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How did American Naval Strategy Change between the Bombing of Pearl Harbor and

the Battle of Midway?

Part A: Plan of the Investigation

An assessment of the United States Navys strategy shift from a Mahanian strategy to

a more modern one during World War II, specifically between Pearl Harbor and Midway.

The time frame of Pearl Harbor to Midway is defined as December 7, 1941 to June 6,

1942. A Mahanian strategy is defined as one following the tenets propounded by Alfred T.

Mahan in his book The Influence of Sea Power upon World History, namely a battleship-

centric one. A modern strategy is defined as an aircraft carrier centric strategy. Academic

secondary sources will be consulted and analyzed in order to demonstrate how the Navys

strategy shifted during World War II, and why the shift occurred. Finally, the analysis of

these sources will reveal why the victory at Midway occurred.

Part B: Summary of Evidence:

The attack on Pearl Harbor led to the near complete destruction of the US Pacific

Fleet, with the exception of its aircraft carriers, the battleship Colorado, a handful of cruisers,

and most of the destroyer flotillas.1 Under the Mahanian strategy, this attack was nothing

short of disastrous.2 However, this attack failed to destroy significant portions of the

infrastructure of the US Pacific Fleet, leading to the commencement of a carrier offensive

against the Japanese.3 Consequently, a shift in strategy began; this strategy was first put to the

1
Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept :New York, NY: Penguin. p. 565
2
Miller, Edward War Plan Orange :Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. p.285
3
Morrison, Samuel Eliot. The Rising Sun in the Pacific: 1931-April 1942. Vol. 3 of
test at the Battle of the Coral Sea. 4 The Battle of the Coral Sea was an American strategic

victory, despite suffering heavier losses. However, the Mahanian plan of the Japanese had

failed. 5 Furthermore, the Japanese had lost their light carrier Shoho, a significant moral

victory on the part of the Americans.6 However, while the Shoho had been lost, so had the

Lexington, a significant portion of the US Pacific Fleet. 7 This left the Saratoga, Enterprise,

and Hornet as the only operational carriers in the Pacific.8 However, this put the Americans

in a dangerous position, as they had little ability to repel Japanese thrusts. 9 Without carriers,

the Allied forces were liable to get butchered, as was seen at the Battle of the Java Sea.10

Coral Sea had been strategically inconclusive at best, and the Japanese felt that they

had won by a large margin. 11 In fact, they claimed no fewer than six major warships, and a

mixed bag of others.12 American intelligence learned about this, and was able to formulate a

strategy to deceive the Japanese, leading them directly to Midway. 13 The Americans were

vastly outgunned, and consequently forced to rely on the strength of their carriers. 14

However, they had another advantage over the Japanese: the submarine Nautilus was on

station, and prepared to attack the Japanese when ready. 15 While Nautilus played a very

US Naval Operations in World War II. Edison, NJ: Castle, 1948.


4
Morison, Samuel Eliot. Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions. Vol. 4 of
History of US Naval Operations in World War II. New York, NY. Atlantic: p.16
5
Prange, Gordon Miracle at Midway : NY, MJF Books, 2002. p.42
6
Morrison 1949 p.20
7
Prange 1982, p.42
8
Morrison, 1949 p.52
9
Morrison 1948 p.393
10
Morrison 1948, p. 345
11
Prange, 1982 p. 42
12
Prange 1982 p. 42
13
Morrison 1964 p. 79
14
Morrison 1949 p.84
15
Prange 1982 p.145
minor role in the battle, it was able to confirm the kills of the Enterprises SBD Dauntless

dive bombers. These dive bombers played a far more significant role than any other weapon

the Americans employed at Midway. 16

However, the Japanese attempted to continue the use of Mahanian strategy

throughout the war. In fact, Coral Sea was a textbook Mahanian encounter.17 Midway was

intended to be another one, with the battleship Yamato and the cruiser Mikuma supposedly

smashing an outgunned American force. 18 However, the Americans were relying on their

carriers to prevent the secondary battle line from getting that close. 19 As previous experience

had shown with ABDACOM, the Japanese would butcher the Allied forces with superior

accuracy and the Mark 49 torpedo Long Lance 20

Consequently, the American plan revolved around air power, knowing that there is

little if any chance in a ship to ship confrontation21. Therefore, the Navy bulked up fighter,

dive bomber, and torpedo planes both on Midway and on the three carriers. 22 However,

the Americans were still extremely afraid of losing their aircraft carriers, as they had Langley

and Lexington. 23 Losing any of the three would represent a 33% loss in carrier strength in the

Pacific theater, making Japanese invasion of Hawaii almost inevitable. 24

However, as luck would have it, the motley crew of Americans managed to hold off

16
Prange 1982 p. 264
17
Morrison 1949 p.6
18
Prange 1982, p. 59
19
Morrison 1949 p. 98
20
Morrison 1948 p. 294
21
Toll, Ian W. Pacific Crucible. New York, NY: Norton, 2012. p.423
22
Morrison 1949 p. 94
23
Morrison 1948 p. 385
24
Prange 1982 p. 69
the Japanese, sinking Hiryu, Soryu, Akagi, and Kaga. These ships represented approximately

70 percent of the Combined Fleets modern carrier strength. 25 Finally, the American strategy

proved ultimately victorious when the Japanese invasion fleet destined for Midway was

forced to turn back under the threat of submarine and air attacks. 26 However, Toll states

Luck led to the bombing of three Japanese aircraft carriers, rather than two. 27

Section C: Evaluation of Sources

Miracle at Midway was written by Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and

Katherine V. Dillon. However, Gordon W. Prange had died two years prior to its publication.

Consequently, it was finished by two affiliated historians. It is a book intended for an

academic audience, though it was originally on the New York Times best seller list for a

number of weeks. This books purpose is to evaluate the events from the aftermath of Pearl

Harbor to the Battle of Midway. Furthermore, it is intended to serve as an analysis of the

battle and explain precisely why the miracle of Midway occurred. It is valuable because it

is an unbiased, relatively personal account. Prange uses either interviews or the personal

diaries of Mitsuo Fuchida, the air commander for the Akagi, Commander Minuro Genda, the

architect of the Pearl Harbor attack, and Rear Admiral Ukagi, Yamamotos chief of staff. He

makes good use of American sources as well, attempting to create a truly balanced narrative.

Also, Gordon Prange was Gen. McArthurs staff historian during World War II, giving him a

tremendous resource to pull from in order to write his books. However, there are some rather

25
Morrison 1949 p. 88
26
Toll p. 476
27
Toll p. 476
significant limitations. First and foremost, Gordon W. Prange had died two years prior to the

publication date. Therefore, this book does not completely reflect Pranges views, as the

manuscript was undoubtedly altered by the two who finished it. Secondly, this book was

written between 30 and 40 years after the Battle of Midway. Therefore, this book has a very

large subjective component, due to the fallibility of human memory. Important events are

either altered to make one side look better, or completely ignored.

Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions was written in 1949 by Samuel Eliot

Morison. This is a secondary source, and a book intended for an academic audience. It is

part of a collection entitled History of US Naval Operations in World War II. This is the

third volume in a set of 15. Its purpose is to discuss the actions taken by the United States

Navy and the Japanese Combined Fleet between 1931 and April 1942. Its value is twofold.

Samuel Eliot Morison was the official historian of the United States Navy during World War

II, giving him unparalleled access to sensitive documents and high-ranking officers.

Secondly, Samuel Eliot Morison was a naval officer during World War II, and served in the

Pacific theater. He experienced many of these events firsthand. However, the limitations are

several in number. First, there is an inherent bias throughout the book. Japanese sources are

infrequently considered. In some cases, Morrison ignores the Japanese accounts for the sake

of the Navys official reports. Secondly, the book ignores the ability of the Americans to read

the Combined Fleets codes, which was a huge factor in the American victory at Midway, as

well as the American positioning at the Battle of the Coral Sea.

Part D: Analysis
With the British attack on Taranto, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the successful

destruction of Force Z off of Singapore, it became more and more clear that the time of the

battleship was passing. No longer could navies expect to win battles based on the strength of

their battleships. After the disastrous attack on Pearl Harbor, the US Navy was left with one

operational battleship on the West Coast: the Colorado. Consequently, the Americans were

forced to turn to the aircraft carrier, which had been expected to serve in an auxiliary, rather

than primary role. The aircraft carriers capabilities had their first major test in the crucible of

Coral Sea.

During Coral Sea, the Americans proved that they would be able to hold their own

against the Japanese Combined Fleet. While the end result was a tactical draw, the new

strategy of torpedo bombers, dive bombers, and CAP (Combat Air Patrol) had proven to

reduce losses as well as divide Japanese air power during attacks. However, this new strategy

had been implemented at a heavy cost; the Lexington was sunk, and the Yorktown heavily

damaged. Moreover, it was far from perfect. The Americans would frequently spend nearly

an hour forming up. A number of aviators were forced to ditch for lack of fuel; the Navy

realized that refinements were needed.

At Midway, the Americans had learned from the lessons of Coral Sea, and were able

to produce a far more coordinated attack than they originally thought was possible. The

improvements made as a result of Coral Sea led to a combined attack, one that the Japanese

could not defend against without severely compromising their ability to defend their carriers.
While this had been attempted at Coral Sea, it had not met with much success, due to the

logistical difficulties of coordinating such an attack. Therefore, the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu

were in flames in a matter of minutes.

However, Prange and Morison disagree as to the cause of Kagas destruction.

Morison states that it was a combination of the submarine Nautilus and Lt. Richard Bests

bombing division. Prange states Kaga was only hit by bombs, and Hiryu was the ship

Nautilus attacked. Japanese accounts vindicate Prange, stating that Nautilus likely attacked

Hiryu. However, these two sources both indicate the importance of Bests decision to bomb

Kaga, due to Akagi and Hiryu being aflame. Both sources indicate that Best at least helped to

destroy Kaga, if not ensure it completely. This revelation lends credence to the idea that the

more modern strategy was responsible for the victory at Midway, rather than the Miracle of

Midway alluded to by historians such as Toll. However, to some extent, Toll is correct. The

location of the Combined Fleet was a function of luck; if Lt. Cmdr. Wade C. McCluskey had

continued along an alternate route, he would not have discovered the Combined Fleets

carriers, and the invasion of Midway would have been inevitable. Moreover, the SBD

Dauntless group from Hornet (Bombing 8) never found the Japanese aircraft carriers.

While the Americans were very successful at Midway, it was the death knell for the

Mahanian strategy that had shaped American naval strategy since the Spanish-American War.

The Americans had proven that the aircraft carrier would be the new battleship, and that

naval strategy now would revolve around it. The implementation of the coordinated attack

prevented the Japanese from being able to react appropriately. While some groups were
butchered, such as Waldrons Torpedo 8 (Hornet), the Japanese were forced to divide their

response between the TBD Devastators and the SBD Dauntless groups. The Dauntless groups

were able to break through and bomb the Japanese carriers through an inventive new tactic

called Hell Diving, a result of the modern strategy. Therefore, the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu

were in flames in a matter of minutes.

Section E: Conclusion

Though American naval strategy was originally a Mahanian one at the outset of

World War II, the destruction of the fleet at Pearl Harbor forced it to change. This was for the

best, as the Mahanian strategy proved unfeasible against air power. This led to the Americans

adapting a more modern strategy, centering around the aircraft carrier and airplane, rather

than the battleship and battle line. Therefore, the Americans were far better equipped to fight

a modern war, seeing as how the modern strategy was far more flexible than the Mahanian

one. While the flaws exposed during Coral Sea took time to correct, Midway revealed that

the Americans had mastered it.

Section F: List of Sources

Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions. Vol. 4 of History of US
Naval Operations in World War II. New York, NY: Atlantic, n.d.

. The Rising Sun in the Pacific: 1931-April 1942. Vol. 3 of US Naval Operations in
World War II. Edison, NJ: Castle, 1948.
Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept. New York, NY: Penguin, 1980.

. Miracle at Midway. Compiled by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon.


New York, NY: MJF Books, 1982.

Toll, Ian W. Pacific Crucible. New York, NY: Norton, 2012.

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