Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem

Author(s): Charles R. Pigden

Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 10, No. 5, Moral Skepticism: 30 Years of
Inventing Right and Wrong (November 2007), pp. 441-456
Published by: Springer
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EthicTheoryMoralPrac(2007) 10:441-456
DOI 10.1007/S10677-007-9097-Z

Nihilism,Nietzscheand theDoppelgangerProblem

Charles R. Pigden

Accepted:13 August2007 /Publishedonline:4 December2007

SpringerScience+ BusinessMedia B.V. 2007

Abstract Nihilism,Nietzscheand the DoppelgangerProblemWas Nietzschea nihilist?

Yes, because,likeJ.L. Mackie,he was an error-theoristaboutmorality, includingtheelitist
morality to whichhe himselfsubscribed.But he was variouslya diagnostician,an opponent
and a survivorof certainotherkindsof nihilism.SchachtarguesthatNietzschecannothave
been an error theorist,since meta-ethicalnihilism is inconsistentwith the moral
commitmentthat Nietzsche displayed. Schacht's exegetical argumentparallels the
substantiveargument(advocated in recentyearsby Wrightand Blackburn)thatMackie's
errortheorycan't be truebecause if it were,we would have to give up moralityor give up
moralizing.I answerthisargumentwitha littlebit of help fromNietzsche.I thenpose a
problem,theDoppelgangerProblem,forthemeta-ethical nihilismthatI attribute
to Mackie
and Nietzsche.(If A is a moralpropositionthennot-Ais a moralproposition:hencenotall
moralpropositionscan be false.) I solve theproblemby reformulating theerrortheoryand
also deal witha variantof theproblem,theReinforcedDoppelganger,glancingat a famous
paper of Ronald Dworkin's. Thus, whateverits demerits,the errortheory,is not self-
refuting,nordoes it requireus to give up morality.

Keywords Errortheory Nihilism Nietzsche J.L. Mackie Doppelganger

Bertrand
Russell Anti-realism CrispinWright SimonBlackburn RichardSchacht
Sayre-McCordRonaldDworkin Moralizing Morality

1 Introduction

Let me startwithtwoclaims:(1) I am a moralnihilist,(2) so was Nietzsche.The firstclaim

controversial.
is notparticularly Absentbraininjuryor massiveself-deception, I am thebest
authorityon what I believe, and I can assure you that I believe somethingthat can
reasonablybe describedas 'moralnihilism',namelya minorvariantof theerrortheoryof J.

C. R. Pigden(El)
Department of Philosophy, of Otago,P.O. Box 56, Dunedin9054, New Zealand
University
e-mail:charles.
pigden@stonebow.otago.ac.nz
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442 C. R. Pigden

L. Mackie. It is otherwisewiththesecond claim. Some say Nietzschewas a nihilist,indeed

a perfect,complete or uninhibitednihilist.1Some say that this is all a horrible
misunderstanding and thatNietzschewas nothingof the kind.2I shall argue thathe was
a nihilistin muchthesame sense as I am, butvariouslya diagnostician, an opponentand a
survivorof certainotherkindsof nihilism.3Then,withNietzsche'said, I shall defendthe
moral nihilismthatwe both believe (meta-ethicalnihilismor the errortheory)againsta
commonline of criticismthatnihilismcan't be truebecause if it were we would have to
give up morality or,at least,moralizing.I thenraisea problem(theDoppelgngerProblem)
formeta-ethical nihilism,reinforcetheproblem,and solve it by reformulating thedoctrine.
Thus althoughI thinkthat tryingto get Nietzsche rightis a worthwhileintellectual
enterprise, therealpointof thepaperis to vindicatetheerrortheory(of whichMackie was
theforemost defender)againstcertainkindsof criticism. For therecord,I agreewith(whatI
take to be) Nietzsche'smetaethicbut disagreewithhis ethicof Calliclean self-assertion. I
also thinkthatthereare lotsof historical, psychologicaland philosophicalinsightsscattered
throughNietzsche'sworks(mixedwitha good deal of silliness)thoughtheydon't always
repaytheeffort ofputtingup withhis big-noting, his button-holing
and his 'Hi Ma! Look at
Me!' styleof writing.

2 Meta-ethicalNihilism

So, in what sense am I a moral nihilist?I think(as a firstapproximation)thatmoral

judgments,specificallymoral judgmentsconcerningthe thin moral concepts ('good',
'right','ought','wrong'etc) arepropositions,thattheyare (in thecurrent jargon) truthapt.
And I thinkthattheyare allfalse.4 For thereare no such propertiesas goodness,badness,
wrongnessor obligatoriness.You can't do genuinelygood deeds since thereis no such
property as goodnessforyourdeeds to instantiate:
at besttheycan be good in some watered
down or ersatzsense. Withthethickmoralconcepts('honest', 'kind', 'spiteful'or 'loyal')
thesituationis morecomplex.Judgments such as 'Abigail is honest'can be trueso long as
theyare construedfactuallyas describingAbigail's propensity to tellthetruth,refrainfrom
falsehoodand stick to her word. If Abigail does indeed have these characteristics, then
'Abigail is honest' is truejust as 'George Bush is honest' is not (since the illustrious
Presidenthas a freeand easy way withthe facts).But 'Abigail is honest' is false if it is
takento implythatbeinghonestis a good thing,virtuousor how one oughtto be and hence
thatAbigail is good, virtuousor thatshe does whatshe should.In otherwords,judgments
involvingthe thickmoral conceptscan be trueso long as the thincoatingof evaluative
contentis scrapedaway. But if suchjudgmentsare freighted withthinevaluativecontent
theytoo are condemnedto falsehood.Moreover,judgmentsinvolvingthethinand thethick
conceptscan bothbe true,so long as theyare construedsociologicallyor in an 'inverted
commas' sense. It is true(I hope) thatAbigail is a good girl since she conforms(on the
whole) to mypaternalethic.It is truethatAchillesis agathos,even thoughhe procuresthe
defeatof his own side because of a quarrelabouta slave girl,sincehis actionsstillconform

1 Ansell-Pearson
(1994, especiallyeh. IO), Danto(1965, pp. 22, 30, 31).
2 Schacht
(1995, chs. 2-3).
Thusmyinterpretation is broadlyin accordwiththatof Leiter(2002).
4
Thoughas we shallsee, thishas to be carefullyqualifiedto avoid self-refutation.
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 Nietzscheand theDoppelganger
Nihilism, problem 443

to theheroiccode. But Abigail is not absolutelygood nor is Achilles absolutelyagathos:

Abigailis good-according-to-her-Dad and Achillesis agathos-according-to-the-heroic-code.
These pedanticand R. M. Hare-ishdistinctionsare quite useful when it comes to
decipheringNietzsche'sthought.For example,when he says thatto become moral is not
itselfmoral {Daybreak,97), whathe means is thatthemotivesand characteristics which
induce people to subscribeto a morality(like the methodspeople use to propagatea
morality)mayqualifyas moralfailingsaccordingto thatverymorality. One's commitment
to virtuemay be due to an 'invertedcommas' vice (Nietzsche 1982, p. 59).
To thebest of myknowledge,thefirstclear formulation of meta-ethical
nihilismor the
errortheoryin thetwentieth century was due to BertrandRussell who propoundedit at a
meeting of the CambridgeApostles in 1922. 'There seems to me no doubt thatour ethical
judgments all claim but
objectivity; thisclaim, to my mind, makes them all false.'5 Since
'the Society,'as the Apostleswere known,was a secretsociety,Russell's paper did not
have much of an impactat the time.The truechampionof meta-ethicalnihilismin the
twentieth centurywas J. L. Mackie. 'Althoughmost people in makingmoraljudgments
implicitly claim... to be pointingto somethingobjectivelyprescriptive,theseclaimsare all
false.'6 His 'Refutationof Morals' (1946) put nihilismon the agenda, and his Ethics:
InventingRightand Wrong(1977) remindedpeople thatit had not been dealt with.Since
thennumerousefforts have been made, so muchso thatMichael Smith'srecentanthology
Meta-Ethics(1995) largelyconsistsof desperateattemptsby variousphilosophersto find
facts thatwill make moraljudgmentstrue (in the circumstances,Smith's omission of
Mackie makes the book not so muchHamlet withoutthe Princeof Denmark,as Hamlet
withouttheghost).

3 Nietzscheand Nihilism

But was Nietzschea nihilist?Well,absentbraininjuryor massiveself-deception, he was the

bestauthority on whathe believed,and he certainly said he was a nihilist,indeed'the first
perfectnihilistin Europe' (Nietzsche 1968b, p. 3). But thisdoes not prove the point.To
begin with,in his case, we cannotaltogetherdiscountthe possibilityof brain injury.He
wrotethese words about a year beforehis descent into madness,and the syphiliswas
beginningto undermine his intellect(theconceitand themegalomaniawerebecomingmore
pronounced,the styleless ironicand more abusive). Moreover,he oftensays thingsthat
suggestthathe is not a nihilist.In Twilightof the Idols, 34, he quotes Flaubert's'One
cannotthinkor writeexceptwhenseated', and exclaims'There I have caughtyou nihilist!
Sittingstill is the very sin against the Holy Spirit!' (Nietzsche 2005, p. 160) Since
Nietzschehad his best ideas whilstwanderinglonelyas a cloud throughAlpine holiday
resorts,theconversationalimplicatumwould appear to be that,unlikeFlaubert,Nietzsche
was nota nihilist.Even Nietzsche'sclaim to be theperfectnihilistis ratherequivocal since
'
his 'perfection'consistsin thefactthathe has 'lived throughnihilismand come out on the
otherside, 'leaving itbehind,outsidehimself.'In otherwords,thereasonhe is theperfect
nihilistis thathe is nota nihilistany more.
Againstthis,Nietzsche's writingsare pepperedwith passages thatsuggest,implyor
expressmeta-ethical nihilism.Daybreak,103, is explicit:"To denymorality"...can mean

5
Pigdened. (1999, pp. 119-124).
6 Mackie
(1977, p. 35).
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444 C. R. Pigden

to denythatmoraljudgmentsare based on truths.Here it is admittedthattheyreallyare

motivesof actionbutthatin thisway it is errorswhich,as thebasis of all moraljudgments,
impelmento theirmoralactions.This is mypointof view'. The GenealogyofMorals is, in
part,an attemptto demonstrate thatsince the current' slave' moralitywould have been
believedeven ifitwerefalse,thefactthatitis widelybelievedgives us no reasonto thinkit
true(Nietzsche 1994). But the same argumentquite obviouslyapplies to the aristocratic
moralitythatNietzscheevidentlyprefers.Thattoo was believedbecause it suitedtheneeds
of thearistocracy: hencethefactthatitwas believedaffordsno argument forsupposingitto
be true.But since moralclaims purportto be truthapt, it followsthatif theyare not true
(whichis whatNietzscheseems to suggest)thentheyare false.Nietzsche'sTwilight of the
Idols, VIII. 1 expressesthesame idea in less metaphoricallanguage: 'Thereare absolutely
no moralfacts. Whatmoraland religiousjudgmentshave in commonis thebeliefin things
that are not real. Morality is just an interpretation of certain phenomena or (more
accurately)a misinterpretation.'
So how do we reconcile the rejectionof nihilismwith these nihilisticsentiments?
Nietzschewas in my sense a meta-ethical nihilist- thatis, an error-theorist in the styleof
JohnMackie - butthenihilismhe claimedto have survived,thenihilismhe regardedas a
menace,thenihilismhe hopedto transcend, was notjust thebeliefthatmoraljudgmentsare
d'' false butthepsycho-socialmalaisecaused by thisbelief.'Scepticismregardingmorality
is whatis decisive',says Nietzsche,The end of themoralinterpretation of theworldwhich
no longer has any sanctionafterit has triedto escape into some beyond, leads [my
emphasis]to nihilism."Everythinglacks meaning'".(Will to Power, p. 7.) Obviously,if
moralskepticismleads to nihilismitcannotbe identicalwiththethingthatitleads to. To be
a nihilist,then,is notjust to believe in theerrortheorybutto believe in theerrortheoryand
to feel bad about it. Thus Nietzsche has ceased to be a nihilist(or has perfectedhis
nihilism)notbecause he has ceased to be an errortheorist butbecause he has ceased tofeel
bad. His projectis the revaluationof all values, the reconstruction of a new morality, the
morality of the overman, which, thoughequally false, will be more bracing, more life-
enhancingand more conduciveto the 'higher' typeof man. It will have a higherutility
(given Nietzsche's elitistand eccentricends), but, since thereare pernicioustruthsand
useful (even life-enhancing) falsehoods,the fact that it is useful won't make it true.
MoralityforNietzscheis like mathematics forHartryField7- itdoes nothave to be trueto
be good - in the sense of being good-for-something. (Though of course he believed that
current moralitiesare neithertruenor good, at leastnotgood foranything whichNietzsche
himselfvalued.) If we believe (or make-believe)in thisnew morality, theworldwill be re-
enchanted;it will become meaningfulagain. For as Zarathrustra makes plain, meaningis
not somethingto be discoveredbut somethingto be imposed,and it is imposedby our
moralbeliefs.'Only man placed value in thingsto preservehimself- he alone createda
meaningforthings,a humanmeaning.Thereforehe calls himself"man" whichmeans"the
esteemer"... withoutesteemingthe nut of existence would be hollow' (Thus Spake
Zarathrustra, 1.15/Nietzsche (1954, p. 171). So ifthenutof existenceseemsto be hollow,if
we suffer froma malaiseof meaninglessness inducedby moralskepticism, thesolutionis to
forgetour doubts(except perhapswhen we are doing meta-ethics)and to createa new
moralityby 'esteeming'a novel collectionof goods. Of course the new moralitywill be
zmmoralaccordingto currentnorms,which is whyNietzschecalls himselfan immoralist.
But a new moralityis notno morality, nor is it any less of a fictionbecause it conducesto
the(rathervague) ends thatNietzschehas set himself.

7 Field
(1989).
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 Nietzscheand theDoppelganger
Nihilism, problem 445

4 Schacht1s Objections

RichardSchacht(1995, pp. 49-61) will have noneof this.In his view,Nietzschecan't have
been an 'axiological [or meta-ethical]nihilist'.Nietzschemay have been an 'immoralist'
buthe was also a moralist,theadvocateof a new,morehealthyethicbased on the 'will to
power'. He feltthatunless this new 'interpretation' were adopted,Europeancivilization
was moribund.He 'held thatthismustnothappenand thatlife[presumablythelifeof the
Europeanelite]oughtto flourish, oughtto be enhancedand oughtto continueto develop'
(Schacht (1995, p. 53). Nietzsche could not have 'held' this if he thoughtall moral
judgments(includinghis own) were false.
Schacht's argumentis interesting since it is closely relatedto a familyof arguments
to
designed prove, not thatNietzsche was nota nihilist,butthatnihilismin itsmeta-ethical
formisfalse. As I understand it,it goes somethinglike this:

(51) If anyoneis thinksthatall moraljudgmentsare falsehe must(a) give up moralizing

(i.e. makingand defendingmoralclaims, adoptingmoralbeliefs) and (b) give up
morality(i.e. actingon thebasis of moralbeliefs).
(52) Nietzsche did not give up eithermoralizingor morality.On the contraryhe was a
dedicatedadvocateof theethicof theoverman.
Therefore
(53) Nietzschewas notan axiologicalnihilist:he did notbelieve thatall moraljudgments
are false.
Now theproblemwiththisargumentis thatpremiseSI is clearlyuntrue.Some meta-
suchas RichardGarner8and Ian Hinckfuss,9
ethicalnihilists, give up (or professto give up)
bothmoralizingand moralityand some, such a Mackie, myselfand RichardJoyce,do not
speakingwhatJoycerecommendsis thatwe continueto act morallyand to thinkin
(strictly
moraltermswhilstabandoningbeliefin the propositionsof morality).The latterpartof
Mackie's Ethics:InventingRightand Wrongis largelydevotedto moralizing,and Mackie
is describedby his erstwhileneighbour,George Cawkwell, as one of the most duteous
personshe had evermet.10And thoughMackie missedouton theChairat theUniversity of
Tasmania because of his nihilisticmeta-ethicalopinions,it was his successfulrival,the
moralisticSydneyOrr,who was laterdismissedfromthepost for'gross moralturpitude.'11
As forme, I am notonlyaddictedto moralizingbutI sometimeseven act on myprinciples,
whichmeansthatI too am a counterexample to S 1.
But perhapsI have misconstrued Schacht'sargument.The 'must' in SI is notan alethic
buta deonticoperator.It is not thatthenihilistmustgive up bothmoralizingand morality
(thathe cannothelphimself,as itwere)butthatin some sense he oughtto do so. Reallythe
argumentshouldstartfrom:
(S'l) If all moraljudgmentsare falsethenwe oughtto (a) give up moralizingand (b) give
up morality.
But of course this premise is at a considerable distance from Schacht's desired
conclusion.For even if S'l) is true,Nietzschemay nothave realizedit,and even ifhe did

8 Garner
(1994, pp. 1-3).
9 Hinckfuss
(1987, p.1).
10Cawkwell
(1985, pp. 219-220).
11
Pybus(1993,pp. 206-207).
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446 C. R. Pigden

realize it,thefactthathe did not give up moralizingdoes notprovehe was not a nihilist.
For he may nothave done whathe thoughthe oughtto do. Still,if we assume thatS'l is
obvious to all philosophicallysensitivepersonswe mightarriveat thefollowing:

(S'2) Nietzschethoughtthatif moraljudgmentswere all false,he oughtto (a) give up

moralizingand (b) give up morality.
Then,ifwe assumethatNietzschegenerallydid whathe thoughthe oughtto do, thefact
thathe did notgive up eithermoralizingor moralityindicatesthathe did notthinkhe ought
to do so. In whichcase he did notbelieve thatall moraljudgmentswere false.The trouble
is thatS'2 itselfis palpablyfalse.For Nietzsche(1968a, pp. 201-202) did notbelieve that,
in general,people should give up or cease actingupon false beliefs.The falsenessof a
judgmentis forus not necessarilyan objectionto a judgment... The questionis to what
extentit is lifepreserving, perhapseven species cultivating.
species preserving, And we are
fundamentallyinclined to think that the falsestjudgments (which include synthetic
judgmentsa priori)are themostindispensableforus.... To recognizeuntruth as a condition
for life - thatcertainlymeans resistingaccustomedvalue feelingsin a dangerousway'
{Beyond Good and Evil, 1.4/Nietzsche(1954, pp. 201-202)). But if untruthcan be a
conditionforlife - if falsehoodscan be indispensable- thenNietzschewould probably
have rejectedS'l). For if falsehoodis notnecessarilyan objectionto beliefsin general- if
indispensability (for certainpurposes) is an excuse for falsehood- then it may be a
sufficient excuse formoralbeliefs.So long as theyare 'species preserving'and all therest
of it - whichNietzsche'sovermanethicwas supposed to be - moralbeliefsneed not be
given up. Hence Schacht'sobjectioncollapses.

5 Wright,Blackburn and the Hoi Polloi

But even if Schachtfails to prove thatNietzschewas not a nihilisthe may providethe

makingsof an argumentagainstnihilismproper.For manypeople thinkthatif nihilismis
true,thenwe oughtto give up eithermoralizingor morality. And thisis somehowsupposed
to be an objection to nihilism,i.e. a reason to thinkthat it is false. Sophisticated
philosopherssuchas SimonBlackburnand CrispinWrightfocuson theallegeddutyto give
up moralizing;whereas simple folk focus on the dutyto give up morality.To give up
moralizingis to give up thepracticeof moraldiscourseas currently constituted;to give up
making,defending and arguing for moral claims and to give up our distinctivelymoral
beliefs.To give up moralityis to giveup ourmoralbeliefsand to give up acting(and getting
otherpeople to act) on thebasis of moralbeliefs.It is notor notnecessarilyto give up the
practices sanctionedby morality.There may be other reasons for not coveting my
neighbour'sox besides the alleged factthatit is morallywrong.(For instance:coveting
leads to theft,and theftis illegal, and illegal actions risk punishment, thus covetingis
imprudent.) But thesimple folk are in
surelyright supposing thatifour beliefssufferedsucha
sea-change our practiceswould not remain unaltered.If considerations of duty ceased to
motivateI would not do quite the same thingsas I do now, even if I refrained fromthe
excessesof a Sid Vicious.Moralityis nota redundant institution.
However,Blackburnseems
to supposethatwe couldgive up moralizing withoutgivingup morality. Forhe seemto think
thatwe mightsubstitute 'shmoral'beliefsand claims formoralbeliefsand claims and that
thesemightplay muchthesame roleas our moralbeliefsdo at present(though,as we shall
see, he regardssucha substitution as silly).Thus givingup moralizingdoes notentailgiving
up morality butonlyalteringit by replacingmoralbeliefswithshmoralbeliefs.
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 Nietzscheand theDoppelganger
Nihilism, problem 447

Accordingto Blackburn,'If a vocabularyembodies an error[especially,he seems to

think,an errorwhichinfectsitwithfalsehood]itwould be betterif itwerereplacedby one
. . . Surelyit would be betterif we avoided moral (erroneous)views
thatavoids the error.
altogetherand contented ourselveswithsome lesser,purgedcommitments thatcan be held
withoutmakingmetaphysicalmistakes.... The puzzle is why, in the lightof the error
theory, Mackie did notat leastindicatehow a moralvocabularywould look and whyhe did
nothimselfgo on to shmoralizenotto moralize.And in myview thisis enoughof a puzzle
to cast doubtback on to theoriginaldiagnosisof error.In otherwords,it would be a silly
thingto do, to tryto substitute some allegedlyhygienicconceptsforthe moralones; but
thatin itselfsuggeststhatno errorcan be incorporated in mereuse of thoseconcepts.'12
Blackburn'sargumentthenis this:

(Bl) If moraljudgmentsare all false,we oughtto give up moralizing(and shmoralize

instead)
(B2) But it is not thecase thatwe oughtto give up moralizing(and shmoralizeinstead).
This would be 'silly.'
Therefore
(B3) It is not thecase thatall moraljudgmentsare false.
Blackburngoes on to contendthatthe reasonmoraljudgmentsare not all false is that
strictlyspeaking theyare neithertruenor false (since theirtruepurpose is to express
attitudes)even though(forvarioussubtleand complicatedreasons) it is OK to call them
trueor falsein commonparlance.HoweverI am notconcernedwithBlackburn'sdefenceof
quasi-realismbut onlywithhis critiqueof nihilism.
CrispinWrighthas somethingsimilarin mind:
'The greatdiscomfort with such an [error-theoretic]
account [eitherabout morality,
mathsor 'the comic'] is that,unless more is said, it relegatesdiscourseabout the
comic to bad faith.[Not such a calamityin the case of thecomic,one is inclinedto
say!]... as soon as philosophyhas taughtus thattheworldis unsuitedto confertruth
on any of our claims about the funnythe reasonableresponseoughtsurelyto be to
forgomakingany such claims. This would not be to forgorightto laugh [That's a
relief!}... But itwould,apparently be to forgothepointof reasonedappreciationand
debate about what is funnyand of criticismof others'opinionsabout it. And these
consequencesare mostcalamitous...withinmoraldiscourse.If it is of theessence of
moraljudgmentto aim at the truth,and if philosophyteachesthatthereis no moral
truthto hit,how do I takemyselfseriouslyin thinking theway I do about any issue
whichI regardas of majormoralimportance?'13
The obvious and unkindcommentis thata man who doesn't have a problemtaking
himselfseriouslywhenengagedin reasonedappreciationand debateabout thecomic need
notfearthateven nihilismwill inducea lapse of seriousnesswhenitcomes to moralissues.
But satireaside, Wrightdoes have an argument,thoughit would appear to be one rung
below Blackburn'son thelogical ladder.For Blackburn'sargument,whateveritsfaults,is at

12Blackburn
(1993, pp. 149-150).
13
Wright(1992, pp, 9-10).
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448 C. R. Pigden

least formallyvalid. The same cannotbe said forthe argumentthatWrightpropounds.

Wright'sfirstpremiseis muchlike Blackburn's
(Wl) Ifmoraljudgmentsare all false,we oughtto give up moralizing(and takeourmoral
commitments a lot less seriously).
But his second premiseis simplythis:

(W2) Giving up moralizingwould be a real calamity.We could not take our moral
commitments seriously.
And fromthisnothingin particularseems to follow.At best Wl and W2 when taken
togetherprovideus witha reason forwishingthatnihilismwere not truebut not witha
reason to thinkthat it is not true. However, we can patch up Wright'sargumentby
W2' forW2.
substituting:
(W2') It is notthecase thatwe oughtto give up moralizing(foritwould lead to a loss
of moralcommitment).

And Wl and W2' do indeedentailthedesiredconclusion:

(W3) It is not thecase thatall moraljudgmentsare false.

6 Nihilismand Its Consequences

Having carefullydistinguishedbetween the two philosophersand the hoi polloi, and

betweenone philosopherand theother,in whatfollowsI am goingto runthemall together.
For what is wrongwith this line of argumentdoes not depend on the details we have
distinguished.So the premise I startwith combines three lines of thought:that of
Blackburn,thatof Wrightand thatof the simplefolk.It is this:
1. If all moraljudgmentsare falsethenwe oughtto (a) give up moralizingand (b) give up
morality.
The restof theargumentrunsas follows:
2. It is not thecase thatwe oughtto (a) give up moralizingand (b) give up morality.
Therefore
3. It is not thecase thatall moraljudgmentsare false.
This argumentis formally valid. But is it sound?This dependsupon which'oughts' we
have in mind. Let us take premise 1. Is it true?Not if the 'ought' is moral,so that 1
becomes:
1'. If all moraljudgmentsare false thenwe morallyoughtto (a) give up moralizingand
(b) give up morality.
For if all moraljudgmentsare false,thenthereis nothingthatwe morallyoughtto do
includinggivingup moralizingor givingup morality. So on thisinterpretation
theargument
fails.
But notall 'oughts' are moral'oughts'so thisdoes notsettlethematter.Let's tryagain.
Suppose we treatthe 'ought' in 1 as a hypothetical'ought' so thatit expresseswhatwe
ought to do if we want to achieve some end. And let us suppose to thatthis end has
somethingto do withrationality.(When Blackburnsays thatifMackie wereright,itwould
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 Nietzscheand theDoppelganger
Nihilism, problem 449

be 'better'to give up moralizingin favorof shmoralizing, he seems to mean rationally

better.Similarlyhisjustificationforthesecond premiseis thatshmoralizing would be silly
As forWright,he explicitlysays that'the reasonableresponse' to an error
i.e. irrational.
theoryis to give up makingthe erroneousclaims.) One such end is truth.Rationalityis
oftendefinedwithrespectto truthso thata ruleor procedureis rationalif it tendsto result
in truebeliefseitherin factor undertheappropriateconditions.So perhapstheidea behind
premise 1 is thatif all moraljudgmentsare false, we rationallyoughtto give up both
moralizingand morality, i.e. thatwe oughtto give themup if we want to have true,as
opposed tofalse, beliefs.This gives us:
1". If all moraljudgmentsare false,thenifwe wantour beliefsto be true(and notfalse)
we oughtto (a) give up moralizingand (b) give up morality.
Even if,like Nietzsche,we do notregardtruthas thesupremelyrationalend, ifnihilism
ifwe are to achieve truth.For
is true,we muststillgive up moralizingand give up morality
iftruth demandsthatwe give up moralizing- whichmeansgivingup ourmoralbeliefs- it
also demandsthatwe give up actingon our moralbeliefssince we won't have any moral
beliefsto act on. But of course, the truthof 1" does not settlethe matter.The second
premise- revisedso as to maintainvalidity- has to be truetoo:
2". It is notthecase thatifwe wantour beliefsto be true(and not false) we oughtto a)
give up moralizingand (b) give up morality.
Now 2" mightbe true.It mightbe thatit is notthecase thatifwe wantour beliefsto be
true(and notfalse)we oughtto give up bothmoralizingand morality. But 2" will onlybe
trueif nihilismis false. For if nihilismis truethenwe can't have moralbeliefswithout
havingfalsebeliefs.Conversely,if we can have moralbeliefswithouthavingfalsebeliefs
thennihilismis nottrue.Indeed,so long as moraljudgmentsare truthapt,thetruthof 2" is
tantamount to thefalsehoodof nihilismand vice versa.Thus 2" begs thequestion.It cannot
providean independentreason for supposingnihilismto be false since it more or less
amountsto thenegationof nihilism.Hence thisversionof the argumentis valid and may
even be sound,butit is notrationallypersuasivesince itbegs thequestionagainstnihilism.
Perhapswe shouldtryanothertack.It is notthatifmoraljudgmentsare falsewe ought
rationallygive up moralizingwhere rationalityhas somethingto do with truthor
consistency.Ratherif all moraljudgmentsare false we oughtpragmaticallyto give up
moralizing.The idea is thatthereare ends,perhapshumaneends,thatare bestachievedby
givingup bothmoralizingand morality.This is in factthe view of Hinckfussand Garner
(and briefly, perhaps,of BertrandRussell14).They are whatI call 'humanisticamoralists'.
They don'tjust thinkthatmoraljudgmentsare false- theythinkthattheyare pernicious
falsehoodswhich serve as a prop to tyrannyand an excuse to torturers. Whetherthe
humanisticamoralistsare rightand giving up moralitywould lead to a bonanza of
tolerance,freedomand equalityis a decidedlymootpoint.But thereare presumablysome
ends thatwould be furthered by givingup moralityand moralizing.Nevermindwhatthey
are, let us just designatethemas X. Then 1"' will be true(indeed trueby fiat):
1'". If all moraljudgmentsare false,thenwe ought,if we are to achieve ends X, to (a)
give up moralizingand (b) give up morality.
But thetroubleis it is triviallytrue,notjust in thesense thatwe have definedendsX as
theones thatwould be achievedby givingup morality, butbecause theconditionalis true
in virtueof its consequentalone. The falsehoodof all moraljudgmentshas nothingto do

14See
Pigden(ed., 1999,pp. 184-188).
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450 C. R. Pigden

withthefactthatabandoningmorality would be conduciveto endsX. The 'if expressesno

dependencyof the consequenton the antecedent.Whichmeans that2"' is simplyfalse.

2"'. It is notthecase thatwe ought,ifwe are to achieveendsX, to (a) give up moralizing

and (b) give up morality.
Hence thisversionof theargumentis valid but unsound.
My conclusionis thatthe 1, 2, 3 line of argument cannotbe made to work.If the'ought'
is moral,the firstpremiseis false. If the 'ought' is rational,thefirstpremisemay be true,
but the second premise presupposesthe falsehood of nihilismwhich means that the
argument begs thequestion.If the 'ought' is pragmaticthenthefirstpremisemay be true,
but if so, it is truein virtueof its consequent,whichmeansthatthesecondpremise,which
consistsin denyingthe consequent,is false. In my view the argumentderivesits appeal
froman unconsciousequivocation.Premise1 is readwitha rationalor truth-related 'ought'
butpremise2 is readwitheithera moralor a pragmatic'ought' (thusifall moraljudgments
are falsewe oughtrationallyto shmoralizeratherthanmoralize,butshmoralizing would be
pedantic and inconvenient and hence i.e.
silly, something we are notpragmatically
obliged
to do). But appealingas it is, thisline of argumentdoes not show thatnihilismis false.

7 The Doppelganger Problem

So far,so good. Meta-ethicalnihilismhas survivedtheobjectionsof Blackburnand Wright.

But we now come to anotherproblem- the DoppelgangerProblemand its supercharged
variant,theReinforcedDoppelganger.
The DoppelgangerProblem in its simple formis this: It seems thatnot all moral
judgmentscan be false,for(in manycases at least) thenegationof a moraljudgment,X, is
itselfa moraljudgment.And if X is false,its negationnot-Xmustbe true.But the error
theoryis preciselythethesisthatall moraljudgmentsare false(at leastwithrespectto their
core moral contents).So the error theoryor meta-ethicalnihilism is false, indeed
incoherent.
The problemis a generalone, which afflictserrortheoriesof all sorts.Accordingto
GeoffreySayre-McCord'sfamoustaxonomy,15 a realistabout a domainof discourseK is
someonewho believes two things:(a) thatK-statements expresspropositions(thatis, are
and
truth-apt) (b) thatsome of them are literally (thatis truewhenconstruedliterally).
true
Conversely,an anti-realist about a domain K is someone who either(a) denies thatK-
statements are reallypropositions, truth-apt,true-or-false(at leastwithrespectto theircore
meanings)or (b) insiststhatall of themare false.Thus withrespectto ethics,emotivists and
othernon-cognitivists are type(a) anti-realists,and nihilistsor errortheoristsare type(b)
anti-realists.
Sayre-McCordratherhoped thathis taxonomywould be notonly neutralbut
fair in a certain sense; it was designed to map out a series of positionsthatcould be
consistently (if not sanely)held. But if type-banti-realism is not such a positionthenhis
taxonomyis in deep trouble.And theDoppelgangerProblemsuggestspreciselythis.For it
seemsto show thatthereare not,or at least,thatthereshouldnotbe, anytype-banti-realists
about any domain (including ethics). And the reason is that type-b anti-realismis
incoherent, and thuscollapses intostraightforward Sayre-McCordrealism.

^Sayre-McCordC^g).
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 Nietzscheand theDoppelganger
Nihilism, problem 45 1

Here's why: If the membershipof a domain of discourseK is closed undernegation,

then,ifX is a statement of kindK, itsdoppelganger~X is a statementof kindK. But ifX is
false,~X is true.So it cannot be thecase thatall judgmentsof kindK are false.If we were
not dealingwithpotentiallyinfinitedomainswe would have to say thatat mosthalf the
statements of kindK are false. The restof them- theirnegations,theirdoppelgangers-
mustbe true.But thethesisthatjudgmentsof kindK are truthaptand thatsome of themare
trueis realismnotanti-realism accordingto Sayre-McCord'staxonomy.Thus type-banti-
realismdoes not markout a coherentclass of theories.Errortheoriesas such seem to be
self-refuting.

8 Solutions to the Doppelganger

Can theDoppelgangerProblembe solved? Perhaps.But it is notclearthattheproblemcan

always be solved or thatthe same solutionwill workforeverydomain.When Field says
thatmathematics is falsehe means thateverymathematical statement thatquantifiesover
abstractobjects is false. Now the negationof a statementthatquantifiesover abstract
-
objectsdoes notquantifyover abstractobjects.Hence theDoppelgangerPrinciple thatif
X is a statementof kind K, ~X is a statementof kind K - does not apply withinthis
domain. And if the Doppelganger Principle does not apply within a domain the
DoppelgangerProblemis dissolved. Thus Field's type-banti-realismdoes not collapse
intorealism.Can we make thesame move withinmeta-ethics? I thinknot.For thoughthe
negationof a moral propositionis not always a moral proposition,it seems to me that
sometimesand in some contextsit is. (Consider'We oughtto keep ourmarriagevows', and
its doppelganger'It is not the case thatwe oughtto keep our marriagevows'. The latter,
like the former, mighthave a considerableimpacton our conductif it came to be widely
believed.) In other words,theDoppelgangerPrincipleappliesbutintermittently. Even so, it
scuppers meta-ethical nihilism as I have describedit. For if the negations of some moral
judgments are moral judgments, then it cannot be the case that all moraljudgmentsare
false.
Thus meta-ethical nihilismneeds to be reformulated. I suggestthe following:All non-
negativeatomic moraljudgmentsare false. This requireselucidation.Firstwe specifya
rangeof primitive'thin' moralpredicates- 'good' (morallygood), 'bad', 'right','wrong'
'oughtto' etc. (theremaybe a problemaboutthisas some of themare interdefinable). We
thendefine an atomic moral judgment as a an
propositionascribing -place moralpredicate
to n specificitems.As definedtheseare non-negative, i.e. not governedby the negation
operator,but we redundantly specifythattheyare non-negativefor the sake of clarity.
Nihilismnow amountsto the claim thatall non-negativeatomic moral propositionsare
false.And theargument is thestandardnihilisticargument thatthereare no moralproperties
or relationscorresponding to the moralpredicatesand thusno moralfacts.Althoughthis
new formulation of nihilismis muchmorerestricted thantheoriginaldoctrine,it captures
thespirit,thoughnottheletterof theoriginalthesis.It capturesthespirit,since moralfacts
are denied and errorramifiesthroughthe great systemsof morality,renderingthem
systematically false. But it rejectsthe letter,since some itemsthatmightreasonablybe
describedas moraljudgmentswill come out true(materialconditionalswithatomicmoral
judgmentsfortheirantecedents, disjunctionsin whichone disjunctis moraland theother
not etc. etc.). But a mythdoes not cease to be a mythbecause it containsa few random
truths,and whatmightbe called restrictednihilismconvertsmoralityintoa collectionof
myths.
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452 C. R. Pigden

Does thisdeal withthe DoppelgangerProblem?Apparentlyyes. For the negationof a

non-negativeatomicmoralpropositionis nevera non-negativeatomicmoralproposition.
And wheretheDoppelgangerPrincipledoes notapply,theDoppelgangerProblemdoes not
arise.
Thereis a generallessonhere.Errortheoriesas characterized by Sayre-McCordare only
viable on one condition.We can only say thatall propositionsof kind K are false if the
negationof a kind K propositionis never itselfa propositionof kind K. Thus the error
theoristmustbe verycarefulabout defininghis kind K if he is to escape self-refutation.
Nietzscheomitsthisprecaution.In The Willto Power 15,he flirtswithwhatmightbe called
Global MetaphysicalNihilismof the Global ErrorTheory: 'The most extremeformof
nihilism would be the view that every belief, every considering-something-true, is
necessarilyfalsebecause theresimplyis no trueworld.[This formof nihilism]would be
a divineway of thinking.* Divine or not,it is absurd.For it amountsto thethesisthatall
propositionsarefalse. Here thekindK of propositionsis thekindof propositionsas such.
This kindis closed undernegationsince thenegationof a propositionis itselfa proposition.
Hence it cannot be the case that all propositionsare false. We may be able to save
Nietzsche'sbacon as a meta-ethicistby restricting his thesisto non-negative
atomicmoral
propositions,but the 'divine of
way thinking' seems to be beyondredemption.

9 The ReinforcedDoppelganger

I come now to theReinforced Doppelganger,a particularproblemformeta-ethical nihilists.

Let us takea specificact (say theslayingof Caesar on theIdes of March,44 BC) performed
by specificactors(Brutusand Cassius forconvenience,thoughof courseotherconspirators
were involved).Then,accordingto revisedmeta-ethical nihilism,proposition
(B) Brutusand Cassius' slayingof Caesar was wrong,
is false.And this,in turn,entails:

(~B) It is notthecase thatBrutusand Cassius' slayingof Caesar was wrong.

But, giventhattheslayingof Caesar was a deliberateaction,(~B) would appearto entail:
(Br) Brutus and Cassius' slaying of Caesar was right(in the sense of 'morally
permissible').
Generallyspeaking,'action X is not wrong' appears to entail 'action X is right'and
'action X is not right'appearsto entailthat'action X is wrong'.Call thesethe 'RD' (for
'reinforcedDoppelganger')principles:

(RDI) 'It is notthecase thatactionX is wrong',entails'actionX is right'.

(RD2) 'It is not thecase thatactionX is right',entails'action X is wrong'.
But if eitherof theseprinciplesis correct,my solutionto the DoppelgangerProblem
fails.For thefalsehoodof a non-negative atomicmoralpropositionentailsitsnegationand,
in some cases at least,the negationof one non-negativeatomicmoralpropositionentails
thetruthof another.So it can't be thecase thatall non-negative atomicmoralpropositions
are false.If all actionsare notwrongthenall actions(at least,thosewhichexist)are rightor
morallypermissible.And ifall actionsare notrightor morallypermissiblethenall actions
(at least,those which exist) are wrong.Eitherway we have moraltruths- non-negative
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Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger problem 453

atomicmoraltruths - in abundance.It seems thattheonly alternative to moralrealism(in

is
Sayre-McCord'ssense) non-cognitivism, after all.
Thereis onlyone way outforthenihilist.He has to denytheRD principles.'ActionX is
notwrong',does notentailthatactionX is right(in thesense of morallypermissible)nor
does 'action X is not right',entail thataction X is wrong. But is this bold and blunt
assertionanythingmore than the desperateresponseof the cornerednihilisticrat? No,
because (I think)it can be motivated.
A entailsB ifitcannotbe thecase thatA is trueand B false.Or A entailsB ifthereis no
conceivablesituation(possibleworld)in whichA is trueand B false.Is therea conceivable
situationin which (~B) is trueand (Br) false? Yes. The situationin which thereare no
moral propertiesor relations,and specificallyno propertiesof Tightness, wrongnessor
obligatoriness which attachthemselves to acts. In such a situationBrutus and Cassius'
slaying of Caesar won't have the of
property wrongness, but it won't have theproperty of
Tightness (moralpermissibility)either.It won't have any moralpropertiesat all. Now this
situationis preciselythesituationthatnihiliststhinkobtains.Thus theRD principlescannot
provideindependentevidence againstnihilism.For theyreston the thesisnot only that
nihilismisfalse but thatit is necessarilyfalse.
The pointcan be expressedwiththeaid of thefollowingtwo diagrams(Figs. 1 and 2):
Figure 1 representslogical space (for deliberateactions) as presupposedby the RD
principles.Figure 2 representslogical space (for deliberateactions) as representedby
nihilists(of course, nihilistsbelieve thatall actual acts are in the doubly shaded area).
Nihilistsbelieve,as RD theoristsdo not,thatit could be thatactionsare neitherrightnor
wrong(indeed,theyarguethatthisis notjust theway it could be but theway it is). RD
theoristseffectivelydeny even the possibilityof nihilism.But to say that nihilismis
impossible- thatit is absolutelyinconceivablethatneithermoralTightness norwrongness
attachto actions- is to makea largeand implausibleclaim.Yet ifthisclaim is nottrue,the
RD principlesare bothfalse.
Thus meta-ethical nihilism(somewhatrevised)can surviveboththe Doppelgangerand
theReinforcedDoppelgangerProblems.
It is perhapsworthstressingthattheRD principlesare notanalyticsince anotherfamous
attemptto refutetheerrortheory(along withmanyotherformsof moralanti-realism) rests
on theclaimthattheyare. In his famouspaper'Objectivityand Truth:You'd BetterBelieve
it' (1996) Ronald Dworkinarguesthatwholesale or Archimedeanmoralskepticismof the
kindadvancedby Mackie (and in myview by Nietzsche)is fundamentally incoherent.You
can't be a skepticaboutall moralclaims,since ifyou thinkthatabortionis notwrong- or
ifyou thinkthatit is notfull-bloodedly truethatabortionis wrong- you are committed to

Fig. 1 Logical space (for

deliberateactions) as
presupposed by the RD principles

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454 C. R. Pigden

Fig. 2 Logicalspace (for

deliberateactions)as represented
by nihilists

the first-order view that abortionis morallypermissible.But that only holds if you
subscribeto somethinglike (RDI) - thatthe claim thatactionsof kindX are not wrong,
entailsthatactionsof kindX are right(in thesense of morallypermissible).But nihilists(if
theyhave any sense) rejectsuch claims. Dworkinmightreplythatthisis like people who
believe boththatOscar is roundand thatOscar is square butabsolve themselvesfromthe
chargeof inconsistency, by rejectingthe thesisthatwhat is roundis not square (and vice
versa). The problem with thisis thatit reallyis analytic(or at least necessarilytrue)that
whatis roundis notsquare,but itis notanalyticthatactionsthatare notwrongare morally
permissible.For it does not hold in worldswherethereare no moralproperties, whichis
preciselythatkindof worldthatnihiliststhinkwe inhabit.Dworkinis like thecitizenof a
mightyempirein whicheverything is legal unlesstheemperorforbidsit.Takingthisto be
an analytictruth, he concludesthatoutsidein theBadlands,wherethewritof theemperor
does not runand nothingis forbidden, everything is legal. 'Those who adopt the second-
orderview thattheBadlands are lawless are in factcommittedto the first-order view that
everything in thebadlands is legal! For they admit- nay,they insist- thatin the Badlands
nothing is forbidden by the emperor!" But where there is nobody with the authorityto
permit or forbid,the factthat something is not forbidden does not entailthatit is permitted.

10 UnfinishedBusiness

In 5-6, 1 discusseda familyof arguments,

derived,in part,fromBlackburnand Wright,
whichcriticizethenihilisticview thatmoraljudgmentsare all false.These argumentsfail,
but perhapstheydo betteragainstthe amendedformof the errortheorythatI have been
defendingin 7-9? Premise1' transforms intopremise1*
1*. If all non-negative
atomicmoraljudgmentsare falsethenwe morallyoughtto (a)
give up moralizing and (b) give up morality.
Is 1* true?Surelynot.It is notquiteclearhow theconsequentof 1* shouldbe analyzed,
but it is mostnaturallyrenderedas a universalquantification:
For any personx, x morally
to and
ought (a) give up moralizing (b) give up morality. Thus fortheconsequentof 1* to
be truetheremustbe a relationof obligationbetweeneach individualand theact-typesof
(a) givingup moralizingand b) givingup morality.But if all non-negativeatomicmoral
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 Nietzscheand theDoppelganger
Nihilism, problem 455

propositionsare false,because thereare no such thingsas obligations,thenit will not be

trueof each individualthathe/sheoughtto (a) give up moralizingand (b) give up morality.
Thus if the antecedentis true, the consequent will be false, which means that the
conditionalitself is false. Thus the firstvariantof the argument(with the 'oughts'
interpretedas moral) is unsound.Whatabout the othertwo? In the second variantof the
argument in whichthe'oughts'are readas hypothetical imperativesindexedto some truth-
seekingproject,premise1" transforms intopremise1*")
atomicmoraljudgmentsare false,thenifwe wantour beliefs
1*". If all non-negative
to be true(and notfalse)we oughtto (a) give up moralizingand (b) give up morality.
1*" Appearsto be true,but premise2", whichdoes not need to be amended,is just as
questionbeggingin thisversionas itwas in theearlierargument, since it is tantamount
(in
context)to theclaim that not all atomic
non-negative moraljudgmentsare false.As forthe
thirdvariant(pragmatic'ought'), the uniformsubstitutionof 'non-negativeatomicmoral
judgments' for 'moral judgments' makes no to
difference its status.The argumentsfail
againstthe olderversionof the errortheoryand theyare just as unsuccessfulagainstthe
amendedversion.

11 Conclusion

In thispaperI have arguedthatNietzschewas a certainsortof nihilisti.e. an errortheorist

aboutethics,defendingmyinterpretation againstSchacht.I thendefendedthismoreor less
MackianpositionagainstBlackburn,Wrightand thehoi polloi. Moralitydoes nothave to
be trueto be good (in thesense of good forsomething), thusifitis good forsomethingand
even worthpersistingwith,thisdoes not show thatit is composedof truths.I raisedand
solved both the Doppelganger Problem and the ReinforcedDoppelganger Problem,
amendingtheerrortheoryalong theway. In orderto escape self-refutation, error-theorists
like Nietzscheand Mackie mustpull in theirhorns.The claim shouldnotbe thatall moral
judgmentsare falsebut onlythatnon-negative atomicmoraljudgmentsare all false.Thus
we can move fromthe non-existenceof moralpropertiesto the systematicfalsehoodof
moralitywithoutadoptingthe incoherentidea thateverything thatmightreasonablybe
regardedas a moraljudgmentis condemnedto error.But myaim has been to vindicatethe
errortheoryagainstcertainobjections,notto establishitstruth. The errortheorymaybe in
error,but I hope I have shownthatit is a lot less sillythansome have supposed.

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