[G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159.

January 16, 2004]

TERESITA S. DAVID, BENJAMIN S. DAVID,PACIFICO S. DAVID,

NEMESIO S. DAVID, CELINE S. DAVID, CRISTINA S. DAVID,
PAULINA S. DAVID, and LEONIE S. DAVID-DE LEON, petitioners,
vs. AGUSTIN RIVERA, respondent.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Claiming to be the owner of an eighteen thousand (18,000)-square meter portion

(hereafter, subject land) of Lot No. 38-B,[1] a five (5)-hectare lot situated at MacArthur
Highway, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, herein respondent Agustin Rivera filed on May
10, 1994 a Complaint [2] for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the Provincial Adjudication Board
(PARAB) of San Fernando, Pampanga against petitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino and
Consolacion David.[3] The respondent averred that the petitioners had been harassing
him for the purpose of making him vacate the subject land although it had already been
given to him sometime in 1957 by the parents of the petitioners as disturbance
compensation, in consideration of his renunciation of his tenurial rights over the original
eighteen (18)-hectare farmholding.
For their part, the petitioners filed a Complaint[4] for ejectment before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that
the respondent was occupying the subject land without paying rentals therefor. The
petitioners also averred that they need the subject land for their personal use but the
respondent refused to vacate it despite repeated demands.
In his Answer[5] to the ejectment complaint, the respondent asserted that the MCTC
had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the tenancy relationship between him and
the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners, as evidenced by the Certification [6] issued
by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Mabalacat, Pampanga. He likewise
reiterated his claim of ownership over the subject land and informed the court of the
complaint he had earlier filed before the PARAB.
On January 31, 1995, or during the pendency of the ejectment case, the PARAB
rendered its Decision[7] declaring the respondent as tenant of the land and ordering that
his peaceful possession thereof be maintained. Expectedly, the petitioners appealed the
PARAB Decision to the Department of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
On September 28, 1995, the MCTC rendered its Decision[8] ordering the respondent
to vacate the subject land. The court found that there was a dearth of evidence
supportive of the respondents claim that the land is agricultural or that it is devoted to
agricultural production. Further, it ruled that the petitioners as the registered owners
have a better right to possession of the subject land. The decretal portion of
the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of herein

plaintiffs and against herein defendant and any one claiming rights under him by
ordering the latter to:

(1) Vacate the subject premises and to peacefully turn over possession of the same to
the plaintiffs or to their authorized representatives;

(2) To pay the plaintiffs the amount of P720,000.00 as reasonable rentals in arrears as
of July, 1994 and to pay monthly rentals of P12,000.00 from August, 1994 up to the
time he (defendant) finally vacates the premises;

(3) To pay the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the
cost of the suit;

(4) Defendant(s) counterclaim is hereby DENIED for lack of proof.

SO ORDERED.

Without appealing the MCTC Decision but within the period to appeal, the
respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City a Petition[9] for
prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the
nullification of the MCTC Decision. The thrust of the petition was that the MCTC had no
jurisdiction as the issue before it was agrarian in nature.
On October 30, 1995, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order[10] enjoining
the petitioners from enforcing the MCTC Decision. Thereafter, it proceeded to hear the
respondents application for preliminary injunction. On November 29, 1995, the RTC
granted the motion and ordered the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction upon the
posting of bond in the amount of P500,000.00.[11]
On January 30, 1996, the petitioners filed their Answer[12] to the Petition for
prohibition in which they asserted that the MCTC could not be divested of its jurisdiction
by simply interposing the defense of tenancy. The petitioners also disputed the
respondents claim that he acquired the subject property by way of disturbance
compensation for the reason that in 1956, when the property was allegedly given, the
law providing for the payment of disturbance compensation was not yet in
effect. Moreover, the petitioners contended, no proof had been adduced evidencing the
conveyance of the property in favor of the respondent.
The case went to trial with the respondent as petitioner presenting his evidence in
chief. However, after the respondent had rested his case, the petitioners filed a Motion
to Dismiss[13]raising as grounds, inter alia: (1) that the extraordinary remedy of prohibition
could not be made a substitute for the available and speedy recourse of appeal; (2) the
jurisdiction of the MCTC of Mabalacat, Pampanga was legally vested, determined as it
was by the averments of the complaint in conformity with Rule 70 of the Rules of Court;
hence, the decision of the ejectment court was a legitimate and valid exercise of its
jurisdiction.
On February 25, 1998, the RTC issued an Order[14] denying the motion to
dismiss. The court ruled that the motion, which was filed after the presentation of the
plaintiffs evidence, partakes of a demurrer to evidence which under Section 1, Rule 33
of the Rules of Court, [15] may be granted only upon a showing that the plaintiff has
shown no right to the relief prayed for.Noting that the evidence presented by the
petitioner establishes an issue which is addressed to [the] court for resolution. . .
whether or not the respondent court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
filed before it, the RTC ruled that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper. The
petitioners moved for reconsideration[16] but was denied in an Order[17] dated June 23,
1998.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari[18] in the Court of
Appeals. On September 3, 1999, the appellate court rendered a Decision,[19] finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the motion to dismiss, as
well as the motion for reconsideration of its order. The appellate court ratiocinated that
the order of denial is merely interlocutory and hence cannot be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In addition, it held that issues raised in
the petition for prohibition were genuine and substantial, necessitating the presentation
of evidence by both parties.
The petitioners now come before us, seeking the nullification of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. At the crux of the petition is the issue of whether the denial of the
motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted with grave abuse of
discretion.
In the Resolution of October 4, 1999,[20] we denied the petition for failure of the
petitioners to accompany the same with a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified
true copy of the assailed decision. The petitioners filed a new petition primarily on the
basis of Philippine Airlines v. Confesor,[21] where this Court held that a petition dismissed
under Circular No. 1-88[22]may be filed again as a new petition as long as it is done within
the reglementary period. In the Resolution[23] of March 8, 2000, we allowed the re-filing of
the petition and required the respondent to comment thereon.
In his Comment,[24] the respondent counters that the RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss inasmuch as the MCTC had no
jurisdiction to render the assailed judgment. He points out that the PARAB had already
declared him the owner of the land and that the PARAB decision was affirmed by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in its Decision[25] dated
March 6, 2000.
We deny the petition.
 At the outset, it may be well to point out that certiorari does not lie to review an
interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in the form of a demurrer to
evidence filed after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case. Being
interlocutory, an order denying a demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither can it
be the subject of a petition for certiorari. After such denial, the petitioners should present
their evidence and if the decision of the trial judge would be adverse to them, they could
raise on appeal the same issues raised in the demurrer.[26] However, it is also settled that
the rule admits of an exception, i.e., when the denial of a demurrer is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27]
Thus, the petitioners submit that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in denying the demurrer. They insist that appeal, not prohibition, is the proper remedy to
question the judgment of the MCTC and that the question of jurisdiction is one of law
which may be ruled upon without the evidence of the parties.
We are not convinced. We uphold the Court of Appeals.
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition to correct what he
perceived was an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC. Indeed, the
propriety of the recourse to the RTC for a writ of prohibition is beyond cavil in view of
the following considerations:
First. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, where two tribunals
exercised jurisdiction over two cases involving the same subject matter, issue, and
parties, and ultimately rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for
prohibition. The MCTC manifestly took cognizance of the case for ejectment pursuant to
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[28] as amended. On the other hand, the
ratiocination of the DARAB, which the respondent echoes, is that the case falls squarely
within its jurisdiction as it arose out of, or was connected with, agrarian relations. The
respondent also points out that his right to possess the land, as a registered tenant, was
submitted for determination before the PARAB prior to the filing of the case for
ejectment.
Indeed, Section 50 of R.A. 6657[29] confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters. [30] In the process of
reorganizing the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A[31] created the DARAB to assume the
powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform
cases.[32] Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure enumerates the cases
falling within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, which is quoted
hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at bar:

Section 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The board
shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act no. 6657,
Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but
not be limited to cases involving the following:

a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical engaged in the
management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and
other agrarian laws;

...

g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946,
except sub-paragraph (Q) thereof and Presidential Decree No. 815.

It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with
the DARAB after August 29, 1987.

Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No.

6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988
and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive
prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the
Secretary of the DAR.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that the existence of prior
agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the
previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the controversy as an agrarian
dispute. Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.[33] Even if the tenurial
arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident arising from the
landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former
landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed to have been given as compensation in
consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian
dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled:

Indeed, section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases involving the
dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and
disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This
jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and
tenant at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises,
precisely from the previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed
immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is
whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute
otherwise springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the
litigation is (then) cognizable only by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . . [34]

As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly
vested in the DAR, through the DARAB.
With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it follows that the
respondent has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the special
civil action of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford
relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, [35] or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained.[36] The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits
of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. [37]
Second. While appeal is the recognized remedy to question the judgment of an
inferior court, this does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of
prohibition to restrain the inferior court, among other instances, from proceeding further
on the ground that it heard and decided the case without jurisdiction. [38] Since the right to
prohibition is defeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by
appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy
or adequate.[39]
To say, as the petitioners argue, that the MCTC Decision has already attained
finality because the respondent opted to file a petition for prohibition instead of an
appeal is to sacrifice needlessly respondents right at the altar of technicalities. Should
tenancy relationship be duly proven, the respondent as a tenant should be protected in
keeping with the social justice precept enshrined in the Constitution. [40] Also noteworthy
is the fact that the petition for prohibition was filed within the reglementary period to
appeal; hence, it cannot be claimed that the same was used as substitute for a lost
appeal.
At this point, let it be stressed that we are not passing upon the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of prohibition in favor of the respondent. As we have earlier pointed
out, adjudication on this matter is best left to the RTC, where the case for prohibition
pends, after the reception of the evidence of both parties.
Third. We cannot also sustain the petitioners assertion that jurisdiction is a question
of law; hence, the RTC could have ruled on the matter without the reception of the
parties evidence.The very issue determinative of the question of jurisdiction is
the real relationship existing between the parties. It is necessary that evidence
thereon be first presented by the parties before the question of jurisdiction may be
passed upon by the court.
 It should be pointed out that the petitioners elevated to the appellate court
the Order of the RTC denying their motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence. A
demurrer to evidence is an objection by one party to the adequacy of the evidence of
his adversary to make out a case. Otherwise stated, the party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict.[41] In this case, the trial court ruled
that respondents evidence in support of his application for a writ of prohibition was
sufficient to require the presentation of petitioners contravening proof. The RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in so ruling.
The Court of Appeals is therefore correct in upholding the lower courts denial of the
petitioners motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., no part.

[1]
Covered by TCT No. 47588-R, Rollo, p. 37.
[2]
Docketed as DARAB Case No. 664 P94.
[3]
Nemecio, Teresita, Benjamin, Celine, Pacifico,, Cristina, Paulina, Marcelo, and Leonie, all surnamed
David.
[4]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 1106, Rollo, pp. 48-54.
[5]
Id., at pp. 55-58.
[6]
Rollo, p. 39. The pertinent portion of the Certification reads:
This is to certify that Mr. Agustin Rivera is one of the original and registered tenant(s) of the late Cristino
David et.al. cultivating an area of ten (10) hectares of rice land more or less, situated at Gasdam,
Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
This is to certify further that he is presently occupying and possessing 1.8 hectares of agricultural land
allegedly given by the owner as his disturbance compensation which he developed, fence(d),
shifted to piggery and hollow blocks making, located at Gasdam, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 502-510.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 307-310.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 381-392.
[10]
Id., at p. 96.
[11]
Id., at pp. 98-101.
[12]
Id., at pp. 150-155.
[13]
Id., at pp. 108-115.
[14]
Id., at p. 117.
[15]
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.
[16]
See Motion for Reconsideration, Rollo, pp119-120.
[17]
Rollo, p. 121.
[18]
Id., at pp. 122-135.
[19]
Id., at pp. 136-145, Per Dacudao, R., J., with Austria-Martinez, A. and Valdez, Jr., S., JJ., concurring.
[20]
Rollo, p. 148.
[21]
G.R. No. 111480, March 10, 1994, 231 SCRA 41.
[22]
Circular on Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and Complementing
Administrative Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988 on Expeditious Disposition of Cases Pending in
the Supreme Court.
[23]
Rollo, p. 150.
[24]
Id., at pp. 347-377.
[25]
Id., at pp. 513-518.
[26]
See Cruz v. People, 228 Phil. 652 (1986); People v. Court of Appeals, 204 Phil. 511 (1982); Joseph v.
Villaluz, G.R. Nos. L-46329-30, April 10, 1979, 89 SCRA 324; People v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-
33492, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 453; Mercado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44001, June
10, 1988, 162 SCRA 75; Bautista v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-45137, September 23, 1985, 138
SCRA 587, 594; Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56614, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378;
De Vera v. Pineda, G.R.No. 96333, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 434; Gold City Integrated Port
Services, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 71771-73, March 31, 1989, 171 SCRA
579.
[27]
See Ong v. People, G.R. No. 140904, 342 SCRA 372, October 9, 2000; Gutib v. CA, 371 Phil. (1999).
[28]
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
...
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases for forcible entry and unlawful detainer x x x .
[29]
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
[30]
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, x x x
[31]
Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for Other Purposes.
[32]
Section 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. There is hereby created an Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. x x x The Board shall assume the powers
and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive Order No.
229 and this Executive Order.
[33]
Sec. 3 (d), Republic Act 6657.
[34]
Basilio v. De Guzman, et.al., 105 Phil. 1276 (1959).
[35]
See Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 98310, October 24, 1996,
263 SCRA 490.
[36]
See Magallanes v. Sarita, 129 Phil. 1158 (1966); Commissioner of Immigration v. Go Tieng, 138 Phil.
247 (1969).
[37]
See Vergara v. Ruque, G.R. No. L-32984, August 26, 1977, 78 SCRA 312; Strong v. Castro, G.R. No.
L-63658, June 29, 1985, 137 SCRA 322.
[38]
See Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, 354 Phil. 211 (1998).
[39]
See Provident International Resources v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119328, July 26, 1996, 259
SCRA 510.
[40]
CONST. article XIII, sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. x x
x
[41]
Gutib v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131209. August 13, 1999, 312 SCRA 365.