32. Diana Ramos vs. Atty. Jose R.
Imbang AND PROMOTE RESPECTFOR THE LAW AND
AC No. 6788; August23, 2007
Facts : This case is about the disbarment or Suspension
against Atty. JoseR. Imbang for multiple violations
of the Code of Profess ional Responsibility.
1992, Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Imbang in
filing civil andcriminal actions against the spouses Roque
and ElenitaJovellanos. She gave Imbang P8, 500 as
attorney's fees but the latter issued areceipt for P5,000
only.Ramos tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her
cases againstthe Jovellanoses. Imbang never allowed
her to enter thecourtroom and always told her to wait
outside. He would thencome out after several hours
toinform her that the hearing hadbeen cancelled and
rescheduled. This happened six times and foreach
appearance in court, respondent charged her
P350.Ramos was shocked to learn that Imbang
never filed any caseagainst the Jovellanoses and that
he was in fact employed in thePublic Attorney's Office
(PAO)
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Imbang should be disbarred.
HELD: YES, as per SCs decision Lawyers are
expected to conduct themselves with honesty and
integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government
service are expected to be more conscientious of their
actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are
not only members of the bar but also public servants who
owe utmost fidelity to public service.
The SC supported this with three explanations:
1. Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition
to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed inthe Constitution and existing laws,
the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared unlawful (b) Outside employment and other
activities related thereto, public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not (1) Engage in the private
practice of profession unless authorizedby the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice
will notconflict with their official function. In this
instance, Imbang received P5,000 from the
complainant andissued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while
he was still connected with thePAO. Acceptance of money
from a client establishes an attorney-clientrelationship.
2. Revised Administrative Code Section 14(3), Chapter
5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:oThe PAO shall be the principal law office
of the Government in extending free legal assistance
to indigent persons in criminal, civil,labor, administrative
and other quasi-judicial cases. As a PAO lawyer, Imbang
should not have accepted attorney's fees fromthe
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's
mission.
3. Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides:o CANON 1.
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION,OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
LEGAL PROCESSES. Every lawyer is obligated to
uphold the law. This undertaking includesthe observance
of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated
byImbang when he accepted the complainant's
cases and receivedattorney's fees in consideration of
his legal services. Consequently, Imbang's acceptance
of the cases was also a breach ofRule 18.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility because
theprohibition on the private practice of profession
disqualified him fromacting as Ramos' counsel.
33) Gisela Huyssen vs. Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez
March 24, 2006 A.C. No. 6707
FACTS: This treats of a Complaint[1] for Disbarment filed
by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez. Complainant alleged that in 1995, while
respondent was still connected with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and her three
sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine
Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law.
Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa
applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they
needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of
one year which could be withdrawn after one year.
Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law,
complainant deposited with respondent on six different
occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of
US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as
proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the
complainant but refused to give her copies of official
receipts despite her demands. After one year, complainant
demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who
assured her that said amount would be returned.When
respondent failed to return the sum deposited, the World
Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member)
sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate
return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999,
respondent promised to release the amount not later than
9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his promise, the
World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In
response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter
dated 19 March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for
the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed
two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999
and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When
complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due
dates, the same were dishonored because respondent
had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter,
respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April
1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment on the
checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with
the assurance that said checks would be honored.
Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their
due dates but they were all dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was
ordered stopped by respondent. After respondent made
several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited
amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who
sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand
letters remained unheeded.
Thus, a complaint[2] for disbarment was filed by
complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Yes. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors
that respondent should be severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official task
have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice.
Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned
in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.[7]
It is undisputed that respondent admitted[8] having
received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by
his signatures in the petty cash vouchers[9] and
receipts[10] he prepared, on the false representation that
that it was needed in complainants application for visa with
the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said
amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to
a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and
children in their application for visa in the BID.[11]Such
defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit
evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty.
Mendoza already died, he did not present the death
certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of
respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has
been naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent but
downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of
the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him.[12] He must show
proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the case
at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records
show that even though he was given the opportunity to
answer the charges and controvert the evidence against
him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any
plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the
case was set for reception of his evidence despite due
notice.
Respondents act of asking money from complainant in
consideration of the latters pending application for visas is
violative of Rule 1.01[17] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.02[18] of the Code which bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private interest.
Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office or which may be affected by the
functions of his office.[19] Respondents conduct in office
betrays the integrity and good moral character required
from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high
public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only
to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent
miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended
by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so.[27]
34) Ruthie Lim-Santiago vs Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
AC No. 6705, March 31, 2006
FACTS: This is a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition
against private practice of law while working as
government prosecutor.
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc.
until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.
Ruthie Lim- Santiago contends that respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the
former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well
Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat
employees. Furthermore, complainant claims that
respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even
harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede
and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.
Also, the complainant contends that respondent is guilty of
engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence
to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainers
fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16
another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17
and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. .
Respondent asserts that no conflicting interests exist
because he was not representing Taggat employees or
complainant. Respondent claims he was merely
performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor. Respondent argues that complainant failed to
establish that respondents act was tainted with personal
interest, malice and bad faith. Respondent denies
complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of the
cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees.
Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof
because complainant failed to mention the names of the
employees or present them for cross-examination.
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his
appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees
from complainant but claims that itwas only on a case-to-
case basis and it ceased in 1996. Respondent contends
that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and
not for representation. Respondent submits that
consultation is not the same as representation and that
rendering consultancy services is not prohibited.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
IBP Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation
("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests,
failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating
the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of
three years suspension from the practice of law.
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal
Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly
handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat.
Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the
employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly
dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-
240. The issues, therefore, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to
the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in
that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or
"consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being
an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal
consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government
prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private
practice of law. The act of being a legal consultant is a
practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do
any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal
profession.It covers any activity, in or out of court, which
required the application of law, legal principles, practice or
procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience.
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Respondent should be found
guilty of conflict of interest
2. Whether or not the respondent violated the
prohibition against the private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor.
HELD
1. No. Complainants evidence failed to substantiate
the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests.
One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection
or previous employment. In essence, what a lawyer owes
his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when
respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the
criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The
issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of
wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat
during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting
interests, evidence must be presented to prove that
respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous
employment. The only established participation
respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is
that he was the one who conducted the preliminary
investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily
follow that respondent used any confidential information
from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat
in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case
he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related
is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for
representing conflicting interests. A lawyers immutable
duty to a former client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client.
The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty
to protect the clients interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters
that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.
2. Yes. The Court has defined the practice of law
broadly as any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of
acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
ones self to the public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy
services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained
counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This
argument is without merit because the law does not
distinguish between consultancy services and retainer
agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that
are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term
"practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his
legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed
stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainers
fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant,
respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to
disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute
infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees unless the acts involved also transgress
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a
violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Respondents admission that he
received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving
as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts. Under Civil Service Law and rules, the
penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension
for six months and one day to one year. .
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B.
Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the
practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of
this Decision.
35) Edilberto M. Cuenca, Vs. CA
G.R. No. 109870, December 01, 1995
FACTS:
The rule that the Supreme Court is not authorized to
entertain a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial
Predicated on Allegedly Newly Discovered Evidence is
relaxed. Although in "Goduco v. CA" decided some twenty
(20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is not authorized to
entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial
predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence the
rationale of which being: "The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has
no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, for only questions of
fact are involved therein," the rule now appears to have
been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like
"Helmuth, Jr. v. People" (112 SCRA 573 [1982]) and
"People v. Amparado" (156 SCRA 712 [1987]). In both
cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and
despite the opposition of the Solicitor General, granted
new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis
of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the
Court considered as newly discovered and probably
sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction.
Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason
why herein petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It
becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances
considering that the "People" does not raise any objection
to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought
to be specially commended for displaying once again such
statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor
General's finest hour, indeed.
ISSUE: WON NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED
HELD: "The above duty is well founded on the instruction
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign
`whose obligation to govern impartially is compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution,
by Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The Lawyers
Review, July 31, 1994). (Italics supplied.)"
"Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, prosecutors who represent the People of
the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to
seek conviction of the accused but to see that justice is
done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:
`Canon 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
`Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in
public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is
done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for
disciplinary action.
36) Ali vs. Atty. Bubong
AC No. 4018, March 8, 2005
Facts:
This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty.
Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave
misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds
of Marawi City.It appears that this disbarment proceeding
is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent, which was initially
investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction;
indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT); and manipulating the criminal complaint filed
against HadjiSeradBauduliDatu and others for violation of
the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that
the BaudaliDatus are relatives of respondent. The initial
inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent,
absolved respondent of all the charges brought against
him.
The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then
SoJ Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges
of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of
documents, butheld guilty of grave misconduct for his
imprudent issuance of TCT and manipulating the criminal
case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted
against HadjiSeradBauduliDatu and the latters co-
accused. As a result of this finding, former President FVR
issued AO No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached
by Secretary Drilon. Respondent questioned said AO
before this Court through a petition
for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition claiming that the
Office of the President did not have the authority and
jurisdiction to remove him from office and insisted that
respondents violated the laws on security of tenure and
that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator
of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules
when he abdicated his authority to resolve the
administrative complaint against him (herein respondent),
but was dismissedfor failure on the part of petitioner to
sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
order. Respondent MR was denied with finality.
ISSUE: WON respondent may be disbarred for grave
misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government.
RULING: We resolve this question in the affirmative.The
Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to
apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of
the bar on such grounds. Although the general rule is that
a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he
committed as a government official, he may, however, be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a
violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as
established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his
qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office
as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his
knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the
benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly
demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his
membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It
reads:Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall
not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples
confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast
doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-
conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the
law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his
privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased
complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of
this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same
as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or
terminated by reason of desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. As we
have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-
Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of
the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens
may have in the proper administrative of justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is
hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
37) Olazo vs. Justice Tinga
December 7, 2010 AM No. 10-5-7- SC
FACTS: The respondent is charged of violating Rule
6.02,[1] Rule 6.03[2] and Rule 1.01[3] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests.
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application
covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower
Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject
land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that
was segregated and declared open for disposition
pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476,[4] issued on January
7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,[5]issued on October
16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No.
119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty
was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on
the applications to purchase the lands declared open for
disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the
Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the
Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998);
the respondents district includes the areas covered by the
proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint,[6] the complainant claimed that the
respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a
member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly
interfered with the complainants sales application because
of his personal interest over the subject land. The
complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue
pressure and influence over the complainants father,
Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainants
sales application and claim the subject land for himself.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent
prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates,
sums of money as payment of the latters alleged rights
over the subject land. The complainant further claimed
that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the
subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondents
deceased wife.
As a result of the respondents abuse of his official
functions, the complainants sales application was denied.
The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and
his sales application were subsequently given due course
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within
the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the
complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the
respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to
convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents promptings, the
rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the
respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying
the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent
wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando
Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The
respondent in this regard executed an Assurance where
he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in
unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under
Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the
proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus,
the approval of his sales application by the Committee on
Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated
Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of
law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he
appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: No. The Court find the absence of any concrete
proof that the respondent abused his position as a
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on
Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants
sales application was ever brought before the Committee
on Awards. By the complaints own account, the
complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before
the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainants
sales application was pending before the Office of the
Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting
claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on
August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director,
NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term
of the respondents elective public office and membership
to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did
in any way promote, advance or use his private interests
in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the
sales application was not brought before the Committee
on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no
sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position
to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the
denial of the complainants sales application over the
subject land was made by the DENR, not by the
Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainants allegation that the respondent
orchestrated the efforts to get the subject land does not
specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What
appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25,
2003,[20] categorically stating that the respondent had no
interest in the subject land, and neither was he a
contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the
subject land. In the absence of any specific charge,
Olazos disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the
respondents alleged participation, and we find it to be in
the respondents favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that
the complainant presented to support his claim that the
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his
father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the
DENR Regional Director-NCR;[21] the Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;[22] and the Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated July 17, 1996[23]), do not contain any
reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the
respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely
showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in
having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas)
surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely
acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may
be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show
how the respondent could have influenced the decision of
Miguel Olazo to contest the complainants sales
application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to
the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of
Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to
what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that
Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what
Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by
the respondent against Miguel Olazo.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage
in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency.[29] By way of exception, a government
lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession
under the following conditions: first, the private practice is
authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second,
the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or
her official functions.[30] The last paragraph of Section 7
provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers
separated from the government service who are covered
under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713,
a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving
the government service, to accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term
intervene which we previously interpreted to include an act
of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings.[31] Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the respondent must have accepted engagement or
employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public
office, he had previously exercised power to influence the
outcome of the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the
respondent previously interfered with the sales application
covering Manuels land when the former was still a
member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant,
too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was
engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal
service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the
preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap,
Inc.,[32] we specifically described private practice of law
as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the
public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within
the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of
evidence are insufficient to show that the legal
representation was made before the Committee on
Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be
presented before it. These are matters for the complainant
to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this
regard against the respondents favor.
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion,
we already struck down the complainants allegation that
respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law
when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the
complainants claim that the respondent violated paragraph
4(1)[33] of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged
the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite
his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified
applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs
qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots
covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the
affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision
dated April 3, 2004,[34] when the DENR gave due course
to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at
this point, bound by this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was
affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of
Appeals[35] and, finally, the Court, per our Minute
Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453.
In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on
certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among
others, that no reversible error was committed by the
Court of Appeals in its decision.[36]
All told, considering the serious consequences of the
penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise
its disciplinary powers.[37] The respondent generally is
under no obligation to prove his/her defense,[38] until the
burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant
has proven. Where no case has in the first place been
proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.[39]
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative
case against the respondent for the complainants failure to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former
committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of
the Courts disciplinary power.
38) Gisela Huyssen vs Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez
AC No. 6707, March 24, 2006
FACTS
This treats of a Complaintfor Disbarment filed by
Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was
still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all
American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under
Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law.
Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa
applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they
needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of
one year which could be withdrawn after one year.
Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law,
complainant deposited with respondent on six different
occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of
US$20,000.
Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he
received the amounts deposited by the complainant but
refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her
demands.
After one year, complainant demanded from respondent
the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said
amount would be returned. When respondent failed to
return the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of
which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to
respondent for the immediate return of the money. Atty.
Gutierrez sent a letter to the complainant explaining the
alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited
amount and promised her several times that he would
repay her out of his personal funds. He even issued
personal post-dated checks on this, but which later
bounced.After respondent made several unfulfilled
promises to return the deposited amount, complainant
referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand
letters to respondent. The demand letters remained
unheeded.
Thus, a complaint[2] for disbarment was filed by
complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Respondent denied the allegations in the complaint
claiming that having never physically received the money
mentioned in the complaint, he could not have
appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount
was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining
the permanent visas in the Philippines.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September
2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence on 25 August 2003.
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
submitted her report[5] recommending the disbarment of
respondent. She justified her recommendation in this
manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there
is no question that respondent received
the amount of US$20,000 from
complainant, as respondent himself
admitted that he signed the vouchers
(Annexes A to F of complainant) showing
his receipt of said amount from
complainant. Respondent however claims
that he did not appropriate the same for
himself but that he delivered the said
amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza. This
defense raised by respondent is
untenable considering the documentary
evidence submitted by complainant. On
record is the 1 March 1999 letter of
respondent addressed to the World
Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint)
where he stated thus:
I really understand your feelings
on the delay of the release of the
deposit but I repeat, nobody really
intended that the thing would
happen that way. Many events
were the causes of the said delay
particularly the death of then
Commissioner L. Verceles, whose
sudden death prevented us the
needed papers for the immediate
release. It was only from
compiling all on the first week of
January this year, that all the said
papers were recovered, hence,
the process of the release just
started though some important
papers were already finished as
early as the last quarter of last
year. We are just going through
the normal standard operating
procedure and there is no day
since January that I do not make
any follow ups on the progress of
the same.
and his letter dated 19 March 1999
(Annex L of Complaint) where he stated
thus:
I am sending you my personal
checks to cover the refund of the
amount deposited by your good
self in connection with the
procurement of your permanent
visa and that of your family. It
might take some more time before
the Bureau could release the
refund as some other pertinent
papers are being still compiled
are being looked at the files of the
late Commissioner Verceles, who
approved your visa and who died
of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure
that everything would be fine later
as all the documents needed are
already intact. This is just a
bureaucratic delay.
From the above letters, respondent makes
it appear that the US$20,000 was officially
deposited with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation. However, if this is true,
how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were
issued by respondent to complainant to
prove his receipt of the said sum and
official receipts therefore were never
issued by the said Bureau? Also, why
would respondent issue his personal
checks to cover the return of the money to
complainant if said amount was really
officially deposited with the Bureau of
Immigration? All these actions of
respondent point to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent received the
money from complainant and appropriated
the same for his personal use. It should
also be noted that respondent has failed
to establish that the late Atty. Mendoza
referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really
exists. There is not one correspondence
from Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa
application of complainant and his family,
and complainant has also testified that
she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred
to by respondent.
Considering that respondent was able to
perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage
of his position with the Board of Special
Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, makes it more reprehensible
as it has caused damage to the reputation
and integrity of said office. It is submitted
that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
A lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of
Governorsapproved[6] the Investigating Commissioners
report with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it
hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED,
with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex
A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and
applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondents violation
of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez is
 hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law and ordered to
return the amount with legal
interest from receipt of the money
until payment.
ISSUE Whether or not Atty. Gutierrez
violated the duty to separate
public duties from private
interest
HELD
Yes. The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors
that respondent should be severely sanctioned.
Llawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official task have more restrictions than lawyers in private
practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public
office.[7]
Respondents act of asking money from complainant in
consideration of the latters pending application for visas
is violative of Rule 1.01[17] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.02[18] of the Code which bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private
interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office.[19] Respondents
conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral
character required from all lawyers, especially from one
occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is
expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public
faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private
practice.
We have held that the issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct,[20] as the effect transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the
circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society
and the public interest.
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in
issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that
he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with,
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral
turpitude.[22]
Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he
misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had
the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID
and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he
does not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law
is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed
only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times
conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions
which includes suspension and disbarment.[23] More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege.[24]
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases
against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the
erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the courts and the
public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from
the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their
lawyers oath have proven them unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the
bar.[25] These pronouncement gain practical significance in
the case at bar considering that respondent was a former
member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It
bears stressing also that government lawyers who are
public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public
trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their
disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the
public eye.[26]
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent
miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession.
PENALTY
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended
by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so.[27]
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct; and
consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of
the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the
legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty
of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.[30]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to
return the amount he received from the complainant with
legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment.
39) Olazo v. Dante Tinga
AM No. 10-5-7-SC December 07, 2010
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case against retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr.
Jovito S. Olazo (complainant).The respondent is charged
of violating Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of theCode
of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests.The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02In the
complaint,the complainant claimed that the respondent
abused his positionas Congressman and as a member of
the Committee on Awards when he undulyinterfered with
the complainants sales application because of his
personalinterest over the subject land.The Second
Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03The second charge involves
another parcel of land within the proclaimed
areasbelonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainants
brother. The complainant allegedthat the respondent
persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his
rightsover the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.The Third
Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01The complainant alleged
that the respondent engaged in unlawful
conductconsidering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez was not a qualifiedbeneficiary under
Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that
JosephJeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the
proclaimed areas and doesnot qualify for an award.The
complainant also alleged that the respondent violated
Section 7(b)(2) of theCode of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of
law, within theone-year prohibition period, when he
appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee andJoseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent was engaged in the practice of
law.
Whether or not respondent is liable under Rules 6.02, 6.03
and 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
In Cayetano v. Monsod, 28 we defined the practice of law
as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should
be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain
restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private
practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition
to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto. Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions; . . .
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of
one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation
from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b)
(2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice
his profession in connection with any matter before the
office he used to be with, in which case the one-year
prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage
in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. 29 By way of exception, a government
lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession
under the following conditions: first, the private practice is
authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second,
the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or
her official functions. 30 The last paragraph of Section 7
provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers
separated from the government service who are covered
under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713,
a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving
the government service, to accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term
"intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an
act of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings. [G.R. No. 93023. March 13, 1991.]
 40) RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, JR. vs.
ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA
[A.C. No. 2984. August 31, 2007]
Facts:
Ismael Mejia, seventy-one years old and barred from the
practice of law for fifteen years, filed a petition with plea for
reinstatement in the practice of law.
Rodolfo Bernardo, Jr. accused Mejia of the following
administrative offenses:
1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use a
part of the sum entrusted to him for payment of real estate
taxes on property and part of another sum entrusted to
him for payment of taxes and expenses in connection with
the registration of the title of Bernardo to another property
in a subdivision;
2) falsification of certain documents (special power of
attorney, deed of sale, and a deed of assignment)
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in
the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo.
The Court declared him guilty of all the charges against
him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of disbarment.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a
publication containing his religious and social writings. He
also organized a religious organization and named it "El
Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and
Mind."
Issue:
Whether or not the Mejia shall be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Held:
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition.
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for
Mejia's disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact
that Mejia is already of advanced years. The Court takes
cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his
disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been
attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously,
he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court
is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it
also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose. After all,
penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish
but to correct offenders.
The Court reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that
the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of
the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the
Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of justice will continue to be
preserved even with the applicant's reentry as a counselor
at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission
to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law.
The Court will take into consideration the applicant's
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred,
his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time
that has elapsed between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement.
41) Quevs Revilla
AC No. 7054 December 4, 2009
Facts :
In a complaint for disbarmentConradoQue (complainant)
accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before
the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on BarDiscipline (IBP Committee
on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following
violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
(1) The respondents abuse of court
remedies and processes. The
respondent repeatedly raised the issue
of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and
RTC knowing fully-well that these
courts have jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case.
(2) The respondents commission of forum-
shopping by filing the subject cases in
order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate
the efficient administration of justice for
his own personal gain and to defeat
the right of the complainant and his
siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC
judgments in the unlawful detainer
case;
(2) The respondents lack of candor and
respect towards his adversary and the
courts by resorting to falsehood and
deception to misguide, obstruct and
impede the due administration of
justice.
- Fabricated an imaginary order
issued by presiding judge in open
court which allegedly denied
motion to dismiss filed by
respondent. It was made to cover
up his lack of preparation.
(4) The respondents willful and revolting
falsehood that unjustly maligned and
defamed the good name and
reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo
Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous
counsel of the respondents clients.
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent
and unauthorized appearances in
court in the petition for annulment of
 judgment for 15 litigants, three of
whom are already deceased;
(6) The respondentswillful and fraudulent
appearance in the second petition for
annulment of title as counsel for the
Republic of the Philippines without
being authorized to do so.
ANSWER OF RESPONDENT :
1. He professed his sincerity, honesty and good
faith in filing the petitions complained of;
2. he filed these petitions to protect the interests
of his clients in their property.
3. that these petitions were all based on valid
grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC
and the RTC over the underlying unlawful
detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed
by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic
fraud committed by the complainant and
his family against his clients
4. On the allegations of falsehood in the motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of
the petition for annulment of judgment
(covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment
complaint), the respondent maintained that his
allegations were based on his observations
and the notes he had taken during the
proceedings on what the presiding judge
dictated in open court.
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether
the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical
infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty
these transgressions should carry.
The Courts Ruling
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for
annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked (as
quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty.
Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt
motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse
party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to
demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against
Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only
participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty.
Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the
respondents petition for annulment of judgment also
represented that no second motion for reconsideration or
appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions
in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the
respondent believed the said decisions were null and void
ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the
respondent has been less than fair in his professional
relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for
violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional
colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed
wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual
basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who
is now dead and unable to defend himself.
42) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
AVELINO T. JAVELLANA
[G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000.]
Facts: On September 8, 1999, we denied the People's
motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990
decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that
respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8,
1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T.
Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del
Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why
private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the
Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court's order specifically
provided for private respondent's detention at the
residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private
respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around
but was to be held as detention prisoner in said
residence. LLpr
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with
because private respondent was not detained in the
residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal
activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in
the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990
prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in
Criminal Case No. 4262, 1 the latter accepted cases and
continued practicing law.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Deogracias can still practice
law?
Held: No. As a matter of law, when a person indicted for
an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of
liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail
during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is
authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether
under preventive detention or serving final sentence can
not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.
 43) JULIO ZETA vs. FELICISIMO MALINAO
[G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000.]
FACTS:
Administrative complaint against Malinao, court interpreter
of the CFI of Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:
l ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. MR.
Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court
of this town for parties like attorney when he is not
an attorney. Reliable information also says he has
been appearing in the municipal courts of other
towns. He is not authorized to do so we believe.
He makes it his means of livelihood as he collects
fees from his clients. He competes with attorneys
but does not pay anything. We believe that his
doing so should be stopped for a good
government. These facts can be checked with
records of those municipal courts.;
2 GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE.;3
CRIME OF FALSIFICATION.;
4 VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND
CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable
information it is prohibited for a civil service
employee to engage in private practice any
profession or business without permission from
the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure
has not secured that permission because he
should not be allowed to practice as he is not an
attorney.
Respondent states that he has not violated any rule or
law, much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules; that his participation for defendants' cause was
gratuitous as they could not engage the services of
counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in
the locality, said assistance has also checked the
miscarriage of justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge,
now resigned.
The DOJthe complaint and answer to District Judge Zosa,
CFI, Catbalogan, for investigation, report and
recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa
submitted his report finding respondent guilty.
Issue: WON respondent is engaged in unauthorized
practice of law
Held: YES. Separated from service
The conclusions of fact of the Investigator is amply
supported by evidence, particularly the documents
consisting of public records and the declarations of the
judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear
to that respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in
various municipal courts without prior permission of his
superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations,
falsified his time record of service by making it appear
therein that he was present in his office on occasions
when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as
counsel, without being a member of the bar, which,
furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law.
The defense of respondent that "his participation for
defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not
engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and
the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if true,
carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as
counsel in court, he did so without permission from his
superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of
service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates
in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent
acted as counsel under the above circumstances would
indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice
obviously for considerations other than pure love of
justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense
committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants a
more drastic sanction than that of reprimand. We find no
alternative than to separate him from the service, with the
admonition that he desist from appearing in any court or
investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are
allowed to practice.
44. Tan and Pagayokan vs. Balajadia
GR No. 169517, March 14,2006
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition before the Supreme Court for
indirect contempt against respondent because an affidavit
filed by respondent in a criminal case against Petitioners -
paragraph 5 thereof asserted that respondent is a
practicing lawyer which he is not.
Respondent, in his comment averred that the allegation in
paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is a
practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that
the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject
complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty. Aquinos
complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had
previously filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioners
involving the same subject matter. His secretary executed
two copies and simply copied some of the details thereof.
Simply, the secretary committed a mistake in preparation
of the affidavits.
Issue: Whether or not respondent may be held in indirect
contempt.
Held:
No. In the case at bar, a review of the records supports
respondents claim that he never intended to project
himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear
inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty
Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the
circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting
of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary
evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances
show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondents
complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation
that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of
inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to
make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases where
we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of
law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing
court pleadings on behalf of his client;appearing before
court hearings as an attorney;[manifesting before the court
that he will practice law despite being previously denied
admission to the bar;or deliberately attempting to practice
law and holding out himself as an attorney through
circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do
so
45. LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs ATTY. ROGELIO P.
TERRADO,
A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006
According to the complainant, Luzviminda C. Lijauco
engaged the services of respondent, Atty. Terrado to
assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development
Bank and the release of her foreclosed house and lot
located. The property identified is the subject of a petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending
before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. Complainant alleged
that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in
the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and
did not protect her interests in the Compromise
Agreement. Respondent denied the accusations against
him. He averred that the sum he received from
complainant was payment for legal services for the
recovery of the deposit with PDB and did not include case
pending before the RTC of Bian, Laguna.
IBP Investigating Commissioner finding respondent guilty
of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the CPR.
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a
Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainants lawyer to
effectuate the compromise agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other
individuals as commission/referral fees respondent
violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the CPR which provides
that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
legal services with persons not licensed to practice law.
Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a
compromise agreement with a false and misleading
assurance that complainant can still recover after Three
(3) years her foreclosed property respondent violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR which says a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Whether or not the respondent is guilty or violating the
CPR.
YES. The court agrees with the findings of the IBP. The
Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of
P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of the
deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his clients interests
commences from his retainer until his discharge from the
case or the final disposition of the subject matter of
litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes
an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the clients cause. The canons of the legal
profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle
a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and
utmost devotion.13
Respondents admission that he divided the legal fees with
two other people as a referral fee does not release him
from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide
a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except in certain cases.
Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating
Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the CPR. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months,
and STERNLY WARNED. He is further ordered to
RETURN, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant.
46) Plus Builders Inc. vs. Revilla
Facts:
The Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD)
rendered a decision in favor of Plus Builders, Inc. and
against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et.al,
who were the clients of respondent, Atty. Revilla, Jr. The
PARAD found that respondents clients were mere tenants
and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land.
The case was elevated all the way up to the Supreme
Court, with this Court sustaining Plus Builders Inc.s rights
over the land.
Respondent was found to have committed
intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with
the intention to delay the execution of the decision through
the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary
restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title
despite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he
allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law holding themselves out as his
partners/associates in the law firm. Respondent maintains
that he did not commit the acts complained of and that the
courses of action he took were not meant to unduly delay
the execution of the DARAB Decision.
Issue: WON respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
Held:
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is
expected to give his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyers
devotion to his clients cause not only requires but also
entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for
the client what is justly due him or to present every
defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to
succeed. In this case, respondent may not be wanting in
this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the
respondents acts complained of were committed out of
his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect the
interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated.
Taking the cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is
rather commendable, but respondent should not forget his
first and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court.
In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the
duty to present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be
performed at the expense of truth and justice. Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by
impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court
processes.
However, the Court also knows how to show compassion
and will not hesitate to refrain from imposing the
appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors,
such as the respondents length of service,
acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of
remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and
equitable considerations, and respondents advanced age,
among other things, which have varying significance in the
Courts determination of the imposable penalty. Therefore,
a suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law is
sufficient in this case.
47) SANTA PANGAN vs. ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS
A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979
FACTS:
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by
Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed
because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in
Manila. When the records of the said case was checked
(one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that he
used the name Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos. In his defense,
Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such name
because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro
Dionisio Ramos. D.D. stands for DionisioDayaw with
Dayaw being his mothers surname. However, in the roll of
attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not what Atty. Ramos explanation was
correct?
HELD:
No. The attorneys roll or register is the official
record containing the names and signatures of those who
are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized
to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges
the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no
falsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice, an
attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness,
candor and frankness. In representing himself to the court
as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of Dionisio D. Ramos, truth. Due to his actions the client was in another case
respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted
to deception. The Supreme Court hence severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar
infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.
48) ATTY. LUIS V. ARTIAGA JR. vs. ATTY. ENRIQUE C.
VILLANUEVA
Facts:
The complaint of Atty. Luis V. Artiaga Jr. seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva for alleged
unethical practices arose from four (4) separate cases and
several incidental cases with Juliano Estolano, client of
complainant Atty. Artiaga, Jr. and Glicerio Aquino and/or
Florentina Guanzon, clients of respondent Atty.
Villanueva, as adversaries in all of these cases involving
the same property.
The case started with the controversy over two parcels of
land with Revocable Permit Applications, originally the
permits belong to a Malabayabas and Suyo, which was
later on sold to the client of Artiaga. However on a later
date, when the client of Villanueva filed for Revocable
Permit Application it was found out that the area being
claimed has already been titled to the client of Artiaga.
Hence the dispute was brought to the Bureau of Lands for
decision. Initially the Director of Lands rendered a decision
in favor of the client of Artiaga, however it was appealed
by Villanueva and the decision was change, after another
appeal the final decision was in favor of the client of
Artiaga. The decision being final and executory an order of
execution was issued however the client of Villanueva
remained in possession of the said parcel of lands.
Thereafter a series of motions and cases were filed by
Villanueva as a dilatory tactics to seek a favorable ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Villanueva is considered
unethical
Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court held that acts of Atty. Villanueva
are in violation of his oath that he will do no falsehood nor
consent to doing of any in court. According to the court it
was evident that Atty. Villanueva caused his client to
commit perjury so that the forceful entry case shall fall
under the jurisdiction of the court, this is shown by the
intentional amendment to the original complaint paragraph
5, wherein under the original complaint it was alleged that
the client was dispossessed of the subject land in 1960
but later on it was alleged in the amended complaint that
the dispossession occurred in 1973. The court stated that
the reason for such change is so that the action may still
be filed or entertained by the court, since the action
prescribes one year after accrual of cause of action.
The court further states that it is expected that a lawyer
will defend the clients cause with zeal, however in doing
so it should not disregard its duty to the court and the
charged with perjury, which is detrimental to the client.
The court also found that Atty. Villanueva is guilty of lack
of condor and respect for the court and the rights of his
adversary, as shown in the case, the client of Artiaga has
already won the case, however Villanueva filed urgent ex-
parte motions and instead of waiting for the result of such,
he perfected his appeal, thus further delaying the
implementation of the first lawful order of the court.
Furthermore when his appeal was denied, Villanueva
turned to other venues such as Court of Agrarian
Relations for positive results, in doing so he did not
disclose of the prior proceedings that was held in the court
thus securing an ex-parte proceeding.
The respondent is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the
practice of law from date of notice until such time that he
can demonstrate to the court that he has rehabilitated
himself and deserves to resume the practice of law.
 49) GARVIDA V. SALES
GR NO 124893
FACTS:
On March 16, 1996, Lynette Garvida applied for
registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
However, her application was denied by the Board of
Election Tellers since she exceeded the age limit. She
then filed a Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataan
Member and Voter with the Municipal Trial Court which
was granted by the said court. Then, on April 23, 1996,
Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Chairman, SangguniangKabataan, Barangay San
Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte.
On the same date, Election Officer Dionisio Rios, per
advise of Provincial Election Supervisor NoliPipo,
disapproved petitioners certificate of candidacy again due
to her age. Petitioner then appealed to COMELEC
Regional Director FilemonAsperin who set aside the order
of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. Earlier and
without knowledge of COMELEC officials, private
respondent and petitioners rival Florencio Sales Jr. filed
with the COMELEC en banc a Petition of Denial and/or
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy via facsimile and
registered mail on April 29, 1996. And, on May 2, 1996
respondent Riso issued a memorandum to petitioner
informing her of her ineligibility and giving hr 24 hours why
her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved.
Also on the same date, the COMELEC en banc issued an
order directing the Board Election Tellers and Board of
Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in
the event she won in the election. This is why on May 6,
1996, Election Day, Garvida was not proclaimed the
winner. She was only proclaimed on June 2, 1996. Said
proclamation was without prejudice to any further action
by the Commission on Elections or any other interested
parties.
ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in
denying and cancelling petitioners CoC on the ground of
overage. (in connection with Rule 10.3 Canon 10)
HELD:
1) Yes. The Rules of Procedure of the Omnibus
Election Code, specifically RULE 23 requires that
a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy for an elective office may
be filed with the Law Department of the
COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has
made a false material representation in his
certificate. The petition may be heard and
evidence received by any official designated by
the COMELEC after which the case shall be
decided by the COMELEC itself. SECTION 3 of
the same Rule further provides that the
Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear
and decide protests or petitions in ordinary
actions, special actions, special cases, provisional
remedies, contempt and special proceedings
except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the
Commission. In the instant case, the COMELEC
en banc did not refer the case to any of its
Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it entertained the petition and
issued the order of May 2, 1996.
50) Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Bagabuyo
A.C. No. 006, October 9, 2007
FACTS: The administrative case resulted from the
events of the Criminal case proceeding originally raffled to
the sala of Judge Buyser. Judge Buyser denied the
Demurrer to Evidence of the accused, declaring that the
evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to
prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder.
the counsel of the defense filed a Motion to fix the Amount
of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Bagabuyo, the Senior
State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case
objected on the ground that the charge of murder,
punishable with reclusion perpetua was not subject of bail
under the Rules of Court.
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case
because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor
Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial
magistrate by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion
to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
Respondent appealed to CA. Instead of availing himself of
the judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication
of an article regarding the Order granting to the accused in
the issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article is
entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for
allowing murder suspect to bail out.
The RTC of Surigao City directed the respondent and the
writer of the article to appear in court to explain why they
should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the
publication of the article which degrade the court and its
presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the
press conference but refused to answer whether he made
the statement in the article until after he shall have filed a
motion to dismiss. for his refusal to answer, the trial court
declared him in contempt of court pursuant to the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Bagabuyo violated Canons 11, 13 and
the Lawyer's oath
HELD: YES. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and he
should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances
against a judge to the proper authorities only.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he
admittedly caused the holding of a press conference
where he made statements against the Order allowing the
accused to be released on bail. Respondent also violated
Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was
displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior
prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003
issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's
statements in the article, which were made while Crim.
Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated
Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall
not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party. Respondent also violated the Lawyers
Oath, as he has sworn to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. As a
senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent
should have set the example of observing and maintaining
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers.
51) TIONGCO VS AGUILAR
FACTS:
Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not
be dealt with administratively for violation of Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his
unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not
at all read the petition in this case before it concluded that
the petition failed to sufficiently show that the respondent
court had committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his descriptions
of the respondent judge as a "liar," "thief." perfidious," and
"blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his use of the
rest of the intemperate words enumerated in the
resolution. Worse, feeling obviously frustrated at the
incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the
intemperate words or phrases, he volunteered to point out
that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called the
respondent judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator,"
"abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eyed."
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tiongcos action constitutes
serious violation of Canon 11 of the Coe of Responsibility
which warrants a fine or suspension or both.
HELD: Yes. CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS
AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's
oath "to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity
to the courts"; his duty under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court "[t]o observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers"; and his
duty under the first canon of the Canons Professional
Ethics "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration in the administration of
justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is
disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people.Thus has it been
said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is
an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That
is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer
of the court to avail of such right. Nevertheless, such a
right is not without limit. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action. The lawyer's duty to render
respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. hence, in the assertion of
their client's rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and
propriety in making the false and malicious insinuation
against this Court, particularly the Members of the First
Division, and the scurrilous characterizations of the
respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious. Such could
only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given
what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one
who "seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he
considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever
he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary
to law and justice whatever does not accord with his
views". When such anger or hate is coupled with
haughtiness or arrogance as when he even pointed out
other intemperate words in his petition which this Court
failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26 September
1994, and with seething sarcasm as when he prays that
this Court "forebear[s] from turning . . . [him] into a martyr
to his principles" and ends up his Compliance with the
"RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND UNDYING LOVE"
(Constitution Preamble, 66th word), "nothing more can
extenuate his liability for gross violation of Canon 11 of the
Code of professional Responsibility and his other duties
entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.
WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B.
TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more money..
52) Banogon Vs. Zerna
FACTS:
In 1926, a judgment favorable to Zerna was issued by a
cadastral court. In 1957 or thirty one years later, Banogon
filed a motion to amend the 1926 decisions. An opposition
was filed by Zerna in the same year. Banogons counsel
repeatedly failed to set for hearing and in 1971 or fourteen
years later, Zerna filed for a motion to dismiss which was
granted by reason of Banogons filing being out of time.
The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of
the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had
been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late.
Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners. 3
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet
become final and executory because the land in dispute
had not yet been registered in favor of the private
respondents. The said judgment would become so only
after one year from the issuance of the decree of
registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the
private respondents who had failed to enforce the
judgment by having the land registered in their the
pursuant thereto
ISSUE:
Whether or not Banogons suit should prosper.
HELD:
No. He slept on his rights hence laches had set in. The
Supreme Court also took time to remind lawyers to
judiciously study facts and laws so as to avoid the filing of
improper cases such as this case where the filing of
motions and pleadings was way out of time. One reason
why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the
way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of
distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. As
officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist
in the proper administration of justice. They do not
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only
add to the workload of the judiciary. Lawyers do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing
litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts.
53) Medina vs. Yan
G.R. no. 30978 September 30, 1974
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction, praying that
judgment be rendered:
rtual 1aw library
(1) Annuling and setting aside all the actuations, orders,
and resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals, more
particularly the resolution dated February 1, 1969, denying
petitioners motion for certification of this case to the
Supreme Court; the resolution dated March 13, 1969
denying petitioners "Urgent Motion for Release of
Petitioner-Detainee", the resolution dated June 10, 1969
denying petitioners "Motion for Reconsideration"; and the
resolution dated June 21, 1969 requiring Atty. Amelito R,
Mutuc to show cause why he should not be held liable and
dealt with for contempt of court and suspended from the
practice of law as member of the Philippine Bar;
(2) Prohibiting respondent Court of Appeals from enforcing
the aforesaid resolution dated June 21, 1969, regarding
the contempt and suspension charge against aforenamed
Amelito R. Mutuc, as well as from proceeding further with
the case at bar; and
(3) Ordering the respondent Court of Appeals to certify the
appeal and to have all the records of the same forwarded
to this Court.
Pending these proceedings a writ of preliminary injunction
to be issued ex parte was sought, to enjoin, restrain and
prohibit the respondent Court of Appeals from proceeding
further with this case, more particularly with the
enforcement of its resolution of June 21, 1969, requiring
Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc to explain why he should not be
held for contempt of court and suspended from the
practice of law.
On September 4, 1969, this Court adopted a resolution
restraining the respondent Court of Appeals from
proceeding further with case No. CA-G.R. No. 42658-R,
entitled "Fortunato Medina, petitioner-appellee v. Gen.
Manuel T. Yan and Brig. Gen. Vicente Raval,
respondents-appellants", more particularly with the
enforcement of its resolution of June 21, 1969, re:
Contempt and Suspension of Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc."
virtua1aw library
For a clear perspective of the present petition, the events
leading thereto are set forth as follows:
At 6:00 oclock in the morning of November 23, 1968
petitioner Fortunato Medina, a Filipino citizen who was in
Saigon, South Vietnam, employed as a laborer in an
American company, was arrested and apprehended by the
South Vietnam police and some members of the Philippine
Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) at the instance of the
Philippine Military Attache in that city, and kept in custody
until 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, when he
was flown to Manila under escort by two Philippine Military
Attache personnel aboard an Air Vietnam plane, arriving in
Manila about 9:00 oclock that same evening. At the
Manila International Airport, he was met and arrested by a
team of Intelligence Service Officers of the Philippine
Constabulary and taken to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City,
where he was interrogated and kept in custody until the
morning of the following day, November 24, 1968, when
he was turned over to the 1st PC Zone Headquarters at
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In the early
morning of November 27, 1968 petitioner Medina was
transferred to the custody of the 174th PC Command
Officer at Bano, Arayat, Pampanga. At 11:00 oclock the
same morning he was delivered to the custody of the
Chief of Police of Arayat, Pampanga, in view of the
absence of the Municipal Judge.
On November 29, 1968 petitioner Medina, through
counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the
Supreme Court to secure his release from confinement in
the Office of the Chief of Police of Arayat. This Court,
acting on the petition, issued on the same day the writ of
habeas corpus, made returnable to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch.
ISSUE: Whether or not Attu. Mutuc violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
RULING: "Considering that the statements attributed to
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, as well as the news items based
thereon, as above set forth, are grossly defiant, offensive
and derogatory to the dignity and integrity of the members
of the Fourth Division of this Court; that they are evidently
intended to browbeat, intimidate and hold them in
contempt and ridicule by imputing to them the act of
knowingly abetting the perpetration of a gross and rank
injustice, and that said statements and news reports tend
to degrade and obstruct the free, just and impartial
administration of justice on a matter then actually pending
consideration by this Court; and
"Considering further that the act of Atty. Amelito Mutuc of
advising, encouraging and practically assisting in the
escape of the petitioner-appellee, Fortunato Medina, from
the custody of the law as a detention prisoner, in utter
disregard of the order of this Court requiring him to post a
bond of P5,000.00 for his release, constitutes a deliberate
and wanton violation of his oath as a lawyer, particularly
that portion thereof where he swears that he will obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities of the Republic of the Philippines and will
conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to his clients;
WHEREFORE, Atty. Amelito Mutuc is hereby required to
show cause within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice
hereof why he should not be held liable and dealt with for
contempt of court, and why he should not be suspended
under Rule 138, Section 28, of the Rules of Court, from
the practice of law as a member of the Philippine Bar."
54) Javellana vs. Lutero
G.R. No. L-23956, July 21, 1967
FACTS
On March 29, 1963 the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against
ElpidioJavellana with the municipal court of Iloilo City,
presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero.
The hearing, originally set for April 30, 1963, was
postponed to May 24 for failure of the defendant to receive
summons, and then postponed again to June 27 for the
same reason. It was thereafter postponed to July 16, then
to July 24, and finally to August 27, all at the behest of
the defendant's Atty. Jose Hautea, on the grounds that "he
has not finished his business transactions in Manila" and
that "he hurt his right foot toe." The last postponement was
granted by the municipal court with the warning that no
further postponement would be entertained.
When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963,
neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty. Hautea
appeared although one Atty. Romy Pea who was present
in court verbally moved for the postponement of the trial
on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending to
a business transaction.
The plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion on the
ground that the defendant and his counsel were well
aware of the court's previous admonition that no further
postponement of the case would be granted, and then
manifested that the witnesses and the evidence for the
plaintiff were ready for presentation on that date.
The verbal motion for postponement was denied and the
plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence. During the
presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the municipal court
received a telegram from Atty. Hautea requesting
postponement of the hearing. The trial proceeded
nevertheless, and, on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence,
the court on the same date rendered judgment for the
plaintiff and against the defendant. The latter's counsel
received a copy of the decision on September 9, 1963. On
the following September 11, he filed a motion to set aside
judgment and for new trial. This motion was denied on
September 26; a copy of the order of denial was received
by him on the same date.
On November 16, 1963, or about 50 days later, the
defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition for relief
(from the judgment of the municipal court)with the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, praying that the decision in question
be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on the
merits, and, pending determination of the petition, that an
injunction issue restraining the enforcement of the
decision.
- Counsel for the petitioner averred that his
absence on the date of the trial was excusable as
he attended to a very urgent business transaction
in Manila; that before his departure for the latter
city, he verbally informed the respondent judge
that his return to Iloilo might be delayed and that
he might not arrive on time for the trial of the case
as set; that he called at both the law office and the
residence of the counsel for the private
respondent to inform him of the desired
postponement and the reason therefor, but the
latter was in Bacolod at the time; that he exercised
utmost diligence and precaution in the sense that
while in Manila he sent a telegram to the
respondent judge, asking for postponement; and
that notwithstanding all the foregoing, the
municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the
trial in his absence and that of his client, allowed
the private respondent to present his evidence ex
parte, and rendered a decision against the
petitioner, thus depriving the latter of his day in
court. Counsel for the petitioner further asserted
that his client has a good and substantial defense,
which is, that the complainant had given his client
an option to buy the premises subject-matter of
the complaint below, and that a reopening of the
case would cause the private respondent no real
injury.
This petition was given due course, the respondents were
required to file their answers, and a cease-and-desist
order was issued as prayed for. On February 22, 1964,
after due hearing, the Court of First Instance rendered
judgment dismissing the petition.
ISSUE Whether or not Atty. Hautea exerted every
effort and considered it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice
HELD
No. A counsel for any party in a judicial elementary
standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for trial
with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct
is no less applicable in a detainer case, such as the one at
bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and
uncomplicated. It is obvious that the counsel for the
petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect.
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was
postponed at the behest of the said counsel. The last
postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the
unequivocal admonition by the judgment that no further
postponement would be countenanced. The case was
reset for hearing on August 27, 1963, which means that
the appellant's counsel had more than a month's time to
so adjust his schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict
between his business transactions and his calendar of
hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the
appellant appeared at the trial. His absence on the latter
date was not occasioned by illness or some other
supervening occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably
prevented him from appearing in court.
In our view, it was the bounden duty of the said counsel,
under the circumstances, to give preferential attention to
the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court
as a mere marionette that must ever await his pleasure.
This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals more
than just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the
established machinery of justice.
Nor is his censurable conduct mitigated by the
appearance in court on August 27 of another attorney who
verbally moved for postponement nor by his telegram
received by the municipal judge on the same date asking
for continuance. These circumstances, upon the contrary,
emphasize his presumptuousness vis-a-vis the municipal
judge.
It is thus crystal-clear from the foregoing disquisition that
the petitioner-appellant was not deprived of his day in
court, and that the respondent municipal judge did not err
in proceeding with the trial, allowing the private
respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and
thereafter rendering decision for the plaintiff-appellee. It
follows that the petitioner was not entitled to the remedy of
a petition for relief.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed. As
this appeal is patently frivolous and dilatory, this Court,
under the authority of section 3 of Rule 142 of the Rules of
Court, hereby assesses treble costs against the petitioner-
appellant ElpidioJavellana, said costs to be paid by his
counsel, Atty. Jose Hautea.
55) Achacoso vs. CA
No. L-35867, June 28, 1973
FACTS:
Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
In compliance with a request addressed by the President
of the Philippines to all Department Heads,
Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads,
and other government officials, he filed a courtesy
resignation. This was accepted by the President, with
deep regrets. The Secretary of Labor requested him to
turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer-
in-charge.
he protested his replacement and declared he was not
surrendering his office because his resignation was not
voluntary but filed only in obedience to the Presidents
directive.
On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was
appointed Administrator of the POEA, vice the petitioner.
Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was
again asked to vacate his office.
He filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied.
He then came to this Court for relief.
The petitioner invokes security of tenure against his
claimed removal without legal cause. Achacoso contends
that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil
Service and so enjoys security of tenure.
ISSUE:
WON Achacoso is protected by the security of tenure
clause
HELD:
NO. The Court finds for the respondent.
A permanent appointment can be issued only to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which
he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed. The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically confer security of
tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the
required qualifications. The mere fact that a position
belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does
not possess the required qualifications. Such right will
have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in
turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who
does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an
acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligible.
The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to
prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by
authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the
selection of a permanent or another appointee.The person
named in an acting capacity accepts the position under
the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is
called upon to do so by the appointing authority.
56) RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON,
CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN BACULBAS vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. SUING
[A.C. No. 7062. September 26, 2006.]
Facts:
Complainants filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) have sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose
Suing on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Complainants are parties to a previous labor case in which
the Atty. Suing is the counsel of their employer Microplast,
Inc. A judgment in favor of them was rendered by the
Labor Arbiter and a writ of execution was issued against
Microplast, Inc.
Four of the seven complainants who purportedly executed
the Release Waiver and Quitclaims denied having signed
and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents
or having received the considerations therefor. Hence,
they subsequently filed an administrative complaint
alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients
Johnny and Manuel Rodil, frustrated the implementation of
the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor
Arbiter the spurious documents.
Moreover, respondent attempted to influence the answers
of his client Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before
Commissioner Manuel Hababag.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can be disbarred for hisalleged
manipulation of four alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND
QUITCLAIM bycomplainants.
Held:
No. Instead, the respondent is found guilty of negligence
and gross misconduct. The Court says that a lawyer
serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of
practice expected of men of good intentions.
CANON 12. A lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his dutyto assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Any act on the lawyers part that tends to obstruct,
perverts or impedes the administration of justice
constitutes misconduct. While the Commission on Bar
Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are
nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary
action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the
misconduct of its officers or an examination into his
character.
The respondent is likewise suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
57) ARSENIO A. VILLAFUERTE, vs. ATTY. DANTE H.
CORTEZ
Complainant, upon the referral of Atty. Rene A. V.
Saguisag, went to the office of respondent lawyer to
discuss his case for "reconveyance". During their initial
meeting, complainant tried to reconstruct before
respondent lawyer the incidents of the case merely from
memory prompting the latter to ask complainant to instead
return at another time with the records of the case.
The complainant again saw respondent but
still sans the records. Complainant requested respondent
to accept the case, paying to the latter the sum
of P1,750.00 representing the acceptance fee
of P1,500.00 and P250.00 retainer fee for January
1987. Respondent averred that he accepted the money
with much reluctance and only upon the condition that
complainant would get the records of the case from, as
well as secure the withdrawal of appearance of, Atty. Jose
Dizon, the former counsel of complainant.
Allegedly, complainant never showed up thereafter
until November 1989 when he went to the office of
respondent lawyer but only to leave a copy of a writ of
execution. Indeed, said respondent, he had never entered
his appearance in the aforenumbered case.
ISSUE : Whether or not he should be suspended to the
practice of law? YES
HELD : A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client
requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that
should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his
best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the
interests of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot be any clearer in its dictum than
when it has stated that a "lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence, decreeing further that he "shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
Complainant, nevertheless, is not entirely without
fault himself. He cannot expect his case to be properly and
intelligently handled without listening to his own counsel
and extending full cooperation to him. It is not right for
complainant to wait for almost two years and to deal with
his lawyer only after receiving an adverse decision.
All considered, the Court deems it proper to reduce
the recommended period of suspension of the IBP from
three months to one month.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante H. Cortez is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
month from notice hereof, with a warning that a repetition
of similar acts and other administrative lapses will be dealt
with more severely than presently.
58) ARTEMIO ENDAYA vs. ATTY. WILFREDO OCA
[A.C. No. 3967. September 3, 2003.]
Facts: This case unfolded with a verified Complaint 2 filed
on January 12, 1993 by complainant
Artemio Endaya against respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca for
violation of the lawyer's oath and what complainant termed
as "professional delinquency or infidelity." 3 The
antecedents are:
On November 7, 1991, a complaint for unlawful detainer
docketed as Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T was filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Batangas by
Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago
Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez against
complainant and his spouse Patrosenia Endaya. 4
On December 13, 1991, the complainant and his wife as
defendants in the case filed their answer which was
prepared by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary
conference was conducted on January 17, 1992, which
complainant and his wife attended without counsel. During
the conference, complainant categorically admitted that
plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes
of the land involved in the case. Continuation of the
preliminary conference was set on January 31, 1992.
Thereafter, complainant sought the services of the Public
Attorney's Office in Batangas City and respondent was
assigned to handle the case for the complainant and his
wife. 5
At the continuation of the preliminary conference,
respondent appeared as counsel for complainant and his
spouse. He moved for the amendment of the answer
previously filed by complainant and his wife, but his motion
was denied. 6 Thereafter, the court, presided by Acting
Trial Court Judge Teodoro M. Baral, ordered the parties to
submit their affidavits and position papers within ten days
from receipt of the order. The court also decreed that thirty
days after receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or
upon expiration of the period for filing the same, judgment
shall be rendered on the case. 7
Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and
position paper, as may be gleaned from
the Decision dated March 19, 1992 of the MCTC where it
was noted that "only the plaintiffs submitted their affidavits
and position papers." 8
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for
unlawful detainer principally on the ground that the
plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest.
Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 1, where the case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3378. On April 10, 1992, the
RTC directed the parties to file their respective
memoranda. 10 Once again, respondent failed the
complainant and his wife. As observed by the RTC in
its Decision
the decision appealed from as it held that plaintiffs are the
co-owners of the property in dispute and as such are
parties-in-interest. 13 It also found that the verbal lease
agreement was on a month-to-month basis and perforce
terminable by the plaintiffs at the end of any given month
upon proper notice to the defendants. 14 It also made a
finding that defendants incurred rentals in arrears.
Complainant received a copy of the Decision on October
7, 1992. Two days later, or on October 9, 1992,
complainant confronted respondent with the adverse
decision but the latter denied receipt of a copy thereof.
Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of Court, however,
complainant found out that respondent received his copy
back on September 14, 1992. 17
Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12,
1993 complainant filed the present administrative
complaint against the respondent for professional
delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required
pleadings in behalf of the complainant and his spouse.
Complainant contends that due to respondent's inaction
he lost the opportunity to present his cause and ultimately
the case itself.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Oca violated the CPR?
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that respondent
violated the lawyer's oath and several of the Canons in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In this case, evidence
abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the required
diligence in handling the case. Every case a lawyer
accepts deserves full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. In other words, whatever the
lawyer's reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound
to do his utmost in prosecuting or defending it. When
respondent was directed to file the required pleadings, he
had no choice but to comply. However, respondent did not
bother to do so, in total disregard of the court orders. This
constitutes negligence and malpractice. cHSTEA
The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably
showed respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a
lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby
warranting his suspension from the practice of
law. aDcHIS
The Court ordered the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for two months.
59) SIMON D. PAZ vs. ATTY. PEPITO A. SANCHEZ
A.C. No. 6125September 19, 2006
FACTS:
Complainant stated that he and his partners engaged the
services of respondent to assist them purchase, as well as
document the purchase, of several parcels of land from
tenant-farmers in Pampanga. Respondent was also
tasked to defend complainant's claim on the properties
against the claim of a certain George Lizares.
Respondent, allegedly after the termination of his services,
filed a complaint before the DARAB in behalf of one Isidro
Dizon for annulment of TCT in the name of complainant
and his partners. Complainant explained that Dizon's
property was among those properties purchased by
complainant with respondent's assistance. Complainant
alleged that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests when he represented Dizon in a case involving
the same properties and transactions in which he
previously acted as complainant's counsel. Complainant
added that respondent filed the DARAB case with
"malicious machination" because respondent used
complainant's old address to serve the complaint and
summons, enabling respondent to obtain a judgment by
default in Dizon's favor. Complainant also charged
respondent with violation of the lawyer's oath because,
"with malice and full knowledge of the real facts,"
respondent filed groundless and false suits against
complainant, his partners and Sycamore.
ISSUE: WON Respondent violated the rule on prohibition
on representing conflicting interests
HELD: YES. GUILTY RULE 15.03 SUSPENDED 1 year
The Court finds insufficient evidence to hold respondent
liable for forum shopping and for filing groundless suits.
However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of
the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.
On Respondent's Violation of the Lawyer's Oath
Lawyers take an oath that they will not wittingly or willingly
promote any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid or consent to the same. The Court notes that the
cases are still pending before the DARAB and the RTC.
The Court, therefore, does not have any basis for ruling if
there was a violation of the oath.
On Respondent's Violation of the Prohibition against
Representing Conflicting Interests
Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.
The proscription against representation of conflicting
interest applies to a situation where the opposing parties
are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action.
By respondent's own admission, when he filed the DARAB
case on Dizon's behalf against complainant, both
complainant and Dizon were respondent's clients at
that time. Respondent was representing complainant in
the cases against Lizares where respondent was duty-
bound to defend complainant's title over the properties
against the claims of Lizares. While it is not clear from the
records that the Lizares cases included Dizon's property, it
is undisputed that respondent acted as complainant's
counsel in the Lizares cases. At the same time,
respondent was also representing Dizon before the
DARAB for cancellation of lispendensinvolving Dizon's
property, which cancellation was needed for complainant
to purchase the Dizon property. In filing the second
DARAB case on Dizon's behalf, respondent was duty-
bound to assail complainant's title over Dizon's property,
which complainant had purchased from Dizon.
Respondent was clearly in a conflict of interest situation.
Respondent merely offered to justify his actuations by
stating that he felt it was his "duty and responsibility" to file
the case because he felt responsible for the cancellation
of the TCT and its subsequent transfer in complainant's
name. However, good faith and honest intentions do not
excuse the violation of this prohibition. In representing
both complainant and Dizon, respondent's duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clients was placed
under a cloud of doubt. The reason for the prohibition is
found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree.
60 Gamilla et.al. vs. Mario, Jr.,
A.C. No. 4763, March 20, 2003
Facts:
The management of UST and the UST Faculty Union
entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in
1986 for the provision of economic benefits to its
members. In 1988 the CBA expired and efforts to forged a
new agreement failed which led Union strike, dismissal of
those who took part thereof and, eventually, a court
litigation which resulted in favor of the Faculty Union. UST
was required to reinstate the members and to pay back
wages and a new CBA was entered.
Respondent Atty. Mario, among others, as the president of
the union, was paid initially by the UST in fulfillment of the
new agreement. Respondent transacted the money for
various purposes and received amount as attorneys fees
thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent atty. Mario violated the CPR.
Held:
Yes. He violated Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requiring every lawyer to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients.Lawyers are vanguards in the bastion of
justice so they are without doubt expected to have a
bigger dose of service-oriented conscience and a little less
of self-interest.
As indispensable part of the system of administering
justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of
office and the canons of professional ethics - a duty more
than imperative during these critical times when strong
and disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice of
law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin
with the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with
clients, which would progress thereafter towards the ideal
that a lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an
ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of
public interest.
61. PASAY LAW AND CONSCIENCE UNION, INC.vs.
ATTY. DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.
A. M. No. 1008 January 22, 1980
The Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (PLACU) filed
this disbarment case against David D.C. Paz, a member of
the Philippine Bar. The complainant charged the
respondent with malpractice, gross misconduct in office,
gross immoral conduct and/or disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines.
The Solicitor General charged Atty. D.C. Paz with
representing clients with conflicting interests and gross
misconduct in office.
Regarding the charge of representing clients with
conflicting interests, The complainant alleged that in the
course of the investigation then being conducted by the
"Charlie Division" of the PARGO, the respondent, David
D.C. Paz, was then PARGO's Legal Officer and Chief
Prosecutor, as well as the head of the aforesaid "Charlie
Division"; that in the series of follow-ups made with
PARGO by Dr. Irineo P. Sia himself and at times in
company of Atty. Galileo P. Brion, President of the
complainant, PLACU, of the aforesaid anti-graft complaint
against the then ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta, the respondent
enlisted the help of Dr. Irineo P. Sia and Atty. Galilee P.
Brion in the gathering of evidence which included
PLACU's copies of the records;
After respondent had resigned from the PARGO, the
Complaints and Investigation Office (CIO) filed an anti-
graft charge and another charge for technical malversation
both against Pablo Cuneta and others with the Pasay City
Fiscal's Office, the respondent entered his appearance,
participated and orally argued therein as one of the
counsels of Pablo Cuneta; and that the alleged withdrawal
of the respondent as counsel for Pablo Cuneta,
On the charge of gross misconduct in office, the
respondent borrowed and received from Atty. Brion the
PLACU's copies of the record or the respondent never
returned to the former the aforesaid PLACU's copies of the
record or expedients
In his answer, respondent, David D.C. Paz, specifically
denied the allegation and that he did not participate in the
investigation of the Cuneta anti-graft case except to swear
the witnesses; that it is true that respondent Paz appeared
among a battery of lawyers for Mayor Cuneta but when his
appearance was questioned by Atty. Brion, it was
withdrawn; and that the anti-graft case against Mayor
Cuneta was finally dismissed.
Issue:
Whether of not respondent violate the rule on conflicting
interest of clients.
Held:
YES, with regard to violation of conflicting interest rule, the
evidence has duly established that the respondent, David
D.C. Paz, as PARGO's Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor
and head of the "Charlie Division", took part in the
investigation of the anti-graft case against ex-Mayor
Cuneta by administering oaths to witnesses and gathering
evidence.
He had already violated the Canons of Legal Ethics and
Sec. 20(e) of Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an
attorney:
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at a every
peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his client's
business except from him or with his knowledge and
approval;
There is no sufficient evidence that the respondent had
borrowed the record. In view thereof, the respondent
cannot be held guilty of the charge of serious misconduct.
The respondent is found guilty of representing clients with
conflicting interests and he is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) months, with a warning that a
repetition of the same offense win be dealt with i more
drastically. The respondent is exonerated of the charge of
g TOSS misconduct in office
62. DIANA RAMOS vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG
FACTS:
Disbarment or Suspension against Atty. Jose R. Imbang
for multiple violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In 1992, Ramos sought the assistance of
Atty. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the
spouses Roque and ElenitaJovellanos. She gave
Imbang P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a
receipt for P5,000 only. Ramos tried to attend the
scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Imbang never allowed her to enter the courtroom and
always told her to wait outside. He would then come out
after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been
cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and
for each appearance in court, respondent charged her
P350.
IBP findings (CBD):
The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service
which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render. However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
CBD Recommendations: Suspension from the practice of
law for three years and ordered him to immediately return
to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was
substantiated by the receipt.
Board of Governors: adopted and approved the findings of
the CBD, however, modified the CBD's recommendation
with regard to the restitution ofP5,000 by imposing interest
at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of
Imbangs failure to return the total amount, an additional
suspension of six months.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Imbang should be disbarred.
HELD: YES.Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves
with honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in
government service are expected to be more
conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to
public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but
also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service.
The SC supported this with three explanations:
1. Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees
Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7.Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition
to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict with their official function.
In this instance, Imbang received P5,000 from the
complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while
he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship.
2. Revised Administrative Code
Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the
Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent
persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other
quasi-judicial cases.
As a PAO lawyer, Imbang should not have accepted
attorney's fees from the complainant as this was
inconsistent with the office's mission.
63) FERNANDO MARTIN PENA vs. ATTY. LOLITO G.
APARICIO
Facts:
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio appeared as legal counsel for
Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
against complainant Fernando Martin Pena. Hufana
is praying for claim for separation pay, but Pena
rejected the claim as baseless.
Thereafter, Aparicio sent Pena a letter reiterating his
client's claim for separation pay. Through his letter,
he threatened complainant that should Pena fail to
pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he
would file and claim bigger amounts including moral
damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax
evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation
of business license to operate due to violations of
laws.
Issue:
WON Aparicioviolated Canon 19 (and 19.01) of the
CPR, enjoining every lawyer to represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law? YES
 NB: Rule 19.01.A lawyer shall employ only fair
and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding."
WON it is proper to disbar Aparicio? NO, reprimand
only
Held:
Under Canon 19, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal
case or cases against the adversaries of his client
designed to secure leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases
against the lawyer's client.
In the case at bar, the threats are not only unethical
for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to
blackmail. Blackmail is "the extortion of money
from a person by threats of accusation or exposure
or opposition in the public prints,obtaining of
value from a person as a condition of refraining
from making an accusation against him, or
disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his
prejudice." The letter in this case contains more
than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains
a threat to file retaliatory charges against
complainant which have nothing to do with his
client's claim for separation pay. Indeed, letters of
this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
It was not respondent's intention to point out
complainant's violations of the law as he so
gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains
an implied promise to "keep silent" about the said
violations if payment of the claim is made on the
date indicated.
DECISION: While the writing of the letter went
beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment
is too severe a penalty to be imposed on
respondent, considering that he wrote the same out
of his overzealousness to protect his client's
interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate
penalty is reprimand.
On the sui generis character of disbarment
proceedings, the Court ratiocinated in In re
Almacen:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither
a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by
the Court motuproprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion
to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
64) JOSE A. RIVERA vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL
Facts:
Rivera instituted a complaint for disbarment charging Atty.
Corral with malpractice and conduct unbecoming a
member of the Philippine Bar. A decision for an ejectment
case was received by Atty. Corrals secretary on February
23, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed by Atty. Corral on
March 13, 1990. Next day, he went to the clerk of court
and changed the date February 23 to February 29 without
the courts prior knowledge and permission. Atty. Corral
later on filed a reply to plaintiffs manifestation claiming
that he received the decision on February 28, not 29
(because there is no Feb 29). In his defense, respondent
claimed that the correction of the date was done on the
paper prepared by him. He also alleged that the correction
was initiated and done in the presence and with the
approval of the Clerk of Court and the other court
employees. According to respondent, the correction was
made because of typographical error he committed.
In a Resolution, the Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation and recommendation. Thereafter,
Investigating Commissioner Victor Fernandez submitted
his report finding respondent guilty and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months. In
October 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
Resolution approving and adopting the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of
the IBP Boards decision. The Board, however, denied the
motion for reconsideration and further pointed out that the
pleading is improper because his remedy was to file the
same with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Corral should be disbarred for
changing the date when he received the decision of the
court without the courts prior knowledge of decision
Held:
NO. While the prevailing facts of the case do not warrant
so severe a penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of
the Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar must,
nonetheless, be exercised because it can not be denied
that respondent has violated his solemn oath as a lawyer
not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.
The relevant rules to the case at bar are Rules 1.01 and
Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 states in no uncertain terms that: "A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." More specifically, Rule 19.01 mandates that "a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain improper advantage in any case or
proceeding."
The Court "cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients." Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D.
Unto, the Court ruled that "The ethics of the legal
profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the
course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined
or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity. Public confidence in the
law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every
lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner
that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession."
The correction of date by Atty. Corral was made not to
reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court in believing
that the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary
period. Because if the decision was received on Feb 22,
the notice of appeal filed on March 13 is filed out of time.
To extricate himself from such predicament, Atty. Corral
altered the date he received the courts decision. By
altering the material dates to make it appear that the
Notice of Appeal was timely filed, Atty. Corral committed
an act of dishonesty. Dishonesty constitutes grave
misconduct.
sum of five hundred pesos as settlement. Despite the
dismissal, Ana felt aggrieved and asked for the disbarment
or suspension of Atty. Gorduiz and Judge Equipilag.
Issue:
Whether or not the judges should be suspended.
Held:
The Court finds that there is justification for suspending
the respondent.Respondent acted precipitately in filing a
criminal action against his client for the supposed
misappropriation of his attomey's fees. It is not altogether
clear that his client had swindled him and, therefore, there
is some basis for concluding that, contrary to his lawyer's
oath, he had filed a suit against her and had harassed and
embarrassed her.
Paragraph 14 of the Canons of Legal Ethics prescribes
that "controversies with clients concerning compensation
are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be
compatible with his self- respect and with his right to
receive reasonable recompense for his services; and
lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to prevent
injustice, imposition or fraud."

In view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

65) Retuya v. Gorduiz

AC NO. 1388

Facts:
Ana F. Retuya filed for a claim of workmens
compensation against Eastern Shipping Lines, the
employer of her husband who died in 1968.In a decision
by the Workmens Compensation Unit at Tacloban City,
Ana was awarded a sum for compensation benefits,
medical and hospitalization expenses, burial expenses,
and attorneys fees of Atty. InegoGorduiz (P300).The
employer paid a reduced award.Ana sent the receipt and
release, wherein she also explained that Gorduiz did not
sign the joint motion to dismiss the claim because he
wanted 20% of the award as his attorneys fees but she
was willing to give him 10% only.Unexpectedly, she was
served with a warrant of arrest. By reason of an affidavit
executed by Atty. Gorduiz stating that Ana had
misappropriated and refused to make payment his
attorneys fees amounting to three hundred pesos.

On the basis of such affidavit, the acting chief of police

filed against Ana a complaint for estafa which was not
tried. Instead, Atty. Diola, lawyer of Ana, offered Gorduiz a