Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS "as a casual occupation a sideline to his scrap iron business" and not
and ERNESTO CENDANA, respondent as a common carrier.
FACTS ISSUE
- Respondent Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying 1. Whether or not private respondent Ernesto Cendana may be properly
up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. He would bring such characterized as a common carrier (Yes)
material to Manila for resale. He utilized two (2) six- wheeler trucks
which he owned for hauling the material to Manila. On the return trip to 2. Whether or not
Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles with cargo which private respondent is
various merchants wanted delivered to different establishments in liable
Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged freight rates. (No)
HELD
- Petitioner Pedro de Guzman a merchant and authorized dealer of First issue
General Milk Company (Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty -The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
filled milk from a warehouse of General Milk in Makati to petitioner's Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
establishment in Urdaneta associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
- Respondent loaded in Makati the merchandise on to his trucks: 150 offering their services to the public.
cartons were loaded on a truck driven by respondent himself, while 600
cartons were placed on board the other truck which was driven by The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
Manuel Estrada, respondent's driver and employee. business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a
- Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. The sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
other 600 boxes never reached petitioner, since the truck was hijacked between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a
somewhere along MacArthur Highway in Tarlac, by armed men regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
- Petitioner commenced action against private respondent demanding distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public,"
payment of P 22,150.00, the claimed value of the lost merchandise i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services
or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
- Petitioner argued that private respondent, being common carrier, and population.
should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods-- respondent
denied that he was a common carrier -So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732
may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of "public service,"
- The trial court rendered a Decision finding private respondent to be a under the Public Service Act (Co
common carrier and holding him liable
-- The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held
1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law on
common carriers set forth in the Civil Code. Under Section 13, - We do not believe, however, that in the instant case, the standard of
paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, "public service" includes: ... extraordinary diligence required private respondent to retain a security
every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or guard to ride with the truck and to engage brigands in a firelight at the
control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or risk of his own life and the lives of the driver and his helper.
limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and
done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, - Under Article 1745 (6), a common carrier is held responsible and will
street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility even for acts
or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or robbers
its classification... in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."
-it appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized - The armed men acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence
as a common carrier even hough he merely "back-hauled" goods for or force. 3 Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed with
other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such back-hauling firearms. The robbers not only took away the truck and its cargo but
was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled also kidnapped the driver and his helper, detaining them for several
manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation was days.
not the carriage of goods for others.
Second issue:
- Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy" 2 are held to a very high degree of care and diligence
("extraordinary diligence") in the carriage of goods as well as of
passengers. The specific import of extraordinary diligence in the care of
goods transported by a common carrier is, according to Article 1733,
"further expressed in Articles 1734,1735 and 1745, numbers 5, 6 and 7"
of the Civil Code.
- MV VLASONS I loaded at plaintiffs pier at Iligan City, the NSCs -It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of
shipment of 1,677 skids of tinplates and 92 packages of hot rolled passengers or goods, provided it has space, for all who opt to avail
sheets or a total of 1,769 packages-- shipment was placed in the three themselves of its transportation service for a fee. A carrier which does
(3) hatches of the ship. not qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier. Generally,
private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier does
-The vessel arrived with the cargo when the vessels three (3) hatches not hold himself out to carry goods for the general public. The most
containing the shipment were opened by plaintiffs agents, nearly all typical, although not the only form of private carriage, is the charter party,
the skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets were allegedly found to be a maritime contract by which the charterer, a party other than the
wet and rusty. Unloading was completed after incurring a delay of 11 shipowner, obtains the use and service of all or some part of a ship for a
days due to the heavy rain period of time or a voyage or voyages.
- It was reported that the rusting of the tinplates was caused by contact
with SEA WATER sustained while still on board the vessel as a
-MV Vlasons I was not a common but a private carrier. used an old and torn tarpaulin or canvas to cover the hatches
[14] Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI an through which the cargo was loaded into the cargo hold of the ship.
NSC, including their respective liability for damage to the The records sufficiently support VSIs contention that the ship used
cargo, are determined primarily by stipulations in their the old tarpaulin, only in addition to the new one used primarily to
contract of private carriage or charter party. make the ships hatches watertight.
B. Burden of proof -The stevedores employed only a tent-like material to cover the
hatches when strong rains occasioned by a passing typhoon
- NSC must prove that the damage to its shipment was caused by disrupted the unloading of the cargo. This tent-like covering,
VSIs willful negligence or failure to exercise due diligence in making however, was clearly inadequate for keeping rain and seawater
MV Vlasons I seaworthy. This view finds further support in the away from the hatches of the ship.
Code of Commerce (Art 361 and 362).
*additional note: The Court defined demurrage in its strict sense as
- Because the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the shipowners the compensation provided for in the contract of affreightment for
obligations are governed by the foregoing provisions of the Code of the detention of the vessel beyond the laytime or that period of time
Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a general rule, agreed on for loading and unloading of cargo. It is given to
places the prima facie presumption of negligence on a common compensate the shipowner for the nonuse of the vessel.
carrier.
-records reveal that VSI exercised due diligence to make the ship
seaworthy an fit for the carriage of NSCs cargo of steel and
tinplates. This is shown by the fact that it was drydocked and
inspected by the Philippine Coast Guard before it proceeded to
Iligan City-- cleared it as seaworthy, fitted and equipped
-As noted earlier, the NSC had the burden of proving that the
damage to the cargo was caused by the negligence of the officers
and the crew of MV Vlasons I in making their vessel seaworthy and
fit for the carriage of tinplates. NSC failed to discharge this burden.
-Before us, NSC relies heavily on its claim that MV Vlasons I had
Transportation Law | Page 4 of 54
Philippine Industrial Corporation vs CA RULE - YES
CASE # 3 - Definition of Common Carrier
A "common carrier" may be defined, broadly, as one who holds
himself out to the public as engaged in the business of
FACTS
transporting persons or property from place to place, for
Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act compensation, offering his services to the public generally.
No. 387 to contract, install and operate oil pipelines
Art. 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any
In 1995, petitioner applied for a mayor's permit. However, before it person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of
could be issued, the respondent City Treasurer required petitioner carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
to pay a local tax based on its gross receipts for the fiscal year or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public."
1993 pursuant to the Local Government Code.
The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of
Not to hamper its operations, petitioner paid the tax under protest. goods is:
Petitioner wrote a letter addressed to the City Treasurer stating
1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others
that their company is a pipeline operator with a government
as a public employment, and must hold himself out as ready to
concession granted under the Petroleum Act. It is engaged in the
engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a
business of transporting petroleum products from the Batangas
business and not as a casual occupation;
refineries, via pipeline, to Sucat and JTF Pandacan Terminals.
Thus, their company is exempt from paying tax on gross receipts 2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his
under Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991 business is confined;
Petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for tax refund. 3. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business
is conducted and over his established roads; and
Respondents contention: exemption applies only to
"transportation contractors and persons engaged in the 4. The transportation must be for hire.
transportation by hire and common carriers by air, land and
Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt
water." Pipelines are not included in the term "common carrier"
that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the business of
which refers solely to ordinary carriers such as trucks, trains, ships
transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a
and the like. And the term "common carrier" under the said code
public employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently,
pertains to the mode or manner by which a product is delivered to
that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and
its destination.
transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that
RTC dismissed petitioners complaint. CA affirmed. petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition
of a common carrier. In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals 16 we ruled
that:
ISSUE
The above article (Art. 1732, Civil Code) makes no distinction
W/N the petitioner is a common carrier between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a "sideline"). Article 1732 . . .
Transportation Law | Page 5 of 54
avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one
offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering
its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from
a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article
1877 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
Also, respondent's argument that the term "common carrier" as used
in Section 133 (j) of the Local Government Code refers only to
common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving
vehicles or vessels either by land, sea or water, is erroneous.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the definition of "common
carriers" in the Civil Code makes no distinction as to the means
of transporting, as long as it is by land, water or air. It does not
provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be
by motor vehicle. In fact, in the United States, oil pipe line operators
are considered common carriers.
From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that petitioner is a
"common carrier" and, therefore, exempt from the business tax as
provided for in Section 133 (j), of the Local Government Code.
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, The prevailing doctrine on the question is that enunciated in the
petitioner, vs. PKS SHIPPING COMPANY, respondent. leading case of De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals.[2] Applying Article
1732 of the Code, in conjunction with Section 13(b) of the Public
Facts: Service Act, this Court has held:
Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
services of respondent PKS Shipping Company (PKS business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of 75,000 bags of who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as
cement worth P3,375,000.00. `a sideline). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
DUMC insured the goods for its full value with petitioner between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a
Philippine American General Insurance Company regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
(Philamgen). occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
The goods were loaded aboard the dumb barge Limar I distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the `general
belonging to PKS Shipping. On the evening of 22 December public, i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers
1988, about nine oclock, while Limar I was being towed by services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
respondents tugboat, MT Iron Eagle, the barge sank a couple general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained
of miles off the coast of Dumagasa Point, in Zamboanga del from making such distinctions.
Sur, bringing down with it the entire cargo of 75,000 bags of
cement. So understood, the concept of `common carrier under Article 1732
may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of `public service,
DUMC was able to claim the full amount from Philamgen.
under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as
Philamgen sought reimbursement from PKS Shipping but the
amended) which at least partially supplements the law on common
latter refused to pay.
carriers set forth in the Civil Code.
Philamgen filed a suit against PKS
RTC dimissed the complaint after finding that the total loss of Much of the distinction between a common or public carrier and a
the cargo could have been caused by a fortutious event private or special carrier lies in the character of the business, such
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to prove that PKS that if the undertaking is an isolated transaction, not a part of the
was a common carrier at the time it undertook to transport the business or occupation, and the carrier does not hold itself out to
cargo since the peculiar method of shipping companys carry the goods for the general public or to a limited clientele,
carrying goods for others was a casual occupation although involving the carriage of goods for a fee,[3] the person or
Issues: corporation providing such service could very well be just a private
Whether it is a private carrier or a common carrier carrier. A typical case is that of a charter party which includes both the
Whether it has observed the proper diligence (ordinary, if vessel and its crew, such as in a bareboat or demise, where the
private carrier, or extraordinary, if a common carrier) required charterer obtains the use and service of all or some part of a ship for a
of it given the circumstances period of time or a voyage or voyages[4] and gets the control of the
vessel and its crew.[5] Contrary to the conclusion made by the
appellate court, its factual findings indicate that PKS Shipping has
engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although
Transportation Law | Page 11 of 54
for a limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The
regularity of its activities in this area indicates more than just a casual
activity on its part.[6] Neither can the concept of a common carrier
change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered
into with patrons of the carrier. Such restrictive interpretation would
make it easy for a common carrier to escape liability by the simple
expedient of entering into those distinct agreements with clients.
Addressing now the issue of whether or not PKS Shipping has
exercised the proper diligence demanded of common carriers, Article
1733 of the Civil Code requires common carriers to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods they carry. In
case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and
the burden of proving otherwise rests on them.[7] The provisions of
Article 1733, notwithstanding, common carriers are exempt from
liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to any of
the following causes:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or
civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in
the containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.[8]
The appellate court ruled, gathered from the testimonies and sworn
marine protests of the respective vessel masters of Limar I and MT
Iron Eagle, that there was no way by which the barges or the tugboats
crew could have prevented the sinking of Limar I. The vessel was
suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8)
feet and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of
water into the barges hatches. The official Certificate of Inspection of
the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise
Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I and
should strengthen the factual findings of the appellate court.
- The cargo was transferred to petitioner's custody on July 25, 1990. - Ruling:
On August 15, 1990, 900 metric tons of the shipment was loaded on
barge PSTSI IIl for delivery. The cargo did not reach its destination. - Yes. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as
persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business
- It appears that on August 17, 1990, the transport of said cargo was of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
suspended due to a warning of an incoming typhoon. On August 22, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.
1990, the petitioner proceeded to pull the barge to Engineering Island Petitioner contends that it is not a common carrier but a private
off Baseco to seek shelter from the approaching typhoon. A few days carrier. Allegedly, it has no fixed and publicly known route, maintains
after, the barge developed a list because of a hole it sustained after no terminals, and issues no tickets. It points out that it is not obliged to
hitting an unseen protuberance underneath the water. Petitioner carry indiscriminately for any person. It is not bound to carry goods
secured the services of Gaspar Salvaging Corporation which refloated unless it consents. In short, it does not hold out its services to the
the barge. The hole was then patched with clay and cement. general public.
- Upon reaching the Sta. Mesa spillways, the barge again ran - In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the definition of
aground due to strong current. To avoid the complete sinking of the common carriers in Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction
barge, a portion of the goods was transferred to 3 other barges. The between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
next day, the towing bits of the barge broke. It sank completely, persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
resulting in the total loss of the remaining cargo. ancillary activity. We also did not distinguish between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
- A bidding was conducted to dispose of the damaged wheat retrieved basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
& loaded on the 3 other barges. Consignee sent a claim letter to the unscheduled basis. Further, we ruled that Article 1732 does not
petitioner, and another letter to the private respondent for the value of distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general
the lost cargo. public, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population.
- The passengers, who had put on their life jackets, struggled to get - That respondent does not charge a separate fee or fare for its ferry
out of the boat and reached the surface. Help came after about 45 services is of no moment. It would be imprudent to suppose that it
minutes. Boarded on those two boats were 22 persons, consisting of provides said services at a loss. The Court is aware of the practice of
18 passengers and four crew members, who were brought to Pisa beach resort operators offering tour packages to factor the
Island. Eight passengers, including petitioners son and his wife, died transportation fee in arriving at the tour package price. That guests
during the incident. who opt not to avail of respondents ferry services pay the same
amount is likewise inconsequential. These guests may only be
- Petitioners demanded indemnification from respondent for the death deemed to have overpaid.
of their son but denied any liability on the ground of fortuitous event.
CA:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding
that petitioner was a common carrier, found that she admitted in her
answer that she did business under the name A.M. Bascos Trucking
and that said admission dispensed with the presentation by private
In a claim for loss filed by the consignee (or the insurer), the burden
of proof to show compliance with the obligation to deliver the goods
to the appropriate party devolves upon the arrastre operator. Since
the safekeeping of the goods is its responsibility, it must prove that
the losses were not due to its negligence or to that of its employees.
Facts: 6. In their defense, Sps. Pereas assailed that they had exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
1. Sps. Pereas were engaged in the business of transporting supervision of Alfaro, by making sure that Alfaro had been issued a
students from their respective residences in Paraaque City to Don drivers license and had not been involved in any vehicular accident
Bosco in Pasong Tamo, Makati City. They used a KIA Ceres Van with prior to the collision. For its part, PNR showed that the proximate
the capacity to transport 14 students at a time. Clemente Alfaro was cause of the collision had been the reckless crossing of the van
employed as the driver of the van. Meanwhile, Sps. Zarate contracted whose driver had not first stopped, looked and listened; and that the
Sps. Pereas to transport their son, Aaron, to and from Don Bosco. narrow path traversed by the van had not been intended to be a
railroad crossing for motorists.
2. Since the students are running late, Alfaro took the van to an
alternate route by traversing the narrow path underneath the 7. The RTC ruled in favor of the Zarates on the grounds that the
Magallanes Interchange that was used as a short cut into Makati.At cooperative gross negligence of the Pereas and PNR had caused
about the time the van was to traverse the railroad crossing,the train the collision that led to the death of Aaron. The CA concurred with the
PNR Commuter No. 302 , operated by Jhonny Alano, was in the RTCs decision.
vicinity of the Magallanes Interchange travelling northbound. As the
train neared the railroad crossing, Alfaro drove the van eastward Issues:
across the railroad tracks, closely tailing a large passenger bus. His
view of the oncoming train was blocked because he overtook the 1. Whether or not Sps. Pereas operated as a common carrier
passenger bus on its left side.
2. Whether or not the indemnity for loss of Aarons earning capacity is
3. When the train was near from the bus and van, Alano applied the proper
ordinary brakes of the train. He applied the emergency brakes only
when he saw that a collision was imminent. The passenger bus Ruling:
successfully crossed the railroad tracks, but the van driven by Alfaro
did not. 1. Yes. We find no adequate cause to differ from the conclusions of
the lower courts that the Pereas operated as a common carrier; and
4. The impact of the collision threw 9 of the 12 students in the rear, that their standard of care was extraordinary diligence, not the
including Aaron, out of the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train, ordinary diligence of a good father of a family.
which dragged his body and severed his head, instantaneously killing
him. Alano (the train operator) fled the scene on board the train. The provisions on ordinary contracts of the Civil Code govern the
contract of private carriage.The diligence required of a private carrier
5. Sps. Zarate commenced an action for damages against Sps. is only ordinary, that is, the diligence of a good father of the family. In
Perena and PNR on the grounds that, Sps Perea are liable for contrast, a common carrier is a person, corporation, firm or
breach of the contract of carriage with plaintiff-spouses in failing to association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
provide adequate and safe transportation for the latter's son. They
Transportation Law | Page 23 of 54
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, wanted to be if not for his untimely death, but the minimum wage in
offering such services to the public. Contracts of common carriage are effect at the time of his death.
governed by the provisions on common carriers of the Civil Code, the
Public Service Act, and other special laws relating to transportation. A
common carrier is required to observe extraordinary diligence, and is
presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of the loss
of the effects of passengers, or the death or injuries to passengers.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code specifies that the common carrier
should "carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances."
Meanwhile, the RTC also held the PNR guilty of negligence despite
the school van of the Pereas traversing the railroad tracks because
the PNR did not ensure the safety of others through the placing of
crossbars, signal lights, warning signs, and other permanent safety
barriers to prevent vehicles or pedestrians from crossing there.
2. The fact that Aaron was then without a history of earnings should
not be taken against his parents and in favor of the defendants whose
negligence not only cost Aaron his life and his right to work and earn
money, but also deprived his parents of their right to his presence and
his services as well. The basis for the computation of Aarons earning
capacity was not what he would have become or what he would have
ISSUE:
Is the stipulation in the charter party of the owner's non-liability valid
so as to absolve the American Steamship Agencies from liability for
loss?
RULING:
Section 2, paragraph 2 of the charter party, provides that the owner is
ISSUE:
whether a land transportation company can be authorized to operate
a ferry service or coastwise or interisland shipping service along its
FACTS:
HELD:
- The case arose from an importation made by Samar Mining The extent of appellant carrier's responsibility and/or liability in the
Co. Inc. of 1 crate Optima welded wedge wire sieves through transshipment of the goods in question are spelled out and delineated
the M/S Schwabenstein, a vessel owned by Nordeutscher under Section 1, paragraph 3 of Bill of Lading No. 18, to wit: the
Lloyd, (represented in the Philippines by its agent, C.F. Sharp carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay,
& Co., Inc.), which shipment is covered by Bill of Lading No. loss or damage occurring before the goods enter ship's tackle to be
18 duly issued to consignee Samar Mining. loaded or after the goods leave ship's tackle to be discharged,
- Upon arrival of the vessel at the port of Manila, the importation transshipped or forwarded. Further, in Section 11 of the same bill, it
was unloaded and delivered in good order and condition to the was provided that this carrier, in making arrangements for any
bonded warehouse of AMCYL. transshipping or forwarding vessels or means of transportation not
- The goods were however never delivered to, nor received by, operated by this carrier shall be considered solely the forwarding
the consignee at the port of destination Davao. agent of the shipper and without any other responsibility whatsoever
- When the letters of complaint sent to Nordeutscher Lloyd even though the freight for the whole transport has been collected by
failed to elicit the desired response, Samar Mining filed a him Pending or during forwarding or transshipping the carrier may
formal claim for P1,691.93, the equivalent of $424.00 at the store the goods ashore or afloat solely as agent of the shipper
prevailing rate of exchange at that time, against the former, but
neither paid. We find merits in Nordeutschers contention that they are not liable for
- Samar Mining filed a suit to enforce payment. Nordeutscher the loss of the subject goods by claiming that they have discharged
Lloyd and CF Sharp & Co. brought in AMCYL as third party the same in full and good condition unto the custody of AMCYL at the
defendant. port of discharge from ship Manila, and therefore, pursuant to the
- The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Samar Mining, aforequoted stipulation (Sec. 11) in the bill of lading, their
ordering Nordeutscher Lloyd, et. al. to pay the amount of responsibility for the cargo had ceased.
P1,691.93 plus attorneys fees and costs.
- However, the Court stated that Nordeutscher Lloyd, et. al. may A careful perusal of the provisions of the New Civil Code on common
recoup whatever they may pay Samar Mining by enforcing the carriers directs our attention to Article 1736, which reads: The
judgment against third party defendant AMCYL, which had extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time
earlier been declared in default. the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
FACTS:
- Sometime in or prior to June, 1977, the M/S ASIATICA, a RULING:
vessel operated by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.,
(referred to hereinafter as Petitioner Carrier) loaded at Kobe, On the Law Applicable
Japan for transportation to Manila, 5,000 pieces of calorized
lance pipes in 28 packages valued at P256,039.00 consigned The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported
to Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and 7 cases of spare governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss,
parts valued at P92,361.75, consigned to Central Textile Mills, destruction or deterioration. As the cargoes in question were
Inc. Both sets of goods were insured against marine risk for transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of Petitioner
their stated value with respondent Development Insurance and Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code. However, in all
Surety Corporation. matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of
- Enroute for Kobe, Japan, to Manila, the vessel caught fire and common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by
sank, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo. special laws. Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law,
- The respective respondent Insurers paid the corresponding is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.
marine insurance values to the consignees concerned and
were thus subrogated unto the rights of the latter as the On the Burden of Proof
insured.
- On May 11, 1978, respondent Development Insurance & Under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1733, common carriers, from
Surety Corporation having been subrogated unto the rights of the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
the two insured companies, filed suit against petitioner Carrier bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods,
for the recovery of the amounts it had paid to the insured. according to all the circumstances of each case. Common carriers are
- Petitioner-Carrier denied liability mainly on the ground that the responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods
loss was due to an extraordinary fortuitous event, hence, it is unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
not liable under the law.
- On August 31, 1979, the Trial Court rendered judgment in (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or
favor of Development Insurance. Petitioner Carrier took an calamity;
appeal to the then Court of Appeals which, on August 14,
1984, affirmed. xxx xxx xxx
- Petitioner Carrier is now before us on a Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it
from liability under the phrase "natural disaster or calamity. "
In this case, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, in effect,
found, as a fact, that there was "actual fault" of the carrier shown by
"lack of diligence" in that "when the smoke was noticed, the fire was
already big; that the fire must have started twenty-four (24) hours
before the same was noticed; " and that "after the cargoes were
stored in the hatches, no regular inspection was made as to their
condition during the voyage." The foregoing suffices to show that the
circumstances under which the fire originated and spread are such as
to show that Petitioner Carrier or its servants were negligent in
connection therewith. Consequently, the complete defense afforded
by the COGSA when loss results from fire is unavailing to Petitioner
Carrier.
- Development Insurance & Surety Corp, who paid for the insurance
filed an action for recovery of money against NDC and MCP
ISSUE: W/N the law of country or port of destination shall apply. (In
this case, Manila)
-Alday then saw Espiritus truck and notified the MPD who
consequently impounded Espiritus truck
-Alday was also compelled by Altas Fertilizers Corp to pay for the loss
of the fertilizers. Thus, he filed for a complaint against Gelisan and
Espiritu
ISSUE: W/N Gelisan as the registered owner of the freight truck is still
lliable
Held: Yes.
RULING:
Yes, Equitable Leasing is liable. The petition is denied and the CA
decision is affirmed.As the registered owner of the tractor, Equitable
Leasing is liable for the acts of Raul Tutor even if he was actually the
employee of Equitables former lessee, Ecatine Corporation, who
became the actual owner of the tractor by virtue of a deed of sale not
registered with the LTO.
Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is
the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for
the consequences of its operation. In the eyes of the law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
owner/operator being considered as merely the agent of the
registered owner/operator. The principle applies even if the registered
Issue: Whether the Vidad is liable being the registered owner of the
jeepney?
Held: As the jeep in question was registered in the name of Vidad, the
government or any person affected by the representation that said
vehicle is registered under the name of the particular person had the
right to rely on his declaration of his ownership and registration. And
the registered owner or any other person for that matter cannot be
permitted to repudiate said declaration with the objective of proving
that the said registered vehicle is owned by another person and not by
the registered owner.
Santos, as the kabit, should not be allowed to defeat the levy in his
vehicle and to avoid his responsibility as a kabit owner for he had led
the public to believe that the vehicle belongs to Vidad. This is one way
of curbing the pernicious kabit system that facilitates the commissions
of fraud against the traveling public.
1. Spouses Nicasio M. Ocampo and Francisca Garcia, purchased in Held: Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an
installment from the Delta Motor Sales Corporation five (5) Toyota arrangement, commonly known as the "kabit system", whereby a
Corona Standard cars to be used as taxicabs. person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows
another person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such
2. Since they had no franchise to operate taxicabs, they contracted franchise for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special
with petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc.,for the use of the latter's privilege conferred by the government . Abuse of this privilege by the
certificate of public convenience in consideration payment and rent of grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. The "kabit system" has
P200.00 per taxicab unit. been Identified as one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft
and corruption in the government transportation offices.
3. To effectuate the agreement, the aforesaid cars were registered to
Lita Enterprises, Inc, Possession, however, remained with tile Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the "kabit
spouses Ocampo who operated and maintained the same system" is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy
and, therefore, void and inexistent under Article 1409 of the Civil
4. About a year later, one of said taxicabs driven by their employee, Code, It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either
Emeterio Martin, collided with a motorcycle whose driver, one party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it
Florante Galvez, died from the head injuries sustained therefrom. A finds them.
civil case for damages was instituted by Rosita Sebastian Vda. de
Galvez, heir of the victim, against Lita Enterprises, Inc., as registered WHEREFORE, decisions rendered therein are hereby annulled and
owner of the taxicab in the latter case set aside.