LA MALLORCA vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not
ET AL., G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966
BARRERA, J.:
La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 23267-R, holding it liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to
respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for the death of his minor daughter
Raquel Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are:
On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife,
together with their minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4
years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing
plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by the defendant, at San
Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were
carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging. The
conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran,
issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their
eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below
the height at which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and
regulations.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow
the passengers bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to
get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some
of their baggages, was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and his
children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of
the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to
the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so
doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano
Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his
bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was
not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its
trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary
signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by
Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it
had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately
jumped from the running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He
landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his
wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the
body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The
child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which
she rode earlier together with her parents.
For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit
against the defendant seeking to recover from the latter an aggregate amount of
P16,000 to cover moral damages and actual damages sustained as a result thereof
and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the court below rendered the judgment in
question.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach
of contract of carriage and sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the child
and P400.00 as compensatory damages representing burial expenses and costs.
be a breach of contract in the case, for the reason that when the child met her death,
she was no longer a passenger of the bus involved in the incident and, therefore, the
contract of carriage had already terminated. Although the Court of Appeals sustained
this theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty of quasi-delict and
held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence of its driver, in accordance with
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the Court of Appeals did not only find the
petitioner liable, but increased the damages awarded the plaintiffs-appellees to
P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00 granted by the trial court.
In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred
(1) in holding it liable for quasi-delict, considering that respondents complaint was one
for breach of contract, and (2) in raising the award of damages from P3,000.00 to
P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal from the decision of the lower court.
Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the
judgement holding petitioner liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel
Beltran. It may be pointed out that although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran,
his wife, and their children (including the deceased child) had alighted from the bus at
a place designated for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also
established that the father had to return to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get
one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus. There can
be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus
for his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between
him and the petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and passenger
does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the
carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.1 The issue to be
determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to a
place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under
the contract of carriage also persisted.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger
does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a
place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this
rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after
alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a
passenger.2 So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is
proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually
doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot,
and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve
his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to
be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its
agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his
baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child
that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on
the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or
bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the
moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was
run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent
had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article
1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its
obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although
stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run
the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter
was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and
family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they
are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the
protection under their contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already
terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled
by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the
complaint, which reads
That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel
Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their
agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle.
Is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for
quasi-delict, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is
permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a
plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each
other or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be resolved and
determined.
The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the
claim was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel
Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their
agent." This allegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that
the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there
were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the
vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the
presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this
presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome.
Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the child
Raquel Beltran.
The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the
Court of Appeals, however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court can
only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in appellant's
brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial court
awarding them on P3,000.00 damages for the death of their daughter. Neither does it
appear that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in their
brief the inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was
merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to the
general rule.5 Herein petitioner's contention, therefore, that the Court of Appeals
committed error in raising the amount of the award for damages is, evidently,
meritorious.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by
sentencing, the petitioner to pay to the respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum
of P3,000.00 for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the amount of P400.00 as
actual damages. No costs in this instance. So ordered.
La Mallorca vs CA 17 Scra 739
Facts:
Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a La
Mallorca bus. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted
from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters from the
vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not
unloaded. He was followed by her daughter Raquel. While the father was still on the
running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run
so that the father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over and
killed.
Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA,
holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay P6,000 plus P400. La
Mallorco contended that when the child was killed, she was no longer a passenger
and therefore the contract of carriage terminated.
Issue:
Whether or not the contractual obligation between the parties ceases the
moment the passenger alighted form the vehicle.
Held:
On the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the child who was
already led a place 5 meters from the bus under the contract of carrier, still persists,
we rule in the affirmative. It is a recognized rule that the relation between carrier and
passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alight from the carriers
premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost
diligence. Firstly, the driver, although stopping the bus, did not put off the engine.
Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the
signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of said passenger
near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists.
Averment of quasi-delict is permissible under the Rules of Court, although
incompatible with the contract of carriage. The Rules of Court allows the plaintiffs to
allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not
(Sec. 2, Rule 1). Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already
terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver
pursuant to Art.2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only question raised in the briefs
can be passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of P3,000.00 the
increase by the CA of the award to P6,000.00 cannot be sustained.
G.R. No. L-21486 May 14, 1966
LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS,
MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS
MAKALINTAL, J.:
La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., commonly known as La
Mallorca-Pambusco, filed this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed that rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its
civil case No. 2100, entitled "Valentin de Jesus and Manolo Tolentino vs. La Mallorca-
Pambusco." The court a quo sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, "to pay to
plaintiffs the amount of P2,132.50 for actual damages; P14,400.00 as compensatory
damages; P10,000.00 to each plaintiff by way of moral damages; and P3,000.00 as
counsel fees."
Two errors are attributed to the appellate Court: (1) "in sustaining the
decision (of the court a quo) holding that the petitioners were liable for the accident
which was caused by a blow-out of one of the tires of the bus and in not considering
the same as caso fortuito," and (2) in holding petitioners liable for moral damages.
The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old
daughter of Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision
between petitioner's bus, on which she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling
in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the morning of October 8,
1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost
control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded.
Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to
no liability for negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez vs.
Red Line Transportation Co., CA-G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People vs.
Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings, however, not only are
not not binding on this Court but were based on considerations quite different from
those that obtain in the at bar. The appellate Court there made no findings of any
specified acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined itself to the
question of whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to
the causative factors, would generate liability. In the present case, the cause of the
blow-out was known. The inner tube of the left front tire, according to petitioner's own
evidence and as found by the Court of Appeals "was pressed between the inner circle
of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel." This was, said Court
correctly held, a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment
which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough, or
rigid check-up before it took to the road that morning.
Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that
the bus was running quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the
tire which exploded was not new petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong
kalbo," or not so very worn out the plea of caso fortuito cannot be
entertained.1wph1.t
The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this
jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in
relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code. These articles have been applied by this
Court in a number of cases, among them Necesito, etc. vs. Paras, et al., L-10605-06,
June 30, 1958; Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328-29, Sept. 29, 1961; Villa-Rey Transit vs.
Bello, L-18957, April 23, 1963.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners
LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS,
MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21486. 14 May 1966.
Facts:
The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old
daughter of Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision
between petitioner's bus, on which she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling
in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the morning of October 8,
1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost
control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded. The court a quo
sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, to pay to plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and
moral damages; and counsel fees. CA affirmed.
Issues:
(1) WON the petitioners are liable for the consequences of the accident.
(2) WON petitioners are liable for moral damages.
Ruling:
Judgment affirmed.
(1) Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives
rise to no liability for negligence. Both the CFI and the CA found that the bus was
running quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which
exploded was not new, petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong kalbo," or not so
very worn out, the plea of caso fortuito by petitioner cannot be entertained. The cause
of the blow-out was a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment
which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough
check-up before it took to the road. Hence, petitioners are liable for the accident.
(2) The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this
jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in
relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. L-22272 June 26, 1967
ANTONIA MARANAN vs. PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab
owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver,
Simeon Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas. Found guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was
taken to the Court of Appeals.1wph1.t the backdrop of the factual situation before Us, which further accounts for a different
On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia
Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants
asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the
driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death
was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as
damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was
dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court,
the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier
mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final
judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v.
Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for
assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling
law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the
passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee.
As this Court there found:
x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to
discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from
Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot
and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando
(La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to
Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact,
his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the
crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the
passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding;
and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa
at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting
transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the
duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a
result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's
contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the
passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the
contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the
passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when the
employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil
Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common
carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or
negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in
the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability.
It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been
substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both
articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the law expressly
provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein
significantly lies the statutory difference between the old and present Civil Codes, in
result in the Gillaco case. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the
Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults
committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which
categorically states that
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation
of the orders of the common carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and were
taken from Anglo-American Law.2There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults
on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat
superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the
passenger safely.3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the
act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that
the act be within the course of employment only.4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is
enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no
defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience
of the carrier's orders.5 The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it
practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently
follows the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie
this rule. As explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388,
389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1) the special
undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of
protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the
law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other
passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with
the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty
to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the
performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith
the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3)
as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful
acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the
passengers, has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability,
but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of
behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
 Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower
court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil
Code. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct.
Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7 and the cab driver
was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he
was convicted by final judgment.
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to
plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable
under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of
contract results in the passenger's death. As has been the policy followed by this
Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to other alleged actual
damages, the lower court's finding that plaintiff's evidence thereon was not
convincing,8 should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages
in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the passenger killed to
compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been
properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral damages.9 Plaintiff
demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider
P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as sufficient.
Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant. 10
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in
plaintiff's favor to P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both
from the filing of the complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid,
the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No costs. So ordered.
Maranan vs. Perez G.R. No. L-22272
Facts:
Rogelio Corachea, a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual
Perez, was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was
found guilty for homicide by the Court of First Instance and was sentenced to suffer
Imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6000. While
pending appeal, mother of deceased filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela. Defendant Perez claimed
that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. The court a quo,
after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against
defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this
ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for
more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability. Defendant-appellant relied
solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad Co. that the carrier is
under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers.
Issue: Whether or not Perez should be held liable for the death of the passenger?
Held:
Yes. The basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed
by its drivers rests on the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the
passenger safely. As between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the
risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers,
since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them. Common
carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers. The liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employees. (Art. 1759)
The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar were
very different. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the
course of duty of the guilty employee. The Gillaco case was decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not
impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against
willfull assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the
passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier
from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has
been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both
articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the law expressly
provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. The Civil Code
provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-
American Law. The basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers
committed by its drivers rested either on the doctrine of respondent superior or the
principle that it was the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Under
the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it was enough
that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It was no defense
for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the
carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here was absolute in the sense that it practically
secured the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.

G.R. No. L-28014-15 May 29, 1970
SPOUSES MARCELO LANDINGIN and RACQUEL BOCASAS
vs. PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN
SPOUSES PEDRO GARCIA and EUFRACIA LANDINGIN
vs. PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN
VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal on a question of law from the portion of the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the defendants Pangasinan Transportation
Co. (PANTRANCO) and Marcelo Oligan to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. D-1468
(L-28014) the sum of P6,500.00, and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1470 (L-28015)
the sum of P3,500.00.
The complaints in said Civil Cases Nos. D-1468 and D-1470 were filed by
the spouses Marcelo Landingin and Racquel Bocasas, and the spouses Pedro Garcia
and Eufracia Landingin, respectively, for damages allegedly suffered by them in
connection with the death of their respective daughter, Leonila Landingin and Estrella
Garcia, due to the alleged negligence of the defendants and/or breach of contract of
carriage. In their complaints, plaintiffs averred, among others, that in the morning of
April 20, 1963, their above-mentioned daughters were among the passengers in the
bus driven by defendant Marcelo Oligan and owned and operated by defendant
PANTRANCO on an excursion trip from Dagupan City to Baguio City and back, that
the bus was open on one side and enclosed on the other, in gross violation of the
rules of the Public Service Commission; that defendant PANTRANCO acted with
negligence, fraud and bad faith in pretending to have previously secured a special
permit for the trip when in truth it had not done so; that upon reaching an uphill point
at Camp 8, Kennon Road, Baguio City, on the onward trip, defendant driver, through
utter lack of foresight, experience and driving knowledge, caused the bus to stall and
stop for a few moments; that through the said defendant's fault and mishandling, the
motor ceased to function, causing the bus to slide back unchecked; that when the
said defendant suddenly swerved and steered the bus toward the mountainside,
Leonila and Estrella, together with several other passengers, were thrown out of the
bus through its open side unto the road, suffering serious injuries as a result of which
Leonila and Estrella died at the hospital and the same day; and that in connection
with the incident, defendant driver had been charged with and convicted of multiple
homicide and multiple slight physical injuries on account of the death of Leonila and
Estrella and of the injuries suffered by four others, although it may be said, by way of
parenthesis, that this case is now pending appeal in a higher court. The plaintiffs
prayed for awards of moral, actual and exemplary damages in the total sum of
P40,000.00 in Civil Case No. D-1468, and in the total sum of P25,000.00 in Civil Case
No. D-1470 as well as attorney's fees in the amounts of P5,000.00 and P4,000.00,
respectively.
Defendants filed a joint answer to each of the two complaints alleging,
among others, that at the time of the accident, defendant driver was driving the bus
at, the slow speed of about 10 kilometers per hour; that while the said defendant was
steering his bus toward the mountainside after hearing a sound coming from under
the rear end of the bus, Leonila and Estrella recklessly, and in disobedience to his
shouted warnings and advice, jumped out of the bus causing their heads to hit the
road or pavement; that the bus was then being driven with extraordinary care,
prudence and diligence; that defendant PANTRANCO observed the care and
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the accident as well as in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly of defendant driver; and that
the decision convicting the said defendant was not yet final, the same having been
appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was still pending.
By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly. On October 17,
1966, the court a quo rendered its decision therein in which it made the following
findings; that upon reaching the fatal spot at Camp 8, a sudden snapping or breaking
of metal below the floor of the bus was heard, and the bus abruptly stopped, rolling
back a few moments later; that as a result, some of the passengers jumped out of the
bus, while others stepped down; that defendant driver maneuvered the bus safely to
and against the side of the mountain where its rear end was made to rest, ensuring
the safety of the many passengers still inside the bus; that while defendant driver as
steering the bus towards the mountainside, he advised the passengers not to jump,
but to remain seated; that Leonila and Estrella were not thrown out of the bus, but
that they panicked and jumped out; that the malfunctioning of the motor resulted from
the breakage of the cross-joint; that there was no negligence on the part of either of
the defendants; that only the day before, the said cross-joint was duly inspected and
found to be in order; and that defendant PANTRANCO had exercised the requisite
care in the selection and supervision of its employees, including the defendant driver.
The court concluded that "the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of
God brought about by some extra-ordinary circumstances independent of the will of
the Pantranco or its employees."
One would wonder why in the face of such factual findings and conclusion of
the trial court, the defendants, instead of the plaintiffs, should come to this Court on
appeal. The answer lies in the dispositive portion of the decision, to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court
hereby renders judgment: (a) Absolving the defendants from any
liability on account of negligence on their part and therefore
dismissing the complaints in these two cases; (b) However, as
stated above, the Court hereby orders the defendant Pantranco to
pay to the plaintiffs spouses Marcelo Tandingin and Racquel
Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468 the amount of P6,500.00; and
the amount of P3,500.00 to the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia
Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470, not in payment of liability
because of any negligence on the part of the defendants but as an
expression of sympathy and goodwill. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to what impelled the court below to include item (b) in the dispositive portion of its
decision, can be gathered from the penultimate paragraph of the decision, which
reads:
However, there is evidence to the effect that an offer of P8,500.00
in the instant cases without any admission of fault or negligence
had been made by the defendant Pantranco and that actually in
Civil Case No. D-1469 for the death of Pacita Descalso, the other
deceased passenger of the bus in question, the heirs of the
decease received P3,000.00 in addition to hospital and medical bills
and the coffin of the deceased for the dismissal of the said case
without Pantranco accepting liability. There was as a matter of fact
during the pre-trial of these two cases a continuing offer of
settlement on the part of the defendant Pantranco without accepting
any liability for such damages, and the Court understood that the
Pantranco would be willing still to pay said amounts even if these
cases were to be tried on the merits. It is well-known that the
 defendant Pantranco is zealous in the preservation of its public
relations. In the spirit therefore of the offer of the defendant
Pantranco aforesaid, to assuage the feelings of the herein plaintiffs
an award of P6,500.00 for the spouses Marcelo Landingin and
Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468 whose daughter Leonila
was, when she died, a third-year Commerce student at the Far
Eastern University, and P3,500.00 for the spouses Pedro Garcia
and Eufracia Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470 whose daughter
Estrella was in the fourth year High at the Dagupan Colleges when
she died, is hereby made in their favor. This award is in addition to
what Pantranco might have spent to help the parents of both
deceased after the accident.
Defendants-appellants complain that having found them to be absolutely
free from fault or negligence, and having in fact dismissed the complaints against
them, the court should not have ordered them to assume any pecuniary liability. There
would be merit in his argument but for the fact that defendant-appellant PANTRANCO
was guilty of breach of contract of carriage. It will be noted that in each of the two
complaints it is averred that two buses including the one in which the two deceased
girls were riding, were hired to transport the excursionist passengers from Dagupan
City to Baguio City, and return, and that the said two passengers did not reach
destination safely.
As a common carrier, defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was duty bound to
carry its passengers "safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances." (Article 1755, Civil Code.) Did defendant-appellant PANTRANCO
measure up to the degree of care and foresight required it under the circumstances?
We think not. The court below found that the cross-joint of the bus in which the
deceased were riding broke, which caused the malfunctioning of the motor, which in
turn resulted in panic among some of the passengers. This is a finding of fact which
this Court may not disturb. We are of the opinion, however, that the lower court's
conclusion drawn from that fact, i.e., that "the accident was caused by a fortuitous
event or an act of God brought about by some extraordinary circumstances
independent of the will of the Pantranco or its employees," is in large measure
conjectural and speculative, and was arrived at without due regard to all the
circumstances, as required by Article 1755. In Lasam vs. Smith (45 Phil. 660), this
Court held that an accident caused by defects in the automobile is not a caso fortuito.
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that "the passenger has neither the
choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and
appliances in use by the carrier." (Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75.)
When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common carrier is at
fault or that it acted negligently (Article 1756). This presumption is only rebutted by
proof on the carrier's part that it observed the "extraordinary diligence" required in
Article 1733 and the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" required in Article
1755 (Article 1756). In the instant case it appears that the court below considered the
presumption rebutted on the strength of defendants-appellants' evidence that only the
day before the incident, the crossjoint in question was duly inspected and found to be
in order. It does not appear, however, that the carrier gave due regard for all the
circumstances in connection with the said inspection. The bus in which the deceased
were riding was heavily laden with passengers, and it would be traversing
mountainous, circuitous and ascending roads. Thus the entire bus, including its
mechanical parts, would naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be under
ordinary circumstances. The mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and
found to be in order would not exempt the carrier from liability unless it is shown that
the particular circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered.
In the premises, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the complaints. The awards
made by the court should be considered in the concept of damages for breach of
contracts of carriage.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
appealed from is modified as indicated above, and defendant-appellant PANTRANCO
is ordered to pay to plaintiffs-appellees the amounts stated in the judgment appealed
from, as damages for breach of contracts, with interest thereon at the legal rate from
the date of the filing of the complaints. Costs against defendant-appellant
PANTRANCO.
SPOUSES MARCELO LANDINGIN and RACQUEL BOCASAS, vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELOOLIGANSPOUSES
PEDRO GARCIA and EUFRACIA LANDINGIN vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN (Villamor, 1970)
Facts:
In the morning of April 20, 1963, Leonila Landingin and Estrella Garcia were
among the passengers in the bus driven by defendant Marcelo Oligan and
owned and operated by PANTRANCO on an excursion trip from Dagupan
City to Baguio City and back.
Upon reaching an uphill point at Kennon Road, Baguio City, on the onward
trip, Oligan caused the bus to stop for a few moments. The motor ceased to
function, causing the bus to slide back unchecked. When Oligan suddenly
swerved and steered the bus toward the mountainside, Leonila and Estrella,
together with several other passengers, were thrown out of the bus through
its open side unto the road, suffering serious injuries. Leonila and Estrella
died at the hospital on the same day.
Oligan had been charged with and convicted of multiple homicide and
multiple slight physical injuries on account of the death of Leonila and
Estrella and of the injuries suffered by four others. His case is pending in CA.
Petitioners sued for damages in connection with the death of their daughters,
Leonila Landingin and Estrella Garcia, due to the alleged negligence of the
defendants and/or breach of contract of carriage. They prayed for awards of
moral, actual and exemplary damages.
Landingin and Garcia:The bus was open on one side and enclosed on the other,
in violation of the PSC rules. PANTRANCO acted with negligence, fraud and bad faith
in pretending to have previously secured a special permit for the trip when in truth it
had not done so.
Pantranco: At time of accident, driver was driving at the slow speed of about 10 kph;
that while the driver was steering his bus toward the mountainside after hearing a
sound coming from under the rear end of the bus, Leonila and Estrella recklessly,
and in disobedience to his shouted warnings and advice, jumped out of the
bus causing their heads to hit the road or pavement; that the bus was then being
driven with extraordinary care, prudence and diligence; that PANTRANCO observed
the care and diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the accident as well as
in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly of driver; and that the
decision convicting the said defendant was not yet final, the same having been
appealed to CA where it was still pending.
Two cases were tried jointly.
CFI: in favor of PANTRANCO, accident caused by fortuitous event. CFI made the ff
findings:
Upon reaching the fatal spot at Camp 8, a sudden snapping or breaking of
metal below the floor of the bus was heard, and the bus abruptly stopped,
rolling back a few moments later.
Some of the passengers jumped out of the bus, while others stepped down.
Driver maneuvered the bus safely to and against the side of the mountain
where its rear end was made to rest, ensuring the safety of the many
passengers still inside the bus. While doing this he advised the passengers
not to jump, but to remain seated.
Leonila and Estrella were not thrown out of the bus, but that they panicked
and jumped out;
Malfunctioning of the motor resulted from the breakage of the cross-joint and
the day before, the said cross-joint was duly inspected and found to be in
order.
No negligence on PANTRANCOs part. It exercised the requisite care in
the selection and supervision of its employees, including the defendant
driver. Accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
panic among some of the passengers. This is a finding of fact which this Court
may not disturb. But conclusion that "the accident was caused by a fortuitous
event" is in large measure conjectural and speculative . In Lasam vs. Smith this
Court held that an accident caused by defects in the automobile is not a caso
fortuito. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that "the passenger has
neither the choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the
equipment and appliances in use by the carrier."
3. When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common
carrier is at fault or that it acted negligently. This presumption is only
rebutted by proof on the carrier's part that it observed the "extraordinary
diligence . CFI considered the presumption rebutted on the strength of
defendants-appellants' evidence that only the day before the incident, the cross
joint in question was duly inspected and found to be in order. It does not
appear, however, that the carrier gave due regard for all the circumstances in
connection with the said inspection. The bus in which the deceased were riding
was heavily laden with passengers, and it would be traversing mountainous,
circuitous and ascending roads. Thus the entire bus, including its mechanical
parts, would naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be under ordinary
circumstances. The mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and
found to be in order would not exempt the carrier from liability unless it is
shown that the particular circumstances under which the bus would travel were
also considered.

PANTRANCO appealed, because while they were absolved, they were ordered Judgment appealed from is modified. PANTRANCO is ordered to pay the
to pay spouses Landingins the amount of P6,500.00 and P3,500.00 to Garcias not in amounts stated in the judgment appealed from, as damages for breach of contracts,
payment of liability because of any negligence on the part of the defendants but as an with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaints.
expression of sympathy and goodwill.

ISSUE:
Did the court err in ordering PANTRANCO to assume pecuniary liability?
NO. But was error for the trial court to dismiss the complaints because accident is not
caused by fortituous event. There was breach of contract of carriage. Therefore
awards made by the court should be considered in the concept of damages for
breach of contracts of carriage.

SC HELD:
1. PANTRANCO was guilty of breach of contract of carriage. It will be noted that in
each of the two complaints it is averred that two buses including the one in
which the two deceased girls were riding, were hired to transport the
excursionist passengers from Dagupan City to Baguio City, and return, and that
the said two passengers did not reach destination safely.

2. As a common carrier, PANTRANCO was duty bound to carry its passengers

"safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances ." (Article 1755) PANTRANCO did NOT measure up to the
degree of care and foresight required it under the circumstances. The court
below found that the cross-joint of the bus in which the deceased were riding
broke, which caused the malfunctioning of the motor, which in turn resulted in