing business under the name and style of
OPM INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,Petitioner,
vs.
AUTOBUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS INC., Respondent.
A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction will not be set aside
unless it was issued with grave abused of discretion.
FACTS:
Petitioner George S.H. Sy is doing business under the name and
style of OPM International Corporation (OPM), which is engaged
in the sale and installation of bus air conditioning units.4
Sometime in July 1996, petitioner entered into a verbal agreement
with respondent Autobus Transport Systems, Inc.,5 a public utility
bus company plying the northern Luzon routes from
Manila.6 Under their agreement, respondent would purchase
Konvecta air conditioning units from petitioner and petitioner
would finance respondents acquisition of twenty-two (22) units of
bus engine and chassis from Commercial Motors Corporation
(CMC) and twenty-two (22) bus deluxe bodies to be built by
Almazora Motors Corporation (AMC).7 The parties agreed that
respondent would amortize the payments for the Konvecta air
conditioning units and the bus units separately;8 that petitioner
would settle respondents account with CMC starting on the
fourteenth (14th) month from the time of the first delivery of the
bus engines and chassis; and that respondent would pay
petitioner the acquisition cost of the 22 units of bus engines and
chassis in 36 monthly installments, starting on the fifteenth (15th)
month from the time of the first delivery of the bus engines and
chassis.9 As security, respondent would execute Chattel Mortgages
over the buses in favor of CMC.10 Once petitioner has fully paid the
amortizations to CMC, respondent would execute new Chattel
Mortgages over the buses, this time, in favor of petitioner.11 In the
meantime, respondent would deliver to petitioner titles to five
properties in Caloocan City registered under the name of Gregorio
Araneta III, the chairman of respondent, as security for
petitioners advances to CMC.12

The 22 bus units were delivered to respondent by CMC in three
batches: 10 in November 1996, five in March 1997 and seven in
October 1997.13 After the delivery of the first batch, respondent
delivered to petitioner Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
292199, 292200, 292201, 292202, and 292203.14
Petitioner, however, defaulted in paying the amortizations to CMC,
forcing the latter to demand payment from
respondent.15 Consequently, respondent was compelled to pay
some of the obligations directly to CMC.16
due to the failure of petitioner to settle the obligations with CMC,
respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance 21 against
petitioner.22 the RTC rendered a Decision33 in favor of respondent
petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment 35 citing the
death of his counsel as excusable negligence.36 Finding the petition
meritorious, the RTC set aside its Decision and set the case for
trial
On September 16, 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Order
[Petitioner] to Return the Five (5) Transfer Certificates of Title to
[Respondent].38 The RTC denied the motion
On January 11, 2005, respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, 40praying for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
commanding petitioner to return to respondent the five titles.41
RTC granted. CA affirmed.
ISSUES WHETHER XXX THE HONORABLE [CA] COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THE ISSUANCE OF
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION TO BE IN
ORDER, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, DECLARING THAT OPM NO LONGER
HAD ANY REASON TO HOLD ON TO THE FIVE (5) TITLES.? NO
HELD:
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner claims that respondent is not entitled to a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction because it failed to show that it
has a clear legal right56 and that it would suffer grave and
irreparable damage if a writ were not issued.57Petitioner alleges
that respondent delivered the titles to him as security for
respondents entire obligation to OPM in the total amount of
more than P81 million, inclusive of interest.58 He insists that
respondent still owes OPM the amount of P30 million, inclusive of
interest.59 Considering that respondents obligation to OPM is not
yet fully paid, respondent is not entitled to a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the RTC validly
issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. 63Respondent
insists that it has a legal right to recover the five titles since
petitioner defaulted in his obligation, exposing respondent to
damages and financial burden.64 It claims that it had to pay
interest and penalty charges to CMC because of petitioners delay
in paying the amortizations.65 Respondent also contends that it
was able to show the possibility of an "irreparable injury." 66 Since
the titles are in the possession of Metrobank, there is a possibility
that petitioner would use these titles to obtain a loan with
Metrobank.67 As to the bond and counter bond, respondent
emphasizes that the fixing of the amount of bond and the granting
of a motion for filing a counter bond are discretionary upon the
trial court.68
In this case, the RTC, in granting respondents Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, explained
that:
From the verified complaint filed in this case as well as
the [respondents] verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, it is clear
that the five (5) land titles registered in the name of
Gregorio Araneta III were delivered by the
[respondent] to the [petitioner] to secure the latters
advances to CMC for the financing of the twenty two
(22) bus chassis which [respondent] purchased from
CMC. However, [petitioner] defaulted in his obligations
to CMC which compelled the [respondent] to directly
pay CMC some of the obligations of the
[petitioner]. Since the condition for the delivery of the
land titles which is the payment by the [petitioner] of
the obligations of the [respondent] to CMC has not
been complied with by the [petitioner], there is no
further justification for the [petitioner] to hold on to
the possession of the land titles.
In this connection, extant in the records of this case are the two
(2) letters of the [petitioner] to the lawyers of the [respondent]
wherein he expressly admitted his failure to comply with his
obligations to CMC on behalf of the [respondent] x x x. These
letters were not denied by the [petitioner]; in fact, it was admitted
by him in his Answer x x x.
It must be noted that the land titles are in the name of Gregorio
Araneta III who is not a party to the transaction between the
[respondent] and the [petitioner] and that there is no document
between the parties concerning the terms and conditions behind
the possession of the said titles by the [petitioner]. There is no
Deed of Mortgage over the properties covered by the said titles.
The only document on record is the acknowledgement receipt
dated March 18, 1997 signed by the [petitioner] x x x but other
than the acknowledgment of the receipt of the titles, there is
nothing else to show the terms and conditions under which
[petitioner] is to possess the same. At best, therefore, the
[petitioner] is merely a depository of the said titles. He cannot
foreclose, dispose of, assign or otherwise deal with the
same. Thus, the damages that he may suffer if the land titles are
returned to the [respondent] is practically inexistent compared
to the damages which [respondent] and the owners of the land
titles have suffered due to the continuous possession of the
[petitioner] of the said titles, as they cannot exercise their
proprietary rights to the properties covered by the titles
The CA affirmed the Order74 since it found no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC. It said:
x x x we find the issuance of the writ to be in order. FIRST, there is
no denying that the titles to the subject five (5) properties
belonged to and were in fact registered under the name of Mr.
Gregorio Ma. Araneta III of AUTOBUS. NEXT, as stated in
AUTOBUS complaint and admitted in OPMs answer, the purpose
in handing over the five (5) titles to OPM was to secure the
advances to be made by the latter to CMC. Hence, when OPM
failed to meet its obligations with CMC, AUTOBUS rights over the
twenty-two (22) buses were materially and substantially
compromised by a threatened foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage. Again, this cannot be denied for a chattel mortgage was
executed by AUTOBUS over the buses in favor of CMC which shall
be transferred to OPM once CMC is paid by OPM, although
claimed by OPM as additional collateral. AUTOBUS in its Comment
and Memorandum asserts that it has paid all its obligations to
CMC which is not denied by OPM. Consequently, OPM no longer
had any reason to hold on to the five (5) titles for its failure to pay
CMC. THIRDLY, the urgency of the situation necessitating the
issuance of the mandatory writ was sufficiently established by
AUTOBUS before the trial court, thus:
[Respondent] has expressed fear that the [petitioner] (OPM) has
turned over the possession of the said titles to Metrobank in order
to obtain a loan from the bank or to secure an existing loan from
the said bank. [Petitioner] has admitted that Metrobank has
possession of the titles, but according to him, it is only for
safekeeping. Considering this admission, this Court gives credence
to the [respondents] fear.
We x x x agree with the trial court for it is very unlikely that the
purpose for handing over the titles to the bank was merely for
safekeeping when the bank itself conducted inspections and
appraisals on the subject five (5) properties of Mr. Araneta.
As regards OPMs offer to post a counter bond, the same on its
own does not however warrant the [writs] dissolution.75
to petitioner solely as security for the refinancing of the buses
purchased by respondent from CMC.1wphi1
In addition, we need not belabor that the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial court
because "the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that
end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive
determination."84 For this reason, the grant or the denial of a writ
of preliminary injunction shall not be disturbed unless it was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction.85 Grave abuse of discretion is defined as
"capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law."86 No grave abuse of discretion exists in this
case.
The contentions of petitioner regarding the fixing of the bond and
the denial of his offer to post a counter bond likewise have no
merit. As we have said, all these depend on the sound discretion
of the trial court, which shall not be disturbed in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Finally, as to whether respondent still owes OPM the amount of
30 million, we believe that this is a factual issue best left to the
determination of the RTC where the main case is pending.

Based on the foregoing disquisition, we find that the RTC had WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
sufficient bases to issue the writ of preliminary mandatory dated September 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March 6,
injunction as all the requisites for the issuance of such writ were 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 90926 are hereby
established. We agree with the RTC that respondent has a right to AFFIRMED.
recover the five titles because petitioner failed to comply with his
obligation to respondent. It bears stressing that respondent was SO ORDERED.
compelled to directly pay CMC to avoid the foreclosure of the
chattel mortgages, which respondent executed in favor of CMC.
Considering that respondent has paid most, if not all, of its
obligations to CMC, there is no reason for petitioner to hold on to
the titles.

Petitioners allegation that respondent delivered the five titles to

him as security, not only for the refinancing of the 22 bus chassis
from CMC, but for the entire obligation deserves scant
consideration.

In respondents demand letter76 dated November 26, 1998,

respondents counsel reminded petitioner that "the sole purpose
of the mortgage on the properties was to secure the refinancing
of [respondents] buses with CMC."77 Thus, respondents counsel
demanded petitioner to settle his obligations with CMC or return
the titles to respondent. In his letter-reply 78 dated December 5,
1998, petitioner did not deny that respondent delivered the titles
to him solely as security for the refinancing of the buses. Instead,
he admitted his failure to settle his obligations with CMC and
asked that he be given additional time to settle the same. 79 In
respondents demand letter80 dated January 28, 1999,
respondents counsel again reminded petitioner to settle the
obligations with CMC or return the titles, which serves "as security
for [petitioners] refinancing of buses."81 Again, in his letter82 dated
January 28, 1999, petitioner did not refute the statement of
respondents counsel. Once more, he admitted his failure and
asked for a final extension. 83The communication between the
parties clearly proves that the respondent delivered the five titles
ACTUAL VIOLATION OF A RIGHT
G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006
EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, ET AL
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from
issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the
prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On
issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of
law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative
acts.1 In such cases, let the hammer fall and let it fall hard.
With health risks linked to exposure to electromagnetic radiation
as their battle cry, petitioners, all residents of Dasmarias Village,
are clamoring for the reversal of the decision 2 dated 3 May 2000
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57849 as well as the
resolution dated 27 September 2000, denying their motion for
reconsideration.
The assailed decision3 of the Court of Appeals reversed the order
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) to stay the latter from energizing and transmitting
high voltage electric current through its cables erected from Sucat,
Paraaque to Araneta Ave., Quezon City.
But, first, the facts:
Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29
decagon-shaped steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters
to support overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230
Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project.
Said transmission line passes through the Sergio Osmea, Sr.
Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio,
and Dasmarias Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where
petitioners homes are.
Said project later proved to be petitioners bane of existence.
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners
scoured the internet on the possible adverse effects that such a
structure could cause to their health and well-being. Petitioners
got hold of published articles and studies linking the incidence of a
fecund of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields. These
illnesses range from cancer to leukemia.
Petitioners left no stones unturned to address their malady. They
aired this growing concern to the NAPOCOR, which conducted a
series of meetings with them.
NAPOCOR received flak from Representative Francis Joseph G.
Escudero, who in his Privilege Speech dated 10 May 1999,
denounced the cavalier manner with which Napocor ignored
safety and consultation requirements in the questioned project.
Petitioners brought their woes to the attention of Rep. Arnulfo
Fuentebella, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy,
wherein NAPOCOR was asked to shed light on the petitioners
problem. In a letter dated 8 November 1999, Napocor President
Federico Puno stated that NAPOCOR was still in the process of
coming up with a "win-win" solution to the concerns of the
Dasmarias Village and Forbes Park residents.4
In a letter dated 10 August 1999 addressed to Congressman
Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, NAPOCORs President wrote:
We have discussed the matter with the Dasmarias and Forbes
residents and we have come up with four (4) options on how to
address the problem, to wit:
Option Cost
Option 1: Transfer the line to Lawton Avenue P 111.84
million
(proposal of Dasmarias/Forbes)
Option 2: Maintain 12 meters distance along P 77.60
million the village
Option 3: Construct an underground line P 482.00
million
Option 4: Reroute along C-5 and South
Luzon P 1,018.83 million
Expressway (combination of overhead and underground)5
Negotiations between petitioners and the NAPOCOR reached an
impass, with petitioners vying for the relocation of the
transmission lines to Fort Bonifacio on one hand, and the
NAPOCOR insisting on a 12-meter easement widening, on the
other.6
Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint 7 for Damages
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping
on the hazardous effects of exposure to electromagnetic radiation
to the health and safety to themselves and their families,
petitioners, through the instant case, sought what they had failed
to achieve through amicable means with NAPOCOR and prayed,
inter alia, for damages and the relocation of the transmission lines
to Lawton Avenue, Fort Bonifacio.
On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an order 8 in Civil
Case No. 00-352, which temporarily restrained the respondent
from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current
through the said project. The pertinent portion of the said order
reads:
Acting on the plaintiffs "Urgent Omnibus Motion," it appearing
that the subject area will be energized by midnight tonight based
on a report taken from Representative Joker P. Arroyo by plaintiffs
counsel, so as not to render moot and academic the instant case,
as prayed for, defendant National Power Corporation is ordered to
maintain the status quo and/or be enjoined from energizing and
transmitting high voltage electric current through its cables for
forty eight (48) hours starting 4 oclock in the afternoon today and
ending 4 oclock in the afternoon of 15 March 2000.9
By order10 of 15 March 2000, the trial court extended the
restraining order for 18 more days.
NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of
Appeals assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to
Presidential Decree No. 1818 (1981),"Prohibiting Courts from
Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases
Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development
Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government,"
particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the dismissal of
the case on the ground of lack jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No.
1818 provides:
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy
involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or
other natural resource development project of the government, or
any public utility operated by the government, including among
other public utilities for transport of the goods or commodities,
stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or government official from proceeding with or
continuing the execution or implementation of any such project,
or the operation of such public utility or pursuing any lawful
activity necessary for such execution, implementation or
operation.
In the interregnum, by order dated 3 April 2000, the trial court
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
NAPOCOR.11 The trial court articulated that an injunction was
necessary to stay respondent NAPOCORs activation of its power
lines due to the possible health risks posed to the petitioners.
Asserting its jurisdiction over the case, the trial court was of the
view that Presidential Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence
proscribing injunctions against infrastructure projects do not find
application in the case at bar because of the health risks involved.
The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR from further
preparing and installing high voltage cables to the steel pylons
erected near petitioners homes and from energizing and
transmitting high voltage electric current through said cables
while the case is pending final adjudication, upon posting of the
bond amounting to P5,000,000.00 executed to the effect that
petitioners will pay all the damages the NAPOCOR may sustain by
reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the
petitioners are not entitled thereto.12
In light of the foregoing order of the trial court, the petition which
NAPOCOR filed with the Court of Appeals was later amended to
include the prayer for the nullification and injunction of the Order
dated 3 April 2000 of the trial court.
In the challenged decision of 3 May 2000, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial courts order, with the following fallo:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for
certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the
respondent court, dated March 13, 2000 and April 3, 2000, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.13
In the Court of Appeals rationale, the proscription on injunctions
against infrastructure projects of the government is clearly
mandated by the above-quoted Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1818, as reiterated by the Supreme Court in its Circulars No. 2-
91 and No. 13-93, dated 15 March 1991 and 5 March 1993,
respectively.
As their motion for reconsideration was met with similar lack of
success, petitioners, in a last attempt at vindication, filed the
present petition for review on the following arguments:
I.
Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions were
purposely designed to address matters of extreme urgency where
there is probability of grave injustice and irreparable injury.14
II.
The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless
restrained, the act complained of will probably work injustice to
the applicant or probably violate his rights and tends to render the
judgment ineffectual.15 (Emphasis in the original.)
Fundamental to the resolution of the instant petition is the issue
of whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and
operation of the 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the
NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Petitioners clutch on their stand that Presidential Decree No. 1818
could not be construed to apply to cases of extreme urgency as in
the present case when no less than the rights of the petitioners to
health and safety hangs on the balance.
We find the petition to be imbued with merit.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981,
prohibiting judges from issuing restraining orders against
government infrastructure projects. In part, the decree says, "No
court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order,
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or
controversy involving an infrastructure project." Realizing the
importance of this decree, this Tribunal had issued different
circulars to implement this particular law.
Presidential Decree No. 181816 prohibits courts from issuing
injunctions against government infrastructure projects. In Garcia
v. Burgos,17 Presidential Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit
courts from issuing an injunction against any infrastructure project
in order not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential
government projects or frustrate the economic development
effort of the nation.
While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases
involving the implementation of projects and contracts on
infrastructure, natural resource development and public utilities,
this rule, however, is not absolute as there are actually instances
when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find application. In
a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential
Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in
cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends
only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise
of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this
dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that
courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to
restrain or prohibit administrative acts.18
In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary
injunction on the ground that the NAPOCOR Project impinged on
their right to health as enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill consciousness among them.
To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondents failure to
conduct prior consultation with them, as the community affected
by the project, in stark violation of Section 27 of the Local
Government Code which provides: "no project or program shall be
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned are complied with, and prior approval of
the Sanggunian concerned is observed."
From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners
constitutionally protected right to health and whether respondent
NAPOCOR had indeed violated the Local Government Code
provision on prior consultation with the affected communities are
veritable questions of law that invested the trial court with
jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary
injunction. As such, these questions of law divest the case from
the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary
injunction finds legal support in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance
of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual. (3a) (Emphasis
supplied.)
The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless
restrained, the act complained of will probably violate his rights
and tend to render the judgment ineffectual.
Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the
conclusion that the project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the
health and safety of the petitioners so as to justify the issuance by
the trial court of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners adduced in evidence copies of studies linking the
incidence of illnesses such as cancer and leukemia to exposure to
electromagnetic fields. The records bear out, to boot, a copy of a
brochure of NAPOCOR regarding its Quezon Power Project from
which will be supplying NAPOCOR with the power which will pass
through the towers subject of the controversy. The NAPOCOR
brochure provides that because of the danger concomitant with
high voltage power, Philippine laws mandate that the power lines
should be located within safe distances from residences. And the
Quezon Power Project mandates an easement of 20 meters to the
right and 20 meters to the left which falls short of the 12-meter
easement that NAPOCOR was proposing to petitioners.
Likewise on record, are copies of letters of Napocor President
Federico Puno to Rep. Arnulfo Fuentebella, Chairman of the House
Committee on Energy, stating updates on the negotiations being
undertaken by the NAPOCOR and the Dasmarias Village and
Forbes Park residents. Also on file is the Privilege Speech dated 10
May 1999 of Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, who
denounced the cavalier manner with which Napocor ignored
safety and consultation requirements in the questioned project.
With a member of Congress denouncing the subject project of
NAPOCOR because of the very same health and safety ills that
petitioners now hew to in this petition, and with documents on
record to show that NAPOCOR made representations to
petitioners that they are looking into the possibility of relocating
the project, added to the fact that there had been series of
negotiations and meetings between petitioners and NAPOCOR as
well as related agencies, there is ample indicia to suggest to the
mind of the court that the health concerns of the petitioners are,
at the very least, far from imaginary.
Indeed, if there is no cause for concern, NAPOCOR would not have
been stirred to come up with options to address the woes of
petitioners, nor would Congressman Escudero have fired away
those strong words of censure, assailing what to Congressman
Escudero smacks of a "cavalier manner by which the NAPOCOR
has responded to earnest pleas for a review of its practice of
installing massive pylons supporting high tension cables in densely
populated areas."19
True, the issue of whether or not the transmission lines are safe is
essentially evidentiary in nature, and pertains to the very merits of
the action below. In fact, petitioners recognize that the
conclusiveness of their life, health and safety concerns still needs
to be proved in the main case below and they are prepared to do
so especially in the light of some studies cited by respondent that
yield contrary results in a disputed subject. Despite the parties
conflicting results of studies made on the issue, the possibility that
the exposure to electromagnetic radiation causes cancer and
other disorders is still, indeed, within the realm of scientific scale
of probability.
Equally important, we take judicial notice that the area alluded to
as location of the NAPOCOR project is a fragile zone being
proximate to local earthquake faults, particularly the Marikina
fault, among other zones. This is not to mention the risks of falling
structures caused by killer tornadoes and super typhoons, the
Philippines, especially Central Luzon, being situated along the
typhoon belt.
Moreover, the Local Government Code, requires conference with
the affected communities of a government project. NAPOCOR,
palpably, made a shortcut to this requirement. In fact, there
appears a lack of exhaustive feasibility studies on NAPOCORs part
before making a go with the project on hand; otherwise, it should
have anticipated the legal labyrinth it is now caught in.
These are facts, which the trial court could not ignore, and form as
sufficient basis to engender the cloud of doubt that the NAPOCOR
project could, indeed, endanger the lives of the petitioners. A
preliminary injunction is likewise justified prior to a final
determination of the issues of whether or not NAPOCOR ignored
safety and consultation requirements in the questioned project.
Indeed, the court could, nay should, grant the writ of preliminary
injunction if the purpose of the other party is to shield a
wrongdoing. A ruling to the contrary would amount to an erosion
of judicial discretion.
After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules
do not require that the act complained of be in violation of the
rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the
act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is enough basis for
injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different from
injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute
certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.
Pending the final determination of the trial court on the main case
for damages, of whether or not the NAPOCOR Project infringes on
petitioners substantive right to health and pending determination
of the question of whether there was non-observance of the
prior-consultation proviso under the Local Government Code, it is
prudent to preserve the status quo. In Phil. Ports Authority v.
Cipres Stevedoring & Arrastre, Inc.,20 we held:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court,
agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a
preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a partys
substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the
principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the
existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which
should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation
would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is
concerned.
At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have
consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is
more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the
issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of
great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency;
where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative
inconvenience bear strongly in complainants favor; where there is
a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs right against his
protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and
where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to
reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation
between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the
defendant, than to establish a new relation." (Emphasis supplied.)
What is more, contrary to respondents assertion, there is not a
single syllable in the circulars issued by this Court enjoining the
observance of Presidential Decree No. 1818, which altogether and
absolutely, ties the hands of the courts from issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction. What Circular 2-9121 dated 15 March 1991
seeks to enjoin is the indiscriminate issuance of court injunctions.
The same holds for Circular 13-93 22 dated 5 March 1993 and
Circular 68-94.23 And, in Circular No. 7-99, judges are enjoined to
observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the
issuance of temporary restraining order and in the grant of writs
of preliminary injunction to avoid any suspicion that its issuance
or grant was for consideration other than the strict merits of the
case.24
There is not a hint from the foregoing circulars suggesting
an unbridled prohibition against the issuance of temporary
restraining orders or preliminary injunctions.
In sum, what Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the
untimely frustration of government infrastructure projects,
particularly by provisional remedies, to the detriment of the
greater good by disrupting the pursuit of essential government
projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the
nation. Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to
be a blanket prohibition so as to disregard the fundamental right
to health, safety and well-being of a community guaranteed by
the fundamental law of the land.25
Lest we be misconstrued, this decision does not undermine the
purpose of the NAPOCOR project which is aimed towards the
common good of the people. But, is the promotion of the general
welfare at loggerheads with the preservation of the rule of law?
We submit that it is not.26
In the present case, the far-reaching irreversible effects to human
safety should be the primordial concerns over presumed
economic benefits per se as alleged by the NAPOCOR.
Not too long ago, the Court, in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 27 upheld the
validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals enjoining the implementation of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authoritys proposed action of opening of the
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic. We were categorical -
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal
shortcuts to solve urgent problems of the people. But even when
government is armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow
it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer
fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for
public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold
that the general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it
should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law.28
In hindsight, if, after trial, it turns out that the health-related fears
that petitioners cleave on to have adequate confirmation in fact
and in law, the questioned project of NAPOCOR then suffers from
a paucity of purpose, no matter how noble the purpose may be.
For what use will modernization serve if it proves to be a scourge
on an individuals fundamental right, not just to health and safety,
but, ostensibly, to life preservation itself, in all of its desired
quality?
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated 3 May
2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57849 is REVERSED
as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000. The Order
dated 3 April 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil
Case No. 00-352 is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119280 August 10, 2006
UNILEVER PHILIPPINES (PRC), INC., Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PROCTER AND
GAMBLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner assails the February 24, 1995 decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 35242 entitled "Unilever
Philippines (PRC), Inc. v. Honorable Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. and
Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc. (P&GP)" which affirmed the
issuance by the court a quo of a writ of preliminary injunction
against it. The writ enjoined petitioner from using and airing, until
further orders of the court, certain television commercials for its
laundry products claimed to be identical or similar to its "double
tug" or "tac-tac" key visual. 2
Petitioner alleges that the writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by the trial court (and affirmed by the CA) without any
evidence of private respondents clear and unmistakable right to
the writ. Petitioner further contends that the preliminary
injunction issued against it already disposed of the main case
without trial, thus denying petitioner of any opportunity to
present evidence on its behalf.
The antecedents show that on August 24, 1994, private
respondent Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. filed a complaint for
injunction with damages and a prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner
Unilever, alleging that:
1.5. As early as 1982, a P&G subsidiary in Italy used a key visual in
the advertisement of its laundry detergent and bleaching
products. This key visual known as the "double-tug" or "tac-tac"
demonstration shows the fabric being held by both hands and
stretched sideways.
1.6. The "tac-tac" was conceptualized for P&G by the advertising
agency Milano and Gray of Italy in 1982. The "tac-tac" was used in
the same year in an advertisement entitled "All aperto" to
demonstrate the effect on fabrics of one of P&GPs products, a
liquid bleach called "Ace."
xxxxxxxxx
1.7. Since then, P&G has used the "tac-tac" key visual in the
advertisement of its products. In fact, in 1986, in Italy, the "tac-
tac" key visual was used in the television commercial for "Ace"
entitled "Kite."
1.8. P&G has used the same distinctive "tac-tac" key visual to local
consumers in the Philippines.
xxxxxxxxx
1.10. Substantially and materially imitating the aforesaid "tac-tac"
key visual of P&GP and in blatant disregard of P&GPs intellectual
property rights, Unilever on 24 July 1993 started airing a 60
second television commercial "TVC" of its "Breeze Powerwhite"
laundry product called "Porky." The said TVC included a stretching
visual presentation and sound effects almost [identical] or
substantially similar to P&GPs "tac-tac" key visual.
xxxxxxxxx
1.14. On July 15, 1994, P&GP aired in the Philippines, the same
"Kite" television advertisement it used in Italy in 1986, merely
dubbing the Italian language with Filipino for the same produce
"Ace" bleaching liquid which P&GPnow markets in the Philippines.
1.15. On August 1, 1994, Unilever filed a Complaint with the
Advertising Board of the Philippines to prevent P&GP from airing
the "Kite" television advertisement. 3
On August 26, 1994, Judge Gorospe issued an order granting a
temporary restraining order and setting it for hearing on
September 2, 1994 for Unilever to show cause why the writ of
preliminary injunction should not issue. During the hearing on
September 2, 1994, P&GP received Unilevers answer with
opposition to preliminary injunction. P&GP filed its reply to
Unilevers opposition to a preliminary injunction on September 6,
1994.
During the hearing on September 9, 1994, Judge Gorospe ordered
petitioner to submit a sur-rejoinder. P&GP received Unilevers
rejoinder to reply on September 13, 1994. The following day, on
September 14, 1994, P&GP filed its sur-reply to Unilevers
rejoinder.
On September 19, 1994, P&GP received a copy of the order dated
September 16, 1994 ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and fixing a bond of P100,000. On the same date, P&GP
filed the required bond issued by Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance, Inc.
On September 21, 1994, petitioner appealed to the CA assigning
the following errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to
wit:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAD ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES ON
EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE, PARTICULARLY OF SEC. 3 (a), RULE 58
OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT AND OF THE PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN ISSUING THE VOID ORDER DATED
SEPTEMBER 16, 1994, HAD, IN EFFECT, ALREADY PREJUDGED THE
MERITS OF THE MAIN CASE.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAD ISSUED THE VOID ORDER ACCORDING
RELIEF TO A NON-PARTY IN CIVIL CASE NO. 94-2434 WITHOUT
JURISDICTION.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN ISSUING THE VOID ORDER HAD DEPRIVED
PETITIONER OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS;
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAD FORECLOSED PETITIONERS RIGHT AND
THE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE PROCTERS WITNESSES
ABAD AND HERBOSA. 4
On February 24, 1995, the CA rendered its decision finding that
Judge Gorospe did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the disputed order. The petition for certiorari was thus dismissed
for lack of merit.
After a careful perusal of the records, we agree with the CA and
affirm its decision in toto:
Petitioner does not deny that the questioned TV advertisements
are substantially similar to P&GPs "double tug" or "tac-tac" key
visual. However, it submits that P&GP is not entitled to the relief
demanded, which is to enjoin petitioner from airing said TV
advertisements, for the reason that petitioner has Certificates of
Copyright Registration for which advertisements while P&GP has
none with respect to its "double-tug" or "tac-tac" key visual. In
other words, it is petitioners contention that P&GP is not entitled
to any protection because it has not registered with the National
Library the very TV commercials which it claims have been
infringed by petitioner.
We disagree. Section 2 of PD 49 stipulates that the copyright for a
work or intellectual creation subsists from the moment of its
creation. Accordingly, the creator acquires copyright for his work
right upon its creation. Contrary to petitioners contention, the
intellectual creators exercise and enjoyment of copyright for his
work and the protection given by law to him is not contingent or
dependent on any formality or registration. Therefore, taking the
material allegations of paragraphs 1.3 to 1.5 of P&GPs verified
Complaint in the context of PD 49, it cannot be seriously doubted
that at least, for purposes of determining whether preliminary
injunction should issue during the pendency of the case, P&GP is
entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for in its Complaint.
The second ground is likewise not well-taken. As adverted to
earlier, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction will not
issue unless it is shown in the verified complaint that plaintiff is
probably entitled to the relief demanded, which consists in whole
or in part in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of. In view of such requirement, the court has to make
a tentative determination if the right sought to be protected exists
and whether the act against which the writ is to be directed is
violative of such right. Certainly, the courts determination as to
the propriety of issuing the writ cannot be taken as a prejudgment
of the merits of the case because it is tentative in nature and the
writ may be dissolved during or after the trial if the court finds
that plaintiff was not entitled to it.
xxxxxxxxx
Obviously, the determination made by the court a quo was only
for purposes of preliminary injunction, without passing upon the
merits of the case, which cannot be done until after a full-blown
hearing is conducted.
The third ground is patently unmeritorious. As alleged in the
Complaint P&GP is a subsidiary of Procter and Gamble Company
(P&G) for which the "double tug" or "tac-tac" key visual was
conceptualized or created. In that capacity, P&GP used the said TV
advertisement in the Philippines to promote its products. As such
subsidiary, P&GP is definitely within the protective mantle of the
statute (Sec. 6, PD 49).
Finally, We find the procedure adopted by the court a quo to be in
order.
The record clearly shows that respondent Judge followed the
(procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 58, as amended by BP
224, and Paragraph A(8) of the Interim Rules). In fact, the court a
quo set the incident for hearing on September 2, 1994, at which
date petitioner was ordered to show cause why the writ should
not be issued. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the application for
preliminary injunction. The same incident was again set for
hearing on September 9, 1994, during which the parties made
some manifestations in support of their respective positions.
Subsequent to such hearing petitioner filed a Reply to P&GPs
Rejoinder to its Opposition. Under the foregoing circumstances, it
is absurd to even suggest that petitioner was not given its day in
court in the matter of the issuance of the preliminary injunctive
relief.
xxxxxxxxx
There was of course extreme urgency for the court a quo to act on
plaintiffs application for preliminary injunction. The airing of TV
commercials is necessarily of limited duration only. Without such
temporary relief, any permanent injunction against the infringing
TV advertisements of which P&GP may possibly succeed in getting
after the main case is finally adjudicated could be illusory if by
then such advertisements are no longer used or aired by
petitioner. It is therefore not difficult to perceive the possible
irreparable damage which P&GP may suffer if respondent Judge
did not act promptly on its application for preliminary injunction. 5
Preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy intended to provide
protection to parties for the preservation of their rights or
interests during the pendency of the principal action. 6 Thus,
Section1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party
or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or
acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or
acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Injunction is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under
any standard compensation. 7 As correctly ruled by the CA, there
was an extreme urgency to grant the preliminary injunction
prayed for by P&GP considering that TV commercials are aired for
a limited period of time only. In fact, this Court takes note of the
fact that the TV commercial in issue the Kite TV advertisement
is no longer aired today, more than 10 years after the injunction
was granted on September 16, 1994.
The sole objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. 8 A
writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial
and incomplete evidence. 9 Thus, it was impossible for the court a
quo to fully dispose of the case, as claimed by petitioner, without
all the evidence needed for the full resolution of the same. To
date, the main case still has to be resolved by the trial court.
The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely on the
discretion of the court and is generally not interfered with except
in cases of manifest abuse. 10 There was no such abuse in the case
at bar, especially because petitioner was given all the opportunity
to oppose the application for injunction. The fact was, it failed to
convince the court why the injunction should not be issued. Thus, G.R. No. 164548 September 27, 2006
in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 11 we held that no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to a judge or body issuing a writ of PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
preliminary injunction where a party has not been deprived of its vs.
day in court as it was heard and it exhaustively presented all its RJ VENTURES REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and
arguments and defenses. RAJAH BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC.,respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. DECISION

Costs against petitioner. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

SO ORDERED. Before this Court is a Petition for Review filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the 31 March 2004 Decision 1 and the 8
July 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
56119. The challenged Decision disposed, thus:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is

hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 28,
1999 and October 26, 1999, respectively,
[are] REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the preliminary
injunction earlier issued is reinstated. No cost.3

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner Philippine National

Bank's (PNB's) Motion for Reconsideration dated 3 May 2004.

The Antecedents

As culled from the records, the facts show that on 26 February

1999, respondents RJ Ventures Realty & Development Corporation
(RJVRD) and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc. (RBN) filed a
Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction 4 against
petitioner PNB and Juan S. Baun, Jr.5 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 66 of Makati City, and docketed as Civil Case No. 99-
452.

In its Complaint, respondents contended that on 13 June 1996,

First Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) received an invitation to
bid from PNB anent the sale of an 8,000 square meter property,
located at Paseo de Roxas corner Sen. Gil. Puyat Avenue, Makati
City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-15223
(Buendia Property).6On 10 July 1996, FWCC bid the amount
of P455,000.00 per square meter or a total of P3,640,000,000.00;
and pursuant to PNB Rules and Regulations on the Acceptance
and Evaluation of Proposals, it deposited ten percent (10%) of the
offered price or P364,000,000.00 with the PNB by way of two
checks, No. 418796 and No. 418797, in the amounts
of P312,000,000.00 and P52,000,000.00, respectively.7 On 11 July
1996, FWCC submitted a revised offer increasing its bid
by P5,000.00 per square meter or a total additional amount
of P40,000,000.00. In view of the increase, FWCC deposited with
PNB an additional amount of P4,000,000.00.8 On 17 July 1996,
FWCC was awarded the Buendia Property. 9 PNB's Notice of Award
to FWCC set a condition that within thirty (30) calendar days from
receipt of the same, the successful offeror shall tender payment of
the balance of the purchase price in the form of a manager's or
cashier's check.10 On 24 July 1996, FWCC, invoking Section 7.2 11 of
the PNB Rules requested PNB to finance the entire balance of the
purchase price.12 On 17 September 1996 and pending action on its
loan application, FWCC assigned all its rights, claims, interest, and
title over the Buendia Property to RJVRD. 13The latter assumed the
right to purchase the Buendia Property and the obligations of
FWCC to PNB on the balance of the bid price.
Respondents further posited that PNB initially refused to finance
the entire balance of the purchase price except to the extent of
seventy-five percent (75%) thereof.14 However, PNB finally agreed
to grant a loan to RJVRD equivalent to eighty percent (80%) of the
purchase price or for the amount of P2,944,000,000.00. The grant
was conditioned on the deposit by RJVRD with PNB of an
additional ten percent (10%) of the purchase price to the first ten
percent (10%) downpayment which the former had paid.
Otherwise stated, RJVRD was required to raise an additional
amount of P368,000,000.00.15 Moreover, to allow RJVRD to raise
the additional amount, PNB proposed to lend RBN the required
amount, the latter being an affiliate company of RJVRD, which
amount will be available for relending to RJVRD.16
Respondents described the said arrangement in this wise:
15.0 PNB shall extend a loan to RBN in the amount
of P350,000,000.00 which in turn would be loaned to
RJVRD.
15.1 The proceeds of the loan shall be used by RJVRD
to partially pay the additional 10% or P368,000,000.00
deposit on the Property. PNB documents would
however show that the loan was for the expansion of
RBN.
15.2 Mr. Ramon P. Jacinto, the majority stockholder of
RJVRD will pledge to PNB 70% of his shares of stock in
RBN and 40% of his shares of stock in FWCC.17
Moreover, in their Complaint a quo, respondents avowed that on
30 September 1996, following the payment by RJVRD to PNB of
the additional deposit of P368,000,000.00, the parties entered
into a loan agreement wherein PNB will finance the balance of the
purchase price in the amount of P2,944,000,000.00 subject to
conditions, inter alia, that after the transfer of the Buendia
Property in the name of RJVRD, the same shall be mortgaged in
favor of PNB. On even date, RJVRD and PNB executed a Loan
Agreement.18 A Deed of Sale19 and a Real Estate Mortgage,20 both
dated 30 September 1996 were similarly executed between RJVRD
and PNB over the Buendia Property. The Loan Agreement included
a two-way peso/dollar convertibility feature at the option of
RJVRD; hence, to avail of a lower interest rate, RJVRD converted its
peso loan to US dollar based on a rate of exchange of P26.23 to
US$1.00, or for a total amount of US$112,237,895.54.
Respondents claimed that RJVRD undertook to engage foreign
investors for the project. It entered into negotiations with Hyundai
Construction of South Korea which were eventually suspended. Its
talks with Siemens of Austria, and Property Investment and
Development Management Corporation of Singapore
failed.21 Respondents interposed further that the Asian currency
crisis on 11 July 1997 caused a depreciation of the Philippine peso
which correspondingly increased the obligation of RJVRD to PNB
from P2,944,000,000.00 to P5,405,301,470.82 inclusive of
interest.22 On 30 September 1997, in an effort to continue the
project, RJVRD entered into a joint venture agreement with Fil-
Estate Management Incorporated for the development of the
Buendia Property. RBN secured another loan from PNB in the
amount of P100,000,000.00, part of which was used in paying the
interest for the loan it had secured in favor of RJVRD. In addition,
as and by way of security, RBN assigned in favor of PNB, all its
rights and interest over radio and television frequencies issued by
the National Telecommunications Commission, located in
Tuguegarao, Baguio, Manila, Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo, including those
in Cagayan de Oro (FM Stations), and Manila (AM Station and TV-
UHF Station).23 On September 1997, RJVRD paid PNB the accrued
interest on the loan amounting to P353,478,628.88. RBN also
updated its first account with PNB by paying about P41,000,00.00.
In March 1998, RJVRD, RBN and PNB entered into discussions on
the restructuring of the loans. Respondents alleged that while
discussions were ongoing, the accounts of RJVRD and RBN
became delinquent.24 PNB sent RJVRD, a notice,25 dated 2 June
1998, declaring their accounts delinquent and demanding the
settlement of the same.26
Respondents asserted that prior to 11 June 1998, in line with the
continuing discussions between PNB and RBN for the restructuring
of the loan, PNB required the redenomination of RBN's loan as a
condition for its restructuring.27On 11 June 1998, RBN sent a letter
to PNB in agreement to the redenomination of the loan, stating
therein the agreed terms for the restructuring of the loan. RJVRD
sent a letter to PNB agreeing to redenominate its own loan based
on PNB's initial proposal, which letter was returned to RJVRD for
the reason that, at that time, the proposals for the restructuring
of the RJVRD loan component did not call for the redenomination
of the loan of RJVRD. 28 On 24 June 1998, RBN sent a letter to PNB,
confirming to redenominate the loan under the terms stated in its
letter of 11 June 1998.29 On 9 September 1998, respondents
asseverated that PNB made a call to RJVRD, asking the latter to
redenominate its loans. On the same date, RJVRD sent PNB, a
letter in agreement to the redenomination. 30 On 23 October 1998,
the RJ Groups of Companies sent Mr. Benjamin Palma Gil,
president of PNB, a proposal for the settlement of respondents'
accounts, including a request for the restructuring of the loans. 31
On 25 January 1999, PNB, through its counsel, sent RBN a demand
letter, requiring the latter to settle their outstanding account
of P841,460,891.91.32 In a letter similarly dated 25 January 1999,
PNB by counsel, demanded from RJVRD the settlement of its total
obligation of P5,405,301,470.82.33 On 28 January 1999, RBN sent a
letter to PNB's counsel, expressing its surprise to receive the
demand letter despite their continuing negotiations with PNB for
the restructuring of its accounts. 34 In its letter, RBN said that it
was, in fact, required by PNB to redenominate its dollar loans into
pesos as an initial step for the restructuring of the account, and
which it has complied.35 On even date, RJVRD sent a letter to
PNB's counsel emphasizing that it had not been advised of any
adverse development in their negotiation with PNB nor had it
been informed of the discontinuance of the negotiation. RJVRD
sought for additional time to justify its proposal to PNB with the
aim of arriving at a friendly settlement.36
On 18 February 1999, PNB made a demand to RBN to turnover the
possession and/or control of Broadcasting Equipment Inventory
located at No. 33, Dominican Hills, Baguio City. 37 On 18 February
1999, RJVRD received a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale, dated 1
February 1999 for the sale of the Buendia Property 38 to be held on
2 March 1999 at the City Hall, Makati City.
Respondents manifested in their Complaint that when RJVRD, as
assignee of FWCC purchased the Buendia Property from PNB, the
Philippine economy was progressive; that it was under this
favorable economic scenario that RJVRD agreed to the terms and
conditions of the loan agreements; however, following the Asian
economic crisis of July 1997, and with the depreciation of the
Philippine peso, the loan of RJVRD which was denominated in US
dollars rose from P2,944,000,000.00 (US$112,237,895.54)
to P5,405,301,470.82.39 According to respondents, from the
original contract price of P3,680,000,000.00, RJVRD already made
a payment of P736,000,000.00, representing twenty-percent
(20%) of the value of the Buendia Property and P353,478,628.88,
representing interest on the loan or a total of P1,089,478,628.88;
and that PNB never effectively lost control over the Buendia
Property, considering that simultaneous with the execution of the
Loan Agreement between RJVRD and PNB, RJVRD executed a Real
Estate Mortgage over the Buendia Property in favor of PNB.
Furthermore, respondents sought to find recourse under Article
1940 of the Civil Code. They contended that the action on the part
of PNB to foreclose the collaterals pledged or mortgaged by RJVRD
and RBN, including the extrajudicial sale of the Buendia Property
on 2 March 1999 at the City Hall of Makati City, and the planned
take over of RBN's radio facilities in Baguio City would be, among
others, premature.41
Finally, in support of its Application for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
respondents alleged that RJVRD and RNB would suffer great and
irreparable injury by the extrajudicial foreclosure of the property
and the take over of RBN's radio facilities in Baguio, unless a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is issued enjoining defendants from implementing the Notice of
Extrajudicial Sale dated 1 February 1999, and enjoining PNB from
taking possession and control of RBN's radio facilities in Baguio
City. Respondents maintained that the commission or continuance
of the acts complained of during the litigation or the non-
performance thereof would work injustice to RJVRD and RBN.
They manifested their willingness to post a bond as the court a
quo may fix in its discretion, to answer for whatever damages PNB
may sustain for the reason of the restraining order or injunction, if
finally determined that respondents are not entitled thereto.
Acting on respondent's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, the RTC, issued an Order 42 dated 2 March 1999,
denying the same. The RTC held that the evidence showed that
respondents are in default of payment of its loan from PNB,
amounting to P5,405,301,470.82, including interests and
penalties. According to the RTC, the respondents failed to prove
that they have a clear right to restrain the foreclosure of the
Buendia Property; whereas, it is PNB which has a clear right to the
Buendia Property. The RTC opined that the evidence failed to
prove that respondents will suffer "irreparable injury" if the
foreclosure of the Buendia Property is not enjoined, for under the
law, respondents have one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds within which to
redeem the Buendia Property; thus, respondents will have a
chance to recover the ownership thereof by way of redemption.
Finally, the RTC ruled that the rule of equity is on the side of PNB
considering that the Buendia Property was formerly owned by
PNB. The RTC denied the application for Temporary Restraining
Order for lack of merit, and held that the exposure of PNB in the
transaction amounted to P5,405,301,470.82, while the exposure
of respondents is P1,089,478,628.00.43
On 2 March 1999, the Buendia Property was sold in a public
auction conducted by Atty. Juan S. Buan, Notary Public of Makati
City.44 There being no other bidder, the Buendia Property was sold
to PNB for the amount of P2,800,000,000.00. On 3 May 1999, RBN
received a Notice of Extrajudical Sale from PNB, specifying therein
that the property covered by Broadcating Equipment Inventory
located at No. 33 Dominical Hills, Baguio City will be sold for cash
at public auction to the highest bidder on 10 May 1999, at the City
Hall, Baguio City, pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Chattel
Mortage dated 19 June 1994 to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness
of P841,460,491.91.45
Following this development, on 4 May 1999, respondents filed an
Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 46 Respondents prayed
that a Temporary Restraining Order be issued enjoining PNB or
any persons acting under its instructions from foreclosing on any
other collaterals pledged or mortgaged by respondents to PNB,
particularly that which is subject of the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale
to be conducted by Notary Public Perlita Chan-Rondez in Baguio
City on 10 May 1999. It was likewise prayed that after due
proceedings, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be similarly issued. 47
On 7 May 1999, the RTC issued an Order 48 granting the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction respondents' application for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), upon posting of a bond in
the amount of P1,000,000.00.
On 27 May 1999, the RTC issued an Order, 49 granting the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, enjoining PNB from foreclosing all
collaterals pledged or mortgaged by respondents to PNB, in
particular those described in Exhibits A to L thereof, after the
posting of a bond in the amount of P5,000,000.00.50 According to
the court, the right of PNB to foreclose the chattel mortgages is
still challenged by the respondents and therefore, is not yet clearly
established. Hence, if PNB is allowed to foreclose the subject
chattel mortgages, the determination of the right of PNB to
foreclose the subject properties will become moot and academic.
Subsequently, on 28 May 1999, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was issued.
On 9 June 1999, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration51 of the
Order of 27 May 1999. PNB averred, inter alia, that RBN failed to
produce any evidence to substantiate and support its claim that it
is entitled to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in order to enjoin
PNB from foreclosing on the subject chattels. According to PNB, it
was able to show that RBN failed without justifiable cause or
reason to service the credit facilities extended to it. PNB advanced
the argument that RBN has no clear right in esse; therefore, it
cannot seek relief from the court. PNB claimed that they were
able to prove irreparable damage to the bank if PNB will be
enjoined from foreclosing on the chattel mortgages. PNB
maintained that proceeding with the auction sale of the subject
properties would lower the bank's "past due ratio" approximately
by 2%; hence, with the decrease in the bank's "past due ratio
percentage," there would be no legal impediment to PNB's
resumption to full lending operations since the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas' recommendation for stoppage of grants of new loans is
anchored on PNB's current high "past due ratio." In support of its
Motion for Reconsideration, PNB further theorized that
decreasing its "past due ratio" would improve investors'
confidence; hence, substantially enhancing the viability of PNB in
its move to attain full privatization by the year 2000.
In its Opposition,52 respondents submitted that during the hearing
of the application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the court
expressed its position that it will not receive evidence relative to
the merits of the case as the same would pre-empt the resolution
of the merits or dispose of the main case without trial; therefore,
by agreement of the parties, the principal issue was limited to
whether RBN will suffer irreparable injury if the writ of preliminary
injunction is not issued. According to respondents, the damage to
RBN's image, loss of listenership, advertisers, staff and employees
is unquantifiable in monetary terms. Irreparable damage would be
caused to RBN if PNB is allowed to foreclose its equipments. It
would also disrupt, if not, paralyze, the operations of RBN's
stations. They further asserted that there is no reason to disturb
the injunction issued by the court absent a showing of manifest
abuse.
On 28 July 1999, the RTC issued an Order 53 granting PNB's Motion
for Reconsideration. This was subsequently rectified in the Order
of 29 July 1999 as to the date of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
from May 28, 1998 to May 28, 1999.54 In lifting the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction of 28 May 1999, the RTC rationalized that
the failure of RBN to pay the three (3) credit facilities it obtained
from defendant PNB was established; thus, RBN was considered to
have effectively "defaulted" on its loan obligation. In the same
Order, the RTC concluded that RBN made express admission of its
delinquency in its Complaint. Moreover, the RTC held that the
"cross-default provision"55 embodied in the Loan Agreement
between the parties establishes against the grant of the
injunction.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration of the 28 July 1999
Order, submitting that there was no reason to disturb the
preliminary injunction order as there was no showing of a
manifest abuse by then Presiding Judge Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario,
in the issuance thereof. Respondents explicated, inter alia, that
the sufficiency of their application was already passed upon by the
RTC through the Order dated 27 May 1999.
On 26 October 1999, the RTC issued an Order,56 denying
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration for the lifting of the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction dated 28 May 1999.
Aggrieved, on 7 December 1999, respondents filed with the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Orders dated 28 July 1999 and 26 October
1999, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued.
Before the appellate court, respondents argued that the
sufficiency of their application for preliminary injunction was
already raised and passed upon by the RTC in the Injunction Order
dated 27 May 1999; however, PNB was not able to allege "other
grounds" for the lifting thereof as mandated by Section 6 of Rule
58 of the Rules of Court. 57Moreover, respondents asserted that on
the issue of the purported delinquency, the RTC failed to consider
PNB's judicial admissions, whereby the rights of PNB should be
those of a seller covered by the law on Sales (Title VI, Book IV, Civil
Code), and not those of a money-lender covered by the law on
Loans (TitleXI, Book IV, Civil Code); hence, PNB's rights as a seller
are either to rescind the sale, retrieve the title to the property
transferred to the buyer, and exact payment of damages or to
leave the property with the buyer, to exact payment of the entire
price with interest, and recover damages thereby suffered.
According to the respondents, the PNB as seller had recovered
through foreclosure the Buendia Property. They alleged that: PNB
had forfeited in its favor as mortgagor, the payments already
made by RJVRD and the interest thereon; PNB is in the process of
recovering as mortgagor and seller additional damages in the form
of interests, penalties, charges, attorney's fees, etc; and PNB is in
the process of recovering as mortgagor, by way of the foreclosure
of mortgage, other realty and chattels of significant value.
Respondents contended that there was no grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
because the contemplated foreclosure of the other properties will
work injustice to RBN and would render ineffectual any judgment
on the merits of the case ineffectual.
Anent the issue of whether respondents will suffer irreparable
injury, respondents pleaded that although the immediate effect of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction may be quantifiable in pesos, the
effect on the respondents is its viability that stands to be affected
in the long-term. Respondents rationalized that the foreclosure of
the radio equipment will result in the stoppage of operations, and
eventually, the loss of the image of the station. These factors will
cause the loss of its listenership and client confidence, which
cannot be quantifiable in monetary terms. Moreover, respondents
set forth the contention that even as PNB suggested that after
foreclosure, the radio equipment would either be sold to improve
PNB's liquidity or disposed by way of lease-purchase agreement,
there exists no assurance that RBN can repurchase the foreclosed
collaterals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 9 December 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution58 temporarily enjoining PNB from foreclosing any
collateral pledged or mortgaged by RJVRD and RBN, and from
taking possession and control of the latter's radio facilities in
Baguio City, until further orders from the appellate court. In
granting the same, the Court of Appeals underscored that the
purpose of the temporary injunctive relief is to preserve
the status quo ante between the parties, and so as not to render
moot and academic the relief prayed for in the Petition.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on 11
January 2000.
On 10 January 2000, the PNB filed a Comment with the Court of
Appeals, disputing the imputation of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC when it lifted the preliminary injunction. The
PNB opposed respondents' claim that there exists in their favor a
right to be protected. According to PNB, the foreclosure of the
collaterals shall be effective upon the default of RBN, which
default had been established as RBN was unable to properly
service the loan agreements without justifiable cause and despite
due demand. Anent the issue on the existence of irreparable
injury, PNB challenged respondents' contention by arguing that
there is, in fact, a pecuniary standard by which RBN's damage can
be measured per the testimony of RBN's witness that it will suffer
a loss of P1.2 Billion for the next ten (10) years. PNB further
posited that there were no judicial admissions on their part to the
effect that RJVRD and RBN are not delinquent. In furtherance of
its opposition, PNB averred that it acted in two separate capacities
as seller and lender. As a seller, PNB owned the Buendia Property
and offered it for sale to interested parties. PNB accepted the bid
of RJVRD and the property was sold to the latter. As a lender, PNB
supplied the credit facility to RJVRD as the latter needed to
borrow money to finance the payment of the remaining balance.
PNB insisted that these two transactions cannot be treated as one
and the same; hence, there is nothing that prevents it from acting
as a seller and lender at the same time. In fine, PNB maintained
that RJVRD did not default on the payment of the purchase price
for such was completely paid; rather, it defaulted on the payment
of the loan, on its principal, and interest.
On 4 February 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution,59 granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, enjoining
PNB and its agents from foreclosing the collaterals pledged and
mortgaged by RJVRD and RBN and from taking over possession
and control of RBN radio facilities in Baguio City. The appellate
court, held, viz:
 The principal action in the petition at bar dwells on the
controversy on whether or not the respondent court
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order lifting and setting aside the injunctive relief
earlier issued in Civil Case No. 4592 (sic). If no
preliminary injunction is issued in this case, pending
resolution of such main petition, respondent will
proceed to foreclose the pledged or mortgaged
collaterals. In that eventuality, petitioners stand to
sustain injury and irreparable damage, the loss of its
properties, income[,] and clientele listeners in the
subject radio broadcasting station in Baguio City, even
before the instant certiorari proceeding could be
resolved. To allow the impending foreclosure to
proceed, at this point in time, will surely be violative of
petitioners' right to be heard and to due process. It is
for this reason, for the preservation of the status
quo between the parties, pending decision of the main
petition and in order not to render the same moot and
academic, We feel justified to grant the preliminary
injunction prayed for.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final
resolution of the petition at bar, let a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be issued in this case enjoining
the respondent PNB, its officers or agents from
foreclosing the collateral pledged and mortgaged by
petitioners, RJ Ventures Realty & Development
Corporation and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc.,
from taking over possession and control of RBN radio
facilities in Baguio City, upon the posting of
a P1,000,000.00 injunction bond.
Undeterred, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that
the Order of 4 February 2000 be set aside and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court of Appeals be
immediately lifted and dissolved.
Acting on the Motion, the Court of Appeals, rendered the assailed
Decision dated 31 March 2004, denying the same. In the same
order, the appellate court, reversed and set aside the Orders
dated 28 July 1999 and 26 October 1999 of the RTC; hence,
effectively reinstating the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier
issued on 28 May 1999. The Court of Appeals held that the RTC
was not asked to make a definitive conclusion on the issue of
whether RBN was indeed guilty of default in paying its loan nor
was it asked to resolve whether RBN committed a breach against
PNB which necessitated foreclosure. A determination of whether
there was default or breach can be only be reached after the
principal action is set for trial on the merits after the parties are
given opportunity to present evidence in support of their
respective claims.
The appellate court decreed, to wit:
It must be emphasized that a preliminary injunction
may be granted at any stage of an action prior to final
judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a
particular act. As the term itself suggests, it is merely
temporary, subject to the final disposition of the
principal action. The justification for the preliminary
injunction is urgency. It is based on evidence tending to
show that the action complained of must be stayed lest
the movant suffer irreparable injury or the final
judgment granting the relief sought become
ineffectual. Necessarily, that evidence need only be a
"sampling," as it were, and intended merely to give the
court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending the decision of the case on the
merits. The evidence submitted at the hearing on the
motion for preliminary injunction is not conclusive of
the principal action, which has yet to be decided.
(Olalia vs. Hizon, 196 SCRA 665 [1991]).
Anent the issue of whether RBN would sustain
"irreparable injury" should the chattel mortgage be
foreclosed, it bears repeating that the evidence to be
submitted at the hearing on the motion for preliminary
injunction need not be conclusive and complete. On
this score, We find petitioners to have sufficiently
established the existence of irreparable injury to justify,
albeit provisionally, the restraint of the act complained
against them.
We find that the potential injury demonstrated by the
various testimonies presented by petitioners more
than satisfies the legal and jurisprudential
requirements of "irreparable injury." There is no
gainsaying in that the foreclosure of the subject radio
equipment[s] would inevitably result in stoppage of
operations. This, in turn, shall result to (sic) the
station's tarnished image and consequent loss of public
listenership. Loss of listenership then leads to loss of
confidence of the station's patrons and advertising
clients that would cause serious repercussions on its
ability to sustain its operations. Undoubtedly, the loss
of image and reputation by a radio station are matters
that are not quantifiable in terms of monetary value.
All told, We find the court a quo's lifting of the
injunction earlier issued tainted with grave abuse of
discretion properly correctable by the special writ of
certiorari.60
On 4 May 2004, PNB moved for the reconsideration thereon. On 8
July 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Resolution, finding no
justification to compel a modification or reversal of the 31 March
2004 Decision.
Hence, the instant Petition.
The Issues
PNB recites the following statement of the issues, viz:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FILED BY PNB
INVOLVES QUESTIONS OF FACTS WHICH SHOULD BE A
CAUSE FOR ITS DISMISSAL;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFAULT BY RJVRD AND RBN IN
THE PAYMENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE LOAN
OBLIGATIONS TO PNB JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
 FOR THE FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGED
PROPERTIES;
III
WHETHER OR NOT RBN'S ADMISSION OF ITS FAILURE
TO SETTLE ITS LOAN OBLIGATION IN FULL GIVES PNB A
CLEAR RIGHT TO FORECLOSE THE MORTGAGE;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] RIGHT OF RJVRD AND RBN TO
A WRIT OF INJUNCTION IS CLEAR, EXISTING[,] AND
UNMISTAKABLE; and
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HAD LEGAL BASIS IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER DATED JULY 28, 1999 AND
OCTOBER 26, 1999 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI, BRANCH 66, AND THEREBY ISSUING A WRIT
OF CERTIOARI IN FAVOR OF RJVRD AND RBN.61
The Ruling of the Court
The pivotal issue in the instant Petition is whether the Court of
Appeals correctly reinstated the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated 28 May 1999. Hence, the question is whether respondents
RJVRD and RBN are entitled to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
It is for this reason that we shall address and concern
ourselves only with the assailed writ, but not with the merits of
the case pending before the trial court. A preliminary injunction
is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to
the latter's outcome.62 It is not a cause of action in itself.63
This Petition has no merit.
Foremost, we reiterate that the sole object of a preliminary
injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be
heard. 64 A preliminary injunction65 is an order granted at any stage
of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party,
court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It
is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party's
substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the
principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the
existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which
should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation
would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is
concerned.66
The grounds for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
are prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Thus:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary
injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or
nonperformance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is
doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Otherwise stated, for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the
following requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a
clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.67 Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that the
very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction
rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of
irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the
prevention of multiplicity of suits.68 Sine dubio, the grant or denial
of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in the
sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since
the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end
involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive
determination.69 Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a
court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except
when there is grave abuse of discretion.70 Grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.71
We find the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals to be in
accord with law.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 72 While this is perhaps
one of our more emphatic doctrines, it admits of certain
exceptions, inter alia, when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court.73 In the case at bar, we
apply the exception and proceed to make a determination of
whether there is a factual and legal bases for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to issue.
First, respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable
right to the possession of the subject collaterals. Evidently, as
owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be extrajudicially
foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the possession and
protection thereof. RBN as the owner and operator of the subject
radio equipment and radio stations have a clear right over them.
The instant case does not involve abstract rights, or a future and
contingent rights, but a right that is already in existence. To our
minds, petitioner's claim that respondents have lost their rights to
the subject collaterals in the face of their admission of default is
best threshed out in a full-blown trial a quo where the merits of
the case can be tried and determined. Significantly, to give the
trial court a fair idea of whether a justification for the issuance of
the writ exists, only a "sampling" of the evidence is needed,
pending a decision on the merits of the case. 74 Hence, the practically brought their ratings down, so, until now
determination of respondents' default and the legality of the they still have to recoup.
defenses they adduced are matters appropriately subject of the
trial on the merits. Atty. Mendoza:

Second, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent Q: What radio station are you referring to?
serious damage. Indeed, an injunctive remedy may only be
resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
Witness:
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation.75 PNB assails the existence of this ground by raising
the argument that there is, in actuality, a pecuniary standard by A: DYRB.
which RBN's damage can be measured, as evidenced by the
testimony of RBN's witness that it will suffer a loss of P1.2 Billion Atty. Mendoza:
for the next ten (10) years.
Q: What would be the consequence if the radio
To be sure, this court has declared that the term irreparable injury stations of RBN stops (sic) operation (sic)?
has a definite meaning in law. It does not have reference to the
amount of damages that may be caused but rather to the difficulty Witness:
of measuring the damages inflicted. If full compensation can be
obtained by way of damages, equity will not apply the remedy of A: It will lose whatever image it has generated to this
injunction.76The Court of Appeals declared that the evidence point and (sic) time, it will cost irreparable damage not
adduced by respondents more than satisfies the legal and only to its operation but most of all (sic) its image as
jurisprudential requirements of irreparable injury. It behooves this being built by RNB. Rajah Broadcasting Network and I
court to appreciate the unique character of the collaterals that doubt very much if it will still be able to recoup to a
stand to be affected should the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be very good result, what we are now generating.
dissolved as PNB would have it. The direct and inevitable result
would be the stoppage of the operations of respondents' radio
stations, consequently, losing its listenership, and tarnishing the Atty. Mendoza:
image that it has built over time. It does not stretch one's
imagination to see that the cost of a destroyed image is That is all for the witness, Your Honor.
significantly the loss of its good name and reputation. As aptly
appreciated by the appellate court, the value of a radio station's COURT:
image and reputation are not quantifiable in terms of monetary
value. This conclusion can be gleaned from the testimony of Alright (sic), cross.
respondents' witness, Jose E. Escaner, Jr., General Manager of
RBN, thus:
Atty. dela Vega:

Atty. Mendoza:
With the permission of the Honorable Court.

Q: Now, in your forty (40) years in the broadcast (sic)

xxxx
industry, have you had any personal experience in (sic)
any actual interruption in the operations of a radio
station programming? Atty. dela Vega:

Witness: Q: Based from (sic) your experienced (sic) as the

person engaged in media practice Mr. Witness, with
respect to the possession, let us go to the heart of the
A: Yes, when I was handling the network of the then
matter as of this point and time.
Ambassador Nanding Cojuanco within which the radio
stations were sequestered and sometime or the other
it (sic) went off the air and immediately, we do not COURT:
have any revenues, so much so that we actually
suffered two (2) to three (3) years. You shoot the question straight.

Atty. Mendoza: Atty. dela Vega:

Q: And how long did it take for that station in Cebu that
you mentioned to retain its listenership day? (sic)
Witness:
A: Well, honestly, until now its airtime, because of its
image, status image (sic) which is the reputation of an
AM Station while they are still recouping other
stations, the other reports came over (sic) and
Yes, Your Honor.
(continuing to (sic) the witness
Q Will it made a difference to the operations of a radio
station and relation with the listeners and their clients
if technical equipments, in (sic) the technical
equipments, the ownership over the sale are
transferred to another person?
Witness:
A: If you take the equipment immediately that would
mean stopping our operations. That would mean
stopping our day to day communication with our
listenership. That they will be wondering, that will cost
damage and (sic) our image immediately. That will cost
damage to our contracts right now without keeping
with our clients.
Atty. dela Vega:
Q: Usually that person who owns that particular
equipment will get the particular equipment. When
you say get, what do you mean by get Mr. Witness?
Witness:
A: If for instance was what we are talking about right
now, you are going to foreclose, ok, (sic), what will we
use?
Evidently, there exists in the case at bar a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences to respondents which cannot be
remedied under any standard compensation. After a careful
scrutiny of the attendant circumstances, we do not find herein a
reason for reversing the reinstatement by the Court of Appeals of
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 31
March 2004 and the Resolution dated 8 July 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56119, reversing and setting aside the
28 July 1999 and 26 October 1999 Orders of the RTC, Branch 66 of
Makati City in Civil Case No. 99-452, and reinstating the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued on 28 May 1999 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Atty. dela Vega:

Q: Assuming Mr. Witness, that the creditor of Rajah

Broadcasting Network will not get, will not get the
equipment, will not get their account, will it adversely
affect the operations of Rajah Broadcating?

Witness:

A: Still it will.

Atty. dela vega:

Q: In what way?

Witness:

A: Because that will have an effect now on our relation

with our clientele. The image will be doubt (sic). The
will be doubt, there be vacillation in the planning of the
media plans, vacillation in the buying of airtime.

Atty. dela Vega:

Q It will affect?

Witness:

A: It will affect. The confidence is there.

Atty. dela Vega:

Q: It will affect?

Witness:

A: We do not want our clientele to lose confidence.77

Section 4
G.R. No. 157494 December 10, 2004
BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge, RTC of Bacolod
City, Br. 46 and the City of Bacolod,respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
First, the chronology of facts. Petitioner Bacolod City Water
District (BACIWA) is a water district established pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 198 as a government-owned and
controlled corporation with original charter. It is in the business of
providing safe and potable water to Bacolod City.
Public respondent City of Bacolod is a municipal corporation
created by Commonwealth Act No. 326, otherwise known as the
Charter of Bacolod.
On March 26, 1999, respondent City filed a case for Injunction
With a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against petitioner in the sala of public
respondent judge. The petition stated that on January 15, 1999,
BACIWA published in the Visayan Daily Star,1 a local paper of
general circulation, a Schedule of Automatic Water Rates
Adjustments for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. The rates were
supposed to take effect seven (7) days after its posting in the local
papers or on January 22, 1999. The increase was aborted after
petitioner unilaterally suspended the January 22, 1999 scheduled
implementation. On March 15, 1999, however, petitioner
announced that the rate hike will be implemented on April 1,
1999. 2
Respondent City opposed. It alleged that the proposed water rates
would violate due process as they were to be imposed without the
public hearing required under Letter of Instructions No. 700 3 and
Presidential Decree No. 1479.4 Hence, it prayed that before the
hearing of the main case, a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction be issued.5
On March 30, 1999, the court a quo issued an Order6 summoning
the parties with their counsels to attend the preliminary hearing
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
mandatory injunction. On April 8, 1999, it required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective memoranda on whether it
had jurisdiction over the case and whether a public hearing was
conducted re the proposed increase in water rates.7
Petitioner filed its Position Paper dated April 15, 1999. It attached
documents evidencing the conduct of extensive and lengthy public
hearings in fifty-eight (58) of the sixty-one (61) barangays of
Bacolod City. It opined that original jurisdiction over cases on rate
review is vested in the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA); appellate jurisdiction is vested in the National Water
Resources [Board] (NWRB) whose decisions shall be appealable to
the Office of the President.8
On May 5, 1999, petitioner also filed a Motion to Dismiss. In an
Order9 dated May 7, 1999, the court directed respondent City to
file its Opposition to petitioners Motion to Dismiss within fifteen
(15) days.
On June 17, 1999, respondent City filed a Motion to Set [for]
Hearing10 its application for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary mandatory injunction. It alleged that the parties had
already submitted their respective memoranda and it has already
submitted its Opposition to petitioners Motion to Dismiss. It also
alleged that petitioner had already effected the water rates
increase and collection, hence, causing irreparable injury to the
public.
Petitioner opposed the Motion. On July 20, 1999, respondent City
filed its Reply to Opposition and reiterated that the application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
mandatory injunction be heard since petitioner continued to
violate the right of the public to due process and it might take
time before the case would be finally resolved. 11 On the same
date, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion12 stating that the
hearing may no longer be necessary as the respective positions of
both parties have already been presented and amplified in their
pleadings and memoranda.
On July 22, 1999, respondent trial court issued an Order 13 stating
that there was no more need to hear the case on the merits14 as
both parties have already submitted their position papers and
documents to prove their respective allegations.
On July 23, 1999, petitioner filed its Reply 15 to respondent Citys
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss reiterating that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies provided by law hence
the petition be dismissed for utter lack of merit.
After a hiatus of nearly seven (7) months, or on February 18, 2000,
respondent City filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order And[/]Or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction16 praying that the case be set for hearing on February
24, 2000. On the same date requested, respondent court heard
respondents application for temporary restraining order and
issued an Order17 commanding petitioner to stop, desist and
refrain from implementing the proposed water rates for the year
2000 which were then supposed to take effect on March 1, 2000.
On March 7, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining
Order.18 Respondent court a quo issued on March 10, 2000 an
Order19 directing respondent City to file an Opposition to the
Urgent Motion. In its Opposition, respondent City20 contended
that the temporary restraining order issued was not infirmed with
procedural and substantive defects. It also averred that
respondent court has jurisdiction over the case since the sole
question of the lack of public hearing does not require the special
knowledge or expertise of an administrative agency and may be
resolved by respondent court, hence the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not apply.
Respondent court continued with the proceedings by receiving
the evidence of petitioner in support of its Motion for
Reconsideration and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order. It
further issued Orders dated March 17, 2000 21and March 20,
2000.22
On April 6, 2000, respondent court issued an Order 23 finding
petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution of
Temporary Restraining Order moot and academic considering
petitioners compliance of said temporary restraining order.
Four (4) days after, in an Order24 dated April 10, 2000, it denied
petitioners Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
On April 19, 2000, respondent City filed a Manifestation praying
that respondent trial court issue a writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioner, stating thus:
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued against the
respondents which, however, expired before the
parties were able to finish the presentation of their
respective witnesses and evidences;
The instant case was submitted for resolution and
decision of this Honorable Court during the last week
of March but while awaiting the decision of this
Honorable Court, several complaints had reached the
petitioner that the respondents had already reflected
in the water billings for the month of April the new
water rates for the year 2000;
x x x 25
Petitioner, for its part, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 26 of
respondent trial courts Order denying its Motion to Dismiss.
Respondent City filed an Opposition to [the] Motion for
Reconsideration27 on June 1, 2000.
Respondent court did not act upon petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration until respondent City filed an [Ex Parte] Motion
for Speedy Resolution28 of the case on October 6, 2000 praying
that the case be resolved before the year 2000 ends in order to
prevent the implementation of the water rates increase for the
year 2001 which was to be imposed allegedly without the benefit
of a public hearing.
On December 21, 2000, respondent court issued the assailed
Decision29 granting the final injunction which allegedly confirmed
the previous preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration 30 of the assailed
Decision on January 11, 2001 asserting, among others, that the
case was not yet ripe for decision when the court granted the final
injunction, the petitioner having had no opportunity to file its
answer, avail of the mandatory pre-trial conference and have the
case tried on the merits.
Respondent court denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit in an Order 31 dated January 24, 2001. Petitioner then filed
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of
Appeals. It alleged that public respondent judge acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave and patent abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
issued the final injunction in disregard of petitioners basic right to
due process.32
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review
on certiorari, ratiocinating thus:
In the case at bar, the [O]rder of public respondent
dated 24 February 2000, though termed by BACIWA as
a temporary restraining order, is in fact a preliminary
injunction. The period of the restraint was not limited.
By its wordings, it can be safely inferred that the
increased water rates must not be effected until final
disposition of the main case. This note of semi-
permanence simply cannot issue from a mere
temporary restraining order. It must be further noted
that the temporary restraining order has been elevated
to the same level as the preliminary injunction in the
procedure, grounds and requirements of its obtention
by S[ection] 4, Rule 58. Thus, to set [a] distinction, the
present practice is to categorically refer to it as a
temporary restraining order. In which case, the
omission by the public respondent in referring to the
24 February 2000 order as a temporary restraining
order could not have been a mere oversight but
deliberate.33
Resorting to this Court, petitioner raises the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED AND REFUSED TO RULE THAT RESPONDENT
COURT HAD ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION FOR ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY
RENDERING A DECISION PURPORTING TO ISSUE A
FINAL INJUNCTION AND CONFIRMING ITS ALLEGED
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT:
A. NO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HAD BEEN
ISSUED;
B. THE RESPONDENT LOWER COURT DID
NOT RESOLVE HEREIN PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO
DISMISS;
C. THE HEREIN PETITIONER HAD NOT YET
FILED ITS ANSWER TO THE PETITION;
D. THERE WAS STILL NO JOINDER OF THE
ISSUES SINCE NO ANSWER HAD YET BEEN
FILED;
E. THE MANDATORY PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE WAS NOT YET CONDUCTED;
F. THERE WAS NO TRIAL ON THE MERITS
FOR THE MAIN CASE.
II
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
INSISTED THAT THE 24 FEBRUARY 2000 ORDER (ANNEX
R) ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION WHEN THE RECORDS CLEARLY AND
INDUBITABLY SHOW THAT IT WAS A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO).
III
BY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED PETITIONER FROM FULLY
VENTILATING ITS CASE IN THE MAIN ACTION DUE TO
THE IRREGULAR AND CONFUSED PROCEEDINGS
CONDUCTED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT.34
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The initial issue is the proper characterization of the Order dated
February 24, 2000.
The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the
trial court make a clear conclusion that the Order issued was a
temporary restraining order and not a preliminary injunction.
First. We quote the pertinent parts of the questioned Order:
xxx
When this motion was called for hearing wherein both
parties have argued exhaustedly their respective sides,
this court denied the ten (10) days extension for
further amplification of the arguments of the
respondent to oppose the said motion for issuance of
a temporary restraining order.
It appearing therefore, that the acts of the defendant
will actually affect the plaintiff before the decision of
this court can be rendered and in order to afford the
court to pass on the issues without the same becoming
moot and academic and considering the urgency of the
matter that immediate action should be taken, and
pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 6, Paragraph 4
and sub-paragraph 15 and The Interim Rules and
Guidelines [set forth] by the Rules of Court, this court
hereby orders the respondent[,] its agents,
representatives or any person acting in his behalf to
stop, desist and refrain from implementing in their
billings the new water rate increase which will start
on March 1, 2000. The Deputy Provincial Sheriff of this
court is hereby ordered to furnish copy of this order to
the respondent Bacolod City Water District as well as
to its agents or representatives acting [o]n his behalf.
x x x 35 (emphases supplied)
It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted Order that what the trial
court issued was a temporary restraining order and not a
preliminary injunction. The trial court has always referred to it as a
temporary restraining order in the succeeding Orders it issued on
March 10, 200036 and April 6, 2000.37
The parties, in their succeeding pleadings, 38 also referred to the
assailed Order as a temporary restraining order. The petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution
of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)39on March 1, 2000. This
was opposed by respondent City itself in its Opposition to Motion
for Reconsideration and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)40 dated March 14, 2000. Further, respondent City, in
its Manifestation dated April 19, 2000 stated, viz:
xxx
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued against the
respondents which, however, expired before the
parties were able to finish the presentation of their
respective witnesses and evidences;
xxx
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that while
waiting for the decision and order of the Honorable
Court, a preliminary injunction as prayed for in the
petition be issued against the respondents.
x x x41 (emphases supplied)
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that both parties and
respondent trial court have consistently referred to the directive
as a temporary restraining order. It was only in the respondent
courts assailed Decision that the Order was referred to as a
preliminary injunction, viz:
xxx
This Court therefore grants the final injunction prayed
for restraining the respondent from the commission of
the act complained of for the year 2001 and hereby
confirming the preliminary injunction previously
ordered.
x x x 42 (emphasis supplied)
Again, it was only when petitioner expressed its vehement
objection on the ruling that the final injunction confirmed the
preliminary injunction previously issued, when the respondent
City and the respondent trial court started to insist that the
questioned Order was a preliminary injunction. Given the previous
undeviating references to it as a temporary restraining order,
respondents cannot now consider it as a preliminary injunction to
justify the validity of the assailed Decision. The attendant facts
and circumstances clearly show that the respondent trial court
issued a temporary restraining order.
Second. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding
whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain
act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for
and as an incident in the main action.43
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist
except only as part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for
injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is Over and above every desideratum in litigation is fairness. All
distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional doubts should be resolved in favor of fairness.
remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to
preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. 44 A IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 2002 and
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it February 28, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
court issuing a final injunction.45
SO ORDERED.
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve
the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 5846 of the
Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order
with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before
the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order
would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by
the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the
said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order
would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of
law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.47

Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was

issued, the temporary restraining order granted automatically
expired after twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that
respondent court merely ordered "the respondent[,] its agents,
representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist
and refrain from implementing in their billings the new water rate
increase which will start on March 1, 2000"48 without stating the
period for the restraint does not convert the temporary
restraining order to a preliminary injunction.

The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day

limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is
absolute if issued by a regional trial court. The failure of
respondent court to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not
lend the temporary restraining order a breath of semi-
permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary
injunction. The twenty (20)-day period provided by the Rules of
Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is
an omission to do so. It is because of this rule on non-extendibility
that respondent City was prompted to move that hearings be set
for its application of a preliminary injunction. Respondent City
cannot take advantage of this omission by respondent trial court.

Third. Even if we assume that the issued Order was a preliminary

injunction, petitioner is correct in contending that the assailed
Decision is premature.

The records reveal that respondent court did not resolve

petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying its
Motion to Dismiss before it issued the assailed Decision.
Consequently, there was no answer filed by petitioner, no joinder
of issues, no mandatory pre-trial conference, and no trial on the
merits, yet, a Decision was handed down by the respondent trial
court.

The short circuiting of the procedural process denied the

petitioner due process of law. It was not able to allege its defenses
in an answer and prove them in a hearing. The convoluted
procedure allowed by the respondent trial court and the pleadings
filed by the parties which are not models of clarity certainly
created confusion. But this confusion should not be seized as a
reason to deny a party the constitutional right to due process.
.M. No. RTJ-03-1814 May 26, 2005
UNIVERSAL MOTORS CORPORATION Represented by GERARDO
M. GELLE, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO G. ROJAS, SR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Cagayan De Oro City, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Universal Motors
Corporation (UMC), represented by Gerardo M. Gelle, Manager of
Dealer Operations Department of said corporation, against Judge
Francisco G. Rojas, Sr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41, Cagayan De Oro City, for serious misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.
The background facts are as follows:
Complainant UMC is the exclusive assembler and distributor in the
Philippines of Nissan light commercial vehicles and spare parts. In
the pursuit of its business, it maintains a network of authorized
dealers who purchase vehicles and spare parts from UMC and
resell them in specified territories in the country. One of
complainants dealers was Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation
(NSSC) covering Misamis Oriental and other provinces and cities in
northern Mindanao, including Cagayan De Oro City.
In November 2000, NSSC ordered from complainant Nissan
vehicles and spare parts worth P5,476,500.00. NSSC issued several
postdated checks in favor of complainant to pay for the purchases.
The checks, however, were dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Complainant demanded payment from NSSC but the latter
repeatedly failed to comply. Hence, complainant stopped
transacting with NSSC, although the latter still remained as dealer.
Complainant later appointed Nissan Cagayan De Oro Distributors,
Inc. (NICAD) to co-exist as dealer with NSSC to meet the market
demand in Northern Mindanao.
On October 30, 2001, because of NSSCs continued failure and
refusal to pay its obligation, complainant terminated its dealership
agreement with NSSC. It also filed a criminal complaint for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and/or estafa against the
officers of NSSC.
On February 22, 2002, NSSC filed Civil Case No. 2002-058 for
breach of contract against complainant and its officers, Rodrigo T.
Janeo, Jr. and Gerry Gelle, and NICAD and its officers, Jefferson
Rolida and Peter Yap. The case was raffled to the sala of
respondent Judge Francisco G. Rojas, Sr.1
On March 1, 2002, respondent judge issued an order setting a
summary hearing on March 7, 2002 on the propriety of the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.2
On March 6, 2002, NSSC filed an amended complaint which
respondent judge admitted in his order also dated March 6, 2002.
The amended complaint inserted a prayer for temporary
restraining order which was not found in the original complaint.3
A hearing on the temporary restraining order was held on March
8, 2002.
On March 11, 2002, respondent judge issued a temporary
restraining order "enjoining defendants, Universal Motors
Corporation, Rodrigo T. Janeo, Jr., [G]erry Gelle, Nissan Cagayan de
Oro Distributors, Inc., Jefferson U. Rolida and Peter Yap, their
agents, representatives, successors and assigns, from continuing in
selling, dealing and marketing all models of motor vehicles and
spare parts of Nissan; from terminating the dealer agreement
between the plaintiff NSSC and defendant UMC; to stop the entry
of defendant Nissan Cagayan de Oro Distributors, Inc. and for the
latter to do business on Nissan Products in the territory of plaintiff
NSSC as defined in the Dealer Agreement and for defendant UMC
to stop supplying and doing trading transactions with defendant
Nissan Cagayan de Oro Distributors, Inc."4
The following day, on March 12, 2002, NSSC filed an Urgent
Motion to Fix Bond for Plaintiff/Applicant and Approve/Admit
Defendants Counterbond with Prayer to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order.5
Respondent judge denied the motion in his order dated March 18,
2002. It stated:
Considering that during the summary hearing for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,
defendants/movant herein failed to present evidence
to prove that they may suffered [sic] irreparable injury
if ever the Court issued [sic] a Temporary Restraining
Order and considering further that the Court has
already exercise[d] its discretion when it issued a
Temporary Restraining Order without fixing the
amount of the bond, hence, defendants[] Urgent
Motion to Fix Bond for Plaintiff/Applicant and
Approve/Admit Defendant[s] Counterbond With
Prayer to Lift Temporary Restraining Order is hereby
denied for lack of merit.6
Respondent judge subsequently held several hearings with
respect to the preliminary injunction.
On April 1, 2002, respondent judge ordered the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction upon posting by the plaintiff of a bond in
the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00). The writ of
preliminary injunction was issued on April 2, 2002 after NSSC filed
its bond.7
On the same day, complainant filed with the trial court an Urgent
Motion to Recall/Dissolve Order/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.8 But respondent judge denied the same in the
resolution dated April 11, 2002.9
Complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the preliminary injunction
issued by respondent judge.10
In the meantime, NSSC filed with the trial court a Motion to
Enforce Writ of Preliminary Injunction.11 Complainant, on the
other hand, filed a Manifestation and Motion to Cancel or Hold
Proceedings in Abeyance.12 Respondent judge resolved both
motions on July 24, 2002, granting NSSCs Motion to Enforce Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.13
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision14 also on July 24,
2004, finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. The
appellate court also observed:
It is worthy to note that public respondent issued an
Order dated March 11, 2002 granting a temporary
restraining order for a period of 20 days without
requiring private respondents to issue any bond at all
notwithstanding Rule 58[,] Section 4 (b) of the Rules of
Court, and this compelled petitioners to file an Urgent
motion to Fix Bond for Plaintiff/Applicant and
Approve/Admit Defendants Counterbond with Prayer
to Lift TRO dated March 12, 2002.
On[e] final point. We further agree with petitioners
observation that public respondent issued an Order
dated March 1, 2002 setting the application for a
Temporary Restraining Order for hearing,
notwithstanding the fact that private respondents were
not applying for a temporary restraining order in their
complaint, and to correct the irregularity, private
respondents filed an Amended complaint on March 6,
2002 inserting the prayer for an application of a
Temporary Restraining Order, on which date, the Court
issued an Order admitting the Amended complaint.
This blatant irregularity committed by the court a
quo cannot be left unnoticed.15
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint against respondent
judge for serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, manifest
partiality and grave abuse of discretion. It alleges that respondent
judge has exhibited manifest partiality toward NSSC, as can be
gleaned from the orders he issued in connection with Civil Case
No. 2002-058 and from the statements he made during the
hearings on the temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction.16
Respondent judge denied the charges against him. He justified his
order setting a summary hearing on the issuance of a temporary
restraining order by citing the caption of the complaint which
stated that it was for "breach of contract, damages, with
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order."
Respondent judge construed the same to mean that the plaintiff
therein expressly applied for a temporary restraining order. He
also pointed out that the complaint included a general prayer "for
such other relief just and equitable," and that the material
allegations in the body of the complaint asked not only for a
preliminary injunction but also for a temporary restraining order.
Respondent judge also denied that he argued for the plaintiff
during the hearing on March 8, 2002. He said that the questions
he propounded during the hearing were merely clarificatory which
is allowed by the Rules. Respondent judge also stated that he
acted within the bounds of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure when he issued the temporary restraining order
because he issued the same only after notice and hearing the
parties. He argued that Sec. 2(b) of Rule 58 does not prohibit the
issuance of a temporary restraining order without bond. Besides,
he later required the plaintiff to post a bond of one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as a condition for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondent judge submitted that the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and the non-
requirement of bond did not amount to a violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct because he was never motivated by bad faith, but
rather, on his best assessment of facts, to maintain the status
quo.17
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent
judge guilty of grave abuse of discretion and recommended a fine
of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
We agree with the recommendation of the OCA as we find
respondent judges actions to constitute grave abuse of authority.
First, respondent judge ordered a hearing on the issuance of a
temporary restraining order although it was not prayed for in the
complaint. We are not impressed with respondent judges
argument that the caption and the body of the complaint showed
an intent to include a prayer for a temporary restraining order.
Nowhere in the allegations in the complaint was it shown that
great or irreparable injury would result to the plaintiff, NSSC,
pending hearing on the preliminary injunction. Under Section 5,
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary
restraining order may be issued only if it appears from the facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the writ of
preliminary injunction could be heard. In addition, Section 4(a) of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is clear with regard to the procedure
to be followed in the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction, i.e., a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order may be granted only when the application in the action or
proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to
the relief demanded.18 We note that the relief sought by NSSC in
the original complaint consisted mainly of its reinstatement as
dealer of Nissan vehicles and spare parts in Northern Mindanao,
and the termination of the dealership agreement between UMC
and NICAD. NSSC did not allege facts to support an urgent need to
issue a temporary restraining order to prevent any great or
irreparable injury that it might suffer while the preliminary
injunction is being heard. In one case, the Court penalized a judge
who awarded reliefs to plaintiffs without any showing that such
reliefs were applied for.19
Second, respondent judge issued the temporary restraining order
without requiring the plaintiff to post a bond. Sec. 4, Rule 58 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Sec. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. A
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
may be granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is
verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files
with the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to
the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or
person all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the injunction or temporary restraining order if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond,
a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
 xxx
While Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the presiding judge the
discretion to require a bond before granting a temporary
restraining order, the Rules did not intend to give the judge the
license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the prejudice of
the defendant. Certainly, each member of the Bench is not a
depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of
law.20 The bond under Rule 58 is intended to pay all the damages
which the party or person against whom the temporary
restraining order or injunction is issued may sustain by reason
thereof should the court finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Hence, it follows that unless it appears that the
enjoined party will not suffer any damage, the presiding judge
must require the applicant to post a bond, otherwise the courts
could become instruments of oppression and harassment.
It is worthy to note that prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, no bond was required for the availment of a
temporary restraining order. However, the present Rules now
regulate the issuance of temporary restraining orders, not only by
requiring a hearing, but also by imposing a bond on the applicant
to prevent the abuse of this relief by litigants. As explained by
Remedial Law expert Justice Florenz D. Regalado:
Under this amended section, a temporary restraining
order has been elevated to the same level as a
preliminary injunction in the procedure, grounds and
requirements for its obtention. Specifically on the
matter of the requisite bond, the present requirement
therefor not only for a preliminary injunction but also
for a restraining order, unless exempted therefrom by
the court, puts to rest a controversial policy which was
either wittingly or unwittingly abused. Heretofore, no
bond was required for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, except in labor cases brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari from a decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission where a
monetary award was granted, in which case the policy
of the Supreme Court was to require a bond equivalent
to the monetary award or benefits granted as a
condition for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order. The exemption from bond in other cases, plus
the fact that no hearing was required, made a
temporary restraining order a much sought relief for
petitioners.21
The temporary restraining order issued by respondent judge in
Civil Case No. 2002-058 effectively enjoined the defendants
therein, UMC and NICAD, from doing business as dealer of Nissan
vehicles in Northern Mindanao. It does not require deep thinking
to realize the losses that these companies will suffer if the court
orders them to freeze operations. Not only will they be deprived
of potential earnings from sales but they will also have to expend
for their overhead even if they are not able to do business. Any
fair judge would require the plaintiff in such case to ensure
compensation to the defendant if it is later found that the former
is not entitled to the injunction. But not respondent judge. He
even rejected complainants motion to fix the plaintiffs bond in
Civil Case No. 2002-058, although complainant, as defendant
therein, had clearly manifested its willingness to post a
counterbond. We cannot consider such error on the part of
respondent judge as mere error in judgment. We agree with the
findings of the OCA, thus:
From the foregoing, it is very evident that respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued
an Order dated March 1, 2002 setting the application
for a Temporary Restraining Order for hearing
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs (NSSC) were
not applying for a temporary restraining order in their
complaint. The alleged irregularity was later on
corrected when the plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint on March 6, 2002 by inserting the prayer for
an application [for] Temporary Restraining Order which
the Court admitted on [the] same day.
In the case at bar, the errors committed by the
respondent were not honest mistakes in the
performance of his duties. There was no urgency nor
any irreparable injury which would require the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated July 24, 2002 the defendants (UMC) had
already terminated its dealership agreement with the
plaintiffs (NSSC) as early as October 30, 2001 on clear
grounds of failure to pay its financial obligations, and,
thus, the latter (NSSC) were no longer entitled to avail
of the remedy of injunction as the act to be prevented
by the issuance thereof had long been consummated.
As for the rest of the charges, we find that the
complainant failed to adduce evidence in support of
the same.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge
in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in
his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although
said acts may be erroneous. It is true that a judge may not be
disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was
made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.
This does not mean, however, that a judge need not observe
propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his
official functions.22 Indeed, all members of the Bench are enjoined
to behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 23 Respondent judges
actions with respect to the issuance of the temporary restraining
order in Civil Case No. 2002-058 failed to live up to such high
standards of judicial conduct.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent judge is ordered to pay a FINE of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and WARNED that
commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
In the Matter of Administrative Complaint against Hon.
Abesamis, ...
[OCA I.P.I. No. 01-32-CA-J. February 13, 2002] IN THE MATTER OF
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST HON. ABESAMIS, et al.
SECOND DIVISION Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your
information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 13 2002. OCA
I.P.I. No. 01-32-CA-J (In the matter of Administrative Complaint
against Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis, Hon. Eugenio S. Labitoria and
Hon. Elvi John S. Asuncion, Associate Justices and members of the
Former Special Twelfth Division of the Honorable Court of
Appeals.) Petitioners, employees of Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc.
and members of the Year Jan Industries of Alliance of Nationalist
and Genuine Labor Organization-Kilusang Mayo Uno (ANGLO-
KMU), charge respondent Court of Appeals Justices Abesamis,
Labitoria and Asuncion, with grave misconduct and abuse of
authority. The case arose from a labor dispute between
petitioners and their employer, Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc.
(Company, for brevity), for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring their dismissal illegal and
ordering them to be reinstated to their former position without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and with backwages,
13th month pay and sick and vacation leave. On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the
aforesaid decision but deleted the money claims. However, upon
motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reinstated the Labor
Arbiters decision. The Company assailed the NLRC decision before
the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 54598
and raffled to the Special Twelfth Division, composed of
respondent justices. On August 30, 1999, an alias writ of execution
was issued against the Company to collect P5,437,992.00
constituting the computed backwages, 13th month pay and sick
and vacation leave pay of the petitioners. A notice of garnishment
was issued against the Companys account in the Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC). On September 21, 1999, the
Company filed a Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin
the implementation of the writ of execution and the order of
garnishment, and if the same has already been implemented, to
restrain RCBC from transferring the garnished amount to the NLRC
Sheriff, or if the garnished amount has already been transferred,
to enjoin the NLRC from releasing the same to the petitioners. On
September 23, 1999, respondents issued a temporary restraining
order. On February 29, 2000, the Companys application for
preliminary injunction was granted upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of P5,437,992.02. The Company, however, failed to post
the bond required. On March 20, 2000, the Company filed an
Omnibus Motion seeking to modify the February 29, 2000
Resolution which was denied on August 10, 2000. On October 6,
2000, the Company filed another Urgent Motion for Issuance of
TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction, this time, to enjoin the Labor
Arbiter from implementing the alias writ of execution dated
September 19, 2000, for the collection of P8,401,103.36
representing additional backwages/salaries of the petitioners. This
was granted by respondents per Resolution dated October 11,
2000. Aggrieved by issuance of the said Resolution, petitioners
moved to inhibit the respondents but was denied on January 30,
2000. Petitioners contend that the questioned Resolution of the
Court of Appeals deprived them of In the Matter of Administrative
Complaint against Hon. Abesamis, ...
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/rulesofcourt/2002/01_32.htm 2
of 3 5/1/2006 9:28 PM their right to be reinstated and to be paid
their lost income. They also assert that the issuance of the TRO
without requiring the posting of the required surety bond and
without defining the period of its effectivity or duration
transgresses Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and
the Canon of Judicial Ethics. Respondents, upon the other hand
maintain, viz: (1) that the TROs never enjoined nor restrained the
reinstatement of the complainants; (2) that under Sec. 4, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court, the bond is posted only when required by
court; (3) that the phrase until further orders of this Court did
not make the period of the TROs indefinite; and (4) that the
charges averred in the complaint have already been passed upon
and considered by this Court in G.R. No. 147388. The complaint
should be dismissed. The respondents, in issuing the assailed
Resolution, acted within the confines and limits of the law and
their authority. I. Petitioners, in their motion for writ of execution,
moved only for the execution of the money judgment. In the
restraining orders issued by respondents, what was restrained and
enjoined is the payment of the monetary claims adjudged by the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and not the reinstatement of the
petitioners to their former positions. Thus, with or without the
restraining orders, the judgment of the NLRC reinstating the
petitioners is immediately executory pursuant to Article 223 of the
Labor Code.[1] II. The failure of the respondents to require the
Company to post a bond did not violate the Rules of Court.
Paragraph (b) of Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, gives the court discretion to require such bond.[2] The
court may, in proper cases, exempt the applicant from filing the
bond normally required.[3] In issuing the October 11, 2000
Resolution, respondents were merely exercising a discretion
granted them by law. Certainly, we find no abuse of discretion,
much less a grave or patent abuse of judgment when they issued
the assailed Order. It must be stressed however, that respondents
in their Resolution dated February 29, 2000, required the
Company to post a bond for the issuance of the preliminary
injunction. Unfortunately, the Company failed to comply, hence,
the writ was never issued. III. The TRO dated October 11, 2000
was not issued for an indefinite time. Under Section 5, Paragraph
4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary restraining
order issued by the Court of Appeals shall be effective for sixty
(60) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined. It automatically terminates upon the expiration of the
60 day period without need of any judicial declaration to that
effect. In the assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals ordered,
among others, that the public respondent NLRC is also restrained
and enjoined from surrendering or releasing the garnished
amount to the private respondents, until further orders of this
Court. As it is clear under the Rules that the effectivity of a TRO
issued by the Court of Appeals is only for a period of 60 days, it
must be stressed that the phrase until further orders of this
Court embodied in said resolution should be understood in such
manner that the Court of Appeals may, in the exercise of its
discretion, shorten the lifespan of the TRO when circumstances so
warrant. Applying the foregoing, we find petitioners allegation
that the questioned resolution transgresses the pertinent rules
erroneous. Lastly, the charges alleged in the complaint have
already been passed upon and considered by this Court in G.R.
No. 147388. It must be recalled that after the issuance of the
October 11, 2000 Resolution, petitioners filed a motion for
inhibition grounded mainly on the issuance of the aforesaid
resolution and contending that the judicial action of respondents
in issuing the assailed Resolution impelled them to believe that
they could no longer obtain labor justice. The motion was denied
by respondents on January 30, 2001, hence, petitioners elevated
the matter to this Court. In the Matter of Administrative
Complaint against Hon. Abesamis, ...
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/rulesofcourt/2002/01_32.htm 3
of 3 5/1/2006 9:28 PM On June 27, 2001, we issued a Resolution
denying the petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
the challenged resolutions as to warrant the exercise by this Court
of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.[4] The
dismissal of the petition, in effect, upholds the correctness of
respondents acts in issuing the restraining orders. The present
administrative complaint is nothing but an attempt on the part of
the petitioners to re-ventilate or re-litigate issues already passed
upon and definitively resolved by this Court.[5] WHEREFORE, the
complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours, (Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS Clerk of Court [1]
Article 223. Appeal.- xxx xxx xxx In any event, the decision of the
Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall
immediately be executory even pending appeal. The employee
shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The
posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement provided herein. [2] Sec. 4 Verified application and
bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.-
xxx xxx xxx (b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files
with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond
executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such
party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should
finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction
shall be issued. See also Annotations by Justice Feria, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. [3] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1997
Edition, p. 651. [4] Annex "9." [5] Flores vs. Abesamis, 275 SCRA
302, 306 [1997].
G.R. No. 140765 January 25, 2001
GONZALO R. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
STATE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Rules of Court requires that an initiatory pleading with an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order filed before a multiple-sala court shall be raffled
only after (a) notice to and (b) in the presence of the adverse
party or the person to be enjoined. These requirements may be
dispensed with, however, in cases where it can be satisfactorily
shown that summons could not be served despite diligent efforts.
Besides, in the present case, petitioner has no reason to complain
because he has been duly served the requirements, and he does
not claim to represent the allegedly adversely affected parties.
Statement of the Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing
the November 22, 1999 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 54677. The CA affirmed the Order 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, setting the raffle of Civil Case
No. LP-99-0077 even without notice to some of the defendants
therein. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED."4
The Facts
The facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this manner:
"x x x [R]espondent State Properties Corporation filed a
verified complaint for Recovery of Property based on
ownership on March 23, 1999 with the Regional Trial
Court of Las Pias against Petitioner Gonzalo R.
Gonzales and his brothers and sisters, all heirs of the
late Benito Gonzales. The complaint, accompanied [by]
an application for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, prayed that after trial, the Court
render judgment confirming its right to take and enjoy
possession of the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-17992 together with all
improvements thereon to the exclusion of the heirs of
Benito Gonzales, inclusive of herein
petitioner.1wphi1.nt
"The case was raffled to Branch 253 of the Regional
Trial Court of Las Pias and summons [was] duly served
on Petitioner Gonzalo Gonzales.
"On April 15, 1998, Petitioner Gonzalo Gonzales filed
an Omnibus Motion, praying among others, that
another raffle be held because the other defendants
therein did not receive any notice of raffle as required
by Administrative Circular No. 20-95.
"In order to expedite the disposition of its application
for injunctive relief, private respondent filed a
 manifestation expressing that it interpose[d] no
objection to the said Omnibus Motion. Petitioner
Gonzalo Gonzales then filed his Answer.
"Meanwhile, private respondent filed a Motion for
Service of Summons by Publication on all the
defendants therein, except Petitioner Gonzalo
Gonzales, for the reason that their residences [could]
not be ascertained despite diligent inquiry. The Court
(Branch 253) granted the said motion at the hearing on
May 21, 1999.
"Subsequently, private respondent received a Notice of
Raffle from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Law Pias enjoining private
respondent to attend the raffle of the case before the
sala of herein public respondent on July 30, 1999 at
1:00 p.m.
"On the said date, the counsel of Petitioner Gonzales
and counsel of private respondent appeared but
petitioner's counsel opposed the holding of the raffle
on the ground that the other defendants were not duly
notified of the raffle, again invoking Administrative
Circular No. 20-95. This was granted by public
respondent in his Order, to wit:
'WHEREFORE, no raffle will be conducted.
The Court advises the parties affected to do
what is to be done for the final
determination of the meaning of
Administrative Circular No. 20-95, par. (1)
when there are other parties whose
addresses are not alleged in the complaint
or with the unknown addresses.' (p. 22.
Records, Annex A)
"To this Order, private respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to which petitioner filed an
opposition.
"On August 30, 1999, public respondent issued the
now assailed order which reconsidered his July 30,
1999 Order. Thus, the instant case was set for regular
raffle on September 8, 1999."5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the Court of
Appeals ruled that, necessarily, if summons could not be served,
notice for the raffle could not be served either. The CA also held
that the logic of petitioner, who insisted otherwise, was flawed.
Herein respondent, it pointed out, would have no remedy in case
the other defendants choose to make their whereabouts
unknown.
Hence, this recourse.6
Issues
In his Memorandum,7 petitioner raises the following issues:
"1. Respondent Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in holding that if summons could not be
personally served, raffle could likewise be held without
notice to parties;
2. Respondent Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in holding that in a case where the parties
are unknown, the case will have to be raffled first
before the court can act on the motion for leave to
serve summons by publication;
3. Respondent Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing the petition;
4. There are special and important reasons to warrant
a review."8
In the main, the issue before us is whether a case may be raffled,
even when some of the parties could not be served notice
because their whereabouts are unknown.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Notice Requirement Prior to Raffle
Petitioner contends that under Section 4 (c) of Rule 58, a case may
be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse
party. These requisites, according to him, are mandatory.
Furthermore, he maintains that the latter part of the rule, which
allows service of summons to be dispensed with in case the
adverse party cannot be located despite diligent efforts, should
not be isolated from other related provisions. He refers specifically
to Section 5 of Rule 58, which provides that no writ of preliminary
injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the
adverse party.9
Petitioner's argument is incorrect. Administrative Circular No. 20-
95,10 which provided for the requisites of a raffle of cases, has
been incorporated into Section 4 (c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The provision now reads as follows:
"(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order is included
in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if
filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after
notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or
the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice
shall be preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service of summons, together with a
copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the
applicant's affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party
in the Philippines.
"However, where the summons could not be served
personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a
 nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or
contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the prerequisites for conducting
a raffle when there is a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order are (1) notice to and (b) presence
of the adverse party or person to be enjoined. The above rule also
provides that the notice shall be preceded or accompanied by a
service of summons to the adverse party or person to be
enjoined.
The second paragraph clearly states, though, that the required
prior or contemporaneous service of summons may be dispensed
with in the following instances: (a) when the summons cannot be
served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts,
(b) when the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines
temporarily absent therefrom, or (c) when such party is a
nonresident.
In such event, the notice of raffle and the presence of the adverse
party must also be dispensed with. As pointed out by respondent,
"the requirement of notice of the raffle to the party whose
whereabouts are unknown does not also apply x x x because the
case will have to be raffled first before the court can act on the
motion for leave to serve summons by publication."11
Under the interpretation of petitioner, however, defendants, by
the simple expedient of concealing their whereabouts and
thereby preventing the holding of a raffle, can bar a trial court
from acting on a case or from allowing a service of summons by
publication. Clearly, such interpretation would result in absurdity
and should not be countenanced.12
Moreover, in his commentary on the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Justice Jose Feria explains that "[p]aragraphs (c) and
(d) [of Section 4, Rule 58,] are based on paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Administrative Circular No. 20-95, with the modification that the
notice to the adverse party shall be preceded or
contemporaneously accompanied by service of summons as
required in Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
with the same exceptions in Section 5 of Rule 57 but excluding
actions in rem or quasi in rem."13
In Davao Light,14 the Court held:
"For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates
and reaffirms the proposition that writs of attachment
may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is
satisfied that the relevant requisites therefor have
been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its
discretion, require prior hearing on the application
with notice to the defendant; but that levy on property
pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly
effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service of summons, a copy of the
complaint x x x, the application for attachment (if not
incorporated in but submitted separately from the
complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiff's
attachment bond." (Emphasis supplied.)
In H.B. Zachry v. CA,15 the Court expounded on the aforecited
ruling as follows: "[A] distinction should be made between the
issuance and the enforcement of the writ. The trial court has
unlimited power to issue the writ upon commencement of the
action even before it acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but enforcement thereof can only be validly done after
it shall have acquired jurisdiction."
In this light, it may be stressed that pursuant to Davao Light and
the subsequent cases prior to the 1997 Rules, a writ of
attachment may be issued ex parte, but it cannot be implemented
if the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. In the present case, the notice of raffle is
required to be served prior to or contemporaneously with the
summons -- a requirement absent from the pre-1997 Rules. This
requirement shows the intention of the new Rules to ensure the
implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction and preclude
the defense that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
defendant.
Nonetheless, the 1997 rule barring the raffle of these cases
without effecting the service of summons is not absolute. As
earlier noted, the second paragraph of Section 4 (c) of Rule 58
clearly provides that the service of summons may be dispensed
with "where the summons could not be served personally or by
substituted service despite diligent efforts." Furthermore, even
Justice Feria opines that the exceptions to the rule are the same as
those in Section 5 of Rule 57, the second paragraph of which reads
thus:
"The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service
of summons shall not apply where the summons could
not be served personally or by substituted service
despite diligent efforts, or the defendant is a resident
of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom, or the
defendant is a non-resident of the Philippines, or the
action is one in rem or quasi in rem."
In the present case, respondent was able to show that the
whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown, and that
summons could not be served personally or by substituted
service. Hence, it cannot be required to serve such summons prior
to or contemporaneous with the notice of raffle. The raffle,
therefore, may proceed even without notice to and the presence
of the said adverse parties.
Indeed, contrary to the argument of petitioner, allowing the raffle
to proceed in a case like this is not inconsistent with Section 5 of
Rule 58, which reads as follows:
"SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without
notice; exception. No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party
or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from
facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application
that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the
court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.
Within the said twenty day period, the court must
order said party or person to show cause, at a specified
time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, determine within the same period whether or
not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly issue the corresponding order.1wphi1.nt
 "However, and subject to the provisions of the
preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency
and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-
sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance
but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of
the next preceding section as to service of summons
and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter,
within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge
before whom the case is pending shall conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the temporary
restraining order shall be extended until the
application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In
no case shall the total period of effectively of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two hours provided
herein." (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, petitioner makes much ado about the requirement
of notice of raffle. In ordinary suits, 16 notice of a raffle is given to
the parties in order "to afford [them] a chance to be heard in the
assignment of their cases."17According to Justice Feria, the raffle of
cases is done in open session with adequate notice, "so that
parties or their counsel will be prevented from choosing judges to
hear their case."18
Petitioner has no ground to object, since he himself had been
given notice prior to the holding of the raffle. Furthermore, he has
no standing to complain on behalf of the other parties, because
he does not claim to represent them.19
In any event, the other defendants had been located and served
summons. In fact, the case was subsequently raffled on December
8, 1999, and a pretrial conducted on May 9, 2000. 20 the other
defendants have not complained of any impropriety in the raffle.
Their silence on this question demonstrates the utter lack of merit
of petitioner's contention.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1746. September 26, 2003]
ROGER F. BORJA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ZORAYDA H.
SALCEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a Complaint dated January 11, 2001, Roger F. Borja
accuses Presiding Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 32) of San Pablo City of gross ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of discretion in issuing a temporary restraining
order (TRO) in Civil Case No. SP-5775 (01), entitled, Damaso T.
Ambray vs. San Pablo City Water District, represented by General
Manager Roger Borja, et al., without complying with the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Complainant alleges that the civil case was filed with the
RTC of San Pablo City on January 2, 2001 and on the same day,
assigned by raffle to Branch 32, presided over by respondent
Judge. The following day, respondent Judge issued an Order
granting the TRO, to wit:
Before this Court is a verified complaint praying for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) which the Court finds to be
sufficient in form and substance.
Conformably with Rule 8 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines and
Section 1 of BP Blg. 224, the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is hereby set on January 4, 2001 at 8:30 oclock in the
morning and at which date and time, the respondents/defendants
are hereby directed to appear and show cause why the writ
prayed for should not be granted.
In the meantime, in order to maintain the status quo between the
parties and to obviate irreparable damage the petitioner may
suffer by reason of and as a consequence of the acts sought to be
enjoined pending hearing on the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, the respondents/defendants are hereby
enjoined from enforcing Board Resolution No. 082, Series 2000
restraining Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr. to sit, act and exercise the
powers of a Director of San Pablo City Water District representing
the civic sector.
Let this Order together with the copy of the Complaint be served
forthwith upon the respondents/defendants who are hereby given
a period of ten (10) days from receipt within which to file their
Answer.
The Deputy Sheriff of this Branch is hereby ordered to implement
the processes of this Court immediately.
SO ORDERED
City of San Pablo, January 3, 2001.
and a copy thereof was received by the complainant that
afternoon.[1]
Complainant claims that the procedure followed by
respondent Judge violated Rule 58 Section 4 [b-c-d], 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure on the following grounds:
 (a) Being a multi-sala court, it is the Executive Judge
that may issue an ex-parte TRO good for 72
hours.
(b) The notice of raffle was not preceded or
contemporaneously accompanied, by service of
summons, with the complaint or initiatory
pleading and the applicants affidavit and bond.
(c) Respondent Judge who was assigned to the case
did not conduct the required summary hearing
with notice and in the presence of the parties
within 24 hours after the Sheriffs return of
service and/or the records are received by the
branch selected by raffle.
(d) The TRO was issued ex-parte without the
required bond and without alleging that the
matter is of extreme urgency and applicant
would suffer grave or irreparable injury.
(e) Complainant did not ask for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction on January 4, 2001 in the
morning.[2]
Then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, through a
letter dated February 7, 2001, informed complainant that the
subject matter of his complaint is judicial in nature hence it shall
be denied due course as there are judicial remedies available
under the Rules of Court yet to be exhausted.[3]
On March 30, 2001, however, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) received a Motion from complainant dated
March 29, 2001, praying for the reconsideration of the notice of
denial of his complaint on the strength of an Order dated January
19, 2001 issued by Judge Marivic Balisi-Umali of the RTC (Branch
30), San Pablo City, dissolving the questioned TRO for failure to
comply with the requisites of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 20-95.
Complainant argues that when the law transgressed is
elementary, as in the instant case, the failure to know or observe
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[4]
Upon the report and recommendation of the OCA, this
Court, in a Resolution dated August 29, 2001 resolved to require:
(a) respondent Judge Zorayda Salcedo to COMMENT on the
complaint and motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days
from notice hereof; and (b) Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali, then
Regional Trial Court Judge, San Pablo City, Branch 30, to EXPLAIN
within ten (10 ) days from notice hereof why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for issuing an order dissolving a
temporary restraining order issued by a court of co-equal
jurisdiction.[5]
On October 16, 2001, respondent judge submitted her
comment and apologized for the delay in its submission explaining
that she, as well as her husband, underwent cataract operation.
[6]
She informed the Court that she is adopting as her comment the
Indorsement dated November 16, 2000 which she had submitted
to this Court in connection with OCA IPI No. 00-1058-RTJ, an
earlier administrative case also filed by herein complainant against
her but which was dismissed by this Court for lack of merit. [7]She
likewise emphasized her denial of partiality, ignorance of the law,
bias and so forth being attributed to her by complainant for the
reverse is true as it has been (her) desire to always observe
impartiality, fairness, and dedication in the administration of
justice.[8]
Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali in her Compliance dated
October 17, 2001, explained her actions relative to the case as
follows:
May the Honorable First Division be informed that Civil Case No.
SP-5757(01) xxx for Declaration of Nullity of Board Resolution No.
082, Series 2000 and for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
was originally raffled to Branch 32 of the San Pablo City, RTC
presided over by the Honorable Zoraida Herradura Salcedo on
January 2, 2001. The following day Judge Salcedo issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). On even date, defendant
Borja filed a Motion to Inhibit Judge Herradura [Salcedo] from
the case and which the latter granted. On January 5, 2001,
defendant Brion filed a Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining
Order anchored on the ground that the TRO was issued in
violation of Rule 58, Section 4(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and is therefore a patent nullity. On even date, the
case was raffled to the undersigned.
The undersigned resolved the Motion to Dissolve Temporary
Restraining Order on January 19, 2001. A copy of her Order is
hereto attached. The undersigned dissolved the TRO because it
was issued in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 20-95.
The record of the case forwarded to the undersigned from
Branch 32 did not show that any Order setting a summary
hearing on the application for TRO was caused to be issued by
Branch 32 for service to all the parties.
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 mandates that the application
for TRO shall be acted upon only after all the parties are heard in a
summary hearing.
The undersigned humbly submits that as aforestated, Judge
Salcedo inhibited herself from the case which was thereafter re-
raffled to the sala of the undersigned. The motion to Dissolve
TRO had to be resolved.
The undersigned in dissolving the TRO did not ignore or overlook
the fact that it was issued by a co-equal court, the orders or
processes of which the undersigned cannot interfere with, pass
upon much less reverse. However, under the circumstances
obtaining where it was clearly shown and the undersigned was
convinced that the TRO was irregularly issued, somehow she had
to correct the error. It was her conviction then and now that by
sustaining the TRO because it was issued by a co-equal court
would tantamount to correcting a mistake with another mistake.
[9]
(Emphasis supplied)
In a Resolution dated July 17, 2002, this Court referred the
case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation.[10]
Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez submitted his
Report, dated November 4, 2002, pertinent portions of which read
as follows:
In the study of the entire record of the case, the undersigned
observed that respondent judge did not controvert the material
allegations in the complaint. Her comment dated November 16,
2000, specifically relates to the incidents involved in Civil Case No.
SP-5454(99) which is the subject matter of OCA IPI No. 00-1058-
RTJ. We therefore find unavailing the explanation of Judge
Salcedo.
We find that respondent judge failed to comply with
Administrative Circular No. 20-95. No order setting a summary
hearing on the application for temporary restraining order was
furnished the defendants. A summary hearing can not be
dispensed with in view of the mandatory requirement that the
application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are
heard in a summary hearing after the record of the case are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle.
A TRO may however be issued ex-parte if the matter is of such
extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will
arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such circumstances,
the executive judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-
two (72) hours from its issuance. But such a procedure is not
applicable to respondent judge because she is not the executive
judge of RTC, San Pablo City. (Emphasis supplied).
In Golangco vs. Villanueva, 278 SCRA 414, it was held that
respondent judges disregard of the Supreme Courts
pronouncement on temporary restraining orders was not just
ignorance of the prevailing rule; to a large extent, it was
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of
justice and grave abuse of authority.
Likewise, in Adao vs. Lorenzo, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1496, 316 SCRA
570, respondent judge was fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for
his failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95.
Concerning the dissolution of the questioned TRO by Judge
Marivic T. Balisi-Umali, RTC, Branch 30, San Pablo City, we find the
same to be proper. Judge Umali has satisfactorily explained that
she granted the defendants motion to dissolve TRO on 19 January
2000 or only after Judge Salcedo inhibited herself from trying the
case and the case re-raffled to the formers sala on 5 January 2000.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended
that:
(1) OCA IPI No. 01-1225-RTJ be RE-DOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter;
(2) Respondent Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo, RTC,
Branch 32, San Pablo City be fined in the
amount of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS for her
failure to comply with Administrative
Circular No. 20-95, with a warning that a
repetition of similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely; and
(3) The explanation of Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali,
then RTC Judge, Branch 30, San Pablo City
be ACCEPTED for being meritorious.[11]
On March 27, 2003, complainant submitted a
Memorandum emphasizing that: respondent judge is not an
Executive Judge; the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-5775 (01) did
not allege extreme urgency for the issuance of a TRO neither did it
state that its non-issuance would cause grave injustice and
irreparable injury to the plaintiff; the TRO issued by respondent
judge on January 3, 2001 failed to declare that it was effective for
72 hours only; and on January 19, 2001, Judge Marivic T. Balisi-
Umali dissolved the TRO issued by respondent judge for violation
of SC Circular No. 20-95.[12]
Respondent judge, on the other hand, manifested, through
a letter dated February 13, 2003, her willingness to submit the
matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings on record.[13]
After a review of the records of the case, we find the
recommendations of the OCA to be well taken.
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:
1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or
writ of preliminary injunction is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or
initiatory pleading shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse
party and in the presence of such party or counsel.
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all
parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-
four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch
selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately
after raffle.
3. If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the
Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two
(72) hours from issuance but shall immediately summon the
parties for conference and immediately raffle the case in their
presence. Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72)
hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned shall
conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be
extended for another period until a hearing in the pending
application for preliminary injunction can be conducted. In no case
shall the total period of the TRO exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued
by the Executive Judge.
4. With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve
multiple-sala stations, these rules shall apply to single-sala
stations especially with regard to immediate notice to all parties of
all applications for TRO.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent judge issued
a TRO without conducting the required summary hearing. There is
no showing that it falls under the exceptional circumstances
enumerated by the afore-quoted administrative circular where a
TRO may be issued by the Executive Judge before assignment by
raffle to a judge without first conducting a summary hearing.
In defense, respondent judge adopts as her comment in
this case, the 2ndindorsement dated November 16, 2002 which she
submitted in OCA IPI No. 00-1058-RTJ, which is an earlier
administrative case filed against her by herein complainant. In said
indorsement, respondent talked about the urgency of the
issuance of the restraining order in that particular case and also
mentions that:
A judge may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold
otherwise, assuming that he has erred would make his position
doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the laws in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or evident bad faith.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
(Quisumbing, J., Annabelle R. Gutierrez V. Hon. Rodolfo Palattao,
A.M. RTJ-95-1326, July 8, 1998).[14]
We find the explanation of respondent in the present case
to be insufficient to excuse her from observing strict compliance
with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95.
As previously explained by this Court, there are differences
in the requisites for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and in the life of a TRO when it is issued by an Executive Judge and
when it is issued by a Presiding Judge of a court. In Adao vs.
Lorenzo,[15] we clarified:
If the temporary restraining order was issued by respondent in his
capacity as Executive Judge, the TRO was good for 72 hours
only. Within that period he was required to summon the parties to
a conference before issuing the TRO and then assign the case by
raffle. Thus, par. 3 of Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:
If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the
Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two
(72) hours from issuance but shall immediately summon the
parties for conference and immediately raffle the case in their
presence. Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72)
hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned shall
conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be
extended for another period until a hearing in the pending
application for preliminary injunction can be conducted. In no case
shall the total period of the TRO exceed (20) days, including the
original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the
Executive Judge. (Emphasis added)
On the other hand, if the TRO was issued after Civil Case No. 3391
had been raffled to Branch 2 and respondent judge issued it in his
capacity as Acting Judge, then he should have complied with the
following provision of Administrative Circular No. 20-95, par. 2:
The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all
parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within
twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the
branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted
immediately after raffle.[16] (Emphasis supplied).
In this case, respondent judge issued the questioned TRO in
her capacity as Presiding Judge. She should have known that a
summary hearing was indispensable.
As we explained in Abundo vs. Judge Manio, Jr.[17]
The holding of a summary hearing prior to the issuance of a
temporary restraining order is mandatory, in view of the
requirement that the application for a temporary restraining order
shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary
hearing after the records are transmitted to the branch selected
by raffle. In other words, a summary hearing may not be
dispensed with.
A TRO can be issued ex parte if the matter is of such extreme
urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless
it is issued immediately. Under such circumstance, theexecutive
judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours
from its issuance. The executive judge is then required to summon
the parties to a conference, during which the case should be
raffled in their presence. Before the expiry of the seventy-two
hours, the presiding judge to whom the case was raffled shall
conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be
extended for another period until a hearing on the pending
application for preliminary injunction can be held. [18] (Emphasis
supplied)
The reason for this is that Administrative Circular No. 20-95
aims to restrict the ex parte issuance of a TRO to cases of extreme
urgency in order to avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury.[19]
The rule holds that before a temporary restraining order
may be issued, all parties must be heard in a summary hearing
first, after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by
raffle. The only instance when a TRO may be issued ex parte is
when the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice
and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued
immediately. Under such circumstance, the Executive Judge shall
issue the TRO effective for 72 hours only. The Executive Judge shall
then summon the parties to a conference during which the case
should be raffled in their presence. Before the lapse of the 72
hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case was raffled shall then
conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be
extended for another period until the application for preliminary
injunction can be heard, which period shall in no case exceed 20
days including the original 72 hours.
Clearly, respondent Judge Salcedo as presiding judge of
Branch 32 to which Civil Case No. SP-5775 (01) was raffled, erred
in issuing the questioned TRO without conducting the necessary
hearing first. Only the executive judge may issue a TRO ex
parte, under exceptional circumstances and following a specified
procedure herein-abovementioned.
In meting out the correct penalty, we considered the
following cases:
Adao vs. Judge Lorenzo [20] where this Court pronounced
that the failure of respondent therein, as an Executive Judge, to
abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the TRO
constituted grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice for which
reason, a fine of P5,000.00 was imposed on respondent judge.[21]
Abundo vs. Judge Manio, Jr.[22] where the Court
reprimanded respondent judge and warned him for failing to
comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95. [23] The Court
explained that while a judges disregard of the Supreme Courts
pronouncement on temporary restraining orders is not just
ignorance of the prevailing rule, but to a large extent, constitutes
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of SO ORDERED.
justice, and grave abuse of authority; however, to be punishable,
an act constituting ignorance of the law must not only be Bellosillo, (Chairman
contradictory to existing law and jurisprudence, but must also be
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[24]

In the present case, there is neither allegation nor proof

that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, corruption or any other ill-motive.

However, it cannot be ignored that on September 7, 2000,

barely a year before the filing of the present administrative
complaint, another administrative case had been lodged against
respondent judge by the same complainant concerning the
issuance of a TRO in another civil case [25] without complying with
the same requirements of Administrative Circular No. 20-95,
docketed as Adm. Matter No. OCA IPI 00-1058-RTJ.In compliance
with the directive of this Court, respondent filed her comment
therein which she now reiterates in the present administrative
case.

Unfortunately, the issue on the issuance of the TRO was

sidetracked when the administrative matter was dismissed by this
Court for lack of merit per its Resolution dated March 12, 2001,
based on the recommendation of then Court Administrator
Alfredo Benipayo that what complainant assailed was
the wisdom of the decision rendered by respondent judge; that
there was already a pronouncement made by this Court that there
is no reversible error committed by respondent in the assailed
decision; and that complainants themselves admitted in their
complaint that the decision was rendered by the court after the
case was tried on the merits.

In other words, respondent judge had earlier been apprised

of the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 20-95 and
therefore, it cannot be said that she is ignorant of the law. For her
conscious disregard of a a basic rule on the issuance of a TRO,
Judge Salcedo must be held administratively liable not for gross
ignorance of the law but for grave abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.

For this reason, we find the recommendation of the Office

of the Court Administrator to fine respondent in the amount
of P5,000.00 to be just and appropriate.

On the other hand, we accept the explanation of Judge

Marivic T. Balisi-Umali, RTC Judge, Branch 30, San Pablo City
regarding her dissolution of the TRO issued by Judge Salcedo of
Branch 32 since it was issued in violation of SC Circular No. 20-
95. While the rule is that no court has the authority to nullify the
judgments or processes of another court they having co-equal
power to grant the same reliefs, said rule does not apply to this
case for the simple reason that Judge Balisi-Umali did not nullify
the process of another court but she merely acted as the presiding
judge over a case that has been duly assigned to her Branch by
raffle after herein respondent had inhibited herself upon motion
of the complainant.

WHEREFORE, we find Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, San Pablo City guilty of grave
abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the proper
administration of justice. She is imposed a fine of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889. December 22, 2004]
MA. CECILIA L. PESAYCO, complainant, vs. JUDGE WILLIAM M.
LAYAGUE, RTC, Branch 14, Davao City, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This administrative case arose from an Affidavit-
Complaint dated July 3, 2002, filed before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by Atty. Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco (Pesayco)
against Judge William M. Layague (Judge Layague) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 of Davao City, charging the latter of
gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust
interlocutory order, manifest partiality, unreasonable delay in the
resolution of pending incident and serious misconduct and
inefficiency in the performance of his duty.[1]
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Pesayco filed the administrative case in her capacity as the
Chief Legal Counsel of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which
earlier had extrajudicially foreclosed the properties mortgaged by
the spouses Robert Alan and Nancy Limso (spouses Limso).
On March 25, 2002, the spouses Limso filed Civil Case No.
29,036-2002[2] before the RTC presided by Judge Layague for
declaratory relief, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. In the complaint, the spouses Limso claimed that the
period to redeem should be governed by Act 3135 which provides
for a one (1) year redemption period from registration of the sale,
not by Republic Act No. 8791 or the General Banking Law of 2000.
[3]
They also asked the court that R.A. No. 8791 be declared
unconstitutional.[4]
Pesayco contends that PNB was not notified of the raffle of
this civil case.[5] Before the bank was served with summons and a
copy of the complaint, the spouses Limso amended their
complaint into a petition, with an application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO)[6]. On April 10, 2002, Judge Layague issued
a TRO without conducting a hearing. However, after realizing his
mistake, Judge Layague issued an Order dated April 16, 2002
reversing his earlier order.[7]
On April 25, 2002, PNB filed a Motion to Dismiss, with
Opposition to Petitioners Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction and Application for Temporary Restraining Order [8] on
the ground that the spouses Limso were guilty of forum-shopping
after the writ of preliminary injunction granted by Branch 17 of
RTC of Davao City in Civil Case No. 28,170-2000 was dissolved by
the Court of Appeals; that there was a pending case involving the
spouses Limso and PNB involving the same issues and the same
reliefs; that the petition stated no cause of action; and that the
spouses Limso had no locus standi to file the petition for not being
the real parties-in-interest. A hearing on the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction was conducted.
On May 3, 2002, Judge Layague issued an Order granting
the writ of preliminary injunction applied for by the spouses
Limso. On May 13, 2002, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the May 3, 2002 Order[9]. According to Pesayco, Judge Layague
had, after issuing the Order filed a leave of absence up to May 31,
2002[10]. However, by reason of his absence, the Motion for
Reconsideration was resolved by the pairing judge who ruled in
favor of PNB by dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction per
the Orderdated May 23, 2002.[11]
Aggrieved by the order of the pairing judge, the spouses
Limso immediately filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 24,
2002. Judge Layague, Pesayco alleges cut short his leave and
returned to work on May 28 or 29, 2002, so that he could hear
the Motion for Reconsideration of the spouses Limso.[12]
On May 30, 2002, the lawyers and the vice-president of
PNB filed a counter bond in the amount of P100 million. On that
occasion, they were able to talk to Judge Layague, who allegedly
expressed his misgivings about the order of the pairing judge,
saying that it was full of loopholes and dealt with alien matters.
Sensing bias and partiality from the statements of Judge Layague,
PNB filed a Motion to Inhibit Judge Layague[13]. On June 24, 2002,
Judge Layague reversed the order of the pairing judge despite
the Motion to Inhibit and reinstated his previous order granting
the writ of preliminary injunction.[14]
Pesayco is of the opinion that by granting the prayer for
injunction, Judge Layague disposed of the main case [15]. She insists
that the spouses Limso are guilty of forum-shopping since the
reliefs they prayed for in Civil Case No. 29,036-2002 are the same
as those sought in Civil Case No. 28,170-2000 entitled Davao
Sunrise Investment Development Corporation v. PNB; Robert Alan
Limso is the president of the plaintiff corporation in the other
case.[16] Pesayco points out that the spouses Limso had sought the
preliminary injunction after a similar writ of preliminary injunction
issued by a different Branch of the Davao RTC (Branch 17) had
been dissolved by the Court of Appeals. She also believes that
Judge Layague was biased when he denied the Motion to
Dismiss in the same order granting the prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction without any hearing. Further, Pesayco
assails the grant of preliminary injunction by Judge Layague
because the remedy is not available in a petition for declaratory
relief.[17]
Pesayco avers that she is aware of the rule that no notice of
hearing is required when the initiatory pleading does not pray for
a temporary restraining order (TRO).[18]She adds, however, that
when the spouses Limso amended their complaint into a petition
which included an injunctive relief, Judge Layague should have
sent the records back to the Clerk of Court for raffle pursuant to
Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
which mandates that the case shall be raffled only after notice to
and in the presence of the party to be enjoined.[19]
Pesayco also alleges in her Affidavit-Complaint that in
another case before the same judge and also involving PNB,
[20]
a Motion for Reconsideration filed nearly a year earlier on June
6, 2001 by PNB had yet to be resolved, despite having been
deemed submitted for resolution when PNB filed its reply on
August 1, 2001. Pesayco points out that Judge Layague has failed
to resolve the motion within the reglementary period.[21]
In his comment to Pesaycos Affidavit-Complaint, Judge
Layague argues that PNB was not entitled to a notice of raffle
because what was initially filed was a complaint without a prayer
for a TRO.[22] Even when the complaint was amended into a
petition, Judge Layague avers that he did not serve summons on
PNB as it was not necessary adding that he had nothing to do with
the raffle of cases. What he did instead was to direct the latter to
file a comment.[23] As regards the issuance of the TRO, Judge
Layague admits erring in granting the TRO without a hearing, yet
points out that he had rescinded such order upon realizing his
mistake.
As to his issuance of the Order dated May 3, 2002, Judge
Layague contends that he granted the prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction based on jurisprudence and after a careful
consideration of the evidence of both parties.[24] He avers that he
was of the honest belief that the spouses Limso did not commit
forum-shopping since the two (2) purportedly related cases, [25] did
not involve the same issues. He denies that his order granting the
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction disposed of the main
case because notwithstanding the order, the parties would still
have to present their respective evidence on the proper
redemption period.[26]
Moreover, Judge Layague refutes the claimed that he
denied the Motion to Dismissof PNB in the same order wherein he
granted the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. He cites
his Order of May 3, 2002, noting that nowhere in the order did he
rule on the motion. He adds that the filing of the Motion to
Dismiss by PNB was not sanctioned by the rules, since the order
giving due course to the petition clearly directed PNB to file a
comment, and not a motion to dismiss. Judge Layague alleges that
he stated in open court that the motion would be treated as
affirmative defenses.[27]
Judge Layague avers that he went on leave on May 9 up to
May 28, 2002 to undergo a physical examination and possibly
prostatectomy. He denies having purposely cut short his leave so
he could hear and resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of the
spouses Limso. He claims that his absence depended on the
outcome of the medical examination.[28]
Judge Layague confirms having met with the lawyers of PNB
and its vice-president but denied saying that the order of the
pairing judge were full of loopholes and included alien matters.
Further, he avers that the denial of PNBs Motion for
Reconsideration on January 10, 2003 was done not out of
vengeance but merely for the purpose of correcting the errors
committed by the pairing judge. In fact, Judge Layague notes that
he subsequently granted PNBs Motion to Inhibit, albeit only on
January 10, 2003, or some months after Pesayco filed the instant
complaint.
Judge Layague admits the delay in resolving PNBs Motion
for Reconsideration in Civil Case No. 28, 469-2001, as he resolved
it only on January 10, 2003. He attributes the delay to his failing
health and the condition of his court docket. However, he partly
blames the counsel for PNB for not reminding him of the
pendency of the motion.[29]
In its report dated September 17, 2003, the OCA
recommends that Judge Layague be fined in the amount
of P10,000.00 for failure to apply Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure when he omitted to have the case
raffled with due notice to PNB after the complaint was amended
to include a prayer for a TRO. [30] The OCA also cites Judge Layague
for inefficiency with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely. The OCA, however, recommends the dismissal
of the other charges for being judicial in nature.[31]
Noting that most of the issues raised in the complaint
are sub judice,[32] the OCA stresses that a study of the petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 71527[33] reveals that the issues raised therein by
PNB are essentially the same as those raised in the instant
complaint. The records of the Court of Appeals show that a
decision favorable to PNB was rendered in the case on December
11, 2002 but on December 20, 2002 the spouses Limso filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which is still to be resolved. Thus,
the OCA concludes, on those matters the complaint is still
premature, and any action this Court may come out thereon may
injudiciously pre-empt whatever action the Court of Appeals may
take on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Limso.
[34]
The OCA finds Judge Layague accountable on two counts:
for failing to apply Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and for inefficiency in taking all of seventeen (17)
months to resolve PNBs Motion for Reconsideration in Civil Case
No. 28, 469-2001.
No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a
judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional
competence.[35] Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A
judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well
as with procedural rules. [36] When a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the
competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One
who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and
the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with
the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules of
procedure must be at the palm of a judges hands.
Thus, this Court has consistently held that a judge is
presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, not
to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [37] Verily,
failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and
the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no
one is excused, and surely not a judge.[38]
However, not every mistake by a judge in the application of
the law is vulnerable to an attack for gross ignorance of the law. A
caveat was laid down by this Court that for liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of
the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be
found to be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be
established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or
some other like motive.[39] Similarly, a judge will be held
administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgmentone which
is contrary to law or jurisprudence or is not supported by
evidencewhen he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other
similar motive.[40] In other words, in order to hold a judge liable for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is and that it was
made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
[41]
In fine, bad faith is the ground for liability in either or both
offenses.[42]
In the case at bar, there is dispute that PNB was not entitled
to a notice of raffle at the time the initial complaint of the spouses
Limso was filed since the same did not contain a prayer for a TRO.
However, when the complaint was amended to include such
prayer, a notice of raffle should have been sent to PNB. The OCA,
agreeing with Pesayco, submits that Judge Layagues failure to
send notice of raffle constitutes a violation of Section 4(c), Rule 58
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
Section 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction CANON 3. Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts business
or temporary restraining order. A preliminary injunction or promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
This tribunal has emphasized that judicial indolence is
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a considered gross inefficiency punishable by fine or suspension
temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any from service without pay with the gravity of the penalty
initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multi-sala court, shall be dependent on the attendant aggravating or mitigating
raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse circumstances.[43] Judge Layague ascribes the delay in the
party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall resolution of the motion to his ailing health and caseload. But this
be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of Court has ruled that if the caseload of the judge or any other
summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory circumstance prevents the disposition of cases within the
pleading and the applicants affidavit and bond, upon the adverse prescribed period, he should ask for a reasonable extension of
party in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) time from the Supreme Court, so as to avoid or dispel any
suspicion that something sinister or corrupt is going on.
.
[44]
In Golangco v. Judge Villanueva,[45] we held that the mandate to
promptly dispose of cases or matters applies also to motions or
interlocutory matters or incidents pending before a magistrate.
The OCA notes that to allow otherwise would lead to easy
Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a
circumvention of the rules by filing first a complaint without any
violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross
prayer for a TRO, and amending such complaint only after the case
inefficiency that warrants the imposition of an administrative
had been raffled off to include a prayer for the issuance of a TRO,
sanction against the defaulting magistrate.
thus effectively evading the requirement of notice to the adverse
party, as well as depriving such party the opportunity to witness
the raffle of the case. These concerns are quite valid, yet must be It must be noted that the delay for which Judge Layague is
qualified by the following observations. being found liable pertains to only one pleading filed. This
circumstance certainly does not extenuate Judge Layague from
sanction, yet may serve to reduce his penalty. A fine of Five
There is no rule of procedure that authorizes the re-raffling
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) is appropriate under the
of a case by reason of an amendment of a complaint to include a
circumstances.
prayer for preliminary injunction or a TRO. Neither has there been
jurisprudence holding that such re-raffling should be done. It
would thus be absurd to require the sending out of notices for a WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, we find
non-existent raffle. On this point, Judge Layague could not be Judge Layague guilty of INEFFICIENCY and fine him in the amount
taken to task for not applying Section 4(c) of Rule 58 simply of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with a warning that a
because there is no indubitable or settled guidepost that the similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
procedure should be observed in the situation in point.
SO ORDERED.
The concerns of the OCA are understandable, and it may
well be observed that the spouses Limso have come across a
loophole to Rule 58. Yet we are mindful that the issue we are
resolving is whether Judge Layague betrayed gross ignorance of
the law in not applying Section 4(c), Rule 58. Considering that the
notice/raffle requirement in relation to a complaint amended to
include a prayer for TRO is a gray area which has yet to be clarified
by the Court, we could not blame Judge Layague for retaining his
assignment absent any express command in law or jurisprudence
for him to abdicate it. Besides, such action is hardly indicative of
any bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive which
characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the law.

However, we agree with the OCA that Judge Layague is

guilty of Inefficiency. By his own admission, it took seventeen (17)
months to resolve the Motion for Reconsiderationfiled by PNB in
Civil Case No. 28, 469-2001. Moreover, Judge Layague resolved
the motion for reconsideration only after the filing of the instant
complaint, leading one to wonder whether such resolution would
have been further delayed had Pesayco not lodged the case
against him. This is a blatant transgression of the rule that judges
should dispose of the case with promptitude for the same is not
only an ethical issue but a constitutional right of the litigants as
well. In fact, the Code of Judicial Conduct enshrined in its pages
the significance of this obligation on the part of the magistrates:

CANON 1. Rule 1.02. - A Judge should administer justice

impartially and without delay.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255 January 17, 2011 Due to these acts of respondent judge, complainants filed a
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3335-RTJ) motion for inhibition5 from further hearing the case, since they
perceive that respondent judge was bereft of the cold neutrality of
SPOUSES DEMOCRITO AND OLIVIA LAGO, Complainants, an impartial judge. The motion was denied by respondent judge in
vs. his Resolution6 dated October 28, 2009. Complainants thus
JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, consider respondent judges non-inhibition as violative of the
BRANCH 43, GINGOOG CITY, Respondent. Code of Judicial Conduct, as it denied them due process and equal
protection of the law.
DECISION
On November 11, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order 7 upon
Obicos motion, directing the reduction of the bond from
NACHURA, J.:
100,000.00 to 50,000.00.

The case arose from an amended complaint 1 dated December 29,

Complainants then filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance Further
2009, filed by Spouses Democrito C. Lago and Olivia R. Lago
Proceedings8 on the ground of the pendency of their appeal
(complainants), charging Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. (respondent
before the Supreme Court of the Order denying the motion for
judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Gingoog City,
inhibition. However, at the December 15, 2009 setting for pre-trial
with acts and omissions violative of the Standards of Conduct
of the civil case, respondent judge issued an Order9 denying the
Prescribed for Judges by Law, the Rules of Court, and the Code of
motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings. Respondent
Judicial Conduct.
judge also allowed Obico to present evidence ex parte on January
26, 2010 for failure of complainants to appear during the pre-
Complainants were the defendants in a civil action for Preliminary trial.10
Injunction, Easement of Road Right of Way, and Attorneys Fees,
with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), filed on July
In his Comment11 dated February 11, 2010, respondent judge
2, 2009 by Christina M. Obico (Obico) before the RTC, Gingoog
clarifies that, as of the time of the filing of the civil complaint,
City, Misamis Oriental, and docketed as Civil Case No. 2009-905.
Branches 27 and 43 of the RTC, Gingoog City, had no regular
The action was spawned by the alleged threats of complainants to
presiding judges. Branch 27 was temporarily presided over by
close the access road leading to Obicos property, where the
Judge Rustico Paderanga, the regular presiding judge of RTC,
latters milkfish (bangus) farm is located. Obico claimed that, if the
Camiguin Province, while Branch 43 was presided over by
access road leading to her property was closed, she would be
respondent judge, who is the regular judge of RTC, Branch 4,
prevented from harvesting her milkfish, causing massive fish kills,
Butuan City.
and leading to heavy financial losses on her part.

Respondent judge claims that he had faithfully observed the

Complainants assert that the civil complaint was never raffled, and
provisions of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, with respect to Civil
that no notice of raffle was ever served upon them, yet the case
Case No. 2009-905. He explains that, as the acting executive judge
went directly to Branch 43, where respondent judge is the acting
of RTC, Gingoog City, he took cognizance of the civil case,
presiding judge. He is also the acting executive judge of RTC,
convinced that it had to be acted upon immediately. Thus, the
Gingoog City. Complainants claim that this is violative of Section
issuance of the 72-hour TRO on July 7, 2009 was by virtue of his
4(c), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
sound discretion based on the civil complaint and its annexes.

On July 7, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order 2 directing the

Respondent judge said that he explained in his July 14, 2009 Order
issuance of a TRO "effective seventy two (72) hours from date of
that he extended the 72-hour TRO to 20 days in this wise
issue," without requiring Obico to put up a bond. Complainants
allege that at that time, they were not yet in receipt of the
summons and copy of the complaint, as well as Obicos affidavit Considering that the TRO previously granted was only for seventy-
and bond. Complainants claim that this is violative of Section 4(c) two hours, the same can be extended for another period provided
and (d) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. that the total period should not exceed twenty days. In order to
prevent plaintiff from incurring serious damage and heavy
financial losses on her part, this court is inclined to grant the
On July 14, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order3 extending
extension of the Temporary Restraining Order for another period
the 72-hour TRO, which had already expired, "for another period
not exceeding twenty (20) days inclusive of the seventy two (72)
provided that the total period should not exceed twenty days."
hour period already granted previously by this court.12
Again, respondent judge failed to require Obico to put up a bond
even as complainants assert that it is already of judicial notice that
a TRO under the amended new rules has been elevated to the With respect to the July 14, 2009 hearing for the TRO, respondent
level of an injunction. judge claims that it was justified since he, as a mere acting
presiding (and executive) judge of RTC, Gingoog City, conducts
hearings in that sala only on Tuesdays and Wednesdays because
In his Resolution4 dated August 11, 2009, respondent judge
he has to travel about 144 kilometers from Butuan City, where he
ordered, among others, the issuance of the writ of preliminary
is actually stationed. In the same July 14, 2009 Order, respondent
injunction conditioned upon the application of a bond by Obico in
judge asserts that the conduct of the summary hearings on days
the amount of 100,000.00. Complainants argue, however, that
other than Tuesdays and Wednesdays would cause undue
said directive was violative of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
prejudice to the other cases already scheduled way ahead of the
Court since they were not required "to show cause, at a specific
subject civil action, thus, the sheer improbability of being
time and place, why the injunction should not be granted."
accommodated.
Respondent judge asseverates that the writ of injunction was
issued only after a serious consideration of all the factual and legal
circumstances of the case. On the other hand, he insists that the
denial of the motion for inhibition was due to its lack of factual
and legal basis.
After due investigation of this administrative case, the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) issued its Report dated September
13, 2010, recommending that this case be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter, and, based on its finding that
respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and rules of
procedure, recommended that he be meted a fine in the amount
of 25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or any similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
The OCA found respondent judge to have been grossly and
deliberately ignorant of the law and procedure for violation of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, specifically by means of the
following acts: (1) when the civil complaint with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO was filed on July 2, 2009, respondent judge
assumed jurisdiction thereon and, without the mandated raffle
and notification and service of summons to the adverse party,
issued a 72-hour TRO on July 7, 2009; (2) when respondent judge
set the case for summary hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to
determine whether the TRO could be extended for another
period, when the hearing should be set within 72 hours from the
issuance of the TRO; (3) when he eventually granted an extension
of an already expired TRO to a full 20-day period; and (4) when he
issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Obico without
prior notice to herein complainants and without the required
hearing.
We find the recommendations of the OCA to be well-taken.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on preliminary
injunction, pertinent to this case, provide
SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order.A preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is
verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files
with the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the
effect that the applicant will pay such party or person
all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court
should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond,
a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order is included
in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if
filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after
notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or
the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice
shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied
by service of summons, together with a copy of the
complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicants
affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the
Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served
personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a
nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or
contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order
shall thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are
heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted
within twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriffs return
of service and/or the records are received by the
branch selected by raffle and to which the records shall
be transmitted immediately.
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception.No preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court
to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only
for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within
the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person
to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted. The court shall also determine, within the
same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the
matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-
sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue
ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-
two (72) hours from issuance, but shall immediately comply with
the provisions of the next preceding section as to the service of
summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter,
within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before
whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to
determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be
extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including
the original seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is
denied or not resolved within the said period, the temporary
restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity
of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of
any judicial declaration to that effect, and no court shall have
authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for
which it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof,
the temporary restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60)
days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A
restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member
thereof shall be effective until further orders.
The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the
Court of Tax Appeals that issued a writ of preliminary injunction
against a lower court, board, officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall
decide the main case or petition within six (6) months from the
issuance of the writ.13
Culled from the foregoing provisions, particularly with respect to
the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, it is clear that, on the matter of the issuance of an ex
parte 72-hour TRO, an executive judge of a multiple-sala court
(applicable to respondent judge), or the presiding judge of a
single-sala court, is empowered to issue the same in matters of
extreme emergency, in order to prevent grave injustice and
irreparable injury to the applicant. However, it is also an
unequivocal provision that, after the issuance of the 72-hour TRO,
the executive judge of a multiple-sala court is bound to comply
with Section 4(c) of the same rule with respect to the service of
summons and the documents to be served therewith.
The records of this case clearly show that respondent judge failed
to cause the raffle of Civil Case No. 2009-905, since RTC, Gingoog
City, is a multiple-sala court, or to cause the notification and
service of summons to complainants after he issued the 72-hour
TRO. Respondent judges July 7, 2009 Order was explicit when the
civil case was set for summary hearing on July 14, 2009,
purportedly to determine whether or not the TRO issued could be
extended for another period. Thus, it is manifest that respondent
judge had directly assumed jurisdiction over the civil action and all
together disregarded the mandatory requirements of Section 4(c),
Rule 58, relative to the raffle in the presence of the parties, and
service of summons. This is gross error.
Even assuming that there was a valid raffle to RTC, Branch 43,
Gingoog City, where respondent judge acts as the presiding
magistrate, the supposed extreme urgency of the issuance of the
72-hour TRO was belied by his setting of the required summary
hearing for the determination of the necessity of extending the
72-hour TRO to 20 days, one week after the issuance thereof.
Indeed, Section 5, Rule 58 is explicit that such summary hearing
must be conducted within the said 72-hour period.
Notwithstanding the explanation of respondent judge that he
could not set the required summary hearing except on Tuesdays
and Wednesdays, it should be noted that July 7, 2009, the date of
the issuance of the 72-hour TRO, was a Tuesday, yet respondent
judge could have set the summary hearing on July 8, 2009, a
Wednesday. He failed to do so on the mistaken notion that, aside
from his alleged hectic schedule, he could, at any time, extend the
72-hour TRO for another period as long as the total period did not
exceed 20 days.
What is more appalling is that respondent judge extended the 72-
hour TRO, which had already and obviously expired, into a full 20-
day TRO. An already expired TRO can no longer be extended.
Respondent judge should have known that the TRO he issued in
his capacity as an acting executive judge was valid for only 72
hours. Beyond such time, the TRO automatically expires, unless,
before the expiration of the said period, he, supposedly in his
capacity as presiding judge to whom the case was raffled,
conducted the required summary hearing in order to extend the
TROs lifetime. Indubitably, a 72-hour TRO, issued by an executive
judge, is a separate and distinct TRO which can stand on its own,
regardless of whether it is eventually extended or not. It is not, as
respondent judge attempts to impress upon us, a mere part of the
20-day TRO issued by a presiding judge to whom the case is
raffled.
Moreover, respondent judge committed another blunder when he
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction without
the required hearing and without prior notice to the defendants,
herein complainants. The records plainly disclose that the only
hearing conducted prior to the August 11, 2009 Resolution
granting the preliminary injunction was the July 14, 2009
summary hearing for the extension of the 72-hour TRO. This could
be gathered from the August 11, 2009 Resolution, wherein
respondent judge declared
During the hearing for the determination of the propriety (sic) the
Temporary Restraining Order should be extended or whether the
Writ of Injunction be granted, the plaintiff presented Christina M.
Obico, who in essence testified that she operated fish cages at
Gingoog Bay. x x x.14
Again, Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and comprehensive
hearing for the determination of the propriety of the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, separate from the summary hearing
for the extension of the 72-hour TRO. The preliminary injunction
prayed for by the applicant can only be heard after the trial court
has ordered the issuance of the usual 20-day TRO. Within that
period of 20 days, the court shall order the party sought to be
enjoined to show cause at a specified time and place why the
injunction should not be granted. During that same period, the
court shall also determine the propriety of granting the
preliminary injunction and then issue the corresponding order to
that effect. In the case of respondent judge, he gravely failed to
comply with what the rule requires, i.e., to give complainants the
opportunity to comment or object, through a full-blown hearing,
to the writ of injunction prayed for. Instead, respondent judge
railroaded the entire process by treating the summary hearing for
the extension of the TRO as the very same hearing required for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.1avvphi1
Verily, the absence of the hearing required by the Rules of Court is
downright reprehensible and, thus, should not be countenanced.
The requirement of a hearing is so fundamental that failure to
comply with it not only amounts to gross ignorance of rules and
procedure, but also to an outright denial of due process to the
party denied such a hearing. Undoubtedly, the acts and omissions
of respondent judge warrant sanction from this Court.
Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or
of the rules, and that, when committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or
the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one
does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who
accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the
court proficiency in the law, and the duty to maintain professional
competence at all times. When a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in
the courts. A judge is expected to keep abreast of the
developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the
mainspring of injustice.15
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.
However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in gross violation
of clearly established law or procedure, which every judge must
be familiar with. Every magistrate presiding over a court of law
must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands and maintain
professional competence at all times.16
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance
of the law or procedure as a serious offense for which the
imposable sanction ranges from dismissal from the service to
suspension from office, and a fine of more than 20,000.00 but
not exceeding 40,000.00. Under the premises, this Court finds it
appropriate to impose on respondent judge the penalty of a fine
in the amount of 25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43, Gingoog City, is found liable for Gross Ignorance
of the Law and Procedure, and is hereby meted a fine of
25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same, or
any similar infraction in the future, shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED
[A.M. No. RTJ-05-1904. February 18, 2005]
BAGONG WEST KABULUSAN 1 NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION,
INC. REPRESENTED BY ITS ACTING PRESIDENT
WENEFREDO S. QUEDOR complainant, vs. JUDGE
ALBERTO L. LERMA respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Judge Alberto L. Lerma, Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa, stands charged in a
complaint[1] dated September 21, 2001 filed by the Bagong West
Kabulusan Neighborhood Association, Inc. (the Association) for
falsification of court records, gross violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross ignorance of the law
with manifest bias and partiality.
The facts which spawned the filing of the complaint are as
follows:
CST Enterprises, Inc. filed before the Muntinlupa
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) thirty eight (38)
complaints for ejectment against 39 individuals[2] (the defendants)
who were occupying lots located at West Kabulusan, Barangay
Cupang, Muntinlupa City and covered by TCT Nos. 124275 and
157581 (the lots). The cases, which were raffled to Branch 80 of
the MeTC, were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715.
Branch 80 of the Muntinlupa MeTC, by decision of March
17, 2000, rendered judgment in favor of CST Enterprises, Inc.,
ordering the defendants to vacate the lots and surrender
possession thereof to CST Enterprises, Inc. [3] The judgment
became final and executory following which writs of execution
were issued and served on the defendants on June 14, 2000.[4]
It appears that the defendants refused to vacate the lots.
Thus, by Order of November 8, 2000, the MeTC directed the
defendants to demolish their respective structures within 5 days
from notice thereof.[5] A writ of demolition[6] dated November 9,
2000 was accordingly issued directing the sheriff to remove and
demolish the houses and improvements introduced by the
defendants on the lots.
On December 11, 2000, the Association, claiming to
represent the underprivileged and homeless residents of the
lots, but without naming the defendants in Civil Case Nos. 4678-
4715, filed a Complaint against MeTC Sheriff Armando M.
Camacho, for Injunctionwith Very Urgent Petition for the Issuance
of Restraining Order to Preserve and Maintain the Status Quo,
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-233. [7]
The Complaint for injunction alleged that under R.A. No.
7279 (URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING ACT OF 1992), it is
mandatory that before demolition or eviction can be effected,
adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent, be
undertaken by the City of Muntinlupa and the National Housing
Authority with the assistance of other concerned government
agencies.[8] It thus prayed that service of the notice to vacate and
demolish be held in abeyance until the provisions of R.A. 7279
have been complied with and that, in the meantime, a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) be issued to preserve and maintain the
status quo.[9]
 On motion of the Association, a special raffle of Civil Case
No. 00-233 was set on December 15, 2000.[10]
Meanwhile, in a petition filed by the defendants before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61991, assailing
among other things, the MeTC judgment in the ejectment
cases which was sought to be annulled, the appellate court, by
Resolution of December 12, 2000, issued a TRO enjoining the
enforcement of the writ of demolition.[11]
The Associations complaint for injunction in Civil Case No.
00-233 was raffled to Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC presided
by respondent, Judge Alberto Lerma. Summons dated January 2,
2001 was thereafter issued to Sheriff Camacho requiring him to
enter his appearance and answer the Associations petition within
15 days from service thereof, which summons was served on him
on January 15, 2001.[12]
Notice dated January 8, 2001 setting for hearing on January
17, 2001 the Associations prayer for a TRO was issued. [13] The
notice addressed to Sheriff Camacho was, however, served on him
the day after the hearing or on January 18, 2001. [14] As he was not
present during the hearing, respondent, on motion of the
Association, considered the matter of the issuance of TRO
submitted for resolution.[15]
By Order[16] of February 5, 2001, respondent denied the
Associations prayer for a TRO, he finding that no great or
irreparable injury would result if a TRO is not issued immediately.
Copies of this order were sent to the parties by registered mail on
February 16, 2001.[17] In the meantime, notice of hearing of the
application for Preliminary Injunction on March 9, 2001 was
issued.
On February 21, 2001, the Association filed a Motion to
Resolve the Pending Incident of Temporary Restraining Order with
Motion to Declare the Defendant in Default which was set by the
movant for hearing on February 28, 2001. [18] By Order of February
28, 2001, upon motion of the Association, the Motion to Resolve
Temporary Restraining Order and to Declare Defendant in default
was submitted for resolution.[19]
During the hearing of the application for the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction on March 9, 2001, respondent
noted Sheriff Camachos absence.
The Association later filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
respondents Order of February 5, 2001 (denying the Motion for
the issuance of a TRO) which was denied by Order of March 13,
2001.[20]
Meanwhile, due to procedural infirmities and for lack of
merit, the Court of Appeals, by Resolution of March 19, 2001,
dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 61991.[21]
On motion of the Association, the hearing of the main case
for injunction in Civil Case No. 00-233 was set for hearing on April
19, 2001[22] during which the defendant sheriff again failed to
show up. The hearing was thus reset[23] to June 22, 2001 during
which respondent, on motion of the Association, declared its
Motion to Declare Defendant in Default submitted for resolution.
[24]
On September 14, 2001, the Association filed a Very Urgent
Motion to Resolve Complaint for Injunction, setting the motion for
hearing on September 17, 2001.[25] The Association was later to
allege in its present complaint that the staff of respondent refused
to set the said motion for hearing.[26]
Alleging that respondent, with manifest bias and partiality
and with gross ignorance of R.A. 7279 and gross neglect of duty,
deliberately delayed the resolution of [Civil Case No. 00-233] in
order for . . . [Sheriff] Camacho [to] EFFECT THE DEMOLITION
before the resolution of [said] case so that [it] will be rendered
moot and academic,[27] the Association, through its Acting
President, Wenefredo S. Quedor, filed on September 24, 2001 the
present complaint against respondent before the Office of the
Court Administrator.
In the affidavit of the Acting President of the Association
(hereinafter referred to as complainant), it is averred that
respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
20-95 requiring him to act on the application for a TRO after all
parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within 24 hours
after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle,
he having set for hearing the prayer for TRO only on January 17,
2001 or 33 days after the complaint was raffled to his sala.[28]
It is further averred in the said affidavit that respondent
maliciously and unlawfully falsified court records by making it
appear that he already resolved the pending incident re the
application for the issuance of a TRO by issuing the Order of
February 5, 2001 when in fact the Motion to Resolve the
application was not yet resolved when it was heard on February
28, 2001.[29]
Respondent, in his Comments[30] dated November 29, 2001,
claimed that several actions were instituted by complainant
and/or the defendants to stop at all cost the enforcement and
implementation of the decision rendered by the MeTC in Civil
Case Nos. 4678-4715;[31] that on August 23, 2000, before the filing
of Civil Case No. 00-233, he dismissed a petition of the defendants
against the MeTC Branch 80 judge, for Certiorari and Prohibition
or Annulment of Judgment in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715 with
prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as SP Civil Case
No. 00-085, and denied their motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal;[32] that the defendants elevated the case on December
4, 2000 to the Court of Appeals via petition for annulment of
judgment with injunction and very urgent motion for the issuance
of a restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 61991) [33] challenging (1) the
MeTC Decision dated March 17, 2000 in Civil Case Nos. 4678-
4715; (2) the RTC Order dated August 23, 2000 dismissing on
motion of CST Enterprises, Inc. the petition for certiorari in
S.P. Civil Case No. 00-085; (3) the RTC Order dated October 18,
2000 in S.P. Civil Case No. 00-085 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the defendants; (4) the MeTC Order dated
November 8, 2000 in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715 granting the
motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition; (5) the MeTC Writ
of Demolition dated November 9, 2000 in Civil Case Nos. 4678-
4715; and (6) the Notice to Vacate and Demolish dated
November 20, 2000 issued by MeTC Sheriff Camacho in Civil Case
Nos. 4678-4715.
Respondent further claimed
that a week after the defendants filed their petitionbefore the app
ellate court or on December 11, 2000, complainant again filed the
Complaint for Injunction with Very Urgent Petition for the
Issuance of Restraining Order to Preserve and Maintain the Status
Quo (Civil Case No. 00-233); that on December 12, 2000, the
Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 61991 a Resolution
enjoining the enforcement of the writ of demolition for a period
of 60 days from the date of its issuance, or until February 10,
2001[34] on account of which the Notice to Vacate and Demolish
dated November 20, 2000, all addressed to the defendants, was
temporarily suspended.[35]
Respondent furthermore alleged that on August 27,
2001, five months after the Courtof Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP
No. 61991, complainant filed a motion to suspendproceedings in C
ivil Case Nos. 4678-4715 before Branch 80 of the MeTC for the
same purpose, that is, to hold in abeyance the enforcement of the
notice to vacate and demolish dated November 20, 2000; [36] that
again, on September 24, 2001, the same daycomplainant filed the
present administrative case against him and while the motion tosu
spend proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715 remained pendin
g, the defendantsfiled before the RTC a complaint, docketed as Civ
il Case No. 01-268, for illegaleviction/demolition, loss of property
and damages, injunction and temporary restrainingorder, relocati
on/restitution/benefits with prayer for lis pendens, which was
raffled and assigned to Branch 276, presided by Judge N.C. Parello,
again praying, among other things, to restrain Sheriff Camacho
from enforcing the notice to vacate and demolish; [37]and that the
motion to suspend proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715 was
denied on November 9, 2001.[38]
In the main,
respondent stressed that all these cases filed after a
writ of demolitionwas issued by the MeTC were filed for the purpo
se of restraining the sheriff fromenforcing the notices to vacate an
d demolish, in violation of the rule against forum-shopping under
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, they
involving the same parties, causes of action, and reliefs.[39]
Respondent went on to stress that all his actions and
findings in Civil Case No. 00-233 were in accordance with the
Rules and the Canons on Judicial Ethics, with cold judicial
impartiality, and with no other objective but to uphold the rule
and majesty of the law.[40]
In its memorandum[41] of August 18, 2003, the OCA opines
that respondent should not have deferred the resolution of the
pending incidents lest he be accused of delay. And it finds that
respondent offered no explanation why the order denying
complainants application for a TRO is dated February 5, 2001
when the hearing thereon occurred on February 28, 2001.[42]
To recall, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61991,
issued a Resolution on December 12, 2000 a day after Civil Case
No. 00-233 (which also prayed for a TRO) was filed on December
11, 2000, enjoining the enforcement of the writ of demolition
against the defendants for a period of 60 days or until February
10, 2001. As respondent was one of the respondents in said CA-
G.R. SP No. 61991, his Order dismissing SP Civil Case No. 00-085
being among those challenged in said case, it is assumed that he
was served a copy of said Resolution.
Consequently, when Civil Case No. 00-233 was raffled to
respondents sala on December 15, 2000, complainants prayer for
a TRO had been rendered moot, such relief having been already
afforded the defendants by the appellate court in its Resolution of
December 12, 2000. To further act on the therein petitioners
prayer for a TRO would thus serve no useful purpose, that is, if
respondent was actually notified of the TRO issued by the
appellate court.
Assuming arguendo that, as respondent alleged,
complainant was guilty of forum shopping, respondent should
have dismissed Civil Case No. 00-233 in accordance with Rule 7,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court.[43]
It would appear though that, to avert the possibility of
complainants Complaint in Civil Case No. 00-233 being dismissed
on the ground of forum shopping, it made it appear that the
parties therein and in CA-G.R. SP No. 61991 are not one and the
same.
A perusal of the allegations embodied in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 00-233 shows, however, that the Association-herein
complainant actually represented the defendants- petitioners in
CA-G.R. SP No. 61991:
Under date of November 17, 1999, CST Enterprises Inc. filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City presided by Hon.
Noli C. Diaz 39 (sic) ejectment cases against herein plaintiffsand
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 4678 to 4715 xxx.[44]
If indeed the Association-herein complainant represented
the underprivileged and homeless citizens of West Kabulusan,
Brgy. Cupang in Civil Case No. 00-233, it failed to comply with the
requirements set forth under Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court[45]that when an action is prosecuted by a representative, the
beneficiaries shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed as the real parties in interest. On that score alone, the
complaint could have been dismissed for lack of cause [46] under
Sec. 1(d) of Rule 16.
More. In the complaint in Civil Case No. 00-233,
complainant did not implead the Presiding Judge of Branch 80 of
the MeTC who issued the writ of demolition dated November 9,
2000 and CST Enterprises Inc. which stood to be adversely
affected in case a TRO was issued by respondent. On the other
hand, the duty of Sheriff Camacho, who was the sole defendant in
the said case, to execute the writ of demolition was purely
ministerial. In the absence of a directive to the contrary, he was
expected to proceed with reasonable promptness to implement
the writ according to its mandate.
Complainant faults respondent for violating Supreme Court
Administrative Circular 20-95 for failure to call for a hearing on its
application for a TRO within 24 hours after the case had been
raffled to his sala on December 15, 2001, he having set the same
for hearing only on January 17, 2000. Upon the assumption that
the appellate courts Resolution granting a TRO had not yet come
to the notice of respondent at the time Civil Case No. 00-233 was
raffled to him, what is mandatory in the circular is the giving of
notice and opportunity for the adverse party to be heard and
interpose objections in a summary hearing, before a prayer for a
TRO is acted upon. The period within which to conduct a summary
hearing is not 24 hours after the case has been raffled but 24
hours after the records are transmitted to the branch to which it is
raffled.
Pertinent paragraphs of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 20-95 are quoted hereunder:
 1. Where an application for temporary restraining
order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction is
included in a complaint or any initiatory
pleading filed with the trial court, such
complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffled
only after notice to the adverse party and in the
presence of such party or counsel.
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted
upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing conducted within twenty-four
(24) hours after the records are transmitted to
the branch selected by raffle. The records shall
be transmitted immediately after raffle.
It is thus possible that when complainant filed on February
21, 2001, its Motion to Resolve the Pending Incident of Temporary
Restraining Order with Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default, the hearing of which motion was set by complainant-
movant on February 28, 2001, complainant had not yet received
the February 5, 2001 Order of the Court.
Respecting the charge that respondent exhibited gross
ignorance of the provisions of R.A. 7279 with manifest bias and
partiality, such allegation remains unsubstantiated.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, for insufficiency of evidence,
the administrative complaint against respondent is hereby
DISMISSED.

xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
This circular is now incorporated in the present Rules of
Court as Rule 58, Section 4 as follows:

SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or

restraining order. - A preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order may be granted only when:

xxx

(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a

temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multi-sala court, shall be
raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse
party or the person sought to be enjoined. In any event, such
notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by
service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or
initiatory pleading and the applicants affidavit and bond, upon the
adverse party in the Philippines.

xxx

(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall

thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty four
(24) hours after the sheriffs return of service and/or records are
received by the branch selected by raffle and to which the records
shall be transmitted immediately. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the circular and the Rules of Court seek to minimize

the ex-parte,[47]precipitate and improvident issuance of TROs.[48]

Again, granting arguendo that respondent may have erred

in not taking a more suitable course of action, given the
circumstances surrounding the case, not to mention the palpable
intent of the defendants to trifle with judicial processes, any lapse
on his part can be seen as mere error of judgment, of which he
may not be held administratively liable in the absence of a
showing of bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose.[49]

As for complainants imputation to respondent of

falsification of court records by making it appear that he already
resolved the application for the issuance of a TRO as early as
February 5, 2001 when the application was yet to be heard on
February 28, 2001: The records before this Court disclose that the
February 5, 2001 Order denying complainants prayer for a TRO
was sent to the parties by registered mail on February 16, 2001.[50]
SECTION 5
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1453. April 29, 2003]
EDITHA PALMA GIL, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO H.
LOPEZ, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Lupon, Davao
Oriental, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
A magistrate should dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Delay in
the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the
public in the institution of justice, lowers its standards and brings
them into disrepute.Every judge must cultivate a capacity for quick
decision; he must not delay the judgment which a party justly
deserves. The public trust reposed in a judges office imposes upon
him the highest degree of responsibility to promptly administer
justice.[1]
In an Affidavit-Complaint[2] dated October 30, 2001,
complainant Editha Palma Gil charged respondent Judge Francisco
H. Lopez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lupon, Davao
Oriental, with Manifest Bias and Partiality, Undue Delay in the
Disposition of Case and Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant alleged that she is the defendant in Civil Case
No. 1110 for Forcible Entry and Damages with Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction, entitled Carlos Palen, Sr.,
Plaintiff versus Editha Palma Gil, Defendant, pending before the
sala of respondent judge; and that respondent failed to render
judgment therein within the thirty-day period required by Rule 70,
Section 11 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure.She further averred
that on October 9, 2001, the plaintiff in the said case filed a
motion for temporary restraining order, which respondent Judge
granted on the same day, despite procedural defects therein such
as the lack of a verification, bond, and service of summons, all in
violation of Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.Complainant further assails the manner in which the
temporary restraining order was implemented with the assistance
of policemen.
In his Comment dated March 1, 2002, respondent judge
denied that there was a deliberate and unreasonable delay in the
resolution of Civil Case No. 1110. He alleged that aside from his
court, he had to hear the cases in the municipal courts in
Governor Generoso and San Isidro, Davao Oriental due to the
inhibition of the presiding judges therein. Moreover, he alleged
that the legal and factual issues raised in Civil Case No. 1110 are
complicated. Anent the alleged issuance of a temporary
restraining order, respondent claims that what he issued was
a status quo order because complainants men entered the land in
dispute and attempted to prevent the harvesting of palay by
plaintiff. Finally, respondent states that he had to seek the
assistance of the police to implement the order because his court
had no regular sheriff and because there were armed guards
employed by both parties. [3]
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 14, 2002,
[4]
both parties manifested their willingness to submit the case on
the basis of the pleadings filed.[5]
After evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) found respondent guilty of delay in the rendition of
judgment in Civil Case No. 1110 and erred in issuing a temporary
restraining order despite procedural defects. Hence, it
recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
We agree with the findings of the OCA, however, we find
the recommended penalty to be not commensurate with the
gravity of respondents misdeeds.
The reasons proffered by respondent judge, i.e., that he
had to hear cases in the other courts, will not excuse his delay in
deciding Civil Case No. 1110. [6] If he felt that he could not decide
the case within the reglementary period, he should have asked for
a reasonable extension of time to decide the same.[7]
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote
the ends of justice by administering it speedily and impartially. The
judge as the person presiding over that court is the visible
representation of the law and justice.[8] Failure to resolve cases
submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a
serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a
speedy disposition of their cases.[9]
Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct state:
Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially
and without delay. (Emphasis ours)
Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 provides:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by
Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication
and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their
courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved
within twelve months from date of submission by all lower
collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of
three months to do so. . . (Emphasis ours)
Along the same vein, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88
states:
6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act
promptly on all motions and interlocutory
matters pending before their courts. x x x.
Considering the summary nature of Civil Case No. 1110,
which is an action for forcible entry, Rule 70, Section 11 of the
1997 Rules of Summary Procedure expressly provides:
Period for rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of
the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain
material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order
specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to
submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten
(10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered
within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the last affidavit or the
expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain
time for the rendition of judgment. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, respondent judge is guilty of gross inefficiency for his
failure to resolve and dispose of Civil Case No. 1110 within the
period prescribed by the Rules. The penalty for gross inefficiency
ranges from reprimand and admonition[10] to removal from
office[11]and/or a fine.[12]
Respondent judge likewise erred in issuing the temporary
restraining order. Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order. A preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified and
shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the
court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed
to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the
court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or
person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should
finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction
shall be issued.
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a
temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court shall
be raffled to only after notice to and in the presence of the
adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such
notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied by
service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or
initiatory pleading and the applicants affidavit and bond, upon the
adverse party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served personally or
by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party
is a resident of the Philippines, temporarily absent therefrom or is
a nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior contemporaneous
service of summons shall not apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall
thereafter be acted upon only after all the parties are heard in a
summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty-four
(24) hours after the sheriffs return of service and/or the records
are received by the branch selected by raffle to which the records
shall be transmitted immediately.
The records reveal that the motion for temporary
restraining order was not verified. [13]Respondent judge issued the
Order on the same date when the motion was filed without prior
notice to the complainant and without a hearing.
The issuance of the assailed Order cannot be justified under
Rule 58, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
reads:
Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior
notice to the person or party sought to be enjoined. If it shall
appear from the facts shown by the affidavits of by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to
which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said
twenty-day period, the court must order said party of person to
show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether
or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted and accordingly
issued the corresponding order.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections,
if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only
seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately
comply with provisions of the next preceding section as to
service of summons and the documents to be served therewith.
Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge
before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary
hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order
shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction
can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including
the original seventy-two (72) hours provided therein. (Emphasis
and italics ours)
Aside from the lack of verification of the motion, no
affidavits of the applicant and his witnesses were appended
thereto. Furthermore, the assailed Order did not specify the
duration of the temporary restraining order.
Respondent argues that considering that the complaint in
Civil Case No. 1110 was verified and prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary and prohibitory injunction, the verification of the
motion for issuance of temporary restraining order may be
dispensed with. We do not agree.
The Rules as above-quoted explicitly mandate that the
application for injunction should be verified. While litigation is not
a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly
administration of justice.[14]
We see nothing wrong in respondents act of securing the
assistance of the police in implementing his Order. Administrative
Circular No. 12-85, paragraph 7 allows a judge to designate or
deputize any person to serve court processes and writs in remote
areas in the absence of the regular sheriff thereat.
Furthermore, the better part of prudence, caution and plain
conventional wisdom dictates the presence of the police on
account of the potentially violent situation engendered by the
presence of armed followers of the contending factions.
 Considering the seriousness of the respondent judges
offenses, stiffer penalties should be imposed to inculcate in him
the value of being proficient in both substantive and procedural
laws.
In Caas v. Castigador,[15] we held:
Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to
uphold is required of every judge.When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less
than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In
short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
In the case at bar, the ignorance of respondent judge is so
gross that he should be held administratively liable even if he
acted in good faith.[16] Hence, the imposition of a fine in the
amount of P20,000.00 is a more appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, respondent Judge
Francisco H. Lopez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lupon,
Davao Oriental, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
gross inefficiency. He is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255 January 17, 2011
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3335-RTJ)
SPOUSES DEMOCRITO AND OLIVIA LAGO, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 43, GINGOOG CITY, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The case arose from an amended complaint 1 dated December 29,
2009, filed by Spouses Democrito C. Lago and Olivia R. Lago
(complainants), charging Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. (respondent
judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Gingoog City,
with acts and omissions violative of the Standards of Conduct
Prescribed for Judges by Law, the Rules of Court, and the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Complainants were the defendants in a civil action for Preliminary
Injunction, Easement of Road Right of Way, and Attorneys Fees,
with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), filed on July
2, 2009 by Christina M. Obico (Obico) before the RTC, Gingoog
City, Misamis Oriental, and docketed as Civil Case No. 2009-905.
The action was spawned by the alleged threats of complainants to
close the access road leading to Obicos property, where the
latters milkfish (bangus) farm is located. Obico claimed that, if the
access road leading to her property was closed, she would be
prevented from harvesting her milkfish, causing massive fish kills,
and leading to heavy financial losses on her part.
Complainants assert that the civil complaint was never raffled, and
that no notice of raffle was ever served upon them, yet the case
went directly to Branch 43, where respondent judge is the acting
presiding judge. He is also the acting executive judge of RTC,
Gingoog City. Complainants claim that this is violative of Section
4(c), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
On July 7, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order 2 directing the
issuance of a TRO "effective seventy two (72) hours from date of
issue," without requiring Obico to put up a bond. Complainants
allege that at that time, they were not yet in receipt of the
summons and copy of the complaint, as well as Obicos affidavit
and bond. Complainants claim that this is violative of Section 4(c)
and (d) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
On July 14, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order3 extending
the 72-hour TRO, which had already expired, "for another period
provided that the total period should not exceed twenty days."
Again, respondent judge failed to require Obico to put up a bond
even as complainants assert that it is already of judicial notice that
a TRO under the amended new rules has been elevated to the
level of an injunction.
In his Resolution4 dated August 11, 2009, respondent judge
ordered, among others, the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction conditioned upon the application of a bond by Obico in
the amount of 100,000.00. Complainants argue, however, that
said directive was violative of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court since they were not required "to show cause, at a specific
time and place, why the injunction should not be granted."
Due to these acts of respondent judge, complainants filed a
motion for inhibition5 from further hearing the case, since they
perceive that respondent judge was bereft of the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge. The motion was denied by respondent judge in
his Resolution6 dated October 28, 2009. Complainants thus
consider respondent judges non-inhibition as violative of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, as it denied them due process and equal
protection of the law.
On November 11, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order 7 upon
Obicos motion, directing the reduction of the bond from
100,000.00 to 50,000.00.
Complainants then filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance Further
Proceedings8 on the ground of the pendency of their appeal
before the Supreme Court of the Order denying the motion for
inhibition. However, at the December 15, 2009 setting for pre-trial
of the civil case, respondent judge issued an Order9 denying the
motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings. Respondent
judge also allowed Obico to present evidence ex parte on January
26, 2010 for failure of complainants to appear during the pre-
trial.10
In his Comment11 dated February 11, 2010, respondent judge
clarifies that, as of the time of the filing of the civil complaint,
Branches 27 and 43 of the RTC, Gingoog City, had no regular
presiding judges. Branch 27 was temporarily presided over by
Judge Rustico Paderanga, the regular presiding judge of RTC,
Camiguin Province, while Branch 43 was presided over by
respondent judge, who is the regular judge of RTC, Branch 4,
Butuan City.
Respondent judge claims that he had faithfully observed the
provisions of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, with respect to Civil
Case No. 2009-905. He explains that, as the acting executive judge
of RTC, Gingoog City, he took cognizance of the civil case,
convinced that it had to be acted upon immediately. Thus, the
issuance of the 72-hour TRO on July 7, 2009 was by virtue of his
sound discretion based on the civil complaint and its annexes.
Respondent judge said that he explained in his July 14, 2009 Order
that he extended the 72-hour TRO to 20 days in this wise
Considering that the TRO previously granted was only for seventy-
two hours, the same can be extended for another period provided
that the total period should not exceed twenty days. In order to
prevent plaintiff from incurring serious damage and heavy
financial losses on her part, this court is inclined to grant the
extension of the Temporary Restraining Order for another period
not exceeding twenty (20) days inclusive of the seventy two (72)
hour period already granted previously by this court.12
With respect to the July 14, 2009 hearing for the TRO, respondent
judge claims that it was justified since he, as a mere acting
presiding (and executive) judge of RTC, Gingoog City, conducts
hearings in that sala only on Tuesdays and Wednesdays because
he has to travel about 144 kilometers from Butuan City, where he
is actually stationed. In the same July 14, 2009 Order, respondent
judge asserts that the conduct of the summary hearings on days
other than Tuesdays and Wednesdays would cause undue
prejudice to the other cases already scheduled way ahead of the
subject civil action, thus, the sheer improbability of being
accommodated.
Respondent judge asseverates that the writ of injunction was
issued only after a serious consideration of all the factual and legal
circumstances of the case. On the other hand, he insists that the
denial of the motion for inhibition was due to its lack of factual
and legal basis.
After due investigation of this administrative case, the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) issued its Report dated September
13, 2010, recommending that this case be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter, and, based on its finding that
respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and rules of
procedure, recommended that he be meted a fine in the amount
of 25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or any similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
The OCA found respondent judge to have been grossly and
deliberately ignorant of the law and procedure for violation of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, specifically by means of the
following acts: (1) when the civil complaint with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO was filed on July 2, 2009, respondent judge
assumed jurisdiction thereon and, without the mandated raffle
and notification and service of summons to the adverse party,
issued a 72-hour TRO on July 7, 2009; (2) when respondent judge
set the case for summary hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to
determine whether the TRO could be extended for another
period, when the hearing should be set within 72 hours from the
issuance of the TRO; (3) when he eventually granted an extension
of an already expired TRO to a full 20-day period; and (4) when he
issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Obico without
prior notice to herein complainants and without the required
hearing.
We find the recommendations of the OCA to be well-taken.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on preliminary
injunction, pertinent to this case, provide
SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order.A preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is
verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files
with the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the
effect that the applicant will pay such party or person
all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court
should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond,
a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order is included
in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if
filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after
notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or
the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice
shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied
by service of summons, together with a copy of the
 complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicants
affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the
Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served
personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a
nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or
contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order
shall thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are
heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted
within twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriffs return
of service and/or the records are received by the
branch selected by raffle and to which the records shall
be transmitted immediately.
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception.No preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court
to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only
for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within
the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person
to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted. The court shall also determine, within the
same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the
matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-
sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue
ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-
two (72) hours from issuance, but shall immediately comply with
the provisions of the next preceding section as to the service of
summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter,
within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before
whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to
determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be
extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including
the original seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is
denied or not resolved within the said period, the temporary
restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity
of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of
any judicial declaration to that effect, and no court shall have
authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for
which it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof,
the temporary restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60)
days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A
restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member
thereof shall be effective until further orders.
The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the
Court of Tax Appeals that issued a writ of preliminary injunction
against a lower court, board, officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall
decide the main case or petition within six (6) months from the
issuance of the writ.13
Culled from the foregoing provisions, particularly with respect to
the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, it is clear that, on the matter of the issuance of an ex
parte 72-hour TRO, an executive judge of a multiple-sala court
(applicable to respondent judge), or the presiding judge of a
single-sala court, is empowered to issue the same in matters of
extreme emergency, in order to prevent grave injustice and
irreparable injury to the applicant. However, it is also an
unequivocal provision that, after the issuance of the 72-hour TRO,
the executive judge of a multiple-sala court is bound to comply
with Section 4(c) of the same rule with respect to the service of
summons and the documents to be served therewith.
The records of this case clearly show that respondent judge failed
to cause the raffle of Civil Case No. 2009-905, since RTC, Gingoog
City, is a multiple-sala court, or to cause the notification and
service of summons to complainants after he issued the 72-hour
TRO. Respondent judges July 7, 2009 Order was explicit when the
civil case was set for summary hearing on July 14, 2009,
purportedly to determine whether or not the TRO issued could be
extended for another period. Thus, it is manifest that respondent
judge had directly assumed jurisdiction over the civil action and all
together disregarded the mandatory requirements of Section 4(c),
Rule 58, relative to the raffle in the presence of the parties, and
service of summons. This is gross error.
Even assuming that there was a valid raffle to RTC, Branch 43,
Gingoog City, where respondent judge acts as the presiding
magistrate, the supposed extreme urgency of the issuance of the
72-hour TRO was belied by his setting of the required summary
hearing for the determination of the necessity of extending the
72-hour TRO to 20 days, one week after the issuance thereof.
Indeed, Section 5, Rule 58 is explicit that such summary hearing
must be conducted within the said 72-hour period.
Notwithstanding the explanation of respondent judge that he
could not set the required summary hearing except on Tuesdays
and Wednesdays, it should be noted that July 7, 2009, the date of
the issuance of the 72-hour TRO, was a Tuesday, yet respondent
judge could have set the summary hearing on July 8, 2009, a
Wednesday. He failed to do so on the mistaken notion that, aside
from his alleged hectic schedule, he could, at any time, extend the
72-hour TRO for another period as long as the total period did not
exceed 20 days.
What is more appalling is that respondent judge extended the 72-
hour TRO, which had already and obviously expired, into a full 20-
day TRO. An already expired TRO can no longer be extended.
Respondent judge should have known that the TRO he issued in
his capacity as an acting executive judge was valid for only 72
hours. Beyond such time, the TRO automatically expires, unless,
before the expiration of the said period, he, supposedly in his
capacity as presiding judge to whom the case was raffled,
conducted the required summary hearing in order to extend the
TROs lifetime. Indubitably, a 72-hour TRO, issued by an executive
judge, is a separate and distinct TRO which can stand on its own,
regardless of whether it is eventually extended or not. It is not, as
respondent judge attempts to impress upon us, a mere part of the
20-day TRO issued by a presiding judge to whom the case is
raffled.
Moreover, respondent judge committed another blunder when he Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction without of the law or procedure as a serious offense for which the
the required hearing and without prior notice to the defendants, imposable sanction ranges from dismissal from the service to
herein complainants. The records plainly disclose that the only suspension from office, and a fine of more than 20,000.00 but
hearing conducted prior to the August 11, 2009 Resolution not exceeding 40,000.00. Under the premises, this Court finds it
granting the preliminary injunction was the July 14, 2009 appropriate to impose on respondent judge the penalty of a fine
summary hearing for the extension of the 72-hour TRO. This could in the amount of 25,000.00.
be gathered from the August 11, 2009 Resolution, wherein
respondent judge declared WHEREFORE, Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43, Gingoog City, is found liable for Gross Ignorance
During the hearing for the determination of the propriety (sic) the of the Law and Procedure, and is hereby meted a fine of
Temporary Restraining Order should be extended or whether the 25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same, or
Writ of Injunction be granted, the plaintiff presented Christina M. any similar infraction in the future, shall be dealt with more
Obico, who in essence testified that she operated fish cages at severely.
Gingoog Bay. x x x.14
SO ORDERED.
Again, Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and comprehensive
hearing for the determination of the propriety of the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, separate from the summary hearing
for the extension of the 72-hour TRO. The preliminary injunction
prayed for by the applicant can only be heard after the trial court
has ordered the issuance of the usual 20-day TRO. Within that
period of 20 days, the court shall order the party sought to be
enjoined to show cause at a specified time and place why the
injunction should not be granted. During that same period, the
court shall also determine the propriety of granting the
preliminary injunction and then issue the corresponding order to
that effect. In the case of respondent judge, he gravely failed to
comply with what the rule requires, i.e., to give complainants the
opportunity to comment or object, through a full-blown hearing,
to the writ of injunction prayed for. Instead, respondent judge
railroaded the entire process by treating the summary hearing for
the extension of the TRO as the very same hearing required for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.1avvphi1

Verily, the absence of the hearing required by the Rules of Court is

downright reprehensible and, thus, should not be countenanced.
The requirement of a hearing is so fundamental that failure to
comply with it not only amounts to gross ignorance of rules and
procedure, but also to an outright denial of due process to the
party denied such a hearing. Undoubtedly, the acts and omissions
of respondent judge warrant sanction from this Court.

Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or

of the rules, and that, when committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or
the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one
does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who
accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the
court proficiency in the law, and the duty to maintain professional
competence at all times. When a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in
the courts. A judge is expected to keep abreast of the
developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the
mainspring of injustice.15

In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a

judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.
However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in gross violation
of clearly established law or procedure, which every judge must
be familiar with. Every magistrate presiding over a court of law
must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands and maintain
professional competence at all times.16
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1901 November 30, 2006
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE, COMPANY, INC., represented by
AMBROCIA G. CANCIO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JIMMY H. F. LUCZON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Tuguegarao, Branch 1, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
For resolution is the administrative complaint filed by Fortune Life
Insurance Company, Inc. ("complainant"), through its Senior Vice-
President Ambrocia G. Cancio, against Jimmy H. F. Luczon, Jr.
("respondent Judge"), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Tuguegarao ("RTC-Tuguegarao"), Branch 1. The charges are
grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, knowingly
rendering an unjust order, and bias and partiality under Section 3,
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Complainant had sought the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
executed in its favor by Maria Victoria Realty and Development
Corporation ("MVRDC"). On 8 October 2003, however, MVRDC
filed a petition for annulment of real estate mortgage and
accounting with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order ("petition") against complainant.
The case was filed before the RTC-Tuguegarao and docketed as
Civil Case No. 6246. On the same day, RTC-Tuguegarao Executive
Judge Vilma T. Pauig ("Judge Pauig") issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining complainant and the deputy
sheriff from holding a foreclosure sale of MVRDCs real properties
on 10 October 2003. The TRO was to be effective for 72 hours. The
clerk of court sent a notice for the special raffle of the case on 13
October 2003.
On 13 October 2003, MVRDC filed a motion for the extension of
the TRO ("motion for extension"), with notice of hearing for 16
October 2003. On the latter date, after the raffle of the case to his
sala, respondent Judge issued an Order1 extending the TRO for
another 17 days.
On 28 October 2003, respondent Judge issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by MVRDC. Respondent Judge
had not yet conducted any hearing on the case. The injunction
order reads:
Considering the fact that the temporary restraining order will
expire on October 30, 2003 a date appearing from the allegations
of the motion[,] that irreparable injuries may result should the
sheriff pursue the foreclosure of the mortgage[,] the Court hereby
grants the injunction subject however to a bond which will answer
for the damages which the defendants may suffer as a result of
the injunction and the bond is fixed at 300,000.00
This injunction will take effect upon filing of the bond and shall
continue until further orders from this Court.
The Sheriff and any of his deputies are hereby enjoined from
enforcing the foreclosure of the mortgage during the pendency of
this injunction.
x x x x2
Complainant assailed the extension of the TRO and the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction "based purely on the
unilateral allegations of MVRDC." Complainant argued that
respondent Judge should not have issued the TRO or writ without
a summary hearing, especially considering that MVRDCs petition
lacked an affidavit of merit. Complainant asserted that it clearly
had the right to foreclose the mortgage. MVRDC defaulted in the
payment of its loan, as shown by copies of dishonored MVRDC
checks totaling 3,165,810.3 Complainant pointed out that under
the law, MVRDC would have the right to redeem any of its
foreclosed properties. Thus, according to complainant, there was
no extreme urgency, grave injustice or irreparable injury which
would justify the injunction in MVRDCs favor.
In its 1st Indorsement dated 2 March 2004, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) required respondent Judge to file his
comment and to show cause why he should not be sanctioned.
In his defense, respondent Judge claimed that he did not know
personally the counsels of either party to the case or any of their
incorporators. Respondent Judge maintained that he dealt with
the parties on a professional level and he always acted fairly.
Respondent Judge claimed that complainant received a copy of
the motion for extension, as shown by a registry receipt posted on
13 October 2003. He granted the motion for extension in view of
the urgency of the case and to avoid irreparable injuries to
MVRDC. Respondent Judge further claimed that complainant
received a copy of the Motion to Set Hearing for the Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction, as shown by a registry receipt posted on 17
October 2003. At any rate, respondent Judge stressed, he already
issued an order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction on 18
March 2004 after complainant filed a motion to dissolve the writ
and MVRDC had filed its comment to the motion.
In its evaluation of the allegations of both complainant and
respondent Judge, the OCA stated:
The instant complaint is partly meritorious. Complainant stresses
pertinent points to account for respondents alleged culpability. A
probe into each reveals that many of the issues raised are judicial
in nature. Save for one, the enumerated points warrant no
culpability on the part of respondent Judge.
Complainant assails the supposed lack of an Affidavit of Merit.
Viewed in the context of the actual petition for preliminary
injunction, this contention cannot be countenanced. The absence
of an Affidavit of Merit is not final where the petition itself, which
is under oath, recites the circumstances or facts which constitute
the grounds of the petition.
Complainant also takes issue with the fact that it was not
furnished a copy of the bond. Apparently, this contention is
premised on Section 7 of Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which in effect allows the adverse party to "except to the
sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon."
Again, said contention cannot be sustained in light of the
circumstances of the case at hand. A check with the records of the
instant case discloses that the summons, a copy of the petition,
and raffle notification were actually received by the complainant
on 10 October 2003. In Caluya v. Ramos, the failure of the
defendants to furnish the adverse parties with copies of the bonds
prior to their approval is not sufficient to invalidate the orders
dissolving the preliminary injunction where the attorneys for the
latter were notified of the filing of the first bond; where they
ultimately received copies of the bonds; and where they do not
contend that said bonds are insufficient or that the sureties are
not solvent.
Except for the allegation of lack of summary hearing,
complainants charges against respondent Judge should be
dismissed for being judicial in nature. Essentially the same
allegations were raised in the Motion to Dissolve Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. The complainant assails the wisdom of the
assailed Orders of respondent. However, it must be noted that the
complainant has adequate remedy under the Rules of Court to
challenge said Orders. In fact, it filed a [m]otion to [d]issolve the
[w]rit of [p]reliminary [i]njunction which was eventually granted
on 18 March 2004.
We submit, however, that the absence of summary hearing
cannot be excused. The conduct of a summary hearing is
mandated under Section 5, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Procedure x x x
x.
The requirement of hearing is so basic and fundamental that an
omission of [such] amounts to gross ignorance of rules and
procedure and invites due sanction. In this case, respondent
[Judge] twice ignored this elementary requisite. First, he extended
the TRO. Then, after its expiration, he converted the same into a
preliminary injunction. Both Orders were issued without
conducting a summary hearing. The rules on preliminary
injunction plainly provide that it cannot be granted without notice
to the defendant.
When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or
to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Judges are duty-bound to be faithful to the law and the rules
and to maintain professional competence at all times. Their role in
the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the
law, rules and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the judiciary
be eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.
x x x [I]t bears stressing that a writ of injunction is an
extraordinary, peremptory remedy that should be dispensed with
circumspection, and both sides should first be heard whenever
possible. In fact, judges are enjoined to observe utmost caution,
prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of [a] TRO and in the
grant of preliminary injunction. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, it
was found that the issuance of the assailed TRO was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion for having been issued without prior
notice and hearing.
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, "Gross Ignorance of the Law or
Procedure" is classified as [a] serious offense for which the
imposable sanction ranges from a fine to dismissal. However, we
find [respondent Judges] acts not ingrained with malice or bad
faith. x x x x
Recommendation: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of
the Honorable Court are the recommendations that:
1. The instant complaint be re-docketed as a regular
administrative case;
2. Respondent [Judge] be meted a fine in the amount
of five thousand pesos for gross ignorance of the law;
and
3. The rest of the charges against respondent [Judge]
be DISMISSED for being judicial in nature.4
The evaluation and recommendation of the OCA are well-taken,
except for the penalty.
The Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 20-955 require
the holding of a hearing where both parties can introduce
evidence and present their side before the court may issue a TRO
or an injunctive writ. Section 5 of Rule 58 provides:
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court
to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only
for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within
the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or
person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted, determine within the same
period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections,
if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only
seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately
comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to
service of summons and the documents to be served
therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72)
hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct
a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary
restraining order shall be extended until the application for
preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total
period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed
twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours
provided herein. (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, where
the matter is of extreme urgency and grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge may issue ex
parte a TRO effective for 72 hours from issuance. Before the expiry
of the 72 hours, the presiding judge to whom the case is raffled
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO
can be extended until the pending application for injunction can
be heard.1wphi1
Evidently, the hearing of the motion for extension set on 16
October 2003 did not take place. All the same, respondent Judge
granted the motion on that date, without mentioning the reason
for the lack of hearing, or whether he intended to conduct one in
the future on the prayer for the issuance of an injunction. Further
compounding his error, respondent Judge failed to conduct a
hearing on the injunction within the 20-day life of the TRO, as
prescribed by the Rules of Court. Yet he issued the assailed
injunction order against complainant. The injunction order did not
even explain why no hearings had taken place prior to its issuance.
Injunction is an extraordinary remedy to be resorted to when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that
cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. 6 A court
may issue an injunction only if it is fully convinced of its extreme
necessity and after it has complied with the procedural
requirements set by law.
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action.7 However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in gross
violation of clearly established law or procedure, with which every
judge must be familiar. Every judge, while presiding over a court of
law, must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands and
maintain professional competence at all times.8
Respondent Judges failure to abide by Section 5, Rule 58 and
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 constitutes gross ignorance of
the law for which he must be disciplined accordingly. 9 Under Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge and
penalized with dismissal, suspension, or a fine ranging from above
20,000 to 40,000.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Jimmy H. F. Luczon, Jr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Branch 1, liable for GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and FINE him
21,000. We STERNLY WARN him that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863 October 22, 2004
ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, FUND FOR ASSISTANCE TO
PRIVATE EDUCATION (FAPE), complainants,
vs.
JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In two verified complaints dated March 12, 2001 and March 22,
2001 filed with the Office the Court Administrator (OCA), Sultan
Sabdulah Ali Pacasum, in his capacity as President and Chairman
of Pacasum College, Inc., Atty. Alfonso M. Gomos and Dr. Roberto
T. Borromeo, as counsel and President of the Fund for Assistance
to Private Education (FAPE) respectively, charged respondent
Judge Santos B. Adiong of RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City with gross
ignorance of law, abuse of authority and gross misconduct.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On February 26, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum filed
Special Civil Action No. 690-01 for mandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction
against FAPE. He alleged that FAPE was required by law
to pay subsidy to Pacasum College, Inc. under the
Educational Service Program of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS); that although
the DECS has already released to FAPE the total
amount of P746,000,000.00 for payment to different
participating schools, FAPE refused to release to
Pacasum College, Inc. the sum of P1,845,040.00 which
represented the remaining unpaid collectible of the
said institution for the school year 2000-2001; that the
continued refusal by FAPE to release the said amount
has caused the school to fail in its obligation to pay the
salaries of its teachers for 3 months.
On the same day the petition was filed, respondent judge
granted1 the application for preliminary mandatory injunction
upon the posting by the petitioner of a surety or property bond in
the amount of P200,000.00.
On February 28, 2001, the respondent judge issued another order
directing the president of FAPE, Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, "to
prepare and issue a check for P1,845,040.00 representing the
payment to the Pacasum College, Inc. x x x payable to its president
and chairman Saripada Ali Pacasum, the petitioner herein." 2 On
the same day, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto served upon FAPE, throught
its president, summons and a copy of the petition.
On March 5, 2001, FAPE filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. No. 635333 before the Court of
Appeals, challenging the Orders, both dated February 26, 2001,
issued by the respondent judge. It argued that a pending
ownership dispute between Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum and
Saripada Ali Pacasum over the shares of the Pacasum College
before the Securities and Exchange Commission precludes the
release of the remaining balance of the subsidy to Pacasum
College under the ESC Program, which requires that any dispute
must be settled first before the release could be made. The
petition further stated that the RTC of Marawi City has no
jurisdiction to enforce the writs of mandamus and preliminary
injunction to FAPE, in its principal office in Makati City, since the
place is outside the 12th judicial region where it belongs. 4 FAPE
also prayed for the issuance of a TRO against Saripada Ali Pacasum
and his agents who have been harrassing its employees with
hourly calls and threats of bodily harm.
On March 9, 2001, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto and Saripada Ali
Pacasum served an Order dated March 7, 2001, which was
allegedly issued on a mere ex-parte motion by Saripada Ali
Pacasum, reiterating the Orders of February 26, 2001 with a
warning that "failure to comply would be under pain of contempt
of court."5 On March 13, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum together with
a Makati policeman served warrant of arrest upon Dr. Borromeo.
On March 14, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining
the respondent judge from enforcing the orders of February 26,
2001. Despite the TRO, respondent judge ordered the arrest of Dr.
Borromeo and certain FAPE employees for failure to comply with
his directive. Two of FAPEs employees, namely: Evangeline
Domondon and Nenita Torres, were subsequently arrested and
detained.
On March 12, 2001, Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum filed a letter
complaint before the OCA charging the respondent judge with
gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. On March 22,
2001, a similar letter-complaint was filed by Atty. Jose Gomos on
the same ground that the respondent judge violated the hearing,
notice and jurisdictional requirements of the Rules of Court in
issuing the questioned orders of February 26 and 28, 2001.
In his Comment, respondent judge claimed that he took
cognizance of Special Civil Action No. 690-10 after it was raffled to
his court. He found that the pleadings were in order; that after a
careful examination of the pleadings submitted by the petitioner,
he saw an extreme necessity to resolve the case expeditiously;
and that all the pending incidents has been rendered moot and
academic with the dismissal of Special Civil Action No. 690-10.
After evaluation of the records, the OCA found that the
respondent judge was liable for gross ignorance of the law,
oppression and abuse of authority; that the respondent, as the
Presiding Judge of RTC, Marawi City, has no authority to enforce a
preliminary injunction in Makati City where the principal office of
FAPE was located; that he violated the rights of FAPE employees
when he summarily cited them in contempt without regard to the
procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court. He abused his
authority when he issued a warrant of arrest on May 25, 2001
despite a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the
OCA made the following recommendations:
1. This matter be re-docketed as a regular
administrative case against the respondent judge;
2. Respondent judge be found guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and the rules;
3. Respondent judge be meted with the penalty of FINE
in the sum of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).6
Upon being directed by the Court,7 complainants manifested their
willingness to submit the case for decision on the basis of the
pleadings submitted.8 Respondent judge, on the other hand, failed
to file his manifestation hence, the Court was constrained to
dispense with the filing thereof.
We agree with the recommendations of the OCA, except as to the
penalty.
Respondent judge granted Saripada Ali Pacasums application for
preliminary mandatory injunction on the very same day the
Special Civil Action No. 690-01 was filed on February 26, 2001.
Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 9 is
very explicit that the writ of preliminary injuction may issue only
after prior notice and hearing upon the adverse party. In issuing
the subject writ on the very same day the application was filed
and considering that the person against whom the same was to be
served was located in Makati, summons could not have been
served upon them or a hearing conducted in evident disregard of
the due process requirements of the Rules of Court.
Respondent judges failure to comply with procedural due process
is aggravated by his total inattention to the parameters of his
jurisdiction. As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should
have known that Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of
his territorial jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary
injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in
any part of their respective regions. The rationale, as explained in
Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 10 is "that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin acts being performed or about to be performed outside its
territorial jurisdiction."
In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction is not a mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of
judgment on the part of respondent judge but a blatant disregard
of basic rules constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. The
responsibility of judges to keep abreast of the law and changes
therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court,
is a pressing need. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory
acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of
the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one not
even judges.11
Respondent judge is likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law
for summarily punishing FAPEs president and employees without
any written charge for indirect contempt or giving them any
opportunity to explain their refusal to obey the courts order, as
mandated by Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.12 What makes the act more reprehensible was the four
FAPE employees cited for contempt, two of whom were arrested
and detained with the exception of Dr. Borromeo, were not even
impleaded in Special Civil Action No. 690-10. Worse, the arrest of
the said employees was made despite the issuance by the Court of
Appeals of a TRO enjoining the respondent from enforcing the
Order of February 26, 2001.
The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the
public, by tradition and necessity, inasmuch as respect for the
courts, which are ordained to administer the laws necessary to the
good order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws
themselves. As in all other powers of the court, the contempt
power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised
judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be
moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties.13 The failure of a judge to afford the
alleged contemner the opportunity to be heard as a matter of due
process of law deserves administrative sanction.
The seeming eagerness and haste with which respondent judge
demonstrated in issuing the assailed orders, warrants and writ
betray a design to railroad judicial processes to favor a preferred
litigant. The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court
in a manner which displays obvious partiality is deplorable and
violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
requires a judge to behave at all times to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 14 A
judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
judicial authority for having precipitately adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt in disregard of the elementary rules of
procedure.
The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks
ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the
procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond
permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to
ignorance of the law.15
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross
ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge which carries
with it a penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension for
more than 3 months but not exceeding 6 months, or a fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
We take judicial notice that the respondent judge had been
previously sanctioned in (1) A.M. No. RTJ-98-1407 per Resolution
of July 20, 1998, where he was fined in the sum of P20,000.00 for
ignorance of the law; and (2) A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581 per Resolution
of July 2002, where he was also fined in the sum of P5,000.00 for
gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.
Obviously, after being chastised twice, respondent judge has
remained undeterred in disregarding the law which he has
pledged to uphold and the Code which he has promised to live by.
He appears undaunted by the previous penalties and warnings he
received. If only for this, we are constrained to impose a penalty
more severe than a fine, as earlier recommended. Suspension
from office for 6 months would be reasonble under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong, Presiding Judge
of Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is found GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law for issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction in violation of Section 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
and Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and for citing FAPE employees in contempt of court in
disregard of Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from office without
salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS with WARNINGthat
a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1506. August 9, 2001]
JOSEFINA MERONTOS Vda. de SAYSON, complainant, vs. Judge
OSCAR E. ZERNA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A temporary restraining order (TRO) may be issued ex
parte by an executive judge in matters of extreme emergency, in
order to prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury. Because
such issuance of a TRO shall be effective only for seventy-two
hours therefrom, as provided under Administrative Circular No.
20-95, the ex parte issuance of a 20-day TRO is unauthorized and
may make the judge administratively liable.
The Case
Before us is an administrative case arising from a verified
Letter-Complaint[1] dated February 25, 1997, filed by Josefina
Merontos vda. de Sayson against Judge Oscar E. Zerna of the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 7. In a
letter[2] dated March 3, 1997, Public Attorney II Vermin M. Quimco
of the Public Attorneys Office, Iligan City, endorsed the Complaint
to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo. Attorney Quimco
requested an investigation of the charges leveled against
respondent; namely, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct
and grave abuse of authority.
The Facts
The facts of this case are as follows.
On June 7, 1996, respondent issued a Temporary
Restraining Order[3] in Civil Case No. 07-373 in favor of the plaintiff,
Napoleon Lee Sr.; and against the defendants -- Francisco
Lumayag, Jose Bravo and Ricardo Sayson -- as well as their agents,
heirs and representatives. The Order directed defendants to
refrain from entering the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-
11750, registered under the plaintiffs name in the Registry of
Deeds of Lanao del Norte. The disputed lot, which is situated
in Barangay Gumagamot, Lala, Lanao del Norte, has an area of
10,741 sq m. It is bounded southeast, southwest, and northwest
by the Gumagamot River; and northeast by the property claimed
by herein complainant.
On June 9, 1996, the TRO was served upon complainant by
Deputy Sheriff Conrado Hingco Jr., who thereafter entered her
two-hectare fishpond and harvested prawn and fish products from
it.
In her verified Letter-Complaint, complainant sought
injunction and damages from respondent, whom she charged with
bad faith in the issuance of the TRO without notice and
hearing. She claims that the TRO was issued with patent violation
and disregard of the constitutional right of due process of the
undersigned who is not even a party to the case, and that it was a
clear disregard and disobedience to Supreme Court Circular No.
20-95 prohibiting judges from issuing Temporary Restraining
Orders (TROs) without the observance of the mandatory
requirement of notice and summary hearing of the parties
concerned. In her words:
That on or about the second week of June 1996, while he was
actually acting and performing his functions and duties as
[p]residing [j]udge of RTC Branch 07, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, with
apparent and manifest bias in favor of the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
07-373, in the person of Napoleon Lee Sr., and with patent
violation and disregard of the constitutional right of due process
of the undersigned who is not even a party to the case, said Judge
Oscar Zerna, wilfully, wrongfully, and if not with gross ignorance of
the constitution and pertinent law, and clear disregard and
disobedience to Supreme Court Circular No: 20-95 prohibiting
judges from issuing Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) without
the observance of the mandatory requirement of notice and
summary hearing of the parties concerned, did actual[ly] issue
and promulgate a temporary restraining order. A certified copy of
said restraining order which would speak for itself is hereto
attached as Annex A of this verified complaint.
That is the very same temporary restraining order utilized by
Sheriff Conrado Hingco Jr. the [p]rovincial [s]heriff of Judge Oscar
Zerna, in entering x x x the land that I possessed and titled to my
name, right after the issuance of said TRO, and capitalizing on my
ignorance/innocence about legal process, he deceived me and my
family to believe that such order authorize[d] him to harvest the
prawn and fishpond products we introduced in my said fishpond. x
x x.
That as the restraining order speaks for itself, neither
[complainant] nor any of the defendants were afforded by Judge
Zerna x x x due process which includes the opportunity to be
notified and heard in a summary hearing as required by the cited
Supreme Court circular before issuance of the same.[4]
In his Comment dated July 15, 1997, respondent denied
that the TRO was issued with ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority. He contended:
On June 7, 1996, a complaint was filed by plaintiff Napoleon T.
Lee, Sr. versus Francisco Lumayag, Jose Bravo alias Joe and Ricardo
Sayson for Injunction and Damages. The plaintiff alleged that he
[was] an owner of a certain parcel of land at Barangay
Gumagamot with an area of 10,741 sq. m., which is bounded on
the S.E., S.W., and N.W., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9 by
Gumagamot River and on the N.E., along lines 9-10-11-12-13-14-
1[, a] property claimed by Josefina Sayson. - Plaintiff further
alleged that he ha[d] title of ownership over the land as evidenced
by OCT No. (KATIBAYAN NG ORIGINAL NA TITULO) No. P-11,750,
Kaloob na Patente Blg. 123509-195-216, as registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Lanao del Norte x x x.
Upon receipt of the complaint and finding [that] the subject
matter of this case was the harvest of the prawn over the lot in
question, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order as
prayed for considering the perishable nature of the prawn and the
ready buyer during the harvest by enjoining the defendants for a
period of 20 days from harvesting the same. The defendants
complained of the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order even
charging the [c]ourt of ignorance of the law by citing
Administrative Circular No. 20-95-that the [c]ourt did not conduct
summary hearing with notice within 24 hours[;] however the
[c]ourt did not also [lose] sight of the fact that in his opinion the
matter was of extreme urgency considering the perishable nature
of the prawn and its ready buyer. This is also provided for in par. 3
of said Circ. No. 20-95 in that if the matter is of extreme urgency
and that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the
[e]xecutive [j]udge shall issue a Temporary Restraining Order
effective only for 20 days from its issuance.[5]
Recommendation of the Court Administrator
After evaluating the pleadings and the records filed by the
parties, the court administrator found that respondent was remiss
in the performance of his duties. He granted the TRO effective, not
for seventy-two hours as prescribed by law in cases of extreme
urgency, but for the maximum of 20 days; and he did so without
conducting beforehand a summary hearing, as required under
Administrative Circular No. 20-95.
He recommends that respondent judge be fined P5,000 and
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.[6]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the court administrator. Administrative
Circular No. 20-95 requires that an application for a TRO shall be
acted upon, only after all parties are heard in a summary
hearing. It clearly provides:
SUBJECT: RE: SPECIAL RULES FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS.
1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or
writ of preliminary injunction is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or
initiatory pleading shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse
party and in the presence of such party or counsel.
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all
parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-
four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch
selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately
after raffle.
3. If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the
Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two
(72) hours from issuance but shall immediately summon the
parties for conference and immediately raffle the case in their
presence. Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72)
hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned shall
conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be
extended for another period until a hearing [o]n the pending
application for preliminary injunction can be conducted. In no case
shall the total period x x x exceed twenty (20) days, including the
original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the
Executive Judge.
x x x x x x x x x.
The Circular aims to restrict the ex parte issuance of a TRO
only to cases of extreme urgency, in order to avoid grave injustice
and irreparable injury.[7] Such TRO shall be issued only by the
executive judge and shall take effect only for seventy-two (72)
hours from its issuance.Furthermore, within the said period, a
summary hearing shall be conducted to determine whether the
Order can be extended for another period until a hearing on the
pending application for preliminary injunction can be conducted.
Untenable is respondent judges contention that the Circular
allows an executive judge, in case of extreme urgency, to issue
an ex parte TRO effective for twenty days. Judges should be
diligent in keeping abreast of developments in law and
jurisprudence, consistent with the mandate that the study of law
is a never-ending process.[8]
In Golangco v. Villanueva,[9] the Court held that the judges
disregard of the Supreme Courts pronouncement on TROs was not
just ignorance of the prevailing rule, but also misconduct and
grave abuse of authority. To be punishable, however, ignorance of
the law must be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption.[10] We find bad faith and dishonesty on the part of
respondent judge. He avers in his Comment that there was
extreme urgency in the ex parte TRO because the prawns, which
were subject to spoilage were perishable; and the buyer was
already waiting for the harvest. But Napoleon Lees Complaint did
not contain such allegations. Nowhere was there any mention of
the immediate need of harvesting prawns or any produce from
the disputed property. Obviously, respondent is now clutching at
straws. He had no justifiable reason at all in immediately issuing
the 20-day TRO.
Besides, the TRO was clearly rushed. Just a day after the
plaintiffs Complaint was filed on the afternoon of June 7, 1996 the
TRO was issued and served on herein complainant, without any
effort to notify the defendants or to schedule a summary hearing.
WHEREFORE, Judge Oscar E. Zerna is hereby
found LIABLE for gross ignorance of the law, misconduct and grave
abuse of discretion and FINED P5,000 with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
In the Matter of Administrative Complaint against Hon.
Abesamis, ...
[OCA I.P.I. No. 01-32-CA-J. February 13, 2002] IN THE MATTER OF
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST HON. ABESAMIS, et al.
SECOND DIVISION Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your
information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 13 2002. OCA
I.P.I. No. 01-32-CA-J (In the matter of Administrative Complaint
against Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis, Hon. Eugenio S. Labitoria and
Hon. Elvi John S. Asuncion, Associate Justices and members of the
Former Special Twelfth Division of the Honorable Court of
Appeals.) Petitioners, employees of Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc.
and members of the Year Jan Industries of Alliance of Nationalist
and Genuine Labor Organization-Kilusang Mayo Uno (ANGLO-
KMU), charge respondent Court of Appeals Justices Abesamis,
Labitoria and Asuncion, with grave misconduct and abuse of
authority. The case arose from a labor dispute between
petitioners and their employer, Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc.
(Company, for brevity), for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring their dismissal illegal and
ordering them to be reinstated to their former position without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and with backwages,
13th month pay and sick and vacation leave. On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the
aforesaid decision but deleted the money claims. However, upon
motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reinstated the Labor
Arbiters decision. The Company assailed the NLRC decision before
the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 54598
and raffled to the Special Twelfth Division, composed of
respondent justices. On August 30, 1999, an alias writ of execution
was issued against the Company to collect P5,437,992.00
constituting the computed backwages, 13th month pay and sick
and vacation leave pay of the petitioners. A notice of garnishment
was issued against the Companys account in the Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC). On September 21, 1999, the
Company filed a Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin
the implementation of the writ of execution and the order of
garnishment, and if the same has already been implemented, to
restrain RCBC from transferring the garnished amount to the NLRC
Sheriff, or if the garnished amount has already been transferred,
to enjoin the NLRC from releasing the same to the petitioners. On
September 23, 1999, respondents issued a temporary restraining
order. On February 29, 2000, the Companys application for
preliminary injunction was granted upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of P5,437,992.02. The Company, however, failed to post
the bond required. On March 20, 2000, the Company filed an
Omnibus Motion seeking to modify the February 29, 2000
Resolution which was denied on August 10, 2000. On October 6,
2000, the Company filed another Urgent Motion for Issuance of
TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction, this time, to enjoin the Labor
Arbiter from implementing the alias writ of execution dated
September 19, 2000, for the collection of P8,401,103.36
representing additional backwages/salaries of the petitioners. This
was granted by respondents per Resolution dated October 11,
2000. Aggrieved by issuance of the said Resolution, petitioners
moved to inhibit the respondents but was denied on January 30,
2000. Petitioners contend that the questioned Resolution of the
Court of Appeals deprived them of In the Matter of Administrative
Complaint against Hon. Abesamis, ...
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/rulesofcourt/2002/01_32.htm 2
of 3 5/1/2006 9:28 PM their right to be reinstated and to be paid
their lost income. They also assert that the issuance of the TRO
without requiring the posting of the required surety bond and
without defining the period of its effectivity or duration
transgresses Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and
the Canon of Judicial Ethics. Respondents, upon the other hand of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.[4] The
maintain, viz: (1) that the TROs never enjoined nor restrained the dismissal of the petition, in effect, upholds the correctness of
reinstatement of the complainants; (2) that under Sec. 4, Rule 58 respondents acts in issuing the restraining orders. The present
of the Rules of Court, the bond is posted only when required by administrative complaint is nothing but an attempt on the part of
court; (3) that the phrase until further orders of this Court did the petitioners to re-ventilate or re-litigate issues already passed
not make the period of the TROs indefinite; and (4) that the upon and definitively resolved by this Court.[5] WHEREFORE, the
charges averred in the complaint have already been passed upon complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
and considered by this Court in G.R. No. 147388. The complaint Very truly yours, (Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS Clerk of Court [1]
should be dismissed. The respondents, in issuing the assailed Article 223. Appeal.- xxx xxx xxx In any event, the decision of the
Resolution, acted within the confines and limits of the law and Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
their authority. I. Petitioners, in their motion for writ of execution, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall
moved only for the execution of the money judgment. In the immediately be executory even pending appeal. The employee
restraining orders issued by respondents, what was restrained and shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
enjoined is the payment of the monetary claims adjudged by the conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and not the reinstatement of the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The
petitioners to their former positions. Thus, with or without the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for
restraining orders, the judgment of the NLRC reinstating the reinstatement provided herein. [2] Sec. 4 Verified application and
petitioners is immediately executory pursuant to Article 223 of the bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.-
Labor Code.[1] II. The failure of the respondents to require the xxx xxx xxx (b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files
Company to post a bond did not violate the Rules of Court. with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond
Paragraph (b) of Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be
Procedure, gives the court discretion to require such bond.[2] The fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such
court may, in proper cases, exempt the applicant from filing the party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of
bond normally required.[3] In issuing the October 11, 2000 the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should
Resolution, respondents were merely exercising a discretion finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
granted them by law. Certainly, we find no abuse of discretion, approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction
much less a grave or patent abuse of judgment when they issued shall be issued. See also Annotations by Justice Feria, 1997 Rules
the assailed Order. It must be stressed however, that respondents of Civil Procedure. [3] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1997
in their Resolution dated February 29, 2000, required the Edition, p. 651. [4] Annex "9." [5] Flores vs. Abesamis, 275 SCRA
Company to post a bond for the issuance of the preliminary 302, 306 [1997].
injunction. Unfortunately, the Company failed to comply, hence,
the writ was never issued. III. The TRO dated October 11, 2000
was not issued for an indefinite time. Under Section 5, Paragraph
4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary restraining
order issued by the Court of Appeals shall be effective for sixty
(60) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined. It automatically terminates upon the expiration of the
60 day period without need of any judicial declaration to that
effect. In the assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals ordered,
among others, that the public respondent NLRC is also restrained
and enjoined from surrendering or releasing the garnished
amount to the private respondents, until further orders of this
Court. As it is clear under the Rules that the effectivity of a TRO
issued by the Court of Appeals is only for a period of 60 days, it
must be stressed that the phrase until further orders of this
Court embodied in said resolution should be understood in such
manner that the Court of Appeals may, in the exercise of its
discretion, shorten the lifespan of the TRO when circumstances so
warrant. Applying the foregoing, we find petitioners allegation
that the questioned resolution transgresses the pertinent rules
erroneous. Lastly, the charges alleged in the complaint have
already been passed upon and considered by this Court in G.R.
No. 147388. It must be recalled that after the issuance of the
October 11, 2000 Resolution, petitioners filed a motion for
inhibition grounded mainly on the issuance of the aforesaid
resolution and contending that the judicial action of respondents
in issuing the assailed Resolution impelled them to believe that
they could no longer obtain labor justice. The motion was denied
by respondents on January 30, 2001, hence, petitioners elevated
the matter to this Court. In the Matter of Administrative
Complaint against Hon. Abesamis, ...
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/rulesofcourt/2002/01_32.htm 3
of 3 5/1/2006 9:28 PM On June 27, 2001, we issued a Resolution
denying the petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
the challenged resolutions as to warrant the exercise by this Court
SECOND DIVISION

The instant petition for review stems from the Decision[1] and Reso
lution[2] of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74874

MIGUEL M. LLAMZON, G.R. No. 167745

Petitioner,

Present:

promulgated on 10 June 2004, and 7 April 2005, respectively

which annulled and set aside the status quo order of the Regional
QUISUMBING, J., Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Balanga, Bataan, [3] dated 2 December
2002,[4] and affirmed the order dated 11 December 2002 [5] denying
Chairperson, respondents motion to dismiss.

- versus - CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES, The antecedents follow.

TINGA, and

ALMA FLORENCE LOGRONIO, VELASCO, JR., JJ. Petitioner Miguel M. Llamzon is an Enterprise Service Officer III at
the Industrial Relations Unit, Bataan Economic Zone. He was
formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
NESTOR HUN NADAL and NICANOR
prejudicial to the best interest of service[6] for having billed Edison
(Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation overtime fees for unloading of
OLIVAR constituting the PHILIPPINE fuel for the dates 28 February 2000 and 20 March 2000, despite
knowledge that the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY had discontinued billing registered locator/enterprises for
overtime fees since 17 December 1999.Petitioner filed his answer
CENTRAL BOARD OF INQUIRY, denying the charges against him and requested a formal
investigation and the transfer of the venue of the case to the Civil
Service Commission Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga.
INVESTIGATION AND DISCIPLINE
This request was however denied, and the investigation was
conducted by the PEZA Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation and
(PEZA-CBIID), PEZA Special Prosecutor Promulgated: Discipline (PEZA-CBIID).

NORMA CAJULIS and PEZA Director

General LILIA DE LIMA, June 26, 2007

Respondents. While investigation was on-going, petitioner requested the PEZA-

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
CBIID to allow the PNP Crime Laboratory to examine the written
contents of the billings for overtime fees. The request was denied
by PEZA-CBIID considering that the National Bureau of
Investigation had already issued a finding that the signatures
appearing in the billings are those of the petitioner.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint on 17 September

DECISION 2002 for damages against respondents, with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction, for allegedly depriving him of his right to
present witnesses for himself and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in the administrative
TINGA, J.: investigation. On the same date, Judge Benjamin Vianzon,
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 4, Balanga, Bataan, issued a TRO
for twenty (20) days for the maintenance and preservation of
the status quo, and scheduled the hearing for preliminary
injunction.[7]
Respondents moved to lift the TRO on the ground of non-holding
of a summary hearing and failure of petitioner to show extreme
urgency for the issuance of said TRO. Respondents motion was
denied by Judge Vianzon.[8]
The Court of Appeals found the petition partly meritorious. It
ruled that Judge Vianzon failed to observe Section 5, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning applications for
preliminary injunction and TRO. According to the appellate court,
Judge Vianzon granted a TRO for 20 days instead of only 72 hours,
and he did not conduct a summary hearing within 72 hours to
determine whether the TRO should be extended.[14] The status
quo order was issued also in violation of the aforementioned
Rule, specifically the portion which provides that the TRO shall not
exceed 20 days and is deemed vacated if the application for
preliminary injunction is not resolved within the 20-day period
and that no court has the authority to extend or renew the TRO
on the same ground for which it was issued.[15]

In addition, the Court of Appeals considered moot the issue of

Respondents filed before the Office of the Court Administrator a
complaint forincompetence, gross ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice against Judge Vianzon.They also
filed a motion for his inhibition in Civil Case No. 565-ML which
Judge Vianzon granted in his Order dated 21 October 2002.[9]
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Vianzon in recalling
his order of inhibition. It found that the judge had already
inhibited himself from hearing Civil Case No. 565-ML via an Order
dated 24 February 2003.[16]

Respondents moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 565-ML but
The appellate court also found that respondents were unable to
petitioner opposed the motion. In the interim, petitioner filed a
show that the issuance of the 11 December 2002 Order denying
motion to maintain the statusquo, which Judge Vianzon
their motion to dismiss was tainted with grave abuse of
granted through an Order dated 2 December 2002 (status
discretion. They likewise failed to file a motion for reconsideration
quo order).[10] Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a motion for
of the said order of denial, and were unable to show that the filing
reconsideration ofthe order of inhibition dated 21 October 2002,
thereof was unnecessary.
[11]
and a motion to cite petitioner incontempt for resuming the
administrative investigation upon the expiration of the TRO.

In the end, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside

the 2 December 2002status quo order, but dismissed the petition
Confused with the orders of Judge Vianzon, respondents filed a
with respect to the order dated 11 December 2002 denying the
manifestation seeking clarification whether the judge had recalled
motion to dismiss.[17]
his earlier order of inhibition. Inhis Order dated 15 November
2002,[12] Judge Vianzon clarified that he had indeed recalled his
order of inhibition and would proceed to try the case, considering
thatBranch

4 is a single-sala court and the matter of inhibition would have to

be referred to the Supreme Court, and it would take months
before a new judge is designated.

Meanwhile, respondents motion to dismiss Civil Case

No. 565-ML was denied by Judge Vianzon in his Order dated 11
December 2002.[13]
Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision, arguing
for the propriety of the 20-day TRO and the status quo order of
Judge Vianzon, and pointing out alleged defects in respondents
petition. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
[18]

Respondents brought the matter to the Court of Appeals,

imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Vianzon
in: (i) his conduct of the proceedings before him; (ii) vacating his
earlier order of inhibition; (iii) issuing the status quo order Petitioner now proposes that the Court of Appeals erred when it:
dated 28 November 2002; and (iv) issuing the 11 December (i) ruled that the TRO and status quo order were wrongfully
2002 Order denyingtheir motion to dismiss.
issued; and (ii) did not dismiss respondents petition despite
several defects which should have merited the outright dismissal
thereof.

According to petitioner, the TRO and status Anent Judge Vianzons order of inhibition, respondents
quo order were made in compliance with Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the state that while the matter of inhibition is within the sound
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, he claims that a 20-day discretion of the
TRO can be issued without prior notice or hearing if it is shown
that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant. On
judge concerned, that same discretion could not be invoked by the
the other hand, he justifies the status quo order by saying that it
same judge in determining whether or not to recall or vacate his
was issued on a ground different from that for which the earlier
earlier order inhibiting himself.There must be good and valid legal
TRO was made.[19] He adverts to several infirmities in respondents
grounds for such recall, otherwise, it becomes grave abuse of
petition which the Court of Appeals disregarded when it gave due
discretion and an indication of bias and partiality for a judge to
course to the petition.
recall his earlier order of recusation.[22]

As for the alleged defects in respondents petition before the Court

The petition must be denied.
of Appeals, petitioner claims that respondents (i) failed to
attach the certified true copies of the assailed Orders; (ii) omitted
the

At the onset, it must be emphasized that the propriety

of the 20-day TRO is a non-issue. It was never raised as an issue in
the petition before the Court of Appeals, nor squarely ruled upon
by the appellate court. Instead, it was discussed in conjunction
with the propriety of Judge Vianzons issuance of the status
quo order dated 2 December 2002. But in any case, the Court will
delve into the mechanics of issuing TROs, if only to provide the
proper perspective to the discussion of the related issue.

discussion on the denial of the motion to dismiss; (iii) failed to

state the date of receipt of the third assailed Order; (iv)
questioned the issuance of the 20-day TRO embodied in the 17
September 2002 Order when it was not even among those
included in the Orders assailed in their petition; (v) failed to file a
motion for reconsideration of all the assailed orders; (vi) filed a
defective certificate against forum shopping; (vii) failed to include
an affidavit of service; and (viii) are politically motivated when
they filed the charges against petitioner.[20]

Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court [23] proscribes the

For their part, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, argue that an ex-parte TRO is issued only in extremis, and
has a lifetime of only 72 hours. In the instant case, the trial court
issued the TRO ex-parte for a full term of 20 days, and despite
there being no clear showing that the applicant had a clear legal
right that should be protected by the writ being sought.
Furthermore, respondents see the status quo order issued by
Judge Vianzon as very much akin to a writ of injunction, forbidding
respondents from prosecuting the case against petitioner.[21]
grant of preliminary injunction without hearing and prior notice to
the party or person sought to be enjoined. However, the rule
authorizes the court to which an application for preliminary
injunction is made to issue a TRO if it should appear from the facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified petition that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter
can be heard on notice,[24] but only for a limited 72-hour period.

The second paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 58 was actually

lifted from paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No. 20-95,
[25]
which aims to restrict the ex parte issuance of a TRO only to
cases of extreme urgency in order to avoid grave injustice and
irreparable injury. Such TRO shall be issued only by the executive
judge or single-sala station judge and shall take effect only for 72
hours from its issuance.

Furthermore, within the said period, a summary hearing shall be
conducted to determine whether the Order can be extended for
another period until a hearing on the pending application for
preliminary injunction can be conducted.[26]
The rule thus holds that before a TRO may be issued, all
parties must be heard in a summary hearing first, after the records
are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The only instance
when a TRO may be issued ex parte is when the matter is of such
extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will
arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such circumstance, the
Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective for 72 hours only. The
Executive Judge shall then summon the parties to a conference
during which the case should be raffled in their presence.Before
the lapse of the 72 hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case
was raffled shall then conduct a summary hearing to determine
whether the TRO can be extended for another period until the
application for preliminary injunction can be heard, which period
shall in no case exceed 20 days including the original 72 hours.[27]
It thus becomes apparent that Judge Vianzon erred in issuing
a TRO effective, not for 72 hours as prescribed by law in cases of
extreme urgency, but for the maximum of 20 days; and he did so
without conducting beforehand a summary hearing, and without
showing that it falls under the exceptional circumstances
enumerated by the Administrative Circular No. 20-95 where a TRO
may be issued by the Executive Judge before assignment by raffle
to a judge without first conducting a summary hearing.
Now on to the real issues of this case.
The status quo order dated 2 December 2002 reads:
Considering the [M]otion to Maintain Status
Quo filed by plaintiff, through counsel Atty.
Francisco Flaminiano, Jr., and finding the
same to be in order, and considering further
that the hearing on the propriety on the
issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction is still pending hearing and no
subsequent order has been issued after the
issuance of the courts order dated
September 17, 2002, let the existing status
quo be maintained restraining and
enjoining defendants from continuing with
the hearing of Administrative Case No.
2002-01 until further orders from this
court.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The above Order was improperly issued by Judge Vianzon. It was,
for all intents and purposes, a mere continuation of the 20-day
TRO erroneously issued. Indeed, this Court has ruled that a status
quo ante order has the nature of a temporary restraining order.
[28]
A TRO
shall be effective only for a period of 20 days from notice to the
party or person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period,
the judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of
issuing a preliminary injunction. If no action is taken by the judge
on the application for preliminary injunction within the said 20
days, the TRO would automatically expire on the 20th day by the
sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being
necessary. In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was
issued; in fact, as stated in the Order, the hearing on the propriety
on the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is still
pending, hence, the TRO earlier issued, assuming arguendo that it
was indeed validly issued, automatically expired under the
aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court.
The 2 December 2002 Order which directed that the
existing status quo be maintained restraining and enjoining
defendants from continuing with the hearing was, for all intents
and purposes an indefinite extension of the first TRO, or a
renewed or second temporary restraining order proscribed by the
rule and extant jurisprudence.[29]
The status quo order is in fact, worse than a second TRO since
unlike an ordinary TRO which has a lifetime of only 20 days, Judge
Vianzon directed the maintenance of the status quo for an
indefinite period, or until further order from this court. It was not
a writ of preliminary injunction, because as previously mentioned,
the hearing on the application for the writ is still pending. Besides,
in the event of an injunctive writ, an injunction bond is required,
unless exempted by the Court.[30]
Another important factor which militates against the correctness
of the issuance of the status quo order is the fact that Judge
Vianzon no longer had authority to do so because he had already
inhibited himself from hearing the case as early as 21 October
2002, or more than a month before he issued the 2 December
2002 status quo order. It appears that Judge Vianzon did not even
forward his order of inhibition to this Court, nor waited for the
Court's resolution, but instead immediately recalled his order of
inhibition and proceeded to try the case.
Now, to the alleged infirmities of respondents petition before the
Court of Appeals which petitioner claims should have merited its
outright dismissal. Most of thealleged defects are connected with
Judge Vianzons 15 November 2002 Order which recalled his
earlier order of inhibition. Petitioner submits that respondents did
not attach a certified true copy of the said Order, neither did it
indicate the date of receipt of the same, nor filed a motion for its
reconsideration. The other remaining issues are: (i) the alleged
failure to file a motion for reconsideration of, and failure to
discuss, the 11 December 2002 Order of denial of respondents
motion to dismiss; (ii) the failure to state in the certificate on non-
forum shopping that they filed administrative complaints against
Judge Vianzon; and (iii) the failure to attach the affidavit of service
to the petition.
As explained by the Court of Appeals, the order of
recall of Judge Vianzons inhibition is already moot and academic,
since he had already issued an Order dated 24 February
2003[31] inhibiting himself once again from the
proceedings. Besides, a new judge has already been assigned to
hear the case.[32] Thus, the fact that only a photocopy of the 15
November 2002 Order was attached to the petition cannot justify
the dismissal of the entire petition, especially since
respondents attached the certified true copies of the other
assailed Orders (2 December 2002 status quo order and 11
December 2002 denial of the motion to dismiss) to the petition.
For the same reason, respondents failure to state the date of
receipt of the 15 November 2002Order will not justify the
dismissal of the petition.
Even the purported absence of a discussion on the order denying
respondents motion to dismiss cannot be a ground of the
petitions outright dismissal, since the other issues raised therein
were sufficiently discussed. As pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, it is because of this failure to show that the denial of
motion was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, and that
respondents failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the
denial, that the petition was dismissed for lack of merit insofar as
it assailed the validity of the 11 December 2002 Order.
While the general rule is that before certiorari may be
availed of, petitioner must have filed a motion for reconsideration
of the act or order complained of, the Court has dispensed with
this requirement in several instances. Thus, a previous motion for
reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari is
necessary unless: (i) the issue raised is one purely of law; (ii) public
interest is involved; (iii) there is urgency; (iv) a question of
jurisdiction is squarely raised before and decided by the lower
court; and (v) the order is a patent nullity.[33] In the instant case,
respondents stated that they did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the status quo order because it would be a
useless exercise considering Judge Vianzons predilection for
issuing orders without stating or specifying his basis therefor. In
any case, the Court of Appeals found the status quo order to be a
nullity, since it was made in violation of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner maintains that respondents submitted a defective
certificate against forum shopping when they failed to declare the
administrative complaints they filed against Judge Vianzon. The
Court finds that the omission of the administrative cases
against Judge Vianzon is not fatal to respondents petition.
Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining
whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the
courts and party-litigant by a party who asks different courts to
rule on the same or related causes
and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issue. [34] The
administrative cases against Judge Vianzon pending before the
Office of the Court Administrator will not affect the outcome of
the civil case a quo.
Finally, on the alleged failure to attach an affidavit of service, the
Court defers to the finding of the Court of Appeals that an affidavit
of service was attached to the petition stating that copies thereof
were sent to respondents by registered mail onJanuary 14, 2003,
as evidenced by registry receipts nos. 494 and 495.[35]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and
the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals of 10 June
2004 and Resolution of 7 April 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74874 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 NACHURA, J.:

UMBRA M. TOMAWIS,

Petitioner,

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 8, 2004,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 84424, and its Resolution [2] dated December 20,
2004. The assailed Decision annulled and set aside the
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur,
Branch 8, Marawi City, dated September 15, 2003 in Special Civil
Action No. 820-02, as well as its Order [4] and Writ of
Execution[5] dated April 23, 2004.

Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On September 1, 1987, then Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA)

Executive Director Jiamil I.M. Dianalan (Dianalan) appointed[6] Atty.
- versus - Nora M. Tabao-Caudang (Caudang) as Regional Director of Region
XII-B, pursuant to Section 8 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 122-A, as
amended by E.O. No. 295. At that time, the OMA staff and
Regional Directors were not yet classified as Career Executive
Service (CES) positions. Hence, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
approved Caudangs appointment as permanent.

On February 18, 1991, the directorship positions in the OMA,

including those of Regional Directors, were classified as CES
positions thereby requiring CES eligibility for permanent
appointments. Said reclassification was embodied in CSC
Resolution No. 94-2925 and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21,
both dated May 13, 1994.

On February 4, 1993, Caudang received a notice[7] that she had

been replaced by Mr. Umbra Tomawis (Tomawis), the latter having
been appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos. Aggrieved,
ATTY. NORA M. TABAO-CAUDANG, Caudang requested a ruling from the CSC on her status (of
appointment) as Regional Director. Before the CSC could resolve
the matter, on April 29, 1993, Caudang filed a petition for quo
Respondent.
warranto against Tomawis before this Court, but the same was
dismissed for lack of certification of non-forum shopping and
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- verified statement of material dates, as required by Revised
---x Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-91.[8]

On January 4, 1994, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 94-

0014[9] declaring Caudangs appointment as permanent. She was
DECISION declared as the lawful incumbent, giving her the right to recover
the position through a petition for quo warrantobefore the
appropriate court.
On the basis of the above resolution, on February 4, 1994,
Caudang filed a petition for quo warranto docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 33246. On June 30, 1994, the CA granted Caudangs petition
reinstating her to the position and ordering Tomawis to vacate and
relinquish the same.[10] However, on motion for reconsideration
filed by the Solicitor General, the CA reversed itself in an
Amended Decision[11] dated October 17, 1994, ruling that the
petition should not have been entertained in the first place for
being violative of the procedural rules on non-forum shopping,
given the identical petition Caudang earlier filed with this
Court. On appeal before this Court via a petition for review
on certiorari, we denied the petition for failure to show that a
reversible error had been committed by the appellate court. The
said denial had become final and executory and the same was
subsequently entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments.[12]
Left with no other recourse, Caudang went to the CSC and moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution of CSC Resolution No. 94-
0014. In Resolution No. 966231[13] dated September 23, 1996, the
CSC denied Caudangs motion. The CSC noted that Caudangs
petition for quo warranto was dismissed by the CA, thus, the
motion for execution must necessarily fail. The CSC likewise held
that the services of Caudang were terminated by the Chief
Executive prior to the filing of the petition for quo warranto, thus,
preventing the Commission from an inquiry into the said
separation from service effected by the President as the issue is
reviewable only by the High Court.[14] The CSC later denied
Caudangs motion for reconsideration.
On July 3, 1998, then OMA Executive Director Acmad Tomawis
removed Tomawis from the contested position and appointed
Engr. Dardagan Maruhom in his stead.Tomawis did not challenge
his removal and, instead, claimed terminal pay equivalent to his
earned leave credits. He was re-appointed to the same position
on July 31, 2000 by then OMA Executive Director Ismael Naga, Jr.
but his appointment was characterized as temporary, because he
did not possess the appropriate CES eligibility.
ostensibly the basis of Hashims Office Order) was, in effect,
reversed by the Court of Appeals in its October 17, 1994 Amended
Decision.[18]
Aggrieved by Hashims order requiring him to vacate his position,
Tomawis instituted an action for injunction and
prohibition[19] against Caudang and Hashim before the RTC. The
case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 820-02.
Tomawis likewise filed a verified complaint against Hashim for
alleged violation of the Anti-Graft Law for issuing Office Order No.
0079. The Presidential Anti-Graft Commission conducted a fact-
finding inquiry and, acting on its recommendation, the Office of
the President (OP) dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
reinstatement of Caudang was just and lawful pursuant to CSC
Resolution No. 94-0014.[20]
Meanwhile, on September 15, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision
in favor of Tomawis, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, the instant petition for
Injunction and Prohibition is hereby granted
for being highly meritorious. Respondent
OMA Executive Director Hon. HABIB
MUJAHAB A. HASHIM or any person acting
in his behalf is hereby directed to cease,
desist and refrain from enforcing office
Order No. 0079, Series of 2002 dated March
8, 2002. Respondent Atty. Nora T. Caudang
is likewise ordered to cease, desist and
refrain from further assuming the powers
and functions of OMA Regional Director,
Region XII-B, Marawi City.

On December 18, 2001, then OMA Executive Director Habib

Mujahab A. Hashim (Hashim) issued a Memorandum [15] to
Tomawis clarifying that his appointment was merely temporary SO ORDERED.[21]
and that a new appointment may be issued either in his favor or
to another qualified individual. He was directed to start clearing
himself of money, property and all other office
accountabilities. On March 8, 2002, Hashim issued Office Order
No. 0079, series of 2002[16] reinstating Caudang to the contested
position. Consequently, Tomawis was directed to vacate and
formally relinquish the position and turn over the office, along A copy of the decision was served on Caudang on September 24,
with its funds and properties, to Caudang. 2003. The following day, Caudang filed a motion for
reconsideration[22] which was denied[23] on December 15,
2003. However, it appears from the records that Caudang never
received a copy of the December 15 Order.[24]

Caudang then requested the CSC to issue an order affirming the

continuity of her service from the time she was separated from
service on February 8, 1993 until her reinstatement in
2002. On July 29, 2002, the CSC denied Caudangs request in On December 18, 2003, Caudang filed a
Resolution No. 021000.[17] The CSC held that Caudangs request Manifestation[25] praying for the immediate dismissal of the case,
had no legal basis because CSC Resolution No. 94-0014 (which was attaching thereto a copy of the Decision of the Office of the
President in OP Case No. 2-J-523 and a Certification issued by the
OMA Director for Administrative Services that Caudang is the
incumbent Regional Director of Region XII.[26] However, this
Manifestation (which was really a motion for the dismissal of the
pending case) was not set for hearing. Thereafter, the RTC issued
an Order[27] dated January 7, 2004 setting aside its September 15
and December 15, decision and resolution, respectively, on the
ground that the legal authority of Caudang as Regional Director
was administratively upheld by the OMA and the OP.
On January 16, 2004, Tomawis filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Execution of the September 15 decision and December 15 order
of the RTC averring that they had become final and executory for
failure of Caudang to appeal the same within the reglementary
period. Caudang, however, opposed the motion claiming that she
had not been served a copy of the order denying her motion for
reconsideration.
On April 23, 2004, the court granted [28] the motion and the
corresponding writ of execution[29] was accordingly issued. On May
7, 2004, Caudang moved [30] to quash the writ which the court
denied in an Order[31] dated May 19, 2004.
Pursuant to the above writ of execution, then
Undersecretary/OMA Executive Director Datu Zamzamin L.
Ampatuan issued Office Order No. 04-270 [32] dated June 3,
2004 re-installing Tomawis to the contested position until the
issuance of a new appointment either in his favor or to other
qualified applicant.
On June 9, 2004, Caudang elevated the matter to the CA via a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
validity of the writ of execution issued by the RTC on the ground
that the decision sought to be executed did not attain
finality.Caudang claimed that it was the January 7 [33] Order of the
RTC that had, instead, become final and executory.
On September 8, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision in
favor of Caudang, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, Marawi City in Spl. Cvl. Action No. 820-02
dated 15 September 2003, the Order
dated 23 April 2004 and the Writ of
Execution dated 23 April 2004 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Office
Order No. 04-270, Series of 2004, issued by
OMA Executive Director Zamzamin
Ampatuan directing the re-installation of
respondent Umbra Tomawis as OMA
Regional Director, Region XII-
B, Marawi City is hereby declared NULL and
VOID.Director Ampatuan is further directed
to recognize petitioner ATTY. NORA TABAO-
CAUDANG as the legitimate
holder/occupant of the office. Land Bank of
the Philippines, Marawi Branch, through its
bank officials, is directed to desist from
honoring checks and withdrawals
signed/issued by respondent
Tomawis.Respondent Umbra Tomawis is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from
performing the functions of OMA Regional
Director, Region XII-B, Marawi City and to
surrender said office to petitioner
Caudang. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[34]
The appellate court held that in both procedural and
substantive aspects of the case, the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion: first, the September 15 Decision of the RTC never
attained finality because Caudang had not received a copy of the
resolution denying her motion for reconsideration; the rule on
constructive receipt of mails is not applicable because the
envelope containing said resolution was marked return to
sender; second, the January 7 Order of the RTC is null and void for
failure to comply with the procedural requirement of a valid
hearing; and third, the petition for injunction commenced by
Tomawis is a disguised petition for quo warranto which should
never have been entertained because Tomawis had no legal
standing to file the same since he held the contested position
merely in a temporary capacity.
Tomawis motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution[35] dated December 20, 2004. Tomawis, now the
petitioner, filed the instant petition, and in his Memorandum,
[36]
he raises the following issues:
(1).
DID NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE THE DECISION OF JUDGE ADIONG
DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 2003.
(2).
 DID NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERR IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER HAD
NO LEGAL RIG[H]T TO FILE SPL. CIVIL
ACTION NO. 802-02.
(3).
DID NOT THE RESPONDENT
COMMIT MULTIPLE FORUM SHOPPING.[37]
In his memorandum, Tomawis claims that the CA erred in
reviewing the merits of the RTC decision, as it was never raised as
an issue before the appellate court. He claims that the only issue
elevated to the appellate court was whether or not the decision
sought to be executed attained finality in order to warrant the
issuance of a writ of execution.[38] Tomawis also insists that he has
the legal personality to commence the injunction case being the
occupant of the contested position, albeit in a temporary capacity.
[39]
He further avers that the CA should not have relied on the
decision of the OP in OP Case No. 2-J-523 because it was in the
nature of a forgotten evidence since the respondent failed to
present the same in her evidence-in-chief.[40] Lastly, the petitioner
argues that respondent is guilty of multiple forum shopping in
litigating her claim before the CSC, the CA and this Court.[41]
The petition is without merit.
The first and second issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed
together.
It must be understood that there are two RTC decisions
involved in the present case, the second (January 7) entirely
incompatible with the first (September 15). From the factual
circumstances surrounding this case, and as correctly held by the
CA, the January 7 Order is null and void because of an incurable
procedural defect,[42] i.e., it was never set for hearing. Thus, the
only decision material to our consideration is the September 15
Decision. Did the aforesaid decision attain finality to justify the
issuance of a writ of execution? We answer in the negative.
Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
Service of judgments, final
orders or resolutions. Judgments, final
orders or resolutions shall be served either
personally or by registered mail. x x x.
Section 10 of the same Rule provides:
Completeness of service. Personal service is
complete upon actual delivery. Service by
ordinary mail is complete upon the
expiration of ten (10) days after mailing,
unless the court otherwise provides. Service
by registered mail is complete upon actual
receipt by the addressee, or after five (5)
days from the date he received the first
notice of the postmaster, whichever date is
earlier.
The rule on service by registered mail contemplates
two situations: (1) actual service, the completeness of which is
determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail;
and (2) constructive service, which is deemed complete upon
expiration of five (5) days from the date the addressee received
the first notice from the postmaster.[43]
Thus, there is constructive service by registered mail
only if there is conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by
the postmaster to the addressee and that such first notice had
been delivered to and received by the addressee. The best
evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification
from the postmaster to the effect that not only was notice issued
or sent but also on how, when and to whom the delivery was
made. The mailman may also testify that the notice was actually
delivered.[44]
In the instant case, there was no sufficient proof that
the respondent actually received a copy of the December 15
resolution. Neither was there proof that a first notice was indeed
received by her. As such, the rule on constructive notice cannot
apply. Accordingly, since the respondent was not served a copy of
the resolution, the decision could never attain
finality. Consequently, there can be no valid basis for the issuance
of the writ of execution.
Before a writ of execution may issue, there must
necessarily be a final judgment or order that disposes of the
action or proceeding. The writ of execution is the means by which
a party can enforce a final judgment or order of the court.Absent
a final judgment or order, there is nothing to enforce or execute;
thus, there can be no valid writ of execution.[45]
Aside from nullifying the questioned writ of execution, the CA also
delved into the intrinsic validity of the September 15 decision of
the RTC, and Tomawis challenges the procedural propriety of such
review by the appellate court.
It is true that in her petition before the CA, Caudang merely
sought the nullification of the writ of execution for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. She did not raise as an issue
the propriety of the RTCs decision granting the writ of injunction.
But the procedural lapse, if any, is of no great moment.
Be it remembered that in the performance of their duties, courts
should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in
manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must be
avoided. Substantive rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and
technical application of the rules. Indeed, when a case is
impressed with public interest, we should relax the application of
the rules.
The controversy between Tomawis and Caudang started in
1993. Several cases had been brought before both judicial and
administrative tribunals, and no final resolution had been
reached. In the meantime, the legitimacy of the public officer who
should occupy the position of OMA Regional Director, Region XII-
B, remains in question. Public service is compromised.
The RTC judge, who should have been resolute, proved to be
indecisive. First, he ordered Hashim and Caudang to cease and
desist from enforcing Office Order No. 0079 and from occupying
the position of Regional Director, respectively; then, in his
clarificatory order, he declared that his decision did not include
the reinstatement of Tomawis to the position. This vacillating
attitude only served to create a hiatus in public service, totally
repugnant to the basic rule that title to public office should not be
subjected to continued uncertainty. In addition, as observed by
the CA, the RTC judge remained deafeningly silent on the alleged
January 7 Order, neither confirming nor denying issuance of the
same.
Moreover, the appellate court could not have simply turned a
blind eye to the obvious blunder committed by the trial court in
issuing the injunctive writ. To overlook such a manifest mistake
would have been inconsistent with substantial justice, and would
have allowed a party to unjustly benefit from a mistake or
inadvertence of the trial court. Thus, the Rules reserve to the
appellate court the right, resting in public duty, to take cognizance
of palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings,
especially such as clearly demonstrate that the suitor has no cause
of action. The rule does not intend for the (appellate) court to sift
the record and deal with questions which are of small importance,
but only to notice errors which are obvious upon inspection and
are of a controlling character. The underlying purpose of this
reservation in the rule is to prevent the miscarriage of justice
resulting from oversight.
On the merit of the RTC decision, we agree with the CA that
Tomawis had no clear legal right to institute his petition for
injunction. Indeed, the Tomawis suit before the RTC was a thinly
disguised petition for quo warranto, and not having any legal title
to the position of Regional Director (his temporary appointment
having been terminated), he did not possess proper personality to
file the action.[46]
Even if the initiatory pleading filed by Tomawis before the RTC is
truly a special civil action for injunction and prohibition, our
conclusion remains he still had no clear legal right to institute the
same.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party
is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the
main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident
in the main action.[47] As a rule, to justify the injunctive relief
prayed for, the movant must show: (1) the existence of a right
in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) that the
act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such
right.[48] A clear legal right means one clearly founded on or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. [49]The onus
probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be
protected, which is directly threatened by the acts sought to be
enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of
the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious
damage.[50]
The facts clearly show that Tomawis was appointed Regional
Director. However, because he did not possess the requisite CES
eligibility, pursuant to established rules and jurisprudence, his
appointment was characterized merely as temporary. His
appointment papers dated July 31, 2000, specifically provided that
his appointment was merely temporary. As such, he had no
security of tenure.[51] Upon the issuance of Office Order No. 0079
appointing Caudang to the position, Tomawis right to the position
ceased to exist. Thus, he should have vacated and relinquished the
position and turned over the duties, funds and properties of the
office to Caudang.
Accordingly, his petition for injunction should have been denied
outright by the court. In the absence of a clear legal right, the
issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.[52]
Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners claim that respondent is Supreme Court
guilty of multiple forum shopping. There is forum shopping where
the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final Manila
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
[53]
True, respondent had previously instituted quo
warranto proceedings involving the same contested position, and
her petitions had been dismissed with finality by this Court. We,
however, find that the issue in the instant case is based on a THIRD DIVISION
different set of facts.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN and CITY MAYOR G.R. No. 157315
LEONIDES THERESA B. PLAZA, the latter in her personal
capacity and as representative of
This case was initiated by no less than the petitioner himself
through a petition for injunction before the RTC in order to enjoin her co-defendant,
the enforcement of Office Order No. 0079 which recognized the
new appointment of the respondent thereby terminating his Petitioners, Present:
(petitioners) temporary appointment. The previous quo
warranto actions instituted by the respondent were based on her
appointment on September 1, 1987.On the other hand, the CARPIO MORALES, Chairp
present action is based on her appointment on March 8,
2002.Although the issues in all of the cases brought to this Court BRION,
involve the rightful occupant of the contested position, the fact
remains that the appointments are distinct from one another. -versus - BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA, JR., and

In view of all the foregoing, we hereby affirm the nullity of the ARANAL-SERENO, JJ.
writ of injunction issued by the RTC for failure of the petitioner to
show clear legal right to enjoin the enforcement of the office CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS), INC., doing
order. We likewise affirm the findings of the appellate court that business under the name and style DXBR Bombo Radyo
the September 15 Decision of the RTC never attained
finality.Consequently, the corresponding writ of execution is null Butuan, represented by its
and void. Office Order No. 04-270 (installing petitioner to the
contested position) issued pursuant to the writ of execution is,
Manager, Norberto P.
likewise, annulled.

Pagaspas, and HON. ROSARITO F. DABALOS, PRESIDING

JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 2, OF AGUSAN

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 8,

DEL NORTE AND BUTUANCITY,
2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its December 20,
2004 Resolution are AFFIRMED.
Respondents.

Promulgated:
SO ORDERED.

December 1, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides
Theresa B. Plaza (petitioners) appeal the adverse decision dated
October 28, 2002 (dismissing their petition for certiorari and
prohibition to challenge the grant by the trial judge of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction after reconsidering
his earlier self-inhibition),[1] and the resolution dated January 29,
2003 (denying their motion for reconsideration), both
promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
69729 entitled City Government of Butuan and City Mayor
Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, the latter in her personal capacity and
as representative of her co-defendant v. Consolidated
Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., doing business under the name
and style DXBR Bombo Radyo Butuan, represented by its Manager,
Norberto P. Pagaspas, and the Hon. Rosarito F. Dabalos, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 2, of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.
Antecedents[2]
In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan City to solicit its support for
her decision to deny the application for mayors permit of
respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System
(CBS), and to eventually close down CBSs radio station. She
justified her decision by claiming that CBSs operating its
broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision, a
residential area, had violated the Citys zoning ordinance. Her
letter pertinently reads:
In 1994, Bombo
Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System
manifested their intention to operate on
their current site at Arujiville Subdivision
which is a residential area. They were
informed that they cannot situate their
business in the area as it violates our zoning
ordinance. However, they have pleaded and
was agreeable to operate in the area by
virtue of a Temporary Use Permit (TUP) xxx.
The TUP allowed them to operate
in the area but only for a very limited
period. As a matter of fact, the TUP was
good only for one year, which can be
renewed every year for a maximum of five
(5) years or until 1999. Thus, right from the
beginning they have been informed and
forewarned that they cannot operate in the
area forever and that they have to relocate
to a proper area.
Bombo Radyo renewed its TUP only
in 1995 and 1996. They have failed to renew
their TUP up to today.
This office has received numerous
complaints against Bombo Radyo for
violation of private rights, inciting people to
go rise against the government, malicious
imputations, insinuations against people not
of their liking, false or fabricated news, etc.
The list is so long to enumerate. Copies of
the petitions, manifestos from various
groups is hereto attached for your perusal.
Thus, for violation of the city zoning
ordinance, the expiration of their TUP,
which was never renewed since 1997,
failure to secure ECC and the numerous
complaints against the station of the
residents within the immediate vicinity of
their premises and the threat they are
causing to the peace and order of the City, I
have decided to deny their application for a
mayor's permit and thereafter to close the
radio station.
In view of the foregoing premises, I
am forwarding this matter to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to solicit your
resolution of support on the matter.
This is not a decision calculated to
deprived (sic) Radio Bombo of its freedom
of speech or expression. This is just a simply
matter of whether or not Radyo Bombo has
complied with existing laws and ordinances.
Thereupon, the Sangguninang Panlungsod adopted
Resolution-057-2002 to strongly support the decision of the City
Mayor to deny the application of Consolidated Broadcasting
System Development Corporation (Bombo Radyo-Butuan) for a
Mayors Permit and thereafter close the radio station. [3]
On February 18, 2002, the Citys licensing officer served on CBSs
station manager a final/last notice of violation and demand to
cease and desist illegal operation, with a warning that he
would recommend the closure of its business in case of non-
compliance.
 offices and public officials will lose their
credibility and respect which are due them.
On February 19, 2002, CBS and its manager, Norberto Pagaspas,
filed a complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages
against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City
(RTC),[4] with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and The court is aware of press freedom
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from is enshrined in our constitution but such
closing its station, or from disturbing and preventing its business freedom should not be abused because in
operations. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 5193, was raffled every right there is a concomitant
to Branch 2, presided by Judge Rosarito P. Dabalos. obligation.

On February 20, 2002, Judge Dabalos voluntarily inhibited and Let therefore this case be returned
directed the return of Civil Case No. 5193 to the Office of the immediately to the office [of the] Clerk of
Clerk of Court for re-raffle.[5] He cited the circumstances that Court VI for re-raffling.
might affect his objectivity and impartiality in resolving the
controversy as his justification, to wit:

SO ORDERED.

xxx

a) That the
On the same day, Judge Victor Tomaneng, Presiding
undersigned was the object of
Judge of Branch 33, issued an order also inhibiting himself from
its (plaintiff's) attacks and
handling Civil Case No. 5193, and in his capacity as Vice Executive
criticism which are
Judge (in lieu of Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr., then on sick
judgmental and not
leave) directed the assignment of Civil Case No. 5193 to Branch 5
inquisitorial in the comments
without raffle,[6] viz:
over the air;

b) That the
undersigned was shouted at
disrespectfully by one of xxx Considering that the Executive
plaintiff's reporters/news Judge Hon. Cipriano B. Alvizo, the Presiding
gatherers in the vicinity of the Judge of RTC-Branch 4 and Acting-Designate
Hall of Justice; Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3, but who is
now in Cebu City for medical treatment, it
would be impractical to include his courts in
the re-raffling of cases for the reason that
the case is for prohibition, mandamus,
c) injunction, etc., that needs immediate
That plaintiff's commentaries action. The herein Vice-Executive Judge who
are making pronouncements is the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 33,
on legal matters, substantive could not also act on this case on the
and procedural, based on its ground of 'delicadeza' considering that
perception and not on laws; defendant Hon. Mayor Leonides Theresa B.
Plaza is his 'kumadre' plus the fact that
before becoming judge he was the legal
counsel of the LDP party here in Butuan
d) That in its City, in the election of 1992 and 1995, which
commentaries in attacking is the political party of the Plazas. RTC-
public officials as well as Branch 1, being the exclusive Family Court
private individuals, words cannot also be included in any raffle.
which are disrespectful and
indecent are used.

In view of the foregoing, and on the

and the net effect and result of its
commentaries over the air causes confusion
on the minds of the public, including the
young that the court and government
ground of expediency, the Clerk of Court is
ordered to send this case to RTC-Branch 5,
without raffle anymore, it being the only
practical available court in this jurisdiction
as of this moment.
 Meanwhile, let this case be set for
summary hearing on March 11,
Civil Case No. 5193 was forwarded to Branch 5, presided by Judge 2002 at 8:30 in the morning to resolve the
Augustus L. Calo, who recused because his wife had been recently pending application for injunction and for
appointed by Mayor Plaza to the Citys Legal Office. Judge Calo the defendants to show cause why the
ordered the immediate return of the case to the Clerk of Court for same shall not be granted.
forwarding to Vice Executive Judge Tomaneng.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Without any other judge to handle the case, Judge Tomaneng
formally returned Civil Case No. 5193 to Judge Dabalos, stating in
his letter that Judge Dabalos reason for inhibition did not amount
to a plausible ground to inhibit. Judge Tomaneng instructed Judge On February 25, 2002, the petitioners filed an urgent
Dabalos to hear the case unless the Supreme Court approved the motion to lift or dissolve temporary restraining order in Branch 2
inhibition.[7] (sala of Judge Dabalos).

On February 26, 2002, Judge Dabalos referred his order

of inhibition in Civil Case No. 5193 to the Court Administrator for
On February 21, 2002, Judge Tomaneng issued a TRO,[8] to wit: consideration, with a request for the designation of another Judge
not stationed in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte to handle the
case.[9]

The Court believes that there is a

need to maintain the status quo until all the
other issues in the complaint shall have Consequently, CBS requested the Court to designate another
been duly heard and determined without judge to hear its application for the issuance of a writ of
necessarily implying that plaintiff is entitled preliminary injunction, the hearing of which Judge Tomaneng had
to the prayers for injunction. The Court set on March 11, 2002.[10]
hereby resolves in the meantime to grant a
temporary restraining order.

In the meanwhile, or on March 8, 2002, the petitioners filed their

answer to the complaint, alleging affirmative and special defenses
WHEREFORE, defendants City Gov't and praying for the dismissal of the complaint, the lifting of the
of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa TRO, the denial of the prayer for preliminary injunction, and the
B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, granting of their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages,
police authorities and/or any person acting attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
upon the Mayors order and instruction
under her authority are hereby enjoined to
cease, desist and to refrain from closing or
padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from
During the hearing on March 11, 2002 of CBSs application for the
preventing, disturbing, or molesting its
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, at which the
business operations, including but not
petitioners and their counsel did not appear, CBSs counsel
limited to the use and operation of its
manifested that he was desisting from his earlier request with the
building, structures and broadcasting
Court for the designation of another judge to hear Civil Case No.
facilities, and the ingress or egress of its
5193. Judge Dabalos noted the manifestation but reset the
employees therein.
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction on March 12,
2002, to give the petitioners an opportunity to show cause why
the writ prayed for should not issue. For the purpose of the
resetting, Judge Dabalos caused a notice of hearing to be served
As this Court cannot issue a on the petitioners.[11]
seventy-two (72) hour Temporary
Restraining Order because of the incoming
delay on Monday, February 25, 2002, a
temporary restraining order is hereby issued
Upon receipt of the notice of hearing, the petitioners moved to
effective for twenty (20) days from issuance
quash the notice and prayed that the TRO be lifted, insisting that
(Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Judge Dabalos had already lost his authority to act on Civil Case
Procedure).
No. 5193 by virtue of his inhibition.[12]
Nonetheless, Civil Case No. 5193 was called on March 12, 2002.
The parties and their respective counsel appeared. At the close of
the proceedings on that date, Judge Dabalos granted CBSs prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction,[13] to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing as the defendants did not
introduce any evidence in spite of the order
of the Court to show cause why no writ of
preliminary injunction be issued and the
repeated directive of the court in open
court for the defendants to present
evidence which the defendants firmly
refused to do so on flimsy grounds, the
Court resolves to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction as the complaint under oath
alleges that plaintiff is a grantee of a
franchise from the Congress of the
Philippines and the act threatened to be
committed by the defendants curtail the
constitutional right of freedom of speech of
the plaintiff which the Court finds that it
should be looked into, the defendants'
refusal to controvert such allegations by
evidence deprived the Court [of] the chance
to be guided by such evidence to act
accordingly that it left the court no
alternative but to grant the writ prayed for,
the City Government of Butuan and City
Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their
attorneys, agents, employees, police
authorities and/or any person acting upon
the Mayor's order or instructions or under
her authority are hereby enjoined to cease
and desist and to refrain from closing or
padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from
preventing, disturbing or molesting its
business operations, including but not
limited to the use and operation of its
building, structures, broadcasting facilities
and the ingress or egress of its employees
therein upon plaintiff's putting up a bond in
the amount of P200,000.00 duly approved
by this court which injunction bond shall be
executed in favor of the defendants to
answer for whatever damages which the
defendants may sustain in connection with
or arising from the issuance of this writ if,
after all the court will finally adjudge that
plaintiff is not entitled thereto.
This order is without prejudice to
the findings of the court after a formal
hearing or a full blown trial.
Furnish copies of this order to the
Hon. Supreme Court and the Hon. Court
Administrator.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Following CBSs posting of P200,000.00 as the required
injunction bond, Branch 2 issued the writ of preliminary injunction
on March 15, 2002,[15]commanding and directing the provincial
sheriff to:
xxx forthwith enjoin the City
Government of Butuan and the Hon. City
Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their
attorneys, agents, employees, police
authorities and/or any person acting upon
the mayor's order or instruction or under
her authority to cease and desist and to
refrain from closing or padlocking RADIO
BOMBO or from preventing disturbing or
molesting its business operations, including
the use and operation of its building,
structures, broadcasting facilities and the
ingress and egress of its employees therein.
Copies of the writ of preliminary injunction,
bond and other pertinent documents
thereto be served on the defendants and
thereafter make a return of your service of
this writ within the period required by law
and the Rules of Court.
Thus, the petitioners commenced in the CA a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for TRO or
writ of preliminary injunction).
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition upon a
finding that Judge Dabalos had committed no grave abuse of
discretion in acting upon CBSs application for preliminary
injunction, given the peculiar circumstances surrounding the
raffling and assignment of Civil Case No. 5193, and the urgent
need to resolve the application for preliminary injunction due to
the expiration of Judge Tomanengs TRO by March 13, 2002. The
CA held that the writ of preliminary injunction had properly
issued, because the petitioners had threatened to defeat CBSs
existing franchise to operate its radio station in Butuan City by not
issuing the permit for its broadcast business.
Issues

Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari, with the
petitioners contending that:[16]
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE
ROSARITO F. DABALOS ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN,
ON MARCH 12, 2002, WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO PETITIONERS,
HE AGAIN TOOK COGNIZANCE OF AND
RE-ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER
CIVIL CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD
ALREADY EFFECTIVELY INHIBITED
HIMSELF FROM HEARING THE SAME
IN TWO EARLIER ORDERS HE HAD
ISSUED DATED FEBRUARY 20
AND FEBRUARY 26,
2002RESPECTIVELY.
II. ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE
ROSARITO DABALOS COULD VALIDLY
RE-ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL
CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD
EARLIER ISSUED TWO ORDERS
VOLUNTARILY INHIBITING HIMSELF
FROM HEARING SAID CASE, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COURT
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITHOUT
REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW
WHETHER SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT
HAS A CLEAR RIGHT THERETO.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit. We find that the CA did not commit any
error in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC.
I in any case in which he, or his wife or child,
Judge Dabalos lawfully re-assumed
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193
In its decision, the CA ruled that Judge Dabalos did not
gravely abuse his discretion in re-assuming jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 5193 in the light of the obtaining circumstances cogently
set forth in its assailed decision, to wit:[17]
Seemingly, petitioners lost sight of the
reality that after the respondent judge
issued his order of inhibition and directed
the return of the case to the Office of the
Clerk of Court for re-raffle to another judge,
Vice-Executive Judge Victor A. Tomaneng,
noting that there is no other judge to
handle the case, directed the return thereof
to the public respondent in view of the
extreme urgency of the preliminary relief
therein prayed for. Under the circumstances
then obtaining, the respondent judge could
do no less but to act thereon. So it is that he
proceeded with the scheduled hearing on
the application for preliminary injunction
on March 11, 2002 and thereafter reset it
for continuation the following day to afford
the petitioners an opportunity to oppose
the application and show cause why the
writ prayed for should not issue. The
urgency of the action demanded of the
respondent judge is further accentuated by
the fact that the TRO issued by Judge
Tomaneng was then about to expire on
March 13, 2002, not to mention the
circumstance that Executive Judge Cipriano
B. Alvizo, Jr., who happened to be around,
advised the respondent judge to resolve the
issues to the best of his discretion. xxx
The petitioners disagree, and insist that Judge Dabalos
lost the authority to act upon CBSs application for preliminary
injunction by virtue of his prior self-inhibition from hearing Civil
Case No. 5193.
We cannot sustain the petitioners insistence.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which
contains the rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges,
states:
Section 1. Disqualification of
judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit
is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
 related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties-in-
interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons
other than those mentioned above.
The self-inhibition of Judge Dabalos was one taken in
accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1. Our
resolution herein turns, therefore, on the proper interpretation
and application of the second paragraph.
The second paragraph of Section 1 (unlike the first
paragraph) does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for
inhibition. This means that the determination of the grounds is left
to the sound discretion of the judge, who must discern with only
his or her conscience as guide on what may be just and valid
reasons for self-inhibition. The vesting of discretion necessarily
proceeds from the reality that there may be many and different
grounds for a judge to recuse from a case, and such grounds
cannot all be catalogued in the Rules of Court. Thus did the Court
cogently point out in Gutang v. Court of Appeals:[18]
xxx The import of the rule on the
voluntary inhibition of judges is that the
decision on whether or not to inhibit is left
to the sound discretion and conscience of
the trial judge based on his rational and
logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in the case brought before him. It
makes clear to the occupants of the Bench
that outside of pecuniary interest,
relationship or previous participation in the
matter that calls for adjudication, there
might be other causes that could
conceivably erode the trait of objectivity,
thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a
sense of realism, for the factors that lead to
preference or predilections are many and
varied.
In his case, Judge Dabalos clearly discerned after the
return of Civil Case No. 5193 to him by the Vice Executive
Judge that his self-doubt about his ability to dispense justice
in Civil Case No. 5193 generated by the airing of criticisms against
him and other public officials by CBSs commentators and
reporters would not ultimately affect his objectivity and judgment.
Such re-assessment of the ground for his self-inhibition, absent a
showing of any malice or other improper motive on his part, could
not be assailed as the product of an unsound exercise of his
discretion.That, it seems to us, even the petitioners conceded,
their objection being based only on whether he could still re-
assume jurisdiction of Civil Case No. 5193.
We hold that although a trial judge who voluntarily
inhibits loses jurisdiction to hear a case, [19] he or she may decide to
reconsider the self-inhibition and re-assume jurisdiction after a re-
assessment of the circumstances giving cause to the inhibition.
The discretion to reconsider acknowledges that the trial judge is in
the better position to determine the issue of inhibition, and a
reviewing tribunal will not disturb the exercise of that discretion
except upon a clear and strong finding of arbitrariness or
whimsicality.[20] Thus, Judge Dabalos re-assumption of jurisdiction
was legally tenable, having come from his seizing the opportunity
to re-assess the circumstances impelling his self-inhibition upon
being faced with the urgent need to hear and resolve CBSs
application for preliminary injunction. Such action was
commendable on his part, given that the series of self-inhibitions
by the other RTC Judges had left no competent judge in the
station to hear and resolve the application. It can even be rightly
said that a refusal by Judge Dabalos to re-assess and reconsider
might have negated his sacred and sworn duty as a judge to
dispense justice.
In this connection, the urgency for the RTC to hear and
resolve the application for preliminary injunction factually existed.
In fact, CBS had communicated it to the Court in its letter
dated March 5, 2002,[21] to wit:
If not for the temporary restraining order
issued on February 21, 2002 by the
Honorable Judge VICTOR A. TOMANENG,
Vice-Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of
Branch 33 of said court xxx violent
confrontations would have continued
between supporters of plaintiff RADIO
BOMBO BUTUAN, on the one hand, and the
loyalists of City Mayor LEONIDES THERESA
PLAZA (including some city employees) led
by the Mayor herself and her husband,
former Mayor DEMOCRITO PLAZA II, on the
other hand.
xxx
As set forth in the temporary restraining
order, the hearing on the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction is set
on Monday, March 11, 2002 because the
 twenty-day lifetime of the temporary
restraining order would expire on March 13,
2002. A repeat of the violent scenario of
February 21 may occur unless the
application is heard as scheduled by a
Regional Trial Court Judge who had not
inhibited himself. xxx
Verily, Judge Dabalos decision to hear the application for
preliminary injunction pending the Courts resolution of the query
on whether or not another Judge sitting outside the City of
Butuan should take cognizance of Civil Case No. 5193 did not
constitute or equate to arbitrariness or whimsicality. He had
reasonable grounds to do so in the context of the tight
circumstances that had developed in Civil Case No. 5193 following
his self-inhibition. Surely, his decision to reconsider did not
proceed from passion or whim, but from his faithful adherence to
his solemn oath to do justice to every man. He thereby neither
violated any law or canon of judicial conduct, nor abused his
juridical authority.
II.
Petitioners to adduce evidence after granting of TRO
The petitioners submit that Judge Dabalos improperly resolved
CBSs application for preliminary injunction by not first requiring
the applicant to adduce evidence in support of the application.
We do not agree with the petitioners.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain
from a particular a particular act or acts. [22] It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known
as a preliminary mandatory injunction. [23] Thus, a prohibitory
injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a
particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the
performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.[24]
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be
issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient
interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be
protected.[25] It is proper only when the applicant appears to be
entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, [26] which must
aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, [27] or
whose averments must in the minimum constitute
a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.
[28]
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive
writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b)
that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c)
that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a
right not inesse, or a right which is merely contingent and may
never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a
cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act
prohibited by statute.[29] Indeed, a right, to be protected by
injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or
is enforceable as a matter of law.[30]
While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to
prove its entitlement to the injunctive writ, the writ was
nonetheless properly granted on the basis of the undisputed facts
that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the Legislature, and
that the acts complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayors permit
and resulting closure of the radio station) were imminent and,
unless enjoined, would curtail or set at naught CBSs rights under
the franchise. In this regard, worthy of mention is that even the
Vice
Executive Judge, acknowledging that CBS had stood to suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury should its radio station suffer
closure, had issued ex parte the TRO.
It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the
evidence of CBS should have first been required before Judge
Dabalos issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on the shoulders of the
petitioners, as the parties against whom the TRO was issued, to
show cause why the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction should not issue,[31] thus:
Section 5. Preliminary injunction
not granted without notice; exception. No
preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the
party or person sought to be enjoined. If it
shall appear from facts shown by affidavits
or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on
notice, the court to which the application
for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
to be effective only for a period of twenty
(20) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined, except as
herein provided. Within the said twenty-
day period, the court must order said party
or person to show cause, at a specified
time and place, why the injunction should
not be granted, determine within the same
period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly issue the corresponding order.
xxx
 FIRST DIVISION

ANGELINA PAHILA- G.R. No. 156358

In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners GARRIDO,
to first present evidence why the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction should not be granted. By their refusal to Petitioner,
comply with the directive to show cause by presenting their
evidence to that effect, the petitioners could blame no one but
themselves.

Present:
- versus -
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari,
and affirm the decision dated October 28, 2002 promulgated by
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69729.
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners. ELIZA M. TORTOGO,
BERSAMIN,
LEONILA FLORES,
DEL CASTILLO, and
SO ORDERED. ANANIAS SEDONIO,
ADELINO MONET, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

ANGIE MONET,

JUANITO GARCIA, ELEONOR

GARCIA,
Promulgated:
BENITA MOYA,

JULIO ALTARES,

LEA ALTARES,
August 17, 2011
CLARITA SABIDO,

JULIE ANN VILLAMOR,

JUANITA TUALA,

VICTOR FLORES III, JOHNNY

MOYA,

HAZEL AVANCEA,

SONIA EVANGELIO, and

GENNY MONTAO,

Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---x

DECISION
 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-167924; Lot 641-B-
2, covered by TCT No. T-167925; and Lot No. 641-B-3, covered by
BERSAMIN, J.: TCT No. T-167926, all owned by the plaintiff. The defendants in
this group relied on the common defense of being agricultural
tenants on the land. The second group, on the other hand, was
represented by Atty. Ranela de la Fuente of the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) and counted the defendants occupying Lot No. F-V-3-
3749-D, covered by TCT No. T-55630, also owned by the
plaintiff. The second groups common defense was that the
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains plaintiffs title was not valid because their respective portions were
finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. [1] The situated on foreshore land along the Guimaras Strait, and thus
enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or their respective areas were subject to their own acquisition from
evaded, for the immediate enforcement of the parties rights, the State as the actual occupants.
confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the ideal
administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any
delay in the full execution of final and executory decisions. [2] Thus,
a remedy intended to frustrate, suspend, or enjoin the
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the
enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution
MTCC rendered a decision dated March 17, 1999 in favor of the
and upon a strict observance of the requirements under existing
petitioner,[4] to wit:
laws and jurisprudence. Any such remedy allowed in violation of
established rules and guidelines connotes but a capricious exercise
of discretion that must be struck down in order that the prevailing
party is not deprived of the fruits of victory.
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS except the defendant
Damiana Daguno, as follows:
Via her pleading denominated as a petition for review
on certiorari, the petitioner has come directly to the Court from
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 48, in Bacolod City for the
nullification of the order dated November 12, 2002 (granting the
respondents application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory 1. Ordering the affected
injunction [enjoining the execution of the final and executory defendants or any
decision rendered in an ejectment suit by the Municipal Trial person or persons in
Court in Cities [MTCC], Branch 6, in Bacolod City]) issued in SCA acting in their behalf,
Case No. 01-11522[3] for being in violation of law and assignees or successors-
jurisprudence. in-interests including
members of their family
to vacate portions of Lot
No. 641-B-1 covered by
TCT No. 16742, Lot
The petitioner also prays that the Court should enjoin
No.641-B-2 covered by
the RTC from taking further proceedings in SCA Case No. 01-
TCT No. T-167926 and
11522, except to dismiss it.
Lot Plan-F-V-337490-D
covered by TCT No. T-
55630 which they
occupy and turn over
Antecedents the possession of the
said property to the
plaintiff, and to pay the
cost of the suit.
On June 23, 1997, Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in
Bacolod City an action for ejectment with prayer for preliminary The prayer for preliminary
and restraining order to evict several defendants, including the injunction/restraining order is denied for
respondents herein, from his properties, docketed as Civil Case lack of basis.
No. 23671 and raffled to Branch 6 of the MTCC. He amended the
complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants.
However, he died during the pendency of the action, and his
surviving spouse, herein petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was
substituted for him on September 24, 1998.
All the defendants appealed. On September 22, 1999, the RTC in
Bacolod City affirmed the decision of the MTCC.[5]

The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two
discrete groups. The first group, represented by Atty. Romeo
Subaldo, included those defendants occupying Lot 641-B-1,
 Only the second group, which includes respondents
herein, appealed the RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals (CA),
insisting that the land was foreshore land and that the petitioners
title (TCT No. 55630) was not valid. Considering that the first
group did not appeal, the RTCs decision became final and
executory as to them.
On December 6, 1999, the CA dismissed the second
groups appeal, and later denied their motion for reconsideration
on April 17, 2000.[6]
The respondents herein appealed the dismissal to the
Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 143458), but the Court
rejected their recourse on July 19, 2000, and issued an entry of
judgment on October 20, 2000.[7]
In the meantime, on February 16, 2000, the MTCC
amended its decision to correct typographical errors in the
description of the properties involved. [8] None of the parties
objected to or challenged the corrections.
On April 5, 2000, the MTCC issued the writ of execution
upon the petitioners motion.[9] The writ of execution was duly
served on August 24, 2000 upon all the defendants, including the
respondents, as the sheriffs return of service indicated.[10]
On April 20, 2001, the respondents filed a motion to
quash against the April 5, 2000 writ of execution and its aliases,
and a motion to stay the execution of the March 17, 1999 decision
and the February 16, 2000 amended decision. [11] They anchored
their motions on the supposedly supervening finding that the lot
covered by the writ of execution was foreshore land belonging to
the State. To support their contention, they presented the
following administrative issuances from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), namely:
(a) Memorandum dated August 30, 2000
issued by the Community Environment
and National Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR recommending
the cancellation of Free Patent F.P. No.
309502 from which was derived
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-1, and petitioners TCT No. T-55630;
and
(b) Memorandum dated November 13,
2000 of the DENR Regional Executive
Director for Region VI in Iloilo City.
They argued that such supervening event directly affected the
execution of the March 17, 1999 decision and its amendment,
whose continued execution affecting foreshore land would be
unjust to the occupants or possessors of the property, including
themselves.[12]
On May 4, 2001, the MTCC denied the respondents
motion to quash, observing that the cancellation of the petitioners
TCT No. T-55630 was an event that might or might not happen,
and was not the supervening event that could stay the execution.
[13]
A month later, on June 8, 2001, the MTCC denied the
respondents motion for reconsideration,[14] viz:
As of this point in time the movant
has not shown that she has a better right to
possess the land she is presently occupying
as a squatter, than the plaintiff who is in
possession of a clean Torrens Title. It is not
true that the execution of the decision of
this court would be unjust to her. To put it
bluntly, it would be more unjust to the
plaintiff who was deprived of possession of
his land for a very long time, because of the
movants insistence in occupying said land
even after the decision ejecting her from
the plaintiffs land had become final and
executory.
In fine, the movant has not shown
additional evidences or arguments which
would warrant the reversal of the order
dated May 4, 2001.
WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration dated June 1, 2001 is
denied.
SO ORDERED.
The story would have ended then but for the fact that
on October 1, 2001, or more than a year after the writ of
execution was served upon the defendants in Civil Case No.
23671, the respondents, led by respondent Elisa M. Tortogo, and
now assisted by Atty. Leon Moya, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order) in the RTC in Negros Occidental,
docketed as SCA Case No. 01-11522,[15] praying:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered,
it is most respectfully prayed of this
HONORABLE COURT that the assailed
ORDERS dated 4 May 2001 and 8 July 2001
be REVERSED, ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
PETITIONERS are further praying
that after due notice and hearing, a
temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction be issued
to enjoin the execution/implementation of
the Decision dated 17 March 1999 and the
16 February 2000 Amended Decision.
Such other and further reliefs just
and equitable under the premises.
On October 11, 2001, Judge Gorgonio J. Ybaez, to
whose branch SCA Case No. 01-11522 was raffled, granted the
respondents prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) in the
following terms,[16] to wit:
xxxx
WHEREAS, the matter of issuance
or not of a TRO was summarily heard on
October 5, 2001 in the presence of the
parties and counsels who were both heard
in support/amplification of their respective
stand(s);
WHEREAS, it appears that the
issuance of a TRO prayed for would be in
order at this stage in this case because
there appears an imminent danger of
demolition of the structures of herein
petitioners at the premises in question,
pending the trial and final determination of
the merits in this case in this case (sic)
wherein the private respondent Pahila does
not appear to have prior possession of the
premises in question, and, wherein
although it appears that the title of the
premises in question is in the name of
respondent Pahila, there also is a showing
that the same title may have been illegally
issued;
WHEREAS, the very imminent
danger of demolition may result to
irreparable damage to herein petitioners,
thus, the impending demolition appears to
be a compelling reason for the issuance of a
TRO at this stage in this case.
NOW THEREFORE, YOU, the herein
respondents, YOUR AGENTS,
REPRESENTATIVES, or ANY PERSON acting
for and in your behalf, are hereby ENJOINED
to CEASE and DESIST from further
implementing the 5 April 2000 Writ of
Execution and/or any of its Aliases or any
demolition order, if one might have already
been issued, in civil case No. 23671, MTCC,
Branch 6, Bacolod City, until further orders
from this Court.
On October 25, 2002, the petitioner sought a clarificatory
order,[17] moving that the TRO be vacated due to its being effective
for only twenty days and because such effectivity could neither be
extended nor be made indefinite. She complained that her hands
had already been tied for a year from executing the decision and
from availing herself of the writ of demolition; and pleaded that it
was time to give her justice in order that she could already enjoy
the possession of the property.
On October 30, 2002, the respondents moved for the
early resolution of the case and for the issuance of the writ of
prohibitory injunction.[18]
On November 12, 2002, the RTC issued the assailed
writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction,[19] as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU, the herein
respondents, YOUR AGENTS,
REPRESENTATIVES, or any person acting for
and in behalf, are hereby ENJOINED to
CEASE and DESIST from further
implementing the April 25, 2000 Writ of
Execution and/or any of its aliases, or any
demolition order, if one might have been
issued already, in Civil Case No. 23671
before MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City,
pending the hearing and final determination
of the merits in this instant case, or until
further orders from this Court.
xxxx
 SO ORDERED.
The petitioner then directly came to the Court through
her so-called petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul
and set aside the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued
by the RTC pursuant to its order dated November 12, 2002. She
contended that: (a) the RTC issued the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction in a way not in accord with law or the
applicable jurisprudence, because the injunction was directed at
the execution of a final and executory judgment of a court of law;
(b) the respondents (as the petitioners in SCA Case No. 01-11522)
had no existing right to be protected by injunction, because their
right and cause of action were premised on the future and
contingent event that the petitioners TCT No. T-55630 would be
cancelled through a separate proceeding for the purpose; and (c)
the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the
execution was issued long after the March 17, 1999 judgment of
the MTCC had become final and executory.
Issues
The petition presents the following issues, to wit:
a. Whether the present petition is a
proper remedy to assail the November
12, 2002 order of the RTC; and
b. Whether the RTC lawfully issued the
TRO and the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction to enjoin the
execution of the already final and
executory March 17, 1999 decision of
the MTCC.
Ruling
We give due course to the petition as a petition
for certiorari.
The RTC was guilty of manifestly grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of SCA Case No. 01-11522 and in issuing the TRO and
the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to restrain the
execution of the final and executory decision of the MTCC.
I The petition, by alleging acts constituting
November 12, 2002 order of the RTC is an
interlocutory order that was not subject of appeal
With the petition being self-styled as a petition for
review on certiorari, a mode of appeal, we have first to determine
whether the assailed order of November 12, 2002 was an
interlocutory or a final order. The distinction is relevant in deciding
whether the order is the proper subject of an appeal, or of a
special civil action for certiorari.
The distinction between a final order and an
interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be
decided upon.[20] An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered.[21] The test to ascertain whether or not an
order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or
judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment
is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted
the application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an
interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of
an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an
interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on
the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals.
Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the
merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will
compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one
of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are
incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory
orders rendered or issued by the lower court. [22] An interlocutory
order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment
has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being
included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject
of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,
[23]
provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then
is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.[24]
II
manifestly grave abuse of discretion, was a
petition for certiorari

Without disregarding the rule that an interlocutory
order cannot be the subject of appeal, the Court is constrained to
treat the present recourse as a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an
inferior court of record, or other tribunal or officer, exercising a
judicial function, requiring the certification and return to the
former of some proceeding then pending, or the record and
proceedings in some cause already terminated, in cases where the
procedure is not according to the course of the common law.
[25]
The remedy is brought against a lower court, board, or officer
rendering a judgment or order and seeks the annulment or
modification of the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and the granting of such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.[26] It is available when the following indispensable
elements concur, to wit:
1. That it is directed against a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions;
2. That such tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion; and
3. That there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[27]
Certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party
who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid
down by law.[28] The extraordinary writ of certiorari may be availed
of only upon a showing, in the minimum, that the respondent
tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion.[29]
For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper
and be given due course, it must be shown that: (a) the
respondent judge or tribunal issued the order without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; or (b) the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of
appeal cannot afford adequate and expeditious relief. [30] Ye t ,
t h e allegation that the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion will
not alonesuffice. Equally imperative is that the petition must
satisfactorily specify the acts committed or omitted by the
tribunal, board or officer that constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.[31] To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the
abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of
law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[32]
A reading of the petition shows that the petitioner has
satisfied the requirements to justify giving due course to her
petition as a petition under Rule 65. She has identified therein
some acts as constituting the RTC Judges manifestly grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, namely:
(a) despite the final and executory nature of the judgment sought
to be enjoined, the RTC still issued the TRO and, later on, the
assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the writ of execution; (b) the RTC issued the
writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to protect the
respondents alleged right in the subject properties, but the right
did not appear to be in esse; and (c) the issuance of the TRO and
the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction was in violation of
the requirements imposed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and
pertinent jurisprudence.
Did the petitioners failure to first make a motion for
reconsideration in the RTC preclude treating her petition as a
petition for certiorari?
The answer is in the negative. That the petitioner did
not file a motion for reconsideration in the RTC before coming to
this Court did not preclude treating her petition as one
for certiorari. The requirement under Section 1 of Rule 65 that
there must be no appeal, or any plain or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law admits exceptions. In Francisco Motors
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[33] the Court has recognized
exceptions to the requirement, such as: (a) when it is necessary to
prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the
trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c)
where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an
appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the
issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is
involved; and (g) in case of urgency. The allegations of the petition
definitely placed the petitioners recourse under most, if not all, of
the exceptions.
Was the petition timely filed?
 It was. The petitioner received a copy of the order
dated November 12, 2002 on November 15, 2002. Pursuant
to Section 4 of Rule 65,[34] she had until January 14, 2003, or 60
days from November 15, 2002, within which to file a petition
for certiorari. She filed the petition on January 2, 2003,[35] well
within the period for her to do so.
We also observe that the rule that a petition should
have been brought under Rule 65 instead of under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court (or vice versa) is not inflexible or rigid.[36] The
inflexibility or rigidity of application of the rules of procedure is
eschewed in order to serve the higher ends of
justice. Thus, substance is given primacy over form, for it is
paramount that the rules of procedure are not applied in a very
rigid technical sense, but used only to help secure, not override,
substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules
is made, their aim is defeated.[37] Verily, the strict application of
procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition
of the case on the merits. [38] To institute a guideline, therefore,
the Rules of Court expressly mandates that the rules of procedure
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.[39]
III
March 17, 1999
Decision of the
MTCC, being already
final and executory,
could not be
assailed; nor could its
execution be
restrained
The respondents elevated to the Court the CA
decision dated December 6, 1999 and resolution dated April
17, 2000 via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 143458
entitled Damiana Daguno, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al.) The Courtdismissed the petition on July 19, 2000, and
the dismissal became final and executory on October 20,
2000 because the respondents did not timely file a motion
for reconsideration. Consequently, the
MTCC rightly issued the writ of execution on April 5, 2000.
Based on the sheriffs return of service, the writ of
execution was duly served upon all the defendants.
Under the circumstances, the principle of
immutability of a final judgmentmust now be absolutely and
unconditionally applied against the respondents. They could
not anymore be permitted to
interminably forestall the execution of the judgment through
their interposition of new petitions or pleadings.[40] Even
as theirright to initiate an action in court ought to be fully
respected, their commencing SCA Case No. 01-11522 in the
hope of securing a favorable ruling despite their case having
been already fully and finally adjudicated should not
be tolerated. Their move should not frustrate the
enforcement of the judgment, the fruit and the end of the
suit itself. Their right as the losing parties to appeal within
the prescribed periodcould not defeat the correlative right
of the winning party to enjoy at last the finality of the
resolution of her case through execution and satisfaction of
the judgment, which would be the life of the law.[41] To
frustrate the winning partys right throughdilatory schemes is
to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the
courts, which thereby increases the costs of litigation. The
interest of justice undeniably demanded that we
should immediately write finis to the litigation, for all courts
are by oath bound to guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about the frustration of the winning partys right, and
to stop any attempt to prolong controversies already
resolved with finality.[42]
It is true that notwithstanding the principle of
immutability of final judgments, equity still accords
some recourse to a party adversely affected by a final and
executory judgment, specifically, the remedy of a petition to
annul the judgmentbased on the ground of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction, or the remedy of a petition for relief
from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court.[43] He may also have a competent court
stay the execution or prevent the enforcement of a final
judgment when facts and circumstances that render
execution inequitable or unjust meanwhile transpire;[44] or
when a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an
injunctive relief.[45]
Neither of such remaining equitable remedies is
available anymore to the respondents, however, for the time
for such remedies is now past. Indeed, it is now high time for
the respondents to bow to the judgment, and to accept their
fate under it.
IV
Issuance of TRO and
writ of preliminary
prohibitory
injunction is patently
without basis and
violated the
requirements of the
Rules of Court and
jurisprudence
At this juncture, we find and declare that the
RTC Judges issuance of the assailed order dated November
12, 2002 granting the respondents application for the writ of
 preliminary prohibitory
injunction constituted manifestly grave abuse of discretion.
A.
Respondents had no existing right violated
by the implementation of the writ of execution
Generally, injunction, being a preservative
remedy for the protection of substantive rights or
interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted
to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard
of compensation. The controlling reason for the existence of
the judicial power to issue the writ of injunction is that the
court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly
adjudicated. The application for the writ rests upon an
alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason for
such an order to issue before the case can be regularly
heard, and the essential conditions for granting such
temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges
facts that appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of
action for injunction and that on the entire showing from
both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that
the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal
rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.[46]
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is
the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. It is granted
only to protect actual and existingsubstantial rights.
Without actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant,
and in the absence of facts bringing the matter within the
conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down
for being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will
not issue to protect a right not in esse, which is merely contingent,
and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not
give rise to a cause of action.[47]
Here, the respondents did not establish the existence
of an actual right to be protected by injunction. They did not, to
begin with, hold any enforceable claim in the property subject of
the MTCC decision and of the writ of execution. The Memoranda
and investigative report, whereby the DENR appeared to classify
the property as foreshore land, conferred upon the respondents
no interest or right in the land. Under all circumstances, the
classification was not a supervening event that entitled them to
the protection of the injunctive relief. Their claim to any right as of
then was merely contingent, and was something that might not
even arise in the future. Simply stated, they could not lay proper
claim to the land before the State has taken a positive act of first
properly classifying the land as foreshore land and the courts have
first conclusively determined and adjudged the ownership in their
favor in a suit brought for the purpose. Without the States positive
act of classification and the courts adjudication, all that the
respondents had was an inchoate expectation that might not at
all materialize, especially if we consider that the petitioner was
already the registered owner of the same property, as evidenced
by her existing and valid transfer certificate of title covering the
land (a fact that they themselves admitted and acknowledged),
[48]
for which she enjoyed the indefeasibility of a Torrens title.[49]
Presumably well aware that the respondents held
absolutely no valid and existing right in the land, the RTC Judge
had plainly no factual and legal bases for enjoining the
enforcement of the writ of execution through the TRO and the
writ of preliminary injunction. He obviously acted arbitrarily and
whimsically, because injunction protected only an existing right
or actual interest in property. Thus, he was guilty of committing
manifestly grave abuse of discretion, and compounded his guilt by
stopping the enforcement of a final and executory decision of the
MTCC.
B.
TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
were wrongfully issued for an indefinite period
We further note that the RTC Judge expressly made the
TRO effective until further orders from him. He thereby
contravened explicit rules of procedure. He knowingly did so,
considering that he thereby disregarded the nature and purpose
of the TRO as a temporary and limited remedy, instead of a
permanent and unrestricted relief. He disregarded Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, which expressly stated that the life span
of a TRO was only 20 days from service of the TRO on the party or
person sought to be enjoined. Considering that the limited life
span of a TRO was a long-standing and basic rule of procedure, he
consciously arrogated unto himself a power that he did not have.
Ignoring a rule as elementary as the 20-day life span of a TRO
amounted to gross ignorance of law and procedure. His violation
is seemingly made worse by the fact that he thereby usurped the
authority of the Court as the only court with the power to issue a
TRO effective until further orders.[50]
Due to its lifetime of only 20 days from service on the
party or person to be enjoined, the TRO that the RTC Judge
issued automatically expired on the twentieth day without need of
any judicial declaration to that effect. Yet,
 SECTION 6

by making the TRO effective until further orders, he made the THIRD DIVISION
effectivity of the TRO indefinite. He thus took for granted the
caution that injunction, as the strong arm of equity, [51] should not
be routinely or lightly granted. Again, restraint was required of
him, for the power to issue injunctions should be exercised
sparingly, with utmost care, and with great caution and
deliberation. The power is to be exercised only where the reason
and necessity therefor are clearly established, and only in cases SPOUSES ALFREDO and SHIRLEY YAP, G.R. No. 17
reasonably free from doubt.[52] For, it has been said that there is
no power the exercise of which is more delicate, requires greater Petitioners,
caution and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case,
than the issuing of an injunction.[53] Present:

AUSTRIA-M

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari. - versus - Acting Cha

TINGA,*

We NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the writ of preliminary CHICO-NAZ

prohibitory injunction issued on November 12, 2002 for being
devoid of legal and factual bases; and DIRECT the Regional Trial INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK,[1] SHERIFF RENATO C. NACHURA,
Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod City to dismiss SCACase No. 01- FLORA and/or OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL
11522. TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, REYES, JJ.

Respondents.

Presiding Judge Gorgonio J. Ybaez of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod City is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in
writing within ten days from notice why he should not be
administratively sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law and Promulgate
procedure for his manifest disregard of the prohibition under
the Rules of Court against unwarranted restraining orders and
writs of injunction, and for issuing a temporary restraining order
effective until furthers of the court. March 28,

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-x

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondents.

SO ORDERED.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set
aside the Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
95074 dated 11 July 2006 which dismissed petitioner-spouses
Alfredo and Shirley Yaps petition for certiorari which questioned
the Order[3] of Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City in Civil Case No. 68088 recalling and dissolving the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated 13 August 2001, and its
Resolution[4] dated 9 October 2006 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Respondent International Exchange Bank (iBank, for
brevity) filed a collection suit with application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment against Alberto Looyuko and
Jimmy T. Go in the RTC of Makati. The case was raffled to Branch
150 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-791. On 7 October
1999, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent
iBank and found Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go liable, ordering
them to pay the amount of ninety-six million pesos
(P96,000,000.00), plus penalty.
A Writ of Execution on the judgment against Mr.
Looyuko was implemented.Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was
issued against Mr. Go for his part of the liability. Thereupon,
respondent Renato C. Flora, Sheriff of Branch 150 of the RTC of
Makati City, issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale on 12 May 2000
notifying all the parties concerned, as well as the public in general,
that the following real properties, among other properties,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. PT-66751, No.
PT-66749, No. 55469 and No. 45229 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pasig City, TCT No. 36489 of the Registry of Quezon City, and TCTs
No. 4621 and No. 52987 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City, allegedly owned by Mr. Go will be sold at public auction
on 15 June 2000.[5] Said public auction did not push through.
On 13 June 2000, petitioner-spouses Alfredo and
Shirley Yap filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction with
the RTC of Pasig City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
67945 and was raffled to Branch 158 thereof. Petitioners sought to
stop the auction sale alleging that the properties covered by TCTs
No. PT-66751, No. PT-66749, No. 55469 and No. 45229 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, TCT No. 36489 of the Registry of
Quezon City, and TCTs No. 4621 and No. 52987 of the Registry of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City, are already owned by them by virtue
of Deeds of Absolute Sale[6] executed by Jimmy Go in their
favor. They further alleged that respondent sheriff disregarded
their right over the properties despite their execution of an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim to prove their claim over the properties
and the publication of a Notice to the Public warning that various
deeds had already been issued in their favor evidencing their right
over the same.
A second Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated 30 June
2000 was issued by Sheriff Flora scheduling a public auction on 24
July 2000 for the afore-mentioned properties. The public auction
did not happen anew. Thereafter, a third Notice of
Sheriffs Sale dated 21 July 2000 scheduling a public auction on 22
August 2000 was issued.
On 21 August 2000, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 158,
issued an Order in Civil Case No. 67945 denying petitioners
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.[7]
As scheduled, the public auction took place on 22
August 2000 for which respondent sheriff issued a Certificate of
Sale stating that the subject properties had been sold at public
auction in favor of respondent iBank, subject to the third-party
claims of petitioners.[8]
Petitioners filed with the RTC of Pasig City the instant
case for Annulment of Sheriffs Auction Sale Proceedings and
Certificate of Sale against iBank, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of RTC Makati City, and Sheriff Flora. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 68088 and was raffled to Branch
264. The Complaint was amended to include a prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.[9]
Engracio M. Escarias, Jr., Clerk of Court VII and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of RTCMakati City, filed his Answer while
respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed an Omnibus Motion
(Motion to Refer the Complaint to the Office of the Clerk of Court
for Raffle in the Presence of Adverse Party and Motion to Dismiss)
dated 17 October 2000.[10]
In an Order dated 20 February 2001, Hon. Leoncio M.
Janolo, Jr. denied the Omnibus Motion for lack of merit.
[11]
Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated 26 February 2001.[12]
A hearing was held on the application for preliminary
injunction. On 18 July 2001, an Order was issued by Judge Janolo
granting petitioners application for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs
application for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED, and
defendants and their representatives are
enjoined from proceeding further with the
execution, including consolidating title and
taking possession thereof, against plaintiffs
real properties covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. PT-66751, PT-
66749, 55469, 45229, 4621, 52987 and
36489.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall be
issued upon plaintiffs posting of a bond
 executed to defendant in the amount of
Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) to the
effect that plaintiffs will pay defendants all
damages which the latter may sustain by
reason of the injunction if it be ultimately
decided that the injunction is unwarranted.
[13]
On 13 August 2001, upon posting a bond in the amount of three
million pesos (P3,000,000.00), Judge Janolo issued the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.[14]
Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed on 29 August 2001 a
Motion for Reconsideration[15] of the order granting the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction which the trial court denied in an Order
dated 21 November 2001.[16]
With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents
iBank and Sheriff Flora filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction[17] praying that it: (a) issue immediately a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Janolo from taking any action or
conducting any further proceeding on the case; (b) annul the
Orders dated 18 July 2001 and 21 November 2001; and (c) order
the immediate dismissal of Civil Case No. 68088.
In its decision dated 18 July 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the Petition.[18]It explained that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by Judge Janolo in promulgating the two Orders. It
emphasized that its ruling only pertains to the propriety or
impropriety of the issuance of the preliminary injunction and has
no bearing on the main issues of the case which are still to be
resolved on the merits.The Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora was
denied for lack of merit.[19]
Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora thereafter filed with this
Court a Petition for Certiorari which we dismissed. The Courts
Resolution dated 7 March 2005 reads:
Considering the allegations, issues and
arguments adduced in the petition for
certiorari, the Court Resolves to DISMISS
the petition for being a wrong remedy
under the Rules and evidently used as a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. Besides, even if
treated as a petition under Rule 65 of the
said Rules, the same would be dismissed for
failure to sufficiently show that the
questioned judgment is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.[20]
Accordingly, an Entry of Judgment was issued by the Supreme
Court certifying that the resolution dismissing the case had
become final and executory on 30 July 2005.[21]
Subsequently, respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed with the
RTC of Pasig City, Branch 264, an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve
Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) dated 31
January 2006 praying that their pending Motion for
Reconsideration dated 26 February 2001 which seeks for the
dismissal of the case be resolved and/or the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction previously issued be dissolved.[22]
On 9 February 2006, petitioners filed their Comment
thereon with Motion to Cite in Contempt the counsel [23] of
respondents. They pray that the pending Motion for
Reconsideration be denied for being devoid of merit, and that the
Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Injunction be also denied,
it being a clear defiance of the directive of the Supreme Court
which ruled with finality that the injunction issued by the trial
court was providently issued and was not tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. They further ask that respondents counsel be cited
in contempt of court and be meted out the appropriate penalty.
[24]
Respondents filed a Reply dated 20 February 2006.
In a Manifestation dated 24 March 2006, respondents
iBank and Sheriff Flora submitted an Affidavit of Merit to
emphasize their resolve and willingness, among other things, to
file a counter-bond to cover whatever damages petitioners may
suffer should the trial court decide to dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction.[25]Petitioners filed a Counter-Manifestation
with Second Motion to Cite Respondents Counsel in Direct
Contempt of Court[26] to which respondents filed an Opposition.
[27]
Petitioners filed a Reply thereto.[28]
In an Order[29] dated 29 April 2006, the trial court
recalled and dissolved the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 13
August 2001, and ordered respondents to post a counter-bond
amounting to ten million pesos. It directed the Branch Clerk of
Court to issue a Writ Dissolving Preliminary Injunction upon the
filing and approval of the required counter-bond. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, this Courts writ of preliminary
injunction dated August 13, 2001 is recalled
and dissolved. Defendants are hereby
ordered to post a counter-bond amounting
to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) to
cover the damages plaintiffs would incur
should a favorable judgment be rendered
them after trial on the merits.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to
issue a Writ Dissolving Preliminary
Injunction upon the filing and approval of
defendants counter-bond.[30]
The trial court explained its ruling in this wise:
In our jurisdiction, the provisions
of Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court
allow the issuance of preliminary
injunction. This court granted plaintiffs
prayer preliminary injunction in the Order
dated July 18, 2001 and the corresponding
writ issued on August 13, 2001.
Defendants in this case,
however, are not without remedy to pray
for dissolution of preliminary injunction
already granted because it is only
interlocutory and not permanent in nature.
The provisions of Section 6, Rule
58 of the Revised Rules of Court allow
dissolution of the injunction granted
provided there is affidavit of party or
persons enjoined; an opportunity to oppose
by the other party; hearing on the issue,
and filing of a bond to be fixed by the court
sufficient to compensate damages applicant
may suffer by dissolution thereby.
A preliminary injunction is
merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to
the main case subject to the latters
outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve
the status quo until the trial court hears
fully the merits of the case. The status
quo is the last actual, peaceable and
uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy. The status quo should be that
existing at the time of the filing of the
case. A preliminary injunction should not
establish new relations between the parties,
but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-
existing relationship between them. x x x.
When the complainants right or
title is doubtful or disputed, he does not
have a clear legal right and, therefore, the
issuance of injunctive relief is not proper
and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. x
x x. In the case at bar, plaintiffs deed of sale
was purported to be not duly notarized. As
such, the legal right of what the plaintiffs
claim is still doubtful and such legal right
can only be threshed out in a full blown trial
where they can clearly establish the right
over the disputed properties.
Moreover, defendants are willing
to post a counter bond which could cover
up to the damages in favor of plaintiffs in
case the judgment turns out to be adverse
to them. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
this is perfectly allowed and the dissolution
of the writ of injunction can accordingly be
issued. In the case of Lasala vs. Fernandez,
the highest court has enunciated that a
court has the power to recall or modify a
writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued by it. The issuance or recall of a
preliminary writ of injunction is an
interlocutory matter that remains at all
times within the control of the court. (G.R.
No. L-16628, May 23, 1962). The defendants
had shown that dissolution of the writ of
injunction is just and proper. It was duly
shown that great and irreparable injury
would severely cause the defendants if the
writ of injunction shall continue to exist.[31]
On 5 May 2006, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals asking that the trial courts Order dated 29
April 2006 be set aside.[32]
During the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari, petitioners filed
before the trial court a Very Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings[33] to which respondents filed a Comment.[34]
On 11 July 2006, the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss outright
the Petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioners to file a motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated 29 April 2006.[35] The
Motion for Reconsideration[36] filed by petitioners was denied.[37]
After being granted an extension of thirty days within which to file THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
a petition for certiorari, petitioners filed the instant Petition on 14 ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
December 2006. They made the following assignment of errors: DISCRETION IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING
YOUR PETITIONERS PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI IN CA-GR SP NO. 95074, AS IT
FAILED TO APPLY EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
TO THE EFFECT THAT A MOTION FOR
I
RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED
WITH WHERE THE CONTROVERTED ACT IS
PATENTLY ILLEGAL OR WAS PERFORMED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JURISDICTION AS HELD IN HAMILTON VS.
JUDGE LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR. GRAVELY LEVY, (344 SCRA 821)
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION DATED 13 AUGUST 2001.

1. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE

IV
COURT OF APPEALS RESOLVED
WITH FINALITY THAT YOUR
PERITIONERS WILL SUFFER
IRREPARABLE INJURY (C.A.s
emphasis) IF NO INJUNCTION IS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ISSUED. LIKEWISE ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION CLEARLY
POINTING OUT TO THE COURT THAT AS AN
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE, THE REQUIRED
2. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE
HON. SUPREME COURT RULED
DISPENSED WITH.
WITH FINALITY THAT THE COURT
A QUO DID NOT ABUSE ITS
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED
THE INJUNCTION DATED 13
AUGUST 2001, THUS,
SUSTAINING THE REGULARITY OF
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY At the outset, it must be said that the Writ of
INJUNCTION. Preliminary Injunction dated 13 August 2001 issued by the trial
court has not yet been actually dissolved because respondents
have not posted the required counter-bond in the amount
of P10,000,000.00. The dissolution thereof is primed on the filing
II of the counter-bond.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
JUDGE LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR. GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY
FIXING THE PHP10,000,000.00 COUNTER-
BOND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO PETITIONERS AS
A RESULT OF DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS INCAPABLE OF
PECUNIARY ESTIMATION OR COULD NOT BE
QUANTIFIED.
III
Petitioners argue that the trial court abused its
discretion when it ordered the dissolution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, the propriety of its issuance having been
affirmed by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court. There being an Order by this Court that the injunction
issued by the trial court was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, the dissolution of said writ is a clear defiance of this
Courts directive.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the trial
court has the authority and prerogative to set aside the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. They add that since petitioners Deed of
Sale was not duly notarized, the latters application for preliminary
injunction is devoid of factual and legal bases. They assert that,
not being public documents, the subject deeds of sale are nothing
but spurious, if not falsified, documents. They add that the
continuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction would cause
them irreparable damage because it continues to incur damage
not only for the nonpayment of the judgment award (in Civil Case
No. 98-791 before the RTC of Makati City, Br. 150), but also for
opportunity losses resulting from the continued denial of its right
to consolidate title over the levied properties.
There is no dispute that both the Court of Appeals and
this Court have ruled that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction by the trial court was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Respondents tried to undo the issuance of said writ but
to no avail. The Resolution on the matter attained finality on 30
July 2005 and an entry of judgment was made.
This, notwithstanding, respondents filed with the RTC
of Pasig City, Branch 264, an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion
to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) dated 31 January
2006 praying that their Motion for Reconsideration dated 26
February 2001 of the trial courts denial of their Motion to Dismiss
which the trial court failed to resolve, be resolved and/or the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction previously issued be dissolved. With this
Omnibus Motion, the trial court issued the Order dated 13 August
2001 recalling and dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
conditioned on the filing of a P10,000,000.00 counter-bond.
The question is: Under the circumstances obtaining in
this case, may the trial court recall and dissolve the preliminary
injunction it issued despite the rulings of the Court of Appeals and
by this Court that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion?
We hold that the trial court may still order the
dissolution of the preliminary injunction it previously issued. We
do not agree with petitioners argument that the trial court may no
longer dissolve the preliminary injunction because this Court
previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different
from its dissolution. Its issuance is governed by Section 3, [38] Rule
58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure while the grounds for its
dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. As long as the party seeking the dissolution of
the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of the
grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved
notwithstanding that this Court previously ruled that its issuance
was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Section 6 of Rule 58 reads:
Section 6. Grounds for objection
to, or for motion of dissolution of, injunction
or restraining order. The application for
injunction or restraining order may be
denied, upon a showing of its
insufficiency. The injunction or restraining
order may also be denied, or, if granted,
may be dissolved, on other grounds upon
affidavits of the party or person enjoined,
which may be opposed by the applicant also
by affidavits. It may further be denied, or, if
granted, may be dissolved, if it appears after
hearing that although the applicant is
entitled to the injunction or restraining
order, the issuance or continuance thereof,
as the case may be, would cause irreparable
damage to the party or person enjoined
while the applicant can be fully
compensated for such damages as he may
suffer, and the former files a bond in an
amount fixed by the court conditioned that
he will pay all damages which the applicant
may suffer by the denial or the dissolution
of the injunction or restraining order. If it
appears that the extent of the preliminary
injunction or restraining order granted is
too great, it may be modified.
Under the afore-quoted section, a preliminary
injunction may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that
although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining
order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be,
would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined
while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as
he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by
the court on condition that he will pay all damages which the
applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the
injunction or restraining order. Two conditions must concur: first,
the court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the
continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to the
defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a counter-
bond.[39] The Order of the trial court dated 29 April 2006 is based
on this ground.
In the case at bar, the trial court, after hearing, found
that respondents duly showed that they would suffer great and
irreparable injury if the injunction shall continue to exist. As to the
second condition, the trial court likewise found that respondents
were willing to post a counter-bond which could cover the
damages that petitioners may suffer in case the judgment turns
out to be adverse to them. The Order of the trial court to recall
and dissolve the preliminary injunction is subject to the filing and
approval of the counter-bond that it ordered. Failure to post the
required counter-bond will necessarily lead to the non-dissolution
of the preliminary injunction. The Order of Dissolution cannot be
implemented until and unless the required counter-bond has been
posted.

The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial
discretion of the trial court, and its action shall not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or, otherwise, in grave
abuse of discretion.By the same token, the court that issued such
a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the
circumstances may warrant.[40] In the case on hand, the trial court
issued the order of dissolution on a ground provided for by the
Rules of Court.The same being in accordance with the rules, we
find no reason to disturb the same.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred
and gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed outright their
Petition for Certiorari by failing to apply existing jurisprudence
that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with where
the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand,
respondents urge the Court to deny the Petition for Review,
arguing that the Court of Appeals properly applied the general
rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non in order that certiorari will lie.
Petitioners argument that they filed the Petition
for Certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration because
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of law except via a Petition for Certiorari does not
convince. We have held that the plain and adequate remedy
referred to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution. [43] The
mere allegation that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy is not one of the exceptions to the rule that a
motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non before a petition
for certiorari may be filed.
All told, we hold that the act of the trial court of issuing
the Order dated 29 April 2006 was not patently illegal or
performed without or in excess of jurisdiction.The Court of
Appeals was correct in dismissing outright petitioners Petition
for Certiorari for failing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
trial courts Order.
Our pronouncements in this case are confined only to
the issue of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction and will
not apply to the merits of the case.

WHEREFORE, all considered, the Petition is hereby

DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
We find petitioners contention to be untenable. 95074 dated 11 July 2006and 9 October 2006 are AFFIRMED. The
Order dated 29 April 2006 of Branch 264 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 68088 recalling and
dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 13 August
2001 is AFFIRMED. Upon the posting by respondents of the
The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for
counter-bond required, the trial court is directed to issue the Writ
reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of a
Dissolving Preliminary Injunction. No costs.
special civil action for certiorari.[41] It must be stressed that a
petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should be
filed only as a last resort. The filing of a motion for reconsideration SO ORDERED.
is intended to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any
actual error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal
and factual issues.[42] By their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration, they deprived the trial court of the opportunity
to rectify any error it committed, if there was any.

Moreover, a perusal of petitioners petition

for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals shows that they filed
the same because there was no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law except via a petition
for certiorari.When same was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts
Order, they argue that while the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a sine qua non before a petition for certiorari is
instituted, the same is not entirely without exception like where
the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. It was only when the Court
of Appeals dismissed their Petition did they argue that exceptions
to the general rule should apply. Their invocation of the
application of the exceptions was belatedly made. The application
of the exceptions should be raised in their Petition
for Certiorari and not when their Petition has already been
dismissed. They must give their reasons and explain fully why their
case falls under any of the exceptions. This, petitioners failed to
do.
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1901 November 30, 2006
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE, COMPANY, INC., represented by
AMBROCIA G. CANCIO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JIMMY H. F. LUCZON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Tuguegarao, Branch 1, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
For resolution is the administrative complaint filed by Fortune Life
Insurance Company, Inc. ("complainant"), through its Senior Vice-
President Ambrocia G. Cancio, against Jimmy H. F. Luczon, Jr.
("respondent Judge"), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Tuguegarao ("RTC-Tuguegarao"), Branch 1. The charges are
grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, knowingly
rendering an unjust order, and bias and partiality under Section 3,
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Complainant had sought the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
executed in its favor by Maria Victoria Realty and Development
Corporation ("MVRDC"). On 8 October 2003, however, MVRDC
filed a petition for annulment of real estate mortgage and
accounting with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order ("petition") against complainant.
The case was filed before the RTC-Tuguegarao and docketed as
Civil Case No. 6246. On the same day, RTC-Tuguegarao Executive
Judge Vilma T. Pauig ("Judge Pauig") issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining complainant and the deputy
sheriff from holding a foreclosure sale of MVRDCs real properties
on 10 October 2003. The TRO was to be effective for 72 hours. The
clerk of court sent a notice for the special raffle of the case on 13
October 2003.
On 13 October 2003, MVRDC filed a motion for the extension of
the TRO ("motion for extension"), with notice of hearing for 16
October 2003. On the latter date, after the raffle of the case to his
sala, respondent Judge issued an Order1 extending the TRO for
another 17 days.
On 28 October 2003, respondent Judge issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by MVRDC. Respondent Judge
had not yet conducted any hearing on the case. The injunction
order reads:
Considering the fact that the temporary restraining order will
expire on October 30, 2003 a date appearing from the allegations
of the motion[,] that irreparable injuries may result should the
sheriff pursue the foreclosure of the mortgage[,] the Court hereby
grants the injunction subject however to a bond which will answer
for the damages which the defendants may suffer as a result of
the injunction and the bond is fixed at 300,000.00
This injunction will take effect upon filing of the bond and shall
continue until further orders from this Court.
The Sheriff and any of his deputies are hereby enjoined from
enforcing the foreclosure of the mortgage during the pendency of
this injunction.
x x x x2
Complainant assailed the extension of the TRO and the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction "based purely on the
unilateral allegations of MVRDC." Complainant argued that
respondent Judge should not have issued the TRO or writ without
a summary hearing, especially considering that MVRDCs petition
lacked an affidavit of merit. Complainant asserted that it clearly
had the right to foreclose the mortgage. MVRDC defaulted in the
payment of its loan, as shown by copies of dishonored MVRDC
checks totaling 3,165,810.3 Complainant pointed out that under
the law, MVRDC would have the right to redeem any of its
foreclosed properties. Thus, according to complainant, there was
no extreme urgency, grave injustice or irreparable injury which
would justify the injunction in MVRDCs favor.
In its 1st Indorsement dated 2 March 2004, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) required respondent Judge to file his
comment and to show cause why he should not be sanctioned.
In his defense, respondent Judge claimed that he did not know
personally the counsels of either party to the case or any of their
incorporators. Respondent Judge maintained that he dealt with
the parties on a professional level and he always acted fairly.
Respondent Judge claimed that complainant received a copy of
the motion for extension, as shown by a registry receipt posted on
13 October 2003. He granted the motion for extension in view of
the urgency of the case and to avoid irreparable injuries to
MVRDC. Respondent Judge further claimed that complainant
received a copy of the Motion to Set Hearing for the Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction, as shown by a registry receipt posted on 17
October 2003. At any rate, respondent Judge stressed, he already
issued an order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction on 18
March 2004 after complainant filed a motion to dissolve the writ
and MVRDC had filed its comment to the motion.
In its evaluation of the allegations of both complainant and
respondent Judge, the OCA stated:
The instant complaint is partly meritorious. Complainant stresses
pertinent points to account for respondents alleged culpability. A
probe into each reveals that many of the issues raised are judicial
in nature. Save for one, the enumerated points warrant no
culpability on the part of respondent Judge.
Complainant assails the supposed lack of an Affidavit of Merit.
Viewed in the context of the actual petition for preliminary
injunction, this contention cannot be countenanced. The absence
of an Affidavit of Merit is not final where the petition itself, which
is under oath, recites the circumstances or facts which constitute
the grounds of the petition.
Complainant also takes issue with the fact that it was not
furnished a copy of the bond. Apparently, this contention is
premised on Section 7 of Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which in effect allows the adverse party to "except to the
sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon."
Again, said contention cannot be sustained in light of the
circumstances of the case at hand. A check with the records of the
instant case discloses that the summons, a copy of the petition,
and raffle notification were actually received by the complainant
on 10 October 2003. In Caluya v. Ramos, the failure of the
defendants to furnish the adverse parties with copies of the bonds
prior to their approval is not sufficient to invalidate the orders
dissolving the preliminary injunction where the attorneys for the
latter were notified of the filing of the first bond; where they
ultimately received copies of the bonds; and where they do not
contend that said bonds are insufficient or that the sureties are
not solvent.
Except for the allegation of lack of summary hearing,
complainants charges against respondent Judge should be
dismissed for being judicial in nature. Essentially the same
allegations were raised in the Motion to Dissolve Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. The complainant assails the wisdom of the
assailed Orders of respondent. However, it must be noted that the
complainant has adequate remedy under the Rules of Court to
challenge said Orders. In fact, it filed a [m]otion to [d]issolve the
[w]rit of [p]reliminary [i]njunction which was eventually granted
on 18 March 2004.
We submit, however, that the absence of summary hearing
cannot be excused. The conduct of a summary hearing is
mandated under Section 5, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Procedure x x x
x.
The requirement of hearing is so basic and fundamental that an
omission of [such] amounts to gross ignorance of rules and
procedure and invites due sanction. In this case, respondent
[Judge] twice ignored this elementary requisite. First, he extended
the TRO. Then, after its expiration, he converted the same into a
preliminary injunction. Both Orders were issued without
conducting a summary hearing. The rules on preliminary
injunction plainly provide that it cannot be granted without notice
to the defendant.
When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or
to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Judges are duty-bound to be faithful to the law and the rules
and to maintain professional competence at all times. Their role in
the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the
law, rules and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the judiciary
be eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.
x x x [I]t bears stressing that a writ of injunction is an
extraordinary, peremptory remedy that should be dispensed with
circumspection, and both sides should first be heard whenever
possible. In fact, judges are enjoined to observe utmost caution,
prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of [a] TRO and in the
grant of preliminary injunction. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, it
was found that the issuance of the assailed TRO was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion for having been issued without prior
notice and hearing.
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, "Gross Ignorance of the Law or
Procedure" is classified as [a] serious offense for which the
imposable sanction ranges from a fine to dismissal. However, we
find [respondent Judges] acts not ingrained with malice or bad
faith. x x x x
Recommendation: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of
the Honorable Court are the recommendations that:
1. The instant complaint be re-docketed as a regular
administrative case;
2. Respondent [Judge] be meted a fine in the amount
of five thousand pesos for gross ignorance of the law;
and
3. The rest of the charges against respondent [Judge]
be DISMISSED for being judicial in nature.4
The evaluation and recommendation of the OCA are well-taken,
except for the penalty.
The Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 20-955 require
the holding of a hearing where both parties can introduce
evidence and present their side before the court may issue a TRO
or an injunctive writ. Section 5 of Rule 58 provides:
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court
to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only
for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within
the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or
person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted, determine within the same
period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections,
if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only
seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately
comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to
service of summons and the documents to be served
therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72)
hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct
a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary
restraining order shall be extended until the application for
preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total
period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed
twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours
provided herein. (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, where
the matter is of extreme urgency and grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge may issue ex
parte a TRO effective for 72 hours from issuance. Before the expiry
of the 72 hours, the presiding judge to whom the case is raffled
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO
can be extended until the pending application for injunction can
be heard.1wphi1
Evidently, the hearing of the motion for extension set on 16
October 2003 did not take place. All the same, respondent Judge
granted the motion on that date, without mentioning the reason
for the lack of hearing, or whether he intended to conduct one in
the future on the prayer for the issuance of an injunction. Further
compounding his error, respondent Judge failed to conduct a
hearing on the injunction within the 20-day life of the TRO, as
prescribed by the Rules of Court. Yet he issued the assailed
injunction order against complainant. The injunction order did not
even explain why no hearings had taken place prior to its issuance.
Injunction is an extraordinary remedy to be resorted to when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that
cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. 6 A court
may issue an injunction only if it is fully convinced of its extreme
necessity and after it has complied with the procedural
requirements set by law.
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action.7 However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in gross
violation of clearly established law or procedure, with which every
judge must be familiar. Every judge, while presiding over a court of
law, must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands and
maintain professional competence at all times.8
Respondent Judges failure to abide by Section 5, Rule 58 and
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 constitutes gross ignorance of
the law for which he must be disciplined accordingly. 9 Under Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge and
penalized with dismissal, suspension, or a fine ranging from above
20,000 to 40,000.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Jimmy H. F. Luczon, Jr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Branch 1, liable for GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and FINE him
21,000. We STERNLY WARN him that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.
SO ORDERED.
SECTION 8
[G.R. No. 126462.February 5, 2003]
NATALIA REALTY vs. CA
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated FEB 5 2003.
G.R. No. 126462(Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.)
Before the Court are two motions filed by private respondents: (1)
Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond (Manager's Check) and (2)
Manifestation with Motion for Entry of Judgment.
On November 12, 2002, the Court dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by Natalia Realty, Inc. ("petitioner" for brevity)
against Antonio Martinez, Felipe Padua, Mario Perfecto and
Hermito Salodega ("private respondents" for brevity). The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, shall forthwith issue and cause to be
immediately enforced an ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION of the Order
of August 3, 1995 granting possession to private respondents of
portions of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 31527 and
31528 (now No. N-67845). This decision is immediately executory.
The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records of the case to
the court of origin.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED."
On November 28, 2002, private respondents filed a "Motion for
Execution Against TRO Bond (Manager's Check)". In their motion,
private respondents point out that to secure the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, petitioner posted with the Court a
Manager's Check of BPI-Family Bank, Taytay Branch, dated
February 27, 1997 in the amount of P100,000.00. Petitioner
posted the cash bond pursuant to the March 3, 1997 Resolution of
the Court granting the motion of petitioner to file a cash bond.
The pertinent portion of the Court's resolution reads:
"The motion of the petitioner dated February 25, 1997 to file a
cash bond in lieu of the supersedeas bond issued by Mercantile
Insurance Company which petitioner filed on October 29, 1996 in
order to expedite the issuance of a temporary restraining order in
this case and submitting a Manager's Check in the amount of
P100,000.00 issued by the BPI-Family Bank, Taytay Branch,
is GRANTED. As prayed for, let a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER ISSUE enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Court
of Appeals' questioned resolutions promulgated on June 27, 1995
and June 19, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 44915 entitled "Natalia
Realty, Inc. vs. Antonio Martinez, et al."
In view of the November 12, 2002 Decision of the Court dismissing
the instant petition, private respondents pray that the bond
posted by petitioner with the Court, in the amount of
P100,000.00, be executed on and released in private respondents'
favor.
On December 16, 2002, the Court required petitioner to file its
Comment.
Petitioner filed its "Opposition to Motion of Ceferino Padua To
Have Manager's Check of P100,000.00 Be Released In Favor of
Respondents" arguing for the denial of the motion of private
respondents. Petitioner contends that the manager's check
deposited by it should be applied to the satisfaction of any
judgment rendered in favor of private respondents, and after
satisfying the judgment, the balance should be refunded to it.
Petitioner insists that a hearing should be conducted to determine
the extent of the damage suffered by private respondents.
Petitioner invokes Section 18 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.The
provision reads:
"Sec. 18. Disposition of money deposited.- Where the party
against whom attachment had been issued has deposited money
instead of giving counter-bond, it shall be applied under the
direction of the court to the satisfaction of any judgment rendered
in favor of the attaching party, and after satisfying the judgment
the balance shall be rendered to the depositor or his assignee. If
the judgment is in favor of the party against whom attachment
was issued, the whole sum deposited must be refunded to him or
his assignee."
On January 13, 2003, private respondents filed a "Manifestation
with Motion for Entry of Judgment". Private respondents bewail
the fact that the Regional Trial Court could not act on their motion
for execution of the Decision of the Court dated November 12,
2002 because the records of the case have not been remanded to
it. Private respondents manifest that they are now far more
interested in forthwith executing the decision of the Court
granting them possession of the parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. 31527 and 31528 instead of pursuing execution on the bond.
Private respondents would rather withdraw their Motion for
Execution Against TRO Bond (Manager's Check) if the motion
would only pose as an obstacle to an immediate execution of the
Court's decision. To expedite the execution of the decision, private
respondents pray for the issuance of an entry of judgment since
petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of said
decision. Private respondents believe that an entry of judgment is
in order even while the Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond
(Manager's Check) is pending before the Court.
The Court resolves to reiterate its declaration in its Decision dated
November 12, 2002 that said decision is immediately
executory. The Court also resolves to refer private respondents'
Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond (Manager's Check) to the
Regional Trial Court so that it could hear private respondents'
claim for damages.
Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that before a
writ of execution could issue, the judgment obligee must first
apply for execution with the court of origin and with notice to the
adverse party. Together with the motion, the judgment obligee
must submit (1) certified true copies of the judgment or
judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and (2)
the entry of such judgment or final order.[1]cralawAn entry of
judgment is thus generally required before a writ of execution
could issue. However, where the judgment or final order or
resolution, or a portion thereof is ordered to be immediately
executory, an entry of judgment is no longer necessary.
[2]cralawSection 11 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court clearly
provides:
"Sec.11- Except where the judgment or final order or resolution,
or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the
motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after
its entry."
To avoid unnecessary delays and to prevent the losing party from
thwarting execution, the 1997 Rules of Court has abandoned the
requirement that a court must await the return of the records
before it could effect execution.[3]cralawThe Regional Trial Court,
the court of origin in this case, has therefore no reason to deny or
delay the enforcement of execution just because the records of
the case have yet to be remanded to it.
For as long as private respondents have on motion applied for a
writ of execution with notice to the adverse party and submitted
certified true copies of the judgment or final orders sought to be
enforced, the Regional Trial Court should posthaste comply with
the Court's directive. In its November 12, 2002 Decision, the Court
emphatically orders the Regional Court to "forthwith issue and
cause to be immediately enforced an ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION
of the Order of August 3, 1995 granting possession to private
respondents of portions of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
31527 and 31528 (now No. N-67845). This decision
is immediately executory." To repeat, the absence of the records
and entry of judgment should not be an excuse in delaying the
execution of the Court's decision and which decision the Court
declares to be "immediately executory".
With respect to private respondents' Motion for Execution Against
TRO Bond (Manager's Check), the trial court is directed to hear
private respondents' application for damages pursuant to Section
20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
The applicable provision to private respondents' claim for
damages on the bond is Section 8 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
It states that the "amount of damages to be awarded to either
party, upon the bond of the adverse party shall be claimed,
ascertained, and awarded under the same procedure prescribed
in Section 20 of Rule 57." The pertinent portion of Section 20, Rule
57 in turn provides:
"xxx
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party
against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim damages
sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an
application in the appellate court, with notice to the party in
whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties,
before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory.
The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and
decided by the trial court.
xxx"
In cases where injunction or a temporary restraining order is
issued, the damages that the other party may suffer by reason of
the writ are recoverable from the bond.[4]cralawThe Court has
ruled in Socorro v. Aquino[5]cralaw that the dissolution of the
injunction even if the injunction was obtained in good faith
amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongly
obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately
accrues to the defendant. The dismissal of the petition in this case
resulted in the dissolution of the temporary restraining order,
conferring on private respondents a right of action on the
injunctive bond.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court is instructed to hear and decide
private respondents' Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond
(Manager's Check) to determine the extent of damages sustained
by private respondents.[6]cralaw The hearing on private
respondents' application for damages against theP100,000.00
bond posted by petitioner should not in anyway hinder the
prompt execution of the order of the Court for the immediate
execution of its November 12, 2002 Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch
74, is ordered to forthwith issue and cause to be immediately
enforced an ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION of the Order of August 3,
1995 granting possession to private respondents of portions of the
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 31527 and 31528 (now No. N-
67845). The Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond (Manager's
Check) of private respondents is REFERRED to the same court so
that it could hear and decide the claim for damages pursuant to
Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
Very truly yours,
[G.R. No. 149758. September 25, 2006]
PHILEX GOLD PHILIPPINES, INC., et al. vs. PHILEX BULAWAN
SUPERVISORS UNION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, JOSE D.
PAMPLIEGA
Special First Division
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated SEPT. 25, 2006.
G.R. No. 149758 (Philex Gold Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Philex
Bulawan Supervisors Union, represented by its President, Jose D.
Pampliega)
For consideration of the Court are the following:
(a) Respondent's Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Bond; and
(b) Petitioners' Opposition (to respondent's Ex Parte Motion to
Withdraw Bond)
Respondent union was the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all the supervisors of petitioner Philex Gold
Philippines, Inc., a gold mining company with mine site at Vista
Alegre, Nabulao, Sipalay, Negros Occidental. On July 2, 1997,
respondent union entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) with petitioners covering the period from August 1, 1996 to
July 31, 2001. After the signing of the CBA, petitioners made the
employees of Philex Mining Corp. from Padcal, Tuba, Benguet
(referred to as the "ex-Padcal" supervisors) its regular supervisory
employees effective July 1, 1997. As the ex-Padcal supervisors
were maintained under a "confidential payroll" who receive a
different set of benefits and higher salaries compared to the
locally-hired supervisors (referred to as the local hires) of similar
rank and classification and who perform parallel duties and
functions, respondent union filed a complaint against petitioners
seeking the payment of wage differentials and damages and the
rectification of the discriminatory salary structure and benefits
between the ex-Padcal supervisors and the local hires.
On January 14, 2000, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision
in favor of respondent union and ordered petitioners, jointly and
severally, to readjust the monthly rates of pay of the locally-hired
supervisors (with the categories of S-1 to S-5 ranks) in the same
level or amount as that of the ex-Padcal supervisors and to pay the
wage differentials of the locally-hired supervisors. In his
Resolution of February 29, 2000, the Voluntary Arbitrator clarified
that there was no discrimination in the determination of the rates
of pay of the supervisors, but increased by P800 a month the
amount of wages of the local supervisors as their uniform wage
increase effective October 1, 1999.
Respondent union then filed a petition for review in the Court of
Appeals. In the decision of April 23, 2001, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the Resolution dated February 29, 2000 of
the Voluntary Arbitrator and reinstated the Voluntary Arbitrator's
decision dated January 14, 2000 with modification that the
adjustment of the monthly rates of pay of the locally-hired
supervisors as well as their wage differential pay be made
effective August 1, 1997 up to the finality of this decision. It also
ordered that the case be remanded to the Voluntary Arbitrator for
the proper computation of wage differential and attorney's fees.
Petitioners thus filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order. After the petitioners posted a cash bond of P100,000, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 23,
2001.
On August 25, 2005, the Court rendered a decision affirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals and lifting the temporary
restraining order it earlier issued. Applying the doctrine of "equal
pay for equal work," the Court ruled that petitioner company and
its corporate officers were guilty of discriminating the locally-hired
supervisors of equal rank who performed the same kind of work
as the ex-Padcal supervisors.
Petitioners moved for a partial reconsideration averring that it had
sufficiently established that there was no discrimination. It argued
that the ex-Padcal supervisors possessed the necessary
experience, training, and skill in the underground mining method
which they gained through lengthy service in the Padcal mines
which used the same technology and that none of the locally-
hired supervisors had undergone the same training. On November
14, 2005, the Court denied petitioners' motion for partial
reconsideration.
On December 28, 2005, respondent union filed the present Ex-
Parte Motion to Withdraw Bond seeking the release of the
P100,000 bond posted by petitioners on the temporary restraining
order which the Court earlier issued. Respondent claims that the
P100,000 bond posted by petitioners should be released in favor
of its employees who would have been earlier benefited by the
supposed salary adjustments in the decision of the Court of
Appeals had the execution thereof not been stayed for 4 years.
Petitioners counter that the temporary restraining order is
intended to be a restraint only until the propriety of granting an
injunction can be determined. Since Section 8, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court provides that the amount of damages to be
awarded shall be claimed in the same proceeding, the absence of
an award of damages by the Court's decision dated August 25,
2005 does not entitle the respondents to their claim for damages
against the petitioners' bond. Petitioners conclude that since it
failed to file an application for damages during the pendency of
the appeal and before the decision became final and executory,
respondent union is not entitled to withdraw the bond they had
posted.
On the matter of preliminary injunction, Section 8, Rules 58
provides that:
SEC. 8. Judgment to include damages against party and sureties. -
At the trial, the amount of damages to be awarded to either party,
upon the bond of the adverse party, shall be claimed, ascertained,
and awarded under the same procedure prescribed in section 20
of Rule 57. (9a)
Correlatively, Section 20, Rule 57 thereof provides that:
SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or
excessive attachment. - An application for damages on account of
improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before
the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment
becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching party and his
surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to
damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded
only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on
the main case.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party
against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim damages
sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an
application in the appellate court, with notice to the party in
whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties,
before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory.
The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and
decided by the trial court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom
the attachment was issued from recovering in the same action the
damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching party
not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit given the
latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award. (20a)
While it may not have filed a claim for damages before the finality
of the judgment of this Court, respondent union is nonetheless
entitled to recover on the P100,000 bond posted by the
petitioners. Respondent union's entitlement to the damages
arises only after the finality of the decision of this Court, as it
would be only then that it can be determined with certainty
whether respondent union has incurred any damage as a result of
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 23, 2001 being
enjoined at the instance of petitioners. Verily, the Court (First
Division) in a Resolution dated October 8, 2001 stated:
Considering the allegations contained, the issues and the
arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari, with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
status quo order, of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 23, 2001, the Court Resolves, without giving due course to
the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon,
not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice.
Acting on the prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order,
the Court Resolves to issue a temporary restraining order
enjoining the execution of the decision dated April 23, 2001 and
resolution dated August 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57701 entitled
"Philex Bulawan Supervisors Union, etc. vs. Philex Gold
Philippines, Inc., et al." upon the petitioners' filing of a bond in the
amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) within a period
of five (5) days from notice hereof otherwise this resolution shall
be deemed to be no force and effect. Said bond shall answer for
the payment to private respondent of any damages which it may
incur by reason of the issuance of the temporary restraining order
sought, if it should be finally adjudged that said petitioners were
not entitled thereto, effective upon approval by this Court of the
bond to be posted.... (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners added that there will be no damage to respondent
union and its members regarding the supposed salary adjustments
mandated by the decision of the Court of Appeals since it may still
claim the amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals. The fact that
the entitlement of respondent union and its members to the
salary adjustments pursuant to the decision of the Court of
Appeals has been stalled by reason of the temporary restraining
order issued constitutes the damage itself, thereby warranting the
recovery on the bond in favor of respondent union.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Ex Parte Motion to SECTION 9
Withdraw [and/or Recover on the] Bond filed by respondent
Philex Bulawan Supervisors Union is GRANTED and the opposition [G.R. No. 115758. March 19, 2002]
thereto filed by petitioners Philex Gold Philippines, Inc. and its
corporate officers is NOTED.
ELIDAD C. KHO, doing business under the name and style of KEC
COSMETICS LABORATORY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
SO ORDERED. OF APPEALS, SUMMERVILLE GENERAL
MERCHANDISING and COMPANY, and ANG TIAM
Very truly yours, CHAY, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the

Decision[1] dated May 24, 1993 of the Court of Appeals setting
aside and declaring as null and void the Orders[2] dated February
10, 1992 and March 19, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, of Quezon City granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On December 20, 1991, petitioner Elidad C. Kho filed a

complaint for injunction and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-91-10926, against the respondents Summerville General
Merchandising and Company (Summerville, for brevity) and Ang
Tiam Chay.

The petitioners complaint alleges that petitioner, doing

business under the name and style of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory, is
the registered owner of the copyrights Chin Chun Su and Oval
Facial Cream Container/Case, as shown by Certificates of
Copyright Registration No. 0-1358 and No. 0-3678; that she also
has patent rights on Chin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for
medicated cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng,
the registered owner thereof in the Supplemental Register of the
Philippine Patent Office on February 7, 1980 under Registration
Certificate No. 4529; that respondent Summerville advertised and
sold petitioners cream products under the brand name Chin Chun
Su, in similar containers that petitioner uses, thereby misleading
the public, and resulting in the decline in the petitioners business
sales and income; and, that the respondents should be enjoined
from allegedly infringing on the copyrights and patents of the
petitioner.

The respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their

defense that Summerville is the exclusive and authorized
importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products
manufactured by Shun Yi Factory of Taiwan; that the said
Taiwanese manufacturing company authorized Summerville to
register its trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the
Philippine Patent Office and other appropriate governmental
agencies; that KEC Cosmetics Laboratory of the petitioner
obtained the copyrights through misrepresentation and
falsification; and, that the authority of Quintin Cheng, assignee of
the patent registration certificate, to distribute and market Chin
Chun Su products in the Philippines had already been terminated
by the said Taiwanese Manufacturing Company.

After due hearing on the application for preliminary

injunction, the trial court granted the same in an Order dated
February 10, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the application of plaintiff Elidad C. Kho, doing
business under the style of KEC Cosmetic Laboratory, for
preliminary injunction, is hereby granted. Consequentially, plaintiff
is required to file with the Court a bond executed to defendants in
the amount of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to the
effect that plaintiff will pay to defendants all damages which
defendants may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court
should finally decide that plaintiff is not entitled thereto.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The respondents moved for reconsideration but their motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an Order dated
March 19, 1992.[4]
On April 24, 1992, the respondents filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 27803, praying for the nullification of the said writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. After the
respondents filed their reply and almost a month after petitioner
submitted her comment, or on August 14 1992, the latter moved
to dismiss the petition for violation of Supreme Court Circular No.
28-91, a circular prohibiting forum shopping. According to the
petitioner, the respondents did not state the docket number of
the civil case in the caption of their petition and, more
significantly, they did not include therein a certificate of non-
forum shopping. The respondents opposed the petition and
submitted to the appellate court a certificate of non-forum
shopping for their petition.
On May 24, 1993, the appellate court rendered a Decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 27803 ruling in favor of the respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby given due course and the
orders of respondent court dated February 10, 1992 and March
19, 1992 granting the writ of preliminary injunction and denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and
declared null and void. Respondent court is directed to forthwith
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-91-10926 and resolve
the issue raised by the parties on the merits.
SO ORDERED.[5]
In granting the petition, the appellate court ruled that:
The registration of the trademark or brandname Chin Chun Su by
KEC with the supplemental register of the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer cannot be equated with
registration in the principal register, which is duly protected by the
Trademark Law.
xxx xxx xxx
As ratiocinated in La Chemise Lacoste, S.S. vs. Fernandez, 129
SCRA 373, 393:
Registration in the Supplemental Register, therefore, serves as
notice that the registrant is using or has appropriated the
trademark. By the very fact that the trademark cannot as yet be
on guard and there are certain defects, some obstacles which the
use must still overcome before he can claim legal ownership of the
mark or ask the courts to vindicate his claims of an exclusive right
to the use of the same. It would be deceptive for a party with
nothing more than a registration in the Supplemental Register to
posture before courts of justice as if the registration is in the
Principal Register.
The reliance of the private respondent on the last sentence of the
Patent office action on application Serial No. 30954 that
registrants is presumed to be the owner of the mark until after the
registration is declared cancelled is, therefore, misplaced and
grounded on shaky foundation. The supposed presumption not
only runs counter to the precept embodied in Rule 124 of the
Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in
Trademark Cases but considering all the facts ventilated before us
in the four interrelated petitions involving the petitioner and the
respondent, it is devoid of factual basis. As even in cases where
presumption and precept may factually be reconciled, we have
held that the presumption is rebuttable, not conclusive, (People v.
Lim Hoa, G.R. No. L-10612, May 30, 1958, Unreported). One may
be declared an unfair competitor even if his competing trademark
is registered (Parke, Davis & Co. v. Kiu Foo & Co., et al., 60 Phil
928; La Yebana Co. v. chua Seco & Co., 14 Phil 534).[6]
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This she
followed with several motions to declare respondents in contempt
of court for publishing advertisements notifying the public of the
promulgation of the assailed decision of the appellate court and
stating that genuine Chin Chun Suproducts could be obtained only
from Summerville General Merchandising and Co.
In the meantime, the trial court went on to hear petitioners
complaint for final injunction and damages. On October 22, 1993,
the trial court rendered a Decision[7] barring the petitioner from
using the trademark Chin Chun Su and upholding the right of the
respondents to use the same, but recognizing the copyright of the
petitioner over the oval shaped container of her beauty cream.
The trial court did not award damages and costs to any of the
parties but to their respective counsels were awarded Seventy-
Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) each as attorneys fees. The
petitioner duly appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On June 3, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
Resolution[8] denying the petitioners motions for reconsideration
and for contempt of court in CA-G.R. SP No. 27803.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following assignment
of errors:
I
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING
TO RULE ON PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS.
II
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
REFUSING TO PROMPTLY RESOLVE PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
III
 IN DELAYING THE RESOLUTION OF PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS DENIED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO
SEEK TIMELY APPELLATE RELIEF AND VIOLATED
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
IV
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING
TO CITE THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CONTEMPT.
[9]
The petitioner faults the appellate court for not dismissing
the petition on the ground of violation of Supreme Court Circular
No. 28-91. Also, the petitioner contends that the appellate court
violated Section 6, Rule 9 of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals when it failed to rule on her motion for
reconsideration within ninety (90) days from the time it is
submitted for resolution. The appellate court ruled only after the
lapse of three hundred fifty-four (354) days, or on June 3, 1994. In
delaying the resolution thereof, the appellate court denied the
petitioners right to seek the timely appellate relief. Finally,
petitioner describes as arbitrary the denial of her motions for
contempt of court against the respondents.
We rule in favor of the respondents.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, one of the grounds for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is a proof that the applicant is entitled to
the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists
in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. Thus, a
preliminary injunction order may be granted only when the
application for the issuance of the same shows facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded.[10] This is the reason why we
have ruled that it must be shown that the invasion of the right
sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right
of complainant is clear and unmistakable, and, that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.[11]
In the case at bar, the petitioner applied for the issuance of
a preliminary injunctive order on the ground that she is entitled to
the use of the trademark on Chin Chun Su and its container based
on her copyright and patent over the same. We first find it
appropriate to rule on whether the copyright and patent over the
name and container of a beauty cream product would entitle the
registrant to the use and ownership over the same to the
exclusion of others.
Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual
property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A
trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods
(trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall
include a stamped or marked container of goods. [12] In relation
thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying
or distinguishing an enterprise.[13] Meanwhile, the scope of a
copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are
original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain
protected from the moment of their creation.[14] Patentable
inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution of a
problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an
inventive step and is industrially applicable.[15]
Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the
exclusive use of the subject trade name and its container. The
name and container of a beauty cream product are proper
subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same falls squarely
within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the
same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must
sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before anybody
else did. The petitioners copyright and patent registration of the
name and container would not guarantee her the right to the
exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are not
appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently,
a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason
that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over
the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not having
proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or used the
same before anyone did.
We cannot likewise overlook the decision of the trial court
in the case for final injunction and damages. The dispositive
portion of said decision held that the petitioner does not have
trademark rights on the name and container of the beauty cream
product. The said decision on the merits of the trial court
rendered the issuance of the writ of a preliminary injunction moot
and academic notwithstanding the fact that the same has been
appealed in the Court of Appeals. This is supported by our ruling
in La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[16], to wit:
Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy
which may be granted at any time after the commencement of the
action and before judgment when it is established that the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and only when his
complaint shows facts entitling such reliefs xxx and it appearing
that the trial court had already granted the issuance of a final
injunction in favor of petitioner in its decision rendered after trial
on the merits xxx the Court resolved to Dismiss the instant petition
having been rendered moot and academic. An injunction issued by
the trial court after it has already made a clear pronouncement as
to the plaintiffs right thereto, that is, after the same issue has
been decided on the merits, the trial court having appreciated the
evidence presented, is proper, notwithstanding the fact that the
decision rendered is not yet finalxxx. Being an ancillary remedy,
the proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand
separately or proceed independently of the decision rendered on
the merit of the main case for injunction. The merit of the main
case having been already determined in favor of the applicant, the
preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to have any
force and effect. (italics supplied)
La Vista categorically pronounced that the issuance of a final
injunction renders any question on the preliminary injunctive
order moot and academic despite the fact that the decision
granting a final injunction is pending appeal. Conversely, a
decision denying the applicant-plaintiffs right to a final injunction,
although appealed, renders moot and academic any objection to
the prior dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in not
dismissing the petition for certiorari for non-compliance with the
rule on forum shopping. We disagree. First, the petitioner
improperly raised the technical objection of non-compliance with
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 by filing a motion to dismiss the
petition for certiorari filed in the appellate court. This is prohibited
by Section 6, Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that (I)n petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Section 2, Rule 56,
shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may
require the respondents to file their comment to, and not a
motion to dismiss, the petition xxx (italics supplied). Secondly, the
issue was raised one month after petitioner had filed her
answer/comment and after private respondent had replied
thereto. Under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for
but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting
a claim. She therefore could no longer submit a motion to dismiss
nor raise defenses and objections not included in the
answer/comment she had earlier tendered. Thirdly, substantial
justice and equity require this Court not to revive a dissolved writ
of injunction in favor of a party without any legal right thereto
merely on a technical infirmity. The granting of an injunctive writ
based on a technical ground rather than compliance with the
requisites for the issuance of the same is contrary to the primary
objective of legal procedure which is to serve as a means to
dispense justice to the deserving party.
The petitioner likewise contends that the appellate court
unduly delayed the resolution of her motion for reconsideration.
But we find that petitioner contributed to this delay when she
filed successive contentious motions in the same proceeding, the
last of which was on October 27, 1993, necessitating counter-
manifestations from private respondents with the last one being
filed on November 9, 1993. Nonetheless, it is well-settled that
non-observance of the period for deciding cases or their incidents
does not render such judgments ineffective or void. [17] With
respect to the purported damages she suffered due to the alleged
delay in resolving her motion for reconsideration, we find that the
said issue has likewise been rendered moot and academic by our
ruling that she has no right over the trademark and, consequently,
to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Finally, we rule that the Court of Appeals correctly denied
the petitioners several motions for contempt of court. There is
nothing contemptuous about the advertisements complained of
which, as regards the proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No. 27803 merely
announced in plain and straightforward language the
promulgation of the assailed Decision of the appellate court.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, the said decision nullifying the injunctive writ was
immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 24, 1993 and June
3, 1994, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1453. April 29, 2003]
EDITHA PALMA GIL, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO H.
LOPEZ, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Lupon, Davao
Oriental, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
A magistrate should dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Delay in
the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the
public in the institution of justice, lowers its standards and brings
them into disrepute.Every judge must cultivate a capacity for quick
decision; he must not delay the judgment which a party justly
deserves. The public trust reposed in a judges office imposes upon
him the highest degree of responsibility to promptly administer
justice.[1]
In an Affidavit-Complaint[2] dated October 30, 2001,
complainant Editha Palma Gil charged respondent Judge Francisco
H. Lopez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lupon, Davao
Oriental, with Manifest Bias and Partiality, Undue Delay in the
Disposition of Case and Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant alleged that she is the defendant in Civil Case
No. 1110 for Forcible Entry and Damages with Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction, entitled Carlos Palen, Sr.,
Plaintiff versus Editha Palma Gil, Defendant, pending before the
sala of respondent judge; and that respondent failed to render
judgment therein within the thirty-day period required by Rule 70,
Section 11 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure.She further averred
that on October 9, 2001, the plaintiff in the said case filed a
motion for temporary restraining order, which respondent Judge
granted on the same day, despite procedural defects therein such
as the lack of a verification, bond, and service of summons, all in
violation of Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.Complainant further assails the manner in which the
temporary restraining order was implemented with the assistance
of policemen.
In his Comment dated March 1, 2002, respondent judge
denied that there was a deliberate and unreasonable delay in the
resolution of Civil Case No. 1110. He alleged that aside from his
court, he had to hear the cases in the municipal courts in
Governor Generoso and San Isidro, Davao Oriental due to the
inhibition of the presiding judges therein. Moreover, he alleged
that the legal and factual issues raised in Civil Case No. 1110 are
complicated. Anent the alleged issuance of a temporary
restraining order, respondent claims that what he issued was
a status quo order because complainants men entered the land in
dispute and attempted to prevent the harvesting of palay by
plaintiff. Finally, respondent states that he had to seek the
assistance of the police to implement the order because his court
had no regular sheriff and because there were armed guards
employed by both parties. [3]
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 14, 2002,
both parties manifested their willingness to submit the case on
[4]
the basis of the pleadings filed.[5]
After evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) found respondent guilty of delay in the rendition of
judgment in Civil Case No. 1110 and erred in issuing a temporary
restraining order despite procedural defects. Hence, it
recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
We agree with the findings of the OCA, however, we find
the recommended penalty to be not commensurate with the
gravity of respondents misdeeds.
The reasons proffered by respondent judge, i.e., that he
had to hear cases in the other courts, will not excuse his delay in
deciding Civil Case No. 1110. [6] If he felt that he could not decide
the case within the reglementary period, he should have asked for
a reasonable extension of time to decide the same.[7]
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote
the ends of justice by administering it speedily and impartially. The
judge as the person presiding over that court is the visible
representation of the law and justice.[8] Failure to resolve cases
submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a
serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a
speedy disposition of their cases.[9]
Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct state:
Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially
and without delay. (Emphasis ours)
Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 provides:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by
Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication
and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their
courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved
within twelve months from date of submission by all lower
collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of
three months to do so. . . (Emphasis ours)
Along the same vein, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88
states:
6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act
promptly on all motions and interlocutory
matters pending before their courts. x x x.
Considering the summary nature of Civil Case No. 1110,
which is an action for forcible entry, Rule 70, Section 11 of the
1997 Rules of Summary Procedure expressly provides:
Period for rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of
the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain
material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order
specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to
submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten
(10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered
within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the last affidavit or the
expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain
time for the rendition of judgment. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, respondent judge is guilty of gross inefficiency for his
failure to resolve and dispose of Civil Case No. 1110 within the
period prescribed by the Rules. The penalty for gross inefficiency
ranges from reprimand and admonition[10] to removal from
office[11]and/or a fine.[12]
Respondent judge likewise erred in issuing the temporary
restraining order. Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order. A preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified and
shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the
court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed
to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the
court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or
person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should
finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction
shall be issued.
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a
temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court shall
be raffled to only after notice to and in the presence of the
adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such
notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied by
service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or
initiatory pleading and the applicants affidavit and bond, upon the
adverse party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served personally or
by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party
is a resident of the Philippines, temporarily absent therefrom or is
a nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior contemporaneous
service of summons shall not apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall
thereafter be acted upon only after all the parties are heard in a
summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty-four
(24) hours after the sheriffs return of service and/or the records
are received by the branch selected by raffle to which the records
shall be transmitted immediately.
The records reveal that the motion for temporary
restraining order was not verified. [13]Respondent judge issued the
Order on the same date when the motion was filed without prior
notice to the complainant and without a hearing.
 The issuance of the assailed Order cannot be justified under
Rule 58, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
reads:
Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior
notice to the person or party sought to be enjoined. If it shall
appear from the facts shown by the affidavits of by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to
which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said
twenty-day period, the court must order said party of person to
show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether
or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted and accordingly
issued the corresponding order.
Considering the seriousness of the respondent judges
offenses, stiffer penalties should be imposed to inculcate in him
the value of being proficient in both substantive and procedural
laws.
In Caas v. Castigador,[15] we held:
Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to
uphold is required of every judge.When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less
than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In
short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
In the case at bar, the ignorance of respondent judge is so
gross that he should be held administratively liable even if he
acted in good faith.[16] Hence, the imposition of a fine in the
amount of P20,000.00 is a more appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, respondent Judge

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections,
Francisco H. Lopez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lupon,
if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
Davao Oriental, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a
gross inefficiency. He is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of
multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and is STERNLY WARNED
may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately
more severely.
comply with provisions of the next preceding section as to
service of summons and the documents to be served therewith.
Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge SO ORDERED.
before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary
hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order
shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction
can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including
the original seventy-two (72) hours provided therein. (Emphasis
and italics ours)

Aside from the lack of verification of the motion, no

affidavits of the applicant and his witnesses were appended
thereto. Furthermore, the assailed Order did not specify the
duration of the temporary restraining order.

Respondent argues that considering that the complaint in

Civil Case No. 1110 was verified and prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary and prohibitory injunction, the verification of the
motion for issuance of temporary restraining order may be
dispensed with. We do not agree.

The Rules as above-quoted explicitly mandate that the

application for injunction should be verified. While litigation is not
a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly
administration of justice.[14]

We see nothing wrong in respondents act of securing the

assistance of the police in implementing his Order. Administrative
Circular No. 12-85, paragraph 7 allows a judge to designate or
deputize any person to serve court processes and writs in remote
areas in the absence of the regular sheriff thereat.

Furthermore, the better part of prudence, caution and plain

conventional wisdom dictates the presence of the police on
account of the potentially violent situation engendered by the
presence of armed followers of the contending factions.