Evol Psychol 2014 Hawley

Evolutionary Psychology
www.epjournal.net 2014. 12(2): 318-342
Original Article
Ontogeny and Social Dominance: A Developmental View of Human Power

Patterns
Patricia H. Hawley, College of Education, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA. Email:
Patricia.Hawley@ttu.edu (Corresponding author).
Abstract: Developmental science has long evolutionary roots and has historically focused
on individual differences. Accordingly, developmental models can inform conversations
about phylogeny and personality. The present paper evokes life history theory to describe a
theoretical model of competitive behavior that applies to both children and adults (resource
control theory: RCT). The model suggests that prosocial and coercive behavior, though
different in manifest form, serve similar evolutionary functions. Accordingly, RCT presents
a view on social dominance that gives primacy to function over form that contrasts sharply
from traditional views. This reformulation gives rise to novel questions (both
developmental and non-developmental) and challenges long accepted views on prosociality
(e.g., that it is altruistic) and aggression (e.g., that it is maladaptive). Similarly, RCT gives
rise to a minority perspective that aligns aggression with social competence.
Keywords: individual differences, personality, development, social dominance, power,

prestige
Evolution, Development, and Individual Differences
In 2011, David Buss and I published the first edited volume on the evolution of
individual differences in humans (Buss and Hawley, 2011). Our claims were quite lofty, the
volume heralding a sea-change in thinking within evolutionary psychology (Hawley and
Buss, 2011, p. xvi). We claimed this because variation in the population (i.e., individual
differences) is known to be fundamental to the evolutionary process. Without it, natural
selection could not occur. However, like our contributors, we turned the logic: Individual
differences are not only the input for selective forces, but also their outcome.
This minority view made the volume unique. To many, the evolution of
personality is nearly an oxymoron. The logic for dismissing individual differences is fairly
straightforward: Adaptations, though admittedly context specific, are universals, and
variability surrounding some modal response pattern can be reasonably seen as error
variance or noise (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990). Accordingly, most scholars in evolutionary
Ontogeny and social dominance
psychology heretofore have focused on said universals, except for variants associated with
very broad categories (e.g., sex).This state of affairs may seem perplexing given the early
success of the behavioral genetics paradigm and the fact that personality factors have long
been known to play a key role in adaptive outcomes (Buss and Greiling, 1999; Jokela,
2012; Jokela, Kivimki, Elovainio, and Keltikangas-Jrvinen, 2009; Ozer and Benet-
Martinez, 2005). In fact, for several decades, quantitative (Figueredo, Petrinovich, and
Ross, 1992; Hawley and Little, 2003) and theoretical (Gosling, 2001; Wilson, Coleman,
Clark, and Biederman, 1993) personality work was being conducted with animals (Carere
and Maestripieri, 2013).
Though at least two broad classes of evolutionary theoretical frameworks give rise
to empirical work on the evolution of personality1, one stands out as particularly relevant
for our present purposes. Namely, until fairly recently, a long standing puzzle
(ontogenetically, if not phylogenetically) was the fact that multiple morphs (some visible
and striking, others subtly quantitative) simultaneously exist in populations. The most
widespread across taxa is reproductive (male, female), recognized as such even by Darwin
(1871). In many fish and insects, these morphs can be so strikingly different that specimens
were long mistaken for different species, making taxonomy work especially challenging
(Gadgil, 1972; Gross, 1991). Take Schistocerca gregaria, for example. It will become a
harmless, solitary grasshopper if the nymph is hatched under a low population density
where it is unperturbed by the presence of others. However, if hatched under densely
populated conditions (coinciding with resource scarcity), it is more likely to become a
social, swarming locust. In response to physical stimulation in the nymph phase,
neurotransmitters (e.g., serotonin) are released. In turn, these proximal mechanisms
restructure its behavioral and physical phenotype (Homberg, 1991). Its manifest form is
dependent on its local conditions, hence condition dependent adaptations (i.e.,
alternative tactics; Caro and Bateson, 1986). That is, key environmental inputs calibrate
the system toward a favorably competitive strategy for the prevailing local environmental
conditions. Yet, the genome results in no permanent changes.
Plasticity is a universal property of living things (West-Eberhard, 2003; p. 34).
Responses to environmental change can be discrete or graded, reversible or irreversible,
behavioral or morphological, adaptive or non-adaptive (Caro and Bateson, 1986; Pigliucci,
2001; Whitman and Agrawal, 2009). Plasticity, like individual differences, was largely
dismissed by biologists as noise (Whitman and Agrawal, 2009) until roughly two
decades ago, when biologists began focusing on proximate causation and ontogenetic
histories (Caro and Bateson, 1986; Whitman and Agrawal, 2009).
1
The other is drawn from evolutionary genetics and accordingly stems from the contributions of Fisher, 1958,
Wright, 1931, and Haldane, 1932. Namely, this work draws on mathematical models of factors involved in
evolutionary change (e.g., mutation, selection, migration, drift) and the resultant genotype frequencies within
populations (e.g., frequency-dependent selection). Such models have been applied to human psychopathy
(Mealey, 1995) and personality (e.g., Camperio Ciani, 2011; Nettle, 2011), but lie outside the scope of the
present work.
Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -319-

The above described evolutionary model (cf. Footnote 1) is inherently

developmental. Developmental psychologists2 have long explored proximate mechanisms
for abrupt, ontogenetic behavioral changes, though the present language used to describe
said processes was adopted not from biology, but rather medicine (e.g., risk factors;
Jessor, 1991). In sharp contrast, one research tradition that famously borrowed from
evolutionary biology and ethology was attachment theory. John Bowlby and Mary Salter
Ainsworth addressed similar calibrations, though in language appropriate for their time.
Drawing on biological models, Bowlby proposed that the mother-infant bond was the most
important first context for humans that provides the basis of personality development, one
in which automatic and ancient primate behaviors (e.g., reflexes) function to maintain
proximity to the primary caregiver (Bowlby, 1969/1982). These adaptations, Bowlby
explained, take different forms, including grasps, separation anxiety, vocalizations, smiles
(positive affect), and cries (negative affect). In other words, positive and negative social
cues in the infant, though very different in form (phenomenal manifestation), serve a
similar function (purpose); in this case, maintaining proximity to the primary caregiver. On
this latter point evolutionists are well versed; in the natural world there are several ways
(forms) to solve similar problems (function).
Bowlbys perspective was refreshingly modern, and, as a clinician, he appreciated
the importance of differential response patterns resulting from varying ecologies:
Instinctive behavior is not inherited; what is inherited is a potential to develop

certain sorts of system, termed here behavioral systems, both the nature and the
forms of which differ in some measure according to the particular environment in
which development takes place. (Bowlby, 1969/1982; p. 45)
Mary Ainsworth elaborated the evolutionary foundations of attachment theory to include a

more articulated perspective on the calibration of personality, cognitive schema about the
self, others, and ones relationship to the material world (e.g., Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters,
and Wall, 1978). In other words, the nature of the attachment relationship calibrates one to
the social environment in which one finds oneself (e.g., secure, avoidant, anxious). More
recent instantiations have extended attachment theory to adult reproductive strategies
(Belsky, Steinberg, and Draper, 1991; Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007). Humans, not unlike
Schistocerca gregaria, are in some sense polymorphic, dependent on ones local ecological
conditions.
Given developmental psychologys deep evolutionary roots, concern with
individual responses to environments, and experience with early calibration processes,
2
Developmental psychology is often understood to mean child psychology. This is incorrect.
Developmentalists study change over time in both humans and animals, and many developmentalists have
strong biological backgrounds (e.g., Gilbert Gottleib, Robert Cairns, Robert Lickliter, Jean Piaget) in ways
that Child Psychologists typically do not. As a consequence, developmental work is all too often ignored in
evolutionary circles, or dismissed as irrelevant. This is a mistake, as evolutionary hypotheses have been
proposed that are contradicted by developmental data. One such proposition is bullies are ostracized.

developmental scholars are uniquely prepared to weigh in on evolutionary processes and

individual differences.
Life History Theory (LHT)
All species have a phylogenetic history that shaped the modal course of their life
trajectories. Life history theory (e.g., Roff, 1992) is the metatheoretical framework that
describes and explains these processes and outcomes as functions of ecological variables,
such as environmental instability and unpredictability (Pianka, 1970) and concomitant rate
of population loss. A species life history is the modal pattern of a lifelong stream of
adaptive trade-offs for allocating finite resources toward competing life functions,
including growth, reproduction, and survival (West-Eberhard, 2003). These patterns have
been described in terms of being fast (rapid development, early reproduction, brief
gestation, short life) or slow (protracted development, later reproduction, longer gestation,
longer life) on a continuum. Fast strategists (formerly known as r strategists) are well
represented in the parasite world, the constituents of which generally live briefly, come to
reproductive age quickly, and bear hundreds of offspring that require no parental care but at
the same time suffer high mortality rates. In contrast, humans (like apes in general) tend to
be positioned on the slow end of the continuum (formerly referred to as K strategists)
as indicated by our slow maturation, late reproduction, and bias toward bearing few, large-
brained, slow-developing offspring that require a good deal of parental care.
Generally, life history theory has been applied to cross-species variation
(interspecies questions) in the field of biology. Important for our present purposes, it has
also been successfully applied to account for variation within species, as demonstrated by
S.g. above, which takes different forms to serve similar functions (reproductive
competition) in the different environments in which the organism finds itself. Moreover,
the framework has revealed the variability in life history courses across humans (Ellis,
2004; Figueredo et al., 2006; Rushton, 1985). LHTs explanatory power lies in its explicit
recognition that organisms are responsive to complex inputs (the modality of detection
varies across species) from their physical and social environments and, accordingly, are
predictably flexible in their developmental course This intraspecific variation includes not
only physical characteristics (e.g., environmental sex determination in some turtles, snakes,
and reptiles; Bull, 1983) but also continuous behavioral traits (e.g., aggressiveness,
agreeableness).
Attachment profiles are a case in point. With LHT lenses (e.g., Belsky et al., 1991),
avoidant attachment is not seen as a maladaptive response to suboptimal environments
simply because it leads to unappealing behavior (e.g., aggressive self-assertion). Rather,
avoidance is seen as a persistent adaptive psychological response to a certain psychological
climate within the family ecology (Frankenhuis and del Giudice, 2012). In other words,
attachment styles are different solutions to the problems faced by the child after birth (an
individuals adaptation to local circumstances), or, like S.g., different forms to serve similar
functions in the different environments in which the organism finds itself. The groups
response to those solutions is a secondary consequence to that adaptive process. Three
primary points from LHT are important to set up the argument that follows. First, humans,
like many organisms, have evolved a degree of structured responsivity to key social and
material cues in the environment (i.e., phenotypic plasticity). This first point is well-
documented by developmental psychologists, and we know what these social and material
cues are (e.g., poverty, harsh parenting). Where developmental psychology and LHT part
ways, however, is on whether this calibration leads to maladaptation or something that can
be seen as beneficial to the organism (e.g., Ellis et al, 2012; Hawley, 2011). Human
nature, then, is in part decided by the context within which we find ourselves. Bickering
over which is the true human nature will generate more heat than light.
Second, we must distinguish form from function in all we do as evolutionists. To
those in the field, this may seem obvious. But there has been at least one domain, I will
argue, where this canon has fallen through the cracks.
Third, individual differences in behavior (including sociality) can be seen as
inherently competitive or cooperative insofar as individuals are attempting to maximize
gains and minimize costs in the presence of others doing the same. In this sense,
environmental cues carry information about important aspects of the competitive landscape
that organisms detect and respond to. These enduring individual differences (traits) can be
considered strategies in LHT and behavioral ecology parlance (Ellis, Figueredo,
Brumbach, and Schlomer, 2009; Hawley, 1999; West-Eberhard, 2003), and they can
sometimes take surprising forms.
Natural selection and the competitive ethos

Natural selection at some level implies competition insofar as asymmetrical
outcomes are a key driver of evolution (Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton, 1964). That is,
adaptations, or those alleles or phenotypic traits that come to be well-represented in the
population, have done so at the expense of others that become less well-represented. This
point of course is non-controversial and has been demonstrated in laboratories, via
mathematical modeling, and shown to occur in actual populations.
Conflating evolutionary and psychological egoism

Conventionally and mistakenly this underlying competitive foundation is taken
to mean that animals behaviorally compete, as if in some naturally occurring Olympics. Of
course some do this, but these types of contests are only a small minority of the types of
competition the theory of evolution by natural selection predicts.
For example, from very early on it was understood that prosocial behavior (e.g.,
helping, sharing, cooperating) and emotions (e.g., sympathy, empathy) are just as much a
part of nature as are aggression and agonism (e.g., Kropotkin, 1902). In the meantime,
these perspectives have been well-elaborated (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Bowles and Gintis,
2011; de Waal, 1996). Humans (and wolves, and elephants, and ants, and slime mold
spores) have evolved to be nice to one another.
Parental love, for example, is inherently biologically selfish, and attentive and
protective parents can out-reproduce inattentive ones. Moreover, attentive parents rear
children who are themselves more successful parents than are children of inattentive
parents. Yet, this scenario is ill-described with appeals to psychological egoism. In fact,
neither psychological egoism nor competition in the conventional sense are required of
superior strategies. On the other hand, it is preposterous to think of a cellular slime mold
spore that adopts the role of the supportive stalk and consequently foregoes its own
reproduction to support that of another cell as psychologically altruistic (see Hawley, 2014
for extended handling of psychological and evolutionary altruism and egoism).
Biological altruism (or selfishness) applies to every living organism, regardless of
where you stand in the eusociality-inclusive fitness debate. Psychological
altruism/selfishness applies to very few. Having a brain of some kind is a bare minimal
condition. If were going to create a general model of behavior, we should consider the
whole continuum of life and eschew human exceptionalism as a philosophical starting
point. Yet, one still finds confusion even among academics over whether evolutionary self-
interest (or selfishness; Dawkins, 1976) means behavioral or psychological self-interest
(e.g., Dodge and Albert, 2012; Gintis, 2013; Nowak, 2006).3 Darwin (1871) conflated the
two as well.4
Consequences of conflating evolutionary and psychological egoism

This confounding of psychological and biological egoism has led to a number of
circuitous detours in evolutionary circles, and has seriously confounded non-evolutionary
writers attempts to incorporate evolutionary logic. One sees this confounding emerge
regularly in debates over group- versus individual-level selection, for example, and has led
some very influential, venerated writers to claim that group selection accounts for the
origin of virtue whereas individual level selection gives rise to sin (Wilson, 2012).
These discussions are highly visible because teams of outspoken eminent writers are
sparring in open forums (see, for example, Edge.org; Abbot et al., 2011). These discussions
are interesting to the lay public because one side seems to provide the biological
underpinnings for morality and religion while the other does not.
But in one domain of inquiry, this influence has crept in invisibly to great effect;
namely, in discussing hierarchical political systems, such as leadership, egalitarianism, and
social dominance. If you want humans to be good, you will favor leadership and
egalitarianism, and eschew social dominance. In my view (and as I have argued at length
elsewhere in the developmental literature over a decade ago; Hawley, 1999), this is a false
and misleading debate based on overly narrow conceptions of dominance and a conflation
of form and function.
Dominance: Whats in a Word?
Dominant: Exercising chief authority or rule; Occupying a commanding position.

Etymology: Latin domint- participial stem of dominr to bear rule, govern.
3
Evolution is based on a fierce competition between individuals and should therefore only reward selfish
behavior (Nowak, 2006; p. 1560).
4
each man would soon learn from experience that if he aided his fellow-men, he would commonly
receive aid in return. From this low motive he might acquire the habit of performing benevolent actions
(Darwin, 1871; p. 163).

The above definition of dominant was drawn from the Oxford English Dictionary,
which indicates this is accepted use since the mid-16th century. Important for our purposes,
notice that nowhere in this definition is implied how dominance is accomplished. In terms
of the form-function discussion above, this is a functional definition. 5
Dominance and dominance hierarchies entered the modern biological vernacular in
the early 19th century. At that time, narrow views of the competitive essence of natural
selection predominated. Accordingly, this view led early animal behavior researchers to
look for hierarchical behavior in asymmetries in agonism and aggression. The very first
dominance hierarchy to be described was the peck-order of chickens (Schjelderup- Ebbe,
1922). Quite literally, it was a description of how hens compete for desired resources by
pecking each other. This work was highly influential and gave rise to the aggression-based
view of social dominance that persists to this day across species and taxa (e.g., Alonso,
Honji, Moreira, and Pandolfi, 2012; Gintis, 2013; Hofer and East, 2003; Ishikawa,
Yamada, Matsuura, Tsukada and Tsuchida, 2011; Krebs and Davies, 1997; Pelletier and
Festa-Bianchet, 2006). Textbooks and journal articles define dominance as a sexually
selected manifestation of conflict (Alcock, 2005; p. 332), a pure exercise of power by
socially dominant males (Gintis, in press), where alpha males control group activities and
others are intimidated or forced to acquiesce (van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser, 2008, p 191;
see also Boehm, 2000).
Moreover, the peck order construal quickly impacted work in child development
(e.g., Bhler, 1927), and similarly has left a legacy of continued focus on the form of
behavior (agonistic contests, fighting ability, submissive gestures), even though the
function of such contests is always understood to be resource control (the theoretical
model; see Hawley, 1999 for extended discussion; Carpenter, 1942 for conflation of form
and function in a single definition6) For example, Abramovitch (1976) defined dominance
as property fights, involving struggles or tussles.
Consequences to favoring agonism as a strategy of resource control

There are at least two consequences of this form-focused view that equates
dominance with agonism. First, it is (adult) male centered, which leads to several
consequences of its own. Second, it ignores the instrumentality of being nice.
Dominance and the masculine political structure. Males are more physically
aggressive than females as early as the age of 3, on average (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974).
This is not controversial. However, it is then just a small step to conclude that social
dominance is the purview of males, and a smaller step further to conclude, therefore, the
predominant political structure in group living social species (i.e., hierarchical structure) is
5
Perhaps there is a conflation with domineering; Ruling arbitrarily or imperiously; tyrannical, despotic;
overbearing, insolent (Oxford English Dictionary, 2013).
6
Carpenter... defined dominance in terms of priority of access to food, mating, and position in the group
while traveling, along with superiority in aggressiveness or group control-- a definition that holds today
(Boehm, 1999; p. 34).

essentially masculine. This conclusion is reified into an assumption. Not surprisingly then,
it is often claimed that socially dominant males hold the central positions in their social
groups (Gintis, in press) and consequently enjoy differential attention and grooming, as
well as priority in ally selection and access to mates (de Waal, 1982a; Dunbar, 1988).
There is nothing wrong with this focus as it led to discovering the signaling value of
dominance and submission displays, and uncovering even in simple species (e.g., fish;
Hsu, Early, and Wolf, 2006) the ability to learn from ones previous interactions with a
conspecific. I would argue, however, that the agonism view is incomplete, or certainly so
say primatologists who have beautifully described and explained the complex strategies
some nice and some nasty that primates use to occupy a commanding position (Boehm,
1993; de Waal, 1982a). Indeed, neither chimpanzees (Boehm and Flack, 2010) nor human
infants (Mascaro and Csibra, 2012) need see any act of aggression to draw important and
enduring conclusions about relative ranks among others (see also early work on leadership
in humans that similarly demonstrated that humans can exercise chief authority or rule in
variegated ways; the most eloquent and thorough, in my view, was Machiavellis
[1513/1966] treatise).
An unintended consequence of this focus on male aggression is that the political
structures of females were (and continue to be) downplayed relative to males (as were
patterns of aggression in females). Indeed, some prominent primatologists (e.g., Hrdy,
1981/1999; Drea, 2005; Gowaty, 1997) have argued that female political structures, though
less visible to field workers, are in fact longer lasting. And presumably because behaviors
used for hierarchy ascent take a different form (but not a different function), they have been
much harder to document (e.g., reproductive suppression). In contrast, the function-focus
approach presented here shines light on variegated ascension strategies, and as a side-effect
(not a central goal), female status-striving.
Form-focus ignores instrumentality of being a good group member and a good
cooperator. Second, being a good group member is highly instrumental. I use the term
instrumental because it is more neutral than its linguistic cousins, egoistic or selfish,
which are highly pejorative and a source of confusion in psychological circles.
Instrumentality neutrally connotes that some goal is attained by what an organism does,
and yet it says nothing about psychological egoism or altruism, which are, for the most
part, irrelevant for the present work.
Cooperation, for example, is a very effective material goal pursuit strategy
(Charlesworth, 1996). Together we can pursue goals (e.g., grants) that neither can
successfully attain alone. Admittedly, the word cooperation is tricky because it has been
used in different ways. For example, evolutionary perspectives from economics use the
term interchangeably with altruism, which in biological circles (not psychological circles)
generally means engaging in behavior that enhances the fitness benefits of another while
bearing a fitness cost to the self (-/+). Thus, in this literature, cooperation is assumed to be
cost-bearing (e.g., Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, and Richerson, 2003; Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg,
and Nowak., 2008; Nowak, 2006: ...the self-interest model predicts no cooperation;
Gintis, in press, p. 3), its extreme form manifesting in eusociality where most of the group
members are of castes that forego reproduction altogether to support the reproduction of a
few (Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson, 2010). Cooperation, then, is viewed in these circles to
demonstrate some degree of sacrifice for the welfare of others.

The above view may strike some as narrow and semantically confusing because of
the cooperation-altruism conflation. Say altruism to a psychologist and they think
motivationally selfless. Use cooperation and altruism interchangeably, the psychologist
assumes cooperation is motivationally selfless. The surface logic seems sound. Therein lies
the danger of using metaphor to explain biological concepts (see Hawley, 2014, for
extended treatment).
Instead, the present view is more explicitly in line with Adam Smiths proposal that
cooperation stems not out of self-sacrifice, but rather self-interest as a primary concern.
Smith, unaware of biological evolution, could only then be talking about psychological
self-interest (e.g., I sell you bread so that I can make money. You having bread is
secondary to me). Like other evolutionary thinkers concerned with various forms of
reciprocity (e.g., Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971), the function of the behavior is biological
self-interest (with psychological self-interest being wide open to debate) and it is
cooperative in terms of it benefitting another (see also West, Griffin, and Gardner, 2007).
Self-sacrifice is not inherent to this point of view (see also Alexander, 1987; Trivers, 1971)
as the behavior can be mutually beneficial (+/+; West et al, 2007). Indeed, mutual benefit
seems to underlie the formation of human society in ways that sets us apart from the apes
(Nowak, 2006; Boehm, 1999). Our other-regarding preferences7 reflect a commitment to
self and other simultaneously (see also Bakan, 1966; Boehm, 1999).
That humans can be reciprocally nice (i.e., prosocial) as a consequence of
evolutionary forces is not controversial. The high-level, sometimes acrimonious discussion
in top tier journals is about evolutionary mechanisms underlying cooperation (e.g.,
individuals vs. group; Abbot et al., 2011; Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson, 2011), none of
which have any bearing on the present piece, accentuated by a failure to distinguish
biological from psychological self-interest. For our purposes, it is enough to say that one
benefits from group living because solitary living bears enormous costs in many domains
(food procurement, protection, rearing young; Krause and Ruxton, 2002), and these
benefits naturally select behaviors that increase the probability that the group accepts us as
valued group members. Valuing others is a case in point. People who valued others were
more likely to treat group members with respect and goodwill than were people who did
not value others (this of course is true even today). They were more likely to make friends
and benefit from these friendships as we still do (e.g., social and material support, child
rearing; Hrdy, 2009). As a result of a long history of humans forming mutually beneficial
friendly relationships (i.e., indirect reciprocity), the desire for attachments to others is seen
as a basic and foundational human need with deep evolutionary roots (Baumeister and
Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1969/1982). It is a need, that when fulfilled, pays (e.g., Silk, Alberts,
7
Economists utilizing game theoretic models appear to refer to regarding the other while regarding the self as
other regarding preferences (in contrast to narrowly focused self regarding preferences which refer to
exclusive concern with ones own advantage). Consequently, the cautious reader must bear in mind that
other regarding preferences are not to be read as selfless, since ORPs still include self payoff.

and Altmann, 2003). Thus, it pays to be nice to others, especially if those others are in a
position to bestow benefits.8 This latter point is foundational to resource control theory.
Resource Control Theory
Resource control theory (Hawley, 1999), with roots in the work of human
ethologists (e.g., Abramovitch , 1976; McGrew, 1972; Strayer and Strayer, 1976) and
animal behaviorists (Bernstein, 1981; Chance, 1967; Rowell, 1974), is an evolutionary
developmental theory of social dominance that, as has been set up above, is a theory of
individual differences in behavior and personality, considers the developing child to be
responsive to key social and material cues in what is essentially a competitive environment.
As with other animal species, outcomes to these daily competitions are presumed to be
highly visible. I use the function-focused term dominance to set up important questions
about the development of behavioral forms (i.e., strategies) which may be either
negatively valenced (e.g., agonism) or positively valenced (e.g., cooperation) used to
occupy a commanding position (OED).
Resource control
Here, resource control refers to the extent to which individuals successfully access
social, material, or informational resources relative to others. This definition is sufficiently
general to include access to and attention from high status others (social), objects meeting
ones survival needs and denoting status (material, e.g., food, clothing: Sahlins, 1963; van
Vugt and Hardy, 2010), and valuable information regarding work, school projects, or
events (informational; Hawley, Shorey, and Alderman, 2009; Keltner, Gruenfeld, and
Anderson, 2003).
Resource control strategies

Meeting ones needs in a social group, or successfully competing for resources in
the presence of others, can certainly be achieved directly, expediently, and without
consideration for the goals and motivations of others. But they can also be met by
coordinating efforts with other group members.
Coercive strategies. Following the lead of ethologists and biologists, RCT
recognizes the utility of aggression, especially in contexts that have a zero-sum quality.
Elaborating somewhat to accommodate humans rather advanced cognitive capacities,
deception and overt manipulation reside in this category (Byrne and Whiten, 1988). These
8
Developmental psychologists seem, as a rule, uncomfortable with the possibility that friendship selection is
psychologically selfish. College students, however, are not. This latter group openly reports that they are very
aware of the benefits they get from friends, and moreover admit that their friend selection has key
instrumental elements, that they are keenly aware when they do not receive the benefits they had hoped for,
and will readily drop a friend (parasite) who does not reciprocate material benefits (e.g., invitations, food,
drink, favors; see Trivers, 1971 for an evolutionary foundation for these processes, and social exchange
theories for a psychological view: Blau, 1964; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978).

strategies characteristically exploit individual group members or bypass the social group
entirely.
As straightforward as these strategies seem, they are the source of a good deal of
controversy. This friction is important for our present purposes because it points to the
value-added by the present view. Namely, there is a prevalent assumption that social
groups are intolerant of such brazenly (e.g., psychologically) self-serving behaviors. This
assumption has been made in anthropological (Boehm, 1999), economic (Fehr and Gchter,
2000), and child development circles (Coie and Dodge, 1998). Yet, in the field of child
development, this wisdom is being chipped away: There is emerging evidence that suggests
that a sizeable subset of the aggressively powerful youths are highly regarded by peers and
are even sought out for friendships and alliances. They are anything but ostracized. RCT
holds a morally neutral view to such behavior (i.e., eschewing monikers of virtue and evil)
and instead it predicts that those occupying commanding positions (i.e., those who have
demonstrated competitive success, the socially dominant) will win positive regard because
of their evident effectiveness in the material world. Simply put, we should find power
attractive, even if this power is wielded aggressively (the social centrality hypothesis;
Hawley, 1999). This point will be re-addressed in more detail later.
Prosocial strategies. Quite unlike coercive strategies, prosocial strategies
theoretical roots are in the evolution of cooperation and reciprocation (e.g., Trivers, 1971;
Charlesworth, 1996). Here, competition takes on a non-zero sum quality; multiple
interactants can gain in this cooperative or reciprocal context. Instead of bypassing the
social group, as direct means do, indirect strategies exploit the mediating effect of the
social group to access resources prosocially. These strategies too are the source of some
irritation in the literature predominantly centering on confusion about the term prosocial.
In specific terms, prosocial behavior refers to voluntary actions that are intended to
help or benefit another individual (Eisenberg and Mussen 1989, p. 3). Important for our
purposes, especially in light of the common conflation of biological and psychological self-
interest, this denition does not favor any one of a variety of possible underlying
psychological motivations (egoistic or altruistic) (Campbell and Christopher, 1996;
Eisenberg, 1996; Eisenberg and Giallanza, 1984). Nor does this definition rule out self-
benefit. Thus, prosociality may be blatantly psychologically egoistic (e.g., performed
consciously for present or future reward), subtly egoistic (winning favor from a colleague),
or psychologically altruistic (i.e., motivated only by true other-oriented/selfless concerns;
Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989). In reality, underlying psychological motivations are likely
complex. Yet, most studies in the field of child development have tended to focus on
altruism and have shown that even at an early age, children are capable of psychological
altruism or the precursors thereof (Hoffman, 1983, 1994; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, and
King, 1983). All of these motivations, however, may in fact be ultimately (evolutionarily)
instrumental. Natural selection does not require you to know why youre doing what youre
doing; only that your genes benefit from it, directly or indirectly. This point would be true
regardless of whether one found individual level selection (direct benefit) or group
selection (indirect benefit) more compelling (Hawley, 2014).

The development of social dominance and power

Bowlby understood that both positively valenced (smiling, touching) and negatively
valenced behaviors (e.g., crying, protesting) are instrumental in human infants; both pay in
terms of strengthening the bond to the caregiver, the first source of social, material, and
informational resources. These strategies are honed and elaborated in the peer group via
operant and social learning processes (i.e., selection by consequence). A child may learn
that pinching is highly effective at wresting the swing from a peer. Teachers and parents,
however, will attempt to teach her that smiling and sharing is more effective and socially
preferable. These foundations give rise to interesting developmental questions.
What predicts dominance differentials and do they organize non-competitive social
behavior? It has been repeatedly shown that it is possible to organize children in a group
according to high and low dominance rank (e.g., Strayer and Strayer, 1976). Doing so only
has meaning, however, if these relative competitive differentials are associated with
behavior outside of the competitive context, an influence that speaks to the central
organizing power of this aspect of relationships (I have argued elsewhere that the early
ethological work had limitations in this regard; Hawley, 2007). Our own attempts at
borrowing from the social relations model of social psychology (Kenny and LaVoie, 1984)
suggested that when put in pairwise interactions in a non-competitive play situation (where
there are plenty of toys for both interactants), dominance rank nonetheless mediates the
relationship between characteristics of the child (e.g., cognitive age, gender, temperament)
and play behavior. These path models spoke to two important issues: the predictors of
relative success in toddlers and the power of these differentials to predict non-competitive
social behavior (Hawley and Little, 1999).
Regarding the first issue, we began to chip away at long-held beliefs from ethology;
namely, that size and gender (i.e., big males) predict social dominance (but see
Lukaszewski and Roney, 2011; Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides, 2009 for a different perspective).
In fact, when one includes psychological variables, we found that persistence
(temperament), cognitive age (as assessed by the Bayley Scales of Infant Development),
and familiarity with the setting predicted dominance well more than physical size.
Moreover, all things being equal, girls were favored over boys in the preschool years.
Regarding the second issue, when paired with a child of lower rank, children were
more likely to engage with the play material and issue directives (e.g., you color here),
and less likely to imitate and passively watch (Hawley and Little, 1999). Children of
middle rank behaved like dominants when paired with children of lower rank, yet deferred
to and imitated those of higher rank. These relationships were moderated by the degree of
familiarity of the children; the more experience they had with each other, the stronger
effect of their relative ranks on their respective behavior. All children were under the age
of 3 (i.e., toddlers), which suggested to us just how basic these abilities and learning
processes are.
What types of behavior in children are associated with resource use? When do they
emerge and what is their developmental course? One of the key and most controversial
questions raised by RCT involves the instrumentality of prosocial behavior. Can prosocial
behavior provide self -benefits? To this end, we set up quasi-experimental situations to look
closely at what children do to access a highly attractive limited resource (i.e., a novel toy).
In the course of filming and coding behavior from multiple dyadic interactions, we
documented that prosocial behaviors (e.g., making helpful suggestions, issuing polite
requests, offering help to commandeer the play material, initiating unequal trades) not
only were associated with resource use (r = .53), but were also the most often employed
strategy class (at twice the frequency of coercion: taking, aggression, insults, also
associated with resource use). Moreover, and critical to the present perspective, both
strategies were highly related to each other (r = .67), just as one would expect of behaviors
sharing common function. Children employing these behaviors effectively controlled our
resource over 70% of the time. Though not the most popular aspect to our program of
research, we do have good evidence that prosocial behavior can be instrumental across
multiple age groups (see, for example, Hawley, 2002 for evidence of its emergence in
preschool; see also Green, Cillessen, Rechis, Patterson, and Hughes, 2008; Pellegrini,
2008; Roseth et al., 2011; Teisl, Rogosch, Oshri, and Ciccetti, 2012).
Are there mixed strategists? Coercive and prosocial strategies find their analog in
game theoretic models under the guise of hawks (escalation) and doves (caution). As with
more complex game theoretic models, RCT does not see humans as pure strategists; more
interesting to us is a model where players bring distinct genotypes that are calibrated by
early environments, with the modal (life history) pattern being one of a mixed strategy (see
Hawley, 2006 for details). That is, most humans flexibly use both strategies to some
degree, the relative employment of which is an important source of individual differences.
Indeed, in principle, it would be optimal to be a mixed strategist. Those who are able to
cooperate and aggress are able to minimize the cost associated with prosociality (e.g.,
exploitation) by drawing on aggressive behaviors to punish free riders. Machiavelli
essentially described the mixed strategist on his treatise of political power (Berlin, 1980;
Machiavelli, 1513/1966).
With this framework in mind, our program has focused on types of resource
controlling individuals depending on their relative employment of the two strategies. The
degree to which an individual employs the strategies can be measured by way of
observation (Hawley, 2002), self-report, or other report (Hawley, 2003a,b). We then
compare these types across dependent variables of interest to derive qualities associated
with the two strategies alone and in combination. Over the last decade (Hawley, 2002;
Hawley and Geldhof, 2012), we (and, more recently, others: e.g., Chen and Chang, 2012;
Roseth et al., 2011; Olthof, Goossens, Vermande, Aleva, and van der Meulen, 2011) have
generated ve subgroups of individuals: bistrategic controllers employ both strategies to a
high degree relative to peers, coercive controllers employ coercive strategies to a high
degree, prosocial controllers employ prosocial strategies to a high degree, and non-
controllers are low on both relative to others (i.e., they are not resource directed). Typical
controllers are the largest remaining group and are average on both strategies and as such
represent the modal life history pattern and a baseline for comparison. We know quite a bit
about these profiles across multiple age groups, and the profiles have in turn revealed some
interesting and counterintuitive (from most views) aspects of aggression and prosociality.
For example, prosocial, coercive, and non-controllers possess very distinct proles
of socially appealing traits and corresponding social success. Prosocial controllers are
above average on resource control (thus reasonably socially dominant), highly socially
skilled (e.g., socially perceptive, extroverted, morally astute), agreeable, and very well-
liked by their peers. They know and internalize moral norms, and behave well within them
(Hawley and Geldhof, 2012). Evolutionists and non-evolutionists alike would agree that
these individuals, as a group, are highly socially competent peer leaders. Perhaps not
surprisingly, females comprise the majority in this group. In stark contrast, coercive
controllers, while being reasonably high in resource control, t the stereotypic prole of
impulsive, unskilled, and socially repellant aggressors (Hawley, 2003a; Hawley, Johnson,
Mize, and McNamara, 2007). By the age of 5, they are already showing signs of social
rejection by their peers. Perhaps also not surprising, given the physicality of pure coercion,
males comprise the majority in this group. Traditional perspectives have handled these
children well and have identified them as needing ameliorative measures.
Most informative to our perspective, however, are the individuals who employ both
strategies to a high degree. These bistrategic controllers tend to be the most successful at
resource control in all age groups. Consistent with our predictions, we have generally found
bistrategic controllers to possess attributes associated with social skills; i.e., they tend to be
extroverted, socially perceptive, and morally astute (Hawley, 2002, 2003b; Hawley and
Geldhof, 2012). But unlike skilled prosocial controllers, they are as a group very high on
traditional measures of aggression, and even direct this aggression towards their best
friends (Hawley, Little, and Card, 2007). In this regard, they are much like coercive
controllers. Yet, despite their high levels of aggression, and in contrast to expectations from
most theoretical perspectives, they demonstrate relationship skills (e.g., intimacy; Hawley,
Little, et al., 2007) and are socially attractive to peers (Hawley, 2003a,b; cf. Henrich and
Gil-White, 2001). They understand moral norms well, but they have not internalized them
in an emotional sense. This combination, unlike prosocial controllers, allows bistrategics to
manipulate the moral atmosphere to their own advantage (Alexander, 1987; Hawley and
Geldhof, 2012). Interestingly, both males and females are well-represented in this group.
And both genders possess skills typically associated with the opposite sex (e.g., males are
attuned to others whereas females are highly aggressive). Thus, we find bistrategics as
rather androgynous behaviorally, in the sense that they embrace all human skills and
strategies and can employ them flexibly and in ways that garner some degree of group
approval. They may even enjoy differential reproductive success (Jokela et al., 2009).
Bistrategic controllers contradict views held by the majority that aggression does
not pay in the long run because it is associated with social punishment and ostracism. On
the contrary, aggression seems to work very well when employed as part of a mixed
strategy. The effectiveness and social savvy of the bistrategic struck us to parallel
Machiavellis treatise. 9 Thus, we have referred to them as Machiavellian (Hawley, 2003a;
see also Baar and Wubbells, 2011; Chen and Chang, 2012; Palmen, Vermande, Dekovi,
and van Aken, 2011; Roseth et al., 2011). And because they not only meet their material
needs more effectively than all other groups, while at the same time also meeting their
9
To be supported by your people, be merciful, faithful, humane, frank, religious but preserve a
disposition which will make a reversal of conduct possible in case the need arises (Machiavelli, 1513/1966,
p 63).

social needs of power and affiliation, we have argued that their behavior pattern may
represent a type of human social competence (Hawley, 2002; Stump, Ratliff, Wu, and
Hawley, 2009).
If there are winners, there must be losers

Views stemming from behavioral ecology suggest that multiple strategies can
achieve similar average payoffs (i.e., different forms can successfully perform different
functions). Non-controllers, however, should not be seen in this light because their payoffs
do not appear to be equal to other groups. Indeed, lack of resource directedness (and by
extension, total lack of aggression) appears to be a losing strategy. Everything the
bistrategics are, the non-controllers are not: They are low on resource control, extraversion,
social skills, aggression, social status, and peer regard, and high on anxiety and withdrawal.
This niche is cost-bearing. In fact, non-controlling school children are the gravest clinical
significance (Stump et al., 2009; but see Hawley et al., 2009); they are ostracized and
victimized by their peers. Thus, non-controllers confront ideological views to social
competence as well. What does it mean when aggression protects you from failing to
thrive?
What these profiles reveal about conventional wisdoms

First, prosocial strategies are not altruistic; they reap true benefits for the actor (see
also Hardy and van Vugt, 2006; Griskevicius, Tybur, and Van den Bergh, 2010; van Vugt
and Iredale, 2012). Moreover, participants readily admit that being nice to others is the
best way to ensure that others are nice to you. That is, not only are these behaviors not
altruistic in the biological sense, but also not altruistic in the psychological sense. 10 The
self-serving nature of prosocial behavior is mostly keenly understood by prosocial and
bistrategic controllers, i.e., those who use them frequently and effectively. Indeed, these
individuals report high levels of material and social goals, and explicitly understand the
relationships among them (Hawley et al., 2009).
Second, aggression (i.e., blatantly self-serving strategies) does not unilaterally lead
to ostracism. Bistrategics clearly show this undeniable fact. You can gain positive peer
regard (i.e., prestige; Henrich and Gil White, 2001) by wielding power aggressively if you
also possess social skills to foresee and smooth over potential repercussions. It is not that
the group does not see their aggression, because they clearly do (e.g., Hawley, Johnson, et
al., 2007). College students simply report that the benefits for associating with someone
who can sometimes be a very volatile person outweigh the costs. Bistrategics are fun,
innovative, and know how to get things done. On the flip side, being non-aggressive does
not win friends. In a sad twist of nature, non-controllers are socially at risk.
Third, relative competitive ability is less gendered than is commonly thought. When
allowing for variegated strategies, females do quite well (Hawley, Little, and Card, 2008;
Hrdy, 1981/1999). Form-focused approaches to social dominance would include only
10
I am not denying the existence of biologically or psychologically altruistic acts. They are simply not
addressed by this work.

bistrategic and coercive controllers as power holders; that is, those who were physically
aggressive. Add prosocial controllers to the mix, and the gender representation equalizes.
Working RCT into the Theoretical Landscape
Reversing the hierarchy

The present view does not explicitly call for leveling mechanisms, or normative
strategies that function to equalize the hierarchy (i.e., reverse dominance hierarchy;
Boehm, 1999) primarily because it does not equate dominance with unbridled aggression.
These leveling behaviors (i.e., counter dominant behavior; Boehm, 1993) against bullying
that have been ethnographically documented (e.g., gossip, ostracism, or corporal
punishment) are generally interpreted to mean that humans possess a propensity for
egalitarianism (see also chimps: Boehm and Flack, 2010). However, Boehm himself has
stressed that this pattern might be expected within some, small, autonomous hunter-
gatherer groups, but certainly not all early human societies. Moreover, Boehm explicitly
added that egalitarianism in these model societies does not extend to women and children
as a rule.
Aside from the obvious narrowness of a male-oriented perspective, it is easy to
conclude that, if we were egalitarian in early human groups, then we must be naturally
egalitarian (or inherently moral creatures; Gintis, 2012) or, at the very least, intolerant of
social dominants. Work in the RCT paradigm seems to suggest something quite different.
When aggression is mitigated with social skills, we seem to be drawn to it even before the
age of 3. And why wouldnt we be? The powerful make better friends and alliance partners
than the socially subordinate. Exchange theories in social psychology have illuminated
these dynamics (e.g., Blau, 1964; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978), and work in developmental
circles have documented relationship processes of powerful adolescents (e.g., friends of
powerful individuals become more powerful themselves over time; Dijkstra, Cillessen,
Lindenberg, and Veenstra, 2010; Marks, Cillessen, and Crick, 2012). These patterns occur
right under our noses at scientific conferences. That is not to say that currying favor from
the powerful is cost-free; powerful individuals are more likely to be aggressive, socially
inappropriate, and sexually uninhibited than the less powerful (see Keltner, Gruenfeld, and
Anderson, 2003 for review). In any case, these patterns too appear to be natural.
Egalitarianism may be the exception rather than the rule. And so much the better if one
can operate with a veneer of morality, as aggressively socially dominant preschoolers
already do (Hawley and Geldhof, 2012). Both perspectives agree, however, that behavior
patterns of group members are context specific, and a good deal of the context is what
other group members are doing to access limited resources.
Leadership and prestige

The present view overlaps significantly with more recent views on leadership (e.g.,
van Vugt et al., 2008) and prestige (e.g., Henrich and Gil White, 2001), even though these
lines of work hold that these structures are distinct from dominance (indeed, the
antithesis of dominance because leadership is proposed to be a solution to intragroup
conflict caused in part by dominance striving: van Vugt et al., 2008; p 188). Here,
leadership, with benefits of its own, is viewed as a group resource having evolved in
response to pressures for group coordination and conflict resolution. Again, I believe that
the distinction relies on the overly narrow view of social dominance as aggression. As
mentioned above, it has long been known that socially complex species with protracted
developments work their hierarchies with variegated strategies (Byrne and Whiten, 1988;
de Waal, 1982a,b; Drea, 2005; Hawley and Little 2003; Hrdy, 1981/1999). These strategies
are especially complex in humans (e.g., Kyl-Heku and Buss, 1996; Raven and French,
1958) and undoubtedly include behaviors we would call leadership (Hawley, 1999).
Prosocial strategists, for example, are exceptional at achieving their own goals while
simultaneously supporting the goals of others. In the end, it may be necessary to develop
separate theories for leadership (a gentler style of command than coercion) in humans and
social dominance in animals. I have made the case elsewhere, however, that it is not
necessary or even desirable (Hawley, 1999). In fact, many of the phenomena highlighted by
the leadership literature have been documented in rudimentary form in animals (e.g., group
coordination, initiating group action, maintaining cohesion, competence recognition,
conflict management). Moreover, the dominance literature has never found subordinance to
be a riddle as the leadership work has followership (cf., van Vugt et al., 2008).
Accordingly, the present view does not hold dominance to be the antithesis of leadership
(van Vugt et al., 2008; p 188) because it does not equate dominance with coercive
domination, nor does it see coercion as an opposite to prosociality; instead, RCT holds
them to be two sides of the same coin (Hawley, 2002, p. 175). These bodies of work will
most certainly find more points in common than in conflict.
Conclusions
Many authors have long recognized a dualism inherent to human nature; a tension
between self and other which is insufficiently solved by attending solely to the self or
solely to others (e.g., pure psychological egoism or pure self-sacrifice). The present
evolutionary view sees this tension as a result of competitive processes inherent to natural
selection giving rise to both antagonistic and other-regarding behavioral strategies.
Developmental processes (e.g., attachment, social learning) are presumed to underlie
change over time, driving strategies to higher levels of sophistication and subtlety. By
being mindful of the important distinction between form and function and their
interrelationships, and being clear about the difference between psychological and
evolutionary egoism, we can bring central human social dynamics and hierarchical
structures into clearer focus.
Received 27 August 2012; Revision submitted 11 March 2013; Revision submitted 02

July 2013; Accepted 02 July 2013
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Evolutionary Psychology

www.epjournal.net 2014. 12(2): 318-342

Ontogeny and Social Dominance: A Developmental View of Human Power

Keywords: individual differences, personality, development, social dominance, power,

Evolution, Development, and Individual Differences

Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -319-

The above described evolutionary model (cf. Footnote 1) is inherently

Instinctive behavior is not inherited; what is inherited is a potential to develop

Mary Ainsworth elaborated the evolutionary foundations of attachment theory to include a

Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -320-

developmental scholars are uniquely prepared to weigh in on evolutionary processes and

Life History Theory (LHT)

Natural selection and the competitive ethos

Conflating evolutionary and psychological egoism

Consequences of conflating evolutionary and psychological egoism

Dominance: Whats in a Word?

Dominant: Exercising chief authority or rule; Occupying a commanding position.

Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -323-

Consequences to favoring agonism as a strategy of resource control

Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -324-

demonstrate some degree of sacrifice for the welfare of others.

Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -326-

Resource Control Theory

Resource control strategies

Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -327-

Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -328-

The development of social dominance and power

Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -331-

If there are winners, there must be losers

What these profiles reveal about conventional wisdoms

Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -332-

Working RCT into the Theoretical Landscape

Reversing the hierarchy

Leadership and prestige

Received 27 August 2012; Revision submitted 11 March 2013; Revision submitted 02

attention (pp. 153-176). London: Wiley.

zur Jugendkunde, 5, Jena: G. Fischer.

Mikulincer, M., and Shaver, P. R. (2007). Attachment in adulthood: Structure, dynamics

dominance relations among preschool children. Child Development, 47, 980-989.

Evolutionary Psychology ISSN 1474-7049 Volume 12(2). 2014. -342-

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