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    Kant's Transcendental Deductions - Eckhart Forster (SUP 1989)

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    Katie Soto
    Kant

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Kant’s Transcendental Deductions The Three Critiques and the Opus postumum ECKART FORSTER Editor STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Stanford, Califor i464 Kanr’s First Drafts of the Deduction of the Categories WOLFGANG CARL Kant’s Nachla contains several drafts of a deduction of the catego. ries, written both before and after the publication of the Critique of Pare Reason, Although Kant himself published two versions of this central picce of his theoretical philosophy, there atc at least wo rea- sons to sttdy these drafts more closely, apart from an interest in Kant’s intellectual biography. First, the deduiction of the categories is one of the most difficult parts of the Critique. Moder commen- tators have referred t0 it as “the mystery” or as “the jungle.” By taking account of the drafts, one can see more clearly Kant’ central aims and the possible arguments available to him. Second, the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason leaves us very good reason to take account of earlier drafts. We know that the final version of the Critique was written within four or five months, but Kant had been working om it, and especially on the deduction of the categories, for almost ten years. Kant himself admitted that, because of the manner of its final production, the Critigue “contains a certain carelessness or precipitance in the way of writing, and certain obscurities as well” (C0272). By looking at the material eft over from his work during those ten years, one might be able eo correct the defects of the pub- lished version, which Kant himself mentions. The attempt is atleast worth making, and itis a new attempt in a field that has been treated in many ways by many interpreters, who have considered only the published versions. Wolfgang Cart “After the publication of the Inaugural Dissertation in 1770, Kant did not publish anything at all in theoretical philosophy for over ten years. But documents have been preserved that show clearly that he ‘worked very hard on the problems of the Critique. These documents are of three kinds, First, there are letters, mainly addressed to his for- ‘mer pupil Marcus Her2, in which he reports his work. Second, there are notes, called Refleienen, which he made in his copies of A. G. Baumgarten’s Metapipsica and G.F. Meier’s Auseug aus der Ver. unflehre; these were the textbooks for his lectures on metaphysics and logic. The editor of these notes has included some Lase Bltter. Zettel 0 to speak—that reflect Kant’s thinking on various topics in- dependent of the textbooks. Third, there are copies of his lectures made by students. This material is relevant in different ways to re- constructing the development of Kant’s thought in the 1770. For the prehistory of the deduction of the categories, in particular, itis specially important that we have three drafts for such a deduction in the Nachlaf, which differ from cach other in important ways. “The first draft comes from the early 1770's and explains the re- lation between categories and objects by pointing out that the cate- gories are conditions of the possibility of experience (4620-34, —19). The argument is based on the thesis that such condi tions are conditions of the objects of experience. A second draft is written panty on the back of a letter to Kant from May 177s belong- ing to the Zettel of the so-called Duishurgiche Nachlag (Ra674~84, 1764373). Kant starts withthe notion of apperception and tries to discover a connection between the fact that different representations “belong to one consciousness and the use of the categories in certain judgments. In a third draft, also written on the back of a letter to Kant from January 1780, the notion of apperception belongs to a transcendental theory of our cognitive faculties, and the relation be- tween categories and objects is explained by the operations of the so- called transcendental faculty of imagination (23:18~20). This draft will not be discussed here. The sequence of these drafts gives rise to atleast three questions. First, the connection between apperception and judgment, which is strongly emphasized in the deduction ofthe categories of the second edition of the Critigue, is earlier than the first edition’s account in terms of a transcendental theory of our cognitive faculties. Why did Kant pick up his earlier draft for the second edition? To answer this Kant’s First Drafts of the Deduction question would require a comparative study of the two published. versions of the deduction, which is beyond the scope of this essay. The second question concems the relation between the first draft, which argues from the conditions of the possibility of experience, and the other two, which are based on the notion of apperception. Why did Kant move from an argument that, as we shall see, is more or less similar to what is called “objective deduction” in the first edi- tion to an argument that makes the notion of appereeption the cor- nerstone of his reasoning? In the first part of my paper I will explain this switch by pointing out two different claims Kant made about his project for a deduction of the categories. ‘The last question concerns the two versions of a deduction start- ing from the notion of apperception. Why did Kant finally come up with an argument given in terms of a transcendental theory of cog- nitive psychology—a theory that he invented and that invites 50 ‘many psychological misunderstandings? In the second part of my paper I will show the reasons for this development, which are mainly connected with deficiencies in his notion of apperception in 1775. So far as we know, Kant first defines the task of the deduction of the categories in his famous letter to Marcus Herz. of February 21, 772. There he states the question that gives the “key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics”—namely, “what is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object?” (C 10130). Greater precision on three points can sug- gest why a deduction of the categories is supposed to answer that question. First, in ths letter Kant distinguishes between two differ- ent classes of representations. On the one hand are representations that are causally related to their objects: cither the effects of their ob- jects (empirical representations) or the causes of their objects (Like the representation of a moral end). On the other hand are represen- {ations that are not causally related to their objects. The key question ‘concerns only the latter. Thus, the deduction must explain a non- ‘causal relation between representations and their objects. Second, Kant is not interested in explaining just any kind of relation between representations and theis objects, but the special case in which the “understanding may form fcr itself concepts of things completely 4 priori, with which concepts the things must necessarily agree” (C 10:13!) In other words, these concepts must be related to things in such a way that things will necesary correspond to them. Finally, Wolfgang Cart ‘one must mention that Kant considers only representations of things that affect us in some way or other, that are accessible only by Way of experience. The “intellectual representations” of the Disertatio are explicitly excluded, The key question of the Herz leter thus concerns an explanation of how certain concepts a priori, which are not causally related to their objects, can refer to things accessible by ex- perience in such a way that these things correspond necessarily t0 those concepts. This is the question that a deduction of the catego- ties is supposed to answer. But even in this more explicit and more precise formulation the term “thing” is ambiguous. Kant use the expressions Sachen, Dinge, or Gegenstinde, which may be interpreted in two different ways. Re- ferring to his earlier Dissertation, he says: “I silently passed over the farther question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible. .. . But by what means are these things given t0 us, if not by the way in which they affect us?” (C 10:130). In the Critique of Pure Reason the repre- sentations that are related to their objects by being affected by them are called “empirical intuitions,” and their abjects are called “appear ances” (Azo/B34). According to this interpretation, the correspon- dence to be explained by a deduction i arelarion between categories and appearances. But in the same letter to Herz, Kaat is discussing the correspondence between the categories and the objects of experi- cence.? These objects, here called Sachen, ae given through sensations as well as thought through a concept. In a remark of the early 170°, ‘we read: “In every experience there is something through which an object is given to us, and something through which it is thought” (R4634, 17:618.17—18). The object of experience, therefore, is some- thing that is given through sensations as well as thought through, concepts. According to this interpretation, the relation to be €x- phiined by a deduction of the categories concems their relation to objects of experience ‘These two explanations saying 10 witat the categories are sup- posed to correspond give rise to different determinations of what a eduction of the categories must explain. According to the first, one must prove that whatever is given in empirical intuition must corre- spond to the categories. According to the second, one must conclude that whatever is accessible to experience must correspond to the cate- gories, Because every experience is based on empirical intuition and ‘what is experienced must be something given by empirical intuition, 6 Kane’ Firse Drafts of the Deduction the conclusion of the deduction according to the first explanation entails the conclusion of the deduiction according to the second ex- planation. But the converse does not hold: that all objects of experi- {ence must correspond to the categories does not imply that whatever is given by the senses corresponds to them. Conceivably, we may ‘have empirical intuitions to which the categories cannot be applied, that is, which cannot be organized to make up an experience. As Kant himself points out in the Crtiguc: “Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them 10 be in accordance with the conditions of its unity. Everything might be in such confusion that, for instance, in the series of appeat- ances nothing presented itself which might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer to the concept of cause and effect” (Ago! B123). Tn the leter to Herz, Kant doesn’t seem to be aware of these dif ferences, and this provides a clue for understanding why he first tried to solve the problem of the deduction of the categories without using the notion of apperception, whereas after 177s this notion be- came the comerstone of his further attcmpes. £ believe that this change must be interpreted as a shift from one to the other of the two different conceptions of what is proved by such a deduction. Itis important to recognize this shift for two reasons. First, the shift makes clear why Kant introduced the notion of apperception at all. He wanted t0 use this notion to establish the more far-reaching conclusion that whatever is given by an empirical intuition must cor- respond t0 the categories. Second, the shift can explain the much: discussed distinction between an objective and a subjective deduc- tion drawn by Kant in the fist edition of the Crieigue, In the letter to Herz, Kant announced that he would publish “within three months” a Crit of Pure Reason (C10: 2). The kind of answer he might have given to the “key question” of the letter can be seen from Reflacionen, which were written, acconding to Erich Adickes, atound 1772 and which contain the first draft of a deduction of the categories. The question of how to explain the relation of con- cepts a priori to objects is called “the first and most important ques- tion,” and “even to rise this question is meritorious” (R4633, 17:616.4~6; cf. R4-470). His attempt to answer this question can be found in R4oxe: fcertain of our concepts contain only what makes experience possible for us, then they can be specified prior to experience; indeed, they can be speci Wolfgang Carl fied a priori and with complete validity for everything we can ever encoun- ter. In that case although they are not valid of objects in general, they are valid of anything thar can ever be given to us by experience, because they contain the conditions under which experience is possible. These propos ‘ions will, therefore, contain the conditions of possibilty —nor of things, bbutof experience. Things that cannot be given to us by any experience, how ver, are nothing for us (R4634,17:618.1-10). If we suppose that there are concepts that contain the conditions of the possibility of experience, then an argument from such condi- tions would answer the question of the Herz letter. These concepts should be valid forall experience as well as for whatever may be ac- cessible through experience. That they are valid forall experience fol lows from the fact that these concepts contain the conditions under which experience is possible. If there is to be any experience at all, these conditions must be satisfied. By why should the concepts hold cof whatever we may experience? The question asked in the Herz, letter concerns the relation of the categories to objects, not their va- lidity vis-a-vis a certain kind of knowledge, called “experience.” Kant explicitly restricts the realm of objects to whatever can be given t0 us by experience. But even then it is far from evident that the concepts that are conditions of the possibility of experience are concepts that are related to the objects of experience. The fact that Kant was never- theless convinced that this relation holds must be explained by his interpretation of the notion “object of experience.” He says: “Ihings, however, which cannot be given to us by any experience, are nothing _ for us.” That things are something “for us” implies, therefore, that they can be given to us by some experience. It is essential for the things that are something “for us” that they can be given in this way, that they cannot be conceived without this possiblity. So things of the kind referred to must satisfy the conditions of the possibil- ity of their experience. This epistemological specification of the no- tion of an object is the foundation of Kant’ well-known and often- stated thesis that the conditions of the possibility of experience are the conditions of the possibilty of objects of experience. I don't ‘want to enter into a more detailed discussion of that thesis, but will confine myself ro a consideration of what is relevant for answering the question of the Herz letter. Within the framework just outlined, this answer can be stated as follows: if the categories can be inter” preted as concepts stating or containing conditions for the possibil- ity of experience, and given the thesis mentioned above, then the cate- Kane's First Drafts of the Deduction gorics will be related to objects. If they are related to objects at all, they will be related to objects of possible experience. ‘This argument is Kant’ first attempt to sole the problem of the deduction of the categories. Two peculiarities of this argument be- come obvious as soon as Kant specifies which concepts contain con- ditions of the possibility of experience: “In every experience there is something through which an object is given to us, and there is some- thing through which it is thought. If we take the conditions that lie in the activities of our mind, through which alone an object can be given, we can know something a priori about the objects. If we take the conditions through which alone an object can be thought, we can also know something a priori of all possible objects” (R4634, 17:618.17-2). Kant starts from experience as a kind of knowledge that, insofar as its subject matter is concerned, is to be characterized in a complex way. Experience is knowledge of something that is given as well as thought. ‘The conditions of the possibility of experience, therefore, can be divided into those that concer the fact that objects have to be given, and into those that are related to objects being thought. Space and time are conditions of the first kind, whereas the categories arc conditions of the second kind. Both are related in the same way to “objects—as conditions of the possibility of those objects’ experience. Within the framework of the argument under consideration, it is ¢s- sential that space and time on the one hand and the categories on the other be rclated in the same way to objects. The notion of condi- tions of the possibility of experience does not mark any difference between them, ‘A further peculiarity of this argument consists in a common pre- supposition for the relationship between objects and the conditions of the possibility of experience. As conditions of the possibility of experience, space and time as well as the categories are only related to objects if this possibility is realized, that is, if there are any objects of experience. The claim that they are related to objects ifand only if they are conditions of the possibility of experience does not prove that they are in fact related to objects. We need the further premise that the concept of experience is not empty, that we have experience and that there are objects of experience. Without that premise the argument from the possibility of experience does not show that the categories are related to objects and, therefore, does not give an an- swer to the question asked in the Herz letter. Some interpreters of ° Wolfgang Cart Kane are convinced that the deduction of the categories in general relies on that premise, and that without the so-called Fekeun der Er- Jfabrung no transcendental argument will prove anything * These ‘commentators ignore the fact that in the Critique, in the section “Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction,” Kant strongly cit cizes the argument I have been considering up to now (A88—90/ Bi20~23) and gives the reasons why, after 177s, he came up with an argument that is based on the notion of apperception. In his frst draft of a deduction, the proof that the categories are related to objects of experience is given in direct analogy to the cor- responding proof for space and time. in the Critique, however, Kant points to an important difference between space and time on the one hand and the categories on the other, The difference concerns the relevance ofa deduction for them. If they are related to objects a ll, this relation must be a prior. An explanation of “the manner in which concepts can relate a priori to objects” is called “a transcen dental deduction” (A8s/Bu7). Now, the difference between space and time on the one hand and the categories on the other hand con sist in the fact that for the latter a transcendental deduction is“indis- Pensably necessary,” whereas itis necessary that if you give a deduc- tion of space and time at all, t must be a transcendental deduction (A88/ Brat). Space and time permic such a deduction, but the catego- ries requie it Kant explains the differences as follows: “We have already been able with but litle difficulty to explain how the concepts of space and time... . must necessarily relate to objects. ... For since only by _reans of such pure forms of sensibility can an abject appear t6 us, and so be an object of empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions which contain priori the condition of the possibilty of ‘objects as appearances” (Aso! Brat). Whatever may be an object of an empirical intuition falls these conditions because what is given by the senses isin time or space. They are the forms of our intuition and are formal conditions of whatever may be an object of our empirical intuition. But withthe categories iis otherwise. They “do not repre sent the conditions under which objects are given in intuition” (A89/ Biza). Thisis important not forthe reason thatthe categories are not forms of intuition but because they are not, like the forms of intui- tion, formal conditions of the objects of empirical intuition. As Kant explicitly states, “objects may, therefore, appear to us without being necessarily related to the functions of understanding” (A8o/ B12). 0 Kant’s First Drafts of the Deduction That categories are not formal conditions of objects of empirical in- tuition makes room for the possibility that we have a manifold of sensuous data without being able to organize them according to the categories. Kant describes this possibilty as the case that we might have “intuition without thought [ gedankenlase Anschaunng], but not knowledge,” or “that appearances would crowd in upon the soul, and yet be such as would never allow of experience” (Am). Kant ‘wants to exclude this possibility by showing thatthe categories have “objective validity,” and to show this is riothing other than to give a transcendental deduction of them. So the deduction of the catego- ries—in this new version—must prove that there can be no objects of empirical intuition, that is, appearances that cannot be organized according to the categories. In other words, it must prove the vali ity of the categories forall possible appearances. This project differs substantially from the one in the frst draft. In the first place, it concerns a relation between the categories and ap- pearances according to the first explanation in the Herz letter of ‘what has to be shown by a deduction of the categories—as opposed to the objects of experience that are given through intuition as well as thought through a concept. This project, second, is based on a fundamental difference between the relations of space and time to appearances and the relations of the categories to them. The proof that relations of the former kind hold can be given by reflecting on the formal conditions of appearances; but, because “intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought” (Aow/B123), the second proof must proceed in.a very different way. It has to be shown that appearances must exhibit a certain order or structure that is not

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