SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-30671. November 28, 1973.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL-SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY,
and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J.
KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, and INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, respondents.
Solicitor General Felix V . Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioner.
Andres T . Velarde & Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by
respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a decision final and
executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently
issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion.
As thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application
indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent
Judge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution must be nullified.
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary of facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3,
1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino
Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in
the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P.
Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal
Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969,
the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, . . . 10. On the strength of the afore-mentioned
Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of
garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution'; the Philippine Veterans Bank
received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 . . . 11. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on
deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches
are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military
and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification
dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Comptroller, . . ." 2 The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12.
Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null
and void." 3 In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set
forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40. 4
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding.
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as
its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends." 5 Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision,
Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 6 with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to
the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the
loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well
known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to
defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well
be imagined." 7
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein
expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." 8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense
from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, 9 such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule
that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action `only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued
in favor of an employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm
as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the
hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in
the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts
except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly
what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of
the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public
policy forbids it." 12
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate
grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969
declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary
injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
Zaldivar, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ ., concur.
Barredo, J ., did not take part.
||| (Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-30671, [November 28, 1973], 153 PHIL 356-362)
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993.]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET
AL., respondents.
Roy Lago Salcedo for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; CONSTRUED. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution
that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of
the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based
on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is
derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate
claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. We have had occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may
be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to
be accordingly restricted.
2. ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION ON NON-SUABILITY OF THE STATE. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say
that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys,
"the state may not be sued without its consent"; its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States'
consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. In
this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is
conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a
contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to
have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPLIED CONSENT THROUGH CONTRACTS; QUALIFICATION. Not all contracts entered into by the
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. (United States
of America vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the contract on security services; nor that it could
have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e., for
underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Security Services,
clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . ."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MONEY CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE; PROVISIONS OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 327 REQUIRING FILING
OF CLAIMS WITH THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE LABOR CODE. Pursuant, however, to
Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1445, the money claim should first be
brought to the Commission on Audit. (Carabao, Inc. vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission) We fail to see any substantial
conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against
the State. The Labor Code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution,
enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No.
327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
6. ID.; ID.; CONSENT NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH LIABILITY; REQUISITE FOR LIABILITY TO ATTACH. When the State gives its
consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the
State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has
a liability. In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus The universal rule
that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
For consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of non-suability of the state. llcd
In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, denying the petition for injunction,
prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro
City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2 of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing
on petitioner's property.
The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract 3 on 01 April 1989 for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of
the guards, the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another contract, dated 01 May 1990, between the
same parties. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the
petitioner.
On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for
damages, 4 before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-90
(or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket number), against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency. LLjur
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May 1991, finding herein petitioner jointly and severally liable with
sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards.
The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final
and executory. cdrep
On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, 5 commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the
judgment against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution
the motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e., one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit
Toyota Crown. 6 These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner,
pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction, was filed by the
petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued
was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no
legal effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize
petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.

On 27 November 1991, the NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution; viz:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are issued:
1. The enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner in NLRC RABX Cases Nos. 10-10-
00455-90; 10-10-0481-90 and 10-10-00519-90 are temporarily suspended for a period of two (2)
months, more or less, but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991 to enable
petitioner to source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it;
2. Meantime, petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within the period above-stated and
to deposit the sums of money equivalent to the aggregate amount it has been adjudged to pay jointly
and severally with respondent Sultan Security Agency with the Regional Arbitration Branch X, Cagayan
de Oro City within the same period for proper disposition;
3. In order to ensure compliance with this order, petitioner is likewise directed to put up and post
sufficient surety and supersedeas bond equivalent to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total
 monetary award issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court or by
the Regional Trial court of Misamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the money claims in case
of failure or default on the part of petitioner to satisfy the money claims;
4. The City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of petitioner levied on execution
within ten (10) days from notice of the posting of sufficient surety or supersedeas bond as specified
above. In the meanwhile, petitioner is assessed to pay the costs and/or expenses incurred by the City
Sheriff, if any, in connection with the execution of the judgments in the above-stated cases upon
presentation of the appropriate claims or vouchers and receipts by the city Sheriff, subject to the
conditions specified in the NLRC Sheriff, subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Manual of
Instructions for Sheriffs;
5. The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement against each other for any
payments made in connection with the satisfaction of the judgments herein is hereby recognized
pursuant to the ruling in the Eagle Security case, (supra). In case of dispute between the judgment
debtors, the Executive Labor Arbiter of the Branch of origin may upon proper petition by any of the
parties conduct arbitration proceedings for the purpose and thereby render his decision after due
notice and hearings;
6. Finally, the petition for injunction is Dismissed for lack of basis. The writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued in Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof, aTemporary Stay of Execution is issued for a
period of two (2) months but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991, conditioned
upon the posting of a surety or supersedeas bond by petitioner with in ten (10) days from notice
pursuant to paragraph 3 of this disposition. The motion to admit the complaint in intervention
is Denied for lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed by Duty Sheriff in Noted. LLpr
SO ORDERED."
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it
claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC
has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent," 7 reflects nothing
less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. 8 It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by
Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. 9 True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it
grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. 10 We have
had occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be
deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be
far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. 11
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On
the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear
import then is that the State may at times be sued. 12 The States' consent may be given either expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law 13 or a special law. 14 In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the
immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be
sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil
action between private parties." 15 Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences
litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim 16 or when it enters into a contract. 17 In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts
entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which
is executed in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 18
In United States of America vs. Ruiz, 19 where the questioned transaction dealt with the improvements on the wharves in
the naval installation at Subic Bay, we held:
 "The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence
and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts ( jure imperii) and private, commercial
and proprietary acts ( jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes."
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e., for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and
similar other items, arising from the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083,
aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, . . ." Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree
("P.D.") No. 1445, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Thus, in Carabao, Inc., vs.
Agricultural Productivity Commission, 20 we ruled:
"(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act
327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit,
subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that 'no execution shall issue upon any
judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions
provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly
observed.' "
We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with
respect to money claims against the State. The Labor Code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State
liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and
procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.

When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it.
Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it
can, that the State has a liability. 21 In Republic vs. Villasor 22 this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has
explained, thus
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general
or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the
stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. 23
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are
hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the
decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ ., concur. |
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 70853. March 12, 1987.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, vs. PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents-appellants.
DECISION
YAP, J p:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of
respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of
the State. LLpr
The background of the present controversy may be briefly summarized as follows:
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion,
Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by
virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola
had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced
by an informacion posesoria; that upon plaintiff's purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same,
introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the
Director of Lands on October 24, 1954; that on November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.
90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which
the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started subdividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that
the property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private
property of plaintiff and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true
owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion
posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal, valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and
nullify all awards to the settlers. LLphil
The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, filed an answer, raising by way of affirmative defenses lack of sufficient
cause of action and prescription.
On August 29, 1970. the trial court, through Judge Rafael S. Sison, rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1, with an area of
701.9064 hectares, to be the private property of the plaintiff, "being covered by a possessory information title in the name
of his predecessor-in-interest" and declaring said lot excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation. The court declared
the rest of the property claimed by plaintiff, i.e. Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.
A motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of August 29, 1970 was filed by eighty-six (86) settlers, together with
the barrio council of Pag-asay, alleging among other things that intervenors had been in possession of the land in question
for more than twenty (20) years under claim of ownership.
On January 25, 1971, the court a quo reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and directed the intervenors to file their
corresponding pleadings and present their evidence; all evidence already presented were to remain but plaintiff, as well as
the Republic of the Philippines, could present additional evidence if they so desire. The plaintiff presented additional
evidence on July 30, 1971, and the case was set for hearing for the reception of intervenors' evidence on August 30 and
August 31, 1971.
On August 30, 1971, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for intervenors, the latter did not appear but
submitted a motion for postponement and resetting of the hearing on the next day, August 31, 1971. The trial court denied
the motion for postponement and allowed plaintiff to offer his evidence "en ausencia," after which the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. On the following day, August 31, 1971, Judge Sison rendered a decision reiterating his
decision of August 29, 1970. prcd
A motion for reconsideration was immediately filed by the intervenors. But before this motion was acted upon, plaintiff
filed a motion for execution, dated November 18, 1971. On December 10, 1971, the lower court, this time through Judge
Miguel Navarro, issued an order denying the motion for execution and setting aside the order denying intervenors' motion
for postponement. The case was reopened to allow intervenors to present their evidence. Unable to secure a
reconsideration of Judge Navarro's order, the plaintiff went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on a petition for certiorari.
Said petition was, however, denied by the Intermediate Appellate Court, and petitioners brought the matter to this Court in
G.R. No. 36163, which was denied on May 3, 1973 Consequently, the case was remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings.
On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines
cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by the plaintiff.
On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued the questioned order dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction. Respondent moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines filed its opposition thereto, maintaining that the dismissal was proper on the ground of non-suability of the
State and also on the ground that the existence and or authenticity of the purported possessory information title of the
respondents' predecessor-in-interest had not been demonstrated and that at any rate, the same is not evidence of title, or
if it is, its efficacy has been lost by prescription and laches. LexLib
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for
certiorari. On April 30, 1985, the respondent appellate court rendered its decision reversing the order of Judge Lising and
remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. Hence this petition.
We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff
has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A
suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. 1 It is an action directed against a
specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the
private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. 2 There is no such showing in the instant
case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, 3 and on this basis alone,
the complaint should have been dismissed.
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a quo, as
alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at
any stage of the proceedings." 4
Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the Proclamation itself, when it established
the reservation "subject to private rights, if any there be." We do not agree. No such consent can be drawn from the
language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No.
90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of
sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. 5 Moreover, the Proclamation is not a
legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can
only be made by an act of the legislative body. prcd
Neither is there merit in respondent's submission. which the respondent appellate court sustained, on the basis of our
decision in the Begosa case, 6 that the present action is not a suit against the State within the rule of State immunity from
suit, because plaintiff does not seek to divest the Government of any of its lands or its funds. It is contended that the
complaint involves land not owned by the State, but private land belonging to the plaintiff, hence the Government is not
being divested of any of its properties. There is some sophistry involved in this argument, since the character of the land
sought to be recovered still remains to be established, and the plaintiff's action is directed against the State precisely to
compel the latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the property. In other words, the plaintiff is out to establish
that he is the owner of the land in question based, incidentally, on an informacion posesoria of dubious value, and he seeks
to establish his claim of ownership by suing the Republic of the Philippines in an action in personam.

The inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria under the Spanish Mortgage Law was a means provided
by the law then in force in the Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States of America, to
record a claimant's actual possession of a piece of land, established through an ex parteproceeding conducted in
accordance with prescribed rules. 7 Such inscription merely furnishes, at best, prima facie evidence of the fact that at the
time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under a claim of right as set forth in his
application. 8 The possessory information could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of 20 years (later reduced
to 10 years), upon the fulfillment of the requisites prescribed in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. 9
There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion posesoria held by the respondent had been converted into a
record of ownership. Such possessory information, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession.
Using this possessory information, the respondent could have applied for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the
Public Land Act, which is an action in rem. However, having failed to do so, it is rather late for him to pursue this avenue at
this time. Respondent must also contend, as the records disclose, with the fact admitted by him and stated in the decision
of the Court a quo that settlers have been occupying and cultivating the land in question since even before the outbreak of
the war, which puts in grave doubt his own claim of possession. cdll
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of
the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was
"reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. PabloFeliciano," without the
submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be
validly made only in case of loss of the original. 10 These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and
validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is
the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," 11 whereas the land claimed by
respondentFeliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701.9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in
accepting "possessory information" documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged
ownership of lands.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, dated April 30, 1985, and affirming the order of the court a quo, dated August 21, 1980, dismissing the complaint
filed by respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines. No costs. cdphil
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., on leave.
||| (Republic v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 70853, [March 12, 1987], 232 PHIL 391-399)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27299. June 27, 1973.]
QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, respondent-appellant.
Quirico del Mar in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Felix V . Makasiar, First Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Eulogio Raquel Santos for
respondent-appellant.
DECISION
CASTRO, J p:
On June 20, 1964, Quirico del Mar (hereinafter referred to as del Mar) filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
petition for mandamus (civil case R-8465) against the Philippine Veterans Administration (hereinafter referred to as the
PVA), to compel the latter to continue paying him his monthly life pension of P50 from the date of its cancellation in March
1950 to June 20, 1957, and thereafter, or from June 22, 1957, his monthly life pension, as increased by Republic Act
1920, 1 of P100, and to pay to him as well the monthly living allowance of P10 for each of his unmarried minor children
below eighteen years of age, 2 pursuant to the said Republic Act 1920 which took effect on June 22, 1957. Del Mar also
asked for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages.
In his petition below, del Mar averred that he served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area
Command (a duly recognized guerrilla organization) with the rank of major; that he subsequently obtained an honorable
discharge from the service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability; that upon proper
claim presented and after hearing and adjudication, the Philippine Veterans Board (the PVA's predecessor) granted him a
monthly life pension of P50 effective January 28, 1947; that in March 1950, the said Board discontinued payment of his
monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government, through the
United States Veterans Administration, by reason of military service rendered in the United States Army in the Far East
during World War II, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Philippine Government; that
he wrote the said Board twice, demanding that it continue paying his monthly life pension, impugning the cancellation
thereof as illegal; and that his demands went unheeded.
The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government effectively
barred him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted him as well as the
monthly allowances he claimed for his five living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age. The PVA also
asserted that it is discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the pension sought by del Mar. In addition, it alleged that
the action of del Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention, and that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar's demand partakes of a money
claim against the PVA a mere agency of the Philippine Government and, in effect, of a suit against the Government
which is not suable without its consent. The PVA thus prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment upholding del Mar's claims. In its decision dated February 27, 1965, the
court (1) ordered the PVA to pay to del Mar his monthly life pension corresponding to the period from April 1950 to May
1957 at the rate of P50 a month, adding up to P4,334.86, and his monthly life pension corresponding to the period from
June 22, 1957 to February 1965 at the rate of P100 a month totalling P9,200, and thereafter to continue to pay his monthly
life pension at the rate of P100 a month; (2) directed del Mar to file with the PVA the corresponding written application for
the payment to him of the monthly living allowance of P10 for each of his five living unmarried minor children from June 22,
1957; and ordered the PVA to give due course to the written application as soon as del Mar shall have filed the same with
it, and once approved, to make the necessary payment of the accumulated unpaid living allowances due to each of the said
children from June 22, 1957 as well as the current ones until each one of them ceases to be entitled to the same; and (3)
directed the PVA, in the event of unavailability of funds to pay the claims aforementioned, to set aside funds from such as
are intended to pay the veterans' living pensions, or to cause the same to be appropriated in its budget in order to comply
with the judgment. For lack of basis, the court a quo omitted to pass judgment on del Mar's claim for moral and exemplary
damages.
Hence, the present appeal by the PVA.
The PVA alleges that the court a quo erred (1) in not holding itself without jurisdiction to try civil case R-8465; (2) in not
finding as premature the petition for mandamus filed by del Mar due to the failure of the latter to exhaust available
administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention; (3) in declaring null and void section 6 of PVA Regulation No. 2
relied upon by it in discontinuing the monthly life pension of del Mar since March 1950; (4) in not finding it discretionary on
the part of the PVA to grant or discontinue the said pension; (5) in ordering it to pay to del Mar the amounts stated in the
judgment; and (6) in ordering it to give due course to and approve the application which the said court directed del Mar to
file for the payment to the latter of the monthly living allowance for each of his living unmarried minor children below
eighteen years of age.
This appeal raises several questions which will be discussed in seriatim.
1. The PVA argues that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try civil case R-8465 because it involves a money claim
against the said PVA a mere agency of the Government performing governmental functions with no juridical personality
of its own and, in reality, partakes of an action against the Philippine Government which is immune from suit without its
consent, citing this Court's observation in Republic of the Philippines vs. Ramolete and Del Mar, 3 to wit:
". . . a charge against the Government where the money involved is part of the public funds, is a suit
against the Government, and the happenstance that the action is directed against the PVA as an entity
and not against the Republic of the Philippines is of no moment. Perforce, the Republic of the
Philippines, on matters of administration of all benefits due to the veterans of revolutions and wars,
and to their heirs and beneficiaries, acts and has to act through its agency and instrumentality, the PVA.
The suit should therefore be regarded as one against the Republic of the Philippines; the PVA is
therefore exempt from the filing of an appeal bond."
The PVA labors under a muddled and mistaken appreciation of the aforecited observation. This Court stated in precise
language the sole issue for resolution in that case, thus:
"Is the PVA exempt from the filing of an appeal bond? To resolve this issue, we must initially determine
whether the PVA is an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines, and, in the
affirmative, whether it exercises governmental functions."
Indeed, the decisive point in the aforementioned case related to the status of the PVA as an agency or instrumentality
of the Republic of the Philippines exercising governmental functions as to be entitled to exemption from the filing of
the appeal bond per section 16 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, not to the nature of the claim sought to be enforced
by the private respondent therein (del Mar) against the said PVA. Thus, in the said case, this Court made a lengthy
disquisition on the history, development and organization of the PVA to show conclusively that the same is an entity or
agency of the Republic of the Philippines performing governmental functions. True, this Court referred to the claim of
the private respondent therein as "a claim for a sum of money against the Government, which claim, if adjudged finally
to be meritorious, would render the Republic of the Philippines liable therefor," since the funds from which the claim
was to be satisfied were funds appropriated by Congress for the PVA; but this Court properly and advisedly omitted any
study and consideration of the question of suability or non-suability of the Government in connection therewith.
As a general proposition, the rule well-settled in this jurisdiction on the immunity of the Government from suit
without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property." 4 Needless to state, in such actions, which, in effect, constitute suits against
the Government, the court has no option but to dismiss them Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception It finds no
application where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release
the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. 5 As clearly
discernible from the circumstances, the case at bar falls under the exception.
2. The second question posed by the PVA relates to del Mar's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to court action. Suffice it to state that where a case as in the present controversy involves a question solely
of a legal nature, there arises no need for the litigant to resort to all administrative remedies available to him before
seeking judicial relief. 6
3. The validity of section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of the "Rules and Regulations on Veterans' Benefits" adopted by the PVA
constitutes the core of the present controversy. The said section 6 reads as follows:
"SEC. 6. Effect of receipt of USVA pension benefit termination, reduction. An award of a similar
disability compensation from the US Veterans Administration shall be a ground for the cancellation of a
disability pension granted under this Regulation: Provided, however, That if and while the disability
compensation awarded by the US Veterans Administration is less than the pension granted hereunder,
the difference in amount shall be assumed and paid by the PVA: Provided, further, That upon proper
application, the disability award previously cancelled may be restored upon the termination of the US
Veterans Administration award if the cause of such termination is due to negative military service
report of the pensioner certified by the US Department of the Army and not for any other valid
cause: Provided, finally,That the veteran is medically determined to be still suffering from the disability
for which he was previously awarded a pension. Payment of pension thus restored shall take effect or
shall commence only from the date of approval of restoration and when funds become available."

Pursuant to the foregoing, the PVA cancelled and discontinued the monthly life pension of del Mar, reasoning that the
latter's receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government precluded his enjoying any like benefit from the
Philippine Government. The PVA avers that it adopted the aforequoted section 6 in order to carry out and implement
section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, 7 particularly its excepting clause. Said section 9 reads:
"SEC. 9. The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently incapacitated
from work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of
one hundred pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of his unmarried minor children below
eighteen years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government
funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." 8
The PVA reads the phrase "from other Government funds" in the excepting clause of the aforecited provision as
necessarily including funds of the United States Government. And without question, the pension del Mar receives from
the United States Veterans Administration comes from the funds of the United States Government.
On the other hand, del Mar avers that section 6 of Regulation No. 2 illegally effects the suspension of the operation of
section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, and argues that under section 20 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, the power to
suspend the payment of the monthly life pension awarded to a disabled veteran belongs exclusively to the President of the
Philippines, not to the PVA which, in the case at bar, illegally arrogated unto itself the said power. Furthermore, del Mar
states, the PVA "deliberately misinterprets" the phrase "from other Government funds" in extending its scope to include
United States Government funds.
The principle recognizing the necessity of vesting administrative authorities with the power to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the
terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its general policies, constitutes a well-
established doctrine in this jurisdiction. 10 In Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration, suprea,this Court fittingly stated:
". . . the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides, to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can,
contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative,
Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with
the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure
from, its provisions. No deviation is allowable."
Section 11 of Republic Ace 2665 11 empowers the PVA to adopt rules and regulations, thus:
"SEC. 11. Policies, rules and regulations. Subject to existing laws, the Administration shall have the
power to promulgate and issue rules and regulations as may be found necessary to govern its
operations and to carry out the aims and purposes of this Act and of all other laws to be administered
by the Administration."
Pursuant to this rule making authority, the PVA allegedly to implement section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended
promulgated its "Rules and Regulations on Veterans' Benefits," section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of which cancels the
disability pension granted if the beneficiary receives a similar compensation from the United States Veterans
Administration. In effect, the PVA, by adopting section 6 of Regulation No. 2, suspended the operation of section 9
of Republic Act 65, as amended. This, Republic Act 65, as amended, forbids the PVA to do for it expressly authorizes
only the President of the Philippines to suspend the operation of any of its provisions "if and when the Congress of the
United States approves the pending GI Bill of Rights applicable to the Philippines the provisions of which are identical
or similar to the provisions of this Act." Clearly then, section 6 of Regulation No. 2 not only negates the very spirit
behind section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, but also contravenes the express mandate of section 20 thereof.
The PVA's pretense that del Mar's case falls under the clause of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, which excepts
those who "are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds" from the coverage of said section 9
predicated upon its interpretation that the phrase "other Government funds" includes funds of the United States
Government fails to persuade this Court as a valid argument to justify its cancellation of del Mar's monthly life pension.
Section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, in providing for the excepting clause, obviously intends to prevent the receipt by
the same beneficiary of concurrent or multiple pensions or benefits similar to each other in nature and basis, although
coursed through different departments or agencies, but paid out of the funds of the same Government. Any contrary
interpretation resulting in the derogation of the interests of the beneficiary who likewise receives a similar pension paid out
of funds of other Governments, conflicts with the established axiom ordaining the construction of pension laws of war
veterans in favor of those seeking their benefits.
The record of the case at oar being completely bereft of any indication to show the suspension by the President of the
Philippines pursuant to section 20 of Republic Act 65, as amended of the operation of any of the provisions of the said
statute, this Court perforce must uphold del Mar's claims.
4. The rest of the assigned errors relate to the alleged undue interference by the court a quo with the purely discretionary
functions of the PVA in the matter of granting or discontinuing the pension benefits.
The law concedes to administrative bodies like the PVA the authority to act on and decide claims and applications in
accordance with their judgment, in the exercise of their adjudicatory capacity. Because of their acquired expertise in
specific matters within the purview of their respective jurisdictions, the findings of these administrative bodies merit not
only great weight but also respect and finality. "There is a limit, however, to such a deference paid to the actuations of such
bodies. Clearly, where there has been a failure to interpret and apply the statutory provisions in question, judicial power
should assert itself. Under the theory of separation of powers, it is to the judiciary, and to the judiciary alone, that the final
say on questions of law in appropriate cases coming before it is vested." 12
All told, no roadblock stands in the way of del Mar's demand for the continuance of his monthly life pension.
In view, however, of the further amendment by Congress of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, through Republic Act
5753 the provisions of which took effect on June 21, 1969 there arises the need to modify the judgment a quo in
order to make it conform to the said statute as it now stands. Republic Act 5753, in further amending section 9 of Republic
Act 65, as amended, grants every totally disabled veteran of World War II "a life pension of two hundred pesos a month,
and thirty pesos a month for his wife and each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age."
ACCORDINGLY, this Court adjudges the appellee Quirico del Mar entitled to his life pension (1) at the rate of P50 a month
effective as of April 1950 to May 1957, per Republic Act 65; (2) at the rate of P100 a month effective as of June 22, 1957 to
May 1969, per Republic Act 65 as amended by Republic Act 1920; and (3) at the rate of P200 a month effective as of June
21, 1969, per Republic Act 65 as further amended by Republic Act 5753. This Court directs the appellant Philippine Veterans
Administration to compute and then to pay to the appellee del Mar his past and accumulated monthly life pension at the
aforementioned statutory rates.
Regarding the monthly living allowance the appellee del Mar asks for each of his five "living unmarried minor children
below eighteen years of age," it appearing that he has not filed any proper application therefor with the appellant PVA but
simply included them in his claim for the restoration of his discontinued monthly life pension, the appellee del Mar, may, if
he so desires, comply with section 15 of Republic Act 65, as amended, which requires that "[A]ny person who desires to
take advantage of the rights and privileges provided for in this Act should file his application" with the Philippine Veterans
Administration, and the latter is hereby ordered to consider and pass upon the merits of such application, if filed, with
particular reference to the entitlement qualifications of the intended beneficiaries. No pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Antonio and Makasiar, JJ., did not take part.

||| (Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Administration, G.R. No. L-27299, [June 27, 1973], 151-A PHIL 792-805)
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-32667. January 31, 1978.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, GABRIEL V. MANANSALA
and GILBERT P. LORENZO, in his official capacity as authorized Deputy Sheriff, respondents.
Conrado E. Medina for petitioner.
Gabriel V. Manansala in his own behalf.
Jose K. Manguiat, Jr. for respondent Court.
SYNOPSIS
Pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the now defunct Court of Industrial Relations in favor of private respondent and
against the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, respondent clerk of court, in his capacity as special deputy sheriff,
served a notice to garnish the funds of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation which were deposited with
petitioner bank. Petitioner moved to quash the notice of garnishment but respondent Court denied the motion. Claiming
that respondent Court's denial amounted to grave abuse of discretion because the appointment of the clerk of court as
authorized deputy sheriff was contrary to law and the funds subject of the garnishment "could be public in character",
petitioner instituted instant certiorari proceeding.
The Supreme Court held that respondent clerk of court is the legally authorized deputy sheriff to serve the Court of
Industrial Relations' writ of execution as provided for in Republic Act No. 4201 which amended the Court of Industrial
Relations Act; and that funds of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation may be the object of garnishment because
although the said corporation is a government-owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality separate and distinct
from the government which subjects it to the rules of law governing private corporations.
SYLLABUS
1. GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS; GARNISHMENT; PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION FUNDS NOT
EXCEMPT THEREFROM. The premise that the funds of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation could be spoken
of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the said corporation is a government-owned entity. However, it
does not follow that they are exempt from garnishment because the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, as a
government-owned and controlled corporation, has a personality distinct and separate from that of the government.
Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes like any other corporation.
2. ID.; INDEMNITY FROM SUIT, GOVERNMENT-OWNED CORPORATIONS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT. By engaging in a
particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign
character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.
3. GOVERNMENT; IMMUNITY FROM SUITS; WAIVER THEREOF DOES NOT SUBJECT ITS PROPERTIES AND FUNDS TO
EXECUTION OR GARNISHMENT. Waiver by the State of its right of immunity from suits does not automatically subject its
properties and funds to execution or garnishment because such would amount to a disbursement without any proper
appropriation as required by law.
4. CERTIORARI; JUDGMENTS; AUTHORITY OF INDUSTRIAL COURT'S CLERK OF COURT AS SPECIAL DEPUTY SHERIFF TO ISSUE
NOTICE OF GARNISHMENT. The Industrial Court's order sustaining the authority of its Clerk of Court as special deputy
sheriff to serve notice of garnishment cannot be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion. Under Republic Act 4201, the
Clerk of Court of the now defunct Court of Industrial Relations was the ex-oficio sheriff. It is true that there is no
authorization in law for the appointment of special sheriffs for the service of writs of execution. But even if there is a
sufficient justification for the infirmity attributed to the order of the court, it would be inequitable to issue a new execution
by the proper official considering the lapse of time during which the judgment creditor had been unable to execute the
judgment in his favor. What is important is that the judgment be executed. It would be carry technicality to an absurd
length if just because of such a mistake, assuming that it is, but undoubtedly committed in good faith, further delay would
still be imposed on the judgment creditor by characterized the order sought to be nullified as amounting to a grave abuse
of discretion.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
The issue raised in this certiorari proceeding is whether or not an order of the now defunct respondent Court of Industrial
Relations denying for lack of merit petitioner's motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as a grave abuse
of discretion. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final and
executory. 1 A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. 2 He was
the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association, in the aforementioned case.
The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two, grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo
as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the
garnishment "may be public in character." 3 In thus denying the motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on
the part of respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. After a
careful consideration of the matter, it is the conclusion of this Tribunal that while the authorization of respondent Lorenzo
to act as special deputy sheriff to serve the notice of garnishment may be open to objection, the more basic ground that
could have been relied upon not even categorically raised, petitioner limiting itself to the assertion that the funds "could
be public" in character, thus giving rise to the applicability of fundamental concept of non-suability is hardly persuasive.
The People's Homesite and Housing Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it sue and be sued. 4 Whatever defect
could be attributed therefore to the order denying the motion to quash could not be characterized as a grave abuse of
discretion. Moreover, with the lapse of time during which private respondent had been unable to execute a judgment in his
favor, the equities are on his side. Accordingly, this petition must be dismissed.
The order of August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, reads
as follows: "The Philippine National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City
by the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. It contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of
the court contravenes Section 11 Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads: 'All writs and processes issued by
the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this
Court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is
the Sheriff of Quezon City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the
notice of garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court
finds no merit in this argument.Republic Act No. 4201 has, since June 19, 1965, already repealed Commonwealth Act No.
103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio
Sheriff, the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area
encompassing the whole of the country, including Quezon City, since his area of authority is coterminous with that of the
Court itself, which is national in nature. . .. At this stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme
Court by individual employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has
already been dismissed and that the same became final and executory on August 9, 1970. There is no longer any reason,
therefore, for withholding action in this case. [Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is
denied for lack of merit. The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of
Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970." 5 There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, but in a resolution dated
September 22, 1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition. prLL
As noted at the outset, the petition lacks merit.
1. The plea for setting aside the notice of garnishment was premised on the funds of the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited with petitioner being "public in character." There was not even a categorical assertion to that effect.
It is only the possibility of its being "public in character." The tone was thus irresolute, the approach diffident. The premise
that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment.
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations 6 is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the
opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are
public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable
for, as a government owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate
from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 ofExecutive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 . . . ,
pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established - 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law . . . . '
Accordingly, it may sue and be sue and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act
No. 1459, as amended." 7 The similarities between the aforesaid case and the present litigation are patent. Petitioner was
similarly a government-owned corporation. The principal respondent was the Court of Industrial Relations. The prevailing
parties were the employee of petitioner. There was likewise a writ of execution and thereafter notices of garnishment
served on several banks. There was an objection to such a move and the ruling was adverse to the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation. Hence the filing of a petition for certiorari. To repeat, the ruling was quite categorical. Garnishment was
the appropriate remedy for the prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned
or controlled by the government. In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, 8 this
Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States v.
Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation,
the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of
law governing private corporations." 9
2. It is worth noting that the decision referred to, the Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 10 was promulgated by
the American Supreme Court as early as 1824, the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As pointed out
by him: "It is, we think, a sound principle when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so
far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of
communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates
itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted. Thus, many
states of this Union who have an interest in banks, are not suable even in their own courts; yet they never exempt the
corporation from being sued. The state of Georgia, by giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips
itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives all the privileges of that
character. As a member of a corporation, a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and
exercises no other power in the management the affairs of the corporation, that are expressly given by the incorporating
act." 11 The National Shipyard and Steel Corporation case, therefore, merely reaffirmed one of the oldest and soundest
doctrines in this branch of the law.
3. The invocation of Republic v. Palacio, 12 as well as Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, 13 did not help the
cause of petitioner at all. The decisions are not applicable is properly understood they can easily be distinguished. As is clear
in the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic v. Palacio, the Irrigation Service Unit which was sued was an office and
agency under the Department of Public Works al Communications. The Republic of the Philippines, through the then
Solicitor General, moved for the dismissal of such complaint, alleging that it "has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued." 14 Such a motion to dismiss was denied. The case was tried and plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz, included as private
respondent in the Supreme Court proceeding, obtained a favorable money judgment. It became final and executory.
Thereafter, it appeared that the Solicitor General was served with a copy of the writ of execution issued by the lower court
followed by an order of garnishment. 15 Again, there was an urgent motion lift such order, but it was denied. A certiorari
and prohibition proceeding was then filed with the Court of Appeals. The legality of the issuance of such execution and
garnishment was upheld, and the matter was elevated to this Tribunal. The Republic was sustained. The infirmity of the
decision reached by the Court of Appeals, according to the opinion, could be traced to the belief that there was a waiver of
"government immunity and, by implication, consent to the suit." 16There was no such waiver. Even if there were, it was
stressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes: "It is apparent that this decision of the Court of Appeals suffers from the erroneous
assumption that because the State has waived its immunity, its property and funds become liable to seizure under the legal
process. This emphatically is not the law. (Merritt v. Insular Government, 34 Phil. 311)." 17 To levy the execution of such
funds, according to him, would thus "amount to a disbursement without any proper appropriation as required by
law." 18 In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, the opening paragraph of Justice Teehankee was quite specific as
to why there could be neither execution nor garnishment of the money of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways: "In this
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, the Court declares null and void the two questioned orders of respondent
Court levying upon funds of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, by virtue of
the fundamental precept that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment." 19 The funds appertained to
a governmental office, not to a government owned or controlled corporation with a separate juridical personality. In
neither case therefore was there an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued, the funds of which could thereafter be held
liable to execution and garnishment in the event of an adverse judgment.
4. Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the doctrine that one of
the corollaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment, refer
to Merritt v. Insular Government, decision. 20 Since then such a principle has been followed with undeviating rigidity, the
latest case in point being Republic v. Villasor, 21 promulgated in 1973. It is an entirely different matter if, according to
Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, 22 the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct
corporate existence." 23 Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished. That is what
happened in this case.
5. With the crucial issue thus resolved in favor of the correctness of the order assailed, the other objection raised, namely
that respondent Court acted erroneously in having a special sheriff serve to the writ of execution, hardly needs any
extensive discussion. It is true that in the aforesaid Commissions of Public Highways opinion, this Court held that there is no
authorization in law for the appointment of special sheriffs for the service of writs of execution. 24 In the order sought to
be nullified, the then Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of respondent Court pointed out that under a later Act, 25 the Court of
Industrial Relations Act was amended with the proviso that its Clerk of Court was the ex-oficio sheriff. The point raised in
the petition that it should be the sheriff of Quezon City that ought to have served the writ of execution would thus clearly
appear to be inconclusive. There is to be sure no thought of deviating from the principle announced in the Commissioner of
Public Highways case. That is as it ought to be. Even if, however, there is sufficient justification for the infirmity attributed
to respondent Court by virtue of such a ruling, still consider all the circumstances of this case, it clearly does not call for the
nullification of the order in question. What cannot be denied that the writ of execution was issued as far back as May 5,
1970 by the then Clerk of Court of respondent Tribunal as the authorized sheriff. It would be, to say the least, unfair and
unequitable if, on the assumption that such Clerk of Court lacked such competence, a new writ of execution had to be
issued by the proper official. At any rate, what is important is that the judgment be executed. That is to achieve justice
according to law. It would be to carry technicality, therefore, to an absurd length if just because of such a mistake, assuming
that it is, but undoubtedly one committed in good faith, further delay would still be imposed on private respondent by
characterizing the order sought to be nullified amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. No costs.
Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Santos, J., is on leave.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
||| (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-32667, [January 31, 1978], 171 PHIL 279-288)
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102667. February 23, 2000.]
AMADO J. LANSANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC., and
JOSE IGLESIAS, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Marlin F. Velasco for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In 1970, the General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) started operating several kiosks in Rizal Park under a verbal contract
of lease with the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the
development of national parks. The contract was terminated in 1988 by the new chairman of NPDC, herein petitioner, by
serving written notice to respondent Iglesias, President of GABI, with a demand to vacate the premises. GABI filed an action
for damages and injunction with the trial court alleging that petitioner acted beyond the scope of his authority when he
showed malice and bad faith in ordering GABI's ejectment from Rizal Park. Perusal of the complaint disclosed that
petitioner, as Chairman of NPDC, acted under the spirit of revenge, ill-will, evil motive and personal resentment in serving
the notice of termination to Iglesias who is totally blind and who was deceived into signing the notice. The complaint failed
to categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It
ruled that the complaint was a suit against the State which could not be sued without its consent. It further ruled that GABI,
a mere concessionaire, cannot claim damages for termination of contract. The decision was, however, reversed by the
Court of Appeals ruling that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official capacity is not enough
to protect him from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority. It found petitioner liable for moral and
exemplary damages and for attorneys fees. Hence, this petition.
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance
of their duties and does cover unlawful acts or where he is being sued in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and can not be the subject of a lease contract. HEacDA
A party allowed by accommodation to occupy spaces in the park may be asked at anytime to vacate the premises.
With regard to damages, moral damages cannot be sustained in the absence of evidence to support a claim of moral injury.
Exemplary damages cannot be awarded in the absence of an award of moral damages. Also, attorney's fees cannot be
recovered in the absence of stipulation between the parties.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT DOCTRINE; APPLIES TO COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS
FOR ACTS DONE IN PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed
against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one
against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to
perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
2. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT APPLY TO UNLAWFUL ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS. The rule does not apply where the public official
is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not
exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT APPLY WHERE PUBLIC OFFICIAL IS SUED IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY. Neither does it apply
where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in
his personal capacity. The complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of the
NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity. Also, it is evident from paragraph 4 of said
complaint that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER AS CHAIRMAN OF NPDC, AGENCY TASKED TO ADMINISTER RIZAL PARK, MAY VALIDLY
DISCONTINUE ACCOMMODATION TO, AND EJECT, PARTIES OCCUPYING AN OFFICE THEREAT. Rizal Park is beyond the
commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written contract. That
private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the
previous administrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to
private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and does not claim a
vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.
6. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; PROOF OF MORAL INJURY, REQUIRED FOR AWARD THEREOF. We find no
evidence on record to support Iglesias' claim that he suffered moral injury as a result of GABI's ejectment from Rizal Park.
Absent any satisfactory proof upon which the Court may base the amount of damages suffered, the award of moral
damages cannot be sustained.
7. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF NOT PROPER IN ABSENCE OF MORAL, TEMPERATE, LIQUIDATED OR
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES. Neither can we sustain the award of exemplary damages, which may only be awarded in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.
8. ID.; ID.; ATTORNEY'S FEES; DISALLOWED IN ABSENCE OF STIPULATIONS BY PARTIES; EXCEPTION NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. We also disallow the award for attorney's fees, which can only be recovered per stipulation of the parties, which is
absent in this case. There is no showing that any of the exceptions justifying the award of attorney's fees absent a
stipulation is present in this case.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
Before us is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 27244, which set aside the ruling of
the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 88-43887, and ordered petitioner Amado J. Lansang to pay
private respondent Jose Iglesias P50,000.00 in moral damages, P10,000.00 in exemplary damages and P5,000.00 in
attorney's fees.
Like public streets, public parks are beyond the commerce of man. However, private respondents were allegedly awarded a
"verbal contract of lease" in 1970 by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body
engaged in the development of national parks, including Rizal Park, 1 but actually administered by high profile civic leaders
and journalists. Whoever in NPDC gave such "verbal" accommodation to private respondents was unclear, for indeed no
document or instrument appears on record to show the grantor of the verbal license to private respondents to occupy a
portion of the government park dedicated to the national hero's memory.
Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. One such
kiosk was located along T.M. Kalaw St., in front of the Army and Navy Club. Private respondent General Assembly of the
Blind, Inc. (GABI) was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of the profits derived from operating the kiosks, 2 without again
anything shown in the record who received the share of the profits or how they were used or spent.
With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to
clean up Rizal Park. In a written notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents on February 29, 1988,
petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the
kiosks it ran privately within the public park. 3 In another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents were given until March
8, 1988 to vacate. 4
The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its
contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. He was allegedly told
by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although
blind, Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business.
On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the Regional Trial Court against
petitioner, Villanueva, and "all persons acting on their behalf." 5 The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on the
same day. 6
The TRO expired on March 28, 1988. The following day, GABI was finally evicted by NPDC.
GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually
directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial court ruled that GABI could not
claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it
could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it could realize from the concession. The trial court noted that no
such proof was presented.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official capacity is not
enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority. 7 Granting that petitioner
had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and capricious manner in which that authority was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be held liable for damages" 8 according to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals noted that, as the trial court observed, the eviction of GABI came at the heels of two significant
incidents. First, after private respondent Iglesias extended monetary support to striking workers of the NPDC, and second,
after Iglesias sent the Tanodbayan, a letter on November 26, 1987, denouncing alleged graft and corruption in the
NPDC. 9 These, according to the Court of Appeals, should not have been taken against GABI, which had been occupying
Rizal Park for nearly 20 years. GABI was evicted purportedly for violating its verbal agreement with NPDC. 10 However, the
Court of Appeals pointed out that NPDC failed to present proof of such violation. 11
The Court of Appeals found petitioner liable for damages under Articles 19, 21, and 24 of the Civil Code. 12
The Court of Appeals absolved from liability all other persons impleaded in GABI's complaint since it appeared that they
were merely acting under the orders of petitioner. The new officers of NPDC, additionally impleaded by GABI, were likewise
absolved from liability, absent any showing that they participated in the acts complained of. Petitioner was ordered to pay
private respondent Iglesias moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Hence, this petition, in which petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
COMPLAINT AGAINST PETITIONER, AS CHAIRMAN OF NPDC, AND HIS CO-DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 88-43887, IS IN EFFECT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE WHICH CANNOT BE SUED
WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S ACT OF
TERMINATING RESPONDENT GABI'S CONCESSION IS VALID AND DONE IN THE LAWFUL
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY. 13
Petitioner insists that the complaint filed against him is in reality a complaint against the State, which could not prosper
without the latter's consent. He anchors his argument on the fact that NPDC is a government agency, and that when he
ordered the eviction of GABI, he was acting in his capacity as chairman of NPDC. Petitioner avers that the mere allegation
that he was being sued in his personal capacity did not remove the case from the coverage of the law of public officers and
the doctrine of state immunity.
Petitioner points out that Iglesias signed the notice of eviction to indicate his conformity thereto. He contends that as
evidence of private respondents' bad faith, they sued petitioner instead of complying with their undertaking to vacate their
library and kiosk at Rizal Park.
Petitioner adds that during the actual eviction, no untoward incident occurred. GABI's properties were properly inventoried
and stored.
According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals' observation that the eviction was prompted by Iglesias' support for striking
NPDC workers and the letter-complaint sent to the Tanodbayan is merely conjectural.
Finally, petitioner avers that the move to evict GABI and award the spaces it occupied to another group was an executive
policy decision within the discretion of NPDC. GABI's possession of the kiosks as concessionaire was by mere tolerance of
NPDC and, thus, such possession may be withdrawn at any time, with or without cause.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that petitioner acted beyond the scope of his authority when he showed
malice and bad faith in ordering GABI's ejectment from Rizal Park. Quoting from the decision of the Court of Appeals,
private respondents argue that petitioner is liable for damages for performing acts "to injure an individual rather than to
discharge a public duty." 14
While private respondents recognize the authority of petitioner to terminate the agreement with GABI "if [the contract] is
prejudicial to the interest of the NPDC,'' 15 they maintain that petitioner's personal interest, and not that of the NPDC, was
the root cause of GABI's ejectment.
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance
of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment
against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the
amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. 16
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to
the rights of others. 17 Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed
in bad faith. 18
Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity,
although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. The
complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of the NPDC, but did not
categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity. 19 Also, it is evident from paragraph 4 of said complaint that
petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
"4. Defendant AMADO J. LANSANG, JR., the Chairman of the National Parks Development
Committee, acting under the spirit of revenge, ill-will, evil motive and personal resentment against
 plaintiff JOSE IGLESIAS, served on the plaintiff corporation a letter, dated February 23, 1988 terminating
plaintiff's lease agreement with a demand for the plaintiff corporation to vacate its office premises. .
." 20 (Emphasis supplied.)
The parties do not dispute that it was petitioner who ordered the ejectment of GABI from their office and kiosk at Rizal
Park. There is also no dispute that petitioner, as chairman of the NPDC which was the agency tasked to administer Rizal
Park, had the authority to terminate the agreement with GABI 21 and order the organization's ejectment. The question now
is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private respondents.
We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authority on record. As earlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce
of man and, thus, could not be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written contract. That private
respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the
previous administrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to
private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and does not claim a
vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.
The Court of Appeals awarded private respondent Iglesias moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. However, we
find no evidence on record to support Iglesias' claim that he suffered moral injury as a result of GABI's ejectment from Rizal
Park. Absent any satisfactory proof upon which the Court may base the amount of damages suffered, the award of moral
damages cannot be sustained. 22
Neither can we sustain the award of exemplary damages, which may only be awarded in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages. 23 We also disallow the award for attorney's fees, which can only be recovered per
stipulation of the parties, which is absent in this case. There is no showing that any of the exceptions justifying the award of
attorney's fees absent a stipulation is present in this case. 24
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27244 is hereby SET
ASIDE, and the DISMISSAL of the complaint for damages by the trial court for want of merit is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., is on official leave.
||| (Lansang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102667, [February 23, 2000], 383 PHIL 141-151)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 84607. March 19, 1993.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO, MAJ. FILEMON GASMEN, PAT.
NICANOR ABANDO, PFC SERAPIN CEBU, JR., GEN. BRIGIDO PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE, PFC
ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT. JOSE MENDIOLA, PAT. NELSON TUAZON, POLICE CORPORAL PANFILO
ROGOS, POLICE LT. JUAN B. BELTRAN, PAT. NOEL MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS TRAINEE (3CT)
NOLITO NOGATO, 3CT ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS, 3CT AGERICO LUNA, 3CT BASILIO
BORJA, 3CT MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO GERVACIO, 3CT MANUEL DELA CRUZ, JR., MARINE
(CDC) BN., (CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL), MOBILE DISPERSAL TEAM (MDT), LT. ROMEO PAQUINTO,
LT. LAONGLAANG GOCE, MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA CRUZ, POLICE CAPTAIN RODOLFO NAVAL, JOHN DOE,
RICHARD DOE, ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER DOES, petitioners, vs. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA
BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM,
PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA
ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased
(ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE,
DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-
two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ,
EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO
LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN
CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR
FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE,
MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA,
ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS
ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO,
REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE
DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES,
RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL
SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO
MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, and ROSELLA ROBALE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 84645. March 19, 1993.]
ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA
GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA
ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO
DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ,
DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE EVANGELIO, RODRIGO GRAMPA, ANGELITO GUTIERREZ, BERNABE
LAKINDANUM, ROBERTO YUMUL, LEOPOLDO ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE
CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE
AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT
PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR. EFREN MACARAIG,
SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE,
GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA,
CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO
ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO
QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS,
EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME
CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS,
MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA,
PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO
MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA
ROBALE, petitioners, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, respondents.
 SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF STATE'S IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; CONSTRUED. Under our Constitution the principle of
immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very
essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be hindered, and the
public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and
consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the
government.
2. ID.; ID.; NOT DEEMED WAIVED WHEN THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZES THE INDEMNIFICATION FOR THE VICTIM OR
THROUGH PUBLIC ADDRESSES MADE BY THE PRESIDENT. Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State
has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the recommendation made by the
Commission for the government to indemnity the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses
made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to be sued. This is not a suit against
the State with its consent. Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of
the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically
attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was
to have a body that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." In the exercise of
its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads: "1. Its conclusions regarding the
existence of probable cause for the commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be
sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly
with the proper court." In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of
action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary
venue. The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State
immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-
finding body. Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not
tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the
incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners
(Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people." Moreover, petitioners rely on President
Aquino's speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be
inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.
3. ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE; RULE; CASE AT BAR. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are" (1) When
the Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; (3) When the suit is on its
face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government.
Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the
incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the
Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the
members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as there was
unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers.
4. ID.; ID.; CANNOT INSTITUTIONALIZE IRRESPONSIBILITY AND NON-ACCOUNTABILITY NOR GRANT A PRIVILEGE STATUS NOT
CLAIMED BY ANY OTHER OFFICIAL OF THE REPUBLIC. As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot
shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without
authority. Until recently in 1991, this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the
Republic. The military and police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to
guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court
showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter.
5. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE RELIEF DEMANDED BY THE SUIT REQUIRES NO AFFIRMATIVE OFFICIAL ACTION ON
THE PART OF THE STATE NOR THE AFFIRMATIVE DISCHARGE OF ANY OBLIGATION WHICH BELONGS TO THE STATE IN ITS
POLITICAL CAPACITY. While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its
political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the
military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the
government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit
requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs
to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by
virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in
the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another."

DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. It is quite ironic that then, some
journalists called it a Black Thursday, as a grim reminder to the nation of the misfortune that befell twelve (12) rallyists. But
for most Filipinos now, the Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter in our history books. For those however,
who have become widows and orphans, certainly they would not settle for just that. They seek retribution for the lives
taken that will never be brought back to life again. LLjur
Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured(Caylao group), instituted this petition, docketed as G.R. No.
84645, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Orders of respondent
Judge Sandoval, 1 dated May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing the complaint for damages of herein petitioners against the
Republic of the Philippines in Civil Case. No. 88-43351.
Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy, docketed as G.R. No. 84607, seeks to set aside the
Order of respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil Case No. 88-43351 entitled "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the
Philippines, et al."
The pertinent portion of the questioned Order 2 dated May 31, 1988, reads as follows:
"With respect however to the other defendants, the impleaded Military Officers, since they are being
charged in their personal and official capacity, and holding them liable, if at all, would not result in
financial responsibility of the government, the principle of immunity from suit can not conveniently and
correspondingly be applied to them.
WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant Republic of the Philippines is hereby dismissed. As
against the rest of the defendants the motion to dismiss is denied. They are given a period of ten (10)
days from receipt of this order within which to file their respective pleadings."
On the other hand, the Order 3 , dated August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by both parties, for a reconsideration of
the abovecited Order, respondent Judge finding no cogent reason to disturb the said order.
The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment by members of the militant Kilusang
Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco
Administration Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.
The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led
by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free
to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments.
The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January 15, 1987. The two days that followed saw a
marked increase in people at the encampment. It was only on January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to meet with then
Minister Heherson Alvarez, only to be informed that the Minister can only meet with him the following day. On January 20,
1987, the meeting was held at the MAR conference room. Tadeo demanded that the minimum comprehensive land reform
program be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez, for his part, can only promise to do his best to bring the matter to the
attention of then President Aquino, during the cabinet meeting on January 21, 1987.
Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their seventh day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises
and prevented the employees from going inside their offices. They hoisted the KMP flag together with the Philippine flag.
At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with Tadeo and his leaders, advised the latter to
instead wait for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and just allow the government to implement its comprehensive
land reform program. Tadeo, however, countered by saying that he did not believe in theConstitution and that a genuine
land reform cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated discussion ensued between Tadeo and
Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a negotiating panel from each side to meet again the
following day.
On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacaang to air their demands. Before the march
started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media. He uttered fiery words, the most telling of which were: ". . . inalis namin
ang barikada bilang kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero kinakailangan alisin din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola sapagkat
bubutasin din namin iyon at dadanak ang dugo . . ." 4
The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacaang, from Quezon Memorial Circle, at 10:00 a.m. They were later joined
by members of other sectoral organizations such as the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),
League of Filipino Students (LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML).
At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio where they held a brief program. It was at this point that
some of the marchers entered the eastern side of the Post Office Building, and removed the steel bars surrounding the
garden. Thereafter, they joined the march to Malacaang. At about 4:30 p.m., they reached C.M. Recto Avenue.
In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM) that the
rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to break through the police lines and rush towards Malacaang, CAPCOM Commander
General Ramon E. Montao inspected the preparations and adequacy of the government forces to quell impending attacks.
OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was
deployed at the vicinity of Malacaang. The civil disturbance control units of the Western Police District under Police
Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim were also activated.
Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA elements and that an insurrection
was impending. The threat seemed grave as there were also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University
would be forcibly occupied.
In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically tasked to investigate the facts surrounding the incident,
Commission for short) stated that the government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola in a formation of three
phalanges, in the following manner:
"(1) The first line was composed of policemen from police stations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and the
Chinatown detachment of the Western Police District. Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, Deputy
Superintendent of the Western Police District, was designated as ground commander of the CDC first
line of defense. The WPD CDC elements were positioned at the intersection of Mendiola and Legarda
Streets after they were ordered to move forward from the top of Mendiola bridge. The WPD forces
were in khaki uniform and carried the standard CDC equipment aluminum shields, truncheons and
gas masks.
(2) At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards behind the WPD policemen were the elements of
the Integrated National Police (INP) Field Force stationed at Fort Bonifacio from the 61st and 62nd INP
Field Force, who carried also the standard CDC equipment truncheons, shields and gas masks. The
INP Field Force wasunder the command of Police Major Demetrio dela Cruz.
(3) Forming the third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control Battalion composed of the first and
second companies of the Philippine Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio. The marines were all equipped
with shields, truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites) slung at their backs, under the command of Major
Felimon B. Gasmin. The Marine CDC Battalion was positioned in line formation ten (10) yards farther
behind the INP Field Force.
At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks, occupying the entire width of Mendiola
street, followed immediately by two water cannons, one on each side of the street and eight fire trucks,
four trucks on each side of the street. The eight fire trucks from Fire District I of Manila under Fire
Superintendent Mario C. Tanchanco, were to supply water to the two water cannons.
Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two Mobile Dispersal Teams (MDT) each composed of
two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an assistant grenadier, a driver and the team leader.
In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4 of Malacaang stood the VOLVO Mobile
Communications Van of the Commanding General of CAPCOM/INP, General Ramon E. Montao. At this
command post, after General Montao had conferred with TF Nazareno Commander, Colonel Cezar
Nazareno, about the adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was agreed that Police General Alfredo S.
Lim would designate Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres and Police Major Conrado Francisco as
negotiators with the marchers. Police General Lim then proceeded to the WPD CDC elements already
positioned at the foot of Mendiola bridge to relay to Police Colonel Torres and Police Major Francisco
the instructions that the latter would negotiate with the marchers." 5 (Emphasis supplied)
The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded toward
the police lines. No dialogue took place between the marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment that a clash
occurred and, borrowing the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". The Commission stated in its findings,
to wit:
". . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of pillboxes, stones and bottles. Steel bars, wooden
clubs and lead pipes were used against the police. The police fought back with their shields and
 truncheons. The police line was breached. Suddenly shots were heard. The demonstrators disengaged
from the government forces and retreated towards C.M. Recto Avenue. But sporadic firing continued
from the government forces.

After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt. Romeo Paguinto and Lt. Laonglaan Goce sped towards
Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at the remaining rallyist still grouped in the vicinity of Mendiola.
After dispersing the crowd, the two MDTs, together with the two WPD MDTs, proceeded to Liwasang
Bonifacio upon order of General Montao to disperse the rallyists assembled thereat. Assisting the
MDTs were a number of policemen from the WPD, attired in civilian clothes with white head bands,
who were armed with long firearms." 6 (Emphasis ours)
After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead, although according to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13)
dead, but he was not able to give the name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by gunshots and
twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers.
Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot wounds and twenty (20) suffered minor physical injuries
such as abrasions, contusions and the like.
In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11, 7 (A.O. 11, for
brevity) dated January 22, 1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body was composed of retired
Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria and Mr. Antonio U.
Miranda, both as members. A.O. 11 stated that the Commission was created precisely for the "purpose of conducting an
investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street
and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission was expected to have
submitted its findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do so. Consequently, the deadline was moved to
February 16, 1987 by Administrative Order No. 13. Again, the Commission was unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on
February 27, 1987, it submitted its report, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 17, issued on February 11, 1987.
In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit:
"(1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together with the other sectoral groups,
was not covered by any permit as required under Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of
1985, in violation of paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under paragraph (a), Section 14 of said law.
(2) The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were armed with .38 and .45 caliber
handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a prohibited act under paragraph 4(g), Section 13, and
punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(3) The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field Force, the Marines and supporting military
units, as well as the security officers of the police and military commanders were in civilian attire in
violation of paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880.
(4) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military crowd dispersal control units in dispersing
the marchers, a prohibited act under paragraph (e), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b),
Section 14, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(5) The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden clubs with spikes, and guns by
the marchers as offensive weapons are prohibited acts punishable under paragraph (g), Section 13, and
punishable under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(6) The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials and were determined to
march to Malacaang, emboldened as they are, by the inflammatory and incendiary utterances of their
leader, Jaime Tadeo "bubutasin namin ang barikada. Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom na
magsasaka ay gagawa ng sariling butas . . ."
(7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces. Upon approaching the
intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers began pushing the police lines and penetrated and
broke through the first line of the CDC contingent.
(8) The police fought back with their truncheons and shields. They stood their ground but the CDC line
was breached. There ensued gunfire from both sides. It is not clear who started the firing.
(9) At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water cannons and tear gas were not put into
effective use to disperse the rioting crowd.
(10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because (a) there was no order to
use them; (b) they were incorrectly prepositioned; and (c) they were out of range of the marchers.
 (11) Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the rioters. After the crowd had
dispersed and the wounded and dead were being carried away, the MDTs of the police and the military
with their tear gas equipment and components conducted dispersal operations in the Mendiola area
and proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the remnants of the marchers.
(12) No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official reason was given for its absence." 8
From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended 9 the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed
individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers. In connection with this, it was the
Commission's recommendation that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to undertake investigations
regarding the identities of those who actually fired their guns that resulted in the death of or injury to the victims of the
incident. The Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District and the INP
Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be prosecuted for violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The Commission's recommendation also included the prosecution of
the marchers, for carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose identities have yet to be established. As for Jaime
Tadeo, the Commission said that he should be prosecuted both for violation of paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 880 for holding the rally without a permit and for violation of Article 142, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code for
inciting to sedition. As for the following officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E. Montao; (2) Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3)
Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar Nazareno; and (5) Maj. Felimon Gasmin, for
their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola,
administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed. LLpr
The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and wounded victims of the
Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their
claim for damages from the government.
Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by the victims. Thus, on July 27,
1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao group) filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the Government. 10 This
formal demand was indorsed by the office of the Executive Secretary to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
on August 13, 1987. The House Committee on Human Rights, on February 10, 1988, recommended the expeditious
payment of compensation to the Mendiola victims. 11
After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to institute an action for damages
against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident,
before the trial court. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43351.
On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without
its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16, 1988, maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from
suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human
Rights.
Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint as against the Republic of the Philippines
on the ground that there was no waiver by the State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration
therefrom, but the same was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988. Consequently, Caylao and her
co-petitioners filed the instant petition.
On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and personnel impleaded as
defendants in the court below, filed its petition for certiorari.
Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically identical issues, the two (2) petitions were
consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision.
The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or not the State has waived its immunity from
suit.
Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is
their considered view that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and
victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of the
killings, the State has consented to be sued.
Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3.
The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 12 It also rests on reasons of public policy that
public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at
the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper
administration of the government. 13
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the
victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is
important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will
conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." 14 In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11
provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads:
"1. Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any offense and of
the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary
investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court." 15
In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event
that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission
is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such
recommendation not having become final and executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to
the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not
mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it
was an act of solidarity by the government with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech
promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the
State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.
Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given considering
the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: 16
(1) When the Republic is sued by name;
(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability
will belong not to the officer but to the government.
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. Although the
military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred,
their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there
was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover, the members of the police and
military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by them in
dispersing the marchers. 19
As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent
acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this doctrine
still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-
accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military and police forces
were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of the very people
that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at the unruly
crowd to disperse the latter.
While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot
be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them
from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The principle of state
immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official
action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political
capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the
state and as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in the government
does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another." 23
The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead,
the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable
for damages.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge in issuing the
questioned orders, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C . J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., on terminal leave.
||| (Republic v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 84607, 84645, [March 19, 1993])
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 11154. March 21, 1916.]
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield & O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avancea for defendant.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; MEASURE OF. Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for six
months it is an error to restrict the damages to a shorter period during which he was confined in the hospital.
2. SPECIAL STATUTES; CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE SUED; CONSTRUCTION. The Government of the
Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the federal and state governments of the United States' the decisions of
the high courts of that country may be used in determining the scope and purpose of a special statute.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. The state not being liable to suit except by its express consent, an act abrogating that
immunity will be strictly construed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not previously existing unless
it is clearly expressed in the act.
5. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS, AGENTS,
AND EMPLOYEES. The Government of the Philippine Islands in only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents,
and employees when they are acting as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil
code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a special agent.
DECISION
TRENT, J p:
This is an appeal by both partied from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of
the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff
suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was
entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead
of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the
collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of
the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in
rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:
"It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a
motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side
thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles and hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten
feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching
said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be
on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned
suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft
Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who
was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post placed there.
"By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr.
Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was
suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in beck part of his
head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
"The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter
and brain mass had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time
set for performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was
little hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the
outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the wound would be expose to
infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.
 "At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby notice that the
plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak
and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable re-adjustment of
the functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a slight weakness in
his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to
do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his memory for mathematical
calculations.
"According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and
physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that
have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost
the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best
constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had
secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no
longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the
building.
"As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor,
he had to dissolve the partnership he had formed with the engineer, Wilson, because he was
incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his
mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between
the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a)
P5,000, the amount awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages
during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We fund nothing in the record which
would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. as to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found,
that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two
months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error,
because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of sex months. The mere fact
that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was
spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government,
the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands
and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E.
Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of
the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the
amount of damages, if any , to which the claimant is entitled; and
"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommend that an act be
passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government,
in order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the
attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on
the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defend said Government at the same.
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, February 3, 1915."
 Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also
concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of
action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It
is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by
the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render
judgment accordingly.

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for
the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions
submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have
"decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the
defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does
the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for
such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and state Governments in
the United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose
and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom
it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice
Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of
the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U.S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199;
and Beers vs. State, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State ( 121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for
personal injuries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created
by the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information
calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance to educate and benefit the industrial classes;
and to advance by such means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public
school system. In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the
court said:
"No claim arises against any government in favor of an individual, by reason of the
misfeasance, laces, or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents." (Citing
Gibbons vs. U.S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N.C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State,
104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St.
Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action
arises out of either tort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
"By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any
cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense."
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which
authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
"SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit,
Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may
be advised for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with
the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorizes officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said
George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of
Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark
River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin."
In determining the scope of this act, the court said;
 "Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part
of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between
private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the
state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's
controversies with the state. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or
courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the
amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the
plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the
absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that
obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so
important a matter to mere inference but would have done so in express terms. (Murdoc Grate
Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N. E., 854; 8 L. R.A., 399)"
In Denning vs. state (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as
follows:
"All persons who have, or shall hereafter have claims on contract or for negligence against the
state not allowed by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions
herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent
jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to
such suits, except as herein otherwise provided."
And the court said:
"This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different
facts, and in both it was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the
state where none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as
would have existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St.
Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)"
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this
statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
"The statute we are discussing discloses no intention to create against the state a new and
heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where
well recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated."
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New
York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained,
Chief Justice Ruger remarks; "It must be conceded
that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force
of some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not
previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts
of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
"That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes another by his fault
or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused
the damage. It follows therefrom that the state by virtue of such provision of law, is not responsible for
the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and in the
appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its
part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested
in its operation. Between these latter and the state therefore, no relations of a private nature governed
by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
 "That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of
fault or negligence; and whereas in the first articles thereof, No. 1902, where the general principle is
laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or
negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the
persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following article refers to third persons and
imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority
over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the
evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to
proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third
persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called up[on to answer in a
direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case,
guardians and owners or director of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except
when it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or
negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.

"That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in
article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions
which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its
executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned
to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce
the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in
sublease.
"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof he executed the trust confided to him. this concept does not
apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who in his own responsibility
performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
"That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a
decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is
limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the
claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charge with
some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid
down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing
the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by
erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code." (Supreme
Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146)
It is, therefore, evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the
above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act
as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of
the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the
plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by
appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the
Legislature and not with the courts.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

||| (Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 11154, [March 21, 1916], 34 PHIL 311-323)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-35645. May 22, 1985.]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V.M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal
and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law Office for petitioners.
Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perlas & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J p:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from trying Civil Case No. 779-M of
the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The factual background is as follows:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following projects:
1. Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment,
NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines. LLpr
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received
from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company.
The company complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its
bids because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States'
bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.) The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached the trial
stage.]
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the
petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its
previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval
Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties.
In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E.
Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is
to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific
performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the
projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance "for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the
subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not
given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The
defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The petition is highly impressed with merit. LexLib
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other
states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].) 2006cdtai
The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order denying the
defendants' (now petitioners) motion: "A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the
sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non-governmental acts." (Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also
said: "It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly not
a governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in
his reply citing the ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with approval, viz.:
'It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the
state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can
be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
'We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United States government, through its
agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor
services within the Subic Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action
before our courts for any contractual liability that political entity may assume under the contract. The
trial court, therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this case . . .'" (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following reasons:
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America supra, plaintiff brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
collect several sums of money on account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of the action. The
court granted the motion on the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give its consent to
the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was
elevated to this Court for review. cdrep
In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:
"It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure laid down in Article
XXI of the contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against the United States Government, or,
stated differently, it has failed to first exhaust its administrative remedies against said Government, the
lower court acted properly in dismissing this case." (At p. 598.)
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and,
therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative authority.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal
nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment
buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the
premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired, They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments
shall have been vacated.
The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance, the
plaintiffs went to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:
"On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party
defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or
increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-
defendants but by the said U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar
already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one
against the U.S. Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court
of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of
jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not
given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover,
this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent
but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent,
which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law
 behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite
authorities in support thereof." (At p. 323.) LLphil

In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the United
States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure
imperii and not for jure gestionis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. 779-M
is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente,
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part.
||| (US v. V.M. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35645, [May 22, 1985], 221 PHIL 179-191)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-26400. February 29, 1972.]
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways
and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
Quirico del Mar, Domingo Antigua, Antonio Paulin and N. Capangpangan for plaintiff and appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo Torres and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for defendants and appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; PROJECT USED BY GOVERNMENT FOR ROAD PURPOSES; RIGHTS OR REGISTERED
OWNER TO DUE COMPENSATION ANYTIME. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the
back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover
possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However,
since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it
has been and is now being used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO DAMAGES. The owner of the land is entitled to damages in the form of legal interest on the
price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the
government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
3. ID.; ID.; BASIS FOR DUE COMPENSATION. To determine the due compensation for the land appropriated by the
Government, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the
plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to
her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest
in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used
a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow,
unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and
the formal construction in 1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot
which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his
9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office
of the President on January 7, 1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion
of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal
occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of
the suit.
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and
interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed
first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due
the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to
be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the
construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court
proceeded to receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had
no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in
question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a
money claim against the government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction
over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to
Us, there being no question of fact involved.
The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 1 involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land
used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that
where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government
without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. We there said:
". . . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken
for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be
summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the
procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it,
and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the
land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.' If there
were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are
now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law
requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that
there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be
maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public
use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it
makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked."
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has
not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the
whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at
anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion
by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes,
the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago.
To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. 2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from
the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the government should pay for
attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the
determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
||| (Amigable v. Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400, [February 29, 1972], 150 PHIL 422-427)