G.R. No.
L-13954 August 12, 1959 COMPULSORY DAILY FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
GENARO GERONA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
K.V. Felon and Hayed C. Cavington for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Conrado T.
Limcaoco for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Petitioners are Appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Masbate dismissing their complaint. Acting upon the "Urgent Motion for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction" filed on behalf of petitioners of December 12,
1958, and without objection on the part of the Solicitor General, by
resolution of this Court of December 16, we issued the corresponding writ of
preliminary injunction restraining respondents from excluding or banning
petitioners-appellants, their children and all other of Jehovah's Witnesses for
whom this action has been brought, from admission to public schools,
particularly the Buenavista Community School, solely on account of their
refusal to salute the flag or preventing their return to school should they
have already been banned, until further orders from this Court.
The facts involved are not disputed. On June 11, 1955, Republic Act No. 1265
was approved and went into effect. Acting upon section 2 of said Act
authorizing and directing the Secretary of Education to issue or cause to be
issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony,
said Secretary issued Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 on July 21,
1955 which Department Order quoting Republic Act No. 1265 in its entirety,
we reproduce below for purpose of reference:
"Republic of the Philippines
Department of Education
Office of the Secretary
Manila
Department Order
No. 8, s. 1955
July 21, 1955
To the Director of Public Schools and the Director of Private Schools:
1. Quoted below is Republic Act No. 1265 entitled "An Act making Flag
Ceremony Compulsory in all Educational Institutions," which is self-
explanatory.
SECTION 1. All educational institutions henceforth observe daily flag
ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing
or singing of the Philippine National Anthem.
SECTION 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to
issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of
the flag ceremony herein provided.
SECTION 3. Failure of refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this
Act and in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of
Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational
institution concerned and its head to public censure as an administrative
punishment which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general
circulation.
In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided
by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall
cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational
institution responsible for such failure.
SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 11, 1955.
2. As provided in Section 2 of the Act, the rules and regulations governing the
proper conduct of the required flag ceremony, given in the in closure to this
Order, are hereby promulgated. These rules and regulations should be made
known to all teachers and school officials, public and private. The patriotic
objective or significance of the Act should be explained to all pupils and
students in the schools and to all communities through the purok
organizations and community assemblies.
(Sgd.) G. HERNANDEZ, JR.
Secretary of Education
Incl.:
 As stated
(Inclosure of Department order No. 8, s. 1955)
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public
and private, every school day throughout the year. It shall be raised at
sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flag staff must be straight, slightly and
gently tapering at the end, and of such height as would give the Flag a
commanding position in front of the building or within the compound.
2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising
ceremony every morning except when it is raining, in which event the
ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall
be held in the afternoon of the same day.
The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be conducted in the following
manner:
a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school
and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. At command,
books shall be put away or held in the left hand and everybody shall come to
attention. Those with hats shall uncover. No one shall enter or leave the
school grounds during the ceremony.
b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by
the school band or without the accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem
may be played by the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the
flag shall be raised briskly. While the flag is being raised, all persons present
shall stand at attention and execute a salute. Boys and men with hats shall
salute by placing that hat over the heart. Those without hats may stand with
their arms and hands downed and straight at the sides. Those in military or
Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed by their regulations. The
salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon last note of the
anthem.
c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite
in unison of following patriotic pledge (English or vernacular version 0, which
may bring the ceremony to a close. This is required of all public schools and
of private schools which are intended for Filipino students or whose
population is predominantly Filipino.
ENGLISH VERSION
I Love the Philippines.
It is the land of my birth,
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
3. The retreat shall be observed as follows:
a. Teachers and pupils or faculty members and students whose classes and
after the last school period in the afternoon before sun down shall assemble
facing the flag. At command, the Philippine National Anthem shall be sung
with accompaniment of the school band. If the school has no band, the
assembly will only sing the Anthem. Boys who have been taking part in
preparatory military training or Boy Scout activities shall attend the retreat in
formation and execute the salute prescribed for them. Others shall execute
the same salute and observe the same deportment as required of them in
the flag-raising ceremony. The flag should be lowered slowly so that it will be
in the hands of the color detail at the sound of the last note of the Anthem.
b. If the school so prefers, it may have its bugle corp play "To the Colors",
instead of the singing of the National Anthem, for the retreat. At the sound
of the first note, the assembly shall stand at attention facing the flag and
observe the same deportment as required in the flag-raising ceremony. Or, it
may have its bugle corp play "To the Colors" and at the sound of the first
note everybody within hearing distance shall stand at attention, face the flag,
and observe the same deportment as required in the flag-raising ceremony.
4. The flag should be handled reverently in raising or lowering it and not
allowed to touch the ground. This can be insured by having one pupil hold
the flag while another pupil fastening it to or unfasten it from the halyard.
5. To display the National Flag at half-mast when necessary, it must be
hoisted to full-mast, allowing it to fly there for a moment, and then brought
down to half-mast. To lower the flag, it must again be hoisted to full-mast
before bringing it down."
In his turn the Director of Public Schools issued Circular No. 22, series of
1955, on July 30, 1955 addressed to Division Superintendents of Schools,
enclosing a copy of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 and enjoining
strict compliance therewith.
It would appear that pursuant to the Department Order in question, the flag
ceremony contemplated therein was held daily in every school, public and
private. Petitioners' children attending the Buenavista Community School,
Uson, Masbate, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement of Department Order
No. 8; as a result they were expelled from school sometime in September,
1955. It is said that other children similarly situated who refused or failed to
comply with the requirement about saluting the flag are under threats of
being also expelled from all public schools in the Philippines.
Petitioners thru counsel wrote to the Secretary of Education petitioning that
in the implementation of this flag ceremony, they and their children
attending school be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention with
their arms and hands down and straight at the sides and that they be
exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem
and the reciting of the patriotic pledge, giving their reason for the same. On
December 16, 1955 the Secretary of Education wrote to counsel for
petitioner denying the petition, making it clear that the denial was the final
and absolute stand of the Department of Education on the matter and that
counsel may thereafter feel free to seek a judicial determination of the
constitutionality or interpretation of Republic Act No. 1265 as construed and
applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. The letter also informed petitioners' counsel
that with reference to his letter of December 1, 1955 relative to the request
for reinstatement of petitioners' children who had been expelled from school
for non-compliance with Department Order No. 8, no favorable action could
be taken thereon. So, on March 27, 1957 petitioners commenced the present
action asking that a writ of preliminary injunction issue to restrain the
Secretary of Education and the Director of Public Schools from enforcing
Department Order No. 8 "as applied to petitioners and all others of Jehovah's
Witnesses for whom this action is brought and to restrain them from
excluding from the public schools the children of the petitioners on account
of their refusal to execute a formal salute to the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, and that after hearing, the trial court
declare Department Order No. 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights and
that the preliminary injunction prayed for be made permanent.
Petitioners-appellants belong to what is called the JEHOVAH'S WITNESS, an
unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is
superior to that of laws enacted by the State. Their religious beliefs include a
literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which say: "Thou shalt
not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under
the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them." They
consider that the flag is an "image within this command. For this reason they
refuse to salute it.
To further make clear the stand of petitioners as to the relative position and
priority of religious teaching on the one hand and laws promulgated by the
State on the other, we quote from appellant's brief on page 50 thereof:
In Halter vs. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41, 27 S. Ct. 419, 51 L. Ed. 696 (1907), the
United States Supreme Court held that the flag `is an emblem of National
sovereignty,
To many persons the saluting of a national flag means nothing. To a sincere
person who believed in God and the Bible as his Word, and who is in a
covenant with Almighty God to do his will exclusively, it means much. To
such person "sovereignty" means the supreme authority or power. Many
believe that "the higher powers," mentioned in the Bible at Romans 13:1,
means the "sovereign state"; but to the Christian this means Jehovah God
and his son, Christ Jesus, Jehovah's anointed King. They, Father and Son are
the higher powers, to whom all must be subject and joyfully obey. (Emphasis
supplied)
The question involved in this appeal is a highly important one. We are called
upon to determine the right of a citizen as guaranteed by the Constitution
about freedom of religious belief and the right to practice it as against the
power and authority of the State to limit or restrain the same. Our task is
lessened by the fact that petitioners do not challenge the legality or
constitutionality of Republic Act 1265. All that they question is the legality or
constitutionality of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 of the
Department of Education implementing said Republic Act.
The realm of belief and creed is infinitive and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and though. So is the freedom of belief, including religious
belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others,
even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief
clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the
former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government steps in and
either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.
One may believe in polygamy because it is permitted by his religious, but the
moment he translates said religious belief into an overt act, such as engaging
or practising plural marriages, he may be prosecuted for bigamy and he may
not plead or involve his religious belief as a defense or as matter of
exemption from the operation of the law.
In the case of Reynolds vs. U.S. (98 U.S. 145) the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the validity of a law prohibiting and punishing polygamy even as against the
claim of religious belief of the Mormons. Said the Court:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion
of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed.
Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief?
To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such
circumstance. (emphasis supplied)
Again, one may not believe in the payment of taxes because he may claim
that according to his religious belief, the payment of taxes means service to
one other than God. As long as he confines himself to mere belief, well and
good. But when he puts said belief into practice and he actually refuses to
pay taxes on his property or on his business, then the States steps in, opposition of petitioners to the flag salute may be reduced to their objection
compels payment, and enforces it either by court action or levy and distraint. to singing the National Anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge.

One of the important questions to determine here is the true meaning and
significance of the Filipino flag. Petitioners believe and maintain that it is an
image and therefore to salute the same is to go against their religious belief.
"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven . . . thou shalt not bow down
thyself to them or serve them." They also claim that the flag salute is a
religious ceremony, participation in which is forbidden by their religious
belief. We disagree. Appellants themselves (page 51 of their brief) concede
that the flag is a symbol of the State. They give the meaning of the word
"image" on page 51 of their brief as follows:
Under the word "image" this comment is given by Webster: "Image, in
modern usage, commonly suggests religious veneration." (Emphasis
supplied)
After a careful and conscientious examination of the patriotic pledge as
reproduced at the beginning of this decision, frankly we find nothing,
absolutely nothing, objectionable, even from the point of view of religious
belief. The school child or student is simply made to say that he loves the
Philippines because it is the land of his birth and the home of his people; that
because it protects him, in return he will heed the counsel of his parents,
obey the rules and regulations of his school, perform the duties of a patriotic
and law-abiding citizen; and serve his country unselfishly and faithly, and that
he would be a true Filipino in thought, in word, and in deed. He is not even
made to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic for which it stands.
So that even if we assume for a moment that the flag were an image,
connoting religious and veneration instead of a mere symbol of the State and
of national unity, the religious scruples of appellants against bowing to and
venerating an image are not interfered with or otherwise jeopardized.

And as to the singing of the National Anthem, which we reproduce below:

The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect.
Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of Land of the morning,
governments, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting
the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag Child of the sun returning.
salute, particularly the recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious
ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a With fervor burning,
candidate for admission to the bar. In said oath, taken while his right hand is
raised, he swears allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, promise to Thee do our souls adore.
defend the Constitution and even invokes the help of God; and it is to be
Land dear and holy,
doubted whether a member of Jehovah's Witness who is a candidate for
admission to the Philippine Bar would object to taking the oath on the
Cradle of noble heroes,
ground that is religious ceremony.
Ne'er shall invaders,

Trample thy sacred shores.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious
ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a a religious group or Ever within thy skies and thy clouds,
sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be
confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and o'er thy hills and sea,
and meaning to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious
groups or sects or followers, all depending upon the meaning which they, Do we behold the radiance, feel the throb
though in all sincerity and good faith, may want to give to such ritual or
ceremony. of glorious liberty.

Thy banner, dear to all our hearts,

We understand that petitioners, during the flag ceremony, are willing to Its sun and stars alight.
remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down straight
at the sides, and they agree that boys, members of Jehovah's Witness who Onever shall its shining field
have been taking part in military training or Boy Scout activities, and are in
uniform, may execute the salute to the flag prescribed by the Circular for Be dimmed by tyrant's might.
them. So, the requirement contained in Department Order No. 8 that during
the flag ceremony those without hats may stand with their arms and hands Beautiful land of love,
down and straight at the sides, including the formal salute by boys in military
Olandoflight,
and boy Scout uniform, meets with the conformity of petitioners. Of course,
there is the other requirement that boys and men with hats shall salute the
In thine embrace `tis rapture to lie.
flag by placing their hats over the heart, but petitioners and other members
of the Jehovah's Witness could well solve this requirements or avoid it by But is glory ever, when thou art wronged,
putting away their hats just as pupils books, may put them away, at
command (Rules and Regulations, Sec. 2, par. [a]). Consequently, the For us, they sons to suffer and die.

the same thing may be said; that it speaks only of love of country, of
patriotism, liberty and the glory of suffering and dying for it. It does not even
speak of resorting to force and engaging in military service or duty to defend
the country, which service might meet with objection on the part of
conscientious objectors. Surely, petitioners do not disclaim or disavow these
noble and sacred feelings of patriotism, respect, even veneration for the flag
and love of coutnry for which the flag stands.
Men may differ and do differ on religous beliefs and creeds, government
policies, the wisdom and legality of laws, even the correctness of judicial
decisions and decrees; but in the field of love of country, reverence for the
flag, national unity and patriotism, they can hardly afford to differ, for these
are matters in which they are mutually and viatlly interested, for to them,
they mean national existence and survival as a nation or national extinction.
In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no
compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school
regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither
were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they
chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of
public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens,
nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave
it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute,
they forfeited their right to attend public schools.
In the case of Hamilton vs. University of California, 293 U.S. 243, 79 L. ed.
343, quite similar to the present case, appellants therein were taxpayers and
citizens of the United States and of California. The University of California
received endowment and support from the State legislature under certain
conditions such as that any resident of California of the age of 14 years or
upward of approved moral character shall have the right to enter the
University as a student and receive instructions therein. The University as
part of its cirriculum and instruction required military science and tactics in
the Reserve Officers Training Corps. Appellants conformed to all
requirements of the University except taking the course in military science
and tactics and for this the regents of the University suspended them.
Appellants were members of the Methodist Espiscopal Church and of the
Epworth League. For many years their fathers have been ordained ministers
of that church. They believed that war and preparation for war is a violation
of their religious belief. In other words, they were conscientious objectors to
war. They believed that war, training for war, and military training were
immoral, wrong and contrary to the letter and spirit of the teaching of God
and precepts of the Christian religion. They petitioned for exemption from
the military science and tactics course but the regents refused to make
military training optional or to exempt them and they were suspended. So
they initiated court action with a California Supreme Court to compel the
regents of the University to admit them. In that action they assailed the
validity of the State law providing for military training in the University. The
petition was denied by the State Supreme Court. In affirming the decision of
the State Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United States held that:
. . . California has not drafted or called them to attend the University. They
are seeking education offered by the State and at the same time insisting
that they be excluded from the prescribed course solely upon grounds of
their religious beliefs and consicientious objections to war, preparation for
war and military education. Taken on the basis of the facts alleged in the
petition, appellants' contentions amount to no more than an assertion that
the due process clause of the Fourtheenth Amendment as a safeguard of
liberty' confers the right to be students in the state university free from
obligation to take military training as one of the conditions of attendance.
Viewed in the light of our decisions that proposition must at once be put
aside as untenable . . .
In United States vs. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 75 L. ed. 1302, 51 S. Ct. 570, a
later naturalization case, the applicant was unwilling, because of
conscientious objections, to take unqualifiedly the statutory oath of
allegiance which contains this statement: "That he will support and defend
the constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same." U.S.C. title 8,
Sec. 381. His petition stated that he was willing if necessary to take up arms
in defense of this country, "but I should want to be free to judge of the
necessity." In amplification he said: "I do not undertake to support "my
country, right or wrong" in any dispute which may arise, and I am not willing
to poromise beforehand, and without knowing the cause for which my
country may go to war, either that I will or that I will not "take up arms in
defense of this country," however "necessary" the war may seem to be to
the government of the day." The opinion of this court quotes from
petitioner's brief a statement to the effect that it is a fixed principle of our
Constitution, zealously guarded by our laws, that a citizen cannot be forced
and need not bear arms in a war if he has conscientious religious scruples
against doing so." And, referring to that part of the argument in behalf of the
applicant this court said (p. 623): "This, if it means what it seems to say, is an
astonishing statement. Of course, there is no such principle of the
Constitution, fixed or otherwise. The conscientious objector is relieved from
the obligation to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision,
express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with the
policy of Congress thus to relieve him . . . The previlege of the native-born
conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not from the
Constitution but from the acts of Congress. That body may grant or withhold
the exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the native-
born conscientious objector cannot successfully assert the privilege. No other
conclusion is compatible with the well-nigh limitless extent of the war power
as above illustrated, which include by necessary implication, the power, inthe
last extremity, to compel armed serviced of any citizen in the land, without
regard to his objections or his views in respect of the justice or morality of
the particular war or of war in general. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 29, 49 L. ed. 643, 651, 25 S. Ct. 358, 3 Ann. Cas, 765, this Court
(upholding a state compulsory vaccination law) speaking of the liberties
guaranteed to the individual by the Fourteenth Amendment, said: "... and yet
he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard
to his personal wishes or his pecuniary intersts, or even his religious or
political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.
And see University of Maryland v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 A. 54, a case,
similar to that now before us, decided against the contention of a student in
the University of Maryland who on conscientious grounds objected to
military training there required. His appeal to this Court was dismissed for
the want of a substantial federal questions. 290 U.S. 597, 78 L. ed. 525, 54 S.
Ct. 131.
Plainly there is no ground for the contention that the regents' order,
requiring able-bodied male students under the age of twenty-four as a
condition of their enrollment to take the prescribed instruction in military
science and tactics, transgresses any constitutional right asserted by these
appellants.
Mr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opinion said:
I assume for present purposes that religious liberty protected by the First
Amendment against invasion by the nation is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against invasion by the states.
Accepting that premise, I cannot find in the respondents' ordinance an
obstruction by the state to "the free exercise" of religion as the phrase was
understood by the foundrs of hte nation, and by the generations that have
followed. Davis vs. Beasin, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 33 L. ed. 637, 10 s.Ct. 299.
There is no occasion at this time to mark the limits of governmental power in
the exaction of military service when the nation is at peace. The petitioners
have not been required to bear arms for any hostile purpose, offensive or
defensive, either now or in the future. They have not even been required in
any absolute or peremptory way to join courses of instruction that will fit
them to bear arms. If they elect to resort to an institution for higher
education maintained with the state's moneys, then they are comanded to
follow courses of instruction believed by the state to be vital to its welfare.
This may be condemned by some unwise or illiberal or unfair when there is
violence to conscientious scruples, either religious or merely ethical. More
must be shown to set the ordinance at naught. In controversies of this order
courts do not concern themselves with matters of legislative policy,
unrelated to privileges or liberties secured by the organic law. The first
Amendment, if it be read into the Fourteenth, makes invalid any state law
`respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.' Instruction in military science is not instruction in the practice or
tenets of a religion. Neither directly nor indirectly is government establishing
a state religion when it insists upon such training. Instruction in military
science, unaccompanied here by any pledge of military service, is not an
interference by the state with the free exercise of religion when the liberties
of the constitution are read in the light of a century and a half of history
during days of peace and war . . .
Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have never yet
been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus
extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether
for attack or for defense, or in furtherance of any other end, condemned by
his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has
never yet been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the
agencies of government. One who is a martyr to a principlewhich may turn
out in the end to be a delusion or an errordoes not prove by his
martyrdom that he has kept within the law."
We are not unmindful of the decision of the United States Federal Supreme
Court on similar set of facts. In the case of Minersville School District vs.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 84 L. ed. 1375, two Jehovah Witnesses children were
expelled from the public school of Minersville for refusing to salute the
national flag in accordance with the regulations poromulgated by the school
board for the daily flag ceremony. Their father Gobitsi on behalf of his two
children and in his own behalf brought suit to enjoin the school authorities
from continuing to exact the execution of the flag ceremony as a condition of
his children's admittance in school. After trial, the District Court gave him
relief and this decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal
to the Federal Supreme Court, the decrees of both the District Court and the
Circuit Court of Appeals were reversed with the lone dissent of Chief Justice
Stone, on the ground that the requirement of participation of all pupils in the
public schools in the flag ceremony did not infringe the due process law and
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly the one referring to
religious freedom and belief. Three years later, that is, on June 14, 1943, the
ruling laid down in the Minersville School District vs. Gobitis case, was in the
case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Bernette, 319 U.S. 624-671
reversed by a sharply divided court, the majority opinion being penned by
Mr. Justice Jackson in which Justice Black, Douglas and Murphy concurred;
while Mr. Justice Frankfurter who wrote the opinion in the Gobitis case, filed
a long dissenting opinion, and Justices Roberts and Reed adhered to the
views expressed in the Gobitis case.
Neither attempting to justify the ruling laid down in the Minersville vs.
Gobitis case nor desiring to criticize the doctrine of the West Virginia vs.
Barnette case, frankly, we are more inclined to favor the former as more in
keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and the government policy as laid
down in Republic Act No. 1265 entitles "An Act Making Flag Ceremony
Compulsory In All Educational Institutions".
We cannot help thinking that one reason that may have possibly influenced
the decision in the West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette case,
was that the children involved in said case and their parents found
themselves in a serious dilemma for refusing to salute the flag as required by
the regulations of the School Board. They were expelled by the School Board
and their absence was considered unlawful and because of the law of
compulsory school atendance of all children of school age, they were
considered as truants and the school officials threatened to send them to
reformatories maintained for criminially inclinded juveniles. Parents of such
children have been prosecuted or were threatened with prosecution for
cause such as alleged delinquency and if convicted, were subject to fine not
exceeding $50.00 and a jail term not exceeding 30 days. That is why in the
majority opinion it was stated:
. . . The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. The
state asserts power to conditions access to public education on making a
prescribed sign and profession and at the same time to coerce attendance by
punishing both parent and child . . .
Such a grave and embarrassing situation, however, does not obtain in the
Philippines. True, we have a law (Republic Act 896) requiring compulsory
enrollment of children of shcool age, but said law contains so many
exceptions and exemptions that it can be said that a child of school age is
very seldom compelled to attend school, let alone the fact that almost
invariably, there is school crisis every year wherein the pupils applying for
admission in public schools could not be accommodated, and what is equally
important is that there is no punishment or penal sanction either for the
pupil who fail to attend school or is expelled for failure to comply with school
regulations such as the compulsory flag salute ceremony, or his parents.

In the case of re Summers, 325 U.S. 561-578, decided on June 11, 1945, that
is, two years after the decision in the case of West Virginia, the Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court
refusing admission of petitioner Clyde Wilson Summers to the Illinois Bar.
Summers had complied with tall the prerequisites to admission to the Bar of
that state, but he was a conscientious objector who did not believe in the use
of force or war because of his religious belief. He described this attitude of
his as follows:
The so-called "misconduct" for which petitioner could be reproached for is
his taking the New Testament too seriously. Instead of merely reading or
preaching the Sermon on the Mount, he tries to practice it. The only fault of
the petitioner consists in his attempt to act as a good Christian in accordance
with his interpreation of the Bible, and according to the dictates of his
conscience. We respectfully submit that the profession of law does nt shut its
gates to persons who have qualified in all other respects even when they
follow in the footsteps of that Great Teacher of mankind who delivered the
Sermon on the Mount. We respectfully submit that under our Constitutional
guarantees even good Christians who have met all the requirements for the
admission to the bar may be admitted to practice law
The Constitution of Illinois required service in the militia in time of war of
men of petitioner's age group. The Federal Supreme Court defined the
position of Summers as a conscientious objector in the following words:
. . . without detailing petitioner's testimony before the Committee or his
subsequent statments in the record, his position may be compendiously
stated as one of non-violence. Petitioner will not serve in the armed forces.
While he recognizes a difference between the military and police forces, he
would not act in the latter to coerce threatened violations. Petitioner would
not use force to meet aggression against himself or his family, no matter how
aggravated or whether or not carrying a danger of bodily harm to himself or
others. He is a believer in passive resistance. We need to consider only his
attitude toward service in the armed forces.
It was not denied that Summers was unwilling to serve in the militia of Illinois
because of his religious belief. In affirming the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court excluding Summers from the practice of law in that state, the
Federal Supreme Court held that the action of the State Supreme Court did
not violate the principle of religious freedom contained in the Constitution.
If a man lived, say on an island, alone and all by himself without neighbors,
he would normally have complete and absolute rights as to the way he lives,
his religion, incuding the manners he practices his religious beliefs. There
would be no laws to obey, no rules and regulations to follow. He would be
subject only to Nature's physical laws. But man iis gregarious by nature and
instinct and he gravitates toward community life, to receive and enjoy the
benefits of society and of social and political organization. The moment he
does this and he becomes a member of a community or nation, he has to
give rights for the benefit of his fellow citizens and for the general welfare,
just as his fellow men and companions also agree to a limitation of their
rights in his favor. So, with his religion. He may retain retain his freedom or
religious belief, but as to practising the same, he would have to give up some
of those practices repugnant to the general welfare and subordinate them to
the laws and sovereignty of the State. In order words, the practice of religion
or religious belief is subject to reasonable and non-discrminatory laws and
regulations by the state.
In the case of Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 88 L. ed. 645, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision convicting Sarah Prince of a
violation of the Child Labor Law of Massachusetts. Mr. Justice Rutledge who
wrote the opinion tersely described the case thus:
The case brings for review another episode in the conflict between Jehovah's
Witneses and state authority. This time Sarah Prince appeals from
convictions for violating Massachusetts' child labor laws, by acts said to be a
rightful exercise of her religious convictions.
When the offenses where committed she was the aunt and custodian of
Betty M. Simmons, a girl nine years of age. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The defendant in this case allowed Betty, under here legal cutody who was at
the same time niece, to distribute religious pamphlets intended to propagate
the religion of Johovah Wiitness. The question involved was whether or not
the law in question contravened the Fourtheenth Amendment by denying
appellant freedom of religion and denying to her the equal protection of the
law. Defendant claimed that the child was exercising her God given right and
her constitutional right to preach the gospel and that no preacher of God's
commands shold be interfered with. She rested her case squarely on
freedom of religion. In affirming the judgment of conviction and upholding
the law as agains the claiim of relgion and the exercise of religious belief, the
court said:
. . . And neither rights of religion nor lights of parenthood are beyond
limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well-being, the
state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring shcool
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other
ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his
claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus,
he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more
than for himself on relgious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does
not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable
disease or the latter to ill health or death. . . . It is too late now to doubt that
legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is withinthe state's
police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or
one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
Incidentally, it must be noted that this case was decided after that of West
Virginia vs. Barnette, supra.
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the
Secretary of Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a
religious test on said students. It was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory
school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem,
Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State was merely carrying out the duty
imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over
and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a
complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all
schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and teach the
duties of citizenship. (Art. XIV, section 5 of the Constitution). It does nothing
more than try to inculcate in the minds of the school population during the
formative period of their life, love of country and love of the flag, all of which
make for united and patriotic citizenry, so that later in after years they may
be ready and willing to serve, fight, even die for it. It is well known that
whatever is taught to the youth during this period, such as love of God, of
parents, respect for elders, love of the truth, loyalty, honoring one's word
and respecting the rights of other, becomes a habit or second nature that will
remain with them always. School children of kingdoms and empires are
taught early to respect and love the king or the emperor for these rulers and
sovereigns symbolize the nation, and the children as future citizens or
subjects will come to love their country.
Petitioners do not question the right of public schools to conduct the flag
salute ceremony regularly but they do "question the attempt to compel
conscientious objectors guided by the word of God to salute the flag or
participate in the ceremony to specific commandment of Jehovah God. It is
perfectly proper and lawful for one nt bound by a covenant with Jehovah to
salute the flag when that person desires to salute it. It is entirely wrong to
interfere with that right or prevent such one from saluting the flag.
Conversely, it is also true that it is wrong and illegal to compel one who, for
concience' sake, cannot participate in the ceremony." (p. 85, Appellant's
Brief)
The trouble with exempting petitioners from participation in the flag
ceremony aside from the fact that they have no valid right to such exemption
is that the latter would disrupt shcool discipline and demoralize the rest of
the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. If the
children of Jehovah Witnesses are exempted, then the other pupils,
especially the young ones seeing no reason for such exemption, would
naturlly ask for the same privilege because they might want to do something
else such as play or study, instead of standing at attention saluting the flag
and singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, all of which
consume considerable time; and if to avoid odions discrimination this
exemption is extended to others, then the flag ceremony would soon be a
thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the
time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in
and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration
for national heroes, and patriotism a pathetic, even tragic situation, and
all because a small portion of the shcool population imposed its will,
demanded and was granted an exemption. In a way that might be regarded
as tyranny of the minority, and a small minority at that.
In a few cases, such exemptions in a limited way have been afforded
members of a religious group. Conscientious objectors in the United States
who because of their religion were unwilling to serve in the war particularly
as regards actual fighting or field duty, were allowed to do some work in
relation to the war, but not involving combat duty or the use of force. But
that was by special legislation. If that is possible here as regards exemption
from participation in the flag ceremony, then petitioners would have to look
to the Legislature, not the courts for relief.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and
cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority. As was said by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in h is dissent in West
Virginia vs. Barnette, supra:
The constitutional protection of religious freedom ... gave religious equality,
not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.
Religious loyalties may be exercised without hindrance from the State, not
the State may not exercise that which except by leave of religious loyalties is
within the domain of temporal power. Otherwise, each individual could set
up his own censor against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the
public good by those whose business it is to make laws. (West Virginia State
Board vs. Barnette, supra, at p. 653; emphasis supplied)
In conclusion we find and hold that the Filipino flag is not an image that
requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity;
that the flag salute is nt a religious ceremony but an act and profession of
love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag
stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education
was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955;
that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided
for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional
provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance
with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school
disicipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to
attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in
the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from
the public shcool they were attending.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is ordered dissolved. No costs.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehovas Witness whose children were expelled
from their schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the
pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS
pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag
ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight
and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.
2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against
the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from
implementing said DO No. 8.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of
Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to
determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.
1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of
the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and
cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee
and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our
system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance.
Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious
ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or
sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be
confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations
and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are
religious groups or sects or followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not
and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and
non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was
absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey
school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted.
Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal
sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost
the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their
fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could
take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about
the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.
3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it
is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of
freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious
ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of
loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the
legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate
Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance
of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8,
does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and
exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and
reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance
of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and
that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners
were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were
attending.
ARCH R. EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF EWING TOWNSHIP
330 US 1February 10, 1947
FACTS:
New Jersey enacted a law that gave School Dist authority to make rules and
casespertaining to the transportation of children to and from schools. Board
of Ed authorizedreimbursement of money paid by parents for bus
transportation of their kids who rode publictransit to school. Some of this
money was paid for the transportation of some kids to parochialschools
Catholic.
ISSUE:
Whether the New Jersey statute or the Board resolution, authorizing the
reimbursementof tax funds to parents with students of parochial schools,
unconstitutionally regulates theestablishment of religion.
HELD:
No, under the facts the 1st Amend does not bar New Jersey from spending
tax funds topay the bus fares of parochial students under a general program
that reimburses the fares of students who attend other schools.The New
Jersey statute is challenged as a "law respecting an establishment of
religion."The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth, Murdock v.Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, commands that a state
"shall make no law respecting anestablishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . ." These words of the First Amendment reflected in
the minds of early Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions
andpractices which they fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve
liberty for themselves
and for their posterity. The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means atleast this: neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can passlaws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither canforce nor influence
a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
himto profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining [p16]or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax inany amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions,whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clauseagainst establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation betweenchurch and State."
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu G.R. No. 95770, March 1,
1993
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers
and pupils belonging to the Jehovahs Witness, and enrolled in various public
and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute
the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division
of DECS and her Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov.
17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of
Private Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process,
teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from
the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag
ceremony and doesnt obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find such memorandum to be
contrary to their religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of
appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the
directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As a
result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan
District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the dropping from the list in
the school register of all Jehovahs Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1
to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute
Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.
Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education
but the latter did not answer to their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for
Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation
of their right to due process, their right to free public education and their
right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the
voiding of the order of expulsion or dropping from the rolls issued by the
District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them
from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him
to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, commanding the respondents to immediately re-
admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the
petitions defending the expulsion orders issued by the respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or behavior that would
offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention
during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the
schools violates right receive free education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools where
they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to
protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to
make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their
right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to
disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag
ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and present danger
of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-
1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the
invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier,
perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they
would not quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders
are hereby annulled and set aside.
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu
GR 95770, 29 December 1995; En Banc Resolution, Kapunan [J]
FACTS:
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones belief. The first is
absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is
the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health
and interests where State has right to prevent.

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
and consolidated raising the same issue whether school children who are
ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or behavior that would
members or a religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled
offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their
through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by
during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in
and reciting the patriotic pledge.
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their
classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by
Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8
(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational
Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.

Petitioners are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious

worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that
to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against
official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the
precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld
the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation
of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it
doesnt involve any religious ceremony. The children of Jehovahs Witnesses
cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no
valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will
disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population
which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief
guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from
or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and
regulations promulgated by competent authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of

religion?

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was
not justified.
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner
contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating
that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any
church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the
separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion
wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further
their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in
accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to
respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be
advantageous to the government.
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not
mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.
Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government
does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps
was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as
originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of
Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. The
focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila,
being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may
be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and
propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the
Government
Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would orderthe issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration
in the City of Manila of the 33rdInternational Eucharistic Congress, organized
by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner,Mons. Gregorio Aglipay,
Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillmentof
what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member
of the PhilippineBar, to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announce
d having sent to the United Statesthe designs of the postage for printing. The
said stamps were actually issued and sold though thegreater part thereof
remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be
preventedby the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the
Constitution.
Held:
Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence forreligion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.
Religion as a profession of faith toan active power that binds and elevates
man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as itinstills into the minds the
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highlyappreciated. When the Filipino people, in
the preamble of their Constitution, implored the aid of
Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody
their ideals, conserveand develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
general welfare, and secure to themselvesand their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy, they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere.Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives
the Director of Posts is thediscretionary power to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be
advantageous to the Government. Of course, the phrase advantageous to
the Government
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use
or apply of publicmoney or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the case at bar,the issuance of the postage
stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particularchurch
or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of theRoman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale
of the stamps given to thatchurch. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps
was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to
give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract moretourists to
the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained
a map of
the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that
reads Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-
7, 1937.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without
pronouncement as tocosts.
FONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS [96 PHIL 417; G.R. L-5917; 28 JAN 1955]
Facts: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its
supreme bishop Gerardo Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render
an accounting of his administration of all the temporal properties and to
recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme bishop of
IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop.
Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and
his legal successor was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was an
accounting of his administration and was turned over to bishop Jamias. Also,
that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their faith and
formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America.
CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and
legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an
accounting of his admistration
CA affirmed the decision of the CFI
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the
legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.
Held: Supreme Court affirmed CAs decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop
of IFI is Isabelo De los Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the
election of Bishop Delos Reyes as the Supreme Bishop based on their internal
laws
To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368
declared that the rule in property controversies within religious
congregations strictly independent of any other superior ecclesiastical
association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules for
resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If
the congregation adopts the majority rule then the majority should prevail; if
it adopts adherence to duly constituted authorities within the congregation,
then that should be followed.
ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO
G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc
City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay
council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by
the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image
was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day which
also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the
fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea,
refused to return custody of the image to the council on the pretext that it
was the property of the church because church funds were used for its
acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against
the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his
co-petitioners filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions
relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the
barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the
Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they
contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state,
freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church.
ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's
image with private funds in connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City,
"reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April
"of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela",
and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and
(2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for
which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash donations",
does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious
liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money.
The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden
image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the
image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta
and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display
of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the
barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition
in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the
lives of the masses.
Garces v Estenzo 104 SCRA 510 (1981)
Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc Citywere
passed:a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image
of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the
said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash
donations.b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta
would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the
image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his
successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during
the celebration of the saints feast day.These resolutions have been ratified
by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay.
However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the
image to the barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church
funds were used in its acquisition.Resolution No. 10 was passed for the
authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for
the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso
as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the
constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a
member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec
18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution
violated.
Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of
the image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of
the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the
acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a laymans
custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to
borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the
councils funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their
property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they
decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution,
since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves
the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative
of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
Reli German vs Santiago Barangan
27 MAR 1985]
135 SCRA 514 Political Law Religious Freedom vs Clear and Present
Danger Doctrine
One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to
pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General
Santiago Barangan from entering the church because the same is within the
vicinity of the Malacaang. And considering that Germans group is
expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who were wearing
yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really
there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the
Malacaang.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at
St. Lukes is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion.
HELD: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or restrained of
their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by
which they had attempted to translate the same into action. There has been
a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow German et al to
practice their religious belief but not in the manner that German et al
impressed. Such manner impresses clear and present danger to the
executive of the state hence the need to curtail it even at the expense of
curtailing ones freedom to worship.
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom.
Held: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious
worship but to conduct an anti- government demonstration since they wore
yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti- government
slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise
must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was
designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, government
officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with
Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive
offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and
disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or
limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to
prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger
lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full
control and had the capability to stop any untoward move. There was no
clear and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of
Malacanang.
RAUL ROGERIO GONZALEZ,
by his guardian ad item
Adelaida Gonzalez,
plaintiff-appellee
,vs. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA,
defendant-appellant
G.R. No. 27619. February 4, 1928
FACTS:
The fifth and last chaplain or beneficiary of the chaplaincy in question was
AngelGonzalez, father of the present plaintiff. This individual resigned the
office of chaplain, effectiveDecember 6, 1910, since which date the
chaplaincy has remained vacant. Plaintiff-appelleeRaul Gonzalez, through his
guardian, filed an action to obtain writ of mandamus before the CFIof Manila
to force respondent to appoint plaintiff to the vacant chaplaincy, to compute
for theincome obtained during the vacancy, and to secure other relief. The
trial court then ruled infavor of the plaintiff. It ordered respondent Roman
Catholic Church of Manila to appoint plaintiff as chaplain to the said
chaplaincy, to pay plaintiff of the income obtained during the vacancy,and to
reserve to him any legal rights that he may have in connection to the
cancellation of certificate of registration of property under the name of the
archbishop. From all the foregoing,the defendant then appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff can be appointed chaplain to the said vacant
chaplaincy
HELD:
No. It is in fact a mistake in the part of the trial court to order defendant to
appointplaintiff chaplain in the chaplaincy in question. The plaintiff does not
possess the qualificationsnecessary for appointment to the office of chaplain
and consequently that the Archbishop was justified in refusing to appoint the
plaintiff to that office.
Under the law of the Church as it stood when this chaplaincy was created, no
ecclesiasticalqualifications were required in a candidate for appointment to
the office of chaplain. However, anew canon became effective in the Church
in 1918 to the effect that, in order to be appointedchaplain, the candidate
must be a clerical, and that in order to be a clerical, one must havetaken the
first tonsure, as a prerequisite to which he must also be a bachelor who has
begun thestudy of theology. It is admitted that the plaintiff in this case does
not possess thesequalifications. This new canon is valid and applicable to
candidates for chaplaincies since it isgeneral in terms and evidently intended
to be applicable to all chaplains appointed in the future.
Pamil v Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978)
G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in
Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato
Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo warranto case against Gonzaga
questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in
Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code:
in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office
ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public
works of the municipality.
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Victorino Teleron
ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971
which now allows ecclesiastics to run.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 is no longer operative?
HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935
Constitution, No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights. If the the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be
maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run
for elective office. However, this issue proved to have divided the Supreme
Court because it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is
needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional.
For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the
lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate
the mayoralty position.
It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one who
swore to serve the Churchs interest above all be in duty to enforce state
policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of
the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still
stands because there is no implied repeal.
G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978
FORTUNATO R. PAMIL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON, as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Bohol, Branch III, and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA, respondents-
appellees.
Urbano H. Lagunay for petitioner.
Cristeto O. Cimagala for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The novel question raised in this certiorari proceeding concerns the eligibility
of an ecclesiastic to an elective municipal position. Private respondent,
Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of
municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. 1 Therefore, he was duly
proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an
aspirant for the office, for his disqualification 2 based on this Administrative
Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a
municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving
salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
public works of the municipality." 3 The suit did not prosper, respondent
Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal
mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by
the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by
petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is
still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised.
There is no clear-cut answer from this Tribunal. After a lengthy and
protracted deliberation, the Court is divided on the issue. Seven members of
the Court are of the view that the judgment should be affirmed as the
challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was superseded
by the 1935 Constitution or repealed. Outside of the writer of this opinion,
six other Justices are of this mind They are Justices Teehankee, Muoz Palma
Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. For them, the overriding
principle of the supremacy of the Constitution or, at the very least, the repeal
of such provision bars a reversal. 4 The remaining five members of this Court,
Chief Justice Castro, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Aquino, on the
other hand, hold the position that such a prohibition against an ecclesiastic
running for elective office is not tainted with any constitutional infirmity.
The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a
minority, the vote of the remaining seven does not suffice to render the
challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The
presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances,
certiorari lies. That is the conclusion arrived at by the writer of this opinion,
joined by Justice Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. They have
no choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and
declare ineligible respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of
municipal mayor. With the aforesaid five other members, led by the Chief
Justice, entertaining no doubt as to his lack of eligibility, this petition for
certiorari must be granted.
Except for the dispositive part announcing the judgment of the Court, the
remainder of this opinion sets forth the reasons why there are constitutional
objections to the continuing force and effectivity of Section 2175 as far as
ecclesiastics are concerned.
1. The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the
1935 Constitution, as it is now under the present Charter, it is explicitly
declared: "No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights." 5 The principle of the paramount character of the
fundamental law 6 thus comes into play. There are previous rulings to that
effect. 6 The ban imposed by the Administrative Code cannot survive. So the
writer of this opinion would hold.
2. This is to conform to this provision of the 1935 Charter: "All laws
of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered,
modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references
in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution." 7 It was first applied in
People v. Linsangan, 8 decided in December, 1935, barely a month after that
Constitution took effect. This Court held that Section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code that would allow the prosecution of a person who
remains delinquent in the payment of cedula tax, 9 was no longer in force. As
stated by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos, after setting forth
that the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment for debt or non-payment of
poll tax: 10 "It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of
the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of
Article Ill of the Constitution in that, while the former authorizes
imprisonment for non-payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it.
It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of the
Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code
became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon."
11
De los Santos v. Mallare 12 came next. The President, under the Revised
Administrative Code, could remove at pleasure any of the appointive officials
under the Charter of the City of Baguio. 13 Relying on such a provision, the
then President Quirino removed petitioner De los Santos, who was
appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, and chose in his place
respondent Gil R. Mallare. Why such a power could not pass the test of
validity under the 1935 Constitution was pointed out by Justice Tuason thus:
"So, unlike legislation that is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive
and menacing, the questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration of nullity by the
court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent,
outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by
express mandate before the petitioner was appointed." 14
Martinez v. Morfe, 15 a 1972 decision, is likewise in point. In the light of the
cited provision of the 1935 Constitution, as authoritatively construed, Article
145 of the Revised Penal Code was found to be inoperative. As therein
provided, the penalty of prision correccional is imposed on any public officer
or employee who, while the Congress was in regular or special session, would
arrest or search a member thereof, except in case he had committed a crime
punishable by a penalty higher than prision mayor. This Court ruled that the
Revised Penal Code extended unduly the legislative privilege of freedom
from arrest as ordained in the Constitution. 16 Such a provision then was
contrary to and in defiance of the clear expression of the will of the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 that such immunity was never intended to
exempt members of a legislative body from an arrest for a criminal offense,
the phrase treason, felony and breach of the peace being all-inclusive.
Reference was likewise made to the prevailing American doctrine to that
effect as enunciated by Williamson v. United States. 17
3. It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of
the applicable construction of the provision on what laws remain operative
after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be heeded. The
challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares
ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face,
inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To
so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Torcaso v. Watkins 18 an
American Supreme Court decision, has persuasive weight. What was there
involved was the validity of a provision in the Maryland Constitution
prescribing that "no religious test ought ever to be required as a
disqualification for any office or profit or trust in this State, other than a
declaration of belief in the existence of God ..." Such a constitutional
requirement was assailed as contrary to the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution by an appointee to the office of notary public in
Maryland, who was refused a commission as he would not declare a belief in
God. He failed in the Maryland Court of Appeals but prevailed in the United
States Supreme Court, which reversed the state court decision. It could not
have been otherwise. As emphatically declared by Justice Black: "this
Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the
appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced
against him." 19
has stood so long and been silently acquiesced in for so great a length of time
that it should not be disturbed, it may be said that the fact that certain
individuals have, by ignorance or neglect, failed to claim their fundamental
rights, furnishes no reason why another individual, alert to his rights and
their proper enforcement, should be prevented from asserting and
sustaining those rights. The fact that Smith and Jones have failed to demand
their constitutional rights furnishes no basis for the refusal to consider and
uphold the constitutional rights of Richard Roe In the case of Sadler v.
Langham (34 Ala. 311), this same question was under consideration and the
court in resolving it said: 'It may be urged, that these statutes have stood,
and been silently acquiesced in for so great a length of time, they should not
now be disturbed. We are sensible of the force of this argument. It will be
observed, however, that in Tennessee, the decision which declared the
private road law unconstitutional was pronounced forty years after the
enact. judgment of the statute; and in New York, after seventy years had
elapsed. It is, perhaps, never too late to re- establish constitutional rights,
the observance of which had been silently neglected." 22 To support such a
conclusion, no less than the great Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for this
Court in United States v. More, in disposing of a contention by one of the
parties as to appellate jurisdiction having been previously exercised and
therefore beyond dispute was likewise relied upon. Thus: "No question was
made in that case as to the jurisdiction petition. It passed sub silentio, and
the court does not consider itself bound by that case. 23 So it should be in
this litigation. As set forth at the outset, it is not even necessary to annul the
challenged Administrative Code provision. It is merely declared inoperative
by virtue of the mandate of the 1935 Constitution, similarly found in the
present Charter.
5. Nonetheless, tie above view failed to obtain the necessary eight
votes needed to give it binding force. The attack on the continuing effectivity
of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given full
force and application.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment a quo is
reversed and set aside. Respondent Gonzaga is hereby ordered immediately
to vacate the mayoralty of the municipality of Albuquerque, Bohol, there
being a failure to elect. No pronouncement as to costs

The analogy appears to be obvious. In that case, it was lack of belief in God
that was a disqualification. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore
professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is
thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied
upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate. It is not a valid
argument against this conclusion to assert that under the Philippine
Autonomy Act of 1916, there was such a prohibition against a religious test,
and yet such a ban on holding a municipal position had not been nullified. It
suffices to answer that no question was raised as to its validity. In Vilar v.
Paraiso, 20 decided under the 1935 Constitution, it was assumed that there
was no conflict with the fundamental law.

4. This is the first case then where this Court has to face squarely
such an issue. This excerpt from the opinion of Justice Moreland in the
leading case of McGirr v. Hamilton, 21 a 1915 decision, has a force
unimpaired by the passage of time: "Relative to the theory that Act No. 1627
G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.
Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province,
and a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating
sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one
bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law
made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-
Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors
of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the
law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it
is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due
process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of
the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must
be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based
upon accident of birth or parentage, as counsel for the appellant asserts,
but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian
tribes refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area
and more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This distinction
is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order
in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the
class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation
against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of
culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
BENJAMIN VICTORIANOvs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION andELIZALDE
ROPE FACTORY, INC.
.G.R. No. L-25246. September 12, 1974.
FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano, appellee, a member of the religious sect known as the
"Iglesia niCristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(Company) since 1958. Assuch employee, he was a member of the Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union (Union) which had withthe Company a collective
bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision. Under Section 4(a),
paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act
No.3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with
a labor organization torequire as a condition of employment membership
therein, if such labor organization is therepresentative of the employees." On
June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 wasenacted, introducing an
amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic ActNo.
875, as follows: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects whichprohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization".
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the establishment of
religionclause or separation of Church and State.
HELD:
The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the support of
any religioustenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of theacceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship, but also assures the free
exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It
has been said thatthe religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, andto live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
commongood. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or allreligions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burdenmay be characterized as being
only indirect. But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting,within its power,
a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the
state'ssecular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance, unless thestate can accomplish its purpose without
imposing such burden.In Aglipay v. Ruiz, this Court had occasion to state that
the government should not beprecluded from pursuing valid objectives
secular ID character even if the incidental result wouldbe favorable to a
religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to
withstandthe strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular
legislative purpose and a primaryeffect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No.3350 cannot be said to
violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of
religion)clause of the Constitution.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs CITY OF MANILA
.G.R. No. L-9637. April 30, 1957.
FACTS:
In the course of its ministry, American Bible Societys Philippine agency has
beendistributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (since
1898, but except during theJapanese occupation) throughout the Philippines
and translating the same into severalPhilippine dialects. On 29 May 1953, the
acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed theSociety that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since
November1945,without providing itself with the necessary Mayors permit
and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance 3000, as amended, and
Ordinances 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required the Societyto secure, within 3
days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with
compromisecovering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the
2ndquarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45. On 24 October 1953, the
Society paid to the City Treasurer under protest the saidpermit and license
fees, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would
betaken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which the
said fees were beingcollected, which was done on the same date by filing the
complaint that gave rise to this action. After hearing, the lower court
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said Ordinances are constitutional and valid.
HELD:
Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sales of bibles and religious
articles. The CityTreasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of generalmerchandise without providing itself with
the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in
violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended, andrequired plaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and
license. Plaintiff protested against thisrequirement and claimed that it never
made any profit from the sale of its bibles. Held: It is truethe price asked for
the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the
actualcost of the same, but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in
the business or occupationof selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this
reasons, the provisions of City Ordinance No.2529, as amended, which
requires the payment of license fee for conducting the business of general
merchandise, cannot be applied to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would
impair itsfree exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship,
as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. Upon the other hand,
City Ordinance No. 3000, as amended,
which requires the obtention of the Mayors
permit before any person can engage in any of thebusinesses, trades or
occupations enumerated therein, does not impose any charge upon
theenjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of
religious practices?Hence, it cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if
applied to plaintiff Society. But asOrdinance No. 2529 is not applicable to
plaintiff and the City of Manila is powerless to license or tax the business of
plaintiff society involved herein, for the reasons above stated, Ordinance
No.3000 is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the
plaintiff.
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of
rumors that Escritor has beenliving with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her
husband, and had eventually begotten a son.
Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before
she entered into the
judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman. Estrada is notrelated to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a
resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it
will appear as if the court allows such act. Escritor is a member of the
religious
sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society where
her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious
beliefs. After tenyears of livi
ng together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness
which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when
legal impedimentsrender it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the
Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since
1991, testified and
explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which
was completely
executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon an
d was signed by three witnessesand recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Escritors contention of freedom of religion as defense to her
action be
sustained.
HELD:
Freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits anydegree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in
the practice of one's religion. TheFree Exercise Clause principally guarantees
voluntarism, although the Establishment Clausealso assures voluntarism by
placing the burden of the advancement of religious groups on their intrinsic
merits and not on the support of the state. In interpreting the Free Exercise
Clause, therealm of belief poses no difficulty. A sinilar jurisprudence is cited
by the court wherein in thecase of Gerona v. Secretary of Education viz: The
realm of belief and creed is infinite andlimitless bounded only by one's
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, includingreligious
belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others,
even heretical whenweighed in the. scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. But between the freedom of belief and .the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel. The difficulty ininterpretation sets in
when belief is externalized into speech and action. religious freedom willnot
be upheld if it clashes with the established institutions of society and with
the law such thatwhen a law of general applicability (in this case the
Department Order) incidentally burdens theexercise of one's religion, one's
right to religious freedom cannot justify exemption fromcompliance with the
law.