Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Paredes, we stated in no uncertain terms that "[a]ppointment prevailing in American jurisdiction that "the power of removal .
to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of . . [is] incident to the power of appointment, 23 although this
has since been tempered in a subsequent case, 24 where it was other as checks," and resist tyranny, the Model of Separated and
held that the President may remove only "purely executive Divided Powers offers continuing testimony to the undying
officers, 25 that is, officers holding office at his pleasure. In dilemmas of progress and justice. 29
Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 this Court held that the President may xxx xxx xxx
remove incumbents of offices confidential in nature, but we As a closing observation, I wish to clear the impression that the
likewise made clear that in such a case, the incumbent is not 1973 Constitution deliberately denied the legislature (the
"removed" within the meaning of civil service laws, but that his National Assembly under the 1971 draft Constitution) the power
term merely expires. to check executive appointments, and hence, granted the
It is to be observed, indeed, that the Commission on President absolute appointing power. 30 As a delegate to, and
Appointments, as constituted under the 1987 Constitution, is Vice-President of, the ill-fated 1971 Constitutional Convention,
itself subject to some check. Under the Charter, "[tlhe and more so as the presiding officer of most of its plenary
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within session, I am aware that the Convention did not provide for a
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. 27 commission on appointments on the theory that the Prime
Accordingly, the failure of the Commission to either consent or Minister, the head of the Government and the sole appointing
not consent to the appointments preferred before it within the power, was himself a member of parliament. For this reason,
prescribed period results in a de facto confirmation thereof there was no necessity for a separate body to scrutinize his
Certainly, our founding fathers have fashioned a Constitution appointees. But should such appointees forfeit the confidence of
where the boundaries of power are blurred by the predominance the assembly, they are, by tradition, required to resign, unless
of checks and counterchecks, yet amid such a rubble of they should otherwise have been removed by the Prime
competing powers emerges a structure whose parts are at times Minister. 31 In effect, it is parliament itself that "approves" such
jealous of each other, but which are ultimately necessary in appointments. Unfortunately, supervening events forestalled
assuring a dynamic, but stable, society. As Mr. Justice Holmes our parliamentary experiment, and beginning with the 1976
had so elegantly articulated: amendments and some 140 or so amendments thereafter, we
xxx xxx xxx had reverted to the presidential form, 32 without provisions for
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and a commission on appointments.
divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them In fine, while Presidential appointments, under the first sentence
are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from of Section 16, of Article VII of the present Constitution, must
one extreme to the other. ... When we come to the fundamental pass prior Congressional scrutiny, it is a test that operates as a
distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received mere safeguard against abuse with respect to those
with a certain latitude or our government could not go on. appointments. It does not accord Congress any more than the
xxx xxx xxx power to check, but not to deny, the Chief Executive's
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we appointing power or to supplant his appointees with its own. It
may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out is but an exception to the rule. In limiting the Commission's
the distinction between legislative and executive action with scope of authority, compared to that under the 1935
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight Constitution, I believe that the 1987 Constitution has simply
compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am recognized the reality of that exception.
far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. 28 GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
xxx xxx xxx I join Justice Isagani A. Cruz in his dissent. I agree that the
We are furthermore told: Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, should never have
xxx xxx xxx any of its provisions interpreted in a manner that results in
... (I)t will be vital not to forget that all of these "checks and absurd or irrational consequences.
counterpoises, which Newton might readily have recognized as The Commission on Appointments is an important constitutional
suggestive of the mechanism of the heavens," (W. Wilson, body which helps give fuller expression to the principles inherent
Constitutional Government in the United States 56 (1908)] can in our presidential system of government. Its functions cannot
represent only the scaffolding of a far more subtle "vehicle of be made innocuous or unreasonably diminished to the
life (Id. at 192: "The Constitution cannot be regarded as a mere confirmation of a limited number of appointees. In the same
legal document, to be read as a will or a contract would be. It manner that the President shares in the enactment of laws
must, of the necessity of the case, be a vehicle of life.") The which govern the nation, the legislature, through its Commission
great difficulty of any theory less rich, Woodrow Wilson once on Appointments, gives assurance that only those who can pass
warned, "is that government is not a machine, but a living thing. the scrutiny of both the President and Congress will help run the
It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the country as officers holding high appointive positions. The third
theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to sentence of the first paragraph " ... The Congress may, by
Newton. It is . . . shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
of life. No living thing can have its organs offset against each President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
other as checks, and five." (Id. at 56.) Yet because no complex agencies, commissions, or boards." specifies only "officers
society can have its centers of power not "offset against each lower in rank" as those who may, by law, be appointed by the
President alone. If as expounded in the majority opinion, only of the multi-sectoral members of the regional consultative
the limited number of officers in the first sentence of Section 16 commission, whose appointment is vested by the Constitution in
require confirmation, the clear intent of the third sentence is the President under Article X, Section 18, their confirmation is
lost. In fact both the second and third sentences become required although their rank is decidedly lower.
meaningless or superfluous. Superfluity is not to be read into I do not think these discrepancies were intended by the framers
such an important part of the Constitution. as they would lead to the absurd consequences we should avoid
I agree with the intervenor that all provisions of the Constitution in interpreting the Constitution.
on appointments must be read together. In providing for the There is no question that bureau directors are not required to
appointment of members of the Supreme Court and judges of be confirmed under the first sentence of Section 16, but that is
lower courts (Section 9, Article VIII), the Ombudsman and his not the provision we ought to interpret. It is the second sentence
deputies (Section 9, Article XI), the Vice President as a member we must understand for a proper resolution of the issues now
of cabinet (Section 3, Article VII) and, of course, those who by before us. Significantly, although there was a long discussion of
law the President alone may appoint, the Constitution clearly the first sentence in the Constitutional Commission, there is
provides no need for confirmation. This can only mean that all none cited on the second sentence either in the Solicitor-
other appointments need confirmation. Where there is no need General's comment or in the majority opinion. We can therefore
for confirmation or where there is an alternative process to only speculate on the correct interpretation of this provision in
confirmation, the Constitution expressly so declares. Without the light of the first and third sentences of Section 16 or by
such a declaration, there must be confirmation. reading this section in its totality.
The 1973 Constitution dispensed with confirmation by a The majority opinion says that the second sentence is the
Commission on Appointments because the government it set up exception to the first sentence and holds that the two sets of
was supposed to be a parliamentary one. The Prime Minister, as officers specified therein may be appointed by the President
head of government, was constantly accountable to the without the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments.
legislature. In our presidential system, the interpretation which This interpretation is pregnant with mischievous if not also
Justice Cruz and myself espouse, is more democratic and more ridiculous results that presumably were not envisioned by the
in keeping with the system of government organized under the framers.
Constitution. One may wonder why it was felt necessary to include the second
I, therefore vote to grant the petition. sentence at all, considering the majority opinion that the
CRUZ, J., dissenting: enumeration in the first sentence of the officers subject to
The view of the respondent, as adopted by the majority opinion, confirmation is exclusive on the basis of expressio unius est
is briefly as follows: Confirmation is required only for the officers exclusio alterius. If that be so, the first sentence would have
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, to wit: (1) the been sufficient by itself to convey the Idea that all other
heads of the executive departments; (2) ambassadors, other appointees of the President would not need confirmation.
public ministers and consuls; (3) officers of the armed forces One may also ask why, if the officers mentioned in the second
from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and (4) other officers sentence do not need confirmation, it was still felt necessary to
whose appointments are vested in the President in the provide in the third sentence that the appointment of the other
Constitution. No confirmation is required under the second officers lower in rank will also not need confirmation as long as
sentence for (1) all other officers whose appointments are not their appointment is vested by law in the President alone. The
otherwise provided for by law, and (2) those whom the third sentence would appear to be superfluous, too, again in
President may be authorized by law to appoint. Neither is view of the first sentence.
confirmation required by the third sentence for those other More to the point, what will follow if Congress does not see fit
officers lower in rank whose appointment is vested by law in the to vest in the President alone the appointment of those other
President alone. officers lower in rank mentioned in the third sentence?
Following this interpretation, the Undersecretary of Foreign Conformably to the language thereof, these lower officers will
Affairs, who is not the head of his department, does not have to need the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, but the while, by contrast, the higher officers mentioned in the second
ordinary consul, who is under his jurisdiction, must be sentence will not.
confirmed. The colonel is by any standard lower in rank than the Thus, a regional director in the Department of Labor and the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, which was labor arbiters, as officers lower in rank than the bureau director,
created by the Constitution; yet the former is subject to will have to be confirmed if the Congress does not vest their
confirmation but the latter is not because he does not come appointment in the President alone under the third sentence. On
under the first sentence. The Special Prosecutor, whose the other hand, their superior, the bureau director himself, will
appointment is not vested by the Constitution in the President, not need to be confirmed because, according to the majority
is not subject to confirmation under the first sentence, and opinion, he falls not under the first sentence but the second.
neither are the Governor of the Central Bank and the members This is carefulness in reverse, like checking the bridesmaids but
of the Monetary Board because they fall under the second forgetting the bride.
sentence as interpreted by the majority opinion. Yet in the case
It must be borne in mind that one of the purposes of the It is not disputed that the power of appointment is executive in
Constitutional Commission was to restrict the powers of the nature, but there is no question either that it is not absolute or
Presidency and so prevent the recurrence of another unlimited. The rule re- established by the new Constitution is
dictatorship. Among the many measures taken was the that the power requires confirmation by the Commission on
restoration of the Commission on Appointments to check the Appointments as a restraint on presidential excesses, in line with
appointing power which had been much abused by President the system of checks and balances. I submit it is the exception
Marcos. We are now told that even as this body was revived to to this rule, and not the rule, that should be strictly construed.
limit appointments, the scope of its original authority has itself In my view, the only officers appointed by the President who
been limited in the new Constitution. I have to disagree. are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
My own reading is that the second sentence is but a continuation Appointments are (1) the members of the judiciary and the
of the Idea expressed in the first sentence and simply mentions Ombudsman and his deputies, who are nominated by the
the other officers appointed by the President who are also Judicial and Bar Council; (2) the Vice-President when he is
subject to confirmation. The second sentence is the later appointed to the Cabinet; and (3) "other officers lower in rank,"
expression of the will of the framers and so must be interpreted but only when their appointment is vested by law in the
as complementing the rule embodied in the first sentence or, if President alone. It is clear that this enumeration does not
necessary, reversing the original intention to exempt bureau include the respondent Commissioner of Customs who, while
directors from confirmation. I repeat that there were no debates not covered by the first sentence of Section 16, comes under
on this matter as far as I know, which simply means that my the second sentence thereof as I would interpret it and so is also
humble conjecture on the meaning of Section 16 is as arguable, subject to confirmation.
at least, as the suppositions of the majority. We read and rely I vote to grant the petition.
on the same records. At any rate, this view is more consistent
with the general purpose of Article VII, which, to repeat, was to
reduce the powers of the Presidency. Separate Opinions
The respondent cites the following exchange reported in page TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
520, Volume II, of the Record of the Constitutional Convention: The Court has deemed it necessary and proper, in consonance
Mr. Foz: Madam President, this is the third proposed with its constitutional duty, to adjudicate promptly the issue at
amendment on page 7, line 28, 1 propose to put a period (.) bar and to rule that the direct appointment of respondent
after 'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY. (without need of submitting a prior nomination to the
Mr. Regalado: Madam President, the Committee accepts the Commission on Appointments and securing its confirmation) is
proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other valid and in accordance with the President's constitutional
officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the authority to so appoint officers of the Government as defined
Commission on Appointments. in Article VII, section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The
However, the records do not show what particular part of paramount public interest and the exigencies of the public
Section 16 the committee chairman was referring to, and a service demand that any doubts over the validity of such
reading in its entirety of this particular debate will suggest that appointments be resolved expeditiously in the test case at bar.
the body was considering the first sentence of the said section, It should be noted that the Court's decision at bar does not
which I reiterate is not the controversial provision. In any case, mention nor deal with the Manifestation of December 1, 1987
although the excerpt shows that the proposed amendment of filed by the intervenor that Senate Bill No. 137 entitled "An Act
Commissioner Foz was accepted by the committee, it is not Providing For the Confirmation By the Commission on
reflected, curiously enough, in the final version of Section 16 as Appointments of All Nominations and Appointments Made by
a perusal thereof will readily reveal. Whether it was deleted later the President of the Philippines" was passed on 23 October
in the session or reworded by the style committee or otherwise 1987 and was "set for perusal by the House of
replaced for whatever reason will need another surmise on this Representatives. " This omission has been deliberate. The
rather confused Constitution. Court has resolved the case at bar on the basis of the issues
I need only add that the records of the Constitutional joined by the parties. The contingency of approval of the bill
Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are at best persuasive mentioned by intervenor clearly has no bearing on and cannot
only and not necessarily conclusive. Interestingly, some quarters affect retroactively the validity of the direct appointment of
have observed that the Congress is not prevented from adding respondent Mison and other appointees similarly situated as in
to the list of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission G.R. No. 80071, "Alex G. Almario vs. Hon. Miriam Defensor-
on Appointments and cite the debates on this matter in support Santiago." The Court does not deal with constitutional
of this supposition. It is true enough that there was such a questions in the abstract and without the same being properly
consensus, but it is equally true that this thinking is not at all raised before it in a justiciable case and after thorough
expressed, or even only implied, in the language of Section 16 discussion of the various points of view that would enable it to
of Article VII. Which should prevail then the provision as worded render judgment after mature deliberation. As stressed at the
or the debates? hearing of December 8, 1987, any discussion of the reported
bill and its validity or invalidity is premature and irrelevant and Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18,
outside the scope of the issues resolved in the case at bar. 1970, 31 SCRA 413). And the primary source from which to
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: ascertain constitutional intent is the language of the
I concur with the majority opinion and with the concurring Constitution itself.
opinion of Justice Sarmiento, and simply wish to add my own SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
reading of the Constitutional provision involved. I concur. It is clear from the Constitution itself that not all
Section 16, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution provides: Presidential appointments are subject to prior Congressional
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the confirmation, thus:
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
boards. departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or during recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress (Emphasis and 1st three next adjournment of the Congress. 1
paragraphings, supplied). By its plain language, the Constitution has intended that only
The difference in language used is significant. Under the first those grouped under the first sentence are required to
sentence it is clear that the President "nominates" and with the undergo a consenting process. This is a significant departure
consent of the Commission on Appointments "appoints" the from the procedure set forth in the 1935 Charter:
officials enumerated. The second sentence, however, (3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of
significantly uses only the term "appoint" all other officers of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the
law to appoint. Deliberately eliminated was any reference to rank of captain to commander, and all other officers of the
nomination. Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise
Thus, the intent of the framers of the Constitution to exclude provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
the appointees mentioned in the second sentence from appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is, to my inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
mind, quite clear. So also is the fact that the term "appoint" heads of departments. 2
used in said sentence was not meant to include the three under which, as noted by the majority, "almost all presidential
distinct acts in the appointing process, namely, nomination, appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the
appointment, and commission. For if that were the intent, the Commission on Appointments. 3 As far as the present Charter
same terminologies in the first sentence could have been easily is concerned, no extrinsic aid is necessary to ascertain its
employed. meaning. Had its framers intended otherwise, that is to say, to
There should be no question either that the participation of the require all Presidential appointments clearance from the
Commission on Appointments in the appointment process has Commission on Appointments, they could have simply
been deliberately decreased in the 1987 Constitution compared reenacted the Constitution's 1935 counterpart. 4
to that in the 1935 Constitution, which required that all I agree that the present Constitution classifies four types of
presidential appointments be with the consent of the appointments that the President may make: (1) appointments
Commission on Appointments. of heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public
The interpretation given by the majority may, indeed, lead to ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
some incongruous situations as stressed in the dissenting rank of colonel or naval captain, and those of other officers
opinion of Justice Cruz. The remedy therefor addresses itself to whose appointments are vested in him under the Constitution,
the future. The task of constitutional construction is to including the regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council,
ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution and 5 the Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service
thereafter to assure its realization (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Commission, 6 the Chairman and Commissioners of the
Commission on Elections, 7 and the Chairman and The system of checks and balances is not peculiar to the
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit; 8 (2) those officers provision on appointments. The prohibition, for instance,
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) against the enactment of a bill of attainder operates as a bar
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) against legislative encroachment upon both judicial and
officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may executive domains, since the determination of guilt and
vest in the President alone. punishment of the guilty address judicial and executive
But like Justice Cruz in his dissent, I too am aware that authors functions, respective y. 16
of the fundamental law have written a "rather confused And then, the cycle of checks and balances pervading the
Constitution" 9 with respect, to a large extent, to its other Constitution is a sword that cuts both ways. In a very real
parts, and with respect, to a certain extent, to the appointing sense, the power of appointment constitutes a check against
clause itself, in the sense that it leaves us for instance, with legislative authority. In Springer v. Philippine Islands, 17we
the incongruous situation where a consul's appointment needs are told that "Congress may not control the law enforcement
confirmation whereas that of Undersecretary of Foreign process by retaining a power to appoint the individual who will
Affairs, his superior, does not. But the Idiosyncracies, as it execute the laws." 18 This is so, according to one authority,
were, of the Charter is not for us to judge. That is a question because "the appointments clause, rather than 'merely dealing
addressed to the electorate, and who, despite those with etiquette or protocol,' seeks to preserve an executive
"eccentricities," have stamped their approval on that Charter. check upon legislative authority in the interest of avoiding an
"The Court," avers the majority, "will thus construe the undue concentration of power in Congress. " 19
applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with The President has sworn to "execute [the] laws. 20 For that
how the executive or the legislative department may want matter, no other department of the Government may
them construed, but in accordance with what they say and discharge that function, least of all Congress. Accordingly, a
provide." 10 statute conferring upon a commission the responsibility of
It must be noted that the appointment of public officials is administering that very legislation and whose members have
essentially an exercise of executive power. 11 The fact that been determined therein, has been held to be repugnant to
the Constitution has provided for a Commission on the Charter. 21 Execution of the laws, it was held, is the
Appointments does not minimize the extent of such a power, concern of the President, and in going about this business, he
much less, make it a shared executive-legislative prerogative. acts by himself or through his men and women, and no other.
In Concepcion v. Paredes, we stated in no uncertain terms that The President, on the other hand, cannot remove his own
"[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act appointees "except for cause provided by law."
involving the exercise of discretion." 12 Springer v. Philippine 22Parenthetically, this represents a deviation from the rule
Islands 13 on the other hand, underscored the fact that while prevailing in American jurisdiction that "the power of removal .
the legislature may create a public office, it cannot name the . . [is] incident to the power of appointment, 23 although this
official to discharge the functions appurtenant thereto. And has since been tempered in a subsequent case, 24 where it was
while it may prescribe the qualifications therefor, it cannot held that the President may remove only "purely executive
circumscribe such qualifications, which would unduly narrow officers, 25 that is, officers holding office at his pleasure. In
the President's choice. In that event, it is as if it is the Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 this Court held that the President may
legislature itself conferring the appointment. remove incumbents of offices confidential in nature, but we
Thus, notwithstanding the existence of a Commission on likewise made clear that in such a case, the incumbent is not
Appointments, the Chief Executive retains his supremacy as "removed" within the meaning of civil service laws, but that his
the appointing authority. In case of doubt, the same should be term merely expires.
resolved in favor of the appointing power. It is to be observed, indeed, that the Commission on
It is the essence of a republican form of government, like ours, Appointments, as constituted under the 1987 Constitution, is
that "[e]ach department of the government has exclusive itself subject to some check. Under the Charter, "[tlhe
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction." 14 But like all Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
genuine republican systems, no power is absolutely separate thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. 27
from the other. For republicanism operates on a process of Accordingly, the failure of the Commission to either consent or
checks and balances as well, not only to guard against not consent to the appointments preferred before it within the
excesses by one branch, but more importantly, "to secure prescribed period results in a de facto confirmation thereof
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the Certainly, our founding fathers have fashioned a Constitution
government." 15 Viewed in that light, the Commission on where the boundaries of power are blurred by the
Appointments acts as a restraint against abuse of the predominance of checks and counterchecks, yet amid such a
appointing authority, but not as a means with which to hold rubble of competing powers emerges a structure whose parts
the Chief Executive hostage by a possibly hostile Congress, an are at times jealous of each other, but which are ultimately
unhappy lesson as the majority notes, in our history under the necessary in assuring a dynamic, but stable, society. As Mr.
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Holmes had so elegantly articulated:
xxx xxx xxx
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and beginning with the 1976 amendments and some 140 or so
divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them amendments thereafter, we had reverted to the presidential
are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from form, 32 without provisions for a commission on appointments.
one extreme to the other. ... When we come to the In fine, while Presidential appointments, under the first
fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must sentence of Section 16, of Article VII of the present
be received with a certain latitude or our government could not Constitution, must pass prior Congressional scrutiny, it is a test
go on. that operates as a mere safeguard against abuse with respect
xxx xxx xxx to those appointments. It does not accord Congress any more
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we than the power to check, but not to deny, the Chief Executive's
may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry appointing power or to supplant his appointees with its own. It
out the distinction between legislative and executive action is but an exception to the rule. In limiting the Commission's
with mathematical precision and divide the branches into scope of authority, compared to that under the 1935
watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, Constitution, I believe that the 1987 Constitution has simply
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution recognized the reality of that exception.
requires. 28 GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
xxx xxx xxx I join Justice Isagani A. Cruz in his dissent. I agree that the
We are furthermore told: Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, should never
xxx xxx xxx have any of its provisions interpreted in a manner that results
... (I)t will be vital not to forget that all of these "checks and in absurd or irrational consequences.
counterpoises, which Newton might readily have recognized as The Commission on Appointments is an important
suggestive of the mechanism of the heavens," (W. Wilson, constitutional body which helps give fuller expression to the
Constitutional Government in the United States 56 (1908)] can principles inherent in our presidential system of government.
represent only the scaffolding of a far more subtle "vehicle of Its functions cannot be made innocuous or unreasonably
life (Id. at 192: "The Constitution cannot be regarded as a diminished to the confirmation of a limited number of
mere legal document, to be read as a will or a contract would appointees. In the same manner that the President shares in
be. It must, of the necessity of the case, be a vehicle of life.") the enactment of laws which govern the nation, the legislature,
The great difficulty of any theory less rich, Woodrow Wilson through its Commission on Appointments, gives assurance that
once warned, "is that government is not a machine, but a only those who can pass the scrutiny of both the President and
living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but Congress will help run the country as officers holding high
under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, appointive positions. The third sentence of the first paragraph
not to Newton. It is . . . shaped to its functions by the sheer " ... The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
pressure of life. No living thing can have its organs offset other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
against each other as checks, and five." (Id. at 56.) Yet courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
because no complex society can have its centers of power not or boards." specifies only "officers lower in rank" as those
"offset against each other as checks," and resist tyranny, the who may, by law, be appointed by the President alone. If as
Model of Separated and Divided Powers offers continuing expounded in the majority opinion, only the limited number of
testimony to the undying dilemmas of progress and justice. 29 officers in the first sentence of Section 16 require confirmation,
xxx xxx xxx the clear intent of the third sentence is lost. In fact both the
As a closing observation, I wish to clear the impression that second and third sentences become meaningless or
the 1973 Constitution deliberately denied the legislature (the superfluous. Superfluity is not to be read into such an
National Assembly under the 1971 draft Constitution) the important part of the Constitution.
power to check executive appointments, and hence, granted I agree with the intervenor that all provisions of the
the President absolute appointing power. 30 As a delegate to, Constitution on appointments must be read together. In
and Vice-President of, the ill-fated 1971 Constitutional providing for the appointment of members of the Supreme
Convention, and more so as the presiding officer of most of its Court and judges of lower courts (Section 9, Article VIII), the
plenary session, I am aware that the Convention did not Ombudsman and his deputies (Section 9, Article XI), the Vice
provide for a commission on appointments on the theory that President as a member of cabinet (Section 3, Article VII) and,
the Prime Minister, the head of the Government and the sole of course, those who by law the President alone may appoint,
appointing power, was himself a member of parliament. For the Constitution clearly provides no need for confirmation. This
this reason, there was no necessity for a separate body to can only mean that all other appointments need confirmation.
scrutinize his appointees. But should such appointees forfeit Where there is no need for confirmation or where there is an
the confidence of the assembly, they are, by tradition, required alternative process to confirmation, the Constitution expressly
to resign, unless they should otherwise have been removed by so declares. Without such a declaration, there must be
the Prime Minister. 31 In effect, it is parliament itself that confirmation.
"approves" such appointments. Unfortunately, supervening The 1973 Constitution dispensed with confirmation by a
events forestalled our parliamentary experiment, and Commission on Appointments because the government it set
up was supposed to be a parliamentary one. The Prime officers specified therein may be appointed by the President
Minister, as head of government, was constantly accountable without the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments.
to the legislature. In our presidential system, the interpretation This interpretation is pregnant with mischievous if not also
which Justice Cruz and myself espouse, is more democratic ridiculous results that presumably were not envisioned by the
and more in keeping with the system of government organized framers.
under the Constitution. One may wonder why it was felt necessary to include the
I, therefore vote to grant the petition. second sentence at all, considering the majority opinion that
CRUZ, J., dissenting: the enumeration in the first sentence of the officers subject to
The view of the respondent, as adopted by the majority confirmation is exclusive on the basis of expressio unius est
opinion, is briefly as follows: Confirmation is required only for exclusio alterius. If that be so, the first sentence would have
the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, to been sufficient by itself to convey the Idea that all other
wit: (1) the heads of the executive departments; (2) appointees of the President would not need confirmation.
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; (3) officers One may also ask why, if the officers mentioned in the second
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain; sentence do not need confirmation, it was still felt necessary to
and (4) other officers whose appointments are vested in the provide in the third sentence that the appointment of the other
President in the Constitution. No confirmation is required under officers lower in rank will also not need confirmation as long as
the second sentence for (1) all other officers whose their appointment is vested by law in the President alone. The
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and (2) third sentence would appear to be superfluous, too, again in
those whom the President may be authorized by law to view of the first sentence.
appoint. Neither is confirmation required by the third sentence More to the point, what will follow if Congress does not see fit
for those other officers lower in rank whose appointment is to vest in the President alone the appointment of those other
vested by law in the President alone. officers lower in rank mentioned in the third sentence?
Following this interpretation, the Undersecretary of Foreign Conformably to the language thereof, these lower officers will
Affairs, who is not the head of his department, does not have need the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, but the while, by contrast, the higher officers mentioned in the second
ordinary consul, who is under his jurisdiction, must be sentence will not.
confirmed. The colonel is by any standard lower in rank than Thus, a regional director in the Department of Labor and the
the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, which was labor arbiters, as officers lower in rank than the bureau
created by the Constitution; yet the former is subject to director, will have to be confirmed if the Congress does not
confirmation but the latter is not because he does not come vest their appointment in the President alone under the third
under the first sentence. The Special Prosecutor, whose sentence. On the other hand, their superior, the bureau
appointment is not vested by the Constitution in the President, director himself, will not need to be confirmed because,
is not subject to confirmation under the first sentence, and according to the majority opinion, he falls not under the first
neither are the Governor of the Central Bank and the members sentence but the second. This is carefulness in reverse, like
of the Monetary Board because they fall under the second checking the bridesmaids but forgetting the bride.
sentence as interpreted by the majority opinion. Yet in the It must be borne in mind that one of the purposes of the
case of the multi-sectoral members of the regional consultative Constitutional Commission was to restrict the powers of the
commission, whose appointment is vested by the Constitution Presidency and so prevent the recurrence of another
in the President under Article X, Section 18, their confirmation dictatorship. Among the many measures taken was the
is required although their rank is decidedly lower. restoration of the Commission on Appointments to check the
I do not think these discrepancies were intended by the appointing power which had been much abused by President
framers as they would lead to the absurd consequences we Marcos. We are now told that even as this body was revived to
should avoid in interpreting the Constitution. limit appointments, the scope of its original authority has itself
There is no question that bureau directors are not required to been limited in the new Constitution. I have to disagree.
be confirmed under the first sentence of Section 16, but that is My own reading is that the second sentence is but a
not the provision we ought to interpret. It is the second continuation of the Idea expressed in the first sentence and
sentence we must understand for a proper resolution of the simply mentions the other officers appointed by the President
issues now before us. Significantly, although there was a long who are also subject to confirmation. The second sentence is
discussion of the first sentence in the Constitutional the later expression of the will of the framers and so must be
Commission, there is none cited on the second sentence either interpreted as complementing the rule embodied in the first
in the Solicitor-General's comment or in the majority opinion. sentence or, if necessary, reversing the original intention to
We can therefore only speculate on the correct interpretation exempt bureau directors from confirmation. I repeat that there
of this provision in the light of the first and third sentences of were no debates on this matter as far as I know, which simply
Section 16 or by reading this section in its totality. means that my humble conjecture on the meaning of Section
The majority opinion says that the second sentence is the 16 is as arguable, at least, as the suppositions of the majority.
exception to the first sentence and holds that the two sets of We read and rely on the same records. At any rate, this view is
more consistent with the general purpose of Article VII, which, I vote to grant the petition.
to repeat, was to reduce the powers of the Presidency.
The respondent cites the following exchange reported in page
520, Volume II, of the Record of the Constitutional
Convention:
Mr. Foz: Madam President, this is the third proposed
amendment on page 7, line 28, 1 propose to put a period (.)
after 'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it
with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
Mr. Regalado: Madam President, the Committee accepts
the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those
other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments.
However, the records do not show what particular part of
Section 16 the committee chairman was referring to, and a
reading in its entirety of this particular debate will suggest that
the body was considering the first sentence of the said section,
which I reiterate is not the controversial provision. In any case,
although the excerpt shows that the proposed amendment of
Commissioner Foz was accepted by the committee, it is not
reflected, curiously enough, in the final version of Section 16
as a perusal thereof will readily reveal. Whether it was deleted
later in the session or reworded by the style committee or
otherwise replaced for whatever reason will need another
surmise on this rather confused Constitution.
I need only add that the records of the Constitutional
Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are at best
persuasive only and not necessarily conclusive. Interestingly,
some quarters have observed that the Congress is not
prevented from adding to the list of officers subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments and cite the
debates on this matter in support of this supposition. It is true
enough that there was such a consensus, but it is equally true
that this thinking is not at all expressed, or even only implied,
in the language of Section 16 of Article VII. Which should
prevail then the provision as worded or the debates?
It is not disputed that the power of appointment is executive in
nature, but there is no question either that it is not absolute or
unlimited. The rule re- established by the new Constitution is
that the power requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments as a restraint on presidential excesses, in line
with the system of checks and balances. I submit it is the
exception to this rule, and not the rule, that should be strictly
construed.
In my view, the only officers appointed by the President who
are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments are (1) the members of the judiciary and the
Ombudsman and his deputies, who are nominated by the
Judicial and Bar Council; (2) the Vice-President when he is
appointed to the Cabinet; and (3) "other officers lower in
rank," but only when their appointment is vested by law in the
President alone. It is clear that this enumeration does not
include the respondent Commissioner of Customs who, while
not covered by the first sentence of Section 16, comes under
the second sentence thereof as I would interpret it and so is
also subject to confirmation.
Republic of the Philippines Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
SUPREME COURT the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
Manila executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
EN BANC consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
G.R. No. 111243 May 25, 1994 vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA, petitioner, officers of the Government whose appointments are not
vs. otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON. SALVADOR M. authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
ENRIQUEZ III, respondents the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
Marlon B. Llaunder for petitioner. alone, in the courts, or in the heads of department, agencies,
commissions, or boards . . . (Emphasis supplied).
QUIASON, J.: Respondents also aver that the Bangko Sentral has its own
This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a budget and accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not
"taxpayer," questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel subject to the provisions of the General Appropriations Act.
Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not We dismiss the petition.
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. II
The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto
performance of his functions as such official until his proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and
appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the
and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral (Cf. Castro v. Del
Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the Rosario, 19 SCRA 196 [1967]). Such a special civil action can
salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson. only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person
I claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully
Respondent Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko held or exercised by another" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 66,
Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos on July 2, 1993, effective Sec. 6; Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18 [1905]).
on July 6, 1993 (Rollo, p. 10). In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637 (1992), we held
Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is null that the petitioner therein, who did not aver that he was entitled
and void since it was not submitted for confirmation to the to the office of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not
Commission on Appointments. The petition is anchored on the bring the action for quo warranto to oust the respondent from
provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the said office as a mere usurper.
Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Likewise in Greene v. Knox, 175 N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. 910,
Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides: it was held that the question of title to an office, which must be
Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and resolved in a quo warranto proceeding, may not be determined
functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the Bangko in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to the person holding
Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary such office, brought by someone who does not claim to be the
Board, composed of seven (7) members appointed by the one entitled to occupy the said office.
President of the Philippines for a term of six (6) years. It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought
The seven (7) members are: by petitioner. To uphold the action would encourage every
(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing
Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of
Sentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall the governmental machinery (See Roosevelt v. Draper, 7 Abb.
be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pr. 108, 23 N.Y. 218).
Whenever the Governor is unable to attend a meeting of the Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner
Board, he shall designate a Deputy Governor to act as his collapses. Hence, there is no need to resolve the question of
alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board whether the disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries
shall designate one of its members as acting Chairman . . . and emoluments of respondent Singson can be enjoined.
(Emphasis supplied). Likewise, the Court refrains from passing upon the
In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the
its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question
Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the
Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an determination of the case (Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489
appointment to the said position is not among the appointments [1992]).
which have to be confirmed by the Commission on However for the information of all concerned, we call attention
Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution to our decision in Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), with
which provides that: Justice Isagani A. Cruz dissenting, where we ruled that Congress
cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointment of other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of
the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J. and Cruz, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. Instead, however, of basing the petition's
dismissal mainly on technicality, I would anchor said dismissal
squarely on the ruling laid down by the Court in Calderon vs.
Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), to the effect that appointments
by the President of the Philippines, which under the Constitution
(Sec. 16, Article VII) are not among those required to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, may not, by
legislation, be made subject to such confirmation. This ruling
was a reiteration of the doctrine earlier laid down in Sarmiento
vs. Mison, (G.R. No. 79974, 156 SCRA 549, December 17, 1987)
and Bautista vs. Salonga, (G.R. No. 86439, 172 SCRA 160, April
13, 1989).
# Separate Opinions
Mison also opined: The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-Deles have
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there interpreted Art. VII, Sec. 16 consistently in one manner. Can
were two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the legislation expand a constitutional provision after the Supreme
Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments Court has interpreted it?
of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by In Endencia and Jugo vs. David, 11 the Court held:
the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of By legislative fiat as enunciated in Section 13, Republic Act No.
appointments made under the second sentence of the section 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is
from the same requirement. . . . not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of
interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase
"which shall not be diminished during their continuance in to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation.
office," found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. provided:
xxx xxx xxx 3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from
before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of
courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government
not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; . . .
term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied). The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the
The legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments,
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, has
thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of
construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am., members of Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if
Jur., 919, emphasis supplied). indeed a problem, is not judicial or legislative but constitutional.
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of A future constitutional convention or Congress sitting as a
government is assigned the task and the power to make and constituent (constitutional) assembly may then consider either
enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with a return to the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the adoption of
regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, a hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987 constitutional
which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If provisions. Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the
the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in
specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the accordance with how the legislature or the executive would want
courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning by it interpreted.
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor
cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the
decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of
case based on a judicial interpretation of the law or of the appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National
Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
Constitution by the Legislative department that would be neither SO ORDERED.
wise nor desirable, being clearly violative of the fundamental Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-
principles of our constitutional system of government, Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon,
particularly those governing the separation of powers. JJ., concur.
14(Emphasis supplied) Bellosillo, J., took no part.
Congress, of course, must interpret the Constitution, must
estimate the scope of its constitutional powers when it sets out
to enact legislation and it must take into account the relevant
constitutional prohibitions. 15 Separate Opinions
. . . The Constitution did not change with public opinion.
It is not only the same words, but the same in meaning . . . and GUTIERREZ, JR., concurring:
as long as it it speaks not only in the same words, but with the When the issues in this petition were first raised in Sarmiento
same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from III v. Mison (156 SCRA 549 [1987]), I joined Justice Cruz in a
the hands of its framers, and was voted and adopted by the dissent because I felt that the interpretation of Section 16,
people . . . 16 Article VII by the majority of the Court results in absurd or
The function of the Court in passing upon an act of Congress is irrational consequences. The framers could not have intended
to "lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the what the majority ruled to be the meaning of the provision.
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter When the question was again raised in Bautista v. Salonga (172
squares with the former" and to "announce its considered SCRA 160 [1989]), I reiterated my dissent and urged a re-
judgment upon the question." 17 examination of the doctrine stated in Sarmiento v. Mison.
It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 The issue is again before us. Even as I continue to believe that
Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously, intended by the majority was wrong in the Sarmiento and Bautista cases, I
the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the think it is time to finally accept the majority opinion as the
system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Court's ruling on the matter and one which everybody should
Commission on Appointments exercised the power of respect. There will be no end to litigation if, everytime a high
confirmation over almost all presidential appointments, leading government official is appointed without confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, another petition is filed with this
Court.
I, therefore, VOTE with the majority to DISMISS the PETITION.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent on the basis of my dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison, which
I believe should be re-examined instead of being automatically
re-affirmed simply because of its original adoption. I do not
believe we should persist in error on the ground merely of
adherence to judicial precedent, however unsound.
Separate Opinion
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
When the issues in this petition were first raised in Sarmiento
III v. Mison (156 SCRA 549 [1987]), I joined Justice Cruz in a
dissent because I felt that the interpretation of Section 16,
Article VII by the majority of the Court results in absurd or
irrational consequences. The framers could not have intended
what the majority ruled to be the meaning of the provision.
When the question was again raised in Bautista v. Salonga (172
SCRA 160 [1989]), I reiterated my dissent and urged a re-
examination of the doctrine stated in Sarmiento v. Mison.
The issue is again before us. Even as I continue to believe that
the majority was wrong in the Sarmiento and Bautista cases, I
think it is time to finally accept the majority opinion as the
Court's ruling on the matter and one which everybody should
respect. There will be no end to litigation if, everytime a high
government official is appointed without confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, another petition is filed with this
Court.
I, therefore, VOTE with the majority to DISMISS the PETITION.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent on the basis of my dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison, which
I believe should be re-examined instead of being automatically
re-affirmed simply because of its original adoption. I do not
believe we should persist in error on the ground merely of
adherence to judicial precedent, however unsound.
Republic of the Philippines from among the senior officers down to the rank of the chief
SUPREME COURT superintendent, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Manila Appointments: Provided, That the Chief of the PNP shall serve a
EN BANC term of office not to exceed four (4) years: Provided, further,
G.R. No. 107369 August 11, 1999 That in times of war or other national emergency declared by
JESULITO A. MANALO, petitioner, Congress, the President may extend such term of office."1
vs. (emphasis supplied).
PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III, NICASIO MA. Sec. 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. The
CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L. appointment of the officers and members of the PNP shall be
LOGAN, WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR, FELINO C. PACHECO, effected in the following manner:
JR., RUBEN J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, (a) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV Appointed by
MERARDO G. ABAYA, EVERLINO B. NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE the PNP regional director for regional personnel or by the Chief
T. BULAN, PEDRO J. NAVARRO, DOMINADOR M. of the PNP for the national headquarters personnel and attested
MANGUBAT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and HONORABLE by the Civil Service Commission;
SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ II In His Capacity as Secretary (b) Inspector to Superintendent Appointed by the Chief of the
of Budget and Management, respondents. PNP, as recommended by their immediate superiors, and
PURISIMA, J.: attested by the Civil Service Commission;
The case at bar is not of first impression. The issue posed (c) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director General
concerning the limits of the power of the Commission on Appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Chief
Appointments to confirm appointments issued by the Chief of the PNP, with the proper endorsement by the Chairman of
Executive has been put to rest in a number of cases. The court the Civil Service Commission and subject to confirmation by the
finds no basis for departing from the ruling laid down in those Commission on Appointments; and
cases. (d) Director General Appointed by the President from among
In this special civil action for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the the senior officers down to the rank of chief superintendent in
Revised Rules of Court, petitioners question the constitutionality the service, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
and legality of the permanent appointments issued by former Appointments; Provided, That the Chief of the PNP shall serve a
President Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of tour of duty not to exceed four (4) years; Provided, further,
the Philippine National Police who were promoted to the ranks That, in times of war or other national emergency declared by
of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation (emphasis supplied).
under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of
Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the Local Government the Philippines, through then Executive Secretary Franklin M.
Act of 1990. Impleaded in the case is the former Secretary of Drilon, promoted the fifteen (15) respondent police officers
Budget and Management Salvador M. Enriquez III, who herein, by appointing them to positions in the Philippine National
approved and effected the disbursements for the salaries and Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to
other emoluments of subject police officers.1wphi1.nt Director2, namely:
The antecedents facts are as follows: Chief Supt. PEDRO G. SISTOZA Director
On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the
Department of Interior and Local Government was signed into
law by former President Corazon C. Aquino. Pertinent provisions
Chief Supt. REGINO ARO III Director
of the said Act read:
Sec. 26. Powers, Functions and Term of Office of the PNP Chief.
The command and direction of the PNP shall be vested in the
Chief Supt. NICASIO MA. Director
Chief of the PNP who shall have the power to direct and control
CUSTODIO
tactical as well as strategic movements, deployment, placement,
utilization of the PNP or any of its units and personal, including
Chief Supt. GUILLERMO Director
its equipment, facilities and other resources. Such command and
DOMONDON
direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated to
subordinate officials with respect to the units under their
Chief Supt. RAYMUNDO L. Director
respective commands, in accordance with the rules and
LOGAN
regulations prescribed by the Commission. The Chief of the PNP
shall also have the power to issue detailed implementing policies
Senior Supt. WILFREDO Chief
and instructions regarding personnel, funds, properties, records,
REOTUTAR Superintendent
correspondence and such other matters as may be necessary to
effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties of the
Bureau. The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by the President
Senior Supt. FELINO C. Chief B. The Philippine National Police is akin to the Armed Forces
PACHECO, JR. Superintendent where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
II. Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting
Senior Supt. RUBEN J. CRUZ Chief
disbursements in favor of respondent officers despite the
Superintendent
unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
Senior Supt. GERONIMO B. Chief
discretion.
VALDERRAMA Superintendent
The petition must fail. It is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner theorizes that Republic Act 6975 enjoys the
Senior Supt. MERARDO G. ABAYA Chief
presumption of constitutionality and that every statute passed
Superintendent
by Congress is presumed to have been carefully studied and
considered before its enactment. He maintains that the respect
Senior Supt. EVERLINO Chief
accorded to each department of the government requires that
NARTATEZ Superintendent
the court should avoid, as much as possible, deciding
constitutional questions.
Senior Supt. ENRIQUE T. BULAN Chief
The Court agrees with petitioner. However, it is equally
Superintendent
demanded from the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, to
see to it that every law passed by Congress is not repugnant to
Senior Supt. PEDRO J. NAVARRO Chief
the organic law. Courts have the inherent authority to determine
Superintendent
whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
delineated by the fundamental law.4 When it does, the courts
Senior Supt. DOMINADOR Chief
will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutional law.
MANGUBAT Superintendent
The power to make appointments is vested in the Chief
Executive by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which
Senior Supt. RODOLFO M. Chief provides:
GARCIA Superintendent Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
The appointments of respondent police officers were in a executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
permanent capacity. Their letters of appointment stated in part: consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
By virtue hereof, they may qualify and enter upon the or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
performance of the duties of the office, furnishing this office and vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
the Civil Service Commission with copies of their oath of office.3 officers of the Government whose appointments are not
Without their names submitted to the Commission on otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
Appointments for confirmation, the said police officers took their authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
oath of office and assumed their respective positions. the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized commissions, or boards.
disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. The President shall have the power to make appointments
On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
this present original petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
made therefor. next adjournment of the Congress.
Petitioner contends that: The aforecited provision of the Constitution has been the subject
I. Respondent officers, in assuming their offices and discharging of several cases on the issue of the restrictive function of the
the functions attached thereto, despite their invalid Commission on Appointments with respect to the appointing
appointments, in view of the failure to secure the required power of the President. This court touched upon the historical
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments as required by antecedent of the said provision in the case of Sarmiento III vs.
the Constitution and the law, are acting without or in excess of Mison5 in which it was ratiocinated upon that Section 16 of
their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, considering Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requiring confirmation by the
that: Commission on Appointments of certain appointments issued by
A. Republic Act 6975 is a valid law that duly requires the President contemplates a system of checks and balances
confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of between the executive and legislative branches of government.
senior superintendent and higher by the Commission on Experience showed that when almost all presidential
Appointments. appointments required the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, as was the case under the 1935 Constitution, the
commission became a venue of "horse-trading" and similar Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction.
malpractices.6 On the other hand, placing absolute power to Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution,
make appointments in the President with hardly any check by The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a
the legislature, as what happened under 1973 Constitution, citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and
leads to abuse of such power. Thus was perceived the need to service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force
establish a "middle ground" between the 1935 and 1973 necessary for the security of the State.
Constitutions. The framers of the 1987 Constitution deemed it On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the
imperative to subject certain high positions in the government Constitution ordains that:
to the power of confirmation of the Commission on The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which
Appointments and to allow other positions within the exclusive shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be
appointing power of the President.1wphi1.nt administered and controlled by a national police commission.
Conformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading The authority of local executives over the police units in their
case of Sarmiento III vs. Mison 7, and in the subsequent cases jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
of Bautista vs. Salonga 8, Quintos-Deles vs. Constitutional To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces,
Commission9, and Calderon vs. Carale10; under Section 16, Congress enacted Republic Act 6975 which states in part:
Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. It is hereby declared to be the
of the government to be appointed by the President: policy of the State to promote peace and order, ensure public
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, safety and further strengthen local government capability aimed
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces towards the effective delivery of the basic services to the
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; competent police force that is national in scope and civilian in
Second, all other officers of the Government whose character. . . .
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; The policy force shall be organized, trained and equipped
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to primarily for the performance of police functions. Its national
appoint; scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof
may by law vest in the President alone. be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging Philippines.
to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent
on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar
are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and
Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent
Singson11 Congress cannot by law expand the power of police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
confirmation of appointments of other government officials not Appointments.
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of In view of the foregoing disquisition and conclusion, the
the 1987 Constitution. respondent former Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III of the
Consequently, unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Department of Budget and Management, did not act with grave
Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on abuse of discretion in authorizing and effecting disbursements
Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials for the salaries and other emoluments of the respondent police
whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be officers whose appointments are valid.
confirmed. But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid sections WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition under consideration
notwithstanding, the rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well- is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
settled that when provisions of law declared void are severable costs.1wphi1.nt
from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional SO ORDERED.
provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
sections.12 Reyes and Ynares Santiago, JJ., concur.
It is petitioner's submission that the Philippine National Police is
akin to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and therefore, the Republic of the Philippines
appointments of police officers whose rank is equal to that of SUPREME COURT
colonel or naval captain require confirmation by the Commission Manila
on Appointments. EN BANC
This contention is equally untenable. The Philippine National G. R. No. 175352 January 18, 2011
Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and
SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs. A. THE ASSAILED DECISION DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95 AS AMENDED DEPRIVED INTERVENOR
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, Intervenor. PNRC OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
RESOLUTION 1. INTERVENOR PNRC WAS NEVER A PARTY TO THE INSTANT
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: CONTROVERSY.
This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for 2. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95, AS
Reconsideration1 filed on August 10, 2009 by respondent AMENDED WAS NEVER AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by B. THE CURRENT CHARTER OF PNRC IS PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the Motion for Partial NO. 1264 AND NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95. PRESIDENTIAL
Reconsideration2 filed on August 27, 2009 by movant-intervenor DECREE NO. 1264 WAS NOT A CREATION OF CONGRESS.
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latters C. PNRCS STRUCTURE IS SUI GENERIS; IT IS A CLASS OF ITS
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper3 filed OWN. WHILE IT IS PERFORMING HUMANITARIAN FUNCTIONS
on December 23, 2009. AS AN AUXILIARY TO GOVERNMENT, IT IS A NEUTRAL ENTITY
In the Decision,4 the Court held that respondent did not forfeit SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL,
his seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of YET IT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS STRICTLY PRIVATE IN
the PNRC Board of Governors, as "the office of the PNRC CHARACTER.
Chairman is not a government office or an office in a In his Comment and Manifestation10 filed on November 9, 2009,
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the respondent manifests: (1) that he agrees with the position taken
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution."5 by the PNRC in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated
The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter August 27, 2009; and (2) as of the writing of said Comment and
"insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation" and Manifestation, there was pending before the Congress of the
consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under the Philippines a proposed bill entitled "An Act Recognizing the PNRC
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange as an Independent, Autonomous, Non-Governmental
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation."6 The Organization Auxiliary to the Authorities of the Republic of the
dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows: Philippines in the Humanitarian Field, to be Known as The
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of Philippine Red Cross."11
the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or After a thorough study of the arguments and points raised by
an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for the respondent as well as those of movant-intervenor in their
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 respective motions, we have reconsidered our pronouncements
Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, in our Decision dated July 15, 2009 with regard to the nature of
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the
Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential PNRC Charter, R.A. No. 95, as amended.
Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the As correctly pointed out in respondents Motion, the issue of
PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.7 constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties,
In his Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the
respondent raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have
constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95 was not raised by reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue
the parties, the Court went beyond the case in deciding such of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,12 thus:
issue; and (2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did not have This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless
standing to file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court
Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter.8 should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non- to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised
issue; therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide on by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
that question. Respondent cites Laurel v. Garcia,9 wherein the presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its
Court said that it "will not pass upon a constitutional question judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional
although properly presented by the record if the case can be question will be left for consideration until such question will be
disposed of on some other ground" and goes on to claim that unavoidable.13
since this Court, in the Decision, disposed of the petition on Under the rule quoted above, therefore, this Court should not
some other ground, i.e., lack of standing of petitioners, there have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended
was no need for it to delve into the validity of R.A. No. 95, and by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC
the rest of the judgment should be deemed obiter. Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial
In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other
Court sustain the constitutionality of its Charter on the following ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment.
grounds: Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by
this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even
originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a
consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and with public interest. Pertinently R.A. No. 95, as amended by P.D.
incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty 1264, provides:
(60) years of existence in this country. WHEREAS, during the meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on 22
Its existence as a chartered corporation remained unchallenged August 1894, the nations of the world unanimously agreed to
on ground of unconstitutionality notwithstanding that R.A. No. diminish within their power the evils inherent in war;
95 was enacted on March 22, 1947 during the effectivity of the WHEREAS, more than one hundred forty nations of the world
1935 Constitution, which provided for a proscription against the have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Conventions of August
creation of private corporations by special law, to wit: 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide and Sick of Armed Forces in the Field and at Sea, The Prisoners
for the formation, organization, or regulation of private of War, and The Civilian Population in Time of War referred to
corporations, unless such corporations are owned and controlled in this Charter as the Geneva Conventions;
by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an
thereof. (Art. XIV, 1935 Constitution.) independent nation on July 4, 1946, and proclaimed on February
Similar provisions are found in Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 14, 1947 its adherence to the Geneva Conventions of 1929, and
Constitution and Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. by the action, indicated its desire to participate with the nations
The latter reads: of the world in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to
SECTION 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private purpose as contemplated by the Geneva Conventions;
corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a chapter
may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the American National Red Cross which was terminated in
of the common good and subject to the test of economic view of the independence of the Philippines; and
viability. WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in other
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several countries which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva
times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, Conventions assist in promoting the health and welfare of their
December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. people in peace and in war, and through their mutual assistance
855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, and cooperation directly and through their international
respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs organizations promote better understanding and sympathy
corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the among the people of the world;
constitutional proscription on the creation of private NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of
aforesaid constitutional ban. the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September
is none like it not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of 22, 1972, do hereby decree and order that Republic Act No. 95,
history, public service and official status accorded to it by the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) as amended
State and the international community. There is merit in PNRCs by Republic Acts No. 855 and 6373, be further amended as
contention that its structure is sui generis. follows:
The PNRC succeeded the chapter of the American Red Cross Section 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the
which was in existence in the Philippines since 1917. It was Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the voluntary
created by an Act of Congress after the Republic of the organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the
Philippines became an independent nation on July 6, 1946 and Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva
proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence to the Conventions and to perform such other duties as are inherent
Convention of Geneva of July 29, 1929 for the Amelioration of upon a national Red Cross Society. The national headquarters
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field of this Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan Manila.
(the "Geneva Red Cross Convention"). By that action the (Emphasis supplied.)
Philippines indicated its desire to participate with the nations of The significant public service rendered by the PNRC can be
the world in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to gleaned from Section 3 of its Charter, which provides:
establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that Section 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall be as
purpose and like other volunteer organizations established in follows:
other countries which have ratified the Geneva Conventions, to (a) To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armed
promote the health and welfare of the people in peace and in forces in time of war, in accordance with the spirit of and under
war.14 the conditions prescribed by the Geneva Conventions to which
The provisions of R.A. No. 95, as amended by R.A. Nos. 855 and the Republic of the Philippines proclaimed its adherence;
6373, and further amended by P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, show (b) For the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-section, to
the historical background and legal basis of the creation of the perform all duties devolving upon the Corporation as a result of
PNRC by legislative fiat, as a voluntary organization impressed
the adherence of the Republic of the Philippines to the said Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Convention; Movement (the Movement). They are also guided by the seven
(c) To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
the authorities of the armed forces as a medium of Movement: Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence,
communication between people of the Republic of the Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality.
Philippines and their Armed Forces, in time of peace and in time A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a
of war, and to act in such matters between similar national protected component of the Red Cross movement under Articles
societies of other governments and the Governments and 24 and 26 of the First Geneva Convention, especially in times of
people and the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Philippines; armed conflict. These provisions require that the staff of a
(d) To establish and maintain a system of national and National Society shall be respected and protected in all
international relief in time of peace and in time of war and apply circumstances. Such protection is not ordinarily afforded by an
the same in meeting and emergency needs caused by typhoons, international treaty to ordinary private entities or even non-
flood, fires, earthquakes, and other natural disasters and to governmental organisations (NGOs). This sui generis character
devise and carry on measures for minimizing the suffering is also emphasized by the Fourth Geneva Convention which
caused by such disasters; holds that an Occupying Power cannot require any change in
(e) To devise and promote such other services in time of peace the personnel or structure of a National Society. National
and in time of war as may be found desirable in improving the societies are therefore organizations that are directly
health, safety and welfare of the Filipino people; regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast
(f) To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or to other ordinary private entities, including NGOs.
resident of the Philippines a member of the Red Cross. xxxx
The PNRC is one of the National Red Cross and Red Crescent In addition, National Societies are not only officially recognized
Societies, which, together with the International Committee of by their public authorities as voluntary aid societies, auxiliary to
the Red Cross (ICRC) and the IFRC and RCS, make up the the public authorities in the humanitarian field, but also benefit
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the from recognition at the International level. This is considered to
Movement). They constitute a worldwide humanitarian be an element distinguishing National Societies from other
movement, whose mission is: organisations (mainly NGOs) and other forms of humanitarian
[T]o prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be response.
found, to protect life and health and ensure respect for the x x x. No other organisation belongs to a world-wide Movement
human being, in particular in times of armed conflict and other in which all Societies have equal status and share equal
emergencies, to work for the prevention of disease and for the responsibilities and duties in helping each other. This is
promotion of health and social welfare, to encourage voluntary considered to be the essence of the Fundamental Principle of
service and a constant readiness to give help by the members Universality.
of the Movement, and a universal sense of solidarity towards all Furthermore, the National Societies are considered to be
those in need of its protection and assistance.15 auxiliaries to the public authorities in the humanitarian field. x x
The PNRC works closely with the ICRC and has been involved in x.
humanitarian activities in the Philippines since 1982. Among The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is
others, these activities in the country include: at one and the same time a private institution and a
1. Giving protection and assistance to civilians displaced or public service organization because the very nature of
otherwise affected by armed clashes between the government its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link
and armed opposition groups, primarily in Mindanao; with the State. In carrying out their major functions, Red
2. Working to minimize the effects of armed hostilities and Cross Societies give their humanitarian support to official bodies,
violence on the population; in general having larger resources than the Societies, working
3. Visiting detainees; and towards comparable ends in a given sector.
4. Promoting awareness of international humanitarian law in the x x x No other organization has a duty to be its governments
public and private sectors.16 humanitarian partner while remaining independent.18(Emphases
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the ours.)
public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that
and provide a range of services including disaster relief and R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of
health and social programmes. its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution
The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987
Crescent Societies (RCS) Position Paper,17 submitted by the Constitution.
PNRC, is instructive with regard to the elements of the specific The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been
nature of the National Societies such as the PNRC, to wit: questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in
National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red Cross and this case before the Court now.
its sister Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, have certain In the Decision, the Court, citing Feliciano v. Commission on
specificities deriving from the 1949 Geneva Convention and the Audit,19 explained that the purpose of the constitutional
provision prohibiting Congress from creating private they "are not inspired by the desire for financial gain but by
corporations was to prevent the granting of special privileges to individual commitment and devotion to a humanitarian purpose
certain individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to freely chosen or accepted as part of the service that National
other groups. Based on the above discussion, it can be seen that Societies through its volunteers and/or members render to the
the PNRC Charter does not come within the spirit of this Community."23
constitutional provision, as it does not grant special privileges to The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross
a particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity and Red Crescent Movement, can neither "be classified as an
that strives to serve the common good. instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of
Furthermore, a strict and mechanical interpretation of Article neutrality" as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution will hinder the State in corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian
adopting measures that will serve the public good or national law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.24
interest. It should be noted that a special law, R.A. No. 9520, Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now
the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, and not the general sufficiently established.1wphi1 Although it is neither a
corporation code, vests corporate power and capacities upon subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor
cooperatives which are private corporations, in order to a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary
implement the States avowed policy. thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009,
In the Decision of July 15, 2009, the Court recognized the public so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly
service rendered by the PNRC as the governments partner in allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently
the observance of its international commitments, to wit: while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, facto imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation" within the
humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be
effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned
most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC
religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a
provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster case-to-case basis.
Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally
Social Services and Voluntary Service. and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva accordance with its commitments under international law. This
Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
July 1929. x x x.20 (Citations omitted.) Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing
So must this Court recognize too the countrys that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters
adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion
unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty of the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the
of law.21 Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of
law of the land.22 This constitutional provision must be disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on
reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the the image of the Philippines in the international community. The
Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must
By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code therefore stay.
just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Richard J.
2009 lost sight of the PNRCs special status under international Gordons Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration and
humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to movant-intervenor PNRCs Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva the Decision in G.R. No. 175352 dated July 15, 2009 are
Conventions. Although the PNRC is called to be independent GRANTED. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 95, as amended, the
under its Fundamental Principles, it interprets such charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by
independence as inclusive of its duty to be the governments the parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon
humanitarian partner. To be recognized in the International by this Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis being
Committee, the PNRC must have an autonomous status, and neither strictly private nor public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains
carry out its humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial valid and constitutional in its entirety. The dispositive portion of
manner. the Decision should therefore be MODIFIED by deleting the
However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of second sentence, to now read as follows:
Voluntary Service of National Societies of the Movement, the WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of
PNRC must be distinguished from private and profit-making the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or
entities. It is the main characteristic of National Societies that an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 4 Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, 593 SCRA
Constitution. 68.
SO ORDERED. 5 Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
Associate Justice may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
WE CONCUR: any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
No part government-owned or controlled corporations or their
RENATO C. CORONA subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither
Chief Justice shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created
See dissenting opinion I join the dissent of J. or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CarpioCONCHITA he was elected.
6 Liban v. Gordon, supra note 4 at 97-98.
Associate Justice CARPIO MORALES
7 Id. at 98.
Associate Justice
8 Rollo, p. 256.
9 G.R. Nos. 92013 and 92047, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 797,
13
Id. at 552, citing Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil.
I join the dissent of J. DIOSDADO M.
516, 522 (1946).
Carpio PERALTA 14 Whereas clause, Republic Act No. 95 (1947).
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice 15 Pamphlet entitled "The Fundamental Principles of the Red
Associate Justice
Cross and Red Crescent Movement" (April 2009), available with
the ICRC, http://www.icrc.org.
16 Id.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL
17 Rollo, pp. 440-442.
Associate Justice CASTILLO
18 Id. at 440-441.
Associate Justice
19 464 Phil. 439 (2004).
See my concurring MARTIN S. 21 Ebro III v. National Labor Relations Commission, 330 Phil. 93,
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 256-264.
laws of their respective countries.24 Thus, the National SEC. 4. The National Assembly shall not, except by general law,
Societies are bound by the laws of their host countries and must provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
submit to the Constitution of their respective host countries. corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled
The Philippine Constitution prohibits Congress from creating by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
private corporations except by general law. I agree with the thereof.
2
PNRC that it is a private organization performing public Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
functions. Precisely because it is a private organization, the SEC. 16. The Congress, shall not, except by general law, provide
PNRC charter whether it be RA 95 or PD 1264 is violative of for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
the constitutional proscription against the creation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations
corporations by special law. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the may be created or established by special charters in the interest
treaty obligations of the Philippines under the Geneva of the common good and subject to the test of economic
Conventions, the assailed Decision only held void those viability.
provisions of the PNRC charter which create PNRC as a private 3 Moldex Realty, Inc. v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board,
corporation or grant it corporate powers. The other provisions G.R. No. 149719, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA 198.
respecting the governments treaty obligations remain valid, 4 356 Phil. 787 (1998).
The other provisions25 of the PNRC Charter remain valid 6 British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, 20
as they can be considered as a recognition by the State August 2008, 562 SCRA 511.
7 G.R. No. 149719, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA 198, 204. Article 4, and to notify other National Societies of such
8 AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95 (As amended by Republic recognition.
Acts No. 855 and 6373). AN ACT TO INCORPORATE THE 21 Statutes and Rules of Procedure of the International Red
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS. Cross and Red Crescent Movement, ICRC Publication, p. 9.
9 50 Phil. 259, 309 (1927). 22 The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red
there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence Crescent, ICRC Publication, pp. 18-19.
thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the 24 Discover the ICRC, ICRC Publication, p. 10.
regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on 25 The valid provisions are Sections 4(b) and (c), 14, 15, 16, and
any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires 17:
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue SEC. 4. In furtherance of the purposes mentioned in the
the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instruction, which preceding sub-paragraphs, the Philippine National Red Cross
shall form part of the law of the land. shall:
11 Legaspi v. Minister of Finance, No. L-58289, 24 July 1982, 115 xxx
SCRA 418. b. Be exempt from payment of all duties, taxes, fees, and other
12 232 Phil. 222 (1987). charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases for its
13 233 Phil. 313 (1987). exclusive use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other
14 Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 77071, 22 March Red Cross services, and in its benefits and fund raising drives all
1990, 183 SCRA 528; Belen v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 443 provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding.
(1988); Leyva v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 239 Phil.47 c. Be allotted by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office one
(1987); Sumulong v. Hon. Guerrero, 238 Phil. 462 (1987); lottery draw yearly for the support of its disaster relief
Ignacio v. Judge Guerrero, 234 Phil. 364 (1987). operations in addition to its existing lottery draws for the Blood
15 241 Phil. 650 (1988). Program.
16 Nos. L-55166 and L-55167, 21 MAY 1987, 150 SCRA 89. SEC. 14. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit, collect or
17 PNRCs Motion for Partial Reconsideration, p. 17; rollo, p. 413. receive money, materials, or property of any kind by falsely
(Boldfacing supplied) representing or pretending himself to be a member, agent or
18 Annex "A." The Position Paper was written by Razia Essack- representative of the Philippine National Red Cross.
Kauaria, Director of Governance Support and Global Monitoring, SEC. 15. The use of the name Red Cross is reserved exclusively
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent to the Philippine National Red Cross and the use of the emblem
Societies. of the red Greek cross on a white ground is reserved exclusively
19 The following are some of the private charitable organizations to the Philippine National Red Cross, medical services of the
in the Philippines: (1) CHILDHOPE Asia Philippines, Inc. - is Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other medical facilities
registered in 1995 under the Securities and Exchange or other institutions as may be authorized by the Philippine
Commission and whose principal purpose is to advocate for the National Red Cross as provided under Article 44 of the Geneva
cause of street children [CHILDHOPE Asia Website, Conventions. It shall be unlawful for any other person or entity
http://www.childhope.org.ph/about-us.html (visited 2 to use the words Red Cross or Geneva Cross or to use the
September 2010)]; (2) PATH Foundation Philippines, Inc. (PFPI) emblem of the red Greek cross on a white ground or any
- is a private, charitable organization whose mission is to designation, sign, or insignia constituting an imitation thereof
improve health and contribute to environmentally sustainable for any purpose whatsoever.
development, particularly in under-served areas of the SEC. 16. As used in this Decree, the term person shall include
Philippines. [PFPI Website, http://www.pfpi.org/about.html any legal person, group, or legal entity whatsoever nature, and
(visited 2 September 2010)]; (3) The Philippine Community any person violating any section of this Article shall, upon
Fund - is a registered charitable organization, whose mission is conviction therefore be liable to a fin[e] of not less than one
to permanently improve the quality of life for the poorest Filipino thousand pesos or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one
communities, through education, nutrition, health, medical and year, or both, at the discretion of the court, for each and every
family enhancement programs, regardless of religion, race or offense. In case the violation is committed by a corporation or
political boundaries [The Philippine Community Fund Website, association, the penalty shall devolve upon the president,
http://p-c-f.org/about_us/index.php (visited 2 September director or any other officer responsible for such violation.
2010)]. SEC. 17. All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the
20 Article 5, paragraph 2 b) states: provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed.
2. The role of the International Committee, in accordance with 26 Decision dated 15 July 2009, pp. 22-23.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
Third Division
February 17, 2016