IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, v. HON. EDILBERTO T.
CLARAVALL, in his But where damages is the main cause of action, should the amount of moral damages prayed for in
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 60, RTC of Baguio City, and VITA N. KALASHIAN,
FACTS:
April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages against
petitioners. In her complaint, respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station of
Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons and police officers, petitioner Irene
Sante uttered words, which when translated in English are as follows, How many rounds of sex did
you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin bitch! Bert refers to Albert Gacusan,
respondents friend and one of her hired personal security guards detained at the said station and who
is a suspect in the killing of petitioners close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around
Natividad, Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the
aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the
amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorneys fees; P20,000.00
litigation expenses; and costs of suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the
amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00,
because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.
June 24, 2004, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, held that the total claim of respondent
amounted to P420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Manila.
July 7, 2004 and July 19, 2004, the trial court also later issued Orders respectively reiterating its
denial of the motion to dismiss and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
August 2, 2004, aggrieved, petitioners filed, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, before the
Court of Appeals
January 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, promulgated a decision, that the case
clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff was seeking to
recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, which amount was well within the
jurisdictional amount of the MTCC. The Court of Appeals added that the TOTALITY OF CLAIM
RULE used for determining which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the instant case
because plaintiffs claim for exemplary damages was not a separate and distinct cause of action from
her claim of moral damages, but merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary damages
should be excluded in computing the total amount of the claim.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
YES, the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case
Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states:
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
P100,000.00 or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds P200,000.00.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:
After 5 years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3),
(4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted
to P200,000.00. 5 years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to
P300,000.00: Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned
jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after 5 years from the effectivity of this Act to P400K.
the complaint be the sole basis for determining which court has jurisdiction or should the total
amount of all the damages claimed regardless of kind and nature, such as exemplary damages,
nominal damages, and attorneys fees, etc., be used?
In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is instructive:
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
In the instant case, the complaint is for the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts of
petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the
facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that
respondents main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by
respondent, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the
primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was
correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, v. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT, ANGELITA LAGMAY,
FACTS:
1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her daughter
Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur,
Nueva Ecija. She sought to collect from Michael the sum of P350,000.00 that Annabel sent to
Michael. She claimed that Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts, and that they agreed to
jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while Annabel was working in
Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of P350,000.00 to purchase the truck. However, after
Annabel and Michael's relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to return the money to
Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the matter before the Barangay Justice.
July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document denominated
as "kasunduan''4 wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of P250,000.00 on specific
dates. The kasunduan was signed by Angelita (on behalf of Annabel), Michael, and the members of
the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo.
Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a period of 10 days from the
settlement, in accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law embodied in the Local
Government Code of 1991 [RA 7160], and Section 14 of its Implementing Rules. When Michael
failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay
Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File Action.
January 15, 1999, Angelita filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur and
Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of the kasunduan.
Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita's alleged
violation of Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
January 17, 2000, the MCTC rendered a decision5 in favor of Annabel
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 Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in prematurely deciding the case. Michael also pointed out that a hearing was necessary for the
petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of the kasunduan.
November 13, 2000 the RTC, Branch 40 of Palayan City upheld the MCTC decision, finding
Michael liable to pay Annabel the sum of P250,000.00. It held that Michael failed to assail the
validity of the kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to dispute Annabel's claims or the applicability
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7160.
Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that (ii) the MCTC does not have jurisdiction
over the case since the amount of P250,000.00 (as the subject matter of the kasunduan) is in excess
of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00.
March 13, 200, the RTC granted Michael's Motion for Reconsideration, and ruled that there is merit
in the jurisdictional issue he raised. It dismissed Angelita's Motion for Execution, and set aside the
MCTC Decision.
Angelita moved for the reconsideration of the March 13, 2001 Order, but the motion was
subsequently denied. Aggrieved, she filed a Petition for Review with the CA.
August 2, 2001, the CA initially dismissed the petition for review on a mere technical ground of
failure to attach the Affidavit of Service. Angelita moved for reconsideration, attaching in her motion
the Affidavit of Service. The CA granted the motion.
March 31, 2004, the CA rendered its decision granting the petition, and reversing the RTC's
decision. The CA declared that the "appropriate local trial court" stated in Section 2, Rule VII of
the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160 refers to the municipal trial courts. Thus, contrary to
Michael's contention, the MCTC has jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award,
regardless of the amount involved.
Michael moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of
the amount involved;
HELD:
YES, the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the
amount involved
A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local Government Code readily discloses the two-tiered
mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement
The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within
six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be
enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court
Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a
period often (10) days from the settlement may be enforced by: first, execution by the Lupon within
six (6) months from the date of the settlement; or second, by an action in the appropriate city or
municipal trial court if more than six (6) months from the date of settlement has already elapsed.
Indisputably, Angelita chose to enforce the kasunduan under the second mode and filed a motion for
execution. The question for our resolution is: Whether the MCTC, through Angelita's motion for
execution, is expressly authorized to enforce the kasunduan under Section 417 of the Local
Government Code?
The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal court" as the forum
for the execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly
conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount
involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law's intendment
was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or
municipal courts regardless of the amount. A basic principle of interpretation is that words must be
given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation where the words of a statute
are clear,' plain and free from ambiguity.
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO
FACTS:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a
house and lot.
March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since
there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido
for partition, but the latter refused.
January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to
their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
September 17, 2003, the Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision, applying Article 129 of the Family
Code, ordering the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, which
was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom
the majority of the common children choose to remain.
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC.
July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the
MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in
adjudicating the subject property to Barrido.
November 16, 2006, upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It held that since the
propertys assessed value was only 8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCCs jurisdiction. Also,
although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the
dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.
Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC HAD
JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.
HELD:
The MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real
property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
a mortgage on real property. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal CircuitTrial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by RA 7691)
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 Here, the subject propertys assessed value was merely 8,080.00, an amount which certainly does
not exceed the required limit of 20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the
jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU v. Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR,
FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint
to expropriate a property of the respondents.
April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned
that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after
payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of
action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is
merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court.
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent
domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would
determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action
should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less
than P20,000,
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to the Supreme Court, raising a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation
HELD:
YES, an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a
mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The
rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages,
demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of
courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws
of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction.
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it
deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for
public use.
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is
the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the
propriety of the expropriation.
MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D. GONZALES v. GJH LAND, INC.
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG A.K.A. STEVE JANG,
SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II
FACTS:
February 1, 2010. Essentially, petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were
already paid by them in full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc., but were nonetheless offered for sale on
July 29, 2011 to the corporation's stockholders, hence, their plea for injunction
August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales and Francis Martin D. Gonzales
(petitioners) filed a Complaint for "Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order, 3 and
20-Day Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Damages" before
the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which they
purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc.
August 9, 2011, said branch issued a temporary restraining order, and later, in an Order dated August
24, 2011, granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
pointing out that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the
designated Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City.
April 17, 2012, Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondents. It found that the
case involves an intra-corporate dispute that is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts. It pointed out that the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 256 (Branch 256) was specifically designated by the Court as the Special Commercial
Court, hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction over the case and cannot lawfully exercise
jurisdiction on the matter, including the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Accordingly, it
dismissed the case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that they filed the case with the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City which assigned the same to Branch 276
by raffle. As the raffle was beyond their control, they should not be made to suffer the consequences
of the wrong assignment of the case, especially after paying the filing fees in the amount of
P235,825.00 that would be for naught if the dismissal is upheld. They further maintained that the
RTC has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes under Republic Act No. (RA) 8799, but since the
Court selected specific branches to hear and decide such suits, the case must, at most, be transferred
or raffled off to the proper branch.
July 9, 2012, Branch 276 denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that it has no authority or
power to order the transfer of the case to the proper Special Commercial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
3

HELD:
A court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case's subject matter is different from incidents
pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is
governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court.
The matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of
its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do
with the question of jurisdiction.
The legal attribution of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general jurisdiction stems from
Section 19 (6), Chapter II of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All
cases, the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction
of any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
It is, therefore, from the time of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action. Unfortunately, the commercial
case was wrongly raffled to a regular branch, e.g., Branch 276, instead of being assigned to the
sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is Branch 256. This error
may have been caused by a reliance on the complaint's caption
According to jurisprudence, "it is not the caption but the allegations in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading which give meaning to the pleading and on the basis of which such pleading may
be legally characterized.
The Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special
Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident related to the exercise of
jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had
already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to
be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for
re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case
to the only designated Special Commercial Court in the station
Meanwhile, if the RTC acquiring jurisdiction has no branch designated as a Special Commercial
Court, then it should refer the case to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court
branch within the judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should
re-docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch
designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the
said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among
those special branches.
JOSEFINA RUBIO DE LARENA v. HERMENEGILDO VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
This action is brought by a lessor against her lessee for the rescission of the contract of lease on the
ground that the lessee has violated the terms of the contract by failing to pay the rent therein
specified. The plaintiff also asks judgment for overdue and unpaid rent in the sum of P6,278.68, as
well as for rent which may have become due during the period between the filing of the complaint
and the execution of the judgment to be rendered, together with the costs and the sum of P2,000 for
attorney's fees.
The defendant's amended answer denies that he has breached the contract and sets up a counterclaim in
the sum of P2,051.52 for money advanced to the plaintiff in excess of the rent due under the contract.
It will be noted that paragraph 3 of the contract contains an apparent contradiction inasmuch as it
fixes the term of the contract at "five years, that is to say, five complete crops, beginning with the
present crop 1920-1921 until the crop of 1925-1926." It may also be noted that the land in question
is used for the cultivation of sugar cane and the years are counted by agricultural years and not by
calendar years. If the duration of the lease is for five annual crops, beginning with the crop of 1920-
1921, the term will expire with the crop of 1924-1925 and not with the crop of 1925-1926.
The plaintiff maintains that the number of crops control in computing the term of the lease and that
the insertion of the figures "1925-1926" in the third paragraph of the lease is due to a miscalculation
and should read "1924-1925."
It is conceded that sugar cane requires at least 14 months from the time of planting for its full
development, so that cane planted in the fall of 1920 would not be ready for harvest until in the last
month of 1921 and the early part of 1922. It is also fully established that the crop of 1920-1921 on
the land in question was a ratoon crop (sprout or second growth). The defendant therefor contends
that this crop was not acomplete crop and therefore not the kind of crop referred to in the contract of
lease; that the first complete crop was that planted by him immediately after the execution of the
contract in the fall of 1920 and which was harvested in 1921-1922; and that he therefore should not
be required to pay rent for the agricultural year which embraces the crop of 1920
We affirmed a decision of the Court of First Instance ordering the rescission of a lease of the
Tacgajan Sugar Plantation and the payment by the defendant-lessee of the unpaid balance of the
rent for the agricultural year 1920-1922 in the sum of P5,949.28 with interest from August 26, 1922,
and for P8,000 in rent for the agricultural year 1921-1923. The decision also provided that the
possession of the leased land be delivered to the plaintiff.
Shortly after the record was returned to the court below, a writ of execution was issued, but before
levy was made the parties came to an agreement, under which the money judgment was to be
satisfied by the payment of P10,500 in cash and the transfer to the plaintiff of a dwelling house
situated in the municipality of Bais.
The present action was brought on April 13, 1925, but the last amended complaint, setting forth three
causes of action, was not filed until June 17, 1927
As her first cause of action the plaintiff, after a preliminary statement of the origin of the
controversy, alleges that while case G. R. No. 21706 was on appeal to the Supreme Court, the
defendant knew positively that the aforesaid lease was declared rescinded by the Court of First
Instance on September 8, 1923, and that he, the defendant, also knew that he thereafter was not
entitled to the possession of the aforesaid hacienda; that he, nevertheless, in bad faith continued in
such possession during the agricultural year 1922-1924 and appropriated to himself the cane harvest
for that year, which after deducting the share of the sugar central, produced 1,679.02 piculs for his
own benefit, which sugar was sold by him for the sum of P13 a picul; that the plaintiff has demanded
payment to her of the total value of said 1,679.02 piculs, amounting to P21,827.26, but that the
defendant refuses to pay. The plaintiff, therefore, asks judgment for the sum of P21,827.26 upon the
first cause of action.
For the second cause of action the plaintiff alleges that under the contract of lease of the Tacgajan
Hacienda, one of the obligations assumed by the defendant was that he would use the care of a good
father of the family in conserving the tools, agricultural implements, draft animals, and other effects
enumerated in an inventory made at the time the defendant entered in possession under the lease;
that he was further obligated to return said property to the plaintiff, but that he returned only a part
thereof and failed to 4 carabaos, 4 vacunos, 1 corn mill, 4 wagons, 106 steel rails, 14 plows, 1 table,
1 scale, an 1 telephone, the total value of the property enumerated being P3,596 for which amount,
plus P500 in damages, the plaintiff asks judgment under her second cause of action.
4
 As a third cause of action the plaintiff alleges that the harvest of sugar cane illegally made by the
defendant in 1924 left ratoon sugar cane in the fields of the hacienda, which sugar can was the
property of the plaintiff, and that during the year 1925, the defendant illegally harvested said ratoon
cane together with some recently planted cane, which harvested after deducting the share of the
sugar central, produced 1,613.25 piculs of sugar, which the defendant sold for his own benefit at the
price of P13 per picul, the total amount received by him being P20,962.25 for which the plaintiff
demands judgment.
In his answer to the first and third causes of action, the defendants alleges that according to the
pleadings in case G. R. No. 21706, the two causes of action were included in that case and, therefore,
must be considered res adjudicata.
In regard to the second cause of action the defendant pleads the general issue and sets up as a special
defense that assuming that the property referred to in said cause of action was missing, it loss was
due to its total extinction by ordinary use, for which the defendant could not be held responsible.
Upon trial the Court of First Instance sustained the defendant's special defense and absolved him
from the complaint with the cost against the plaintiff, whereupon the latter appealed to this court.
HELD:
The defendant maintains that the plaintiff having had an opportunity to ventilate the matter in the
former case, she cannot now enforce the same cause of action in the present case. Properly speaking,
this argument does not involve the doctrine of res judicata but rests on the well-known an, in
American law, firmly established principle that a party will not be permitted to split up a single
cause of action an make it the basis for several suits. But that is not this case. The rule is well
established that when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate installments, each
installment is an independent cause of action, though it has been held and is good law, that in an
action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the installments due at the time the action brought
must be included in the complaint and that failure to do so will constitute a bar to a subsequent
action for the payment of that rent.
The plaintiff also amended the prayer of the complaint by asking judgment for rent for years
subsequent to 1922. The motion was granted, and the case came up for trial on July 30, 1923, and on
September 8, 1923, the trial court rendered its decision giving judgment for rent up to and including
the rent for the agricultural year ending in 1923. The lease did not provide for payment of rent in
advance or at any definite time, and it appears plainly from the record that the rent for an agricultural
year was not considered due until the end of the corresponding year. It follows that the rent for the
agricultural year 1922-1924 had not become due in time of the trial of the case and that
consequently the trial court could not render judgment therefore. The action referred to is,
therefore, no bar to the first cause of action in the present litigation.
We do not think that the court below erred in absolving the defendant from liability upon the second
cause of action. It is not without significance that in her original complaint the plaintiff claimed only
5 plows, 6 carts, 3 carabaos an 4 vacunos, the total value of which was alleged to be P1,360; in the
first amended complaint filed over two years later, the same claim was made, but in the last amended
complaint a number of other articles were included, thus increasing the claim to P3,596. The court
below found that the weight of the evidence showed that the missing draft animals died from
rinderpest and that the other personal property was turned over to the provincial sheriff for delivery
to the plaintiff. If so, the action would lie against the sheriff rather than against the defendant.
Very little need be said in regard to the third cause of action. It relates to a period subsequent to the
complete termination of the lease by final judicial order. The defendant had then no right whatever to
the possession of the land or to the fruits thereof, and in removing the fruits, he acted in bad faith.
This being the case, he must pay for the fruits received by him, less the necessary expenses of
production. As his bad faith commence long before the fruits in question were produced, he is not
entitled to any part of the net proceeds of the crop. The evidence shows that the net ratoon crop of
the year 1924-1925 was 1,613.25 piculs of sugar, and according to the defendant's own statement,
the market value of the sugar was in the neighborhood of P11 per picul an the costs of production
about P4.50. The net result is that under the third cause of action, the defendant must pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P10,486.13 with interest.
BLOSSOM AND COMPANY, INC. v. MANILA GAS CORPORATION,
FACTS:
September 10, 1918, plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant in which the plaintiff
undertook to purchase for a period of 4 years, water gas tar and coal gas tar, delivery to be made
at the plant of the defendant in the City of Manila, without containers and at the price of P65 per ton
for each kind of gas tar, it being agreed that this price should prevail only so long as the raw
materials used by the defendant in the manufacture of gas should cost the defendant the same price
as that prevailing at the time of the contract, and that in the event of an increase or decrease in the
cost of raw material there would be a corresponding increase or decrease in the price of the tar.
January 31, 1919, this contract was amended so that it should continue to remain in force for a
period of ten years from January 1, 1919
That in consideration of this modification of the contract of September 10, 1918, plaintiff agreed to
purchase from the defendant of certain piece of land lying adjacent to its plant at the price of P5 per
square meter. That pursuant to, defendant sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff which in turn
executed a mortgage thereon to the defendant for P17,140.20, to secure the payment of the balance
of the purchase price.
July, 1920 the defendant herein, the Manila Gas Corporation wilfully, and deliberately breached its
said contract with the plaintiff by ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas tar to it hereunder solely
because of the increased price of its tar products and its desire to secure better prices therefor than
plaintiff was obliged to pay to it, notwithstanding the frequent and urgent demands made by the
plaintiff upon it to comply with its aforesaid contract, but said defendant flatly refused to make any
deliveries under said contract,
November 23, 1923, the plaintiff was forced to commence action against the defendant herein in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, to recover the damages which it had up to that time suffered by
reason of such flagrant violation of said contract on the part of the defendant herein, and to obtain
the specific performance of the said contract
After due trial of that action, judgment was entered therein in favor of the plaintiff herein and against
the said defendant, for the sum of P26,119.08, as the damages suffered by this plaintiff by the
defendant's breach of said contract from July, 1920, up to and including September, 1923, with legal
interest thereon from November 23, 1923, and for the costs
That after the defendant had wilfully and deliberately violated its said contract, the plaintiff suffered
great damage, the plaintiff claimed the right to off- set its damages against the balance due from the
purchase of said land from the defendant, and immediately thereupon, the said defendant caused
against the plaintiff a foreclosure action, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and obtained
judgment therein ordering that Blossom & Company pay the last installment and interest due on
said land or else the land and improvements placed thereon would be sold as provided by law in such
cases to satisfy the same, and the said defendant proceeded with the sale of said property and did
everything in its power to sell the same for the sole purpose of crushing and destroying the plaintiff's
business, but fortunately the plaintiff was able to redeem its property as well as to comply with its
contract and continued demanding that the defendant performed its said contract and deliver to it the
coal and water gas tar required thereby.
5
 March 26, 1926 defendant offered to resume delivery to the plaintiff from that date of the minimum
monthly quantities of tars stated in its contract ,and the plaintiff believing that the said defendant was
at least going to try to act in good faith in the further performance of its said contract, commenced to
accept deliveries of said tars from it, and while plaintiff accepted deliveries of the minimum
quantities of tars stated in said contract and paid the increased prices demanded by the defendant, it
has in all cases done so under protest and with the express reservation of the right to demand from
the said defendant an adjustment of the prices charged in violation of its contract, and it also has
continuously demanded that the said defendant furnish it statements supported by its invoices
showing the cost prices if its raw materials, which is the only way the plaintiff has to calculate the
true price of said tars, but said defendant has and still refuses to furnish such information, and will
continue to refuse to do so, unless ordered by the court, and the plaintiff believes that the said
defendant has overcharged on the deliveries of said tars mentioned in the sum of at least P10,000, all
in violation of the rights of the plaintiff under its said contract with the defendant.
July 18, 1928, the defendant filed an amended answer in which it alleged as an affirmative defense,
first, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute cause of action the reason that a
prior adjudication had all the issues involved in this action, and, second, "that on or about the 16th
day of June, 1925, in an action brought in the Court of First Instance of the City on Manila, said
plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant decreeing a breach of the contract sued upon herein,
and awarding damages therefor in the sum of P26,119.08 with legal interest from November 23,
1923, and costs of suit
In its decision the court let judgment be entered awarding damages to plaintiff in the sum of
P2,219.60, with costs.
ISSUE:
The trial court erred in holding that this suit in so far as the damages from November, 1923, to
March 31, 1926, are concerned , is res adjudicata.
HELD:
In the final analysis, plaintiff in this action seeks to recover damages growing out of, and arising
from, other and different breaches of that same contract after November, 1923, for the remainder of
the ten-year period, and the question is thus squarely presented as to whether whether the plaintiff, in
a former action, having recovered judgment for the damages which it sustained by reason of a breach
of its contract by the defendant up to September, 1923, can now in this action recover damages it
may have sustained after September, 1923, arising from, and growing out of, a breach of the same
contract, upon and for which it recovered its judgment in the former action.
Both actions are founded on one and the same contract. That is to say, the contract provided for the
delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of the specified amounts of the different tars as ordered
and requested by the plaintiff. In other words, under plaintiff's own theory, the defendant was to
make deliveries from month to month of the tars during the period of ten years, and it is alleged in
both complaints that the defendant broke its contract, and in bad faith refused to make any more
deliveries.
The complaint on the former case specifically alleges that the defendant "has refused and still
refuses, to deliver to the plaintiff any coal and water gas tar whatsoever under the said contract
since the said month of July, 1920." " That owing to the bad faith of the said Manila Gas
Corporation, defendant herein, in not living up to its said contract and refusing now to carry out the
terms of the same." That is a specific allegation not only a breach of the contract since the month of
July, 1920, but of the faith of the defendant in its continuous refusal to make deliveries of any coal
and water gas tar.
Having recovered damages against it, covering a period of 4 years, upon the theory that the
defendant broke the contract, and in bad faith refused to make deliveries of either of the tars, how
can the plaintiff now claim and assert that the contract is still in force and effect? In the instant case
the plaintiff alleges and relies upon the ten year contract on January 11, 1920, which in bad faith was
broken by the defendant. If the contract was then broken, how can it be enforced in this action?
After careful study of the many important questions presented on this appeal in the exhaustive brief
of the appellant, we are clearly of the opinion that, as found by the lower court, the plea of res
judicata must be sustained. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and NEAL B.
CHRISTIAN,
FACTS:
Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., through Atty. Leonor L. Infante and Rodney David Hegerty,
its president and vice-president, respectively, obtained from private respondent Neal B. Christian
loans evidenced by three promissory notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997.
Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of US$50,000 payable after three years from its date
with an interest of 15% per annum payable every three months.
16 December 1998, Christian informed the petitioner corporation that he was terminating the loans
and demanded from the latter payment in the total amount of US$150,000 plus unpaid interests in
the total amount of US$13,500
2 February 1999, private respondent Christian filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 59, a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the Petitioner Corporation,
Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. The complaint alleged as follows: petitioner, as well as its president and
vice-president obtained loans from him in the total amount of US$150,000 payable after three years,
with an interest of 15% per annum payable quarterly or every three months. For a while, they paid an
interest of 15% per annum every three months in accordance with the three promissory notes.
However, starting January 1998 until December 1998, they paid him only an interest of 6% per
annum, instead of 15% per annum, in violation of the terms of the three promissory notes. Thus,
Christian prayed that the trial court order them to pay him jointly and solidarily the amount of
US$150,000 representing the total amount of the loans; US$13,500 representing unpaid interests
from January 1998 until December 1998; P100,000 for moral damages; P50,000 for attorneys fees;
and the cost of the suit.
Petitioner, together with its president and vice-president, filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of
cause of action and novation of the principal obligations. According to them, Christian had no
cause of action because the three promissory notes were not yet due and demandable. In December
1997, since the petitioner corporation was experiencing huge losses due to the Asian financial
crisis, Christian agreed
o (a) to waive the interest of 15% per annum, and
o (b) accept payments of the principal loans in installment basis, the amount and period of which
would depend on the state of business of the petitioner corporation.
Thus, the petitioner paid Christian capital repayment in the amount of US$750 per month from
January 1998 until the time the complaint was filed in February 1999. The petitioner and its co-
defendants then prayed that the complaint be dismissed and that Christian be ordered to pay P1
million as moral damages; P500,000 as exemplary damages; and P100,000 as attorneys fees
5 May 2000, trial court rendered a decision declaring the first two promissory notes dated 7 August
1996 and 14 March 1997 as already due and demandable and that the interest on the loans had been
reduced by the parties from 15% to 6% per annum. It then ordered the petitioner corporation to pay
Christian the amount of $100,000 representing the principal obligation covered by the promissory
notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997, plus interest of 6% per month thereon until fully
paid, with all interest payments already paid by the defendant to the plaintiff to be deducted
therefrom.
6
 5 September 2003, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners appeal and affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is cause of action because none of the promissory notes was due and
demandable.
HELD:
Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief
At the time the complaint was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, none of the three
promissory notes was due yet; although, two of the promissory notes with the due dates of 7 August
1999 and 14 March 2000 matured during the pendency of the case with the trial court. Both courts
also found that the petitioner had been religiously paying the private respondent US$750 per month
from January 1998 and even during the pendency of the case before the trial court and that the
private respondent had accepted all these monthly payments.
When the complaint for a sum of money and damages was filed with the trial court on 2 February
1999, no cause of action has as yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in
violation of the terms of the three promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in December
1997. Without a cause of action, the private respondent had no right to maintain an action in court,
and the trial court should have therefore dismissed his complaint.
The trial court did not dismiss the complaint, citing Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the
action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
The curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the
complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts.
It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or
remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of
action while the case is pending.
Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is
commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while
the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such after-
accrued cause of action is not permissible
LILIA B. ADA, LUZ B. ADANZA, FLORA C. BA YLON, REMO BA YLON, JOSE BA YLON,
ERIC BA YLON, FLORENTINO BA YLON, and MA. RUBY BA YLON, v. FLORANTE BAYLON
FACTS:
At the time of their death, Spouses Baylon were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita
Baylon (Rita), Victoria Baylon (Victoria), Dolores Baylon (Dolores), Panfila Gomez (Panfila),
Ramon Baylon (Ramon) and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada (Lilia).
Dolores died intestate and without issue on August 4, 1976. Victoria died on November 11, 1981
and was survived by her daughter, herein petitioner Luz B. Adanza. Ramon died intestate on July 8,
1989 and was survived by herein respondent Florante Baylon (Florante), his child from his first
marriage, as well as by petitioner Flora Baylon, his second wife, and their legitimate children,
namely, Ramon, Jr. and herein petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby, all
surnamed Baylon.
July 3, 1996, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition, accounting and damages
against Florante, Rita and Panfila. They alleged therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime,
owned 43 parcels of land all situated in Negros Oriental. After the death of Spouses Baylon, they
claimed that Rita took possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income
from the same. Using the income produced by the said parcels of land, Rita allegedly purchased two
parcels of land, Lot No. 47096 and half of Lot No. 4706,7 situated in Canda-uay, Dumaguete City.
The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a partition of the said parcels of land.
In their Answer, Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted that they and the petitioners co-owned 229 out
of the 43 parcels of land mentioned in the latters complaint, whereas Rita actually owned 10 parcels
of land10 out of the 43 parcels which the petitioners sought to partition, while the remaining 11
parcels of land are separately owned by Petra Cafino Adanza, Florante, Meliton Adalia,
Consorcia Adanza, Lilia and Santiago Mendez. Further, they claimed that Lot No. 4709 and half
of Lot No. 4706 were acquired by Rita using her own money. They denied that Rita appropriated
solely for herself the income of the estate of Spouses Baylon, and expressed no objection to the
partition of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but only with respect to the co-owned parcels of land.
July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation, conveyed Lot No.
4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 to Florante.
July 16, 2000, Rita died intestate and without any issue. Thereafter, learning of the said donation
inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading dated February 6,
2002, praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent be rescinded in accordance with
Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further alleged that Rita was already sick and very weak
when the said Deed of Donation was supposedly executed and, thus, could not have validly given
her consent thereto.
Florante and Panfila opposed the rescission of the said donation, asserting that Article 1381(4) of
the Civil Code applies only when there is already a prior judicial decree on who between the
contending parties actually owned the properties under litigation.
The RTC held that the death of Rita during the pendency of the case, having died intestate and
without any issue had rendered the issue of ownership insofar as parcels of land which she claims as
her own moot since the parties below are the heirs to her estate. Thus, the RTC regarded Rita as the
owner of the said parcels of land and, accordingly, directed that the same be partitioned among her
heirs. Nevertheless, the RTC rescinded the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No.
4706 in favor of Florante.
July 28, 2006, the RTC issued an Orde3 which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Florante.
The CA held that before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they must first obtain a
favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate
of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted, an action for rescission is premature.
Further, the CA ruled that the petitioners action for rescission cannot be joined with their action for
partition, accounting and damages through a mere supplemental pleading.
ISSUE:
7
 Whether the CA erred in ruling that the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. complaint and prayed for additional reliefs, i.e., rescission. Indeed, the petitioners claim that the said
4706 in favor of Florante may only be rescinded if there is already a judicial determination that the lots form part of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but cannot be partitioned unless the gratuitous
same actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon. conveyance of the same is rescinded. Thus, the principal issue raised by the petitioners in their
original complaint remained the same.
HELD:
The actions of partition and rescission cannot be joined in a single action.
The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two separate, distinct and independent
actions partition and rescission. First, the petitioners raised the refusal of their co-heirs, Florante,
Rita and Panfila, to partition the properties which they inherited from Spouses Baylon. Second, in
their supplemental pleading, the petitioners assailed the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and
half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante pendente lite
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or
more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a
declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the
basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and
subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters
in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the
disposition of litigation at minimum cost.
Such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not
include special civil actions governed by special rules.
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners
could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of
Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69
of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the
ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition
and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being
tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of
the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each
particular cause of action.

A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or by the court sua sponte,
may be adjudicated by the court together with the other causes of action.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have
the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the
misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately.
If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined
cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any
adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity.
Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of the petitioners
action for rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent omission on the part
of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its decision.
The RTC validly adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission filed by the
petitioners.

A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it has some relation to the
original cause of action set forth in the original complaint.
A supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or events which had
transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental
facts constitute another cause of action.
The petitioners supplemental pleading merely amplified the original cause of action, on account of
the gratuitous conveyance of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 after the filing of the original