Republic vs Huan Te Fu

Naturalization: A Foreigner Living In A Foreign Land

Should Conduct Himself Accordingly In This Country With
Care, Circumspect, And Respect For The Laws Of The Host.
..
MAY 22, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST

The Facts:

Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy, a Chinese businessman allegedly

engaged in the business of manufacturing zippers, married to
Irene D. Chan, and born in Taiwan, filed a petition for
naturalisation with RTC of Quezon City. Highlights of his petition
to prove compliance with C.A. 473 are the following:he had
resided continuously in the Philippines for 23 years; received
primary, secondary and tertiary education in Philippine schools;
and he derive a monthly income of P15,000.00 from their family
business of manufacturing zippers.
After trial, the RTC granted the petition for naturalisation filed by
Huang, hence the OSG appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its
brief, the OSG pointed to the following disqualifications
warranting the reversal of Huangs grant of naturalisation: he
does not own real estate in the Philippines; he does not possess a
lucrative trade or profession, and is not even included in the
payroll of the company; does not have sufficient monthly income
since he merely receives salary from the family corporation which
is not even sufficient for his family, much less lucrative; in a Deed
of Sale executed on August, 2001 for a parcel of land in Antipolo
City, Huang signed in the Deed of Sale and falsely misrepresented
himself as a Filipino, exhibiting his lack of good moral character;
and, his income tax returns for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004
reveal that his actual monthly income differs from his monthly
income as declared in his petition for naturalization, leading to the
conclusion that either he is evading taxes or concealing the truth
regarding his income; and, on cross-examination by petitioner, he
could not cite any of the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution which he is supposed to believe in. In his Comment,
Huang alleged that he merely signed and did not prepare the
Deed of Sale; he does not prepare his income tax returns; most of
his expenses are taken care of by his parents who own the
corporation; his tailure to cite particular principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution were brought about by his not having been
confronted about it.
The CA denied the OSGs appeal hence, the OSG elevated the
case to the Supreme Court on petition for review via certiorari.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not the grant of Philippine citizenship to Huang was
proper.
The Courts ruling:
The Court finds for petitioner.
In Republic v. Hong,1 it was held in essence that an applicant for
naturalization must show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for
naturalization will be denied. This ponente has likewise held that
[t]he courts must always be mindful that naturalization
proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law.2

Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires,

among others, that an applicant for naturalization must be of
good moral character and must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation. In regard to the requirement
that the applicant must have a known lucrative trade,
this ponente declared:
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation means not only
that the person having the employment gets enough for his
ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able
to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment,
sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the
object of charity or a public charge. His income should permit
him and the members of his family to live with reasonable
comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and
consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of
our civilization.
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a
lucrative income, the courts should consider only the applicants
income; his or her spouses income should not be included in the
assessment. The spouses additional income is immaterial for
under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify
him to become a Filipino citizen. Lastly, the Court has
consistently held that the applicants qualifications must be
determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.3 (Emphasis
supplied)
From the above, it may be concluded that there is no basis for the
CA finding that respondent is engaged in a lucrative trade.
Indeed, his supposed income of P15,000.00 to P18,000.00 per
month as found by the CA is not enough for the support of his
family. By his own admission, most of his familys daily expenses
are still shouldered by his parents who own the zipper
manufacturing business which employs him. This simply means
that respondent continues to be a burden to, and a charge upon,
his parents; he lives on the charity of his parents. He cannot
support his own family on his own.
Indeed, it is even doubtful that respondent is carrying on a trade
at all. He admitted during trial that he was not even listed or
included in the payroll of his familys zipper business. If this is the
case, then he may not be considered an employee thereof. One
of the most effective pieces of evidence to prove employment
aside from the employment contract itself and other documents
such as daily time records4 is a workers inclusion in the
payroll. With this admitted fact, one may not be faulted for
believing that respondents alleged employment in his familys
zipper business was contrived for the sole purpose of complying
with the legal requirements prior to obtaining Philippine
citizenship.
On the other hand, even assuming that respondent was indeed
employed by his parents, his non-inclusion in the payroll for all
the years he has worked in his parents business5 suggests as
correctly argued by petitioner an intent to evade taxes or to
conceal the true nature of his employment and the amount of his
salary or income. It is concealment of the truth; an attempt to
circumvent with impunity the tax laws, labor laws relative to the
employment of aliens, and other laws that would otherwise
regulate respondents actions during his stay in this country.
Indeed, without payroll records, it can never be said that
respondent works for his parents zipper business. If such is the
case, then respondent is not required to state in his income tax
return as is the case his employer and what he actually
receives as salary therefrom; he is free to conveniently declare
any amount of income in his tax returns.
Either way, respondents deliberate non-inclusion in the payroll of
his parents business can have only the most unpleasant
connotations. And his consent to be part of such scheme reflects
negatively on his moral character. It shows a proclivity for
untruthfulness and dishonesty, and an unreserved willingness and
readiness to violate Philippine laws.
The appellate courts reliance upon the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals6 is misplaced. In that case, there was only a
discrepancy between the applicants estimate of his income in his
application and that declared by him during his direct testimony.
In the present case, respondent is not at all listed on the payroll of
his parents business, where he is supposed to be its general
manager. As a result, there is absolutely no basis for the correct
determination of his income; instead, he invites Us to
conveniently rely on his income tax returns and his unilateral
declarations. As We have earlier said, if We are to believe them,
then still, they are insufficient to generate a conclusion that
respondent is carrying on a lucrative trade; he cannot support his
family from his declared income.
Moreover, respondents admitted false declaration under oath
contained in the August 2001 deed of sale that he is a Filipino
citizen which he did to secure the seamless registration of the
property in the name of his wife is further proof of respondents
lack of good moral character. It is also a violation of the
constitutional prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign
individuals.7 His defense that he unknowingly signed the deed is
unacceptable. First of all, as a foreigner living in a foreign land,
he should conduct himself accordingly in this country with care,
circumspect, and respect for the laws of the host. Finally, as an
educated and experienced businessman, it must be presumed
that he acted with due care and signed the deed of sale with full
knowledge of its import.8
Having decided in the foregoing manner, We must conclude the
instant case and disregard the other issues and arguments of the
parties; they are deemed irrelevant and will not alter the
conclusion arrived at. As far as this Court is concerned,
respondent has failed to satisfy the law which renders him
completely undeserving of Filipino citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The November 29, 2011
Decision and March 7, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 91213 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
September 24, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 96 in Nat. Case/Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251 is
likewise ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondents Petition
for Naturalization in said case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015, REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HUANG TE FU, A.K.A.
ROBERT UY, RESPONDENT.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
1 520 Phil. 276, 285 (2006).
2 Republic v. Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012, 673 SCRA 485,
498.
3 Id. at 499-500.
4 See Ang v. San Joaquin, Jr., G.R. No. 185549, August 7, 2013,
703 SCRA 269, 287.
5 Or since 2000.
6 354 Phil. 733 (1998).
7 CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 7. Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
8 See Development Bank of the Philippines v. National
Merchandising Corporation, 148-B Phil. 310 (1971).
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS KAMRAN F. KABARSI

FACTS:
On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Kabarsi filed a petition for
naturalization with the RTC where he alleged the following:
His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;
He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a
certification duly issued by the UNHCR;
He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street,
Dipolog City, since early part of June 2000 and more so has
resided continuously in the Philippines for not less than 11 years
immediately preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11
July 1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1) year;
His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other
places of residence, prior to his present residence, were as follows
(i) Panay Ave., Quezon City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City; (iii)
Capitol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga
del Norte;

He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran, as shown in his

identity card which also serves as his birth certificate;
He is married and is the father of one (1) child;
His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old and
born on 10 August 1979 in Cebu City, whom he married on 12
October 2000 in Dipolog City, as shown in their certificate of
marriage;
His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, l-year old , was born on 9 June 2001
in Dipolog City and presently residing with him and his wife at 341
Burgos Street, Dipolog City;
He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed name (Syed
Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11 July 1990 specifically at the Manila
International Airport on board Philippine Airlines Flight No. 731,
per UNHCR certification containing reference to his Pakistani
passport issued under said assumed name;
Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reduced to five years the ten
year requirement of continuous residence;
He speaks and writes English and Visayan;
His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in which he has
been engaged since 1998 and, as such, he derives an average
annual income of Php 80,000.00 more or less;
He has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of
the disqualifications under Section 4, of the Commonwealth Act
No. 473;

He has complied with the requirements of the Naturalization Law

(Commonwealth Act No. 473) regarding the filing with the Office
of the Solicitor General of his bona fide intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration of Intention
duly filed on 25 May 2001;

It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the

Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty,
and particularly to Iran of which, at this time, he is a citizen or
subject; that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
date of filing of this petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citizenship;

Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age, Filipino, married and

residing at ABC Compound, Quezon Ave., Miputak, Dipolog City
and Alton C. Ratificar, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing
at 047 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who are Filipino citizens,
whose affidavits are attached to his petition, will appear and
testify as witnesses at the hearing thereof.

After finding that the petition is sufficient in form, the petitioner

submitted his witnesses, and thereafter, took the witness stand
himself. He narrated that he is an Iranian national. He and his
brother left Iran in 1986 beacause of the war between Iran and
Iraq at that time. Their government confiscated their passport so
they travelled by camel to Pakistan where they stayed for 3 years,
but was not granted a refugee status there. They decided to come
to the Philippines since one of his brothers was already studying
in the country. They procured Pakistani passports under assumed
names.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July n, 1990, he submitted
himself to the United Nations in Manila. After several interviews,
he was admitted as a refugee and, later on, as a person of
concern. As a refugee, he was granted by the United Nations
allowances, medical benefits and protection to some extent.

On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasi's evidence sufficient

to support his petition. Finding Karbasi as possessing all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a
Filipino citizen, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition
for naturalization.
Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the
CA, based mainly on the ground that the RTC erred in granting
Karbasi's petition as he failed to comply with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law) on character,
income and reciprocity. Specifically, the OSG pointed out that
Karbasi failed to establish that: 1] Iran grants reciprocal rights of
naturalization to Filipino citizens; 2] he has a lucrative income as
required under the law; and 3] he is of good moral character as
shown by his disregard of Philippine tax laws when he had
underdeclared his income in his income tax returns (ITRs) and
overstated the same in his petition for naturalization.

The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in Karbasi's ITRs

was prepared in good faith because he was of the belief that he
no longer needed to include the income he received as payment
of his services to Daewoo Electronics Electronics Services, Inc.
(Daewoo) and Kolins Philippines International, Inc. (Kolins),
because the same were already withheld at source. The CA
likewise affirmed the RTC finding that Karbasi, as a refugee, need
not prove reciprocity between Philippine and Iranian laws.

ISSUE:
WON reciprocity is necessary in the naturalization of refugees?

HELD: NO
Although it is True that the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens
or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos
the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of
Karbasi's petition, both with the RTC and the CA, together with his
supplemental pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals
that he has successfully established his refugee status upon
arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the country's obligations under
its various international commitments come into operation.
Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, to which the Philippines is a signatory, must be
considered in this case, to wit:

Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:

For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same
circumstances" implies that any requirements (including
requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence)
which the particular individual would have to fulfill for the
enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must
be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by
their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.

Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:

The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the

assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in
particular make every effort to expedite naturalization
proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and
costs of such proceedings.
In the same vein, Article 729 of the said Convention expressly
provides exemptions from reciprocity, while Article 34 states the
earnest obligation of contracting parties to "as far as possible
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees." As
applied to this case, Karbasi's status as a refugee has to end with
the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance with
Philippine statutory requirements and international obligations.
Indeed, the Naturalization Law must be read in light of the
developments in international human rights law specifically the
granting of nationality to refugees and stateless persons.
Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an
alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La
Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the
Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998,

filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he
submit to the Court the following documents as proof of his
Philippine Citizenship:

1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that

Ching is a certified accountant;

2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing

that Ching is a registered voter of his place; and

3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the

Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union .

On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath
taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.

Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was

not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. The
Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on
Ching's petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:

1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and

continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the
manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be
declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"

2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine

citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a
reasonable time".

Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect
Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. The reasonable
time means that the election should be made within 3 years from
upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead,
he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age
of majority which the court considered not within the reasonable
time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file
the same with the nearest civil registry.
Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second
district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative

in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative

of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private

respondent premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on

November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the

Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident
of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence
from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in
China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of
Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community
of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He
was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong
Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in
love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic
faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is
the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan never
emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a
result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime,
Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization
on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong
Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First
Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April
28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was
issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was
9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of
Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other

Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private

respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in
order to acquire his secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed
the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities
were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner.
Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family
in Manila.

In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the

1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born
citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship
formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full
brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention
had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it
was precisely amending the article on this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2,
1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers,
elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was
enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the
status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the
status of a natural-born

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the

Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected

citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a
natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and
1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an

unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a
citizen since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a

naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of
citizenship.
S_C_:_ _T_h_e_ _C_o_u_r_t_ _c_a_n_n_o_t_ _g_o_ _i_n_t_o_ _t_h_e_
_c_o_l_l_a_t_e_r_a_l_ _p_r_o_c_e_d_u_r_e_ _o_f_ _s_t_r_i_p_p_i_n_g_
_r_e_s_p_o_n_d_e_n_t_s_ _f_a_t_h_e_r_ _o_f_ _h_i_s_
_c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _a_f_t_e_r_ _h_i_s_ _d_e_a_t_h_._ _A_n_
_a_t_t_a_c_k_ _o_n_ _a_ _p_e_r_s_o_n_s_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_
_m_a_y_ _o_n_l_y_ _b_e_ _d_o_n_e_ _t_h_r_o_u_g_h_ _a_ _direct
action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the
grant of Philippine c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _t_o_
_r_e_s_p_o_n_d_e_n_t_s_ _f_a_t_h_e_r_ _a_s_ _n_u_l_l_ _a_n_d_
_v_o_i_d_ _w_o_u_l_d_ _r_u_n_ _a_g_a_i_n_s_t_ _t_h_e_
_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_l_e_ _o_f_ _d_u_e_ _process because he has already
been laid to rest
BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case,

in view of the constitutional r_e_q_u_i_r_e_m_e_n_t_ _t_h_a_t_
_n_o_ _p_e_r_s_o_n_ _s_h_a_l_l_ _b_e_ _a_ _M_e_m_b_e_r_ _o_f_
_t_h_e_ _H_o_u_s_e_ _o_f_ _R_e_p_r_e_s_e_n_t_a_t_i_v_e_s_
_u_n_l_e_s_s_ _h_e_ _i_s_ _a_ _natural-b_o_r_n_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_._ _
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted
in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63
[(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship
May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen
may lose his c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _b_y_,_ _a_m_o_n_g_
_o_t_h_e_r_,_ _r_e_n_d_e_r_i_n_g_ _s_e_r_v_i_c_e_ _t_o_ _o_r_
_a_c_c_e_p_t_i_n_g_ _c_o_m_m_i_s_s_i_o_n_ _i_n_ _t_h_e_
_a_r_m_e_d_ _f_orces o_f_ _a_ _f_o_r_e_i_g_n_ _c_o_u_n_t_r_y_._ _

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine

citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in
1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed
Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998
elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the
Constitution. HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition
for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63
enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization, 2. by repatriation, and 3. by direct act of
Congress. **
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces; 2. services in the armed forces
of the allied forces in World War II; 3. service in the Armed Forces
of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and 5. political
economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where
he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic
and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as
a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both
candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered
the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. From the facts presented, it
appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. The
Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as
candidate for said elective position. However, in a subsequent
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have
renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority
and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor
of Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public

elective office in the philippines.

RULING: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A.
7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of
the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they
are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. When a person
applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and
complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization
Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should
apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation
and application. The court ruled that the filing of certificate of
candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other
hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. His declarations will
be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country
of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad
that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be
taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The petition
for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 Ramon Labo, Jr. vs Commission on Elections
176 SCRA 1 _Law on Public Officers _Election Laws
_Citizenship of a Public Officer _Dual Citizenship _Labo
Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His
rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo
as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence
disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he
married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an
Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has
dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed
became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such
citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was
later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that
even if h_e_s_ _c_o_n_s_i_d_e_r_e_d_ _a_s_ _a_n_
_A_u_s_t_r_a_l_i_a_n_,_ _h_i_s_ _l_a_c_k_ _o_f_
_c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _i_s_ _j_u_s_t_ _a_ _m_e_r_e_
_t_e_c_h_n_i_c_a_l_i_t_y_ _w_h_i_c_h_ _s_h_o_u_l_d_ _not frustrate
the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast
majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest
vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is
disqualified.
HELD:
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence
presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in
1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an
oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not
dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the
Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here.
It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino
citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared
as a Filipino through an act of Congress _none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that
his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the
electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have,
even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a
foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they
known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or
at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city.
Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo
warranto proceeding, that he s_h_o_u_l_d_ _b_e_
_d_e_c_l_a_r_e_d_ _t_h_e_ _m_a_y_o_r_ _b_y_ _r_e_a_s_o_n_ _o_f_
_L_a_b_o_s_ _d_i_s_q_u_a_l_i_f_i_c_a_t_i_o_n_ _b_e_c_a_u_s_e_
_L_a_r_d_i_z_a_b_a_l_ _o_b_t_a_i_n_e_d_ _the second highest
number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed
as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are
filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in
all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971.
On February 10, 1978, he was naturalized as a Philippine citizen.
Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese
Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies
that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents
he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate
Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn,
filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7
November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court
en banc denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration
was denied, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.
ISSUE:

W_h_e_t_h_e_r_ _o_r_ _n_o_t_ _p_e_t_i_t_i_o_n_e_r_s_ _a_c_t_s_

_c_o_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_ _r_e_n_u_n_c_i_a_t_i_o_n_ _o_f_ _h_i_s_
_P_h_i_l_i_p_p_i_n_e_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _

HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is
made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity,
after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization
as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport and represented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such
resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has
renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial
court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become
unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of
petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether
or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or
were to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)
G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul
R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to
take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had
already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor
and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the
second highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of
Sorsogon.

ISSUE:
W_h_e_t_h_e_r_ _o_r_ _n_o_t_ _F_r_i_v_a_l_d_o_s_
_r_e_p_a_t_r_i_a_t_i_o_n_ _w_a_s_ _v_a_l_i_d_._ _

HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because
of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his
repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application
to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship
by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing
the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the
oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon
taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso
jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had
intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the
application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
 AKBAYAN YOUTH VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066, March 26 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before May
2001 General Elections for new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or
before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent
COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.
A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new
voters on February 17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied
by the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly
provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all
pre-election activities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to
conduct a special registration of new v_o_t_e_r_s_ _d_u_r_i_n_g_
_t_h_e_ _p_e_r_i_o_d_ _b_e_t_w_e_e_n_ _t_h_e_
_C_O_M_E_L_E_C_s_ _i_m_p_o_s_e_d_ _D_e_c_e_m_b_e_r_ _2_7_,_
_2_0_0_0_ _deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a
special registration of new voters. The right to suffrage is not
absolute and must be exercised within the proper bounds and
framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus
missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the
fact that the President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a
Special Session to allow the conduct of special registration for
new voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend
Republic Act No. 8189. Read full text
 MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a
declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in
the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates
the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the
constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the
Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on
Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are
disqualified voting under this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a
permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country.
However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes,
upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from
approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she
has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return
shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement
in Section 1 Article V of the Constitution which requires the voter
must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and a
resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding an election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at
present, and that the Court may have to discard that particular
ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the
presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The
qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to
have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to
have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country.
Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires
the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary
visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must
return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met
according to RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after
he has exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to
rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law
is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the
Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided for
deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as
promised
stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast
shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the
date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly
its whole meaning, the Court is prevented from making it mean
what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent
of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and
intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise
the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that
Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a
power that constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the
votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in
the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to
proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list
Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review,
amend and revise the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA
No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court
is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. Read full text
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not
citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples
economic life.
_a prohibition against aliens and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade
_aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954
are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary
retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted

from this Act.
_provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail
business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry.
_provision against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action
to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of
the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not
deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real
and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification
adopted.

RATIO: The equal protection clause does not demand absolute

equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The classification is
actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike. The difference in status between citizens and aliens
constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of
police power. Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing
dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this
domination and control that is the legislatures target in the
enactment of the Act. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause
of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes
his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and
the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject
to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential
enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through
the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien
now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:36 PM
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22 1963 [Executive Agreements]

FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign
rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a
petition opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542
which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the
importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration
or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is
to be authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on
behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add that after
enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other
government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA
3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice under its
provisions. They contended that the government has already
constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma,
that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter
should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American
jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.

RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as
alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established.
Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and
void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by
statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for
the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
Agustin v. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979, 88
SCRA 195

Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the

constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229 and its implementing
order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car
already had warning lights and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early
warning device installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents between
moving vehicles and parked cars.

The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than
15% of the acquisition cost.

The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on
any street or highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.

Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police

power, equal protection, and due process/

2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car

dealers millionaires at the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos
per set. Hence the petition.

The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with
regard to the unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police
power to such acts.

The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention

of UN on road signs as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still
an unlawful delegation of police power.

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing

the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all
motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip
them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning
devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional,
harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are
already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to
provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to
compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and
dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive

redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are
already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor
vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers
of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps
(the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory
countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even
under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any
motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees
a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking,
that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway,
or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary,
stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic.
On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum
lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it
an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an
ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the
motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision.

On Police Power

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of

the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main
reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former,
however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended
against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power
which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the
American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or
less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v.
Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified
police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine,
such a competence being referred to as the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept
was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-
Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be
hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc
with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to
quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at
least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly
pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances
thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be
interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What
is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power is
thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state
and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin,
compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure
challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would
be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character. None has been
called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the
Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in
view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon,
and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national
roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified
after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense
Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by
the imperative demands of public safety.
IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian
supremacy clause]

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII
of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive,
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this
case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued
that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does
not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither
does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the
task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of
the Constitution.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22:
Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify
allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello
Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief
of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen.
Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two
appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has
been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their
assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the
time honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga
ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior
officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order
to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before
a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do
so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress
which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against
the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to
compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a
blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials
summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing.
In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on
executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions
and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members

of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial
relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.
Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly
detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss
right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to
pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the
presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require
prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may
soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-

chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before
Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the
notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the
Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final
orders of the courts.
Gonzalez et al. vs. Gen. Abaya
G.R. No. 164007, Aug. 10, 2006

The nature of the military justice system

Coup d'etat vis-a-vis violation of the Articles of War

FACTS:

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily
armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the
premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala
Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards and
planted explosive devices around the building. They then declared
their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and
demanded that she resign as President of the Republic.

After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms.
Subsequently, an Information for coup detat was filed against
them with the RTC, at the same time that they were tried at court
martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the
jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the RTC ordered
that their act was not service-connected and that their violation of
Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the
crime of coup detat.

ISSUE:

Whether the act complained of was service-connected and

therefore cognizable by court martial or absorbed by the crime of
coup d'etat cognizable by regular courts

RULING:

The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at

achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the
highest degree of military efficiency. Military law is established not
merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve
the tranquility and security of the State in times of war, but also
to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of
peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace
and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. The
administration of military justice has been universally practiced.
Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of
the world look upon the power of military law and its
administration as the most effective means of enforcing
discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become
invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it
being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in
peace and in war.

The Court held that the offense is service-connected. xxx It bears

stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the
alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional
conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the
service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty
prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable
only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in
character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of
misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP)
vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et al (2003)

FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD,

is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary
services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities.
Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars,
orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to
qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001,
respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5
creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating
respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive
authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related
regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO
violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to
formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme
because said scheme is a function only religious organizations,
entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.

ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as

to freedom of religion

RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the
societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim
community as a "national cultural community" and not as a
religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier
between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that
OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate
the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion"
provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers
of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed
this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live
as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a
food product as halal is a religious function because the standards
used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like
herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to
itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect
forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and
Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government
fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a
democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its
interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them
to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.
There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive
Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right
to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health
of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to
OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The
protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health
are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products
released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly
labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the
religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given
detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and
safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health
of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The
halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations
come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit
for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive
Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
TABASA VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:16 PM
G.R. No. 125 793, 29 August 2006 [Naturalization; Reacquisition; R.A. No. 8171]

FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his
father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines
and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the
agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a request with the
BID that his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for
several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance
with the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be
deported or detained by the BID.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.

RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only
person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her
Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino, including his
minor children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be
applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in
1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at
the time of filing of the petition for repatriation.
ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 9:25 PM
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is
not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC that he was
not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's
running for as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was
already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization in December 17, 1997.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.

RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry
and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his
certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioners
repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application and was, therefore,
qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004
elections.
AAJS, CALILUNG VS. DATUMANONG
Posted by kaye lee on 1:32 PM
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2009 [Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; RA 9225 -
Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003]

FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth
Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual
allegiance.

RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is not self-
executing provision.

What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. In its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.