K

First we still link, our 1NC link evidence indicates that the plan is securitized, this still
causes our impact
Second, the 1AC is not in a line of flight they dont do anything revolutionary
Third, all theory is local and fragmented, and must be attached to praxis, adding
pieces to local fragmented theories such as the alternative fails because it totalizes
our approach and converts it to disciplinary power. The permutation simply cannot
explain its praxis, which means it will always fail.
Deleuze and Foucault 04 (Gilles and Michel, French philosophers, Desert
Islands and Other Texts. Intellectuals and Power. Semiotext.)
Gilles Deleuze: Maybe it's because for us the
relationships between theory and praxis are being lived in a new way.
On the one hand, praxis used to be conceived as an application of theory, as a consequence; on the other hand, and
inversely, praxis was supposed to inspire theory, it was supposed to create a new form of theory. In any
case, their relationship took the form of a process of totalization, in one shape or another. Maybe we're asking
the question in a new way. For us the relationships between theory and praxis are much more fragmentary and
partial. In the first place, a theory is always local, related to a limited domain, though it can be applied in another domain
that is more or less distant. The rule of application is never one of resemblance. In the second place, as soon as a
theory takes hold in its own domain, it encounters obstacles, walls, collisions, and these impediments
create a need for the theory to be relayed by another kind of discourse (it is this other discourse which eventually
causes the theory to migrate from one domain to another). Praxis is a network of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory
relays one praxis to another. A theory cannot be developed without encountering a wall, and a praxis is needed
to break through. Take yourself, for example, you begin by theoretically analyzing a milieu of imprisonment like the psychiatric asylum of
nineteenth-century capitalist society. Then you discover how necessary it is precisely for those who are imprisoned to speak on their own
behalf, for them to become a relay (or perhaps you were already a relay for them), but these people are prisoners, they're in prison. This was
the logic behind your creating the GIP (Group for Information on Prisons):

to promote the conditions in which the prisoners themselves could speak.2 It

would be totally misguided to say, as the
Maoist seemed to be saying, that you were making a move toward praxis by applying your theories. In
your case we find neither an application, nor a reform program, nor an investigation in the traditional
sense. It is something else entirely: a system of relays in an assemblage, in a multiplicity of bits and
pieces both theoretical and practical. For us, the intellectual and theorist have ceased to be a subject, a consciousness, that
represents or is representative. And those involved in political struggle have ceased to be represented, whether by a party or a union that
would in turn claim for itself the right to be their conscience. Who speaks and who acts? It's always a multiplicity, even in the person that
speaks or acts. We are all groupuscles. There is no more representation. There is only action, the action of theory, the action of praxis, in the
relations of relays and networks.

Michel Foucault: It seems to me that traditionally, an intellectual's political status resulted from two things: 1) the position as an intellectual in
bourgeois society, in the system of capitalist production, in the ideology which that system produces or imposes (being exploited, reduced to
poverty, being rejected or "cursed," being accused of subversion or immorality, etc.), and 2) intellectual discourse itself, in as much as it
revealed a particular truth, uncovering political relationships where none were before perceived. These two forms of becoming politicized were
not strangers to one another, but they didn't necessarily coincide either. You had the "cursed" intellectual, and you had the "socialist"
intellectual. In certain moments of violent reaction, the powers that be willingly confused these two politicizations with one anotherafter
1848, after the Commune, after 1940: the intellectual was rejected, persecuted at the very moment when "things" began to appear in their
naked "truth," when you were not supposed to discuss the king's new clothes.

Since the latest resurgence, however, intellectuals realize

that the masses can do without them and still be
knowledgeable: the masses know perfectly well what's going on, it is perfectly clear to them, they even
know better than the intellectuals do, and they say so convincingly enough. But a system of power exists
to bar, prohibit, invalidate their discourse and their knowledgea power located not only in the upper
echelons of censorship, but which deeply and subtly permeates the whole network of society. The
intellectuals are themselves part of this system of power, as is the idea that intellectuals are the agents
of "consciousness" and discourse. The role of the intellectual is no longer to situate himself "slightly
ahead" or "slightly to one side" so he may speak the silent truth of each and all; it is rather to struggle against those
forms of power where he is both instrument and object: in the order of "knowledge," "truth," "consciousness," and
"discourse."

So it is that theory does not express, translate, or apply a praxis; it is a praxis but local and regional, as you
say: non-totalizing. A struggle against power, a struggle to bring power to light and open it up wherever it is
most invisible and

insidious. Not a struggle for some "insight" or "realization" (for a long time now consciousness as knowledge has been
acquired by the masses, and consciousness as subjectivity has been taken, occupied by the bourgeoisie)but a struggle to
undermine and take power side by side with those who are fighting, and not off to the side trying to
enlighten them. A "theory" is the regional system of this struggle.

Fourth, The permutation is an attempt to mask the plans violent governmentality and war
against the Other these internal contradictions means it inevitably fails.
Sjoberg 13 Laura, Department of Political Science, University of Florida , Gainesville The paradox of
security cosmopolitanism?, Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, 29-34

Particularly, Burke suggests that security cosmopolitanism rejects a procedural faith in strongly post-
Westphalian forms of government and democracy (p. 17) and reiterates that such an approach includes
no automatic faith in any one institutional design (p. 24). This seems to move away from one of the
prominent critiques of, in Anna Agathangelou and Lings (2009) words, the neoliberal imperium, as
reliant on Western, liberal notions of governance to the detriment of those on whom such a form of
government is imposed. Burke clearly problematizes this imposition, framing many of the serious
problems in global politics as a result of choices that create destructive dynamics and constraints (p. 15)
at least in part by Western, liberal governments characterizing modernity as culpable for insecurity. At
the same time, the solution seems to be clearly situated within the discursive framework of the problem.
Burke suggests that there should be a primary concern for effectiveness, equality, fairness, and justice
not for states, per se, but for human beings, and the global biosphere (p. 24). Unless the only problem
with modernity is the post- Westphalian structure of the state (which this approach does not eschew, but
claims not to privilege), then this statement of values might entrench the problem. Many of the ideas of
equality, fairness, and justice that come to mind with the (somewhat rehearsed) use of those words in
progressive politics are inseparable from an ethos of enlightenment modernity. This may be problematic
on a number of levels. First, it may fail to interrupt the series of choices that Burke suggests produce a
cycle of insecurity. Second, it may fold back onto itself in the recommendations that security
cosmopolitanism produces. This especially concerned me in Burkes discussion of how to end dangerous
processes, where he places greater faith in the ethical, normative, and legal suppression of dangerous
processes and actions than in formalistic or procedural solutions (p. 24). It seems to me that there is a
good argument that suppression is itself a dangerous process, yet Burkes framework does not really
include a mechanism for internal critique. Another problem that seems to confound security
cosmopolitanism is evaluating the relationships between power, governance, and governmentality. There
are certainly several ways in which Burke uses a notion of the state that distinguishes security
cosmopolitanism from the mainstream neoliberal literature. For example, he characterizes the state as
an entity whose national survival depends on its global participation, obligations, and depen- dencies,
(citing Burke 2013a, 5). This view of the state sees it as not only survival-seeking (in the neo-neo synthesis
sense) but also dependent on its positive interactions with other states for survival. Burkes approach to
government/governance initially appears to be global rather than state-based, another potentially
transformative move. For example, he sees the job of security cosmopolitanism as to theorize and
defend norms for the respon- sible conduct and conceptualization of global security governance (p. 21).
At the same time, later in the article, Burke suggests entrenching the current structure of the state. His
practical approach of looking for the solidarity of the governing with the governed seems to
simultaneously interrogate the current power structures and reify them. Burke says: Such a solidarity of
the governed that engages in a practical interrogation of power ought to be a significant feature of
security cosmopolitanism. At the same time, however, security cosmopolitanism must be concerned with
improving the global governance of security by elites and experts. (p. 21) This attachment to the
improvement of existing structures of governance seems to be at the heart of what I see as the failure
of the radical potential in the idea of security cosmopolitanism. When discussing how the power
dynamics between the elite and the subordinated might change, Burke suggests that voluntary
renunciation of the privileges and powers of both state and corporate sovereignty will no doubt be a
necessary feature of such an order (p. 25). Relying on the voluntary renunciation of power by the
powerful seems both unrealistic and not particularly theoretically innovative. This seems to be at the
center of a paradox inherent in security cosmopolitanism: Faith in the Western liberal state is insidious,
but the Western liberal state does not have to be. Modernity causes insecurity, but need not be
discarded fully. Some universalizations are dangerous, others are benign. Dangerous processes must be
stopped, even if by dangerous processes. Moral entrepreneurship is the key, but ther e is no clear
foundation for what counts as moral. The security cosmopolitanism critique is inspired by
consequentialism, but lacks deontological foundations despite deontological implications. Burke calls for
(and indeed demands) to take responsibility for it (p. 23) in terms of both formal and moral
accountability (p. 24). In so doing, he endorses (Booths vision of) moral progress (p. 25), despite
understanding the insidious deployment of various notions of moral progress by others. Security
cosmopolitanism, then, is a proclamation for radical change that is initially stalled by its internal
contradictions and further handicapped by its lack of capacity to enact the very sort of radical change
Burke sees it as fundamental to righting the wrongs he sees in the world. The result seems to be the
(potential) reification of existing governments/governmentality through what essentially appears to be a
non-anthropocentric human security which cannot be clearly distinguished from current notions of
human security (p. 15). It appears to remain top-down and without clear moral foundation while
claiming significant improvement over existing approaches. This appearance/seduction of improvement
without real promise for change might be more insidious than the nihilism of which many post-
structuralists are accused, as it seductively appears to solve a problem it does not solve.

Fifth, Only complete resistance to security logic can generate genuine political thought.
Neocleous 8 Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]
The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security
altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought
other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something
that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be
imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is
an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to
do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political
way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-
encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and
discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as
the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode
of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such
differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world
is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply
removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of
power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security',
despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved
it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same
manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the
monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security
politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and
legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal
communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which
the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined
to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that
this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or
gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist
political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the
grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to
fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security
and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical
politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while
much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that
the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is
the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep
harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this
increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real
alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against
security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant
securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the
power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most
democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different
conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that
moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this
might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an
illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity ;
it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the
certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that
come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it
politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return
the gift."'
Sixth, the revolutionary line of flight of the 1AC becomes a line of death this is the
moment in which revolutionary movements turn inward and destroy themselves, the
passion for complete abolition as they demand total ontological stability, perm guts
alt solvency
Koerner 11. Michelle Koerner, professor of womens studies at Duke, Lines of Escape: Gilles
Deleuzes Encounter with George Jackson, Genre, Vol. 44, No. 2 Summer 2011 pg. 164

On the first page of the provocatively titled essay On the Superiority of

Anglo- American Literature, Jacksons line is once again deployed, but
here it is in reference to the idea that the highest aim of literature is
to escape (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2006: 26). An interesting convergence occurs here
between political and aesthetic practices, suggesting an indiscernibility
between the two insofar as both effectuate becomings. Genet had already made a
similar point in describing Soledad Brother as a poem of love and combat, but deploying Jackson with respect to
the question of literature as such, this essay invites us to rethink a more profound relation between blackness and writing. At some distance

Deleuze and Parnet insist we reject any account of

from traditional Marxist theory,

literature as an imaginary representation of real conditions

(literature as ideology) in order to consider writing as a production at
the level of real conditions.10 Writing, which is to say the unleashing of
the creative force of becoming in language (a line of flight), is not
finally reducible to already existing historical conditions, because such
an act involves the production of new conditions. Literature, as they underscore,
is driven by a desire to liberate what existing conditions seek to govern,
block, capture; as such, it asserts a force in the world that existing
conditions would otherwise reduce to nonexistence. Such formulations enable a radical
assertion: Soledad Brother, insofar as Jacksons letters defy the prison system and

the arrangement of a social order defined by the criminalization and

capture of blackness, escapes what would otherwise be thought of as
the historical conditions of its production. Jacksons writing gains its real force by a total refusal to
adjust to existing conditions of capture, enslavement, and incarceration. And it does so concretely by rejecting
the subjectivity produced by the structures of what Genet, in his introduction to the letters,
called the enemys language (Jackson [1970] 1994: 336). Jackson (ibid.: 190, 305) himself
underscores this dimension of the letters several times, remarking, I work on words, and more precisely
describing an operation by which the intensities of black resistance
come to be expressed in writing: We can connect the two, feeling and
writing, just drop the syntax (ibid.: 331). The specific feeling invoked here is linked first to Jacksons total
rejection of the terms of captive societythe feeling of capture . . . this slave can never adjust to it (ibid.: 40) but it further

affirms a connection to the uncounted generations of enslaved black

labor: I feel all they ever felt, but double (ibid.: 233). In dropping the syntax,
Jackson describes a method for rearticulating the relationship between
the historical experience of capture (and the multiplicity of feeling
carried across the passage) and the feeling of that experience. In his introduction
to Soledad Brother, Genet focuses almost entirely on how Jacksons use of language could be

understood as a weapon precisely because Jacksons lines were shot

through with such violent hatred of the words and syntax of his
enemy that he has only one recourse: to accept this language but to
corrupt it so skillfully the whites will be caught in his trap (ibid.: 336).11 In
corrupting the words and syntax of domination, one directly attacks
the conditions that destroy life, because language is here considered
a mechanism by which ones thought, agency, relations, and
subjectivity are caught by Power. As can be seen, this idea is not one that
Genet imports into Soledad Brother. Rather, these are ideas that Jackson himself has already emphasized.
Jacksons minor use of a standard, major language thus contributes
to Deleuze and Guattaris understanding of literature. This is to say that, while
commonly associated with Franz Kafka, the very notion of minor
literature is also linked to the encounter between black radicalism and
French philosophy in the early 1970s. The connection forged between writing and feeling in Jacksons
letters sug- gests that the production of resistant subjectivities always involves a

dismantling of the dominant order of language. To drop the syntax

names a strategy for forcibly rearranging existing relations. But such a
strategy also implies that one releases something else, specifically the
affective force of what resists those relations. Writing here becomes the
active discharge of emotion, the counterattack (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 400).
Or put differently, writing becomes a weapon.12 When Deleuze (1997: 143) states that in the act of

writing theres an attempt to make life something more than personal,

of freeing life wherever its imprisoned, he seems to refer to
something exceedingly abstract, but Jacksons letters concretely assert
writing as a freeing of lifeof blacknessfrom the terms of racist
imprisonment. As we will see, Jackson twists and pulls on the joints of
language itself, quite literally seizing on the standard syntax until it
breaks. In doing so, what Jackson describes as his completely informal style
makes language an open field shot-through with fugitive uses (Jackson [1970]
1994: 208). Writing becomes an expression of thought on the run, a way of

mapping escape routes and counterattacks that cannot be adequately

understood in terms of structure or an understanding of language as an
invariable system. But escaping the existing dominant social order on
lines of flight given the volatile intensities they assert in the world carries a real danger. In A
Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 229) note the risk of the line of flight crossing

the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with
other lines and each time augmenting its valence, turns to destruction,
abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition. Here, a restricted
concept of abolition, understood simply as the destruction of the
existing social order, runs the risk of transforming the line of flight
into a line of death. For this reason the issue of escape must not stop at
negation pure and simple but become one of construction and the
affirmation of life. And it is for this reason that the effort to connect lines of flight
and to compose consistencies across these lines becomes a matter of
politics: an affirmation of a politics of reconstruction as the immanent
condition of abolition. Jackson ([1970] 1994: 328) wrote from prison: Dont mistake this as a
message from George to Fay. Its a message from the hunted running
blacks to those people of this society who profess to want to change
the conditions that destroy life. A collective imperative determines the reading of these lettersnamely, the
necessity to put them in connection with other lines. The circulation of these letters in France

during the 1970s offers a compelling example of how Jacksons

message insinuated itself into what would seem an unlikely
arrangement of French philosophy in the 1970s. Yet it is precisely in
understanding that moment in French thought as an effort to change
conditions that destroy life that we gain a sense of how Jacksons
book arrives at its expressly stated destination. In making the
connection between Jacksons line and the lines of Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, Deleuze and his coauthors can be said to have gotten
the message.
TURN: my alt solves for extinction and ecological destruction, I save the tree they
dont. The ontology of security creates a reinforcing cycle of insecure anticipation and
violent action calculative ordering is the root cause of extinction threats
Burke 07 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, and
author of many books, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Truth & Existence, 10:2)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive
optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and
rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action
and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the
progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will
save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of
modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity
and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being
itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out
every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to
enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political
existence and security -- is a view that the
challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon,
government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that
lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity --
militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction
-- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from
calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of
being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become
necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die . Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is
the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous,
becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It
creates both discursive constraints -- available
choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from
the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence
as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

The everyday practices of militarism destroy the environment

Cuomo 96 (Chris, prof of womens studies @ UGA, War is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of
Everyday Violence, Hypatia 11:4, Women and Violence, Autumn, pp. 30-45)
Drucker's view depends on sharp distinctions: between combatants and noncombatants, between war and peace. But both human and
nonhuman noncombatants are always harmed or otherwise affected by militarism, even when they are not directly harmed in battles. This
simple truth was captured in a popular Vietnam War era antiwar poster that read, "War is not healthy for children and other living things."
Because natural noncombatants are every- where; their destruction is necessary for war and for the
existence of military institutions, even when wars are not explicitly being fought. The ecological
realities of war, and of what it takes to be prepared for war in the contemporary world, are mind-boggling. To take nature
at all seriously entails acknowledging the effects of combat as well as the severe harm caused by everyday
military practices. In Scorched Earth: The Military's Assault on the Environment, William Thomas, a U.S. Navy veteran, illustrates the
extent to which the peacetime practices of military institutions damage natural environments and
communities. Thomas argues that even "peace" entails a dramatic and widespread war on nature, or as Joni Seager
puts it, "The environmental costs of militarized peace bear suspicious resemblance to the costs of war"
(Thomas 1995, xi). All told, including peacetime activities as well as the immense destruction caused by combat, military
institutions probably present the most dramatic threat to ecological well-being on the planet. The
military is the largest generator of hazardous waste in the United States, creating nearly a ton of toxic
pollution every minute, and military analyst Jillian Skeel claims that, "Global military activity may be the largest
worldwide polluter and consumer of precious resources" (quoted in Thomas 1995, 5). A conventionally powered
aircraft carrier consumes 150,000 gallons of fuel a day. In less than an hour's flight, a single jet launched
from its flight deck consumes as much fuel as a North American motorist bums in two years. One F-16 jet engine
requires nearly four and a half tons of scarce titanium, nickel, chromium, cobalt, and energy-intensive aluminum (Thomas 1995, 5), and nine
percent of all the iron and steel used by humans is consumed by the global military (Thomas 1995, 16). The United States Department
of Defense generates 500,000 tons of toxins annually, more than the world's top five chemical
companies combined. The military is the biggest single source of environmental pollution in the United
States. Of 338 citations issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency in 1989, three-quarters went to military installations
(Thomas 1995, 17). The feminization, commodification, and devaluation of nature helps create a reality in which its
destruction in warfare is easily justified. In imagining an ethic that addresses these realities, feminists cannot neglect the
extent to which military ecocide is connected, conceptually and practically, to transnational capitalism and other forms of
human oppression and exploitation. Virtually all of the world's thirty-five nuclear bomb test sites, as well as most
radioactive dumps and uranium mines, occupy Native lands (Thomas 1995, 6). Six multinationals control one-quarter of all United
States defense con- tracts (Thomas 1995, 10), and two million dollars per minute is spent on the global military (Thomas 1995, 7). One
could go on for volumes about the effects of chemical and nuclear testing, military-industrial
development and waste, and the disruption of wildlife, habitats, communities, and lifestyles that are
inescapably linked to military practices. There are many conceptual and practical connections between military practices in
which humans aim to kill and harm each other for some declared "greater good," and nonmilitary practices in which we displace, destroy, or
seriously modify nonhuman communities, species, and ecosystems in the name of human interests. An early illustration of these connections
was made by Rachel Carson in the first few pages of The Silent Spring (1962), in which she described insecticides as the inadvertent offspring
of World War II chemical weapons research. We can now also trace ways in which insecticides were part of the Western-defined global
corporatization of agriculture that helped kill off the small family farm and made the worldwide system of food production dependent on the
likes of Dow Chemical and Monsanto. Military practices are no different from other human practices that damage
and irreparably modify nature. They are often a result of cost-benefit analyses that pretend to weigh all likely
outcomes yet do not consider nonhuman entities except in terms of their use value for humans and they nearly always
create unforeseeable effects for humans and nonhumans. In addition, everyday military peacetime practices are actually
more destructive than most other human activities, they are directly enacted by state power, and, because they
function as unquestioned "givens," they enjoy a unique near-immunity to enactments of moral reproach. It is
worth noting the extent to which everyday military activities remain largely unscrutinized by
environmentalists, especially American environmentalists, largely because fear allows us to be fooled into thinking
that "national security" is an adequate excuse for "ecological military mayhem" (Thomas 1995, 16). If
environmental destruction is a necessary aspect of war and the peacetime practices of military
institutions, an analysis of war which includes its embeddedness in peacetime militarism is necessary
to address the environmental effects of war. Such a perspective must pay adequate attention to what is required to
prepare for war in a technological age, and how women and other Others are affected by the realities of contemporary military
institutions and practices
 Case if I get to it
There is no connection between the aff and material agency get out of the argument
room
Schlag 3 (Pierre Schlag legal theorist @ Colorado univ. 4-1-2003, A Reply-The Missing Portion [pgs. 1031 1039])
The presumption is that the words of the judge (if they are well crafted) will effectively produce a social reality
that corresponds roughly with the words uttered. But what reason is there to believe this? False
Empowerment (No. 2) The endlessly repeated question in first year, "What should the court do?" leads law
students to believe that courts respond to the force of the better argument. This would be tolerable if one added
two provisos:1. The better argument often means little more than the one the courts are predisposed to believe; and 2. In the phrase "force of better argument" it's
important to attend not just to the "better" part, but to the other term as well. False Empowerment (No. 3) Law students
first learn of many
complex social and economic realities through the medium of case law. What they learn is thus the law's
vision of these economic and social realities. Not surprisingly, there is an almost magical correspondence
between legal categories and social or economic practices. This magical fit leads law students (later to become law
professors) to have an extremely confident view of the efficacy of law. Many law students are cured of this belief-structure by a
n4
stay in the legal clinic or by law practice. There is one group of people, however, who are generally not cured of this belief-structure at all, but whose faith is
actually intensified. These are the people who hold prestigious judicial clerkships where an emotional proximity to and identification with their judge ("my judge")
leads to an even greater confidence in the efficacy of law. These people are frequently chosen to teach in law schools. False empowerment can be disempowering.
It can also lead to pessimism and despair. Many people react to a loss of faith in law or legal studies with despair or pessimism. But this is the despair and pessimism
that comes from giving up a naieve or a romantic vision of law and/or legal studies. The onslaught of this despair and pessimism is a good thing. It is like the thirty-
something who realizes that he is mortal and that life is brief. Generally, this is not welcome news. At the same time, it may help prevent a life spent in
Heideggerian dread, tanning salons, or the interstices of footnote 357. When
the academic loses faith in law or legal studies, typically
that person is most troubled because she has lost the framework that makes her academic project
possible. But so what? Isn't the demand that law conform to an academic project arguably a selfish one?
The Con, The Joke, and The Ironic Truth The Con: In the courtroom, the appellate judge is typically seated behind an elevated bench. On the classroom blackboard
the appellate judge is chalked in above the plaintiff and the defendant. This is both a reflection and a reinforcement of the belief that the appellate judge is an
intellectually and politically privileged legal actor. The Joke: In actuality, the appellate judge is a person who operates in conditions of severe information deficits
and whose outlook is thoroughly manipulated by professional rhetoricians. Very often he has little or no understanding of the configurations of the social field to
which his rulings will apply. What's more, this is a person who is prohibited from talking about the social field, except with a highly restricted number of people. The
Ironic Truth: On the other hand, because we believe the appellate judge is a particularly privileged intellectual and political actor, we contribute to making him so.
Legal intellectuals like to believe that law is an intelligent enterprise. They like
to believe that the law offers an interesting
vocabulary, grammar, and rhetoric through which to think about the world and law itself. This is naive.
The political demand that law be efficacious means that law must track, must indeed incorporate
popular beliefs about social and economic identities, causation, linguistic meaning, and so forth. (Those
beliefs are often intellectually bereft.)The Argument Room The argument room is a place where academic advocates go to

argue passionately about law and politics. (Apologies to Monty Python.) Within the room, arguments are
won and lost; triumphs and defeats are had. But generally, no one outside the room pays much attention to
what goes on inside the room. Sometimes there is seepage and fragments of the conversations are
heard outside the room. Participants most often spend their time arguing about what should happen
outside the room. This they call knowledge or "understanding" or "jurisprudence" or scholarship or politics. The
one thing that generally cannot be talked about inside the room is the construction of the room itself.
Politics (No. 1) For progressive legal thinkers, politics is a "theoretical unmentionable": The concept "politics" does a

great deal of theoretical work and yet its identity remains generally immune from scrutiny. The
categories (right, left) and the fundamental grammar of politics (progress, reaction, and so forth)
generally go unquestioned. Oddly, while everything else seems to be contingent, conditional, contextual, and so on, the categories of
politics seem to be oddly stable, nearly transcendent. Strangely, this occurs at a time when the categories, left and right (and even
politics itself), seem increasingly fragile and non-referential.Still, this is an intensely political time - political not in the sense of significant social contestation (not
much of that) nor in the sense of ideological struggle (not happening much either). Rather, political in the sense of very significant reorganizations and reallocations
of power, wealth, and so on. Capital (for lack of a better term) is in a period of rapid self-reorganization in which it increasingly regiments precincts of life previously
offering some resistance to its grammar - to wit: time, family, media, public space, wilderness, and so forth. The point is not that these precincts were immune to
capital before, but rather that capital is advancing at such an intense rate to bring about a significant disruption and a qualitative change in these precincts. This
change is manifest not only in the colonization of new precincts, but in the self-organization of capital [*1034] (new financial vehicles) and, of course, in new literary
and intellectual forms (postmodernism as both symptom and diagnosis). Meanwhile, the old categories, the old grammar, the old answers, seem to have lost some
of their hold. The right is intellectually stagnant. And the left is, as a social presence, ontologically challenged. Indeed, in the United States, we seem at present to
have several right wings and no left wing. This does not mean that "politics" as a social category is necessarily dead. It might mean simply that we (and others) have
not understood, have not grasped, have not articulated its new configurations.What would be required on the intellectual level is a re-evaluation not only of the
conventionally articulated categories, but of the social and economic ontology. At its best, postmodernism (and there has been a lot of bad reactionary and
nostalgic postmodernism) is an attempt to trigger such a re-evaluation. Progressives, understandably, strive to protect their categories, grammar, and self-image
from these challenges. But this is not without cost. To
argue in favor of political positions is sometimes political. But it is
not always political. Sometimes taking up a political argument is political and sometimes it has no consequences whatsoever. One cannot know
beforehand. But it is a serious mistake to suppose that arguing in favor of a political position is in and of itself

political. Very often in the legal academy, to argue for a political (or normative) position is not political at all. It simply
triggers a scholastic, highly stereotyped meta-discourse about whether the arguments advanced are
sound, accurate, should be adopted, or the like. Traditionally, the left has defended the victims of capitalism,
imperialism, and racism. Indeed, this is an important part of what it means to be "on the left." Meanwhile, in the university,
scholarly attention depends upon the production of new exciting ideas and research agendas. This poses a problem
for the left: the victims of capitalism, imperialism, and racism remain the same. The political-intellectual
defenses advanced on behalf of victims remain the same. This leads to a certain sense of weariness and
deja vu - stereotyped arguments, standard rhetorical moves. A tendency to fight the same old fights.
Machines. This is a problem. A Problem for Progressive Legal Thinkers As the author of Laying Down the Law, it just isn't clear to me
that law is the sort of thing that is endlessly perfectible. At times it seems to me that law is a lot like military strategy. You can try
making military strategy the best it can be (maybe you should). But when you get done it's still going to be military strategy. In that context it would be a good thing
to have a few people (I volunteer) to be less than completely enthralled by military strategy. The same would go for law. It
could be that law is
objectionable in important respects because, well ... it's law. From this standpoint it seems odd that
someone should feel authorized to say: "You should do X." Legal Thought as Arrogance The belief is that the future
of the free world, the maintenance of the rule of law, the welfare of the republic, the liberation of oppressed peoples, the direction of the Court, the

legitimacy of the Florida election, hangs on a law professor's next article. This is the esprit serieux gone nuts. The most

significant effect of this belief is to arrest thought and end the play of ideas necessary for creativity.Yes,
n9
legal interpretation sometimes takes place in a field of pain and death. But that hardly means that legal studies takes place in a field of pain and death. It is a
residual objectivism that enables legal academics to believe that when they write about law - what it is or what it should be - they are somehow engaged in the
same enterprise as judges. They're not. It is not that legal scholarship is without consequence. It's just that the institutional and rhetorical contexts are sufficiently
different that the consequences are different as well.There is an important, indeed foundational, category mistake that sustains American legal thought - it is the
supposition that because academics and judges deploy the same vocabulary and the same grammar, they are involved in largely the same enterprise. I just don't
think that's true. My own view is that legal academics are but one social group (among many) competing for the articulation of what law is. Judges are another.
Social movements, corporations, public interest groups, administrative officials, criminals, etc., are some of the others. For most of the history of the American law
school, academics have anointed judges as privileged speakers of law. In turn, legal academics have adopted the habits, forms of thought, and rhetoric of judges -
thereby accruing to themselves the authority to say what the law is.Legal academics legitimate their claim to say what the law is by fashioning law as an academic
discipline requiring expertise. Legal academics then hold themselves out as possessing this expertise. Among those critical theorists who seek to contest this
expertise, one can distinguish two approaches. One approach is to try to reveal the emptiness of the claims to expertise among the legal intelligentsia and to reveal
how these claims nonetheless gain power. Another approach is to try to relocate the authority to say what the law is among those who have been excluded.I do not
see these approaches as antithetical, but rather as complementary. Furthermore, both approaches will in fact reinscribe, will performatively reinforce, precisely the
sort of rhetorics and hierarchies they contest. No way around that.I think critical thinkers all do this - though in different ways. And it's certainly worthwhile pointing
out how it is being done. At the same time, no one is safe or immune from this sort of criticism.To learn to laugh at what is taken seriously, but is not serious, is a
serious thing to do. To take seriously what is not, is a drag. A Problem for Progressives Progressives wish to pursue a politics that is efficacious. This means
keeping track both of the social context in which progressivism articulates itself (on the side of the subject), and the social context in [*1038] which progressivism
seeks to register its results (on the side of the object). But this work of reconnaissance - a work that is necessary - may bring unwelcome news: namely that
progressivism unmodified is no longer a terribly cogent project. Choices will have to be made: to defend progressive thought against this unwelcome news or to put
the identity of progressive projects at risk by encountering this unwelcome news. Formalism is virtually an inexorable condition of legal scholarship in the following
sense: a legal academic generally writes scholarship outside the social pressures of what a lawyer would call real stakes, real clients, or real consequences. The
failure of an argument in the pages of the Stanford Law Review is generally very different from the failure of an argument in a brief or an opinion. The difference in
context changes the character and consequences of the acts - even if the authors use exactly the same words.Binary and Not (Insider/Outsider,
Immanent/Transcendent, Mind/Body etc. etc. etc.)It's one thing to deploy oppositional binarism to describe the broad structures of a text. It's quite another to
adopt binarism as an intellectual lifestyle choice. Oppositional binarism has a special hold/appeal in American law precisely because: 1) law is often identified with
what appellate courts say it is; and 2) by the time a case gets to an appellate court, the reductionism of litigation and the binary structure of the adversarial
orientation has reduced the dispute to an either/or (e.g., liberty vs. equality or formal equality vs. substantive equality, and so on).But ... .Oppositional binarism
flounders because law does not have fixed, uncontroversial grids. Hence, for instance, the notion that a person is an insider or an outsider just doesn't track with
much of anything (except perhaps the author's own formalism).If one thinks about it, a person is an insider in this respect (he's white) but an outsider in that
respect (he's working class) and then an insider with respect to his pedigree (he went to Columbia) but really an outsider within his insider Columbia status because
he was profoundly [*1039] alienated from the Columbia social scene and blah blah blah. After a while (very soon, actually) the insider/outsider distinction loses its
hold. The point is, unless you happen to have a well-formed, non-overlapping fixed grid (and this would be a very strange thing for a critical theorist to have!),
oppositional binarism (like everything else) ultimately collapses.Interestingly, there was a moment of slippage in the history of critical legal studies (or perhaps the
fem-crits) when binary oppositionalism slid from a heuristic into (of all things) a metaphysic!The Machines In Keith Aoki's comic strip, the agents of R.E.A.S.O.N. and
P.I.E.R.R.E. fight each other in a comically cliched fashion. It is Nick Fury jurisprudence. And there is something strikingly right about that (however humbling it may
be for me and others).One of the things that happens in the Nick Fury comic strips (as in Keith Aoki's contribution) is that the antagonists
deploy
machines against each other. In legal thought, we have a lot of machines in operation. n13 By this I mean
that a great deal of so-called legal thought is not really thought at all - but the deployment of a series of
rhetorical operations over and over again to perform actions (usually destructive in character) on other
peoples' texts or persons. Every argument tends to become a machine. Over time, legal academics tend to become their
own arguments. Then, of course, they become their own machines. At that point, it's time to move on.

Roleplaying is an addictive form of simulation steeped in slave morality and

ressentiment; this politics culminates in a form of passive nihilism which paves the
road to tyranny with blood.
Antonio 1995 [Robert; Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas; Nietzsches Antisociology:
Subjectified Culture and the End of History; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July
1995]

While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity,
Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with
their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the
opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in
simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually
become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity.
The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent
"inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern
about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what
others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-
17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows,"
"abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion
of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that
which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it
is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp.
26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor
cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is
neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp.
93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One
thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of
the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than
nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after
gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and
overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated
sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role
attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even
cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and
praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply
feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify
the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing,
arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses."
Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who
commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party
conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled
ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18,
213, 288-89, 303-4).

Nothing is a cause of anything

Empiricus 200 A.D. (Sextus Empiricus, Greek philosopher, pioneer of skepticism, all around good guy.
Veeeerrry niiice! Outlines of Skepticism p. 148-149)

That it is also plausible to say that nothing is a cause of anything will be evident when we have set out for the present a
few of the many arguments which suggest this. Thus, it is impossible to conceive of a cause before apprehending its
effect as an effect of it; for we recognize that it is a cause of its effect only when we apprehend the
latter as an effect. But we cannot apprehend the effect of a cause as its effect if we have not apprehended the cause of the effect as its
cause; for we think that we know that it is its effect only when we have apprehended its cause as a cause of it. Thus if, in order to
conceive of a cause, we must already have recognized its effect, and in order to know its effect as I have
said, we must already know the cause, the reciprocal mode of puzzlement shows that both are
inconceivable: the cause cannot be conceived of as a cause nor the effect as an effect; for each of them needs to be made convincing by
the other, and we shall not know from which to begin to form the concept. Hence we shall not be able to assert that
anything is a cause of anything. To concede that it is possible to conceive of causes, they will be deemed to be inapprehensible
because of the dispute. For some say that some things are causes of others, some say that they are not, and some have suspended judgment.
Anyone therefore, who says that some things are causes of others either states that he says this simply
and impelled by no reasonable cause or else will say that he came to give assent to this because of
certain causes. If simply, then he will not be more convincing than someone who says simply that nothing is a cause of anything; and if he
states causes because of which he deems that some things are causes of others, then he will be attempting to establish the matter under
investigation by way of the matter under investigation - for we are investigating whether anything is a cause of anything, and he says, as though
there were causes, that there is a cause of there being causes. Again, since we are investigating the reality of causes, he
will have to
provide a cause for the cause of there being causes - and another for that, and so ad infinitum. But it is
impossible to provide infinitely many causes. Therefore, it is impossible to assert firmly that anything is a
cause of anything.

China and US corporations say no domestic Chinese backlash, changing priorities and
US support for Taiwan in crisis
Dumbaugh and Grimmett no date (Kerry B. Dumbaugh and Richard F. Grimmett, Congressional
Research Service, US Arms Sales to China, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%208-
1/Dumbaugh%20&%20Grimmett.pdf)

Fourth, by moving in measured steps the US takes into account the fact that current PRC policies of
seeking closer cooperation with the US remain controversial within the PRC itself, are still evolving, and
are thought to be dependent in part on the continued presence and influence of 81-year old Deng
Xiaoping. A more aggressive arms sales approach toward China could leave the United States over-
extended and over-exposed should PRC priorities suddenly change. Finally, Taiwan represents a major
constraint. The United States has a continuing interest in Taiwan and its security, as evidenced by
continued large scale U.S. arms sales to Taiwan under terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. Moreover, the
U.S. has on a number of occasions made clear its explicit interest in a peaceful resolution of PRC-Taiwan
differences. [17] As a result, the U.S. is not likely to sell weapons systems to the PRC that would enable
it to threaten Taiwan militarily.

Export control reform is coming now.

Guida 6/22 Victoria Guida is a financial services reporter, June 22, 2016, POLITICO, Commerce
overhauls export control enforcement http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-
trade/2016/06/commerce-overhauls-export-control-enforcement-2149542.

COMMERCE OVERHAULS EXPORT CONTROL ENFORCEMENT: TheCommerce Departments Bureau of Industry and Security
today finalized a regulation that will significantly change how it prosecutes violations of U.S. laws that
restrict the export of certain goods. The rule will bring BISs enforcement practices in line with Treasurys Office of Foreign Assets Control and
aims to increase transparency in the process of penalizing export control scofflaws, according to a notice

published in todays Federal Register. Story Continued Below The rule, part of the administrations
broader effort to streamline the complex export control regime, will cover administrative enforcement
of the Export Administration Regulations. A major new feature for BIS will prioritize violations by categorizing them as egregious and non-
egregious. An egregious violation determination would be based on willful or reckless violation of law and other criteria, and would be subject to maximum
penalties under U.S. law.

Chinas rise is over anemic economy, aging/demographics, environmental destruction,

state control, political legitimacy crisis, party division, and regional tension
Pei 12 {Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna and a non-resident senior fellow at
the German Marshall Fund, Superpower Denied? Why Chinas Rise May Have Already Peaked, The
Diplomat, 8/9, http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/09/superpower-denied-why-chinas-rise-may-have-
already-peaked/?all=true#THUR}

Has China's rise peaked? If one were to pose this

These are the questions to bear in mind when we tackle an important real-world problem:

question a few years ago, he would probably be laughed out of the room. The conventional wisdom then was that China's rise was
certain to continue. But today, this question is very much on everyone's mind. What has changed? Almost

everything. If one has to take a position, it may be reasonable to argue that the Beijing Olympics in 2008 symbolically marked the peaking of Chinese power.
Everything began to go downhill afterwards. Caught up in the global economic crisis, the Chinese economy has
never fully recovered its momentum. To be sure, Beijing's stimulus package of 2008-2009, fueled by deficit spending and a proliferation of credit, managed to avoid a
recession and produce one more year of double-digit growth in 2010. For awhile, Beijing's ability to keep its economic growth high was lauded around the world as a sign of its strong

leadership and resilience. Little did we know that China paid a huge price for a misguided and wasteful stimulus program. The bulk
of its stimulus package, roughly $1.5 trillion (with two-thirds in the form of loans from state-owned banks), was squandered on fixed-asset investments,

such as infrastructure, factories, and commercial real estate. As a result, many of these projects are not economically viable and will saddle

the banking system with a mountain of non-performing loans. The real estate bubble has maintained its
froth. The macroeconomic imbalance between investment and household consumption has barely improved. Today, Chinese
economic policy-makers are hamstrung in trying to revive economic growth. The combination of local government indebtedness, massive
bad loans hidden in the banking system, anemic external demand, and diminishing returns from investments has made it all but
impossible for Beijing to use the same old economic playbook to fire up the economy. Short-term difficulties are not the
least of Beijing's worries. In the coming decade, many of the favorable structural factors that have helped power China's double-digit growth in the
past two decades are going to disappear. Topping the list is the demographics. The proportion of the Chinese population of working age

peaked in 2011 and has started decreasing in 2012, according to a RAND study. At the same time, the share of the elderly in the population
is beginning to rise rapidly. In 2010, 8.6 percent of the population was 65 and older. By 2025, the figure will likely be 14.3 percent. An aging population
will increase labor costs, reduce savings and investments, inflate healthcare and pension costs and slow down
growth. Another difficult obstacle ahead is environmental degradation. Beijing has neglected environmental protection for the sake of rapid
growth. But the costs of environmental degradation have become unbearable, both economically and politically. Water and air

pollution today cause 750,000 premature deaths and around 8 percent of GDP. China's long-suffering population has finally begun to fight
vigorously for their environmental rights. This year alone, large-scale protests forced the government to cancel plans
to build plants that would threaten the health and livelihoods of the residents in two Chinese cities. In the decade ahead, the combination of environmental degradation and the

effects of global warming will further drag down Chinese growth. The most serious long-term obstacle to Chinese growth is its state capitalist

system. In the last decade, Beijing has largely reversed pro-market reforms and embarked on a decidedly statist developmental path.
Consequently, state-owned enterprises have gained enormous clout in the economy and enjoy monopolistic privileges. The financial system favors such firms at the expense of private

entrepreneurs. Household income, at 43 percent of GDP, is too low to support a higher level of consumption, a critical factor in
rebalancing the Chinese economy and providing a source of future growth. Without systemic reforms, according to an influential World Bank study, growth in the

coming two decades will fall well below 7 percent per annum. But reforming state capitalism is almost impossible

politically because that will undermine the very foundations of the Communist Party's rule. On the political front, the
coming decade will likely be one of rising opposition against the party's political monopoly. Chinese citizens have
become far more outspoken and willing to contest the party's authority. Despite the regime's huge investments in censorship, it
now even concedes that the Internet has given ordinary Chinese people a powerful collective voice in shaping public opinion.
Government policies across a wide range of issues, such as the one-child policy, budget transparency, education and healthcare policies, are being challenged for their reasonableness and

legitimacy.Behind these developments is a fundamental crisis of legitimacy of the current regime. As for the ruling elites, their unity can
no longer be taken for granted.The Bo Xilai Affair has revealed the rift at the very top of the regime. Worse still, a
sense of political malaise and loss of direction today pervades the party. Many of the party's best and brightest now realize that the regime's best days are
probably behind it and, without fundamental political reforms, it will not be able to hold on much longer. Externally, China's benign external environment is

beginning to deteriorate. Its relations with many of its neighbors have become far more contentious due to territorial disputes. China's
major trading partners have lost patience with its mercantilist policies. The all-important Sino-American relationship
is growing more competitive. The fundamental fissures in this relationship have widened because of ideological conflict,
geopolitical rivalry, and strategic distrust. As countries around the world, for their own reasons, raise their vigilance against Chinese influence and start to
push back, Beijing no longer enjoys a free hand in expanding its economic foothold and securing access to markets and resources. What this analysis

reveals is that the growth of Chinese power under one-party rule has peaked. The seductive authoritarian state-capitalist development model may have delivered an
economic miracle in the post-Tiananmen era, but for all practical purposes this model has lost its magic, if it has not gone totally

bankrupt. However, China's future does not have to be a dismal one. The obverse of this analysis is that, with the right reforms, particularly a return to a pro-market growth strategy
and a transition to democratic rule, China can comfortably confront these domestic and external challenges. A more liberal market-based economic system will utilize resources more
efficiently and equitably than state-capitalism. Democratic reforms will give the regime a fundamental source of political legitimacy at home and also help reduce animosity and distrust of
China abroad. China will have an excellent chance to lay the economic and political foundations for a 21st-century superpower. If this were to occur, China's best days would still be ahead,
not behind.

Mutual coop is possible and prevents war if conflict is inev, its because the US and
they dont solve
Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi 12 (Kenneth Lieberthal, senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global
Economy and Development, and Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking
University, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, http://yahuwshua.org/en/Resource-
584/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf)

A stable, cooperative relationship with the United States is in the best interest of China in its road to
modernization. Since the end of the Cold War, the PRC leadership has consistently demonstrated the desire to
increase trust, reduce trouble, develop cooperation, and refrain from confrontation in U.S.-China
relations. Beijing has assured Washington, especially in the last few years when it has seen more worries in America
about China strategic intentions, that China does not seek to challenge or supplant the role of the U.S. in
the world, and that China-U.S. cooperation must be based on mutual strategic trust. The Chinese leadership has
also taken measures to manage domestic media and public opinion to reduce excessive nationalist sentiment directed at the U.S. Meanwhile,
in Beijings view, it is U.S. policies, attitude, and misperceptions that cause the lack of mutual trust
between the two countries.

Huge alt causes to competitiveness and leadership

ACC Shanghai 11 (The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, U.S. Export Competitiveness in
China http://www.amcham-shanghai.org/ftpuploadfiles/Publications/Viewpoint/Viewpoint_US-Export-
Competitiveness.pdf)

However, to compete effectively in the worlds fastest-growing market, China, American companies need
the U.S. government to take the following specific, targeted actions. 1. Congress should build on +20
percent growth of U.S. exports in 2010 by funding job creating programs like the National Export
Initiative (NEI) and other agencies and programs focused on enhancing U.S. export competitiveness in
key markets like Chinas One clear-cut way to increase U.S. export competitiveness in China is to fully
staff U.S. Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) offices in China to support the increasing number of U.S.
companies, especially SMEs, interested in exporting to China. Office closings and hiring freezes over the past four
years have left the FCS, the federal agency charged with promoting U.S. exports abroad, severely understaffed in key
emerging markets like in China. However, lack of resources for FCS is beginning to take its toll. Today, there is a
35 percent vacancy rate of locally engaged staff in China which is critical to supporting U.S. companies, particularly SMEs. Already,
the ability of FCS staff in China to do vital market research for U.S. companies is extremely limited. A commitment to
funding the FCS is important considering the agency has among the best return on investment in the U.S.
government. In 2008, for every $1 spent on the agencys export promotion services, FCS returned $420 in company confirmed export
successes. In 2010, FCS reported more than 1,000 confirmed export successes. In 2010, the U.S. Small Business Administration allocated $30
million dollars to U.S. state trade The China market continues to grow in importance as a top destination for U.S. exports and an opportunity to
create and support American jobs. In 2010, U.S. exports to China supported the jobs of approximately 500,000 American workers,
farmers, ranchers and service providers. As
China continues to develop a consumer-driven economy, that number
should in a responsible manner we will definitely be able to make it more stable and sound.