Belgica v.

Executive Secretary PERLAS-BERNABE, J

* FACTS:

HISTORY

In the Philippines, the pork barrel (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (Congressional Pork Barrel). However, it has also come
to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The Congressional Pork Barrel can be traced from Act 3044 (Public
Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao
Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the
Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada
administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE

2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority
list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to
projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For
this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or design within ninety
(90) days from effectivity of this Act.

All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a member of the
House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence of the member
of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.

3. Legislators Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall be as follows:

a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft programs and
projects listed under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B,
the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1; and

b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and
One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which
are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.

Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on the use and release of
fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester and the remaining
fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second semester.

4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of Agriculture,
Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social
Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for
infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the
original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original project/scope of work; and (iii)
request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any
realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund
shall be limited within the same classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1
hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be
implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds
have been deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or
the implementing agency, as the case may be.

5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special
Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the implementing agencies subject to the conditions under
Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

The Presidential Pork Barrel questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential
Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by
then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The
Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social
Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management
Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under
the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel

WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on

1.) separation of powers

2.) non-delegability of legislative power

3.) checks and balances

4.) accountability

5.) political dynasties

6.) local autonomy

* HELD AND RATIO:

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel

1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special
Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-
enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF
Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).

Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational aspects
of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the regulation
and release of funds, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling
in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.

In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators
to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court
also declared that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases
of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.

2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed
to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and
Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified
purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from
which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that
they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as
described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.

3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal
lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own
discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence,
outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents power of
item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent
with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects.

Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
Presidents power of item veto.

The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining
relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.
Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency.

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with
post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also,
this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that: [A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must
be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process
of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase as may be defined by law. In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not
been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention
of making equal the unequal (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely
on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount
of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
underdeveloped compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-
List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction. Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body.
Rodriguez v Gella G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953 Paras, C.J.:

Facts:

1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545
appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of
P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic
action and other calamities.

2. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war
between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it
necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in
section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1."

3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB 727 may at
least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress to formally declare the termination of the
emergency powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative

NO.

1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has since liberation repeatedly
been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others
purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to
assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President.

2. CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly
intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such
step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious
unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the
President may wield his veto.

3. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect
of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is
significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force"
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still
effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations.

4. The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to
enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that
although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on
every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to
confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of
legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had
thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more
efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In
our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in
their faithful adherence to the Constitution.

Carmen Planas vs Jose Gil (LAUREL J.)

In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila, published a statement criticizing
the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she
received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president directing her to report
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.

She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an
elective official, she is accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute
offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to
which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a
private citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the
subject of an administrative investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents
of said statement infringe any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil,
however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied
for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction
to review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of purely administrative in character.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President.

HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts
will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal
premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or
constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical
separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government.
There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.

In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in
a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an
investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no
jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a
subordinate officer of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important
averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative
immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the
subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the
authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is
necessarily abated or suspended.

Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out
her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those
allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.
ABUEVA vs WOOD G.R. No. L-21327 January 14, 1924 JOHNSON, J

The parties:

Petitioners are members of the Independence Commission. The creation of the commission was ratified and
adopted by the Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of March, 1919. Twenty six of the petitioners are members of
the House of Representatives and four are members of the Senate of the Philippine Islands and they all belong to
the democratic party;

Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel
Roxas, Presidents of the Independence Commission. Sued as well are the Acting Auditor, the Executive
Secretary and the Secretary of the Independence Commission.

This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court by the petitioners for the writ of mandamus to compel
the respondents to exhibit to the petitioners and to permit them to examine all the vouchers and other
documentary proofs in their possession, showing the disbursements and expenditures made out of the funds of
the Independence Commission.

FACTS:

By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided for a standing appropriation of one million
pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to
defray the expenses of the Independence Commission, including publicity and all other expenses in connection
with the performance of its duties; that said appropriation shall be considered as included in the annual
appropriation for the Senate and the House of Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although
the appropriation act hereafter approved may not make any specific appropriation for said purpose; with the
proviso that no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall be necessary to
make the payment or payments authorized by said act

Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they are legally obliged to prevent the
funds from being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in open contravention of the
purposes of the law. Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested the respondents to permit them to
examine the vouchers and other documentary proofs relating to the expenditures and payments made out of the
funds appropriated for the use of the Independence Commission.

Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from examining said vouchers and
documentary proofs.

ISSUE: Can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the petitioners

HELD:

1. Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the executive department of
the Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or supervision of the courts.

2. Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence Commission, are mere agents of
the Philippine Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts.

3. As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because section 24 of the
Jones Law provides that: The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts, whether of funds
or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive

The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of Independence should be shown
to the plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and administrative discretion, and is therefore not justiciable.
Government of the Philippine Islands vs Milton Springer (Malcolm j.)

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created
it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the
Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of
the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely
lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the
head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate
President and the House Speaker.

However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker,
notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four
others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed
against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of
NCC.

HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to
fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and
controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the
Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive
powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may
appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons
to fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive
branch.

ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION (laurel j)

FACTS: Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.

On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for
garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly
passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l
Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before
the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.

Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking
further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme
Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy; Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art.
VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

SANIDAD VS COMELEC
73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976
Ponente: Martin, J

FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary injunction
to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without
force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the president has no power to
propose amendments to the new constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.

ISSUE:
1. Is the case at bar justiciable?
2. Does the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed sufficient and
proper submission?

HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable question since
it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform such act is in question. The
president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers are generally concentrated to
the president in times of crisis. The time for deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not
too short especially since the questions are issues of the day and the people have been living with them since the
proclamation of martial law.

Ople vs Torres GR No 127685 23 July 1998 puno

Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition
to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on
two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizens
right to privacy.

Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?

Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of
the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. Oples concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress
is understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of
executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.
Separation of Powers: Mendoza vs People G.R. No. 183891 October 19, 2011 (leonen)

Facts:

Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a special law known as the
Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions to his
employees. The offense is criminal in nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he acted in
good faith. But still, the Court has to render judgment and apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura lex
sed lex).

The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term. Considering the circumstances, the court the
Court transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the
grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.

Issue:

Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the President, the grant of
executive clemency to a convict?

Ruling:

The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its power
when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code which provides;
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same
way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of
this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.

JEROME M. DAABAY,Petitioner, v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., Respondent.

REYES, J.:

FACTS: The records indicate that the employment of Daabay with Coca-Cola as Sales Logistics Checker was
terminated by the company in June 2005, following receipt of information from one Cesar Sorin (Sorin) that
Daabay was part of a conspiracy that allowed the pilferage of company property. A formal investigation on the
matter ensued. Eventually, Coca-Cola served upon Daabay a Notice of Termination that cited pilferage, serious
misconduct and loss of trust and confidence as grounds. At the time of his dismissal, Daabay had been a regular
employee of Coca-Cola for eight years, and was receiving a monthly pay of P20,861.00, exclusive of other benefits.

The LA ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. NLRC reversed the decision, holding that Daabay's
participation in the conspiracy was dulu established. However, NLRC ordered that the case be remanded to the LA
for the computation of Daabay's retirement benefits.

Coca-Colas partial motion for reconsideration to assail the award of retirement benefits was denied by the NLRC in
a Resolution. The NLRC explained that there was a need "to humanize the severe effects of dismissal"and "tilt the
scales of justice in favor of labor as a measure of equity and compassionate social justice. The CA agreed with the
Coca- cola that the award of retirement benefits has no basis. Daabay moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Daabay may be entitled to retirement benefits despite his being dismissed legally.
HELD: No. CA decision affirmed.

Labor Law

Daabay was declared by the NLRC to have been lawfully dismissed by Coca-Cola on the grounds of serious
misconduct, breach of trust and loss of confidence. The pronouncement in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRCon the
issue of whether an employee who is dismissed for just cause may still claim retirement benefits equally applies to
this case. The SC held in that case that

Private respondent was not separated from petitioners employ due to mandatory or optional retirement but,
rather, by termination of employment for a just cause. Thus, any retirement pay provided by PALs "Special
Retirement & Separation Program" dated February 15, 1988 or, in the absence or legal inadequacy thereof, by
Article 287 of the Labor Code does not operate nor can be made to operate for the benefit of private respondent.
Even private respondent's assertion that, at the time of her lawful dismissal, she was already qualified for
retirement does not aid her case because the fact remains that private respondent was already terminated for
cause thereby rendering nugatory any entitlement to mandatory or optional retirement pay that she might have
previously possessed.

Being intended as a mere measure of equity and social justice, the NLRC's award was then akin to a financial
assistance or separation pay that is granted to a dismissed employee notwithstanding the legality of his dismissal.
Jurisprudence on such financial assistance and separation pay then equally apply to this case. The Court has ruled,
time and again, that financial assistance, or whatever name it is called, as a measure of social justice is allowed
only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character.

Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason
for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or
illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee
separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.

A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the
erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the
separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who
steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will
commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again
found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the
infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution. Clearly,
considering that Daabay was dismissed on the grounds of serious misconduct, breach of trust and loss of
confidence, the award based on equity was unwarranted

DENIED.
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015

IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY
MOVEMENT v. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and replacing it with the Judiciary
Support Fund. Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to the national
treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be used.

Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to
exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress.

This matter was raised to this court through the letter signed by Mijares and addressed to the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is a Filipino citizen, and a
concerned taxpayerHe filed this petition as part of his continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution
because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after this court
promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund case on November 19, 2013 and Disbursement Acceleration
Program case on July 1, 2014.

The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the promulgation of these
cases show a threat to judicial independence.

In the first week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Farias filed House Bill No. 4690, which would
require this court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund collections to the national
treasury.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A week later, Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas, Jr., filed House Bill No. 4738 entitled The Act Creating the Judicial
Support Fund (JSF) under the National Treasury, repealing for the purpose Presidential Decree No. 1949.

Petitioner argues that Congress gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence
and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of the congress is subject to judicial review

RULING: No.

This court resolves to deny the petition.

The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner
must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The
requisites are:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.23

Petitioners failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright dismissal of this petition.

The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review

No actual case or controversy

One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the existence of an actual
controversy. This means that there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.

Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.

Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into
motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its
legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of
bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the
eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific
constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of
judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.

....

. . . To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the
three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of government.34 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Similar to Montesclaros, petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress from passing laws that will abolish the
Judiciary Development Fund. This court has explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative power of
Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint[.]35 A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed
into law. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere
speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination.36 The petition, therefore, does not present any
actual case or controversy that is ripe for this courts determination.
Petitioner has no legal standing

Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve, petitioner has no legal
standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule on legal standing has been discussed in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo:37

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing
is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person
who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a
citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief
as a citizen or taxpayer.

This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such
as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.38

Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed into law.
While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing
to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary.

This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved are of
transcendental importance to the public. Specifically, this court has stated that:

the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.39

Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v. House of Representatives:40

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.

A mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not enough for this court to set aside
procedural rules:

Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An
allegation of transcendental importance must be supported by the proper allegations
None of the determinants in Francisco are present in this case. The events feared by petitioner are merely
speculative and conjectural.

In addition to the determinants in Francisco, it must also be shown that there is a clear or imminent threat to
fundamental rights.
For this reason, we appreciate petitioners concern for the judiciary. It is often only through the vigilance of private
citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the remedy he
seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is not a lost cause. Considering that what he seeks to be
struck down is a proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying in Congress. There, he
may discover the representatives and senators who may have a similar enthusiastic response to truly making the
needed investments in the Rule of Law.

Petition is DISMISSED.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. HON. REYNALDO M. LAIGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, MAKATI CITY, BRANCH 56, GLICERIA
AYAD, SAHLEE DELOS REYES AND ANTONIO P. HUETE, JR.

G.R. No. 188639

September 02, 2015

Commercial Law; Corporation Law; Trust Fund Doctrine

To the Assignee, these "control" mechanisms are indicative of the interest of Legacy in the enforcement of the
trust fund because the agreement gives it the power to dictate on LBP the fulfillment of the trust, such as the
delivery of monies to it to facilitate the payment to the planholders.

Iit must be stressed that a person is considered as a beneficiary of a trust if there is a manifest intention to give
such a person the beneficial interest over the trust properties.

It is clear from Section 16 that the underlying congressional intent is to make the planholders the exclusive
beneficiaries. It has been said that what is within the spirit is within the law even if it is not within the letter of the
law because the spirit prevails over the letter.

The Congress, because of the chaos confounding the industry at the time, considered it necessary to provide a
stronger legal framework so that no entity could claim that the mandate and delegated authority of the SEC under
the SRC was nebulous. The Pre-Need Code cemented the regulatory framework governing the pre-need industry
with precise specifics to ensure that the rights of the pre-need planholders would be categorically defined and
protected

"Under the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by re-enactment, the re-enactment of a
statute, substantially unchanged (as in this case), is persuasive indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior
executive construction." Accordingly, where a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the
government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter reenacts the provisions without
substantial change, such action is to some extent confirmatory that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose.

The Court cannot go against that legislative intent for it is the duty of this institution to read what the law intends.
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in
its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice
The Pre-Need Code is clear on this. It recognizes the distinction between claims against the pre-need company and
those against the trust fund. Section 52 (b) states that liquidation "proceedings in court shall
proceed independently of proceedings in the Commission for the liquidation of claims, andcreditors of the pre-
need company shall have no personality whatsoever in the Commission proceedings to litigate their claims
against the trust funds." The reason why claims against the trust funds can proceed independently of the
proceedings in the courts is the fact that the latter is directed against a different person or entity.

The Pre-Need Code recognizes that the jurisdiction over pending claims against the trust funds prior to its
effectivity is vested with the SEC. Such authority can be easily discerned even from the provisions of the SRC.
Section 4 thereof provides that despite the transfer of jurisdiction to the RTC of those matters enumerated under
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, the SEC remains authorized to "exercise such other powers as may be provided by law
as well as those which may be implied from, or which are necessary or incidental to the carrying out of,
the express powers granted the Commission to achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws."

Finally, it must be stressed that the primary protection accorded by the Pre-Need Code to the planholders is
curative and remedial and, therefore, can be applied retroactively. The rule is that where the provisions of a
statute clarify an existing law and do not contemplate a change in that law, the statute may be given curative,
remedial and retroactive effect. To review, curative statutes are those enacted to cure defects, abridge
superfluities, and curb certain evils.

A reading of the Pre-Need Code immediately shows that its provisions operate merely in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of the right of the planholders to exclusively claim against the trust funds as intended by
the legislature. No new substantive right was created or bestowed upon the planholders. Section 52 of the Pre-
Need Code only echoes and clarifies the SRC's intent to exclude from the insolvency proceeding trust fund assets
that have been established "exclusively for the benefit of planholders." It was precisely enacted to foil the tactic
of taking undue advantage of any ambiguities in the New Rules.

Any doubt or reservation in this regard has been dispelled by the Pre-Need Code. Section 57 thereof provides that
"[a]ny pre-need company who, at the time of the effectivitv of this Code has been registered and licensed to sell
pre-need plans and similar contracts, shall be considered registered and licensed under the provision of this
Code and its implementing rules and regulations and shall be subject to and governed by the provisions
hereof xxx." Thus, Legacy and all other existing pre-need companies cannot claim that the provisions of the Pre-
Need Code are not applicable to them and to the claims which accrued prior to the enactment of the said law.

"[I]t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which
it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future,
then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct:46 With the Pre-Need Code having the
attribute of a remedial statute, Legacy and all pre-need providers or their creditors cannot argue that it cannot be
retroactively applied.

University of the Immaculate Conception vs Sec of Labor

GR 151379 azcuna j

Facts:

This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner University of Immaculate
Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching and Non- Teaching Personnel and Employees
Union (UNION). The UNION, as the certified bargaining
agent of all rank and file employees of the UNIVERSITY, submitted its collective bargaining proposals to the latter
on February 16, 1994. However, one item was left unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of some
positions in the scope of the bargaining unit.
The UNION it filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and ULP. During the thirty (30) day
cooling-off period, two union members were dismissed by petitioner. Consequently, the UNION went on strike.

On January 23, 1995, the then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction
over the labor dispute.

On March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a reason the UNIVERSITYs
termination of the individual respondents. The UNION alleged that the UNIVERSITYs act of terminating the
individual respondents is in violation of the Order of the Secretary of Labor.

On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued another Order reiterating the directives contained in the January
23, 1995 Order. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the individual respondents under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute.

The UNIVERSITY filed a MR. In the Order dated August 18, 1995, then Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes denied the
MR, but modified the two previous Orders by adding:

Anent the Unions Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not warrant the physical reinstatement
of the twelve (12) terminated employees.

Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until thevalidity of their termination is finally
resolved.

Issue: WON payroll reinstatement, instead of actual reinstatement, is proper.

Held: With respect to the Secretarys Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the
individual respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued by her office, the same is usually not
allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work
and all employers
must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The phrase
under the same terms and conditions makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with
the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that
particular industry can be detrimental to the national interest.

In ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement, then Acting Secretary of Labor Jose S. Brillantes
said:

Anent the Unions Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not warrant the physical reinstatement
of the twelve (12) terminated employees. Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until
the validity of their termination is finally resolved.

As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that render actual
reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law.

The superseding circumstances mentioned by the Acting Secretary of Labor no doubt refer to the final decision
of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents, thereby
rendering their actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the situation. The
payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases, therefore, appears justified as an
exception to the rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. This Court sees no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Acting Secretary of Labor in ordering the same. Furthermore, the issue has not
been raised by any party in this case.

Petition denied.
SC Case Digest: Carpio Morales v. CA and Binay, Jr. (G.R. No. 217126-27, 10 Nov 2015) PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before
the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise
known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building). 13

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators 14 to conduct a fact-finding
investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special
Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint 16 (OMB
Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases17for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases 18 for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases). 19

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following
procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and
present terms as City Mayor of Makati:

Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building
project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design, 24 and
approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15,
2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3) P92,775,202.27 onFebruary 25, 2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51
on March 28, 2011;28 (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project
to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract 32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design,34 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following
amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3)
P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on
October 1, 2012;39

(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award 40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project
to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract 41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the
required publication and the lack of architectural design,43 and approved the release of the funds therefor in the
amounts of P32,398,220.0544 and P30,582,629.3045 on December 20, 2012; and

Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46

(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the
September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of
P27,443,629.97;47 and

(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract48 with
MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati
Parking Building project in the amount of P429,011.48.49
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2 nd Special Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, 2015,
the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their
respective counter-affidavits.52

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the
2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et
al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are
present,54 finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and
members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati
Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement
vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were
administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them
access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may
prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them. 55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas),
to immediately implement the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.56

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and
received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff. 57

Five (5) issues were discussed in this case, namely:

1. Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
was the Ombudsmans plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;

2. Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) has subject matter jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition;

3. Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension issued
by Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.;

4. Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO and WPI; and

5. Whether the CAs directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.s petition for contempt was
improper or illegal.

Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales (Photo credit: inquirer.net)

In dispensing the First Issue, the SC ruled that the Ombudsmans petition falls under the exceptions that a prior
motion for reconsideration must be filed, citing the case of Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, 5 June 2013, which
held as follows: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Emphasis supplied on the grounds relied on
by the SC in this case, in ruling that no motion for reconsideration was needed.)

(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 0.)

As to the Second Issue, the discussion revolved around Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act (RA 6770), more particularly its 2nd Paragraph states:

Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal orapplication for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Now the SC ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is vague, unconstitutional and invalid. The SC relied
on its ruling in the landmark case of Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998), which, in turn, held that the 4th
Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is void, as it had the effect of increasing theappellate jurisdiction of the SC without
its advice and concurrence, inviolation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. This tells us that lawyers should
always be wary of reading RA 6770 since case law has affected itso much maybe its time to update it.

Interestingly, the SC mentioned the Senate deliberations cited by the Ombudsman, in the crafting of RA 6770. It
quoted the exchanges between Senators Jovito Salonga, Edgardo Angara, Teofisto Guingona, Jr., and Neptali
Gonzales, which merely led the SC to be suspicious on whether said Senators were talking about Sec. 14, RA 6670,
or some other provision. In other words, while the throwback was appreciatedby the SC, the discussions were not
really useful in this case.

Regardless, the SC still ruled thatthe remedy of Binay, Jr. the filing of petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, to assail the Ombudsmans preventive suspension order was valid, citing the cases of Office of
the Ombudsman v. Capulong, G.R.No. 201643, 12 March 2014, and Dagan v.Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
184083, 19 November 2013. Its just sad that the sorry end of Second Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770 came as
collateral damage in this case. The SC justified its taking up this issue on its own motion, or ex mero motu, which it
canrightfully do, since it is, after all, the SC.

(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 1. Bonus point goes to Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution)

The Third Issue is where it starts to become more interesting.Here, the Ombudsmans history was discussed, citing
heavily from the case of Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231 and 19232, 28 January 2014
(hereinafter referred to as Gonzales). You can imagine the Ombudsman smiling from ear to ear while reading
this portion, but this form of flattery should lead one to be suspicious.

What can be picked up from the Gonzales case is that the Office of the Ombudsmans independence covers
thefollowing: (1) it is the creation of the Constitution; (2) it enjoys fiscalautonomy; and (3) it is insulated from
executive supervision and control. Onthis basis, the SC held that the Ombudsman was meant to be protected
frompolitical harassment and pressure, to free it from the insidious tentacles of politics. (Oh, what imagery does
this give.) Since the SC is apolitical, then Gonzales should not be interpreted toshield the Ombudsman from the
judicial review power of the courts. After all, there is no politics in the judiciary, right?

After the Ombudsman, it is now the SCs turn to give an exhaustive recap of its own history. Starting from the
definition of Judicial Power, the SC went on the discuss its expanded scope ofjudicial review enunciated in Oposa v.
Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, then the evolution of itsrule-making authority in Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 361 Phil. 73 (1999). The SC pointed out that Congress, in relation to RA 6770, has no authority to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and rules allowing the issuance of an
injunction form part of the courts inherent power, which (now, citing foreign case law) enable the judiciary to
accomplish itsconstitutionally mandated functions.

The SC ruled that Congress passing of the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, which prohibits the issuance of an
injunction, is an encroachment of the SCs rule-making authority. An injunction, after all, is merely a provisional
and auxiliary relief to preserve rights in esse. However, the SC noted that it has not consented to this as it has not
issued rules of procedure through an administrative circular. Thus, pending deliberation, the SC declared the First
Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, as ineffective, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor. Abangan ang susunod na kabanata.

Sec. 14, RA 6770 is now beaten and badly bruised. To sum it up: The Second Paragraph was declared
unconstitutional, and the First Paragraph was now deemed ineffective. As such,the CA was held to have correctly
issued the injunctive relief in enjoining thepreventive suspension against Binay, Jr.

(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 2.)

The Fourth Issue is where the condonation doctrine was taken up. To go right at it, the SC abandoned the
condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the WPI, as it did so
based on good case law, considering that the abandonment is prospective in nature.

In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that this was a jurisprudential creation that originated
in the 1959 Pascual case, which was decided under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable that there was no legal
precedent on the issue at that time, and the SC resorted to American authorities. The SC stated what appears the
sole basis forthe condonation doctrine in Pascual, to wit:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office
because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.

Much has happened since the 1935 Constitution. (Photo credit: en.wikipedia.org)

As can be read above, it is clear that no real justification was given for the condonation doctrine, except that it
seems to incline towards American authorities. On this regard, the SC made its own investigation, and found that
there was really no established weight ofauthorities in the United States (US). In fact, 17 States in the US have
already abandoned the condonation doctrine, as pointed out by the Ombudsman. The SC went on to adopt the
findings of the Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the caveat that said cases are merely guides of
interpretation.

Perhaps the greatest victory in this case for the Ombudsman is that it was able to convince the SC not to adhere to
stare decisis, thereby enriching Philippine jurisprudence on this matter. This is important, as its effects are far-
reaching, since we now have additional basis to petition the abandonment of old ineffective case laws. For this
moment of glory, allow us to quote directly from the case, viz:

Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual,and carried
over in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis
does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis
rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against its application. In other
words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing
precedent. As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it
is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it thrives. In the words of a
recent US Supreme Court Decision, [w]hat we can decide, we can undecide.'

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape
has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions
do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain
difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability,
calls for Pascuals judicious re-examination.

The SC then proceeded to dissect Pascual, and went on to enumerate the notable cases that applied Pascual,
which included cases issued under the 1987 Constitution. Pascual was tested under existing laws, to see if there
exists legislation to support Pascual, e.g. 1987 Constitution, Revised Administrative Code, Code of Conductand
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Local Government Code of 1991, and Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in Civil Service. The SC ruled:

"Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cite legal provisions now leads this Court to the
conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective
local officials administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning
an administrative offense,and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction tosupport the
notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be
condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in
Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses: xxx "

Office of the Ombudsman (Photo credit: philstar.com)

The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory basis at all. By abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC
would remove this defense oft-times used by elected officials, of which the SC was aware of, as it made mention of
the databrought forward by the Ombudsman, to wit:

To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that for the period of July 2013 to December
2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground on
condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct involving infractions
such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct were placed beyond the reach of the
Ombudsmans investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable
of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.

(Score: Ombudsman 2; Binay, Jr. - 2. Bonus point goes to the research team of the Ombudsman, who
painstakingly went through American jurisprudence to support their position.)

The Fifth and Final Issue on whether the order to comment directed to the Ombudsman was illegal, was refused
to be resolved on the ground there are no contempt proceedings yet. It is the claim of the Ombudsman that since
she was an impeachable officer, she could be subjected to contempt. However, no due course has been given to
the contempt action, thus, the Ombudsmans claim was premature.

(Score: Ombudsman 2; Binay,Jr. -2. No points in this round.)

Justice Perlas-Bernabe (Photo credit: sc.judiciary.gov.ph)

So there you have it! The case was Solomonic, in my opinion, as both parties walk away with something. This
review also does not do justice on how well this case was penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. So
please go read the case on the SC website, or just click here.

Some final thoughts:

Expect this case to be taken up in Constitutional law classes on judicial review, SCs rule-making power,
and the Ombudsman as a constitutional body.

It is interesting to wait for the SCs future rules with regard the matter on the issuance of injunction under
Section 14, RA6770. We hope that this actually comes into fruition.

This case may be cited by practitioners who intend to file a petition at the SC without prior motion for
reconsiderationbefore the CA.

Lawyers with politician clients should really take note of this case, as it removes a vital defense in
administrative cases filed against them. Good thing that this is prospective in nature.

Bar candidates must watch out for this, as it may come out in next years Bar Exam in the subject of
Political Law.

Please read, as well, the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who
concurred on the SCs ruling on the ineffectiveness and unconstitutionality of the First Paragraph and
Second Paragraph, respectively, of Sec. 14, RA 6770, but dissented on the revisitation on the condonation
doctrine. Justice Bersamin postulates that condonation must apply only after the conduct of
anadministrative investigation, not while such officer is undergoing investigation. As such, the CA,
according to Justice Bersamin, wrongly applied the condonation doctrine, as such, said doctrine should
not have warranted a re-examination by the SC.

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines)

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301 & 209430 (December 8, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines

The Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld a lower court decision invalidating an administrative order governing
import and release of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) in the Philippines. The Court addressed a range of
issues, from standing and mootness to application of the precautionary principle. On the procedural claims by the
petitioners that the case was moot and academic because all field trials had been suspended, the Supreme Court
found the paramount public interest in the case and the fact that the legal issues were capable of repetition yet
evading review justified the Courts review of the case. Page 38. The Court also noted the petitioners were
warranted in seeking judicial review because the biotechnology administrative framework does not provide a
speedy, or adequate remedy. Page 40.

The decision explains the current controversy over GMOs and, in particular, genetically-modified food crops for
human consumption. Drawing on research and case studies from around the world, and the testimony of expert
witnesses, the Supreme Court found there to be no consensus on the safety of Bt talong to humans and the
environment, stating [t]hese divergent views of local scientists reflect the continuing international debate on
GMOs and the varying degrees of acceptance of GM technology by states . . . . Page 69. The Court also cautioned
that the uncertainties generated by conflicting scientific findings or limited research [are] not diminished by
extensive use at present of GM technology in agriculture. Page 70.

Turning to the existing biosafety regulation in the Philippines, the Supreme Court found Administrative Order
(DAO) 08-2002 deficient because it lacks provisions for meaningful, participatory, and transparent public
consultation prior to field trials and contains no mechanisms requiring applicants seeking to import or release
GMOs to comply with international biosafety standards. Pages 89-91. The Court also found that officials should
have complied with environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedures prior to approving release of Bt
talong. Pages 91-92.

Invoking the precautionary principle, the Supreme Court blocked further field trials of Bt talong until regulatory
systems governing the import and release of GMOs are strengthened. When these features - uncertainty, the
possibility of irreversible harm, and the possibility of serious harm - coincide, the case for the precautionary
principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology. Page 100. The Court proceeded to nullify DAO 08-2002 and enjoined applications for contained
use, field testing, propagation and commercialization, and importation of any GMOs until a new administrative
order is adopted. Page 102.

Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC Case DIgest (G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009) Carpio Morales

FACTS: In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks to extend the voters registration for the May
10, 2010 national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8514, to January
9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.

The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads: "The personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120)
days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election."

On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the
power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that Section 29 of
R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts which include voters
registration; and that the October 31, 2009 deadline was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations,
citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to fix the voter's registration beyond the prohibitive period
set forth by R.A. 8189.

RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.

It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and participate to the fullest extent in every national or
local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during office hours,
except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. The
Court is bound to respect the determination of Congress that the 120 day or 90 day period, as the case may be,
was enough to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections and COMELEC's rule making
power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.

R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's registration under R.A. 8189. R.A.
6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for pre-election activities only if the same
cannot be reasonable held within the period provided by law. However, this grant of power, is for the purpose of
enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the common underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646
and R.A. 8436.

In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's registration cannot be
reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.

With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if the petitioners had
only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the prayer would have been
granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.

As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration for the May 10, 2010
national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent. CONCEPCION, J.:

n 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was purportedly
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general
from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which
provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of
Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by
the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create
municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of
the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which would mean
that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not
replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as the public
welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the
President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and
NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).

G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN TUASON, J

Facts:

1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency
Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate
rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.

2. EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under
prosecution in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition.

3. EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to
compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation
of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes
from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4. EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949
to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector,
and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in
1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the
respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

YES.

1. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met
during the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first
special session after it.

2. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December
24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the
operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for
election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after
Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is
based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers
of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or
other causes brought on by the war.
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for reconsideration and
four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review,
which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and
thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the
application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch
of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng,
alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV
of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of
several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not
lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall
apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the
application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through
appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals.
Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary
of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument
to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund
for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation
without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.

JOHNS, J.:

In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of
such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on
August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice
dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than
that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged
for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a
P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of
the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of
a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable
standard of guilt.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard
policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The
law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR.,
FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO
E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO
PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking ti enjoin the
Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any
action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by
such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUES: W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the justices and judges in this case?

RULING: It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The
rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in
order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with
an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National President (BOCEA
National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L.
MORALES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Respondents.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335. RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets
by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and
a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with
at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in
violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioners directly filed the present petition before this Court
against respondents.

BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the
constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among
others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet
the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and
at their and their respective families prejudice.

Respondents countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due process and right to security
of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987
Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided a reasonable and
valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR provided that an employee may only be separated from the service upon compliance with substantive
and procedural due process. The OSG added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality.

In Abakada, the Court declared Section 12of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to
approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the principle of separation of powers. However, the
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to Section 13of R.A. No. 9335.
The Court also held that until the contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and effective even
without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEAs members to: (a) equal protection of
laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process?

HELD: Ruling in Abakada is adopted.

REMEDIAL LAW: actions; parties

Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC,
are actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEAs members have a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that they have sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative agencies

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily
imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas
delegata non delegari potest, which means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based
on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is the
delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in this case.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection clause

Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: due process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side. BOCEAs apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its
answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given
a target revenue collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due
consideration to all relevant factors that may affect the level of collection.
As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies
are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within
the domain of the Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give
statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No.
9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. We have so
declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.

DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection
Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being
threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO,
private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified
TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the
given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an
axercise in futility.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the
modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue
of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised
at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of
the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a
basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue
delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to
existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence
and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The grant
of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by not allowing
mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the
case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the
laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same
holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent
with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

FEDERICO S. ROBOSA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 176085, February 8, 2012 brion

FACTS:

The NLRC issued a TRO and directed CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other company executives to cease and desist from di
smissing any member of the union and from implementing memorandum terminating the services of the sales driv
ers, and to immediately reinstate them if the dismissals have been effected.

Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRCs resolution. They instead moved to dissolve the TRO and
opposed the unions petition for preliminary injunction. Then, the NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary
injunction.The respondents moved for reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite
the responsible CTMI officers in contempt of court.
Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt charge and issued a resolution dismissing the charge. It ordered the lab
or arbiter to proceed hearing the main case on the merits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NLRC has contempt powers.

HELD:

Yes. Under Article 218 the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt
, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The penalty for direct contempt c
onsists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is against the Co
mmission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with
indirect contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does
not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mo
de is to be observed only when there is no law granting them contempt powers. As is clear under Article 218(d) of
the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party o
r parties in direct or indirect contempt. Robosa, et al., therefore, have not improperly brought the indirect contem
pt charges against the respondents before the NLRC.