THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal
Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. Accordingly, he was
sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00, to pay the amount of
P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

The information alleges:

That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident
premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, inflicting
upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law. From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana together with PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite,
was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n.,
Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the
restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what
appellant was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the
restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun
that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant moved one
step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from
appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1
1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22,
1971). After the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana
pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and after
signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt.
Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they would talk the
matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant
suddenly pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and
stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov.
22, 1971).

While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast
Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica who were all seated at a separate table about one and one-half
(1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused and Lt. Masana stood up to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of
Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker
than any of them in going near the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and
thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the
accused to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp.
26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of Lt. Masana brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital in
Quezon City where he expired several hours later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the accused (pp. 21,
22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the following findings, which are embodied in his
Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as follows:

Postmortem findings.
General: Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity over the dependent
portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and toe tips are pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy incision at
the abdomen, measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with eighteen (18) stitches applied. There
are surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen, measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the anterior midline and 2
cm. long, 6.5 cm. from the anterior midline with two (2) stitches applied and a rubber drain sticking out of each,
respectively.

TRUNK:

(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior midline, 128 cm. above the heel, 1
cm. deep, directed posterior wards and slightly upwards, passing superficially between muscles and tissues.

(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior midline, 121 cm. above the heel, 5.5.
cm. deep, directed posterior wards, downwards and to the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.

(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior midline, 96 cm. above the heel 11 cm.
deep, directed posterior wards, upwards and to the left, perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and the
gastric vessels, grazing the liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of the lower lobe of the right
lung.

(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the posterior midline, 127 cm.
above the heel.

UPPER EXTREMITIES:

(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring 3 by 0.5 cm., just medial to its
anterior midline.

(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index finger, measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just
medial to its posterior midline.

Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.

There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature of the stomach.

There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.

REMARKS:

Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic hemorrhage as a result of
multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the
right lung.

Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the following facts:

At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife were in a restaurant near the
market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had just come from Mandaluyong, Rizal where
they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant, the accused saw three persons to his right,
eating, while to his left he saw a person whom he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone.
While the accused and his wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him and asked him
whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After receiving an
affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join him in his table. The accused accepted the invitation so
the two moved over to the officer's table where the deceased offered beer to the accused who, however, refused
saying he was still hungry. In the course of their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report any
matter about smuggling to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not reported any smuggling
activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the accused for his identification card as a member of the Anti-
Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture and indicating that he
was an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).

Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the accused insisted that it was
genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter was about to put it back in his pocket.
Because of his refusal to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the latter got mad and, in an angry tone of voice,
demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still the accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt. Masana
Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with its handle two (2) time
Immediately, blood gushed from his head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the accused for the third
time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer two or three
times and then pushed him away from him and ran out of the restaurant (pp. 74,75,79, Ibid).

The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where he intended to surrender to
the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite. The Chief of Police
asked him why his head and face were bloody and he answered that he was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a
gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the Chief of Police asked somebody to accompany the accused to the
municipal building. Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben
Ochoa, whose clinic was just across the street where the municipal building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n.,
Dec. 15, 1971). After he was given first aid treatment, he was brought back by the Indang policeman to the
municipal, building where he was detained for two days before he was picked up by the Philippine Constabulary
operatives and transferred to the 121th PC Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40,
t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).

After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of murder can be complexed with assault upon agent of authority.

HELD: Yes. The Solicitor General claims the crime committed was murder because "it was established by the
prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to defend
himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself
suffice to support a finding of treachery , the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill
his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by
appellant on his victim was the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of
evidence does not clearly show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim.
Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore
inferior both in rank and social status to the victim. If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of
murder with assault against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating
because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a
person in authority.

But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance
should be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Appellant guilty of HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT
FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON
ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant.

This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by 13-year old
Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape alleged to have been committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the herein accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersignedcomplaint,
against her will, and in her own room situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.

That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was committed in the dwelling of the
offended party, the latter not having givenprovocation for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)

The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its decision on May 30, 1966,
finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
ofreclusion temporal and not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1

His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a notice of appeal; forthwith the
case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.

On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered a decision the dispositive portion
of which follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado Daniel has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, and he should accordingly suffer the penalty for the crime herein charged.

We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the judgment appealed from is not in accordance
with law.

Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
providing that

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296, as amended)

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the
law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in

(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; ...

WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate further proceedings pursuant to
law. 2

By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to this Court and in a Resolution
of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed.

The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the findings of facts of the trial court
which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after the latter had examined the evidence as a result of which it
certified the case to this Court.

Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible motive could a thirteen-year
old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that could only bring down on her and her family shame and
humiliation and make her an object of gossip and curiosity among her classmates and the people of her
hometown. It cannot be denied that a public trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the victim to what can
be a harrowing experience of submitting to a physical examination of her body, an investigation by police
authorities, appearance in court for the hearing where she has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful
event which she would prefer to forget and leave it unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all these and
preferred to face the cruel realities of the situation it was due to her simple and natural instincts of speaking out
the truth.

The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the girl although he promised to
marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965, Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old and was
not of marriageable age, hence, marriage was a legal impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony that the
complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who was Margarita's uncle, the trial court did not give
credit to such a declaration.

Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity to ask for help or attract
the attention of other people before she reached her boarding house, she failed to do so. According to counsel
there were people at the Dangwa station, in the busy streets, in the market place, in the jeepney parking place
where the girl took a jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and in the neighboring houses the closest of which
was about 5 meters away, but no attempt was ever made by complainant to seek help so as to prevent appellant
from molesting her. 16

Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from the moment she saw the
appellate inside the bus that the latter had intentions of abusing or raping her. All that the appellant did inside the
bus was to hold her bag and she caged the attention of the driver and the conductor to the impertinence of
appellant but the two did not do anything about it. 17 And when Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney
station, although she saw appellant walking behind her she did not suspect that he was following her. To a
question propounded by His Honor whether she suspected that appellant was following her, Margarita answered:
"No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along Margarita could not call the attention of the people in the street or shout for
help inasmuch as at that particular moment the appellant was not doing anything against her. And when Margarita
reached the boarding house there were no persons around 19 and in fact she went straight to her room and it was
at that particular moment when appellant barged into the room before she could close the door. In short, the Poor
girl was simply taken by surprise by the forced entrance of appellant who immediately took out an 8-inch long
dagger and said "If you will talk I will kill you."

Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that some may manifest an aggressive or violent attitude
of confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while others, like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a silent.
fearful attitude.

Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts of the accused at the time
the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by the medical findings that there were no signs of extra-
genital injuries on the girl's body, and no blood stains on her dress and underwear.

The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of Margarita's straightforward and
positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs and
five feet 21 and six inches tall, 20 overpowered her and succeeded in accomplishing the sexual act despite her
resistance. Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 " in height, and weighed around 95 lbs. 21

In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired
result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible, is beside the point. 22
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to consummate his evil purpose.
InU.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A 12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a man
of superior physical strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:

It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of the crime of rape it is not
necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is
only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in
view. (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa doctrine has been
followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape and one of the latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice
Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.)

And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or violence necessary in rape is naturally
a relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. 23

Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself against her will
because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a
dagger and with it threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened
whatever resistance Margarita could muster at the time and as a result appellant was able to consummate his
coitus on the victim. 24

One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the time of the trial in 1965
was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with the National
Bureau of Investigation and the report of the lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was
telling the truth on the questions propounded to him one of which was whether he forced Margarita Paleng into
having sexual intercourse with him and the reply was "No". 25

On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and We quote from his decision
the following:

As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and credit on it. It is well known that the
same is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the time, place and circumstances when taken and the nature of
the subject. If subject is hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not conducive to affect the subject
emotionally, the test will fail. The subject had nothing more to fear because the trial was over. He was not
confronted by the victim or other persons whom he had a reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to the questions
propounded was normal and unaffected and the apparatus could not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)

To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the aggravating
circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita was merely
renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term
is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place
where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the
law seeks to protect and uphold.

Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for the crime of rape as charged,
and We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng by
way of moral damages in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and pay the costs.

Decision Modified.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS, accused-appellant.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been adduced; it is also
essential that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental rights.

Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, Metro
Manila, to the crime of rape under a criminal complaint, which read:

COMPLAINT

The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, of the crime of Rape,
committed as follows:

"That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while armed with a knife and by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW

Paraaque, Metro Manila

August 8, 1994

(SGD) MANUEL P. BERMAS

Complainant

Assisted by:

(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS

Mother[1]

Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which the lower court, presided over by Hon.
Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its decision, dated 02 May 1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged
and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.

The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached this Court by way of automatic review pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 (otherwise known as An
Act To Impose Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose The Revised Penal Code, as
amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes, which took effect on 31 December 1993).

The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, gave an account, rather briefly, of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution.

"On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own father, appellant Rufino
Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed inside their house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8,
Paraaque, Metro Manila (pp. 6-7, TSN, Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife, appellant removed the victim's shorts
and panty, placed himself above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital movements (pp. 7-8,
ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his lustful desire, he threatened the victim with death if she reports the incident
to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)
"On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which yielded the following findings:

"The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the
time of examination; 2. Hymen, intact but distensible and its orifice wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow
complete penetration by an average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any
hymenal laceration."[2]

The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the charge, and that of his married daughter,
Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the accusation made by her younger sister to a mere resentment by the
latter. The trial court gave a summary of the testimony given by the accused and his daughter Luzviminda; viz:

The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of rape on her daughter, the
complainant. He told the Court that he could not do such a thing because he loves so much his daughter and his
other children. In fact, he said that he even performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his children since
the time of his separation from his wife. The accused further told the Court that in charging him of the crime of
rape, the complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the numerous scoldings that she
has received from him on account of her frequent coming home late at night. The accused stressed that he knew
of no other reason as to why his daughter, the complainant, would ever charge him of the crime of rape except
probably in retaliation for being admonished by him whenever she comes home late in the night.

The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his behalf, denied that the complainant was raped by the
accused. She said that the complainant did not come home in the night of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a
liar. She told the Court that the concoction by the complainant of the rape story is probably due to the resentment
by the latter of the frequent scoldings that she has been receiving from the accused. She further added that she
was told by the previous household employer of the complainant that the latter is a liar. She went on to testify
further that she does not believe that the accused, who is her father, raped the complainant, who is her younger
sister.[3]

The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of the prosecution against the accused as having
been duly established and so ruled out the defense theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the part of private
complainant that allegedly had motivated the filing of the complaint against her father. The court adjudged:

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and hereby
sentences him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P75,000.00,
Philippine Currency, and to pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED."[4]

In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in collaboration with the Anti-Death
Penalty Task Force), detailed several errors allegedly committed by the court a quo; thus:

I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.

A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL

1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in appointing the accused's counsel de officio;

2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;

a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of illegal arrest;

b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of invalid filing of the information;

c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;

d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case number;

e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;

f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.

3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio

a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;

b. His work was shoddy;

4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio

5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and prejudicial to the accused.

B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE
PRESUMED INNOCENT.

C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS
BEHALF.

D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.

E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT `SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME CAUTION THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE,
MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND THEREFORE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT."[5]

The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the appeal enough to warrant a remand of the
case for new trial.

It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years of age, assisted by her mother Rosita
Bermas, executed a sworn statement before SPO1 Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Paraaque Police Station, stating, in
sum, that she had been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her own father, in 1991 and 1993, as well as
on 03 August 1994, particularly the subject matter of the complaint, hereinbefore quoted, duly signed and filed
conformably with Section 7, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court. The Second Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification
to the effect that the accused had waived his right to a preliminary investigation.

On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994, the accused was brought before the trial court
without counsel. The court thereupon assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C. Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to be
the counsel de officio. Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.

The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994. The prosecution placed complainant Manuela
Bermas at the witness stand. She testified on direct examination with hardly any participation by defense counsel
who, inexplicably, later waived the cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved of her duty as
counsel de officio.

"ATTY. VILLARIN: And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and my paero besides me, would
accede to my request that I be relieved as counsel de officio because I could not also give justice to the accused
because as a lady lawyer . . . if my paero here and if this Honorable Court will accede to my request.

"COURT: It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the defenseless. That is your sworn duty, Mrs. Counsel de
Officio. Are you retracting?
"ATTY. VILLARIN: That is why I am asking this Honorable Court."[6]

Counsel's request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the new counsel de officio. While Atty.
Gomez was ultimately allowed to cross-examine the complainant, it should be quite evident, however, that he
barely had time, to prepare therefor. On this score, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva in the instant
appeal would later point out:

To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty. Roberto Gomez to be appointed as defense counsel
de oficio. And so the trial court appointed him.

Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his cross examination, presumably to prepare. But a
ten minute preparation to cross examine the complainant upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on the
accused who stands to be meted the death penalty if found guilty, is far too inadequate. He could not possibly
have familiarized himself with the records and surrounding circumstances of the case, read the complaint, the
statement of the complainant, the medico-legal report, memos of the police, transcripts and other relevant
documents and confer with the accused and his witnesses, all in ten minutes. [7]

The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had testified.

The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December 1994; it was later reset to 09 January
1995. When the case was called on 09 January 1995, the following transpired:

COURT: Where is the counsel for the accused?

COURT: Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the turn of the defense to present its evidence.

PROSECUTOR GARCIA: Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.

COURT: Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and considering that the accused is under detention ...
it seems he cannot comply with his obligation.

COURT: (To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?

ACCUSED R. BERMAS: Wala po.

COURT: It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in this case. In view of the fact that the defense
counsel is not interested anymore in defending the accused because last time he moved for the continuance of the
hearing of this case and since this time he did not appear, he is unduly delaying the proceedings of this case and
considering the accused here is under detention, I think it would be better if the Court appoints another lawyer. He
should file his withdrawal if he is not interested anymore.

In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly failed to appear in this Court to defend his client-
accused, the Court is hereby constrained to appoint another counsel de officio to handle the defense of the
accused. For this purpose, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is hereby appointed as the counsel de officio for accused Rufino
Mirandilla Bermas.[8]

The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995 upon the request of Atty. Lonzame. On even date,
Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be relieved as counsel de officio but later, albeit reluctantly, retracted; thus:

COURT: Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?

ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME: As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is here, may I be allowed to
give her my responsibility as counsel de officio considering that the lawyer from the PAO ...

COURT: What about?

ATTY. LONZAME: I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the Court will allow us to be relieved
from our responsibility as appointed counsel de officio of the accused ...

COURT: You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed counsel de officio? As an officer of the Court
you don't want to handle the defense of the accused in this case?

ATTY. LONZAME: I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved of my responsibility as counsel
de officio.

COURT: So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?

ATTY. LONZAME: Yes, Your Honor.[9]

Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the witness stand. He denied the accusation against
him. The next witness to be presented was his married daughter who corroborated her fathers claim of innocence.

The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame who himself, for one reason or another,
had ceased to appear for and in behalf of accused-appellant.

This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not properly and effectively been
accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to counsel that it has been enshrined in our fundamental
law and its precursor laws. Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935 Constitution, the right to counsel of an
accused has already been recognized under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a defendant in
all criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, [10] and that if he is unable to
employ counsel, the court must assign one to defend him.[11] The 1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in
declaring, in Article III, Section 17, thereof, that -

(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the 1973 Constitution, essentially, has
remained unchanged. Under the 1987 Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that has been introduced is the
provision from which prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the right to counsel as early as the stage of
custodial interrogation can be deemed to be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14, Article III, of the
1987 Constitution, states -

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxxxxxxxx

Sec. 14. x x x x x x x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which declares in Section 1, Rule
115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of
the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.

The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal proceedings should never be
taken lightly.[12] Chief Justice Moran in People vs. Holgado,[13]explained:

"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how
to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for
this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused
of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own."[14]

In William vs. Kaiser,[15] the United States Supreme Court, through the late Justice Douglas, has rightly observed
that the accused needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the laws complexity
or of his own ignorance or bewilderment. An accused must be given the right to be represented by counsel for,
unless so represented, there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be as inadequate
considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. [16] The right to counsel proceeds from
the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes
an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly
in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental
procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the
performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly
decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. [17]

It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he should also be asked whether he
wants to avail himself of one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that
one can be provided to him at his request.[18] Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. - The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the
questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by
reason of their experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. But in localities where such members of
the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good repute for
probity and ability, to defend the accused.

A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost.[19] A mere pro-forma appointment of de oficio counsel who fails to
genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits disapprobation. [20]The exacting demands expected of a
lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He must take the case not as a burden but
as an opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility
except only for the most compelling and cogent reasons.[21]
Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, promulgated on 29 March 1999, this Court has said:

We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the manner by which the PAO
lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their
client.

xxxxxxxxx

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost
dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
this regard renders him administratively liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did
not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their
function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might
have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to
adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise,
commission of any similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned.

The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the court a quo for new trial.

WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis of the complaint, aforequoted,
under which he was arraigned. Atty. Ricardo A. Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is hereby
appointed counsel de officio for the appellant.

Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office, Paraaque, Roberto Gomez and Nicanor Lonzame are
hereby ADMONISHED for having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the court and as
members of the Bar and are warned that any similar infraction shall be dealt with most severely.

SO ORDERED.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.

Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on
a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head
delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was standing behind
the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man, ran to his assistance and found him lying on
the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was
passing along the street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was
about to enter, attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of
which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying
his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both
wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the former died within an hour,
the record not stating the result of the wound inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.

In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court charging Manalinde with
the crime of murder, and proceedings having been instituted, the trial judge, in view of the evidence adduced,
rendered judgment on the 5th of February of said year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been submitted to
this court for review.

From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt that the crime of murder, defined
and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, was committed on the person of the Chinaman Choa, in that the
deceased was unexpectedly and suddenly attacked, receiving a deep cut on the left shoulder at the moment when
he had just put down the load that he was carrying and was about to start for the door of the store in front of
which he stopped for the purpose of entering therein. As a result of the tremendous wound inflicted upon him by
the heavy and unexpected blow, he was unable, not only to defend himself, apart from the fact that he was
unarmed, but even to flee from the danger, and falling to the ground, died in an hour's time. It is unquestionable
that by the means and form employed in the attack the violent death of the said Chinaman was consummated
with deceit and treachery (alevosia), one of the five qualifying circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid article
as calling for the greatest punishment.

When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the crime herein
mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before and that he had come from his home in
Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato in
order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a
sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a
pretty woman on his return, but that in case he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order
of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his intention to kill two persons in the town of
Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night
from his home, upon reaching the town, attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front of a store and,
wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close by, just as the latter was placing a tin that
he was carrying on the ground and he was about to enter a store near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and
fleeing at once; he further stated that he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.

From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and self-convicted author of the
crime in question has been unquestionably established, nor can his allegation that he acted by order of Datto
Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible exculpate him, because it was not a matter of proper
obedience. The excuse that he went juramentado by order of the said datto and on that account killed only two
persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would have killed many more, because it is the
barbarous and savage custom of a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason whatever, can not
under any consideration be accepted or considered under the laws of civilized nations; such exhibitions of ferocity
and savagery must be restrained, especially as the very people who up to the present time have been practicing
such acts are well aware that the established authorities in this country can never allow them to go unpunished,
and as has happened a number of times in towns where juramentados are in the habit of appearing, the
punishment of the author has followed every crime so committed.

In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and 7 of article 10 of the
Penal Code should be taken into consideration in that promise of reward and premeditation are present, which in
the present case are held to be generic, since the crime has already been qualified as committed with the
treachery, because the accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck to
go juramentadoand kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped punishment he
would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with the order the accused undoubtedly acted of his
own volition and with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable injury on some of his fellow-beings,
depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing that he was about to commit a most serious
deed which the laws in force in this country and the constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto
Mupuck, who ordered and induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew perfectly well that he
might be caught and punished in the act of committing them.

As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order and undertaking
the journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over
the nature and the consequences of the acts which, under orders received from the said datto, he was about to
carry out, and to that end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a
journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not
know, and with whom he had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent,
might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered
the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration of the circumstance of
premeditation. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and
the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor
alter the nature of the crime. The person having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent,
the crime is considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent intention of the accused from the moment,
before said death, when he received the order until the crime was committed in manifestly evident. Even though
in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not
being inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not
necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the
latter might have existed without the former, the one being independent of the other. In the present case there
can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his
subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally
agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde
obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it.

The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted by the United States vs. Caranto
et al., wherein the decision on page 256 of Volume IV of the Philippine Reports was rendered, as may be seen from
the mere perusal of the statement of facts. It is also different from the case where a criminal who has made up his
mind to kill a certain individual kills a person other than the object of his criminal intent. On going to Cotabato the
Moro Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two persons he encountered, and the fact that the victim was not
predetermined does not alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of the crime, for the reason that to cause
the violent death of a human being without any reasonable motive is always punishable with a more or less grave
penalty according to the nature of the concurrent circumstances.

For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is present to neutralize the effects of
the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs provided
however, that the penalty imposed on the culprit shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of Acts. Nos.
451 and 1577, and that in the event of a pardon being granted he shall likewise be sentenced to suffer the
accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the Penal Code. So ordered.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.

This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses disclose that at around six o'clock in
the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang, Cavite to
gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he was on top of the
tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the coconut tree.

His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She went outside the hut. From a distance of
about twenty-five meters, she saw five men, each armed with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was already
wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of the coconut tree. His assailants were about five meters away
from him.

She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were firing at her husband. She and her
brother Ricardo had known Sangalang since their childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel,
Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors.

Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking
asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then about twenty meters away from them. She retreated to the
hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After the lapse of about five minutes, Laureano Sangalang and his
companions left the place. When Flora returned to the spot where her husband was prostrate, he was already
dead.
On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old, a brother of Flora, was inside his own
nipa hut which was about ten meters away from Flora's hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and children were
eating breakfast. He heard several shots. He came out of his hut. He saw his brother-in-law being shot by Laureano
Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom, Perino Canuel, Irineo Canuel and Conrado Gonzales. He saw Sangalang using a Garand
carbine in shooting his brother-in-law. The latter fell from the top of the coconut tree after he was shot (10 tsn).
His sister Flora was trying to approach her husband but she had to flee to her hut when Sangalang and his
companions fired at her. He wanted to join her but he was likewise fired upon by the five men. So, he retired and
took refuge in his own hut.

Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He followed her after she left the hut and went to see her
dead husband, who was lying on the ground, face up, at the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed that his
brother-in-law was already dead, he gathered his children and brought them to Sitio Biga, which was more or less
thirty meters away from his hut in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo reported the killing to the chief of police who went to the
scene of the crime with some policemen and Constabularymen.

The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained twenty-three gunshot wounds on the
different parts of the body, fourteen of which were entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A and B).
He died due to the multiple gunshot wounds (Exh. C).

On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing, Flora and Ricardo were interrogated by the Silang police. They
executed sworn statements before the Municipal Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado Gonzales, Irineo
Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the assassins of Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in her statement that she
knew those persons because from time to time they used to pass by her place. They resided at Barrio Capitula,
Dasmarias, which is near Barrio Adlas. On the basis of those statements, the police filed on June 10 in the
Municipal Court a complaint for murder against the five aforenamed persons. Sangalang was arrested. He posted
bail in the sum of P50,000 on June 13. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The other
accused have not been apprehended. On August 8, 1968 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for murder
against Sangalang.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch, rendered a judgment convicting Sangalang of
murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cortez an indemnity of
twelve thousand pesos and to pay his widow moral damages in the sum of ten thousand pesos (Criminal Case No.
TG-162). Sangalang appealed.

The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he knew Cortez and that he knows his wife, Flora Sarno. He
pleaded an alibi. He declared that in the afternoon of June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went to the house of
Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's place at six o'clock. He wanted to
borrow money from Gatdula to defray the matriculation fees of his children.

As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised Sangalang to wait until morning. He would try to raise the sum
of two hundred pesos which Sangalang desired to borrow. Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They allegedly slept in
Gatdula's house on the night of June 8th. The next morning, they breakfasted in that house. At about ten o'clock
on June 9, Gatdula delivered the two hundred pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza then went to the Central
Market in Manila and then to Quiapo. They returned to Cavite and arrived at seven o'clock in the evening of June 9
in Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi.

In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs.
Cortez and the victim's brother-in-law, Ricardo Sarno. The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony that
they saw appellant Sangalang as one of the five armed persons, who riddled Cortez with fourteen gunshot wounds
of entry, is sufficient to overcome his alibi. In essence, the case projects the ever recurring conflict in criminal
jurisprudence between positive identification and alibi.
The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that although his witnesses, Mendoza and Gatdula, learned of his
arrest, and Mendoza even visited him in the municipal jail, Sangalang and his witnesses did not interpose the
defense of alibi when he was investigated by the police and when he was summoned at the preliminary
investigation.

Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the declarations of Mrs. Cortez and her brother Ricardo Sarno. Those
inconsistencies, which are not glaring, strengthen their credibility and show that their testimonies were not
coached nor rehearsed. The discrepancies may be attributed to deficiencies in observation and recollection, or
misapprehension of the misleading and confusing questions during cross-examination, or to the defective
translation of the questions and answers but they do not necessarily indicate a wilful attempt to commit falsehood
(People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 350).

The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly and consistently testified that they saw Sangalang, a
person already well-known to them, among the five armed persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That unwavering
identification negates appellant's alibi.

The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing. On the other hand, Sangalang did not show that Mrs.
Cortez and Sarno were impelled by a malicious desire to falsely incriminate him. .

Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the contradictions and deficiencies in the evidence for the prosecution.
He made a spirited defense of the appellant. However, his efforts failed to cast any reasonable doubt on
Sangalang's complicity in the killing.

The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and defenseless. He
was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack
shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution which insured the killing without any risk
to them arising from any defense which the victim could have made. The qualifying circumstance of treachery
(alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly established (See art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). Hence,
the killing can be categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil. 1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating
circumstance of band(U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident premeditation, which was alleged in the information,
was not proven.

The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Sangalang (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised
Penal Code).

Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TORREFIEL, accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel; Hilario Masgong alias Mark; Casiano Masgong alias Manny; Saturnino Suyod alias
Ka Eddie; Jerry Delicano alias Ka Cocoy; Luciano Solanoy, Jr., alias Ka Balot; Noel Semira alias Ka Nido; Ricky David
alias Ka Macky; and Alex Francisco alias Ka Jing, were charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for Murder
and in Criminal Case No. 2911 for Robbery before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Alklan. These cases
were, upon agreement of the parties, jointly tried, since they arose from the same incident and involved the same
parties. The trial proceeded as against the accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel only, the rest of the accused having
remained at large.

After trial, the court a quo convicted accused-appellant1 in each of the cases, the dispositive portions of which are
quoted hereinbelow:

In Criminal Case No. 2909 for Murder:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and hereby sentences the accused to a penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One
(1) day to Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.

The accused is hereby ordered also to indemnify the family of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) by way of damages. x x x2

In Criminal Case No. 2910 for Murder:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and hereby sentences the accused to a penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One
(1) day to Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.

The accused is hereby ordered also to indemnify the family of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) by way of damages. x x x3

In Criminal Case No. 2911 for Robbery:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Jose Torrefiel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
and sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Twelve (12) years and One (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and
Eight (8) months. x x x.4

Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel, appealed to the Court of Appeals. After considering the evidence and the law
involved, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction in all the cases but refrained from entering
judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for murder, having ascertained that the proper imposable penalty
for each of said crimes is reclusion perpetua, and instead, certified these two (2) cases to us for final determination
pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The facts as correctly summarized by the prosecution in its Brief are as follows:5

On May 26, 1989 at about 5:00 oclock in the morning at Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, Realidad Mangilog
woke up early to prepare their breakfast. Her husband Leopoldo Mangilog and her son Reynaldo were about to
join her downstairs, when someone knocked at the kitchen backdoor (TSN, March 21, 1990, pp. 3-4).

It was Leonardo who opened the door. When the door was opened appellant Jose Torrefiel armed with a bolo and
a hand gun entered the house first followed by Masiano Masgong, Hilario Masgong, Alex Francisco, Saturnino
Suyod and Noel alias Nido in that order, who were all armed with long firearms. (TSN, Ibid., p. 5)

The group greeted Leopoldo as How are you Tay? to which the latter answered as usual. Leopoldo even served the
newcomers with coffee, but because the coffee was not sufficient for them, Realidad asked Hermogenes Calizo,
who was then the errand boy of the Mangilog (sic), to buy coffee from the store. (TSN, Id., pp. 5-6).

The group of appellant Torrefiel did not even touch or taste the coffee served them by Leopoldo. Instead,
appellant, Casiano Masgong and Satur Suyod aimed their guns at Leopoldo and started shooting him to death
(TSN, Id., p. 6).6 Simultaneous to the shooting of Leopoldo inside the house by the group of appellant was the
shooting and stabbing of Reynaldo who was then taking a bath inside the bathroom located outside of the house
by the other members of the group who did not enter the house. (TSN. id., p. 7)

After the killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo, the accused ransacked the house and took P500.00 cash, wrist watch,
kitchen wares, grocery items, chickens and guitar. (TSN, Id., p. 10)

Before the accused left the house of the victims, they even fired their guns at random. They were blaming the
victims to be responsible to the incident why the military was running after them. They were also telling the
people along the road that the fish is okey and could be ready to be butchered (Id., p. 11).
Accused-appellant invoked the defense of alibi, claiming that at about 7:00 oclock in the morning of May 26, 1989,
he was at the house of Barangay Captain Benedicto Puod in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, which can be
reached in an hour and a half( 1 1/2) from Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, the scene of the incident. He had
gone on vacation to Barangay Agbalogo on May 22, 1989 and attended the fiesta on May 25, 1989. He had
remained in the said barangay since then upon the advice of his wife not to return to Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay,
Aklan, appellants place of residence, as the situation there was somewhat hot.7 Benedicto Puod confirmed
appellants claim as to his whereabouts in the morning of May 26, 1989, recounting that he and appellant were,
indeed, together drinking alcoholic drinks from 7:00 to 11:00 oclock in the morning on the occasion of the birthday
of his child.8 In addition, Pedro Tosio as a witness testified as to the presence of appellant at his house in Barangay
Agbalogo in the morning until about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, the day of the fiesta, declaring
further that he also saw appellant pass by his house on May 26, 1989.9

In his appeal, accused-appellant interposed the following assignment of errors:

I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2909.

II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2910.

III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2911.10

On the first and third assignment of errors, accused-appellant maintains his defense of alibi, stressing that, not
being around at the time and place of the incident as he was at Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, he could not
have murdered Leopoldo Mangilog and robbed the Mangillogs of their personal belongings.

We are not persuaded.

It is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused.11 Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission.12

That accused-appellant had been positively identified as one of the culprits by prosecution witness Realidad
Mangilog cannot be doubted. The Mangilogs and the accused-appellant had known each other for years as
neighbors. Accused-appellant whose parents reside in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, established residence in
Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan when he got married to a resident there. Since his house is only about one
hundred and fifty (150) meters away from that of the Mangilogs, there were occasions when accused-appellant
would visit the Mangilogs, usually for coffee, and that Leopoldo Mangilog would also go to the accused-appellants
house. Indeed, eyewitness Realidad Mangilog knows the accused-appellant so well that she could not have been
mistaken in identifying appellant as one of those armed men responsible for the death of her husband and son on
that fateful morning of May 26, 1989. She testified thus:

Q. When your husband open (sic) the door, was there somebody who got inside?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you at that time?

A. I am (sic) at that time at the door dividing the sala and the dining room.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Were you able to recognized (sic) those persons who entered your house?

A. I can recognized (sic) Jose Torrefiel leading the group and Masiano Masgong alias Manny, Alex Francisco
followed by Satur or Saturnino Suyod and the other one was Noel Semira alias Nido. 13

Moreover, the two other prosecution witnesses, Coreto Maguirang and Hermogenes Calizo, confirmed the
presence of accused-appellant in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at the time of the incident in question.
Maquirang testified that while he watched over his carabao which was grazing on May 26, 1989 at around 5:00
oclock in the morning, he saw the appellant and his group as they passed by him from a distance of about ten (10)
meters heading towards the direction of the house of Leopoldo Mangilog in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay,
Aklan.14 He could not be mistaken as to appellants identity since he had on several occasions seen appellant
together with the same group of armed men.15 Calizo, on the other hand, claimed that he had seen appellant face
to face in the house of the Mangilogs that same morning of May 26, 1989 shortly before the subject incident
occurred since at that time he was living in said house. He only happened to be sent out by Realidad Mangilog to
buy coffee so he did not get to see the actual killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo Mangilog. 16

It is significant to note that no improper motive can be imputed to Realidad Mangilog as would make her testify
falsely against accused-appellant; hence her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 17

Evidently complementing the positive identification of accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes
charged is his failure to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at
the time of the incident, assuming that his claim that he went to the house of Barangay Captain Puod at 7:00
oclock in the morning of May 26, 1989 was true. As testified to by appellant himself, it would take just one and a
half (1 ) hours to reach Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan from Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan. Needless to
state, it would not at all be impossible for appellant to be at Barangay Agbalogo at 7:00 oclock in the morning or
some two hours after the crimes were committed at Barangay Naligusan.

In his second assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that he had nothing to do with the killing of the
victim Reynaldo Mangilog, obviously relying on the testimony of Realidad Mangilog to the effect that Reynaldo
Mangilog was shot and stabbed to death by the members of appellants group who stationed themselves outside
the house.

This contention we also find untenable, conspiracy being clearly manifest in this case as was correctly found by the
Court of Appeals. For collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by
direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime 18 as only rarely would such an agreement be
demonstrable since in the nature of things criminal undertakings are rarely documented by agreement in
writing.19 Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during and right after the
shooting of the victim which indicate their common intention to commit the crime. 20

The record shows that: (1) all the accused which include accused-appellant arrived together at the scene of the
killings; (2) they were all fully armed; (3) three of them simultaneously shot to death Leopoldo Mangilog, while an
undetermined number shot and stabbed to death Reynaldo Mangilog; (4) the attack on the two victims was
executed simultaneously; and (5) the accuseds statement to the effect that the victims were responsible for the
fact that the military men were running after them. This tends to establish a motive on their part to kill the victims.
All these indubitably indicate a concerted effort on the part of the accused on a common design to kill the victims.

Conspiracy having been adequately shown, all the accused are answerable as co-principals regardless of the
degree of their participation.21 In fact, it is not necessary to ascertain the individual participation in the final
liquidation of the victims22 or to ascertain the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual
conspirator as the applicable rule is that the act of one conspirator is the act of all of them. 23 It hardly matters,
therefore, that accused-appellant did not actually participate in the killing of Reynaldo Mangilog or of Leopoldo
Mangilog.
As alleged in the informations and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the killing of the victims was
qualified by treachery. Leopoldo Mangilog was shot while he was serving the accused coffee or shortly thereafter.
Reynaldo Mangilog, on the other hand, was shot and stabbed to death while he was taking a bath. It may be added
that the victims were naturally unarmed at that time and their execution was done so early in the morning, that is,
when they had practically just awakened. Under the circumstances, the victims were clearly not in any position to
defend themselves from the sudden and unexpected attack of the accused. 24 These circumstances are

manifestly indicative of the presence of the conditions under which treachery may be appreciated, i.e., the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate, and that said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 25

The Court of Appeals appreciated abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men and evident premeditation as
aggravating circumstances. These findings are factual and the rule is that findings of the Court of Appeals upon
factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on
record,26 and, in this case, there is no such showing. However, we believe, and so hold, that treachery absorbs the
circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men, as it appears that the accused saw to it that
they were armed and far outnumbered the victims precisely to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal
objective.27

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Since we find accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 and that the generic aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation was also attendant, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in each case,
applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the proscription against the imposition of the death
penalty at the time the crimes were committed.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each case of murder (Criminal Cases Nos.
2909 and 2910).

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS ALFANTA 320 SCRA 357

Facts: The victim, Nita Fernandez, was asleep in the residence of a friend when at around 12 midnight, a man she
had not seen before suddenly entered the house, boxed her jaw and covered her mouth with his had. He was
pointing a bolo at her and threatened to kill her if she will resist. Thereafter, she was taken and brought to a vacant
house where the stranger succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After the first intercourse, she was
ordered to lie face down while the man sodomized her. Not satisfied, the accused then inserted his finger inside
her. Thereafter, the man lay down beside her and again threatened to kill her. After a while, Nita noticed that the
man was asleep, she then stabbed the man with the knife and hacked him with the bolo when the former broke.
She was able to escape and go to the authorities, who apprehended the man later on identified as the accused.

Issue: Whether the crime of rape should be aggravated bynighttime. Whether there was ignominy when the
accused forced the victim to engage in anal sex.

Held: The law defines night as being from sunset to sunrise. By and itself, nighttime would not be an aggravating
circumstance unless it is specially sought by the offender or taken advantage of by him, or it facilitated the
commission of the crime by insuring the offendersimmunity from capture. In the present case, the accused
abducted the victim, brought her to an abandoned, unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her,
assured of the stillness of a sleeping world.
With respect to ignominy, Art 14 par 17 of the RPC considers to be aggravating any means employed or
circumstance that adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. The case of People vs
Saylan is applicable. In this case wherein the accused entered the victim from behind, the offender claimed that
there was no ignominy because the studies of experts have shown that the position is not novel and has been
resorted to by couples in the act of copulation. This may well be true if the sexual act is performed by consenting
partners but not otherwise.