CASE COMPILATION-MATERIAL DATES

MELENCIO CANTURNA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO

CABERO AND LEONARDA CORBILLA, SPOUSES
G.R. No. L-40934 April 30, 1976
(Appeal of an Agrarian Case)

While it is true that the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal
were not incorporated in the notice of appeal as required by law, such omission
owing to counsel's mistake, inadvertence and negligence considering the given
circumstances of "confusion caused by heavy pressure of work aggravated by
lack of personnel and equipment in the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, field office" could not be deemed inexcusable and
meted the capital penalty of dismissal of the appeal.

The innocent party who would thus be penalized in this case and deprived of
the right to appeal what he believes to be a just cause would be the very
agricultural tenant, tiller or lessee to whom the law has sought to extend all
legal protection and assistance because of his disadvantaged position in our
society, to the extent of extending him free legal assistance and representation
through the BALA and all the rights and privileges of a pauper and indigent
litigant without need of further proof.

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORPORATION, FERRY

CASINOS LIMITED and PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY
CORPORATION v. JENNIFER ANNE B. ACUA, HAYDEE ANNE B. ACUA,
MARITES T. CLARION, MARISSA C. ENRIQUEZ, GRACIELA M. TORRALBA
and MARY PAMELA A. SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 140189. February 28, 2005
(Labor Case)

As a general rule, these requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-

compliance therewith is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

In the case before us, the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of
material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from
the records. A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the January 15,
1997 decision of the NLRC was received by respondents counsel on January
24, 1997. On February 19, 1997, respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated April 30,
1997. Respondents counsel received the resolution on May 30, 1997 and they
filed the petition for certiorari on July 18, 1997.
SECURITY BANK CORPORATION v. INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY,
THE BRANCH SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
256, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY
G.R. No. 146197, June 27, 2005
(Efforts to rectify mistake; substantial compliance; date evident from the
records)

Contrary to the Court of Appeals findings, Security Bank correctly asserted

that page 13 of its petition states the date of filing of the motion for
reconsideration on 23 February 1999, or thirteen days after the receipt of the
Order. The petition also states the date of receipt of notice of denial of the
motion for reconsideration filed before the trial court. Hence, the petition only
lacked the date of receipt of the trial courts Order of 1 February 1999 that was
the subject of the motion for reconsideration.

The stamped date on the Order of 1 February 1999 annexed to the petition is
not clear enough for the Court of Appeals to determine when Security Banks
counsel received a copy of the Order. However, upon filing its motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, Security Bank attached another
copy of the Order of 1 February 1999. This time, the stamped date of receipt of
the Order shows that the Security Banks counsel received the Order on 10
February 1999.

When Security Bank furnished the Court of Appeals with the copy of the trial
courts Order bearing the stamped date of its receipt, it showed its willingness
to rectify its omission. Security Bank, in effect, substantially complied with the
Rules. In addition, the trial court would have dismissed the motion for
reconsideration outright if Security Bank had filed it late. The trial courts
Order of 3 November 1999 does not show that Security Bank filed the motion
for reconsideration out of time.

In the recent case of Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acua,

we held that "the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material
dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the
records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals
is the date of receipt of the trial courts order denying the motion for
reconsideration, which date is admittedly stated in the petition in the present
case. The other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the case if
reasonably evident. Thus, in this case the Court deems it proper to relax the
Rules to give all the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.
SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD and CECILIA TRINIDAD v. VICTOR ANG
G.R. No. 192898, January 31, 2011
(Date evident from the records)

A careful examination of the petition reveals that it stated the date when the
petitioners received a copy of the RTCs assailed order. In addition, the
petitioners failure to state the material date of filing the motion for
reconsideration is only a formal requirement that warrants the relaxation of the
rules in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of justice.

WILLIAM ENDELISEO BARROGA v. DATA CENTER COLLEGE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and WILFRED BACTAD
G.R. No. 174158, June 27, 2011
(Labor Case; evident in the records of the case)

The three material dates which should be stated in the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 are the dates when the notice of the judgment was received,
when a motion for reconsideration was filed and when the notice of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration was received. These dates should be reflected
in the petition to enable the reviewing court to determine if the petition was
filed on time. Indeed, petitioners petition before the CA stated only the date of
his receipt of the NLRCs Resolution denying his motion for partial
reconsideration. It failed to state when petitioner received the assailed NLRC
Decision and when he filed his partial motion for reconsideration. However,
this omission is not at all fatal because these material dates are reflected in
petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration attached as Annex "N" of the
petition. In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, we held that failure to state these two dates
in the petition may be excused if the same are evident from the records of the
case. It was further ruled by this Court that the more important material date
which must be duly alleged in the petition is the date of receipt of the
resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration. In the case at bar,
petitioner has duly complied with this rule.

LORRAINE D. BARRA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 205250, March 18, 2013
(Date evident from the records; More important dates were included)

The petitioners failure to state the date of receipt of the copy of the October 10,
2011 CSC decision is not fatal to her case since the dates are evident from the
records. Besides, we have ruled that the more important material date which
must be duly alleged in the petition is the date of receipt of the resolution of
denial of the motion for reconsideration, which the petitioner has duly
complied with.

SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL.

G.R. No. 180147, June 4, 2014
(Labor Case, Date evident from the records)

Xxx However, the strict requirements of the law may be dispensed with in the
interest of justice. It may not be amiss to point out this Courts ruling in the
case of Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, and we quote:

We also agree with the petitioner that failure to state the material dates is not
fatal to his cause of action, provided the date of his receipt, i.e., 9 May 2006, of
the RTC Resolution dated 18 April 2006 denying his Motion for
Reconsideration is duly alleged in his Petition. In the recent case of Great
Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acua, we held that "the failure to
comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be
excused since the dates are evident from the records." The more material date
for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial
court's order denying the motion for reconsideration. The other material dates
may be gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident.

In the instant case, the Corporations alleged in their petition before the Court
of Appeals that when they received the Resolution of the NLRC on 6 July 2006,
it can be determined whether the appeal to the Court of Appeals was filed
within the 60-day reglementary period. And as a matter of fact, the appeal was
filed on 8 September 2006, and well within the 60-day period.