HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence
1. Unloading 1. More Flow (liquid) 1. Excessive flow from cargo 1. Vibration to loading arm, potential loading
refrigerated LPG arm detach, LOPC, potential fire/explosion,
(C3) simultaneously leading to major hazard involving fatalities
from VLGC at Jetty-
1 to the refrigerated
tanks
2. Potential flow exceed from maximum flow
of pipeline, leading to vibration of pipeline,
potential pipeline damage, LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
involving fatalities
2. FCV -1019 malfunction wide open 1. Vibration to loading arm, potential loading
arm detach, LOPC, potential fire/explosion,
leading to major hazard
2. Potential flow exceed from maximum flow
of pipeline, leading to vibration of pipeline,
potential pipeline damage, LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
involving fatalities
3. Potential over pressure at T-201, leading
to tank burst, potential LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
involving fatalities
2. More Flow (gas) 1. PCV-2002 malfunction open 1. Potential low pressure at T-201, potential
flow exceed from maximum flow of pipeline,
leading to vibration of pipeline, potential
pipeline damage, LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
involving fatalities
2. Potential Blower B-201 over loaded,
leading to Blower damage, operation disturb
3. Potential high pressure at cargo, high
pressure at cargo, leading to process upset
3. Less/No Flow 1. SDV-6001 malfunction closed 1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
(liquid) potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
2. FCV -1019 malfunction closed 1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
3. MOV-1015 malfunction closed 1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. FAH-1045A/B, operator response 1. To re-evaluate action of FAHH-1045A/B and to WIKA-PEN
re-configure FAHH not to confuse between (Process)
interlock and SIS
2. FIC-1019, FCV-1069 to adjust flow as per 2. To include in Loading Procedures the WIKA-PEN
requirement monitoring flow from cargo as monitoring (Process)
activities
1. FAH-1045A/B, operator response
2. FIC-1019, FCV-1069 to adjust flow as per
requirement
1. FAH-1045A/B, operator response
1. FAH-1045A/B, operator response
1. PAH-1006, operator response
2. PAH-1002, operator response
3. PIC-1001, PCV-1001 open
4. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
5. PSV-1001/1002
1. PAL-1002, operator response
2. PAL-2006, operator response
3. FAH-2001, operator response
4. PALL-1002, shutdown P202A/B/C, P-
203A/B, P-204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C,
P-208A/B
5. PALL-2006 shutdown Compressor C-201
A/B/C and Blower B-201
6. FAHH-2001A, Blower B-201 trip
1. Overload protection available in MCC
1. FAH-2001, operator response
2. FAHH-2001A, Blower B-201 trip
1. ZSC-6001 available to alert operator 3. To change mode operation of valve 60-GA- WIKA-PEN
14002 from manual operation to remote (Process)
operation and linked to backloading mode
operation
1. ZSC-6001 available to alert operator
2. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1015 available to alert operator
1 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
4. MOV-1026A/1026B malfunction
closed
5. Strainer LM-201A/B blockage
6. MOV-1016 malfunction closed
7. MOV-2017 malfunction closed
8. SDV-1001 malfunction closed
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
3. Temperature at loading line tend to
increase, leading to excessive generate of
BOG, when unloading operation started,
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1015 available to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1026A/1026B available to alert
operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1026A/1026B available to alert
operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. PDAH-1046A/B to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. PDAH-1046A/B to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1016 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1016 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-2017 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-2017 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1001 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1001 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14001 installed at
upstream SDV-6001
1. LCV-6001 to release BOG from liquid
loading line to BOG vapor line
2. PSV-6001 to release BOG from liquid
loading line to BOG vapor line
2 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation
4. Less/No Flow (gas)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Cause
1. MOV-2002 malfunction closed
2. Blower B-201 trip
3. PCV-2002 malfunction closed
4. MOV-1006 malfunction closed
5. Strainer VM-201 blockage
6. MOV-1005 malfunction closed
7. MOV-1062 malfunction closed
8. SDV-6002 malfunction closed
Consequence
potential piping damage due to thermal
expansion
1. Potential over pressure at T-201, leading
to tank burst, potential LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
2. Potential at cargo, leading to cargo
buckle, leading to major hazard, involving
fatality, environmental hazard
3. Potential vacuum at suction line of Blower
B-201, potential oxygen inpose to Blower
leading to oxygen sent to cargo, potential
cargo get fire, potential fire/explosion,
leading to major hazard
1. Potential over pressure at T-201, leading
to tank burst, potential LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
2. Potential at cargo, leading to cargo
buckle, leading to major hazard, involving
fatality, environmental hazard
1. Potential Blower B-201 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
1. Potential Blower B-201 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
1. Potential Blower B-201 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
1. Potential Blower B-201 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
1. Potential Blower B-201 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
1. Potential Blower B-201 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
3. PSV-2011 to BOG from liquid loading line
to tank BOG outlet line
1. PAH-1006, operator response
2. PAH-1002, operator response 4. To link ZSC-2002 (close position of MOV-2002) WIKA-PEN (E&I)
to stop Blower B-201 operation
3. ZSC-2002, operator response
4. PIC-1001, PCV-1001 open
5. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
6. PSV-1001/1002
1. Refers to low pressure scenario at cargo
side
1. PAH-1006, operator response
2. PAH-1002, operator response
3. PIC-1001, PCV-1001 open
4. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
5. PSV-1001/1002
1. Refers to low pressure scenario at cargo
side
1. Open FCV-2001 to release BOG back to
Tank T-201
2. TAH-2003, operator response
3. TAHH-2003, trip Blower B-201
1. Open FCV-2001 to release BOG back to
Tank T-201
2. TAH-2003, operator response
3. TAHH-2003, trip Blower B-201
1. Open FCV-2001 to release BOG back to
Tank T-201
2. TAH-2003, operator response
3. PDAH-1042 to alert operator
4. TAHH-2003, trip Blower B-201
1. Open FCV-2001 to release BOG back to
Tank T-201
2. TAH-2003, operator response
3. ZSC-1005 to alert operator
4. TAHH-2003, trip Blower B-201
1. Open FCV-2001 to release BOG back to
Tank T-201
2. TAH-2003, operator response
3. ZSC-1062 to alert operator
4. TAHH-2003, trip Blower B-201
1. Open FCV-2001 to release BOG back to
Tank T-201
3 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. TAH-2003, operator response
3. ZSC-6002 to alert operator
4. TAHH-2003, trip Blower B-201
5. Reverse Flow 1. Refers to No Flow - SDV-6001
(liquid) malfunction closed
6. Reverse Flow (gas) 1. No credible cause identified
7. Misdirected Flow 1. LCV-6001 malfunction open 1. Potential liquid carry over to vapor line, 1. LAH-6001 operator response
(liquid) potential vapor line 2-phase, potential liquid
carry over to Compressor and Blower,
leading to equipments damage
8. Misdirected Flow 1. PCV-1001 malfunction open 1. Low pressure tank T-201, potential tank 1. PAL-1002, operator response
(gas) vacuum, potential tank buckle and potential
tank collapse 2. PALL-1002, shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-
203A/B, P-204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C,
P-208A/B
3. PALL-2006 shutdown Compressor C-201
A/B/C and Blower B-201
4. PSV-1003 (vacuum breaker)
9. More Level 1. Continuous filling of C3 to Tank T- 1. Tank T-201 overfilling, potential spillage, 1. LAH-1001A/1002A, operator response
201 potential pool fire if ignited, potential tank
collapse, leading to major hazard 2. LAHH-1001A, close SDV-1001
3. Fire and Gas Detector available at Tank
area
4. Sprinkler available for Fire Fighting
10. Less Level 1. Leakage at Tank T-201 1. Potential spillage, potential pool fire if 1. LAL-1001A/1002A operator response
ignited, potential tank collapse, leading to
major hazard 2. LALL-1001A shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-
203A/B, P-204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C,
P-208A/B
3. Fire and Gas Detector available at Tank
area
4. Sprinkler available for Fire Fighting
2. Simultaneously discharge of C3 to 1. Low pressure tank T-201, potential tank 1. PAL-1002, operator response
Jetty 2 and 3 vacuum, potential tank buckle and potential
tank collapse 2. PALL-1002, shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-
203A/B, P-204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C,
P-208A/B
3. PALL-2006 shutdown Compressor C-201
A/B/C and Blower B-201
4. PSV-1003 (vacuum breaker)
2. Potential no flow to pump P-203A/B, P- 1. LAL-1001A/1002A operator response
204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C, P-208A/B,
potential pump cavitation, leading to 2. LALL-1001A shutdown P-203A/B, P-
vibration, pump damage 204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C, P-208A/B

11. More Pressure 1. See More Flow

12. Less Pressure 1. See No Flow
13. More Temperature 1. See No Flow
2. External fire 1. Excessive heat up to C3 Tank T-201, 1. Fire and Gas Detector available at Tank
potential liquid expand, potential tank burst, area
potential escalate to major hazard
2. Sprinkler available for Fire Fighting
3. High ambient temperature 1. No significance consequence since
ambient temperature as per ITB is max. 50
degC (for tank only), while ambient
temperature only 35 degC
14. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
15. Composition 1. Excess light component C2 in 1. Potential reduced performance BOG 1. Density meter available at coriolis meter 5. To be explained in Operating Manual special WIKA-PEN
Change filling liquid recovery system, leading to tank T-201 over handling of light component in C3 feed material (Process)
pressure 2. Sampling point available at loading line

1. Density meter available at coriolis meter

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 4 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. Excess heavy component in filling 1. Potential electric motor overload, leading 2. Overload protection available in MCC
liquid to motor damage,
3. Sampling point available at loading line
16. Contamination 1. No credible cause identified
17. Corrosion/Erosion 1. Refers to More flow due to high
velocity
2. External corrosion 1. Potential piping corroded, loading line 1. Corrosion allowance 1.5 mm is applied as
corroded, potential pin hole to loading line per project specification
2. Pipeline is insulated (liquid and vapor line)
18. Safety 1. Discharge from PSV-1001/1002 1. 6. Tank manufacturer has to configure PSVs on WIKA-PEN
Concerns/Relief are released directly to atmosphere the top of tank (Process)
19. Others 1. Drawing comment 1. 7. To provide manual isolation valve on the liquid WIKA-PEN
loading line (hose connection line) (Process)
2. Backloading 1. More Flow (liquid) 1. Two pumps P-202A/B/C running 1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to 1. XL-2111A/B/C, operator response
refrigerated LPG of simultaneously vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
C3 simultaneously hazard 2. FAH-1045A/B, operator response
from the 3. Refers to rec. FAHH-1045A/B
refrigerated tanks to
a fully refrigerated 4. SOP provided for operation of
coastal tanker at backloading pump
Jetty-1
2. FCV -1019 malfunction wide open 1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to 1. FAH-1045A/B, operator response
vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
hazard 2. Refers to rec. FAHH-1045A/B

2. Motor pump overload, leading to pump 1. XAH-2114A/B/C, operator response

damage
2. More Flow (gas) 1. PCV-1061 malfunction open 1. Potential vacuum at cargo tank, potential
cargo damage, leading to major hazard
2. Potential BOG increased C3 tank T-201,
potential increase pressure at T-201, leading
to high pressure, tank damage, leading to
major hazard
3. Potential overload on Blower B-202, motor
damage
2. Overload protection available in MCC
3. PAL-2033A/B/C, operator response
1. Refers to low pressure scenario at cargo 8. To provide PAL-6003 to alert operator when low WIKA-PEN
side pressure at cargo side (Process)
2. PALL-6003, to trip Blower B-202 9. To include stopping Blower B-202 in interlock WIKA-PEN
PAHH-1002 during backloading operation (Process)
1. PAH-1002, operator response
2. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
1. Overload protection available in MCC

3. Less/No Flow 1. SDV-1003 malfunction closed
(liquid)
2. MOV-1008 malfunction closed
3. SRT-202A/B/C blockaged
4. Pump P-202A/B/C stop
5. MOV-2016 malfunction closed
1. Pump P-202A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-202A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-202A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Backloading stop, backloading delay,
economic impact
2. Potential back flow from discharge pump
to suction line, potential pump reverse
rotation, pump damage
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. ZSC-1003 operator response
2. VAH-2003A/B, 2004A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
3. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
1. ZSC-1008 operator response
2. VAH-2003A/B, 2004A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
3. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
1. VAH-2003A/B, 2004A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
2. PDI-2016A/B/C available at local
3. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
1. Standby pump available
1. Check valve installed
1. ZSC-2016, operator response 10. To review the possibility to remove loop PSHH- WIKA-PEN
2033A/B/C since the reliability of minimum flow (Process)
2. FAL-1045A/B, operator response

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 5 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation
4. Less/No Flow (gas)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Cause
6. MOV-1028 malfunction closed
7. FCV -1019 malfunction closed
8. MOV-1026A/1026B malfunction
closed
9. Strainer LM-201A/B blockaged
10. MOV-1027 malfunction closed
11. SDV-6001 malfunction closed
12. Minimum Flow Valve FCV
2033A/B malfunction close when it
required to be open
1. SDV-6002 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1061 malfunction closed
Consequence
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
2. Potential surging at pipeline, leading to
pipe displacement, pipeline damage, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. Pressure discharge pumps P-
202A/B/Cincrease potential leaks from
flanges, LOPC, potential fire if ignited,
potential loss of properties
1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure
at T-201, potential tank buckle, tank damage,
LOPC, leading to major hazard
2. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure
at T-201, potential tank buckle, tank damage,
LOPC, leading to major hazard
2. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow line is good, there is no additional scenario to
line increase pressure at discharge pump line
4. PSV-2010 thermal expansion case
1. ZSC-1028, operator response
2. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2010 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
3. PSV-2010 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1026A/B, operator response
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2010 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. PDAH-1046A/B, operator response
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2010 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1027, operator response
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2010 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response 11. To review closing time of shutdown valve to WIKA-PEN
avoid surging in case of SDV malfunction (Process)
2. ZSC-6001, operator response close, during backloading operation
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2010 thermal expansion case
1. PAH-2033A/B to alert operator
2. PAHH 2033A/B to shutdon the pump P
202 A/B
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. FIC-1061 to open FCV-1061 12. To provide protection PALL at suction Blower
B-202
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. FIC-1061 to open FCV-1061
2. Refers to rec. To provide protection PALL
at suction Blower B-202
6 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
3. B-202 stop
4. PCV-1061 malfunction closed
5. MOV-1010 malfunction closed
6. MOV-1009 malfunction closed
7. Strainer VM-201 blockaged
8. MOV-2001 malfunction closed
5. Reverse Flow 1. See No Flow - Pump P-202A/B/C
(liquid) stop
6. Reverse Flow (gas) 1. No credible cause identified
7. Misdirected Flow 1. See LCV malfunction open
(liquid)
8. Misdirected Flow 1. MOV-1005 malfunction open
(gas)
2. MOV-1061 malfunction open
3. FCV-1071 malfunction open
9. More Level 1. See More Flow (liquid)
10. Less Level 1. Continuous discharge C3 from
Tank T-201
11. More Pressure 1. See No Flow (gas)
12. Less Pressure 1. See No Flow (gas)
13. More Temperature 1. See No Flow (liquid)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure
at T-201, potential tank buckle, tank damage,
LOPC, leading to major hazard
2. Low pressure at T-201, potential tank
collapse
1. Blower block discharge, potentially
increase discharge line, potential Blower
damage
1. Blower B-202 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-202,
leading to Blower damage
1. Blower B-202 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-202,
leading to Blower damage
1. Blower B-202 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-202,
leading to Blower damage
1. Blower B-202 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-202,
leading to Blower damage
1. No data for BOG recovery from cargo,
dispute in economical issue
1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction
of Blower, leading to temperature increase at
Blower, potential Blower B-202 damage
1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction
of Blower, leading to temperature increase at
Blower, potential Blower B-202 damage
1. Low level at T-201, leading to pump P-
202A/B/C cavitation, pump high vibration,
pump damage
2. Potential overflow at cargo
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. PAL-1002, operator response
2. PALL-1002, shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-
203A/B, P-204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C,
P-208A/B
1. FIC-1061A to open FCV-1061
2. TAH-1064 operator response
3. TAHH-1064, stop Blower B-202
1. FIC-1061A to open FCV-1061
2. ZSC-1010 operator response
3. TAH-1064 operator response
4. TAHH-1064, stop Blower B-202
1. FIC-1061A to open FCV-1061
2. ZSC-1009 operator response
3. TAH-1064 operator response
4. TAHH-1064, stop Blower B-202
1. FIC-1061A to open FCV-1061
2. PDAH-1042 operator response
3. TAH-1064 operator response
4. TAHH-1064, stop Blower B-202
1. FIC-1061A to open FCV-1061
2. ZSC-2001 operator response
3. TAH-1064 operator response
4. TAHH-1064, stop Blower B-202
1. ZSO-1005, operator response
1. ZSO-1061 operator response
2. TAH-1064 operator response
3. TAHH-1064, stop Blower B-302
1. TAH-1064 operator response 13. To provide FAH-1061 (shall be consider 100% WIKA-PEN
open for FAH), to alert operator (Process)
2. TAHH-1064, stop Blower B-302
1. LAL-1001A/1002A operator response
2. VAH-2003A/B, 2004A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
3. LALL-1001A shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-
203A/B, P-204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C,
P-208A/B
1. Rely to safeguard to overflow protection
system at cargo side
7 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
2. Dry pump P-202A/B/C start to
operate
14. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
15. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
16. Contamination 1. Contaminant from cargo through
BOG
17. Corrosion/Erosion 1. External corrosion
18. Safety 1. Discharge from vent line are
Concerns/Relief released directly to atmosphere
during start up pump P-202A/B/C
19. Others 1. No additional credible cause
identified
3. C3 Recirculation 1. More Flow 1. Two pumps P-207A/B/C running
to loading line Jetty- simultaneously
1 and Jetty-2
2. FCV-6001 malfunction open
(Jetty-1)
3. FCV -1019 malfunction wide open
(Jetty-1)
4. FCV-6011 malfunction open
(Jetty-2)
5. FCV-1039 malfunction open
(Jetty-2)
2. Less/No Flow 1. SDV-1003 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1008 malfunction closed
3. SRT-207A/B/C blockaged
4. Pump P-207A/B/C stop
5. FCV-6001 malfunction closed
(Jetty-1)
6. MOV-1015 malfunction closed
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. Increase boil of gas, potential pump
cavitation leading to pump damage
1. Potential tanks contaminated by
contaminant from cargo
1. Potential piping corroded, loading line
corroded, potential pin hole to loading line
1.
1. Excessive flow to 6" recirculation pipeline,
leading to vibration to pipeline, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. Excessive flow to 6" recirculation pipeline,
leading to vibration to pipeline, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. No significant consequence since flow will
be control by FCV-6001
1. Excessive flow to 6" recirculation pipeline,
leading to vibration to pipeline, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. No significant consequence since flow will
be control by FCV-6011
1. Pump P-207A/B/C cavitation, potential
high vibration leading to pump damage
1. Pump P-207A/B/C cavitation, potential
high vibration leading to pump damage
1. Pump P-207A/B/C cavitation, potential
high vibration leading to pump damage
1. No recirculation, potential temperature
increase on loading line leading to excessive
BOG regeneration, especially during
unloading/backloading, leading to high
pressure at C3 Tank T-201, tank rupture,
leading to major hazard
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. TAH-2031A/B/C as permissive to start
pump P-202A/B/C
1. Inspection of Certificate Of Quality (COQ)
available from cargo before backloading
activities
1. Corrosion allowance 1.5 mm is applied as
per project specification
2. Pipeline is insulated (liquid and vapor line)
14. To review using portable flexible hose if the WIKA-PEN
activity quite often, then fix line is required to (Process)
be applied
1. XL-2129A/B/C, operator response 15. To add FAH-6001 to alert operator WIKA-PEN
(Process)
2. SOP provided for operation of 16. To provide LOTO for operation of discharge WIKA-PEN
recirculation pump manual valve of recirculation pump P- (Process)
207A/B/C
1. SOP provided for operation of
recirculation pump
1. SOP provided for operation of 17. To add FAH-6011 to alert operator WIKA-PEN
recirculation pump (Process)
1. ZSC-1003 operator response 18. To provide FAL-6001 to alert operator for WIKA-PEN
Jetty-1 (Process)
19. To provide FAL-6011 to alert operator for WIKA-PEN
Jetty-2 (Process)
20. To link the position of MOV-1008, if MOV at WIKA-PEN
close position as permissive to run Pump P- (Process)
207A/B/C
1. ZSC-1008 operator response
1. PDI-2048A/B/C available at local
1. XL-2126A/B/C, operator response
2. LCV-6001/6011 to release BOG from
liquid loading line to BOG vapor line
3. PAH-1002, operator response
4. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
5. PSV-1001/1002
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response 21. To review safeguard required for recirculation WIKA-PEN
pump P-207A/B/C on block discharge case (Process)
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
8 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
7. Strainer LM-201A/B blockaged
8. MOV-1026A/B malfunction closed
9. FCV -1019 malfunction closed
10. MOV-1016 malfunction closed
11. FCV-6011 malfunction closed
(Jetty-2)
12. Strainer LM-205A/B blockaged
(Jetty-2)
13. MOV-1081A/B malfunction
closed (Jetty-2)
14. FCV-1078 malfunction closed
(Jetty-2)
15. MOV-2025 malfunction closed
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand
by pump
4. Misdirected Flow 1. No credible cause identified
5. More Level 1. No credible cause identified
6. Less Level 1. No credible cause identified
7. More Pressure 1. See No flow
8. Less Pressure 1. See more flow
9. More Temperature 1. See no flow
10. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
11. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
12. Contamination 1. No credible cause identified
13. Corrosion/Erosion 1. No credible cause identified
14. Safety 1. PSV-2015/2026 release to flare
Concerns/Relief
15. Others 1. Manual valve 20-
BA01674/1675/1676 in bypass
check valve inadvertently close,
when pump P-207A/B/C start up
1. More Flow (liquid)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Pump reverse rotation, potential pump
damage
1. Potential lost of C3,
1. Potential liquid in section of d/s check
valve and isolation valve get thermal
expansion, potential pipe burst, LOPC,
leading to fire if ignited
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
1. PAH-2042A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2042A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2015/2026
1. PG and Check valve installed at 22. To include in operating manual, operating of WIKA-PEN
discharge line manual valve 20-BA01674/1675/1676 at (Process)
bypass line
23. To see possibility to recover C3, instead of C3 WIKA-PEN
discharge to flare whenever PSV-1015/1026 (Process)
open
1. Refers to Rec. to be explained in 24. To review application of bypass line to check WIKA-PEN
operating manual valve at discharge P-207A/B/C to avoid (Process)
misoperation of recirculation pump
1. XL-2111A/B/C, operator response
9 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node
4. Backloading
refrigerated LPG of
C3 from the
refrigerated tanks to
a fully refrigerated
coastal tanker at
Jetty-2
2. More Flow (gas)
3. Less/No Flow
(liquid)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Deviation Cause
1. Two pumps P-202A/B/C running
simultaneously
2. FCV -1078 malfunction wide open
1. PCV-1040 malfunction open
1. SDV-1003 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1008 malfunction closed
3. SRT-202A/B/C blockaged
4. Pump P-202A/B/C stop
5. MOV-2024 malfunction closed
6. Strainer LM-205A/B blockaged
7. MOV-1081A/B malfunction closed
Consequence
1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to
vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
hazard
1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to
vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
hazard
2. Motor pump overload, leading to pump
damage
1. Potential vacuum at cargo tank, potential
cargo damage, leading to major hazard
2. Potential BOG increased n C3 tank T-201,
potential increase pressure at T-201, leading
to high pressure, tank damage, leading to
major hazard
3. Potential overload on Blower B-204, motor
damage
1. Pump P-202A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-202A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-202A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Backloading stop, backloading delay,
economic impact
2. Potential back flow from discharge pump
to suction line, potential pump reverse
rotation, pump damage
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. FAH-1045A/B, operator response
3. Refers to rec. FAHH-1045A/B
4. SOP provided for operation of
backloading pump
1. FAH-1045A/B, operator response
2. Refers to rec. FAHH-1045A/B
1. XAH-2114A/B/C, operator response
2. Overload protection available in MCC
3. PAL-2033A/B/C, operator response
1. Refers to low pressure scenario at cargo 25. To provide PAL-6003 to alert operator when WIKA-PEN
side low pressure at cargo side (Process)
2. PALL-6013, to trip Blower B-204 26. To include stopping Blower B-202 in interlock WIKA-PEN
PAHH-1002 during backloading operation (Process)
1. PAH-1002, operator response
2. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
1. Overload protection available in MCC
1. ZSC-1003 operator response
2. VAH-2003A/B, 2004A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
3. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
1. ZSC-1008 operator response 27. To include valve position close of MOV as WIKA-PEN
permissive to start pump P-202A/B/C (Process)
2. VAH-2003A/B, 2004A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
3. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
1. VAH-2003A/B, 2004A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
2. PDI-2016A/B/C available at local
3. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
1. Standby pump available
1. Check valve installed
1. ZSC-2024, operator response
2. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2024 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. PDAH-1078A/B, operator response
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2024 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1081A/B, operator response
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2024 thermal expansion case
10 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
8. FCV -1078 malfunction closed
9. SDV-6011 malfunction closed
4. Less/No Flow (gas) 1. SDV-6012 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1041 malfunction closed
3. B-204 stop
4. PCV-1040 malfunction closed
5. Strainer VM-205 blockaged
6. MOV-1049 malfunction closed
5. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand
(liquid) by pump
6. Reverse Flow (gas) 1. No credible cause identified
7. Misdirected Flow 1. See LCV malfunction open
(liquid)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
2. Potential surging at pipeline, leading to
pipe displacement, pipeline damage, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure
at T-201, potential tank buckle, tank damage,
LOPC, leading to major hazard
2. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure
at T-201, potential tank buckle, tank damage,
LOPC, leading to major hazard
2. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure
at T-201, potential tank buckle, tank damage,
LOPC, leading to major hazard
2. Low pressure at T-201, potential tank
collapse
1. Blower block discharge, potentially
increase discharge line, potential Blower
damage
1. Blower B-204 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-204 leading
to Blower damage
1. Blower B-204 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-204 leading
to Blower damage
1. Pump P-202A/B/C reverse rotation, pump
damage
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
3. PSV-2024 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1045A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-6011, operator response
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2024 thermal expansion case
28.
29. To review closing time of shutdown valve to WIKA-PEN
avoid surging in case of SDV-6011 (Process)
malfunction close, during backloading
operation
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
30. To provide protection PALL at suction Blower WIKA-PEN
B-204 (Process)
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
31. To provide protection PALL at suction Blower WIKA-PEN
B-204 (Process)
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. PAL-1002, operator response
2. PALL-1002, shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-
203A/B, P-204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C,
P-208A/B
1. FIC-1038A to open FCV-1038
2. TAH-1039 operator response
3. TAHH-1039, stop Blower B-204
1. FIC-1038A to open FCV-1038
2. PDAH-1076 operator response
3. TAH-1039 operator response
4. TAHH-1039, stop Blower B-204
1. FIC-1038A to open FCV-1038
2. ZSC-1049 operator response
3. TAH-1039 operator response
4. TAHH-1039, stop Blower B-204
1. PG and Check valve installed at
discharge line
11 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
8. Misdirected Flow 1. MOV-1042 malfunction open 1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction 1. ZSO-1042 operator response
(gas) of Blower, leading to temperature increase at
Blower, potential Blower B-204 damage 2. TAH-1039 operator response
3. TAHH-1039, stop Blower B-204
2. FCV-1038 malfunction open 1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction 1. TAH-1039 operator response 32. To provide FAH (shall be consider 100% open WIKA-PEN
of Blower, leading to temperature increase at for FAH), to alert operator (Process)
Blower, potential Blower B-204 damage 2. TAHH-1039, stop Blower B-204

9. More Level 1. No credible cause identified

10. Less Level 1. Continuous discharge to cargo 1. Low level at T-201, leading to pump P- 1. LAL-1001A/1002A operator response
202A/B/C cavitation, pump damage
2. VAH-2003A/B, 2004A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
3. LALL-1001A shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-
203A/B, P-204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C,
P-208A/B
11. More Pressure 1. See No flow
12. Less Pressure 1. See No flow
13. More Temperature 1. See No Flow (liquid)
2. Dry pump P-202A/B/C start to 1. Increase boil of gas, potential pump 1. TAH-2031A/B/C as permissive to start
operate cavitation leading to pump damage pump P-202A/B/C
14. Less Temperature 1. Liquid spill after post backloading 1. Potential liquid spill to concrete, concrete 1. Fire and Gas Detector available at Jetty-2
damage area
2. Specification of concrete is fc`30 (strength
4000 Mpa) stands to low temperature of
propane
15. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
16. Contamination 1. Contaminant from cargo through 1. Potential tanks contaminated by 1. Inspection of Certificate Of Quality (COQ)
BOG contaminant from cargo available from cargo before backloading
activities
17. Corrosion/Erosion 1. External corrosion 1. Potential piping corroded, loading line 1. Corrosion allowance 1.5 mm is applied as
corroded, potential pin hole to loading line per project specification
2. Pipeline is insulated (liquid and vapor line)
18. Safety 1. Discharge from vent line are 1. 33. To review using portable flexible hose if the WIKA-PEN
Concerns/Relief released directly to atmosphere activity quite often, then fix line is required to (Process)
during start up pump P-202A/B/C be applied
19. Others 1. No additional credible cause
identified
5. Backloading 1. More Flow (liquid) 1. Two pumps P-204A/B running 1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to 1. XL-2116A/B, operator response
refrigerated LPG of simultaneously vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
C3 from the hazard 2. FIC-1039 to control flow for backloading
refrigerated tanks to to Jetty-3
a fully refrigerated 3. FAH-1047A/B, operator response
Coastal Tanker at
Jetty-3 4. Refers to rec. FAHH-1047A/B
5. SOP provided for operation of
backloading pump
2. FCV-1039 malfunction wide open 1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to 1. FAH-1047A/B, operator response
vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
hazard 2. Refers to rec. FAHH-1047A/B

2. Motor pump overload, leading to pump 1. VAH-2005A/B, operator response

damage
2. More Flow (gas) 1. PCV-1021 malfunction open 1. Potential vacuum at cargo tank, potential
cargo damage, leading to major hazard
2. VAH-2006AB, operator response
3. PAL-2036A/B, operator response
4. Overload protection available in MCC
1. Refers to low pressure scenario at cargo 34. To provide PAL-7003 to alert operator when WIKA-PEN
side low pressure at cargo side (Process)
2. PALL-7003, to trip Blower B-203 35. To include stopping Blower B-203 in interlock WIKA-PEN
PAHH-1002 during backloading operation (Process)

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 12 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
3. Less/No Flow 1. SDV-1012 malfunction closed
(liquid)
2. MOV-1017 malfunction closed
3. SRT-304A/B blockaged
4. Pump P-304A/B stop
5. MOV-2068 malfunction closed
6. Strainer LM-302A/B blockaged
7. MOV-1079A/B malfunction closed
8. FCV-1089 malfunction closed
9. SDV-7051 malfunction closed
4. Less/No Flow (gas) 1. SDV-7052 malfunction closed
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
2. Potential BOG increased C3 tank T-201,
potential increase pressure at T-201, leading
to high pressure, tank damage, leading to
major hazard
3. Potential overload on Blower B-203, motor
damage
1. Pump P-304A/B cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-304A/B cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-304A/B cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Backloading stop, backloading delay,
economic impact
2. Potential back flow from discharge pump
to suction line, potential pump reverse
rotation, pump damage
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
2. Potential surging at pipeline, leading to
pipe displacement, pipeline damage, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure
at T-301, potential tank buckle, tank damage,
LOPC, leading to major hazard
2. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. PAH-1002, operator response
2. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
1. Overload protection available in MCC
1. ZSC-1002 operator response
2. VAH-2005A/B, 2006A/B, operator
response
3. FAL-1097A/B, operator response
1. ZSC-1007 operator response 36. To include valve position close of MOV as WIKA-PEN
permissive to start pump P-304A/B (Process)
2. VAH-2005A/B, 2006A/B, operator
response
3. FAL-1047A/B, operator response
1. PDI available at local
2. VAH-2055A/B, 2056A/B, operator
response
3. FAL-1097A/B, operator response
1. Standby pump available
1. Check valve installed
1. ZSC-2068, operator response 37. To review the possibility to remove loop WIKA-PEN
PSHH-2083A/B/C since the reliability of (Process)
2. FAL-1097A/B, operator response minimum flow line is good, there is no
3. FCV-2086A/B to open minimum flow line additional scenario to increase pressure at
discharge pump line
4. PSV-2062 thermal expansion case
1. PDAH-1098A/B, operator response
2. FAL-1097A/B, operator response
3. FCV-2086A/B to open minimum flow line
4. PSV-2062 thermal expansion case
1. ZSC-1079A/B, operator response
2. FAL-1097A/B, operator response
3. FCV-2086A/B to open minimum flow line
4. PSV-2062 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1047A/B, operator response
2. FCV-2036A/B to open minimum flow line
3. PSV-2062 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1097A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-7051, operator response
3. FCV-2083A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2062 thermal expansion case
38. To review and adjust the traveling time of
SDV-7051, to avoid surging effect when SDV
malfunction close
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. FIC-1031A to open FCV-1031 39. To provide protection PALL at suction Blower WIKA-PEN
B-303 (Process)
13 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
2. MOV-1071 malfunction closed 1. High pressure at cargo side 1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
2. Low pressure at 3-201, potential tank
buckle, tank damage, LOPC, leading to
major hazard
3. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
3. B-303 stop 1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure 1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
at T-201, potential tank buckle, tank damage, scenario at cargo side
LOPC, leading to major hazard 40. To provide protection PALL at suction Blower WIKA-PEN
B-204 (Process)
2. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
4. PCV-1021 malfunction closed 1. Blower block discharge, potentially 1. FIC-1021A to open FCV-1021
increase discharge line, potential Blower
damage 2. TAH-1024 operator response
3. TAHH-1024, stop Blower B-203
5. Strainer VM-202 blockaged 1. Blower block discharge, potentially 1. FIC-1021A to open FCV-1021
increase discharge line, potential Blower
damage 2. TAH-1024 operator response
3. TAHH-1024, stop Blower B-203
5. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand 1. Pump P-202A/B/C reverse rotation, pump 1. PG and Check valve installed at
(liquid) by pump damage discharge line
6. Reverse Flow (gas) 1. No credible cause identified
7. Misdirected Flow 1. LCV-7001 malfunction open 1. Potential liquid carry over to BOG line, 1. LAH-1022 operator response
(liquid) potential Blower B-203 damage
2. LAL-7001, operator response
3. LAHH-1022, Blower B-203 stop
8. Misdirected Flow 1. MOV-1022 malfunction open 1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction 1. ZSO-1022 operator response
(gas) of Blower, leading to temperature increase at
Blower, potential Blower B-203 damage 2. TAH-1024 operator response
3. TAHH-1024, stop Blower B-203
2. FCV-1021 malfunction open 1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction 1. TAH-1024 operator response 41. To provide FAH (shall be consider 100% open WIKA-PEN
of Blower, leading to temperature increase at for FAH), to alert operator (Process)
Blower, potential Blower B-203 damage 2. TAHH-1024, stop Blower B-203

9. More Level 1. LCV-7001 malfunction open 1. Liquid level increase at BOG drum D-204, 1. LG-1021 available for daily inspection
liquid carry over to Blower B-203, leading to
Blower damage 2. LAH-1022 operator response
3. LAHH-1022, Blower B-203 stop
10. Less Level 1. Manual valve of drain line keep 1. Potentially oxygen sucked by Blower B- 42. To review requirement to apply liquid closed WIKA-PEN
open 203 and HC exposed to oxygen, potential drain instead of liquid open drain (Process)
fire if ignited, leading to major hazard
11. More Pressure 1. See No flow
12. Less Pressure 1. See No flow
13. More Temperature 1. See No Flow (liquid)
2. Dry pump P-204A/B start to 1. Increase boil of gas, potential pump 1. TAH-2032A/B as permissive to start pump
operate cavitation leading to pump damage P-204A/B
14. Less Temperature 1. Liquid spill after post backloading 1. Potential liquid spill to concrete, concrete 1. Fire and Gas Detector available at Jetty-3
damage area
2. Specification of concrete is fc`30 (strength
4000 Mpa) stands to low temperature of
propane

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 14 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
15. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
16. Contamination 1. Contaminant from cargo through
BOG
17. Corrosion/Erosion 1. External corrosion
18. Safety 1. Discharge from vent line are
Concerns/Relief released directly to atmosphere
during start up pump P-204A/B
19. Others 1. Portable flexiblehose used when
performing manual draining
accumulate liquid from Drum D-204
6. C3 Recirculation 1. More Flow 1. Two pumps P-208A/B running
to loading line Jetty- simultaneously
3 leading to major hazard
2. FCV-7001 malfunction open
3. FCV-1039 malfunction open
2. Less/No Flow 1. SDV-1002 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1007 malfunction closed
3. SRT-208A/B blockaged
4. Pump P-208A/B stop
5. FCV-7001 malfunction closed
6. FCV-1039 malfunction closed
7. MOV-1029A/B malfunction closed
8. Strainer LM-202A/B blockaged
9. MOV-2019 malfunction closed
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. Potential tanks contaminated by
contaminant from cargo
1. Potential piping corroded, loading line
corroded, potential pin hole to loading line
1.
1. Potential leakage during connection,
person expose to HC hazard, potential
involving fatalities
1. Excessive flow to 4" recirculation pipeline,
leading to vibration to pipeline, LOPC,
1. Excessive flow to 4" recirculation pipeline,
leading to vibration to pipeline, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. No significant consequence since flow will
be control by FCV-7001
1. Pump P-208A/B cavitation, potential high
vibration leading to pump damage
1. Pump P-208A/B cavitation, potential high
vibration leading to pump damage
1. Pump P-208A/B cavitation, potential high
vibration leading to pump damage
1. No recirculation, potential temperature
increase on loading line leading to excessive
BOG regeneration, especially during
unloading/backloading, leading to high
pressure at C3 Tank T-201, tank rupture,
leading to major hazard
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. Inspection of Certificate Of Quality (COQ)
available from cargo before backloading
activities
1. Corrosion allowance 1.5 mm is applied as
per project specification
2. Pipeline is insulated (liquid and vapor line)
43. To review using portable flexible hose if the WIKA-PEN
activity quite often, then fix line is required to (Process)
be applied
1. SOP Manual drain liquid is included in the 44. To review method of draining liquid at whole WIKA-PEN
operating manual from Contractor facilities. An alternative preferrence of liquid (Process)
drain will be routed into drain header and send
back to C3 Tank instead of manual drain using
portable flexible hose
1. XL-2131A/B, operator response 45. To add FAH-7001 to alert operator WIKA-PEN
(Process)
2. SOP provided for operation of 46. To provide LOTO for operation of discharge WIKA-PEN
recirculation pump manual valve of recirculation pump P-208A/B (Process)
1. SOP provided for operation of 47. To add FAH-6001 to alert operator WIKA-PEN
recirculation pump (Process)
1. ZSC-1002 operator response 48. To provide FAL-7001 to alert operator for WIKA-PEN
Jetty-3 (Process)
49. To link the position of MOV-1007, if MOV at WIKA-PEN
close position as permissive to run Pump P- (Process)
208A/B
1. ZSC-1007 operator response
1. PDI-2049A/B available at local
1. XL-2131A/B, operator response 50. To update P&ID to change LZLL-7001 WIKA-PEN
become LZI-7001 (Process)
2. LCV-7001 to release BOG from liquid
loading line to BOG vapor line
3. PAH-1002, operator response
4. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
5. PSV-1001/1002
1. PAH-2045A/B, operator response 51. To review safeguard required for recirculation WIKA-PEN
pump P-208A/B on block discharge case (Process)
2. PAHH-2045A/B, shutdown P-208A/B
3. PSV-2016
1. PAH-2045A/B, operator response
2. PAHH-2045A/B, shutdown P-208A/B
3. PSV-2016
1. PAH-2045A/B, operator response
2. PAHH-2045A/B, shutdown P-208A/B
3. PSV-2016
1. PAH-2045A/B, operator response
2. PAHH-2045A/B, shutdown P-208A/B
3. PSV-2016
1. PAH-2045A/B, operator response
15 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up, 2. PAHH-2045A/B, shutdown P-208A/B 52. To review sizing of return line 20-RP162-12"- WIKA-PEN
potential thermal expansion A12-C80 in relation to flow from recirculation (Process)
3. PSV-2016 pump only 15 T/hr
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand 1. Pump reverse rotation, potential pump 1. PG and Check valve installed at 53. To include in operating manual, operating of WIKA-PEN
by pump damage discharge line manual valve 20-BA01734/1735 at bypass (Process)
line
4. Misdirected Flow 1. LCV-7001 malfunction open 1. Potential liquid carry over to BOG drum D- 1. LAH-1022 operator response 54.
204, potential Blower B-203 damage
2. LAHH-1022, Blower B-203 stop
5. More Level 1. No credible cause identified
6. Less Level 1. No credible cause identified
7. More Pressure 1. See No flow - block discharge
case
8. Less Pressure 1. See More Flow
9. More Temperature 1. See No flow - block discharge
case
10. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
11. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
12. Contamination 1. No credible cause identified
13. Corrosion/Erosion 1. No credible cause identified
14. Safety 1. PSV-2016 release to flare 1. Potential lost of C3 55. To see possibility for recovery of C3 whenever WIKA-PEN
Concerns/Relief PSV-2016 open (Process)
15. Others 1. Manual valve 20-BA01734/1735 1. Potential liquid in section of d/s check 1. Refers to Rec. to be explained in 56. To review application of bypass line to check WIKA-PEN
used for bypassing check valve valve and isolation valve get thermal operating manual valve at discharge P-208A/B to avoid (Process)
inadvertently close, when pump P- expansion, potential pipe burst, LOPC, misoperation of recirculation pump
208A/B start-up leading to fire if ignited
7. C3 BOG 1. More Flow 1. PCV-2007A malfunction open 1. Potential high pressure at D-202, potential 1. PIC-2007 to open PCV-2007B to maintain 57. To review requirement to provide FIQ at WIKA-PEN
Recovery System drum burst, potential fire if ignited, involving pressure downstream of PCV-2007B (Process)
fatality
2. PSV-2006
2. Three pumps P-201A/B/C running 1. Potential low level in BOG Drum D-202, 1. Minimum flow line at pump available
simultaneously pump P-201A/B/C cavitation, leading to
pump damage 2. LIC-2005 to close LCV-2005A
3. FIC-2004A/B/C to open FCV-2004A/B/C
4. LAL-2005, operator response
5. LALL-2004 to stop pump P-201A/B/C
3. LCV-2005A malfunction open 1. Potential low level in BOG Drum D-202, 1. LAL-2005, operator response 58. To review high current alarms, the current WIKA-PEN
pump P-201A/B/C cavitation, leading to indication may sufficient enough to monitor the (Process)
pump damage 2. LALL-2004 to stop pump P-201A/B/C process parameter
2. Potential pump overload, motor overheat, 1. XIAH-2104A/B/C, operator response
leading to motor damage
2. Overload protection available in MCC
4. FCV-2007 malfunction open 1. No significant consequence since mixing 59. To keep fully open FCV-2007 when flow only WIKA-PEN
at M-401 will be effective if flow reach to coming from Compressor C-201A/B/C (Process)
above 50% of turndown ratio
2. Less/No Flow 1. MOV-2003/2004/2005 malfunction 1. Potential over pressure at T-201, leading 1. PAH-1006, operator response 60. To ensure PALL trip is available in WIKA-PEN
close to tank burst, potential LOPC, potential compressor C-201A/b/C package (Process)
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard 2. PAH-1002, operator response
3. PIC-1001, PCV-1001 open
4. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
5. PSV-1001/1002
2. Low suction pressure, potential
mechanical damage at Compressor C-
201A/B/C
2. Compressor C-201A/B/C stop 1. PAH-1006, operator response

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 16 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation
3. Reverse Flow
4. Misdirected Flow
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Cause
3. HV-2031/2032/2034 malfunction
closed
4. PCV-2007A malfunction closed
5. Strainer SRY-102A/B/C
6. Pump P-201A/B/C stop
7. LCV-2005 malfunction closed
8. FCV-2007 malfunction closed
1. Flow from running pump to stand
by pump
1. PCV-2007B malfunction open
2. HV-2033 malfunction open
Consequence
1. Potential over pressure at T-201, leading
to tank burst, potential LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
1. Block discharge potential pressure exceed
pipeline design, potential pipe burst, LOPC,
fire and explosion, involving fatalities
1. Potential low pressure at C-201A/B/C,
potential liquid carry over to flare header,
leading to high level in KO Drum, KO Drum
overflow, potential fire if ignited, potential
pool fire, escalate to major hazard
1. Potentially pump P-201A/B/C cavitation,
pump damage
1. Potential liquid build up on D-202,
potential liquid carry over to flare header,
leading to high level in KO Drum, KO Drum
overflow, potential fire if ignited, potential
pool fire, escalate to major hazard
1. Potential liquid build up on D-202,
potential liquid carry over to flare header,
leading to high level in KO Drum, KO Drum
overflow, potential fire if ignited, potential
pool fire, escalate to major hazard
2. Block discharge of pump P-201A/B/C,
potential vibration, pump damage
1. Potential liquid build up on D-202,
potential liquid carry over to flare header,
leading to high level in KO Drum, KO Drum
overflow, potential fire if ignited, potential
pool fire, escalate to major hazard
2. Block discharge of pump P-201A/B/C,
potential vibration, pump damage
1. Pump reverse rotation, potential pump
damage
1. Pressure at D-202 tend to decrease,
potentially liquid carry over to KO Drum,
potential KO Drum overflow, potential fire at
KO Drum
1. Hot liquid goes to Tank T-201, potential
excessive BOG generation, potential over
pressure at T-201, leading to tank burst,
potential LOPC, potential fire/explosion,
leading to major hazard
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. Running indicator available at compressor
package and at CCR
3. PAH-1002, operator response
4. PIC-1001, PCV-1001 open
5. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
6. PSV-1001/1002
1. PAHH to trip compressor at compressor
package
2. TAHH to trip compressor at compressor
package
3. PSV-2002/2003/2018/2022/2023/2019
1. LAH-2005, to open LCV-2005A 61. To review requirement to provide mechanical WIKA-PEN
limit switch to PCV-2007A, to ensure gas is (Process)
2. LAHH-2004 to stop Compressor C- flowing to D-202
201A/B/C
62. To provide local PDI to monitor condition of WIKA-PEN
Strainer SRY-102A/B/C (Process)
1. XL-2101A/B/C
2. LAH-2005, to open LCV-2005A
3. LAHH-2004 to stop Compressor C-
201A/B/C
1. LAH-2005, to open LCV-2005A
2. LAHH-2004 to stop Compressor C-
201A/B/C
1. FIC-2004A/B/C to open FCV-2004A/B/C
2. FAL-2004A/B/C operator response
3. PAH-2010A/B/C op[erator response
4. PAHH-2010, pump P-201A/B/C stop
1. LAH-2005, to open LCV-2005A
2. LAHH-2004 to stop Compressor C-
201A/B/C
1. FIC-2004A/B/C to open FCV-2004A/B/C
2. FAL-2004A/B/C operator response
3. PAH-2010A/B/C operator response
4. PAHH-2010, pump P-201A/B/C stop
1. PG and Check valve installed at
discharge line
1. LAH-2005, to open LCV-2005A
2. LAHH-2004 to stop Compressor C-
201A/B/C
1. PAH-1006, operator response
2. PAH-1002, operator response
3. PIC-1001, PCV-1001 open
4. PAHH-1002, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
5. PSV-1001/1002
17 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
5. More Level 1. Refers to No Flow
6. Less Level 1. Refers to More Flow
7. More Pressure 1. Refers to More Flow and No Flow
8. Less Pressure 1. Refers to More Flow and No Flow
9. More Temperature 1. Refers to No Flow
2. Sea water cooling E-201A/B 1. Potential high pressure at D-202, potential 1. PIC-2007 to open PCV-2007B to maintain
malfunction exceed mechanical design, drum rupture, pressure
LOPC, potential involving fatality
2. PAH-2007 operator response
3. TAH-2008 operator response
4. PSV-2006
2. Loss of BOG to flare, loss of production 1. FAL-2002/2003, operator response
10. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
11. Composition 1. Excess light component C2 in 1. Pressure tend to increase at discharge 1. PAH and PAHH avalable at Compressor
Change BOG from T-201 Compressor C-201A/B/C, potential package
Condenser E-201A/B blockage by non-
condensed product, leading to Condenser
damage
12. Contamination 1. No credible cause identified
13. Corrosion/Erosion 1. No credible cause identified
14. Safety 1. Fire cases 1. Liquid trapped at Condenser E-201A/B, 1. PSV-2004/2005 63. To review requirement to provide redundant WIKA-PEN
Concerns/Relief liquid expand, potential equipment damage PSV (Process)
due to over pressure 2. Hot insulation and fire proofing provided

2. Liquid trapped at BOG Drum D-202, liquid 1. PSV-2006

expand, potential equipment damage due to
over pressure
15. Others 1. No additional credible cause
identified
8. Transfer C3 from 1. More Flow 1. Two pumps running P-203A/B 1. Potential high vibration on the downstream 1. FIC-210 to control the flow with FCV-210 64. To provide FAH-2007 to alert operator in case WIKA-PEN
Propane simultaneously pipeline, leading to pipe break, LOPC, fire if of excess C3 feed to Mixer M-401 (Process)
Refrigerated Tank ignited, escalate to major hazard 2. XL-2106A/B
(T-201) to 3. TAL-2021, operator response
Propane/Butane
Blending Mixer(M- 4. TALL-2021, pump P-203A/B stop
401) thru Propane
Transfer Pumps(P- 2. The low temperature of C3 after Heater E- 1. FIC-210 to control the flow with FCV-210
203A/B) to Propane 202A/B potentially pipeline downstream of
Heater embrittlement, LOPC, fire if ignited, 2. XL-2106A/B
Heater(E-202A/B)
and finally to LPG escalate to major hazard 3. TAL-2021, operator response
Spherical Storage
Tanks (V- 4. TALL-2021, pump P-203A/B stop
001/002/003/004); 2. FCV-2007 malfunction open 1. Potential C3 excess from blending ratio, 1. Refers to Rec. FAH-2007 65. To review with Mixer manufacture either WIKA-PEN
Coastal Tanker at
impact to quality of product Mixer is resisted to max flow of C3 (Process)
Jetty-2, Jetty-3
66. Process has to select the PCV-2020 is tent to WIKA-PEN
max dp case and min dp case (Process)
67. To provide shutdown system to C3 pump P- WIKA-PEN (E&I)
203A/B in case is excess C3 compared to
blending ratio
2. Potential impact to Mixer M-401, 1. Refers to Rec. FAH-2007
potentially Mixer damage

3. Potential high dp across PCV-2020 1. Refers to Rec. FAH-2007

leading to high vibration downstream PCV,
potential pipeline break, LOPC, fire if ignited,
escalate to major hazard

4. Potential imperfect mix between C3 and 1. Refers to Rec. FAH-2007

C4 within Mixer M-401 leading to quality
impact of LPG product

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 18 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation
2. Less/No Flow
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Cause
3. PCV-2020 malfunction open
4. FCV-1068 malfunction open
1. SRT-203A/B blockaged
2. Pump P-203A/B stop
3. Strainer at LM-204 blockage
4. FCV-2007 malfunction closed
Consequence
1. Potential high pressure to existing
spherical tank potential pressure exceed
mechanical design of spherical tank,
spherical tank burst, LOPC, fire if ignited,
escalate to major hazard
2. Potential high pressure at costal tanker,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of tanker, leading to tank burst, LOPC, fire if
ignited, escalate to major hazard
3. Additional excessive BOG return from
coastal tanker, leading to high pressure at
spherical tank, leading to spherical tank
burst, LOPC, fire if ignited, escalate to major
hazard
1. Filling rate increase, potential vibration at
loading arm, potantial loading arm detach,
LOPC, fire if ignited, escalate to major
hazard
1. Pump cavitation, potantial pump damage
1. Stop backloading activity, potential no
level at spherical tank
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. PAH-102 operator response 68. To review existing spherical tank for high WIKA-PEN
pressure protection scenario, specially PCV (Process)
failure has to be included in calculation of PSV
2. PAH-203B/205B/207B/209B operator 69. To review high dp across FCV-1068 and to WIKA-PEN
response provide high dp on the specification of FCV- (Process)
1068
3. PAHH-102A to close SDV-102 70. To review high dp across FCV-1028 and to WIKA-PEN
provide high dp on the specification of FCV- (Process)
4. PAHH-203B/205B/207B/209B to close 1028
SDV-202/204/206/208
5. FIC-1068 to close FCV-1068
6. FIC-1028 to close FCV-1028
1. PAH-102 operator response
2. PAH-203B/205B/207B/209B operator
response
3. PAHH-102A to close SDV-102
4. PAHH-203B/205B/207B/209B to close
SDV-202/204/206/208
5. FIC-1068 to close FCV-1068
6. FIC-1028 to close FCV-1028
1. PAH-102 operator response
2. PAH-203B/205B/207B/209B operator
response
3. PAHH-102A to close SDV-102
4. PAHH-203B/205B/207B/209B to close
SDV-202/204/206/208
5. FIC-1068 to close FCV-1068
6. FIC-1028 to close FCV-1028
1. FAH-1068 operator response
2. Discharge Agreement procedure available
1. PDI-20151A/B at local
1. Refers to level controls at spherical tanks 1. New configuration, number of spherical
tanks available is sufficient to serve truck
loading activities
1. PDAH-2019 operator response 71. To see possibility to have additional devices to WIKA-PEN
increase reliability of backloading operation (Process)
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV- 72. To include in SOP to inspect Strainer at LM- WIKA-PEN
2012A/B 204 before high pressure backloading is (Process)
started
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
19 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
5. PCV-2020 malfunction closed 1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
6. MOV-1070 malfunction closed 1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. By pass line available
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. By pass line available
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. By pass line available
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. By pass line available
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
20 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
7. MOV-1069 malfunction closed
8. MOV-1068 malfunction closed
9. FCV-1068 malfunction closed
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. Utilize bypass line
1. PDAH-2019 operator response
21 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. Potential backloading activities delay, 2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement, 2012A/B
potentially impact on economic concern
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. Utilize bypass line
10. FCV-1028 malfunction closed 1. High pressure at discharge pump, 1. PDAH-2019 operator response
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC, 2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard 2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. Utilize bypass line
2. Potential backloading activities delay, 1. PDAH-2019 operator response
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern 2. FIC-2012 open minimum flowline FCV-
2012A/B
3. FAL-2012A/B operator response
4. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2012A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2012A/B pump stop
7. Utilize bypass line
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to 1. Pump reverse rotation, leading to pump 1. PG and check valve available at
standby pump damage discharge line
4. Misdirected Flow 1. Misidentification of filling to Jetty 1. Potentially delay inspected bacloading 73. To provide HMI logic to enable operator easily WIKA-PEN (E&I)
activity, economical impact to monitor pressurized backloading activities
5. More Pressure 1. See No Flow/More Flow
6. Less/No Pressure 1. See No Flow/More Flow
7. More Level 1. Continuous spherical tank 1. Potential high pressure at spherical tank, 1. Refers to existing level control for
backloading spherical tank burst, LOPC, fire if ignited, spherical tank
escalate to major hazard
2. PAH-203B/205B/207B/209B operator
response
3. PAHH-203B/205B/207B/209B to close
SDV-202/204/206/208 and P-203A/B
4. LAHH-201/202/203/204 to stop P-203A/B
8. Less/No Level 1. See Pump stop
9. More Temperature 1. Dry pump started before cooling 1. Potential pump vibration, leading to pump 1. TAH-2030A/B will stop the pump (as
damage permissive for start up condition of pump)
2. VAH-2001A/B and 2002A/B operator
response
10. Less Temperature 1. Seawater cooling out of service 1. Low temperature liquid, potential liquid 1. FAL-2021/2022 operator response at
carry over to non-resiliance material, seawater side
potential pipeline embrittlement, LOPC, fire if
ignited, escalate to major hazard 2. TAL-2021 operator response
3. TALL-2021 to stop Pump P-203A/B
11. Composition 1. Imperfect blending of C3 and C4 1. Low quality of product, product offspec 1. Refers to rec to provide FAHH-2007 to
Change stop Pump P-203A/B
12. Contaminant 1. Mercaptan/odour flowing to 1. Potential impact to fresh LPG at coastal 74. To provide check valve at tie in point to filling WIKA-PEN
coastal tanker tanker, potential economical impact line of spherical tank (Process)

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 22 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
13. Erosion/Corrosion 1. External corrosion due to water 1. Potential pipe corroded, in the long run 75. To provide suitable pipe support and U-bolt for WIKA-PEN
trap at below pipe on the pipe may cause pitting corrosion and pin hole non insulated pipe to avoid water trap in the (piping)
support pipe support
2. Galvanic corrosion due to 1. Potential pipe corroded, in the long run 1. Isolation kit has applied to flanges
difference material may cause galvanic corrosion and pin hole connection pipe between two different
material
14. Safety concern 1. Low point at existing vapor line on 1. 76. To review existing vapor line on spherical tank WIKA-PEN
spherical tank side to ensure there is no pocket exist at the vapor (Process)
line
15. Others
9. Transfer C3 to 1. More Flow 1. DCV-4001 malfunction open 1. Potential liquid overflow from truck, 1. Batch controller available
Truck thru truck potential liquid spills from truck, potential fire
loading bay if ignited, involving fatalities 2. SOP filling available

2. Potential liquid carry over to vapor line, 1. No pocket at vapor line 77. To check existing vapor line whether low point WIKA-PEN
potential vapor line blockaged by liquid pocket is existing or not (Process)
trapped at low point
2. Two pumps P-206A/B running 1. No significant consequence since
simultaneously operation manually, no window for two
pumps running
2. Less/No Flow 1. SRT-206A/B blockaged 1. Pump cavitation, potential pump damage 1. PDI at local
2. Pump P-206A/B stop 1. Delay loading, filling disturb 1. XL-2121A/B
3. SDV-4002 malfunction closed 1. Delay loading, filling disturb 1. ZSC-4002
4. Strainer TM-007 blockage 1. Delay loading, filling disturb 1. PDI-4001
5. DCV-4001 malfunction closed 1. Delay loading, filling disturb 1. Batch controller available
6. Strainer TM-107 blockage 1. Vapor blockage, potential filling disturb 1. PDI-4005
7. SDV-4001 malfunction closed 1. Vapor blockage, potential filling disturb 1. ZSC-4001
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand 1. Pump reverse rotation, potential pump 1. PG and Check valve installed at
by pump damage discharge line
4. Misdirected Flow 1. No credible cause identified
5. More Level 1. Truck over filling 1. Potential liquid overflow from truck, 1. Batch controller available
potential liquid spills from truck, potential fire
if ignited, involving fatalities 2. PSV at skid tank pop-up to alert operator
3. SOP filling available
6. Less Level 1. No credible cause identified
7. More Pressure 1. Refers to No Flow
8. Less Pressure 1. Refers to No Flow
9. More Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
10. Less Temperature 1. Seawater out of service 1. Low temperature liquid entering to non- 1. TAL-2023 operator response
resilint material for handling low temperature
liwuid, potential pipeline embrittlement, 2. FAL-2024 operator response (sea water
leading to LOPC, potential involving major line)
hazard 3. TALL-2023 to stop P-206A/B
11. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
12. Contamination 1. No credible cause identified
13. Corrosion/Erosion 1. No credible cause identified
14. Safety 1. No credible cause identified
Concerns/Relief
15. Others 1. No additional credible cause
identified
10. Unloading 1. More Flow (liquid) 1. Excessive flow from cargo 1. Vibration to loading arm, potential loading 1. FAH-1095A/B, operator response 78. To re-evaluate action of FAHH-1095A/B and WIKA-PEN
refrigerated LPG arm detach, LOPC, potential fire/explosion, to re-configure FAHH not to confuse between (Process)
(C4) simultaneously leading to major hazard involving fatalities interlock and SIS
from VLGC at Jetty-
1 to the refrigerated 2. FIC-1069, FCV-1069 to adjust flow as per 79. To include in the Butane Unloading WIKA-PEN
tanks requirement Procedures, the flow from cargo as part of (Process)
monitoring activities

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 23 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence
2. Potential flow exceed from maximum flow
of pipeline, leading to vibration of pipeline,
potential pipeline damage, LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
involving fatalities
2. FCV -1069 malfunction wide open 1. Vibration to loading arm, potential loading
arm detach, LOPC, potential fire/explosion,
leading to major hazard
2. Potential flow exceed from maximum flow
of pipeline, leading to vibration of pipeline,
potential pipeline damage, LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
involving fatalities
3. Potential over pressure at T-301, leading
to tank burst, potential LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
involving fatalities
2. More Flow (gas) 1. PCV-2053 malfunction open 1. Potential low pressure at T-301, potential
flow exceed from maximum flow of pipeline,
leading to vibration of pipeline, potential
pipeline damage, LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
involving fatalities
2. Potential Blower B-301 over loaded,
leading to Blower damage, operation disturb
3. Potential high pressure at cargo, high
pressure at cargo, leading to process upset
3. Less/No Flow 1. SDV-6051 malfunction closed 1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
(liquid) potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
2. MOV-1065 malfunction closed 1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
3. Strainer LM-301A/B blockage 1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. FAH-1095A/B, operator response
2. FIC-1069, FCV-1069 to adjust flow as per
requirement
1. FAH-1095A/B, operator response
1. FAH-1095A/B, operator response
1. PAH-1016, operator response
2. PAH-1012, operator response
3. PIC-1011, PCV-1011 open
4. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1011/1016,
shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-304A/B, P-
307A/B/C, P-308A/B
5. PSV-1011/1012
1. PAL-1012, operator response
2. PAL-2056, operator response
3. FAH-2051, operator response
4. PALL-1012, shutdown P302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
5. PALL-2056 shutdown Compressor C-301
A/B/C and Blower B-301
6. FAHH-2051A, Blower B-301 trip
1. Overload protection available in MCC
1. FAH-2051, operator response
2. FAHH-2051A, Blower B-301 trip
1. ZSC-6051 available to alert operator 80. To change mode operation of valve 60-GA- WIKA-PEN
14012 from manual operation to remote (Process)
operation and linked to backloading mode
operation
1. ZSC-6051 available to alert operator
2. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1065 available to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1065 available to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. PDAH-1096A/B to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. PDAH-1096A/B to alert operator
24 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation
4. Less/No Flow (gas)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Cause
4. MOV-1076A/B malfunction closed
5. FCV -1069 malfunction closed
6. MOV-1066 malfunction closed
7. MOV-2067 malfunction closed
8. SDV-1011 malfunction closed
1. MOV-2052 malfunction closed
Consequence
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
1. Unloading activity stop, unloading delay,
potential economic
2. Potential back pressure into the cargo,
leading to high pressure at cargo, leading to
process upset
3. Temperature at loading line tend to
increase, leading to excessive generate of
BOG, when unloading operation started,
potential piping damage due to thermal
expansion
1. Potential over pressure at T-301, leading
to tank burst, potential LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1076A/B available to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1076A/B available to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1066 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1066 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-2067 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-2067 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1011 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1011 to alert operator
3. Check valve 60-CK14003 installed at
upstream SDV-6011
1. LCV-6051 to release BOG from liquid
loading line to BOG vapor line
2. PSV-6051 to release BOG from liquid
loading line to BOG vapor line
3. PSV-2011 to BOG from liquid loading line
to tank BOG outlet line
1. PAH-1016, operator response 81. To link ZSC-2002 (close position of MOV- WIKA-PEN (E&I)
2002) to stop Blower B-201 operation
2. PAH-1012, operator response
3. ZSC-2052, operator response
4. PIC-1011, PCV-1011 open
25 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
2. Blower B-301 trip
3. PCV-2053 malfunction closed
4. MOV-1056 malfunction closed
5. Strainer VM-301 blockage
6. MOV-1055 malfunction closed
7. MOV-1072 malfunction closed
8. SDV-6052 malfunction closed
5. Reverse Flow 1. Refers to No Flow - SDV-6051
(liquid) malfunction closed
6. Reverse Flow (gas) 1. No credible cause identified
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
2. Potential at cargo, leading to cargo
buckle, leading to major hazard, involving
fatality, environmental hazard
3. Potential vacuum at suction line of Blower
B-201, potential oxygen inpose to Blower
leading to oxygen sent to cargo, potential
cargo get fire, potential fire/explosion,
leading to major hazard
1. Potential over pressure at T-301, leading
to tank burst, potential LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
2. Potential at cargo, leading to cargo
buckle, leading to major hazard, involving
fatality, environmental hazard
1. Potential Blower B-301 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
1. Potential Blower B-301 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
1. Potential Blower B-301 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
1. Potential Blower B-301 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
1. Potential Blower B-301 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
1. Potential Blower B-301 surge, leading to
Blower damage, operation disturb
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
5. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
6. PSV-1011/1012
1. Refers to low pressure scenario at cargo
side
82. To provide protection PALL at suction Blower WIKA-PEN
B-201 (Process)
1. PAH-1016, operator response
2. PAH-1012, operator response
3. PIC-1011, PCV-1011 open
4. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-208A/B
5. PSV-1011/1012
1. Refers to low pressure scenario at cargo
side
1. Open FCV-2051 to release BOG back to
Tank T-301
2. TAH-2053, operator response
3. TAHH-2053, trip Blower B-201
1. Open FCV-2051 to release BOG back to
Tank T-301
2. TAH-2053, operator response
3. TAHH-2053, trip Blower B-201
1. Open FCV-2051 to release BOG back to
Tank T-301
2. TAH-2053, operator response
3. PDAH-1092 to alert operator
4. TAHH-2053, trip Blower B-201
1. Open FCV-2051 to release BOG back to
Tank T-301
2. TAH-2053, operator response
3. ZSC-1055 to alert operator
4. TAHH-2053, trip Blower B-201
1. Open FCV-2051 to release BOG back to
Tank T-301
2. TAH-2053, operator response
3. ZSC-1072 to alert operator
4. TAHH-2053, trip Blower B-201
1. Open FCV-2051 to release BOG back to
Tank T-301
2. TAH-2053, operator response
3. ZSC-6052 to alert operator
4. TAHH-2053, trip Blower B-201
26 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
7. Misdirected Flow 1. LCV-6051 malfunction open 1. Potential liquid carry over to vapor line, 1. LAH-6051 operator response
(liquid) potential vapor line 2-phase, potential liquid
carry over to Compressor and Blower,
leading to equipments damage
8. Misdirected Flow 1. PCV-1011 malfunction open 1. Low pressure tank T-301, potential tank 1. PAL-1012, operator response
(gas) vacuum, potential tank buckle and potential
tank collapse 2. PALL-1012, shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
3. PALL-2056 shutdown Compressor C-301
A/B/C and Blower B-301
4. PSV-1013 (vacuum breaker)
9. More Level 1. Continuous filling of C3 to Tank T- 1. Tank T-301 overfilling, potential spillage, 1. LAH-1011A/1012A, operator response
301 potential pool fire if ignited, potential tank
collapse, leading to major hazard 2. LAHH-1011A, close SDV-1011
3. Fire and Gas Detector available at Tank
area
4. Sprinkler available for Fire Fighting
10. Less Level 1. Leakage at Tank T-301 1. Potential spillage, potential pool fire if 1. LAL-1011A/1012A operator response
ignited, potential tank collapse, leading to
major hazard 2. LALL-1011A shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
3. Fire and Gas Detector available at Tank
area
4. Sprinkler available for Fire Fighting
2. Simultaneously discharge of C3 to 1. Low pressure tank T-201, potential tank 1. PAL-1012, operator response
Jetty 2 and 3 vacuum, potential tank buckle and potential
tank collapse 2. PALL-1012, shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
3. PALL-2006 shutdown Compressor C-301
A/B/C and Blower B-301
4. PSV-1013 (vacuum breaker)
2. Potential no flow to pump P-303A/B, P- 1. LAL-1011A/1012A operator response
304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C, P-308A/B,
potential pump cavitation, leading to 2. LALL-1011A shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-
vibration, pump damage 303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
11. More Pressure 1. See More Flow
12. Less Pressure 1. See No Flow
13. More Temperature 1. See No Flow
2. External fire 1. Excessive heat up to C3 Tank T-301, 1. Fire and Gas Detector available at Tank
potential liquid expand, potential tank burst, area
potential escalate to major hazard
2. Sprinkler available for Fire Fighting
3. High ambient temperature 1. No significance consequence since
ambient temperature as per ITB is max. 50
degC (for tank only), while ambient
temperature only 35 degC
14. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
15. Composition 1. Excess light component C2 in 1. Potential reduced performance BOG 1. Density meter available at coriolis meter 83. To be explained in Operating Manual special WIKA-PEN
Change filling liquid recovery system, leading to tank T-301 over handling of light component in C4-Butane feed (Process)
pressure 2. Sampling point available at loading line material
2. Excess heavy component in filling 1. Potential electric motor overload, leading 1. Density meter available at coriolis meter
liquid to motor damage,
2. Overload protection available in MCC
3. Sampling point available at loading line
16. Contamination 1. No credible cause identified
17. Corrosion/Erosion 1. Refers to More flow due to high
velocity

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 27 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. External corrosion 1. Potential piping corroded, loading line 1. Corrosion allowance 1.5 mm is applied as
corroded, potential pin hole to loading line per project specification
2. Pipeline is insulated (liquid and vapor line)
18. Safety 1. Discharge from PSV-1011/1012 1. 84. Tank manufacturer has to configure the WIKA-PEN
Concerns/Relief are released directly to atmosphere projection of PSVs on the top of Butane tank (Process)
T-301 shall be directed to the safe location -
opposite direction to flare
19. Others 1. Drawing comment 1. 85. To provide additional manual isolation valve WIKA-PEN
on the liquid loading line (hose connection (Process)
line) on Butane line
11. Backloading 1. More Flow (liquid) 1. Two pumps P-302A/B/C running 1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to 1. XL-2161A/B/C, operator response
refrigerated LPG of simultaneously vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
C4 simultaneously hazard 2. FAH-1095A/B, operator response
from the 3. Refers to rec. FAHH-1095A/B
refrigerated tanks to
a fully refrigerated 4. SOP provided for operation of
coastal tanker at backloading pump
Jetty-1
2. FCV -1069 malfunction wide open 1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to 1. FAH-1095A/B, operator response
vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
hazard 2. Refers to rec. FAHH-1095A/B

2. Motor pump overload, leading to pump 1. XAH-2164A/B/C, operator response

2. More Flow (gas) 1. PCV-1071 malfunction open
3. Less/No Flow 1. SDV-1013 malfunction closed
(liquid)
2. MOV-1018 malfunction closed
3. SRT-302A/B/C blockaged
4. Pump P-302A/B/C stop
5. MOV-2066 malfunction closed
damage
1. Potential vacuum at cargo tank, potential
cargo damage, leading to major hazard
2. Potential BOG increased C3 tank T-301,
potential increase pressure at T-301, leading
to high pressure, tank damage, leading to
major hazard
3. Potential overload on Blower B-302, motor
damage
4. Potential overload on Blower B-302, motor
damage
1. Pump P-302A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-302A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-202A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Backloading stop, backloading delay,
economic impact
2. Potential back flow from discharge pump
to suction line, potential pump reverse
rotation, pump damage
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
2. Overload protection available in MCC
3. PAL-2083A/B/C, operator response
1. Refers to low pressure scenario at cargo 86. To provide PAL-6053 to alert operator when WIKA-PEN
side low pressure at cargo side (Process)
2. PALL-6053, to trip Blower B-302 87. To include stopping Blower B-302 in interlock WIKA-PEN
PAHH-1012 during backloading operation (Process)
1. PAH-1012, operator response
2. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1011/1016,
shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-304A/B, P-
307A/B/C, P-308A/B
1. Overload protection available in MCC
1. Overload protection available in MCC
1. ZSC-1013 operator response
2. VAH-2053A/B, 2054A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
3. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
1. ZSC-1018 operator response
2. VAH-2053A/B, 2054A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
3. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
1. VAH-2053A/B, 2054A/B, 2005A/B,
operator response
2. PDI-2066A/B/C available at local
3. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
1. Standby pump available
1. Check valve installed at discharge Pump
P-302A/B/C
1. ZSC-2066, operator response 88. To review the possibility to remove loop OF WIKA-PEN
PSHH-2083A/B/C since the reliability of (Process)
2. FAL-1095A/B, operator response minimum flow line is good, what if there is no
3. FIC-2083A/B/C to open FCV-2083 A/B/C additional scenario to increase pressure at
minimum flow line discharge pump line

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 28 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation
4. Less/No Flow (gas)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Cause
6. MOV-1078 malfunction closed
7. FCV -1069 malfunction closed
8. MOV-1076A/1026B malfunction
closed
9. Strainer LM-301A/B blockaged
10. MOV-1077 malfunction closed
11. SDV-6051 malfunction closed
12. Minimum Flow Valve FCV
2083A/B malfunction close when it is
required to be opened position
1. SDV-6052 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1071 malfunction closed
Consequence
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
2. Potential surging at pipeline, leading to
pipe displacement, pipeline damage, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. Pressure discharge pumps P-302A/B/C
increase potential leaks from flanges, LOPC,
potential fire if ignited, potential loss of
properties
1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure
at T-301, potential tank buckle, tank damage,
LOPC, leading to major hazard
2. Low sucstion pressure of Blower B-302,
potential suction blower buckle, Blower
sucked atmosphere, potential oxygen
expose to tank T-301, potential fire, escalate
to major hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure
at T-301, potential tank buckle, tank damage,
LOPC, leading to major hazard
2. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-301, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
4. PSV-2074 thermal expansion case
1. ZSC-1078, operator response
2. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
3. FIC-2083A/B/C to open FCV-2083 A/B/C
minimum flow line
4. PSV-2060 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. FIC-2083A/B/C to open FCV-2083 A/B/C
minimum flow line
3. PSV-2060 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1076A/B, operator response
3. FIC-2083A/B/C to open FCV-2083 A/B/C
minimum flow line
4. PSV-2060 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. PDAH-1096A/B, operator response
3. FIC-2083A/B/C to open FCV-2083 A/B/C
minimum flow line
4. PSV-2060 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1077, operator response
3. FIC-2083A/B/C to open FCV-2083 A/B/C
minimum flow line
4. PSV-2060 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-6051, operator response
3. FIC-2083A/B/C to open FCV-2083 A/B/C
minimum flow line
4. PSV-2060 thermal expansion case
89. To review closing time of shutdown valve WIKA-PEN
SDV-6051 to avoid surging in case of SDV (Process)
malfunction close, during backloading
operation
1. PAH-2083A/B to alert operator
2. PAHH 2083A/B to shutdon the pump P-
302 A/B
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. FIC-1071 to open FCV-1071 90. To provide protection PALL at suction Blower WIKA-PEN
B-302 (Process)
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. FIC-1071 to open FCV-1071
2. Refers to rec. to provide protection PALL
at suction Blower B-302
29 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
3. B-302 stop
4. PCV-1071 malfunction closed
5. MOV-1060 malfunction closed
6. MOV-1059 malfunction closed
7. Strainer VM-201 blockaged
8. MOV-2051 malfunction closed
5. Reverse Flow 1. See No Flow - Pump P-302A/B/C
(liquid) stop
2. Flow from running pump to
standby pump
6. Reverse Flow (gas) 1. No credible cause identified
7. Misdirected Flow 1. LCV-6051 malfunction open
(liquid)
8. Misdirected Flow 1. MOV-1055 malfunction open
(gas)
2. MOV-1072 malfunction open
3. FCV-1071 malfunction open
9. More Level 1. See More Flow (liquid)
10. Less Level 1. Continuous discharge C4 from
Tank T-301
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. High pressure at cargo side, low pressure
at T-301, potential tank buckle, tank damage,
LOPC, leading to major hazard
2. Low pressure at T-301, potential tank
collapse
1. Blower block discharge, potentially
increase discharge line, potential Blower
damage
1. Blower B-302 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-302,
leading to Blower damage
1. Blower B-302 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-302,
leading to Blower damage
1. Blower B-302 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-302,
leading to Blower damage
1. Blower B-302 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-302,
leading to Blower damage
1. Standby Pump P-302A/B/C reverse
rotation, potential motor damage
1. Potential liquid carry over to vapor line,
potential vapor line 2-phase, potential liquid
carry over to Compressor and Blower,
leading to equipments damage
1. No data for BOG recovery from cargo,
dispute in economical issue
1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction
of Blower, leading to temperature increase at
Blower, potential Blower B-302 damage
1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction
of Blower, leading to temperature increase at
Blower, potential Blower B-302 damage
1. Low level at T-301, leading to pump P-
302A/B/C cavitation, pump high vibration,
pump damage
2. Potential overflow at cargo
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. PAL-1012, operator response
2. PALL-1012, shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-
203A/B, P-204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C,
P-208A/B
1. FIC-1071 to open FCV-1071
2. TAH-1074 operator response
3. TAHH-1074, stop Blower B-302
1. FIC-1071 to open FCV-1071
2. ZSC-1060 operator response
3. TAH-1074 operator response
4. TAHH-1074, stop Blower B-302
1. FIC-1061A to open FCV-1061
2. ZSC-1059 operator response
3. TAH-1064 operator response
4. TAHH-1064, stop Blower B-202
1. FIC-1071 to open FCV-1071
2. PDAH-1092 operator response
3. TAH-1074 operator response
4. TAHH-1074, stop Blower B-302
1. FIC-1071 to open FCV-1071
2. ZSC-2051operator response
3. TAH-1074 operator response
4. TAHH-1074, stop Blower B-302
1. Check valve and pressure indicator
installed at discharge Pump P-302A/B/C
1. LAH-6051 operator response
1. ZSO-1005, operator response
1. ZSO-1072 operator response
2. TAH-1074 operator response
3. TAHH-1074, stop Blower B-302
1. TAH-1074 operator response 91. To provide FAH-1071 (shall be consider 100% WIKA-PEN
open for FAH), to alert operator (Process)
2. TAHH-1074, stop Blower B-302
1. LAL-1011A/1012A operator response
2. VAH-2053A/B, 2054A/B, 2055A/B,
operator response
3. LALL-1001A shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
1. Rely to safeguard to overflow protection
system at cargo side
30 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
11. More Pressure 1. See No Flow (gas)
12. Less Pressure 1. See No Flow (gas)
13. More Temperature 1. See No Flow (liquid)
2. Dry pump P-202A/B/C start to
operate
14. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
15. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
16. Contamination 1. Contaminant from cargo through
BOG
17. Corrosion/Erosion 1. External corrosion
18. Safety 1. Discharge from vent line are
Concerns/Relief released directly to atmosphere
during start up pump P-302A/B/C
using flexible hose
19. Others 1. No additional credible cause
identified
12. C4 Recirculation 1. More Flow 1. Two pumps P-307A/B/C running
to loading line Jetty- simultaneously
1 and Jetty-2
2. FCV-6051 malfunction open
(Jetty-1)
3. FCV-1069 malfunction wide open
(Jetty-1)
4. FCV-6061 malfunction open
(Jetty-2)
5. FCV-1089 malfunction open
(Jetty-2)
2. Less/No Flow 1. SDV-1013 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1018 malfunction closed
3. SRT-307A/B/C blockaged
4. Pump P-307A/B/C stop
5. FCV-6011 malfunction closed
(Jetty-1)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. Increase boil of gas, potential pump
cavitation leading to pump damage
1. Potential tanks contaminated by
contaminant from cargo
1. Potential piping corroded, loading line
corroded, potential pin hole to loading line,
containment leaks, environment expose to
hydrocarbon harazard
1. Potential personal expose to hydrocarbon
hazard and low temperature of liquid - frost
bite
1. Excessive flow to 6" recirculation pipeline,
leading to vibration to pipeline, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. Excessive flow to 6" recirculation pipeline,
leading to vibration to pipeline, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. No significant consequence since flow will
be control by FCV-6051
1. Excessive flow to 6" recirculation pipeline,
leading to vibration to pipeline, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. No significant consequence since flow will
be control by FCV-6061
1. Pump P-307A/B/C cavitation, potential
high vibration leading to pump damage
1. Pump P-307A/B/C cavitation, potential
high vibration leading to pump damage
1. Pump P-307A/B/C cavitation, potential
high vibration leading to pump damage
1. No recirculation, potential temperature
increase on loading line leading to excessive
BOG regeneration, especially during
unloading/backloading, leading to high
pressure at C4 Tank T-301, tank rupture,
leading to major hazard
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. TAH-2081A/B/C as permissive to start
pump P-302A/B/C
1. Inspection of Certificate Of Quality (COQ)
available from cargo before backloading
activities
1. Corrosion allowance 1.5 mm is applied as
per project specification
2. Pipeline is insulated (liquid and vapor line)
92. To review the draining liquid using portable WIKA-PEN
flexible hose, if the activity quite often, then fix (Process)
line is required to be applied
1. XL-2179A/B/C, operator response 93. To add FAH-6051 to alert operator WIKA-PEN
(Process)
2. SOP provided for operation of 94. To provide LOTO for operation of discharge WIKA-PEN
recirculation pump manual valve of recirculation pump P- (Process)
307A/B/C
1. SOP provided for operation of
recirculation pump
2. Refer to rec. To add FAH-6051 to alert
operator
1. SOP provided for operation of 95. To add FAH-6061 to alert operator WIKA-PEN
recirculation pump (Process)
1. ZSC-1013 operator response 96. To provide FAL-6051 to alert operator for WIKA-PEN
Jetty-1 (Process)
97. To provide FAL-6061 to alert operator for WIKA-PEN
Jetty-2 (Process)
1. ZSC-1018 operator response 98. To link the position of MOV-1018, if MOV at WIKA-PEN
close position as permissive to run Pump P- (Process)
307A/B/C
1. PDI-2098A/B/C available at local
1. XL-2176A/B/C, operator response
2. LCV-6011/6061 to release BOG from
liquid loading line to BOG vapor line
3. PAH-1012, operator response
4. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1011/1016,
shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-304A/B, P-
307A/B/C, P-308A/B
5. PSV-1011/1012
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response 99. To review safeguard required for recirculation WIKA-PEN
pump P-307A/B/C on block discharge case (Process)
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
31 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
6. MOV-1065 malfunction closed
7. Strainer LM-301A/B blockaged
8. MOV-1076A/B malfunction closed
9. FCV -1069 malfunction closed
10. MOV-1066 malfunction closed
11. FCV-6011 malfunction closed
(Jetty-2)
12. FCV-1083 malfunction closed
(Jetty-2)
13. MOV-1083A/B malfunction
closed (Jetty-2)
14. Strainer LM-305A/B blockaged
(Jetty-2)
15. MOV-2067 malfunction closed
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand
by pump
4. Misdirected Flow 1. No credible cause identified
5. More Level 1. No credible cause identified
6. Less Level 1. No credible cause identified
7. More Pressure 1. See No flow
8. Less Pressure 1. See more flow
9. More Temperature 1. See no flow
10. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
11. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
12. Contamination 1. No credible cause identified
13. Corrosion/Erosion 1. No credible cause identified
14. Safety 1. PSV-2065/2076 release to flare
Concerns/Relief
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Pump reverse rotation, potential pump
damage
1. Potential lost of C4
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
1. PAH-2092A/B/C, operator response
2. PAHH-2092A/B/C, shutdown P-207A/B/C
3. PSV-2065/2076
1. PG and Check valve installed at 100. To include in operating manual, operating of WIKA-PEN
discharge line manual valve 20-BA01704/1705/1706 at (Process)
bypass line of check valve discharge P-
307A/B/C
101. To see possibility to recover C4, by reroute WIKA-PEN
the C4 to Tank instead of discharge to flare (Process)
whenever PSV-1015/1026 open
32 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node
15. Others
13. Backloading 1. More Flow (liquid)
refrigerated LPG of
C4 from the
refrigerated tanks to
a fully refrigerated
coastal tanker at
Jetty-2
2. More Flow (gas)
3. Less/No Flow
(liquid)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Deviation Cause
1. Manual valve 20-
BA01704/1705/1706 in bypass
check valve inadvertently close,
when pump P-207A/B/C start up
1. Two pumps P-302A/B/C running
simultaneously
2. FCV -1083 malfunction wide open
1. PCV-1090 malfunction open
1. SDV-1013 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1018 malfunction closed
3. SRT-302A/B/C blockaged
4. Pump P-302A/B/C stop
5. MOV-2074 malfunction closed
6. Strainer LM-305A/B blockaged
7. MOV-1083A/B malfunction closed
Consequence
1. Potential liquid in section of down stream
check valve and isolation valve get thermal
expansion, potential pipe burst, LOPC,
leading to fire if ignited
1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to
vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
hazard
1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to
vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
hazard
2. Motor pump overload, leading to pump
damage
1. Potential vacuum at cargo tank, potential
cargo damage, leading to major hazard
2. Potential BOG increased C3 tank T-201,
potential increase pressure at T-301, leading
to high pressure, tank damage, leading to
major hazard
3. Potential overload on Blower B-304, motor
damage
1. Pump P-302A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-302A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-302A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Backloading stop, backloading delay,
economic impact
2. Potential back flow from discharge pump
to suction line, potential pump reverse
rotation, pump damage
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. Refers to Rec. to be explained in 102. To review application of bypass line of check WIKA-PEN
operating manual valve at discharge P-307A/B/C to avoid (Process)
misoperation when recirculation pump P-
307A/B/C need to be shutdown
1. XL-2161A/B/C, operator response
2. FAH-1095A/B, operator response
3. Refers to rec. FAHH-1095A/B
4. SOP provided for operation of
backloading pump
1. FAH-1095A/B, operator response
2. Refers to rec. FAHH-1095A/B
1. XAH-2164A/B/C, operator response
2. Overload protection available in MCC
3. PAL-2083A/B/C, operator response
1. Refers to low pressure scenario at cargo 103. To provide PAL-6063 to alert operator when WIKA-PEN
side low pressure at cargo side (Process)
2. PALL-6063, to trip Blower B-204 104. To include stopping Blower B-304 in interlock WIKA-PEN
PAHH-1012 during backloading operation (Process)
1. PAH-1012, operator response
2. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-303A/B, P-304A/B,
P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C, P-308A/B
1. Overload protection available in MCC
1. ZSC-1013 operator response
2. VAH-2053A/B, 2054A/B, 2055A/B,
operator response
3. FAL-1083A/B, operator response
1. ZSC-1018 operator response 105. To include valve position close of MOV-1018 WIKA-PEN
as permissive to start pump P-302A/B/C (Process)
2. VAH-2053A/B, 2054A/B, 2055A/B,
operator response
3. FAL-1083A/B, operator response
1. VAH-2053A/B, 2054A/B, 2055A/B,
operator response
2. PDI-2066A/B/C available at local
3. FAL-1083A/B, operator response
1. Standby pump available
1. Check valve installed
1. ZSC-2074, operator response
2. FAL-1083A/B, operator response
3. FIC-2083A/B/C to open FCV-2083 A/B/C
minimum flow line
4. PSV-2074 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1083A/B, operator response
2. PDAH-1083A/B, operator response
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
4. PSV-2074 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1083A/B, operator response
33 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation
4. Less/No Flow (gas)
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Cause
8. FCV -1078 malfunction closed
9. SDV-6061 malfunction closed
1. SDV-6062 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1091 malfunction closed
3. B-304 stop
4. PCV-1090 malfunction closed
5. Strainer VM-305 blockaged
Consequence
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
2. Potential surging at pipeline, leading to
pipe displacement, pipeline damage, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side
2. Low pressure at T-301, potential tank
buckle, tank damage, LOPC, leading to
major hazard
3. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-301, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side
2. Low pressure at T-301, potential tank
buckle, tank damage, LOPC, leading to
major hazard
3. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
1. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
2. Low pressure at T-301, potential tank
buckle, tank damage, LOPC, leading to
major hazard
1. Blower block discharge, potentially
increase discharge line, potential Blower
damage
1. Blower B-304 blockage, potential increase
temperature at downstream of B-304 leading
to Blower damage
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. ZSC-1083A/B, operator response
3. FIC-2083A/B/C to open FCV-2083 A/B/C
minimum flow line
4. PSV-2074 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1083A/B, operator response
2. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow
line
3. PSV-2074 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-6061, operator response
3. FIC-2083A/B/C to open FCV-2083 A/B/C
minimum flow line
4. PSV-2074 thermal expansion case
106. To review closing time of shutdown valve to WIKA-PEN
avoid surging in case of SDV-6061 (Process)
malfunction close, during backloading
operation
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. PAL-1012, operator response
2. PALL-1012, shutdown P302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
1. FIC-1088A to open FCV-1088 107. To provide protection PALL at suction Blower WIKA-PEN
B-304 (Process)
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
2. ZSC-1091 to alert operator
1. PAL-1012, operator response
2. ZSC-1091 to alert operator
3. PALL-1012, shutdown P302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
1. FIC-1088A to open FCV-1088
2. ZSC-1091 to alert operator
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. PAL-1012, operator response
2. PALL-1012, shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-
203A/B, P-204A/B, P-206A/B, P-207A/B/C,
P-208A/B
1. FIC-1088A to open FCV-1088
2. TAH-1089 operator response
3. TAHH-1089, stop Blower B-204
1. FIC-1088A to open FCV-1088
2. PDAH-1081 operator response
3. TAH-1089 operator response
34 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
4. TAHH-1089, stop Blower B-204
6. MOV-1099 malfunction closed 1. Blower B-304 blockage, potential increase 1. FIC-1088A to open FCV-1088
temperature at downstream of B-304 leading
to Blower damage 2. ZSC-1099 operator response
3. TAH-1089 operator response
4. TAHH-1089, stop Blower B-204
5. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand 1. Pump P-202A/B/C reverse rotation, pump 1. PG and Check valve installed at
(liquid) by pump damage discharge line
6. Reverse Flow (gas) 1. No credible cause identified
7. Misdirected Flow 1. LCV-6061 malfunction open 1. Potential liquid carry over to vapor line, 1. LAH-6061 operator response
(liquid) potential vapor line 2-phase, potential liquid
carry over to Compressor and Blower,
leading to equipments damage
8. Misdirected Flow 1. MOV-1092 malfunction open 1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction 1. ZSO-1092 operator response
(gas) of Blower, leading to temperature increase at
Blower, potential Blower B-304 damage 2. TAH-1089 operator response
3. TAHH-1089, stop Blower B-304
2. FCV-1088 malfunction open 1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction 1. TAH-1089 operator response
of Blower, leading to temperature increase at
Blower, potential Blower B-204 damage 2. TAHH-1089, stop Blower B-304

9. More Level 1. No credible cause identified

10. Less Level 1. Continuous discharge to cargo 1. Low level at T-301, leading to pump P- 1. LAL-1011A/1012A operator response
302A/B/C cavitation, pump damage
2. VAH-2053A/B, 2054A/B, 2055A/B,
operator response
3. LALL-1011A shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
11. More Pressure 1. See No flow
12. Less Pressure 1. See No flow
13. More Temperature 1. See No Flow (liquid)
2. Dry pump P-302A/B/C start to 1. Increase boil of gas, potential pump 1. TAH-2081A/B/C as permissive to start
operate cavitation leading to pump damage pump P-302A/B/C
14. Less Temperature 1. Liquid spill after post backloading 1. Potential liquid spill to concrete, concrete 1. Fire and Gas Detector available at Jetty-2
damage area
2. Specification of concrete is fc`30 (strength
4000 Mpa) stands to low temperature of
propane
15. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
16. Contamination 1. Contaminant from cargo through 1. Potential tanks contaminated by 1. Inspection of Certificate Of Quality (COQ)
BOG contaminant from cargo available from cargo before backloading
activities
17. Corrosion/Erosion 1. External corrosion 1. Potential piping corroded, loading line 1. Corrosion allowance 1.5 mm is applied as
corroded, potential pin hole to loading line per project specification
2. Pipeline is insulated (liquid and vapor line)
18. Safety 1. Discharge from vent line are 1. 108. To review method using portable flexible hose WIKA-PEN
Concerns/Relief released directly to atmosphere for draining liquid, if the activity of draining (Process)
during start up pump P-302A/B/C quite often, then fix line is required to be
applied
19. Others 1. No additional credible cause 109.
identified
14. Backloading 1. More Flow (liquid) 1. Two pumps P-304A/B running 1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to 1. XL-2166A/B, operator response 110. To re-evaluate action of FAHH-10497A/B and
refrigerated LPG of simultaneously vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major to re-configure FAHH not to confuse between
C4 from the hazard 2. FIC-1089 to control flow for backloading interlock and SIS
refrigerated tanks to to Jetty-3
a fully refrigerated 3. FAH-1097A/B, operator response
coastal tanker at
Jetty-3 4. FAHH-1097A/B

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 35 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
2. FCV-1089 malfunction wide open
2. More Flow (gas) 1. PCV-1021 malfunction open
3. Less/No Flow 1. SDV-1012 malfunction closed
(liquid)
2. MOV-1007 malfunction closed
3. SRT-204A/B blockaged
4. Pump P-204A/B stop
5. MOV-2018 malfunction closed
6. Strainer LM-202A/B blockaged
7. MOV-1029A/B malfunction closed
8. FCV-1039 malfunction closed
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. Excessive flow to pipeline, leading to
vibration to pipeline, LOPC, leading to major
hazard
2. Motor pump overload, leading to pump
damage
1. Potential vacuum at cargo tank, potential
cargo damage, leading to major hazard
2. Potential BOG increased C4 tank T-301,
potential increase pressure at T-201, leading
to high pressure, tank damage, leading to
major hazard
3. Potential overload on Blower B-203, motor
damage
1. Pump P-304A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-202A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Pump P-202A/B/C cavitation, pump
vibration, pump damage
1. Backloading stop, backloading delay,
economic impact
2. Potential back flow from discharge pump
to suction line, potential pump reverse
rotation, pump damage
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
5. SOP provided for operation of
backloading pump
1. FAH-1097A/B, operator response
2. FAHH-1097A/B
1. VAH-2055A/B, operator response
2. VAH-2056AB, operator response
3. PAL-2086A/B, operator response
4. Overload protection available in MCC
1. Refers to low pressure scenario at cargo 111. To provide PAL-7003 to alert operator when WIKA-PEN
side low pressure at cargo side (Process)
2. PALL-7003, to trip Blower B-303 112. To include stopping Blower B-303 in interlock WIKA-PEN
PAHH-1012 during backloading operation (Process)
1. PAH-1012, operator response
2. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1011/1016,
shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-304A/B, P-
307A/B/C, P-308A/B
1. Overload protection available in MCC
1. ZSC-1012 operator response
2. VAH-2005A/B, 2006A/B, operator
response
3. FAL-1047A/B, operator response
1. ZSC-1007 operator response 113. To include valve position close of MOV as WIKA-PEN
permissive to start pump P-204A/B (Process)
2. VAH-2005A/B, 2006A/B, operator
response
3. FAL-1047A/B, operator response
1. PDI available at local WIKA-PEN
(Process)
2. VAH-2005A/B, 2006A/B, operator
response
3. FAL-1047A/B, operator response
1. Standby pump available
1. Check valve installed
1. ZSC-2018, operator response 114. To review the possibility to remove loop WIKA-PEN
PSHH-2033A/B/C since the reliability of (Process)
2. FAL-1047A/B, operator response minimum flow line is good, there is no
3. FCV-2036A/B to open minimum flow line additional scenario to increase pressure at
discharge pump line
4. PSV-2012 thermal expansion case
1. PDAH-1048A/B, operator response 115. To review the possibility to remove loop WIKA-PEN
PSHH-2033A/B/C since the reliability of (Process)
2. FAL-1047A/B, operator response minimum flow line is good, there is no
3. FCV-2036A/B to open minimum flow line additional scenario to increase pressure at
discharge pump line
4. PSV-2012 thermal expansion case
1. ZSC-1029A/B, operator response 116. To review the possibility to remove loop WIKA-PEN
PSHH-2033A/B/C since the reliability of (Process)
2. FAL-1047A/B, operator response minimum flow line is good, there is no
3. FCV-2036A/B to open minimum flow line additional scenario to increase pressure at
discharge pump line
4. PSV-2012 thermal expansion case
1. FAL-1047A/B, operator response 117. To review the possibility to remove loop WIKA-PEN
PSHH-2033A/B/C since the reliability of (Process)
2. FCV-2036A/B to open minimum flow line minimum flow line is good, there is no
3. PSV-2024 thermal expansion case additional scenario to increase pressure at
discharge pump line
36 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
9. SDV-7001 malfunction closed
4. Less/No Flow (gas) 1. SDV-7052 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1031 malfunction closed
3. B-303 stop
4. PCV-1031 malfunction closed
5. Strainer VM-302 blockaged
5. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand
(liquid) by pump
6. Reverse Flow (gas) 1. No credible cause identified
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
2. Potential surging at pipeline, leading to
pipe displacement, pipeline damage, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side
2. Low pressure at T-301, potential tank
buckle, tank damage, LOPC, leading to
major hazard
3. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side
2. Low pressure at T-301, potential tank
buckle, tank damage, LOPC, leading to
major hazard
3. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
1. High pressure at cargo side
2. Low pressure at T-301, potential tank
buckle, tank damage, LOPC, leading to
major hazard
3. Low pressure of Blower, potential suction
blower buckle, Blower sucked to
atmosphere, potential oxygen goes to tank
T-201, potential fire, escalate to major
hazard
1. Blower block discharge, potentially
increase discharge line, potential Blower
damage
1. Blower block discharge, potentially
increase discharge line, potential Blower
damage
1. Pump P-304A/B/C reverse rotation, pump
damage
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. FAL-1095A/B, operator response 118. To review the possibility to remove loop WIKA-PEN
PSHH-2036A/B since the reliability of (Process)
minimum flow line is good, there is no
additional scenario to increase pressure at
discharge pump line
2. ZSC-6011, operator response 119. To review closing time of shutdown valve to WIKA-PEN
avoid surging in case of SDV-7001 (Process)
3. FCV-2033A/B/C to open minimum flow malfunction close, during backloading
line operation
4. PSV-2024 thermal expansion case
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. PAL-1012, operator response
2. PALL-1012, shutdown P302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
1. FIC-1031A to open FCV-1031 120. To provide protection PALL at suction Blower WIKA-PEN
B-303 (Process)
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. PAL-1012, operator response
2. ZSC-1031 to alert operator
3. PALL-1012, shutdown P302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
1. FIC-1031A to open FCV-1031
2. Refer to rec. to add PALL at suction
blower
1. Rely to safeguard to high pressure
scenario at cargo side
1. PAL-1012, operator response
2. ZSC-1031 to alert operator
3. XL-1033 to alert operator
4. PALL-1012, shutdown P302A/B/C, P-
303A/B, P-304A/B, P-306A/B, P-307A/B/C,
P-308A/B
1. FIC-1031A to open FCV-1031
2. Refer to rec. to add PALL at suction
blower
1. FIC-1031A to open FCV-1031
2. TAH-1034 operator response
3. TAHH-1034, stop Blower B-303
1. FIC-1031A to open FCV-1031
2. TAH-1034 operator response
3. TAHH-1034, stop Blower B-303
1. PG and Check valve installed at
discharge line
37 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
7. Misdirected Flow 1. LCV-7051 malfunction open 1. Potential liquid carry over to BOG line, 1. LAL-7051, operator response
(liquid) potential Blower B-303 damage
2. LAH-1032 operator response
3. LAHH-1032, Blower B-303 stop
8. Misdirected Flow 1. MOV-1032 malfunction open 1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction 1. ZSO-1032 operator response
(gas) of Blower, leading to temperature increase at
Blower, potential Blower B-203 damage 2. TAH-1034 operator response
3. TAHH-1034, stop Blower B-303
2. FCV-1031 malfunction open 1. Potential back flow to cargo and to suction 1. TAH-1034 operator response 121. To provide mechanical locking for FCV-1031 WIKA-PEN
of Blower, leading to temperature increase at to ensure the FCV will never 100% close (Process)
Blower, potential Blower B-203 damage 2. TAHH-1034, stop Blower B-303

9. More Level 1. LCV-7001 malfunction open
10. Less Level 1. Manual valve of drain line keep
open
11. More Pressure 1. See No flow
12. Less Pressure 1. See No flow
13. More Temperature 1. See No Flow (liquid)
2. Dry pump P-304A/B start to
operate
14. Less Temperature 1. Liquid spill after post backloading
15. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
16. Contamination 1. Contaminant from cargo through
BOG
17. Corrosion/Erosion 1. External corrosion
18. Safety 1. Discharge from vent line are
Concerns/Relief released directly to atmosphere
during start up pump P-304A/B
19. Others 1. Portable flexiblehose used when
performing manual draining
accumulate liquid from Drum D-304
15. C4 Recirculation 1. More Flow 1. Two pumps P-308A/B running
to loading line Jetty- simultaneously
3 leading to major hazard
2. FCV-7051 malfunction open
3. FCV-1089 malfunction open
2. Less/No Flow 1. SDV-1012 malfunction closed
2. MOV-1017 malfunction closed
1. Liquid level increase at BOG drum D-204,
liquid carry over to Blower B-203, leading to
Blower damage
1. Potentially oxygen sucked by Blower B-
203 and HC exposed to oxygen, potential
fire if ignited, leading to major hazard
1. Increase boil of gas, potential pump
cavitation leading to pump damage
1. Potential liquid spill to concrete, concrete
damage
1. Potential tanks contaminated by
contaminant from cargo
1. Potential piping corroded, loading line
corroded, potential pin hole to loading line
1.
1. Potential leakage during connection,
person expose to HC hazard, potential
involving fatalities
1. Excessive flow to 4" recirculation pipeline,
leading to vibration to pipeline, LOPC,
1. Excessive flow to 4" recirculation pipeline,
leading to vibration to pipeline, LOPC,
leading to major hazard
1. No significant consequence since flow will
be control by FCV-7001
1. Pump P-308A/B cavitation, potential high
vibration leading to pump damage
1. Pump P-208A/B cavitation, potential high
vibration leading to pump damage
1. LG-1021 available for daily inspection
2. LAH-1032 operator response
3. LAHH-1032, Blower B-303 stop
122. To review requirement to apply closed drain WIKA-PEN
instead of manual operation with temporary (Process)
connection when draining liquid from D-304
1. TAH-2082A/B as permissive to start pump
P-204A/B
1. Fire and Gas Detector available at Jetty-3
area
2. Specification of concrete is fc`30 (strength
4000 Mpa) stands to low temperature of
propane
1. Inspection of Certificate Of Quality (COQ)
available from cargo before backloading
activities
1. Corrosion allowance 1.5 mm is applied as
per project specification
2. Pipeline is insulated (liquid and vapor line)
123. To review using portable flexible hose with WIKA-PEN
temporary connection when starting pump P- (Process)
304A/B; if the activity quite often, then fix line
is required to be applied
1. SOP Manual drain liquid is included in the 124. To review method of draining liquid at whole WIKA-PEN
operating manual from Contractor facilities. An alternative preferrence of liquid (Process)
drain will be routed into drain header and
send back to C4 Tank instead of manual
drain using portable flexible hose
1. XL-2181A/B, operator response 125. To add FAH-7051 to alert operator WIKA-PEN
(Process)
2. SOP provided for operation of 126. To provide LOTO for operation of discharge WIKA-PEN
recirculation pump manual valve of recirculation pump P-308A/B (Process)
1. SOP provided for operation of
recirculation pump
2. Refer to rec. to add FAH-7051
1. ZSC-1012 operator response 127. To provide FAL-7051 to alert operator for WIKA-PEN
Jetty-3 (Process)
1. ZSC-1007 operator response 128. To link the position of MOV-1017, if MOV at WIKA-PEN
close position as permissive to run Pump P- (Process)
308A/B

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 38 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
3. SRT-308A/B blockaged
4. Pump P-308A/B stop
5. FCV-7051 malfunction closed
6. FCV-1089 malfunction closed
7. MOV-1079A/B malfunction closed
8. Strainer LM-302A/B blockaged
9. MOV-2069 malfunction closed
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand
by pump
4. Misdirected Flow 1. LCV-7051 malfunction open
5. More Level 1. No credible cause identified
6. Less Level 1. No credible cause identified
7. More Pressure 1. See No flow - block discharge
case
8. Less Pressure 1. See More Flow
9. More Temperature 1. See No flow - block discharge
case
10. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
11. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
12. Contamination 1. No credible cause identified
13. Corrosion/Erosion 1. No credible cause identified
14. Safety 1. PSV-2066 release to flare
Concerns/Relief
15. Others 1. Manual valve 20-BA01764/1765
used for bypassing check valve
inadvertently close, when pump P-
308A/B start-up
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. Pump P-308A/B cavitation, potential high
vibration leading to pump damage
1. No recirculation, potential temperature
increase on loading line leading to excessive
BOG regeneration, especially during
unloading/backloading, leading to high
pressure at C3 Tank T-201, tank rupture,
leading to major hazard
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Block discharged, potential liquid heat up,
potential thermal expansion
1. Pump reverse rotation, potential pump
damage
1. Potential liquid carry over to BOG drum D-
304, potential Blower B-303 damage
1. Potential lost of C4
1. Potential liquid in section of d/s check
valve and isolation valve get thermal
expansion, potential pipe burst, LOPC,
leading to fire if ignited
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. PDI-2099A/B available at local
1. XL-2131A/B, operator response 129. To update P&ID to change LZLL-70551 WIKA-PEN
become LZI-7001 (Process)
2. LCV-7001 to release BOG from liquid
loading line to BOG vapor line
3. PAH-1012, operator response
4. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1001/1006,
shutdown P-202A/B/C, P-204A/B, P-
207A/B/C, P-308A/B
5. PSV-1001/1012
1. PAH-2095A/B, operator response 130. To review safeguard required for recirculation WIKA-PEN
pump P-308A/B on block discharge case (Process)
2. PAHH-2095A/B, shutdown P-308A/B
3. PSV-2066
1. PAH-2095A/B, operator response
2. PAHH-2095A/B, shutdown P-308A/B
3. PSV-2066
1. PAH-2095A/B, operator response
2. ZSC-1079A/B, operator response
3. PAHH-2095A/B, shutdown P-308A/B
4. PSV-2066
1. PAH-2095A/B, operator response
2. PDAH-1098A/B, operator response
3. PAHH-2095A/B, shutdown P-308A/B
4. PSV-2066
1. PAH-2095A/B, operator response 131. To review sizing of return line 20-RBP162- WIKA-PEN
12"-A12-C80 in relation to flow from (Process)
2. ZSC-2069A/B, operator response recirculation pump only 15 T/hr
3. PAHH-2095A/B, shutdown P-308A/B
4. PSV-2066
1. PG and Check valve installed at 132. To include in operating manual, operating of WIKA-PEN
discharge line manual valve 20-BA01764/1765 at bypass (Process)
line
1. LAH-1032 operator response
2. LAHH-1032, Blower B-303 stop
133. To see possibility for recovery of C4 WIKA-PEN
whenever PSV-2066 open (Process)
1. Refers to Rec. to be explained in 134. To review application of bypass line to check WIKA-PEN
operating manual valve at discharge P-308A/B to avoid (Process)
misoperation of recirculation pump
39 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
16. C4 BOG 1. More Flow 1. PCV-2057A malfunction open
Recovery System
2. Three pumps P-301A/B/C running
simultaneously
3. LCV-2055A malfunction open
4. FCV-2007 malfunction open
2. Less/No Flow 1. MOV-2053/2054/2055 malfunction
close
2. Compressor 3-201A/B/C stop
3. HV-2081/2082/2084 malfunction
closed
4. PCV-2007A malfunction closed
5. Strainer SRY-102A/B/C
6. Pump P-301A/B/C stop
7. LCV-2055 malfunction closed
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
1. Potential high pressure at D-302, potential
drum burst, potential fire if ignited, involving
fatality
1. Potential low level in BOG Drum D-302,
pump P-301A/B/C cavitation, leading to
pump damage
1. Potential low level in BOG Drum D-302,
pump P-301A/B/C cavitation, leading to
pump damage
2. Potential pump overload, motor overheat,
leading to motor damage
1. No significant consequence since mixing
at M-401 will be effective if flow reach to
above 50% of turndown ratio
1. Potential over pressure at T-301, leading
to tank burst, potential LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
2. Low suction pressure, potential
mechanical damage at Compressor C-
201A/B/C
1. Potential over pressure at T-301, leading
to tank burst, potential LOPC, potential
fire/explosion, leading to major hazard
1. Block discharge potential pressure exceed
pipeline design, potential pipe burst, LOPC,
fire and explosion, involving fatalities
1. Potential low pressure at C-201A/B/C,
potential liquid carry over to flare header,
leading to high level in KO Drum, KO Drum
overflow, potential fire if ignited, potential
pool fire, escalate to major hazard
1. Potentially pump P-301A/B/C cavitation,
pump damage
1. Potential liquid build up on D-302,
potential liquid carry over to flare header,
leading to high level in KO Drum, KO Drum
overflow, potential fire if ignited, potential
pool fire, escalate to major hazard
1. Potential liquid build up on D-302,
potential liquid carry over to flare header,
leading to high level in KO Drum, KO Drum
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. PIC-2057 to open PCV-2057B to maintain 135. To review requirement to provide FIQ at WIKA-PEN
pressure downstream of PCV-2057B (Process)
2. PSV-2056
1. Minimum flow line at pump available
2. LIC-2005 to close LCV-2005A
3. FIC-2004A/B/C to open FCV-2004A/B/C
4. LAL-2005, operator response
5. LALL-2004 to stop pump P-201A/B/C
1. LAL-2055, operator response
2. LALL-2054 to stop pump P-301A/B/C
1. XIAH-2154A/B/C, operator response 136. To review high current alarms XAH-2154, the WIKA-PEN
current indication may sufficient enough to (Process)
2. Overload protection available in MCC monitor the process parameter
137. To keep fully open FCV-2057 when flow only WIKA-PEN
coming from Compressor C-301A/B/C (Process)
1. PAH-1016, operator response 138. To ensure PALL trip is available in WIKA-PEN
compressor C-201A/b/C package (Process)
2. PAH-1012, operator response
3. PIC-1011, PCV-1011 open
4. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1011/1016,
shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-304A/B, P-
307A/B/C, P-308A/B
5. PSV-1011/1012
1. PAH-1016, operator response
2. Running indicator available at compressor
package and at CCR
3. PAH-1012, operator response
4. PIC-1011, PCV-1011 open
5. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1011/1016,
shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-304A/B, P-
307A/B/C, P-308A/B
6. PSV-1011/1012
1. PAHH to trip compressor at compressor
package
2. TAHH to trip compressor at compressor
package
3. PSV-2052/2053/2068/2072/2083/2099
1. LAH-2055, to open LCV-2055A 139. To review requirement to provide mechanical WIKA-PEN
limit switch to PCV-2057A, to ensure gas is (Process)
2. LAHH-2054 to stop Compressor 3- flowing to D-302
201A/B/C
140. To provide local PDI to monitor condition of WIKA-PEN
Strainer SRY-207A/B/C (Process)
1. XL-2151A/B/C
2. LAH-2055, to open LCV-2055A
3. LAHH-2054 to stop Compressor 3-
201A/B/C
1. LAH-2055, to open LCV-2055A
2. LAHH-2054 to stop Compressor 3-
201A/B/C
40 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence
overflow, potential fire if ignited, potential
pool fire, escalate to major hazard
2. Block discharge of pump P-301A/B/C,
potential vibration, pump damage
8. FCV-2007 malfunction closed 1. Potential liquid build up on D-202,
potential liquid carry over to flare header,
leading to high level in KO Drum, KO Drum
overflow, potential fire if ignited, potential
pool fire, escalate to major hazard
2. Block discharge of pump P-201A/B/C,
potential vibration, pump damage
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand 1. Pump reverse rotation, potential pump
by pump damage
4. Misdirected Flow 1. PCV-2057B malfunction open 1. Pressure at D-202 tend to decrease,
potentially liquid carry over to KO Drum,
potential KO Drum overflow, potential fire at
KO Drum
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. FIC-2054A/B/C to open FCV-2054A/B/C
2. FAL-2054A/B/C operator response
3. PAH-2060A/B/C op[erator response
4. PAHH-2060, pump P-301A/B/C stop
1. LAH-2005, to open LCV-2005A
2. LAHH-2004 to stop Compressor C-
201A/B/C
1. FIC-2004A/B/C to open FCV-2004A/B/C
2. FAL-2004A/B/C operator response
3. PAH-2010A/B/C operator response
4. PAHH-2010, pump P-201A/B/C stop
1. PG and Check valve installed at
discharge line
1. LAH-2055, to open LCV-2055A
2. LAHH-2054 to stop Compressor C-
301A/B/C

2. HV-2083 malfunction open 1. Hot liquid goes to Tank T-301, potential 1. PAH-1016, operator response
excessive BOG generation, potential over
pressure at T-301, leading to tank burst, 2. PAH-1012, operator response
potential LOPC, potential fire/explosion, 3. PIC-1011, PCV-1011 open
leading to major hazard
4. PAHH-1012, close SDV-1011/1016,
shutdown P-302A/B/C, P-304A/B, P-
307A/B/C, P-308A/B
5. PSV-1011/1012
5. More Level 1. Refers to No Flow
6. Less Level 1. Refers to More Flow
7. More Pressure 1. Refers to More Flow and No Flow
8. Less Pressure 1. Refers to More Flow and No Flow
9. More Temperature 1. Refers to No Flow
10. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
11. Composition 1. Excess light component C2 in 1. Pressure tend to increase at discharge 1. PAH and PAHH avalable at Compressor
Change BOG from T-301 Compressor C-201A/B/C, potential package
Condenser E-201A/B blockage by non-
condensed product, leading to Condenser
damage
12. Contamination 1. No credible cause identified
13. Corrosion/Erosion 1. No credible cause identified
14. Safety 1. PSV-2058 release to flare 1. Potential lost of C4 141. To see possibility for recovery of C4 WIKA-PEN
Concerns/Relief whenever PSV-2058 open (Process)
15. Others 1. No additional credible cause
identified
17. Transfer C4 1. More Flow 1. Two pumps running P-303A/B 1. Potential high vibration on the downstream 1. FIC-2057 to control the flow with FCV- 142. To provide FAH-2057 to alert operator in WIKA-PEN
from Butane simultaneously pipeline, leading to pipe break, LOPC, fire if 2057 case of excess C4 to Mixer M-401 (Process)
Refrigerated Tank ignited, escalate to major hazard
(T-301) to 2. XL-2156A/B
Propane/Butane 2. FCV-2057 malfunction open 1. Potential C4 excess from blending ratio, 1. Refers to Rec. FAH-2057 143. To review with Mixer manufacture either WIKA-PEN
Blending Mixer(M- impact to quality of product Mixer is resisted to max flow of C4 (Process)
401) thru Butane
Transfer Pumps (P- 144. To provide shutdown system to C4 pump P- WIKA-PEN (E&I)
303A/B) and and 303A/B in case is excess C4 compared to
finally to LPG blending ratio
Spherical Storage
Tanks (V- 1. Refers to Rec. FAH-2057

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 41 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence
001/002/003/004), 2. Potential impact to Mixer M-401,
Coastal Tanker at potentially Mixer damage
Jetty-2, Jetty-3
3. Potential high dp across PCV-2020
leading to high vibration downstream PCV,
potential pipeline break, LOPC, fire if ignited,
escalate to major hazard
4. Potential imperfect mix between C3 and
C4 within Mixer M-401 leading to quality
impact of LPG product
3. PCV-2020 malfunction open 1. Potential high pressure to existing
spherical tank potential pressure exceed
mechanical design of spherical tank,
spherical tank burst, LOPC, fire if ignited,
escalate to major hazard
2. Potential high pressure at costal tanker,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of tanker, leading to tank burst, LOPC, fire if
ignited, escalate to major hazard
3. Additional excessive BOG return from
coastal tanker, leading to high pressure at
spherical tank, leading to spherical tank
burst, LOPC, fire if ignited, escalate to major
hazard
4. FCV-1068 malfunction open 1. Filling rate increase, potential vibration at
loading arm, potantial loading arm detach,
LOPC, fire if ignited, escalate to major
hazard
2. Less/No Flow 1. SRT-303A/B blockaged 1. Pump cavitation, potantial pump damage
2. Pump P-303A/B stop 1. Stop backloading activity, potential no
level at spherical tank
3. Strainer at LM-304 blockage 1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. Refers to Rec. FAH-2057
1. Refers to Rec. FAH-2057
1. PAH-102 operator response 145. To review existing spherical tank for high WIKA-PEN
pressure protection scenario, specially PCV (Process)
failure has to be included in calculation of
PSV
2. PAH-203B/205B/207B/209B operator 146. To review high pressure drop across FCV- WIKA-PEN
response 1068 and to provide high pressure drop on (Process)
the specification of FCV-1068
3. PAHH-102A to close SDV-102 147. To review high pressure drop across FCV- WIKA-PEN
1028 and to provide high pressure drop on (Process)
4. PAHH-203B/205B/207B/209B to close the specification of FCV-1028
SDV-202/204/206/208
5. FIC-1068 to close FCV-1068
6. FIC-1028 to close FCV-1028
1. PAH-102 operator response
2. PAH-203B/205B/207B/209B operator
response
3. PAHH-102A to close SDV-102
4. PAHH-203B/205B/207B/209B to close
SDV-202/204/206/208
5. FIC-1068 to close FCV-1068
6. FIC-1028 to close FCV-1028
1. PAH-102 operator response
2. PAH-203B/205B/207B/209B operator
response
3. PAHH-102A to close SDV-102
4. PAHH-203B/205B/207B/209B to close
SDV-202/204/206/208
5. FIC-1068 to close FCV-1068
6. FIC-1028 to close FCV-1028
1. FAH-1068 operator response
2. Discharge Agreement procedure available
1. PDI-2065A/B at local
1. Refers to level controls at spherical tanks 1. New configuration, number of spherical
tanks available is sufficient to serve truck
loading activities
1. PDAH-2069 operator response 148. To see possibility to have additional devices WIKA-PEN
to increase reliability of backloading (Process)
operation
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV- 149. To include in SOP to inspect Strainer at LM- WIKA-PEN
2062A/B 304 before high pressure backloading is (Process)
started
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
42 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
4. FCV-2057 malfunction closed
5. PCV-2020 malfunction closed
6. MOV-1070 malfunction closed
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. By pass line available
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. By pass line available
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. By pass line available
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. By pass line available
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
43 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
7. MOV-1069 malfunction closed
8. MOV-1068 malfunction closed
9. FCV-1068 malfunction closed
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. MOV can be opened manually
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
44 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence
1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
10. FCV-1028 malfunction closed 1. High pressure at discharge pump,
potential pressure exceed mechanical design
of pipeline, leading to pipeline burst, LOPC,
fire if ignited, escalate to major hazard
2. Potential backloading activities delay,
leading to breaching Discharge Agreement,
potentially impact on economic concern
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to 1. Pump reverse rotation, leading to pump
standby pump damage
4. Misdirected Flow 1. Misidentification of filling to Jetty 1. Potentially delay inspected bacloading
activity, economical impact
5. More Pressure 1. See No Flow/More Flow
6. Less/No Pressure 1. See No Flow/More Flow
7. More Level 1. Continuous spherical tank 1. Potential high pressure at spherical tank,
backloading spherical tank burst, LOPC, fire if ignited,
escalate to major hazard
8. Less/No Level 1. See Pump stop
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. Utilize bypass line
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. Utilize bypass line
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. Utilize bypass line
1. PDAH-2069 operator response
2. FIC-2062 open minimum flowline FCV-
2062A/B
3. FAL-2062A/B operator response
4. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
5. PAH-2052A/B operator response
6. PAHH-2052A/B pump stop
7. Utilize bypass line
1. PG and check valve available at
discharge line
150. To provide HMI logic to enable operator WIKA-PEN (E&I)
easily to monitor pressurized backloading
activities
1. Refers to existing level control for
spherical tank
2. PAH-203B/205B/207B/209B operator
response
3. PAHH-203B/205B/207B/209B to close
SDV-202/204/206/208 and P-203A/B
4. LAHH-201/202/203/204 to stop P-203A/B
45 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
9. More Temperature 1. Dry pump started before cooling 1. Potential pump vibration, leading to pump 1. TAH-2080A/B will stop the pump (as
damage permissive for start up condition of pump)
2. VAH-2051A/B and 2052A/B operator
response
10. Less Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
11. Composition 1. Imperfect blending of C3 and C4 1. Low quality of product, product offspec 1. Refers to rec to provide FAHH-2057 to
Change stop Pump P-303A/B
12. Contaminant 1. Mercaptan/odour flowing to 1. Potential impact to fresh LPG at coastal 151. To provide check valve at tie in point to filling WIKA-PEN
coastal tanker tanker, potential economical impact line of spherical tank (Process)
13. Erosion/Corrosion 1. External corrosion due to water 1. Potential pipe corroded, in the long run 152. To provide suitable pipe support and U-bolt WIKA-PEN
trap at below pipe on the pipe may cause pitting corrosion and pin hole for non-insulated pipe to avoid water trap in (piping)
support the pipe support
2. Galvanic corrosion due to 1. Potential pipe corroded, in the long run 1. Isolation kit has applied to flanges
difference material may cause galvanic corrosion and pin hole connection pipe between two different
material
14. Safety concern 1. Low point at existing vapor line on 1. 153. To review existing vapor line on spherical WIKA-PEN
spherical tank side tank to ensure there is no pocket exist at the (Process)
vapor line
15. Others
18. Transfer C4 to 1. More Flow 1. DCV-4002 malfunction open 1. Potential liquid overflow from truck, 1. Batch controller available
Truck thru truck potential liquid spills from truck, potential fire
loading bay if ignited, involving fatalities 2. SOP filling available

2. Two pumps P-306A/B running
simultaneously
2. Less/No Flow 1. SRT-306A/B blockaged
2. Pump P-306A/B stop
3. SDV-4005 malfunction closed
4. Strainer TM-008 blockage
5. DCV-4002 malfunction closed
6. Strainer TM-108 blockage
7. SDV-4006 malfunction closed
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to stand
by pump
4. Misdirected Flow 1. No credible cause identified
5. More Level 1. Truck over filling
6. Less Level 1. No credible cause identified
7. More Pressure 1. Refers to No Flow
8. Less Pressure 1. Refers to No Flow
9. More Temperature 1. No credible cause identified
10. Less Temperature 1. Seawater out of service
11. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
12. Contamination 1. No credible cause identified
2. Potential liquid carry over to vapor line, 1. No pocket at vapor line 154. To check existing C4 vapor line whether low WIKA-PEN
potential vapor line blockaged by liquid point pocket is existing or not (Process)
trapped at low point
1. No significant consequence since
operation manually, no window for two
pumps running
1. Pump cavitation, potential pump damage 1. PDI at local
1. Delay loading, filling disturb 1. XL-2171A/B
1. Delay loading, filling disturb 1. ZSC-4002
1. Delay loading, filling disturb 1. PDI-4002
1. Delay loading, filling disturb 1. Batch controller available
1. Vapor blockage, potential filling disturb 1. PDI-4006
1. Vapor blockage, potential filling disturb 1. ZSC-4006
1. Pump reverse rotation, potential pump 1. PG and Check valve installed at
damage discharge line
1. Potential liquid overflow from truck, 1. Batch controller available
potential liquid spills from truck, potential fire
if ignited, involving fatalities 2. PSV at skid tank pop-up to alert operator
3. SOP filling available
1. Low temperature liquid entering to truck, 1. TAL-2071 operator response
potential C4 expand during transportation,
high pressure tank truck, potential tank truck 2. FAL-2072 operator response (sea water
burst, leading to LOPC, potential involving line)
major hazard 3. TALL-2071 to stop P-306A/B
4. High pressure protection available at truck

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 46 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
13. Corrosion/Erosion 1. No credible cause identified
14. Safety 1. No credible cause identified
Concerns/Relief
15. Others 1. No additional credible cause
identified
19. Flare System 1. More Flow 1. Excessive discharged from 1. Potentially high flow to flare, potential flare 1. Flame and Gas detector available at Flare 155. To discuss with vendor, to consider scenario WIKA-PEN (Flare generator is hold, to be hazoped when
process to flare F-501 flame out, leading to vapor cloud, potentially liquid carry over to flare F-501 on design (Process) detail design from vendor is available)
major hazard to public area 2. Automatic Ignition at Flare tip available
3. Heater E-501 available at KO Drum
4. LAH-1052 operator response
2. Potential high level liquid at KO Drum, 1. Flame and Gas detector available at Flare
leading to liquid carry over to Flare F-501,
potential flare tip damage due to liquid carry 2. Automatic Ignition at Flare tip available
over 3. Heater E-501 available at KO Drum
4. LAH-1052 operator response
2. Less/No Flow 1. Nitrogen blockage 1. Potential air ingress into the flare header, 1. FAL-2051 operator response
leading to fire at flare header, potential
backfire 2. PAL-1051, operator response

2. No fuel gas to flare tip 1. Potential flare tip flame out, leading to 1. Flame arrester available 156. To review with vendor Flare F-501 the WIKA-PEN
flare flame out, leading to air ingress to flare, requirement to provide flame arrester to (Process)
leading to backfire 2. Flare seal drum provided protect backfire from flare to spherical tank
3. Reverse Flow 1. Refers to no flow: air ingress case
4. Misdirected Flow 1. No credible cause identified
5. More Pressure 1. See More Flow
6. Less/No Pressure 1. See No Flow: N2
7. More Level 1. See More Flow
2. Heater E-501 out of service 1. Potential high level liquid at KO Drum, 1. XL-1051 157. To review requirement to adjust Heater E- WIKA-PEN
leading to liquid carry over to Flare F-501, 501 instead 1X100% preferable 2X50% (Process)
potential flare tip damage due to liquid carry 2. XA-1053
over 3. LAH-1052, start Heater
8. Less/No Level 1. No credible cause identified
9. More Temperature 1. Heater E-501 running dry 1. Potentially Heater temperature reached to 1. LAL-1052 to stop E-501
auto ignition of propane vapor, leading to
fire, potential backfire 2. TAHH-1052 to stop E-501

10. Less Temperature 1. Heater E-501 out of service 1. Potential high level liquid at KO Drum, 1. XL-1051
leading to liquid carry over to Flare F-501,
potential flare tip damage due to liquid carry
over
11. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
12. Contaminant 1. No credible cause identified
13. Erosion/Corrosion 1. Galvanic corrosion due to 1. Potential pipe corroded, in the long run 1. Isolation kit has applied to flanges
difference material may cause galvanic corrosion and pin hole connection pipe between two different
material
14. Safety concern 1. Hot surface expose to personal 1. Personal expose to hot surface, potential 1. Pernal protection is applied to hot surface 158. To provide full personal protection to hot WIKA-PEN
personal injury surface surrounding Flare F-501 area (Process)
15. Others 1. No credible cause identified
20. Instrument/Plant 1. More Flow
Air
2. Less/No Flow

(Hold, to be 3. Reverse Flow

hazoped when 4. Misdirected Flow
detail design from
vendor is available) 5. More Pressure
6. Less/No Pressure
7. More Level

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 47 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
8. Less/No Level
9. More Temperature
10. Less Temperature
11. Composition
Change
12. Contaminant
13. Erosion/Corrosion
14. Safety concern 1. Continuous connection between 1. Potentially IA line exposed to nitrogen 159. To disconnect permanent line between WIKA-PEN (E&I)
IA and Nitrogen supply gas, the hazard of asphyxiation within nitrogen and IA
confine space
15. Others
21. Nitrogen Supply 1. More Flow
System
2. Less/No Flow

(Hold, to be 3. Reverse Flow

hazoped when 4. Misdirected Flow
detail design from
vendor is available) 5. More Pressure
6. Less/No Pressure
7. More Level
8. Less/No Level
9. More Temperature
10. Less Temperature
11. Composition
Change
12. Contaminant
13. Erosion/Corrosion
14. Safety concern
15. Others
22. Diesel Oil 1. More Flow
Supply System
2. Less/No Flow
3. Reverse Flow
4. Misdirected Flow
5. More Pressure
6. Less/No Pressure
7. More Level
8. Less/No Level
9. More Temperature
10. Less Temperature
11. Composition
Change
12. Contaminant
13. Erosion/Corrosion
14. Safety concern
15. Others
23. Seawater 1. More Flow 1. Three pumps P-501A/B/C running 1. More flow to heat exchanger, potential 160. To provide FAH-6007 WIKA-PEN
simultaneously erosion occur to HE, potential equipment (Process)
damage, potential tube leaks, leading to HC
ingress to seawater side, loss of HC 161. To include in the operating manual to reduce WIKA-PEN
flow injection of hypochloride to standby (Process)
pump

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 48 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
2. Excessive hypochloride injected
into suction pump
2. Less/No Flow 1. Suction pump P-501A/B blockage
by microorganism growth
2. Scaling on Heat Exchanger
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to
standby pump
4. Misdirected Flow 1. Manual valve 60-GA08052 for
start up pump keep open after
switching pump
5. More Pressure 1. Refers to No Flow
6. Less/No Pressure 1. Refers to No Flow - Suction
blockaged
7. More Level 1. No credible cause identified
8. Less/No Level 1. Low tide sea level
9. More Temperature 1. Increase ambient temperature
10. Less Temperature 1. Low temperature of ambient
11. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
12. Contaminant 1. Suction level pump P-501A/B/C is
close to seabed level
13. Erosion/Corrosion 1. Refers to contaminant
14. Safety concern 1. Presence of hydrogen as a side
product of hypochloride
15. Others 1. No credible cause identified
24. Service Water 1. More Flow 1. Three pumps P-501A/B/C running
simultaneously
2. Excessive hypochloride injected
into suction pump
HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong
Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. Potential excess hypochloride
accumulated at suction standby pump,
potential corroded at suction standby pump
1. Potential corrosion at pipe and suction 1. Chlorine concentration control available 162. Blower to be discussed further with Vendor WIKA-PEN
pump Electrochlorination Package (Process)
163. To review classification of electric motor WIKA-PEN
applied of seawater pump has to be (Process)
classified as HAC
2. Potentially free hydrogen release from 1. Chlorine concentration control available
water pump intake, if hydrogen reach to 4%
by volume it will auto ignite, motor burnt
1. Suction pump P-501A/B blockaged, pump 1. Hypochloride injection available 164. To review requirement to enable operation to WIKA-PEN
cavitation, leading to pump damage identify in case of any of seawater pump get (Process)
2. XAL-6003C/6004C/6005C (low current) suction blockaged
operator response
1. 165. To review requirement to provide filter after WIKA-PEN
discharge pump P-501A/B (Process)
1. Pump reverse rotation, motor pump 1. PG and check valve installed at discharge
damage line
1. Less flow to Heater, potential low 1. FAL at seawater side in Heater 166. To review operation of start/stop pump P- WIKA-PEN
temperature of liquid entering to non resiliant 501A/B to see the possibility operational can (Process)
material, potential pipe embrittlement, LOPC, 2. TAL at outlet Heater be operated remotely
leading to major hazard 3. TALL to stop pump
1. Potentially pump P-510A/B/C running dry, 1. Depth of sea water pump is 5.5 m from
leading pump damage seabed, meanwhile low tide is 0.5 m
1. Potential reduce the performance of 1. The highest sea water temperature based
Condenser, potential pressure tend to on study is 30.5 degC, and it is used as
increase to Compressor, potential reduce basic design for sea water cooling media
performance of Compressor
1. Potential reduce performance of Heater, 1. The lowest temperature sea water is 28
potential icing formed at tube, potential degC based on study, and it is used as
Heater fall down additional weight from icing basic design for Heater
1. Potential mud debris from seabed sucked 167. To review the possibility to provide devices to WIKA-PEN
by pump, leading to low performance of Heat protect debris/mud from seabed level sucked (Process)
Exchanger by sea water pump
1. Sea water pump house exposed to 168. Engineering to review if the sea water area WIKA-PEN
hydrogen hazard, potential fire and explosion including hypochloride tank are continuously (Process)
if ignited exposed to hydrogen, can be classified as
HAC
1. More flow to heat exchanger, potential 169. To provide FAH-6007 WIKA-PEN
erosion occur to HE, potential equipment (Process)
damage, potential tube leaks, leading to HC
ingress to seawater side, loss of HC 170. To include in the operating manual to reduce WIKA-PEN
flow injection of hypochloride to standby (Process)
pump
2. Potential excess hypochloride
accumulated at suction standby pump,
potential corroded at suction standby pump
1. Potential corrosion at pipe and suction 1. Chlorine concentration control available 171. Blower to be discussed further with Vendor WIKA-PEN
pump Electrochlorination Package (Process)
172. To review classification of electric motor WIKA-PEN
applied of seawater pump has to be (Process)
classified as HAC
49 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
Node Deviation Cause
2. Less/No Flow 1. Suction pump P-501A/B blockage
by microorganism growth
2. Scaling on Heat Exchanger
3. Reverse Flow 1. Flow from running pump to
standby pump
4. Misdirected Flow 1. Manual valve 60-GA08052 for
startup pump keep open after
switching pump
5. More Pressure 1. Refers to No Flow
6. Less/No Pressure 1. Refers to No Flow - Suction
blockaged
7. More Level 1. No credible cause identified
8. Less/No Level 1. Low tide sea level
9. More Temperature 1. Increase ambient temperature
10. Less Temperature 1. Low temperature of ambient
11. Composition 1. No credible cause identified
Change
12. Contaminant 1. Suction level pump P-501A/B/C is
close to seabed level
13. Erosion/Corrosion 1. Refers to contaminant
14. Safety concern 1. Presence of hydrogen as a side
product of hypochloride
15. Others 1. No credible cause identified
25. Firewater 1. More Flow
system
2. Less/No Flow
Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Responsibility Remark
2. Potentially free hydrogen release from 1. Chlorine concentration control available
water pump intake, if hydrogen reach to 4%
by volume it will auto ignite, motor burnt
1. Suction pump P-501A/B blockaged, pump 1. Hypochloride injection available 173. To review requirement to enable operation to WIKA-PEN
cavitation, leading to pump damage identify in case of any of seawater pump get (Process)
2. XAL-6003C/6004C/6005C (low current) suction blockaged
operator response
1. 174. To review requirement to provide filter after WIKA-PEN
discharge pump P-501A/B (Process)
1. Pump reverse rotation, motor pump 1. PG and check valve installed at discharge 175.
damage line
1. Less flow to Heater, potential low 1. FAL at seawater side in Heater 176. To review operation of start/stop pump P- WIKA-PEN
temperature of liquid entering to non-resilient 501A/B to see the possibility operational can (Process)
material, potential pipe embrittlement, LOPC, 2. TAL at outlet Heater be operated remotely
leading to major hazard 3. TALL to stop pump
1. Potentially pump P-510A/B/C running dry, 1. Depth of sea water pump is 5.5 m from
leading pump damage seabed, meanwhile low tide is 0.5 m
1. Potential reduce the performance of 1. The highest sea water temperature based
Condenser, potential pressure tend to on study is 30.5 degC, and it is used as
increase to Compressor, potential reduce basic design for sea water cooling media
performance of Compressor
1. Potential reduce performance of Heater, 1. The lowest temperature sea water is 28
potential icing formed at tube, potential degC based on study, and it is used as
Heater fall down additional weight from icing basic design for Heater
1. Potential mud debris from seabed sucked 177. To review the possibility to provide devices to WIKA-PEN
by pump, leading to low performance of Heat protect debris/mud from seabed level sucked (Process)
Exchanger by sea water pump
178.
1. Sea water pump house exposed to 179. Engineering to review if the sea water area WIKA-PEN
hydrogen hazard, potential fire and explosion including hypochloride tank are continuously (Process)
if ignited exposed to hydrogen, can be classified as
HAC

(Hold, to be 3. Reverse Flow

hazoped when 4. Misdirected Flow
detail design from
vendor is available) 5. More Pressure
6. Less/No Pressure
7. More Level
8. Less/No Level
9. More Temperature
10. Less Temperature
11. Composition
Change
12. Contaminant
13. Erosion/Corrosion
14. Safety concern
15. Others

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 50 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET

HAZOP STUDY/DRAFT-Tanjung Sekong 51 of Page 51 By PT. EXCOM INDONESIA/EXIDA LLC