T Military

Our interpretation is that economic and diplomatic engagement is distinctly

different than military engagement

This means the topic excludes operation activities, confidence and security
building measures, security assistance, military contacts, assistance, arms
control, info sharing, humanitarian assistance, combined training, education,
and exercises
Hager 04 (Lieutenant Colonel Gregory L. Hager, United States Army, Strategy Research Project, SUPPORTING AND INTEGRATING THEATER
SECURITY COOPERATION PLANS, 3/19/14)

Although the JSCP provided each geographic commander prioritized regional objectives in support of national objectives, it established neither
prisoritization between the regions nor among the objectives. This provided planning flexibility to commanders but created
conflicts during competition for resources. To fulfill the planning requirement of the JSCP, and initially to provide

visibility of peacetime military engagement to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, combatant commanders
were tasked to develop a two-part plan including a Strategic Plan that outlined the theater strategy and objectives, and the Engagement Activity
Annexes that documented each specific engagement activity conducted with foreign militaries in engagement groups identified by the Joint Staff. Concepts for planning and
conducting peacetime engagement did not change; however, the planning and reporting requirements increased with Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01, Theater Engagement
Planning published in February 1998. Geographic CINCs and Executive Agents will develop, as applicable, TEPs for their assigned theaters or designated countries inclusive of
the year of execution and the next seven (7) fiscal years. The plan development process is conducted in four phases. The first phase provides planning guidance via the JSCP; the
second phase results in a geographic CINC approved TEP Strategic Concept; the third phase includes synchronization of supporting and coordinating plans and results in a
geographic CINC-approved TEP; and the fourth phase is the national-level review and integration into the Global Family of Theater Engagement Plans. Under CJCSM 3113.01 all
Unified Combatant Commanders were required to submit biennially on 1 April, a Strategic Concept to the Joint Staff for review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and an
Engagement Activity Annex with specific resource and execution data covering the year of execution plus the next seven years. The activity annexes were also submitted to the

included in the 1998 CJCSM 3113.01 was a refined definition of what

Joint Staff J5 annually on 1 October. Also

qualified as an engagement activity and thus required coordination and reporting. The categories of engagement
included Operational Activities, Combined Exercises, Security Assistance, Combined Training,
Combined Education, Military Contacts, Humanitarian Assistance and Other Activities. Other
activities included arms Control Treaties, Negotiations, and Information Sharing. These groups of peacetime
engagement tasks included a broad range of non-combat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces to demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities,
promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and in many other ways enhance regional stability. Even with this newly stated peacetime engagement planning requirement, the
primary objective of our military strategy remained to be the militarys ability in acting to deter aggression and prevent conflict; and fighting and winning our Nation's wars when

As defined by the 1995 National Military Strategy, Peacetime Engagement included

called upon.

Military to Military Contacts, Nation Assistance, Security Assistance, Humanitarian Operations,

Counterdrug and Counterterrorism, and Peacekeeping . With this narrow definition of engagement, the major fund sources
Commanders had at their disposal included CJCS Exercise funds, Security Assistance dollars budgeted by the State Department and executed by the Department of Defense
through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Commands were also provided additional funds to conduct operations including counterdrug, disaster assistance and
peacekeeping operations. In addition to these budgeted programs, service component commanders could use operational funds to conduct engagement activities with foreign
militaries in conjunction with training opportunities both inside and outside of the United States. By May of 2000, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
combatant commanders were well into the formalized process of developing an electronic media to plan, coordinate and track engagement activities. The premise behind the
database was that commanders reported engagement activities via the database and the Joint Planning Community could review and track execution of engagement plans. The
media that was fielded was the Theater Engagement Planning Management Information System (TEPMIS), later called the Theater Security Cooperation Management
Information System (TSCMIS). Shortly after the publication of the May 2000 CJCSM 3113.03, the DOD centralized TSCMIS was eliminated. The result of ending TSCMIS was that
there was no longer an electronic tool that could assist in engagement planning and synchronization as well as provide global visibility on engagement activities. The
organization for planning and conduct of the Security Cooperation Plan included the combatant commands, service components, defense agencies, and for those countries with
established embassies, the military section of the country team or the security assistance officer. The planning cycle, which began with the geographic combatant commanders
publication of their Strategic Concept on 1 April that provided the strategic planning guidance for the AOR and subsequent activity annexes on 1 October, was established to
coincide with the Department of Defense Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). The purpose of this process was to allow combatant commanders an opportunity

Although
to influence the budget process to gain funding for the conduct of their engagement plans. CURRENT SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING GUIDANCE

much of the specific reference to peacetime military engagement is absent from the current
National Security Strategy, the requirement to engage other countries still exists. The September 2002 NSS
identifies the need to work with others to defuse regional conflicts. Although there has been no publication of a more recent

National Military strategy that outlines the militarys strategy for support of current national objectives, the
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review articulates military requirements to conduct security cooperation activities. As with the National Security Strategy, much of the explicit
reference to peacetime engagement is omitted from the 2001 QDR and focus is placed primarily on improving capability and interoperability among our allies. The QDR noted:

The AFF violates because they are categorized as military engagement

Two impacts
Limits allowing for military engagement triples the size of the topic, because it
justifies recycling the China Pressure Topic and the College Military Topic
thats turns education claims recycling disincentives original topic research
and arguments

Heres a list of whats topical under their interp:

A. First Strike China AFF
B. Invade North Korea AFF
C. Increase Carrier Presence in the SCS
D. Joint Training Missions with the PLA
E. Military Tech Transfers

That makes it impossible for the NEG predictable limits are the biggest
internal link to clash, NEG prep, and cost-benefit analysis its key focus
research in the correct and fixed literature base they make debate structurally
unfair

This outweighs debate is a game means maintaining the competitive equity

of the game should be a jurisdictional priority
Military engagement is not only defined by the goal of engagement, but the
process of it too any interaction of military contacts between another military
or government is considered military engagement thats 1NC Resnick
Extend the fact that they violate because they are not military engagement, that said, they are
also reducing the education of the debate
 2NC Link - Appeasement
Backing away from Taiwan undermines US influence and triggers the DA two
link args
A. The plan would significantly increase Chinas desire to unify with Taiwan
gaining access super-charges Chinese influence in the region
B. It undermines confidence of regional allies theyll doubt the status quo
US containment campaign and bandwagon with China thats 1NC
Friedberg

Prefer our evidence Friedberg is a Professor of Politics and International

Affairs at Princeton University with an intent to compare different strategies in
response to a hostile China to formulate his work

Territorial concessions increase the likelihood of war by signaling

weakness
Glaser 15 (Charles L., Professor at Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington
University, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation, International Security, Vol. 39, Is. 4.,
pg. 74)

Second, and more complicated, instead of satisfying the adversary, territorial accommodation could
enable or encourage it to demand or forcibly pursue additional concessions. Whether these dangers
exist depends on the adversarys motives and the extent of its aims. Accommodation that might satisfy a greedy
adversary with limited aims could instead increase the probability of war if the adversary has
unlimited aims, or even limited aims that significantly exceed the scope of the concessions. The
state will almost always face some uncertainty about the nature and extent of the adversarys aims, so
accommodation will rarely be risk free. Given this uncertainty, territorial accommodation can be dangerous if it
increases the adversarys ability to launch additional challenges. Territorial concessions can enhance the
adversarys potential offensive capabilities by increasing its wealth or access to critical resources,
by providing it with territory that enhances its ability tonight on the offensive, and by freeing up military
forces that were previously committed to challenging the conceded territory. In addition, given
uncertainty about the adversarys aims, territorial accommodation can be dangerous if it decreases the
adversarys assessment of the states credibility for defending its interests, thereby increasing the
adversarys willingness to launch additional challenges.

Independently, the link is a solvency deficit strong deterrence key to prevent

Chinese expansion plan emboldens China
Cole, 15- analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service( Michael, If the Unthinkable
Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan, The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-
over-12825)//JS
[Even if they win that China is a liberal state, strong deterrence in the status quo is key in
order to buy time to facilitate that transition]

Whites realism isnt a solution; its a recipe for chaos.

By accumulating enough comprehensive national power, and
by crossing the nuclear threshold, states would have free rein to make irredentist or
expansionist territorial claims on weaker states, a return to the scorpions-filled bottle preWorld War I, only this time the critters are
bristling with nuclear weapons. Not only would this invite aggression by powerful states, it would create

incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons and thereby bury existing nonproliferation regimes, not to mention spark arms races
all over the planet. If force is the only determinant of international politics, this is the only foreseeable outcome. Moreover, how much comprehensive
power would a state assume is necessary in order to get away with aggression? How many nuclear warheads? Rather than bring stability, Whites world
would encourage miscalculation. Abandoning Taiwan to its inevitable fate due to Chinas strength (and
nuclear blackmail) would also undermine existing security alliances and discredit the
agreements, legal and tacit, that have helped maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific over the decades. Such signaling would
in turn encourage states in Chinas neighborhood to do the necessary to protect themselves
should the day come when they, too, are left to fend for themselves. It would indicate that good behavior and peaceful democratizationtwo qualities
that apply to Taiwanare of no intrinsic value to mankind and therefore not worth defending. And it would also prove that even medium powers (with
a population of 23 million people and the worlds nineteenth-largest economy, Taiwan is not exactly a gnat) are not immune to the desires of greater
powers. Lastly, as I pointed out in my previous piece, there is absolutely no guarantee that after acquiring Taiwan (on
a silver platter or at the end of a rifle), Chinas appetite would be sated. In fact, much like imperialism, territorial expansionism has its

own internal dynamics: the more territory one controls, the greater the incentive to push outwards to protect newly acquired real estate. Should

Taiwan become part of Chinese territory, Beijing would likely seek to protect the island from
neighboring countries (Japan, the Philippines) and U.S. forces in Guam, all of whom would likely have adjusted their military postures due
to the proximity of an expanded China to their territories. The vicious circle that this would risk engendering isnt too difficult to imagine. All of this

shows us that it would be nearly impossible to isolate the absorption of Taiwan from the region in

which that transfer of power would occur. A neutral Taiwan is therefore the surest way to ensure stability in that corner of
Northeast Asia all the way to the South China Sea. To quote from Christopher Clarks The Sleepwalkers, his study of the origins of World War I, far
from being inevitable, this war was improbable. The same could be said, perhaps, of alternative scenarios had the international community
presented a more credible challenge initially to Nazi Germany, though as David Faber argues in Munich, 1938, Hitler actually felt hed been stolen the
delights of armed conquest by the pact signed with Chamberlain. I am reluctant to use the Nazi analogy when discussing China, but since White raises
it, so must I. However, I am far
from convinced that China seeks war in the way that Hitler did, and if it did,
we would have every reason not to give it Taiwan and to make sure it is safely contained in its
box. There is more reason to believe that Beijing is un-Hitler-like in that it would heartily welcome a Chamberlain over the Taiwan issue.
Opposing authoritarian Chinas designs on Taiwan, and extending to Taiwanese the right to self-
determination that is theirs, also need not inevitably lead to war. As discussed in this article, there are several
steps that the international community and Taiwan itself can take to reduce the risks of war in the Taiwan Strait,

chief among them a strong and concerted deterrent strategy. Surrendering to blackmail by powerful statesWhites
prescriptionwould turn back the clock. In fact, doing so would deny those in China who seek alternatives to belligerence and repression the chance to
play a leading role in shaping a new international system. By
keeping the aggressors in check, deterrence can buy us
time and facilitate the emergence of a leadership in Beijing that is more liberal and perhaps less inclined to
throw its weight around. Conversely, give in to coercion and you feed the beast.

If we win that China is a hostile power, it proves that its try or die for
containment and the plan just delays the war thats which is comparatively
worse
Jacobs 2016 (Bruce Jacobs is emeritus professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash
University. 5-28-2016, Appeasement will only encourage China," Age,
http://www.theage.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourage-expansionist-china-
20151101-gknz2l.html, Accessed: 5-27-2016, /Kent Denver-MB)
The arguments of people such as Age columnist Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we
have to be careful about becoming involved in a war. History has taught us that "appeasement" of such
expansionist powers as China does not stop war. Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed
conflict and ultimately leads to a much larger war later. Appeasement of China only enhances
Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless paper tiger. It creates a sense among China's
generals and political leaders that they can pursue expansionist policies without international
protest. The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature can lead to war is false. Both main candidates,
Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu, want to maintain the status quo that Taiwan is de facto an independent state but that it will not
announce this. Australians would be appalled if we were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill
Shorten would lead to war and that we should vote accordingly. Wemust be clear that China is the only country
threatening anyone else in Asia. The close talks between leaders of such countries as the US,
Japan, India and Australia demonstrate that Asia's democratic countries have become aware
of the risks. In classical balance-of-power theory, the rise of one expansionist power creates a coalition
among other powers. China's expansionist actions have already created a substantial
democratic coalition in Asia prepared to prevent China from starting a major war
Thesis China is a hostile power. If we win power competition is
inevitable, then we win the debate.

Even if they win they resolve cooperation for a while, they cant solve
relations in the long term because they are not sustainable. It takes out
their aff solvency and makes their competition impacts inevitable.

Hostile rise is inevitable 1NC Mulgan isolates three warrants

A. Territorial expansion rapid land-grab and aggressive militarization in
the South and East China Sea despite violations of international law
B. Hyper-nationalism leaders are taking advantage of public emotion to
inflate the US as a threat, rally support for rise, and fuel security
competition
C. Differing Governments ideological differences between the US and
Chinese governments make clash inevitable when liberalization fails

Prefer it multiple actions confirm Chinas hostile rise

A. Offensive realism is the dominant Chinese IR paradigm and Xi
embraced the prospect of an inevitable confrontation with the US
Topping 15-Military and Strategic Studies Scholar (Vincent, Tracing a Line in the Water: Chinas Anti-Access/Area-
Denial Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region and its Implications for the United States, August 2015, University of Calgary,
http://theses.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/11023/2602/4/ucalgary_2015_topping_vincent.pdf)//SL
For decades, China has kept the same discourse: it is seeking peaceful development, it will never seek hegemony, and security
alliances in Asia are a relic of the Cold War that should be discarded. Nonetheless, in recent years (and especially since the
arrival of Xi Jinping as the President of the PRC), there has been an increasingly severe dichotomy between words and actions.
Whereas the official Chinese discourse had long been that China was still a developing country that should not be pushed too
hard otherwise it could destroy its social cohesion and enhance the pressure on its domestic tensions,39 and whereas China
had for decades kept Deng Xiaopings motto of keeping a low profile and never seek leadership, now China
wants to be
recognized as a leading power in the world and is striving for achievements. Chinese
international relations expert and Dean of the International Relations department at Tsinghua University Yan Xuetong had
been preaching since at least 2010 that China
and the United States should drop the pretense that they
are partners in this new century and accept that they are competitors that will more often
than not have divergent and conflicting interests.40 After all, according to Yan, Chinas endeavour
to regain its historical place as a world leading power and the United States refusal to
relinquish its sole superpower status constitutes their greatest political conflict. 41 In the words
of Alastair Iain Johnston, this is quite an admission about Chinas interests as it goes against every single policy statement
and declaratory policy that China has issued over thirty years.42 This could be disregarded as a Chinese realists perspective
who is trying to further his point of view and agenda. However, when Xi Jinping came to power, he projected
his vision of China for the future, which entailed that the country needed to undergo a national
rejuvenation (fuxing zhi lu, ). According to Yan, this is a phrase that literally refers to resuming Chinas
historical international status as the worlds most advanced state in early Tang Dynasty (618-917 AD). Today this phrase
specifically refers to Chinas efforts to catch up with the United States in terms of comprehensive
national power [] the competition for international leadership between China and the

United States will be inevitable (emphasis added).43 This also points out to one inconvenient truth about
Chinese politics, one that will definitely leave a bitter taste for American policymakers that have been working tirelessly to
socialize China in the international system and who thought liberalism would convert China to the benefits of the current
international order: not only realist (along with ultra-nationalist) thinkers in China are not on the
fringe of Chinese politics, they are very much in the mainstream. 44 International relations theory
is still somewhat of a new phenomenon in China, but Chinese experts have quickly appropriated realism
(and especially John J. Mearsheimers version of offensive realism) as one of their own.45 It is now, and has been
for a while, the most dominant paradigm of international relations in China.46 Some theorists in
China like Wang Jisi, Dean of the International Relations department at the prestigious Peking University, have been
trying for years to strike a conciliatory note to reconcile differences and bridge the gap between China and the
U.S., but his attempt (and those of likeminded colleagues) to do so is mostly the exception, not the
rule.47
 2NC Link - Japan
Giving up Taiwan wrecks the Japan alliance and causes an arms race
perceived as the US abandoning an ally allows China to extend their line of
control and threaten the first island chain undermines the relationship and
drives an arms race as countries secure themselves against a more powerful
China thats Cole

AT no prolif

Anti-prolif args are culturally outdated and ignore internal politics Japan is shifting
towards militarization, could get the bomb quickly, and are bypassing legal restraints
Hunt 15 [Jonathan Hunt (Post-Doctoral Fellow @ Stanton Nuclear Security Program, fellow @
Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Visiting Professor @
Emory University), Out of the Mushroom Clouds Shadow, Foreign Policy, 8/5/15,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/]

With the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually leaving its
pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind, however, the security alliance with the United States and
the nuclear umbrella that it affords are increasingly crucial backstops for Japans commitments
to nonproliferation and disarmament. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East
Asia. If Japan pursued nuclear weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread,
especially in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member
nuclear club, Japan has long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it
accepts the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency the global nuclear watchdog on activities ranging from
uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing. In 1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEAs voluntary Additional Protocol, which
mandated even more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts
nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil abroad in support of international efforts to
manage and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction. These
attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed
to the bombs enduring impact on Japanese culture and politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and
69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and 25,000 in Nagasaki in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During
the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities
populations. Anti-nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square
miles of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel the Lucky Dragon one of whom later
died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan and was featured in the
godfather of all monster movies Godzilla. One year later, Japans parliament, the Diet, restricted domestic nuclear activities to
those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-
Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons. Yet
Japanese leaders
renunciation of nuclear weapons has never been absolute. In private remarks, many of Japans
prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that the weapons would enhance their
countrys national security and international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight
Eisenhower insisted that he saw no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldnt be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or
anything else.) After
Chinas first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson
that if the [Chinese] had nuclear weapons, the Japanese also should have them. He later
confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear
Principles were nonsense. Why then did Japan not build atomic bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the United States
offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952 and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting
Japan. Those treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however, so after Chinas nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team
devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson
inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its
defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense. These reassurances seemed to have their
intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State
Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan
had no intention to make nuclear weapons, he told them. Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence also
formed a pillar of Japans nuclear posture. When Satos former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he
convinced the Diet to ratify Japans acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Fords reaffirmation that the U.S.-Japan
security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, where
the two countries foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate their common defense. Optimists claim
that nuclear aversion, political checks, and international commitments will prevent a Japanese
nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida who hails from Hiroshima renewed calls to
accelerate nuclear disarmament at the NPT Review Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
order to witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic bombings. And
yet, Japan is becoming increasingly
ambivalent about its military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new
arrangements with the United States that encourage Japan to function more proactively in
East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing aside widespread public resistance to a Diet
resolution that would authorize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the
first time since World War II. During his first administration, in the wake of the first North
Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a limited nuclear arsenal would not necessarily
violate the pacifist constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear status in 2006, but with North
Korea testing medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its conventional and nuclear
forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another review
seems inevitable. In 2011, Shintaro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of Tokyo, even called
for Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to Pyongyangs provocations.
South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took
the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And
if Tokyo invoked North Koreas nuclear arsenal to
withdraw from the NPT, which has a 90-day waiting period, it could build its own in short order.
It has a growing defense industry recently freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile
technology thanks to its space program, and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough
weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki.
Indeed, if Japan wanted to, it could probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a
sophisticated arsenal in three to five years. Faced with an existential crisis, however, those
numbers would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons,
Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-
level consultations in 2010; the meetings should expand to include South Korea trilateral coordination is overdue. The United
States should continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military spending has hovered
around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense budgets, reducing
scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be called on and increasing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as
a result. Hibakusha
have educated Japan and humanity about the lifelong harm that nuclear
weapons can inflict. Their advancing age is representative of the generational changes facing
Japan, however, with profound implications for its foreign policies. As Japan assumes a more
active security role in East Asia, it may be tempted to rethink its nuclear options. With some
experts promoting tailored proliferation to U.S. allies to counter Chinas rise, U.S.-Japanese
efforts to reduce nuclear risks regionally and worldwide appear increasingly in jeopardy. The
shadow of American power still looms over Japan 70 years after two artificial suns rose over
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear partnership with Washington has afforded Tokyo the
security necessary to renounce nuclear weapons and champion a world without them. With
Japans nuclear restraint no longer the article of faith it once was, the significance of the nuclear
pacts struck decades ago will become ever more consequential.

Rearmament is possibleJapan is pushing for remilitarization

Thorsten 16 [In Power in Contemporary Japan, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-59193-7_14, Chapter 14: Soft
Hard Power Convergence and Democracy in Abes Japan. Marie Thorsten teaches at the Department of Global Communications, Doshisha
University, Kyoto, Japan]

At the same time that Japans business and government leaders are vaunting their conception of national culture through the foreign gaze, the

nation is also redeveloping its military capability. In 2015, the government under Abe Shinzo (Liberal Democratic Party, LDP)
converted its Self-Defense Forces (SDF), restricted to performing humanitarian roles domestically or in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations, into a
military with offensive capability serving collective self-defense. As
of 2016, for the first time since the Second World
War, Japans forces may legally fight offensively overseas, namely to assist an ally under attack
even if Japan itself is not threatened. Moreover, the Abe administration has also been
reconsidering revision of laws regarding arms exports, peacekeeping missions and domestic
counterterrorism policies.

New generation more inclined to prolif

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Mary Nikitin, analyst in
nonproliferation, 2-19-2009, Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US
Interests, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB

A review of recent articles and interviews with prominent Japanese opinion-makers and experts
revealed a near-consensus of opposition to the development of nuclear weapons.20 Realist-
minded security observers cite the danger of threatening China and causing unnecessary
instability in the region, while foreign policy managers point to the risk of weakening the U.S.
alliance. Some observers claim, however, that a younger generation of upcoming elites may be
more nationalistic and therefore potentially more supportive of the option in the future