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Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

People vs. Silvestre and Atienza People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana
Silvestre and Martin Atienza, defendants-appellants.Villareal, December 14, 1931

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:

Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage

Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan

On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn complaint
for adultery

After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president of
Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint

The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in
Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)

On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the justice of
the peace dismissed the adultery case

The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Nio, in Paombong

About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in Santo
Nio and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves)

Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas

On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were gathered
after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he was
going to set fire to it

He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had
instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana

Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him

Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late

The fire destroyed about 48 houses

Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire

The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of cadena
temporal)

Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)

The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI decision with
regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:

The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice

The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at least, of
reasonable doubt

Issue:

Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice

Holding:

No.

Ratio:

Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does not take
a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor
cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.

In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an agreement
to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do
not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to
commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does
not make her liable as an accomplice.

Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14 of
the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to
which one has kept silent

Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who
is acquitted.
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

G.R. No. L-32126 The People of the Philippines vs Nemesio Talingdan, Teresa Domogma, et al.

July 6, 1978 Per curiam (Barredo, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur)

FACTS:

On the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in
their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of the
place. For sometime, however, their relationship had pdf

been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and
each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis
Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits
Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go down the house and
leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was going on between
Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that
should she get pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed,
Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of more than three (3) weeks, and
Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra
during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before he was gunned down, Bernardo and
Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the latter went down the house
and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of
Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a
policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo
that someday he would kin him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning,
Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa,
meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a
small hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached
them, she heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed
the presence of her daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".

ISSUES:

Whether or not Teresa Domogma was rightly convicted as an accessory to the crime.

RULING:

Yes, Teresa Domogma was rightly convicted as an accessory to the crime. Her subsequent acts of her
constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as
an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. With the above
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias,
Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without
any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be executed in
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant
Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties
of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants

Hence, the Supreme Court sentenced to DEATH Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras
and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating
circumstance to offset them to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

MANUEL VS. PEOPLE G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005

Petitioner: Eduardo P. Manuel Respondent: People of the Philippines Ponente: J. Callejo, Sr.

Facts:

November 7, 2001, complaint was filed in the RTC of Baguio City. The following facts were presented:

(a) On April 22, 1996, Baguio City, Philippines, Eduardo P. Manuel, respondent, contracted a second
marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel, complainant, in RTC of Baguio City. It so appeared in the
marriage contract that Manuel was single.

(b) Eduardo P. Manuel was previously legally married to Rubylus Gana without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved before the second marriage.

(c) Tina Gandalera-Manuel did not know the existence of the first marriage of the respondent to Rubylus
Gana.

(d) On July 28, 1975, Makati, Eduardo was married to Ruby.

(e) On January 1996, Eduardo met Tina in Dagupan City. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio to visit her
and he proposed assuring her that he was single.

(f) Starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a
year.

(g) Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. He stopped giving
financial support.

(h) Sometime in August 2001, Tina learned that Eduardo had been previously married.
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

(i) Eduardo testified that he declared that he was single because he believed in good faith that his
marriage was invalid. He said he did not know he had to go to the court to seek for nullification of his
first marriage before marrying Tina. Ruby was jailed and he had not heard from her for more than 20
years.

On July 2, 2002, RTC found Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy under Article 349 of the
RPC, and sentenced him an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as
minimum to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant, Tina
Gandalera, the amount of P200,000 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.

Manuel appealed the decision to the CA. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the RPC, there
must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He posited that the RTC should have taken
into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification to
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision coreccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and affirmation in all other respect, as to the
penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of
bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply.

Issues:

The issues of the petition are:

(1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioners first wife
cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration
of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code; and

(2) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of P200,000 as
moral damages as it had no basis in fact and in law.

Held:

(1) No. The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy
is misplaced. The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, is created
by law and arises without necessity of judicial declaration. However, Article 41, of the Family Code,
which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, provides that for the purpose of contracting
a subsequent marriage (under its preceding paragraph), the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

(2) No. The Court rules against the petitioner. The petitioner is liable to the private complainant for
moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The Court thus
declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine, and subvert the family as
a social institution, good morals, and the interest, and general welfare of society. Because the private
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral
damages. Even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery as held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald.

People vs. Puno (Crim1) People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias
"Beloy," and Enrique Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants
Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent
Facts:

January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there)
arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC

He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will
temporarily take his place

When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's
Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving

After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver

Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her

Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused

But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a
check for P100,000

Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check

Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the
car again towards Pampanga

According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because according to
her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car

The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo,
he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car

He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway

Issue:

Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged

Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Holding:

No.

No.

Ratio:

There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they
committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under
the compulsion of threats or intimidation.

For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to
deprive the offended party of her liberty

In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another
offense primarily intended by the offenders

This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention

Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands
were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate
to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law
on highway robbery)

PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately
against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a
predetermined or particular victim

The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a highway
does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case

This is not justified by the accused's intention

Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision


correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual
damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

Criminal Law- People vs. Delim

This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code "the act of one is the act of all"

G.R. No. 142773 28January2003

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the
appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto
Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are related for modesto is an
adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the
house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both
armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and
alibi as their evidence against the charge.

*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.

appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed
with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:

TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:

a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity

to defend himself
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted

in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed
and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto
was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.

Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three
took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:

APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)

US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1) The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts:

The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province

Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho

"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building

No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of
the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building

This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height

The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room

He called out twice, "Who is there?"

He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room

The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual

Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded

Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and ran back to
his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds

Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day

The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that the door and acquaint his
companion with his identity

The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because of
repeated robberies in Fort McKinley

Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual
was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite the defendant's
warnings

Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating)
circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by
law

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible

Holding:

No.

Ratio:

By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief, he will
not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was
actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)

The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith

"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"

The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist

"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide

The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense

He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into
his mistake as to the facts

RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

People vs. Oanis (Crim1) The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Antonio Z. Oanis and
Alberto Galanta, defendant-appellants.

Facts:

Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were instructed by the Constabulary
Provincial Inspector to arrest the escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, with bailarina named Irene, and if
overpowered, to get him dead or alive.

Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada Mallare
where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour.

Oanis and Galanta then went to the room and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the
door, they simultaneously fired at him.

Shocked by the entire scene, Irene fainted.

It turned out later that the man shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent man named Serapio
Tecson, Irene's paramour.

Issue: Whether or not Oanis and Galanta can be held responsible for Tecson's death.

Held: Yes

Ratio:

No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall
not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. A peace officer cannot claim
exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary or unreasonable force in making an arrest.

Through impatience of desire to take chances, Oanis and Galanta have exceeded in the fulfillment of
their duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and
without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

Padilla vs. Dizon (Crim1) Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.

Facts:

Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that
Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least
the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.

Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle
foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.

An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No.
960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.

Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit or attempt to
take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an authorization by the
Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. Tourists and
non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at
points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale of
foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty
of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal
(minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00.

At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he had come to
the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his business associates, and that he
and his business associates declared all the money they brought in and all declarations were handed to
and kept by him.

Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his business
associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.

Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for
acquitting Lo Chi Fai.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the
law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution
must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.

Held:
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

Yes.

Ratio:

Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in
the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such foreign
exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial,
and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other people.

In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to Lo
Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is
nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the
said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

Magno vs. CA (Crim1) Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the
Philippines, respondents.

Facts:

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.

VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party
who could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no
sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:
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No

Ratio:

To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own
account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

Arsenia Garcia vs Court of Appeals

484 SCRA 617 Criminal Law Felonies Mala In Se vs Mala Prohibita Crimes Defense of Good Faith

In 1995, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., ran for the senatorial elections.

Meanwhile, in Alaminos, Pangasinan, Arsenia Garcia was one of the designated election officers. Garcia
was accused by Pimentel of violating the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. Pimentel alleged that Garcia
decreased Pimentels vote by 5,000 votes.

The trial court found Garcia guilty. On appeal, Garcia invoked that the trial court erred in ruling that her
defense of good faith was not properly appreciated. She averred that due to the workload given to her
during said elections, she got fatigued and that caused the error in the tabulation of Pimentels votes.

Pimentel argued that the Electoral Reforms Law is a special law hence it is a malum prohibitum law and
therefore, good faith is not a defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged violation of Garcia of the Electoral Reforms Law is a malum
prohibitum.

HELD: No. Generally, mala in se crimes refer to those felonies in violation of the Revised Penal Code.
However, it must be noted that mala in se are crimes which are inherently immoral. Hence, even if the
crime is punished by a special law, if it is inherently immoral, then it is still a crime mala in se.

In this case, the said violation of the Electoral Reforms Law is a mala in se crime because it is inherently
immoral to decrease the vote of a candidate. Note also that what is being punished is the intentional
decreasing of a candidates votes and not those arising from errors and mistakes. Since a violation of this
special law is a malum in se, good faith can be raised as a defense.

However, Garcias defense of good faith was not proven. Facts show that the decreasing of Pimentels
vote was not due to error or mistake. It was shown that she willingly handled certain duties which were
not supposed to be hers to perform. Thats a clear sign that she facilitated the erroneous entry.
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

Criminal Law- People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2) OF THE R.P.C.
"A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it."
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment."
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor)
as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.

Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to
sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario
Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they
were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took
a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do
the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the
same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal
responsibilities of the accused?

There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting
at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun
of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is
liable only for the act that was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.

Criminal Responsibilities:
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PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising
from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. -
GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying
circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED
to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.

Ivler vs. San Pedro G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010 Bill of Rights

FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the
charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for
certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the
arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of
this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES: 1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when
the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
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2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings
in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent
Ponces husband.

RULING:

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the
prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses,
whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection
of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying
as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article
48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

Petition granted.
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People v. Guillen GR No. L-1477, January 18, 1950

FACTS:

The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the President of the Philippines, Manuel
Roxas on March 10, 1947.During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing
candidate of Manuel Roxas. According to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter for failing to
redeem and fulfil promises made by President Roxas during the elections. Consequently, the accused
determined to assassinate the President and found the opportunity to do so on the night of March 10,
1947 when the President attended a popular meeting by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo,
Manila. Guillen first intended to use a revolver to accomplish his goal but he had previously lost his
licensed firearm, so he thought of using two hand grenades which were given to him by an American
soldier in exchange for two bottles of whisky. The accused stood on the chair he had been sitting on and
hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech. A general who was on
the platform saw the smoking grenade and kicked it away from the platform towards an open space
where he thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of a
group of persons standing close to the platform and grenade fragments seriously injured Simeon Varela,
who died the next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and several other persons. Guillen was
arrested and he readily admitted his responsibility.

ISSUE: WON the accused was guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the
death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to the other injured persons.

HELD: The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In throwing the hand
grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice and is
therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As provided by Art. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. As held by the
Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence. Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered reckless imprudence. The sentence of the trial court is affirmed by unanimous
vote and death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code

Criminal Law: People v Sabalones

294 SCRA 751, August 31, 1998


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling," ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, TEODULO ALEGARBES and
EUFEMIO CABANERO, accused, ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling" and ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA,
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accused-appellants.
Fact: Beronga, Sabalones, Alegarbes, and Cabanero were convicted after a shooting incident in Cebu in
1985 which led to the death of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries of Nelson Tiempo,
Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. The victims were asked to bring the car of a certain Stephen Lim who
also attended a wedding party. Nelson Tiempo drove the car with Rogelio Presores. Alfredo Nardo drove
the owner-type jeep along with Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo to aid the group back to the party after
parking the car at Lims house. When they reached the gate, they were met with a sudden burst of
gunfire. The accused were identified as the gunmen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Sabalones and Beronga appealed.
Crime Committed: Two counts of murder, and three counts of frustrated murder
Contention of the People: Prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores testified about the
shooting and identified the faces of the accused. Presores was riding in the car that is behind the jeep.
He positively identified Sabalones as one of the gunmen. When the gunmen fired at the car, driver
Nelson Tiempo immediately maneuvered and arrived at Major Juan Tiempos house from which they
have escaped death.
Contention of the Accused: Accused-appellants Sabalones and Beronga denied their presence during the
commission of the crime. Sabalones presented numerous witnesses who stated that he was sound
asleep when the incident took place [since he got tired watching over his brothers wake]. While
Beronga testified that he attended a cock-derby in Cebu, and was fetched by his wife at 7 pm, arrived
home by 10:30 pm to sleep. Sabalones even escaped from place to place to flee from the wrath of Maj.
Juan Tiempo, the father of the two victims. The defense even pointed out errors from the testimonies of
the witnesses arguing that the place where the incident happened is dim and not lighted.
RULING: The appeal is DENIED. Costs against appellants.
Issue 1: Whether the prosecution witnesses and evidences are credible?
Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated testimonies of two witnesses. There was
positive identification by survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls in gunfire. The place
was well-lit, whether from post of cars headlights. The extrajudicial confession has no bearing because
the conviction was based on positive identification. It is binding though to the co-accused because it is
used as cirmustancial evidence corroborated by one witness. The inconcistencies are minor and
inconsequential which strengthen credibility of testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus [mistake in
blow], mistake does not diminish culpability; same gravity applies, more proper to use error in personae.
Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.
Issue 2: Whether the alibis are acceptable?
No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by positive identification. Using the case of
People v. Nescio, Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short distance from the scene
of the crime. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt.
Issue 3:Whether the correct penalty is imposed?
No. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, to
death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA erred in
computing the penalty for each of the three counts of frustrated murder. Under Article 50 of the RPC,
the penalty for frustrated felony is next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
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consummated felony. Because there are no mitigating or aggravating conspiracy between the two
accused. It does not matter that the prosecution has failed to show who was between the two who
actually pulled the trigger that killed the child. They are liable as co-conspirators since the act of a
conspirator becomes the act of another regardless of the precise degree of participation in the act.
Also there was a presence of treachery, because of the circumstances that the crime was done at night
time and that the accused hid themselves among the bamboo. Evident premeditation is also an
aggravating circumstance [the accused had planned to kill the victim some days before].

Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan vs Mariano Medina

Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano Medina from Cavite to
Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving fast and when he applied the brakes it cause
the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some passengers were able to free themselves
from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was
dark, the villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be
helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which
engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the
tires of the bus were old.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of
the torches which ignited the gasoline.

HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of
the driver because he was speeding and also he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet
he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be
helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from
the passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source
of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor
failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.

WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?

Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
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Result is different from what was intended

PEOPLE vs ILIGAN

FACTS:

At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo Quinones and his companions ZaldyAsis and Felix Lukban were
walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio fiesta. On the way they met the
accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew EdmundoAsis and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them
aside prompting Zaldy Asis to boxhim. Felix quickly said that they had no desire to fight. Upon seeing his
nephew fall,Fernando Iligan drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed.Terrified the trio
ran, pursued by the three accused. They ran for a good while andeven passed the house of Quinones,
when they noticed that they were no longer beingchased the three decided to head back to Quinones
house. On the way back the threeaccused suddenly emerged from the road side, Fernando Iligan then
hacked Quinones Jr.on the forehead with his bolo causing him to fall down. Felix and Zaldy ran.
Uponreturning they saw that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his head busted.The postmortem
examination report and the death certificate indicates that thevictim died of shock and massive
cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular accident.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused are liable for the victims death given that it was dueto a vehicular accident
and not the hacking.

HELD: YES.

We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed after Quinones, Jr. hadfallen from the bolo hacking
perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. Thisfinding, however, does not in any way exonerate
Iligan from liability for the death of Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the RPC which states that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done
bedifferent from that which he intended.The essential requisites of Art 4 are: that an intentional felony
has been committed andthat the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct natural and logical
consequenceof the felony committed by the offender

It is held that the essential elements are present in this case. The intentional felonycommitted was the
hacking of the head of Quinones the fact that it was consideredsuperficial by the physician is immaterial.
The location of the wound intended to do awaywith
him.The hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles pass anymoment, the
hacking blow received by Quinones weakened him and was run over by avehicle. The hacking by Iligan is
thus deemed as the proximate cause of the victimsdeath.Iligan is held liable for homicide absent any
qualifying circumstances
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Urbano v. IAC

Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place
where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the
elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass.
Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on
the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980,
Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On
November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The
doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm.
He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial
court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit
of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation
canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latters death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days.
Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the
time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not
yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected
by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
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The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of
his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure
to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992 Intod v CA


FACTS:
February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at
Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness

ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)

HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner
guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:


xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions
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riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.


The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability
to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet
and finds the pocket empty
United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment -
attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any crime

People vs Saladino (07 March 2001) en banc

(Topic: Impossible crime, Art 4 Par 2 of RPC)

Ponente: Bellosillo

FACTS:

Lourdes Relevo is the niece of the accused-appellant Conrado Saladino. (Her mother and
Conrados wife, Rosita, are sisters.)
In 1995, Lourdes (who was then 13) was sent by her parents (from Balayan, Batangas) to live
with Conrado and Rosita Saladino in Pasig because her own parents cannot send her to school.
Rosita gave Lourdes weekly allowance while Lourdes helped doing household chores.
Saldinos lived in a two-storey house in Rosario, Pasig with spouses Zaldy and Corazon Cedeo
with three children and three boarders. There were three rooms separated only by curtains. The
Saladinos slept on a bed while Lourdes slept on a mattress on the floor.
September 1995-Conrado woke Lourdes up (from the mattress on the floor; she was feeling
sick) to make her transfer to the bed.
Rosita was about to go to work (10pm-6am shift at the factory). Conrado conducted (what a
verb for hinatid, haha) her to the jeepney stop and returned to the room after about 15mins.
(Will make this as clinical as possible, craaaaaaaaap) He laid down beside Lourdes. 25mins later,
he fondles her breasts. Poked kitchen knife at her waist, threatened to kill her if she shouted.
Dropped knife, pinned Lourdess hands to her belly, removed her shorts and underwear with his
free hand. Removed his own shorts and underwear, went on top of her, inserted penis into
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vagina. Lourdes struggled and he slipped out a few times, he re-inserted every time. Shit (bestial
movements) went on for about 50mins, accdg to Lourdes.
She was able to push him away; he warned her not to tell anyone or else he would kill her.
Lourdes told Rosita, Rosita did not believe her. Lourdes told Corazon Cedeo. Corazon made the
Saladinos leave.
After sometime, Rosita invites Lourdes back to the new house. Lourdes goes back because she
wanted to finish school and she needed money.
17 Dec 1996, 7am. Lourdes was sleeping in the living room. Conrado held her at knifepoint,
threatened her to silence. He forced sex again; she cried and struggled but her efforts were in
vain.
Lourdes told Rosita, she didnt believe her again. Lourdes told Corazon, Corazon advised her to
wait for her mother (Elena), who was spending Christmas in Manila. Lourdes could not tell her
mother. Elena spent 11 days in Pasig. On 28 Dec 1996, all four went to Batangas.
1 Jan 97, Lourdes and the Saladinos went back to Pasig. 2 Jan 97, 7am, Conrado raped Lourdes
again. 3 Jan 97, Conrado attempts to rape Lourdes again. He dropped the knife, Lourdes was
able to free herself from his grasp and she kicked him. She ran to the bathroom and stayed
there until he left the house. She packed her clothes and went to Corazons house. She also told
her mother about the sexual abuse and Elena brought Lourdes home to Batangas.
Elena had Lourdes examined. Not a virgin anymore. They filed a case in Pasig City Prosecutors
office. Lourdes underwent another physical exam; it was revealed that she had deep-healed
lacerations.

Testimony of the Accused

1995 Sept, Conrado alleged that he was drunk. Said Lourdes was aware of what was happening
but she did not show a reaction.
Said they left the old house because they did not have privacy.
When Lourdes followed the Saladinos in their new home, Saladino said he avoided contact
with Lourdes but he said she was seducing him (parang tinutukso niya akofeeling mo lang
yan, koya). Said he gave in and fondled her at least once a week; kissed her everyday before
going to work. Said he did not have sex with her since he was afraid shed get pregnant. Said
Lourdes gets angry when he didnt have sex with her.

Lower court meted Saladino 3 death penalties, along with moral damages and indemnity.

ISSUES:

Which of the two narrations deserve greater weight? (In other words, who should the court
believe?)
In relation to the topic at hand, was Saladino liable for an impossible crime (recall how the
fourth time did not happen)? (What is an impossible crime?)

RULING/RATIO:
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II

The SC believed Lourdes, based on the fact that she was candid, straightforward, and firm.
Saladino was said to be evasive and uncertain. (In other words, SC judged based on body
actions.) SC also went on about how humiliating this experience was but she still went for it
(wtf, diba lang. And this case was in 2001!). This case was judged based on the credibility of
Lourdes.
On the topic of impossible crime, recall par (2) of Art 4 which defines impossible crimes:
- (1) act performed would be an offense against persons or property
- (2) act was done with evil intent
- (3) its accomplishment is inherently impossible or that the means employed are either
inadequate or ineffectual
- (4) the act performed should not violate any other provision in the RPC
Answers to the requisites of impossible crime:
(1) It was a crime against persons
(2) It was done with evil intent
(3) On the question of WoN the means employed were inadequate or ineffectual:
The 4th time, Saladino once again forced Lourdes (like how he did for the first three
times) but she was able to get away. I think this constitutes frustrated rape. A frustrated felony
is when the means employed were adequate, but the result is different from that which is
intended. Meaning, in this case, Saladino forced her (adequate means) but she got away (result
different from what was expected, given the adequate means). Take this with a grain of salt,
though. Since this is my own interpretation and Im not sure what Im talking about just yet, I
really think I might be wrong.
(4) Dont know the RPC provisions yet.

Interesting note: All 14 justices of the SC concurred with this Decision.

JACINTO vs PEOPLE

GEMMA JACINTO vs PEOPLE


G.R. NO. 162540 13July2009 592SCRA26

FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a post dated checked
worth P10,000 as payment for Babys purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc. The said check was
deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitles husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for
Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph
Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had already
paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a
criminal case for qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.
Kriz Abeja | Crim Case Digests II
RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5)
months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime.
HELD: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioners act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as continuation of the Theft.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:

1. That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or property;


2. That the act was alone with evil intent; and
3. That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the
acts to consummate that crime of theft had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an
impossible crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto mayor and pay courts.