J.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
COMMON PROVISIONS authority, as in the case before it. The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3,8 affirmed the Comelec Second
Section 6 Division's ruling.
1. Aruelo v. CA
Sevilla argues that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it entertained So's petition despite its
Facts: loss of jurisdiction to entertain the petition after the court a quo's dismissal order became final and
executory due to So's wrong choice of remedy. Instead of filing an appeal within five (5) days from receipt of
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent the Order and paying the required appeal fee, So filed a motion for reconsideration a prohibited pleading
therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule that did not stop the running of the prescriptive period to file an appeal. Sevilla also emphasizes that So's
35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the petition for certiorari should not have been given due course since it is not a substitute for an appeal and
filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of may only be allowed if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five- of law. In his Comment, the respondent contends that the petition was filed prematurely. He emphasizes
day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer. that the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc was not a majority decision considering that
three Commissioners voted for the denial of the motion for reconsideration and the three others voted to
grant the same. So notes that the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution was deliberated upon only by six (6)
Issue:
Commissioners because the 7th Commissioner had not yet been appointed by the President at that time.
Considering that the October 6, 2012 Resolution was not a majority decision by the Comelec en banc, So
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of prays for the dismissal of the petition so that it can be remanded to the Comelec for a rehearing by a full
jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed and complete Commission.
in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Issue:
Held: Whether or not the majority decision in the COMELEC en banc resolution lacks legal effect?
No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are Ruling:
governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for having been prematurely filed with this Court, and remand the case
to the COMELEC for its appropriate action. The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc's Resolution lacks legal
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings effect as it is not a majority decision required by the Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought
We have previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four members of the Comelec en banc. In
before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections,18 we declared "that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the members
Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before of the Comelec en banc, and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary
the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.
general or limited jurisdiction. In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc appears to have affirmed
the Comelec Second Division's Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevilla's motion for reconsideration, the
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that equally divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is not
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests orquo warranto cases pending the majority vote that the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid
before the regular courts. pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain Recall that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a majority vote of all the members of the
pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure Commission en banc is necessary to arrive at a ruling. In other words, the vote of four (4) members must
in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]). always be attained in order to decide, irrespective of the number of Commissioners in attendance. Thus, for
all intents and purposes, the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc had no legal effect
whatsoever except to convey that the Comelec failed to reach a decision and that further action is required.
2. SEVILLA vs. COMELEC The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc's Resolution must be reheard pursuant to the Comelec Rules of
Procedure
Facts:

Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City
during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On November 4, 2010, So
filed an election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and
irregularities in all the protested precincts. The Comelec Second Division held that certiorari can be granted

Section 7
3. Cua v. Commission on Elections | 156 SCRA 582
FACTS:
The first division of Comelec rendered a 2 -1decision favoring the petitioner but nevertheless
suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the
unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No. 1669.
Section 5 of the said resolution states that, A case being heard by it shall be decided with the unanimous
concurrence of all three Commissioners and its decision shall be considered a decision of the Commission. If
this required number is not obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion, the case may be appealed to the
Commission En Banc, in which case the vote of the majority thereof shall be the decision of the Commission.
Petitioner contends that the 2 -1 decision of the first division was a valid decision despite
the resolution stated above because of Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. He argues that this
applies to the voting of the Comelec both in division and En Banc.
Respondent, on the other hand, insists that no decision was reached by the first division because the required
unanimous vote was not obtained. It was also argued that no valid decision was reached by the Comelec En
Banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and these did not constitute the majority of
the body.
ISSUE:
Whether the 2-1 decision of the first division was valid.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-
A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the
First Division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon
En Banc and their decision i s also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the
proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to
assume his seat in the House of Representatives.
appointment as Associate Professor he was also designated as Acting Administrative Officer in a
memorandum dated October 30, 1985.
March 21, 1986, then Secretary of Education Lourdes Quisumbing, designated Dr. Josefina V.
Estolas as RTC Officer-in-Charge in lieu of Dr. Lydia Profeta.
April 4, 1986, the RTC Board of Trustees approved the designation of twenty two (22) employees
of the College to various positions including the designation of Ricardo Salvador as Acting
Administrative Officer vice petitioner Acena. Subsequently, on May 23, 1986, the RTC Board of
Trustees confirmed said designation in its regular meeting.
In a memorandum No. 30, series of 1986, Dr. Estolas revoked effective April 8, 1986, the
designation of petitioner Acena as Acting Administrative Officer. She also requested the latter to
effect a smooth turn-over of the said office to Ricardo Salvador.
On April 8, 1986, the Civil Service Commission National Capital Region, received two letters
dated January 9, 1986 and January 13, 1986. In the letter dated January 9, 1986 addressed to Dr.
Profeta, petitioner Acena manifested to the latter his desire to remain as Administrative Officer as
his appointment as Associate Professor. In her reply letter dated January 13, 1986, Dr. Profeta
withdrew the appointment of petitioner Acena.
April 8, 1986, petitioner Acena filed a complaint for injunction with damages against Dr. Estolas
and Ricardo Salvador. He assailed the validity of Memorandum No. 30 as violative of his security
of tenure.
On May 9, 1986, petitioner Acena filed a letter complaint dated April 17, 1986 with the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) against Dr. Estolas for illegal termination.
On May 20, 1986, Adelina B. Sarmiento, Assistant Regional Director, CSC-NCR, approved as
temporary the appointment of petitioner Acena as Associate Professor because he lacks the
master's degree required for the position pursuant to CSC MC No. 4, series of 1985.
March 23, 1987, petitioner Acena sought the opinion of the CSC Chairman Celerina G. Gotladera
who opined in her letter dated, addressed to the RTC Officer-in-Charge that petitioner is still the
Administrative Officer of RTC because his appointment as Associate Professor had been
withdrawn. Dr. Estolas filed on May 18, 1987 a motion for reconsideration, but then CSC
Chairman Gotladera denied it in her letter dated July 8, 1987.
May 15, 1987, the Pasig Court granted petitioner Acena's application for a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Dr. Estolas from enforcing Memorandum No. 30. The Court of Appeals
likewise sustained the issuance of injunction when it dismissed on September 4, 1987 the petition
for certiorari filed by Dr. Estolas and Ricardo Salvador.
February 3, 1988, the MSPB issued an order dismissing petitioner Acena's complaint for illegal
termination. The dismissal was anchored of the findings that petitioner Acena was validly
appointed to the position of Associate Professor and he was merely designated as Administrative
Officer which designation could be revoked anytime by the appointing authority.

Issue:
4. Raymundo Acena vs. Civil Service Commission and Josefina Estolas, Whether or not the public respondent Civil Service Commission acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion when it set aside the order dated March 23, 1988 of the MSPB (Merit
Petition for certiorari to annul resolution No. 89748 of the Civil Service Commission which set Systems Protection Board)
aside the order of the Merit Systems Protection Board declaring Raymundo Acena as the legitimate
Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges
Ruling:
It is a settled rule, that a respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions acts without
Facts:
jurisdiction if he does not have the authority conferred by law to hear and decide the case. There is excess of
October 18, 1982, Petitioner Raymundo T. Acena was appointed on as an Administrative Officer of jurisdiction where the respondent has the legal power to decide the case but oversteps his authority. And
Rizal Technological Colleges. He was appointed by Dr. Lydia Profeta, President of Rizal there is grave abuse of discretion where the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
Technological Colleges. His appointment as Administrative Officer was approved as permanent by manner in the exercise of his judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
the Civil Service Commission. In the case at bar, it is an admitted fact by no less than the public respondent Civil Service Commission that
December 9, 1985, Dr. Lydia Profeta extended to petitioner Acena a promotional appointment as private respondent Estolas' petition for review filed on June 16, 1988, with the Office of the President was
Associate Professor of Rizal Technological Colleges effective November 1, 1985. Despite his
filed out of time and with the wrong forum . Ostensibly, public respondent Civil Service Commission has suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the
the jurisdiction to review the decision of the MSPB. However, said authority to review can only be exercised cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case. It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is
if the party adversely affected by the decision of the MSPB has filed an appeal with the Commission within not here charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a crime, there is no legal
the reglementary period. obstacle to her being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. The petition was DENIED and the
Here, it is admitted by public respondent Commission and not disputed by private respondent Estolas that resolution was affirmed.
the petition for review which can be considered as an appeal from the decision of the MSPB dated March
23, 1988 was filed outside the reglementary period. This being so, the public respondent exceeded its 6. FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON. JAIME N. FERRER
jurisdiction when it entertained the petition that was erroneously filed with the Office of the President. FACTS:
Having exceeded its jurisdiction public respondent committed a reversible error when it set aside the order COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting booths. However, the
dated March 23, 1988 of the MSPB which had long become final and executory. Final decision or orders of losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas Engineering filed an Injunction suit against COMELEC
the MSPB is adjudication on the merits conclusive on the parties, hence, it can no longer be subject to and Acme. The lower court denied the writ prayed for.
review. Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
case which the court granted. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
5. VITAL GOZON VS. CA (G.R. No. 129132) appeal for certiorari.
ISSUES:
FACTS: 1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the
Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 ordered the reorganization of the various offices of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and
Ministry of Health where Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was demoted to Medical Specialist II from being the 2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the COMELEC
Chief of the Clinics of the National Children's Hospital. De la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract.
Reorganization Board but was ignored and she brought this to Civil Service Commission. While the case RULING:
was pending, the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr.
Jose D. Merencilla. Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided and declared that the demotion/transfer of It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari;
appellant de la Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as null and void, the resolution final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of
became final. De la Fuente there upon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of election laws.
National Children's Hospital, demanding the implementation of the Commission's decision but she did not
answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the final The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-
and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. She instituted in the Court of Appeals an action judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
of " mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the
Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution but Vital- Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said
Gozon did not respond to the order of the court. Thus CA declared, that the said resolution declared dela order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question
Fuente as the lawful and de jure Chief of Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be complied with. A writ of execution was issued
thereafter. On her motion for reconsideration, Vital-Gozon argued that the Appellate Court had no
jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus action and referred this to the Office of Solicitor What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable
General. Court of Appeals denied the motion and ruled that the Solicitor General has no authority to appear by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before
as counsel for respondent Gozon. the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against a public
officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer 7. MATEO v CA

HELD:
The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit and specific statement
regarding " actions for moral and exemplary damages, " and finding none, concluded that the Court of
Appeals had not been granted competence to assume cognizance of claims for such damages. The
conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in
civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and indeed does
not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide claims
for moral, exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling
within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere
procedural one allowing the joining of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it
implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus
SUMMARY: Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager of MOWAD, was placed under preventive
suspension before being terminated by the BoD of MOWAD. He filed a special civil action for quo warranto
and mandamus. The Board moved to dismiss the case, on the ground of the RTCs lack of
jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees. RTC denied the motion. CA dismissed the
Boards petition. The SC granted the petition and set aside the CA decision, saying that the CSC, not the
RTC, had jurisdiction to entertain cases involving the dismissal of officers and employees under the Civil
Service Law.
DOCTRINE: The hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are governed by the provision of the Civil Service
Law and Rules and Regulations. RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers
and employees covered by the Civil Service Law. Employees of GOCC with original charter fall under the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
FACTS
1. Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board
Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General
Manager. He was then placed under preventive suspension, later dismissed on January 7, 1993. Mazimo
San Diego was designated in his place.
2. Sta. Maria filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction 2
before the RTC of Rizal challenging his dismissal by petitioners. He averred that the petitioners
unilaterally stopped and prohibited him from exercising his rights and performing his duties as
General Manager and conspired to remove him from Office while he was out of office on official travel.
3. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that (1) the court had no jurisdiction over
disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service
Commission; and that (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy. This was denied. CA likewise dismissed
their petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S: WON RTC of Rizal has jurisdiction over cases involving dismissal of anemployee of a quasi-
public corporation NO
RULING: Petition granted. CA decision annulled and set aside.
RATIO:
1. There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD No. 198, (Water
Utilities Act of 1973) as amended.
Jurisprudence already ruled that employees of GOCCs with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the 2. CASES NOT COVERED. These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the
Civil Service Commission. The established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.
2. PD 807, EO 292, and Rule II Section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil
Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. The
party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination
of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go
on certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the
Civil Service Commission.
3. It was held in Mancita v. Barcinas that the Civil Service Commission under the Constitution is the single
arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil service and as such, and its judgments are unappealable
and subject only to this Court's certiorari judgment. However, this no longer governs for under the
present rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took
effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no
jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service
Law
8. REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 May 16, 1995
(REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91)
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION
SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from
Judgment or Final Orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-
Judicial Agencies.
1. SCOPE. These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government
Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission.
Labor Code of the Philippines.
3. WHERE TO APPEAL. An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the
period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.
4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law
for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in accordance
with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be
allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full a mount of the docket fee before the expiration of
the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.
5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible
copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the
court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated
as such by the petitioner.
Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals the
docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of
docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon
verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the
petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the denial.
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to
the case, without impleading the courts or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a
concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order
or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as
are referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates showing
that it was filed within the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91.
7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. The failure of the petitioner to comply
with the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for
costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal thereof.
8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on
the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court, however, may dismiss the 16. EFFECTIVITY. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall
petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or
memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself.
14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service Commission and
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed and pending in the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of
this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions for review hereunder and shall be
transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid
agencies which may be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered
as petitions for review and shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for the same purpose.
In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt
by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be considered as the date of
the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may require the filing of amended or
supplemental pleadings and the submission of such further documents or records as it may deem necessary
in view of and consequent to the change in the mode of appellate review.
15. REPEALING CLAUSE. Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and superseded by
this Circular.
take effect on June 1, 1995.

9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7)
legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the
record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall point out insufficiencies or
inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and state the reasons why the petition should be
denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed
with the Court of Appeals.

10. DUE COURSE. If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be
required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the filing thereof, and on
the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agencies
concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise,
it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by
substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.

11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given
due course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a
legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted
may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit
subsequent correction of or addition to the record.

12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought
to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the
case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from
 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965she was
extended another appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent in the same office. On March
Section 2 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as confidential agent have
been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General
9. TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES vs. NATIONAL upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to
HOUSING CORPORATION and ATTY. VIRGILIO SY, as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of Civil Service. On the
Labor Relations same day, petitioner assumed the position. On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of
Civil Service requesting that she be reinstated to her former position as confidential agent. However, no
Facts: action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel
On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition
Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance.
the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the Issue:
corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November (1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.
7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its (2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent was validly terminated on the alleged
employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after
bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.
Code." Held:
From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where, acting thereon in (1)
BLR Case No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77), Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances when a position may
and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge be considered primarily confidential:
Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of November 21, 1978 6 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent (A)When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service
NHC. Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (B) In the absence of such
In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of the said resolution and prays that a declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the
certification election be held among the rank and file employees of NHC. appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom
Issue: from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case before us, the
Whether or not the employees of NHC have the right to form union? provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring ...confidential agents in the several department and offices
Ruling: of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidential brings within
With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions, the fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the
instrumentalities and agencies of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.
with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the guidelines for the (2)
exercise of their right to organize is provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her
consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the "sole and exclusive employees services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positionsare
representative"; Under Section 12, "where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein isallowed by the
in the appropriate organization unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition order the conduct Constitution.
of certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of aprimarily confidential position holds
employees in said organizational unit." office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should benoted, however, that when such pleasure
Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office his term merely
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted expires, in much the same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" and that they shall also participate in policy which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." therefrom, upon the expiration of said term.
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations, dated The main difference between the former the primarily confidential officer and the latter is that the
November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the conduct of a certification election among the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his
affected employees of respondent National Housing Corporation in accordance with the rules therefor is appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its
hereby GRANTED decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent.
When this even takes place, the latter is not removed or dismissed from office his term has merely
10. Salazar vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976 expired. But even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily
confidential and that therefore her removal from said position for loss of confidence was in violation of her
The Civil Service Commission: Appointments security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner in
Facts: the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandoned former position of
confidential agent in the same office.
On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General confidential
agent in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her appointment
 11. R. MARINO CORPUS, vs. MIGUEL CUADERNO, SR.
FACTS:
Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was administratively charged
with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the internal regulations of the office. He was
suspended by the Monetary Board despite the recommendation of the investigating committee that he be
reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the
date of his suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI
of Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He
was awardedP5,000 as attorneys fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment. Petitioner
was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what he has spent for
attorneys fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly technical position may
be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power who was Governor Cuaderno.
ISSUE:
Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an employee or a public
officer?
HELD:
The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical employees, and
to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable. No public officer or employee in elevated the case before the Court and argues that pursuant to Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 the
the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law. Pertaining to the
petitioners claim for damages, the agreement between a client and his lawyer as to attorneys fees cannot
bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to recover
reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a casino operations manager is classified as highly confidential employee. (2)
Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power
to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service .and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.
CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better
qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
13. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) vs. Carlos P. Rilloraza
FACTS: PAGCOR filed administrative charges against the respondent for dishonesty, grave misconduct
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and loss of confidence as their casino operations
manager. Finding the defendants explanation unsatisfactory, PAGCOR Board handed a resolution
dismissing the respondent and several others from their positions in PAGCOR. On appeal to the Civil Service
Commission, the respondent was found guilty only of Simple Neglect of Duty and was penalized only for one
month and one day suspension. The appellate court reaffirmed the decision of Commission and ordered the
petitioner to reinstate the respondent with payment of full backwages plus benefits. The petitioner, however,
respondent is a primarily confidential employee. Hence, he holds office at the pleasure of the appointing
power and may be removed upon the cessation of confidence in him by the latter.
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, whether or not there has been a sufficient cause
of action to dismiss the defendant.

12. Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327
Facts:
Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The
appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final
action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested
position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner
whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor
Duterte, the new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondents appointment.
Issue:
WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is
better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.
Held:
No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by
Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it
was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
RULING: No. PAGCOR employees like casino operations manager are not highly confidential employees by
operation of law under Section 16 of P. D. 1869. First, the classification of a particular position as primarily
confidential, policy- determining or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative
declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. Undoubtedly,
it can be gleaned that the duties of a casino operations manager call for a great measure of both ability and
dependability, but his position lacks confidence, trust or close intimacy reposed in him by his superior so as
to qualify his position as primarily confidential. Second, whether primarily confidential, policy-determining
or highly technical, the exemption provided in the Charter (that is, the charter for the operations of the
PAGCOR) pertains to exemption from competitive examinations to determine merit and fitness to enter the
Civil Service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of tenure. Last, and more to the
point, Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily confidential,
is not absolutely binding on courts. Executive pronouncements such presidential decrees can be no more
than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. It must be so, or else it would then lie
within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny any offer the protection of Section 2(3), Article IX-B of
the Constitution which states that no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law. In other words, Section 16 of P.D. 1869 cannot be given stringent
application without compromising the constitutionally protected right of an employee to security of tenure.
Regardless of whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical, the
Supreme court, being the final arbiter, shall decide the matter not by title but by the nature of the task
entrusted by the appointing power to it. The Supreme Court held that since a casino operations manager is
not among those highly confidential appointees or employees it classified to be, the respondent is not bound
to be dismissed by PAGCOR Board because the latter has no sufficent cause of action to do so: the former
being protected of his right to security of tenure.
 14. SSSEA (employees association) v. SSS
FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a Still, the CSC found that the re-assessment was not in order. It ruled that the immediate supervisor of respondent Luz was in the best position to
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that
on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and
SSS members from transacting business with the SSS;
that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the RULING:
strikers to return to work;
that the strikers refused to return to work; and
that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work;
that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and
that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: authority and to give to the Commission a task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does not confer. This does not mean that the Commission's
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on act of approving or disapproving becomes ministerial.The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments
check-off of union dues;
payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;
conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and
benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and
payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from
the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor
practices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution, Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), Sec. 31, provides that the State "shall
guarantee therights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities,including the right to strike in accordance with law" . Resort to the intent of the framers
of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of theseprovisions. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to
the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities,and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters" [Art.IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil
service are denominated as"government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter,having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the
civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.
15. REYNALDO D. LOPEZ, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROMEO V. LUZ, JR.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana, was appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila
International Container Terminal, Manila South Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively. A law was passed wherein the DOTC was
reorganized, and the number of Assistant Harbor Master in the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was reduced from (3) three to (2) two. After a careful
evaluation of a placement committee of the PPA,Luz was rated third.Luz protested/appealed the appointment of Lopez, but the PPA General
Manager said Luz was not qualified for the two slots. Luz then appealed to the CSC. The CSC ordered for a re-assessment which the PPA complied.
assess the competence of the respondent and not a psychiatric-consultant who was merely a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. It
directed the appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopez appointment and instead substituting its decision for that of the PPA.
The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in promoting the morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and
courtesy among civil servants is not disputed by petitioner Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of appointment delegated to the
heads of departments or agencies of the government is not controverted by the respondents. In the appointment, placement and promotion of
civil service employees according to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially where it is assisted by a screening committee composed
of persons who are in the best position to screen the qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity, performance and
capabilities of the future appointees.The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications
and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. To go beyond this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of the appointing
shall be exercised by the respondent Commission. In the case of Luego v.Civil Service Commission, 143SCRA 327 [1986], the Court ruled
that all the Commission is actually authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the qualifications and appropriate eligibility: "If he does, his
appointment is approved; if not it is disapproved." We further ruled that the Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because
it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the
appointing authority.The Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority.
Petition is GRANTED.
16. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DE TORRES vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts
"Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of the University of the Philippines in Los
Baos (UPLB) who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September 1, 1986 to
August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government'' official
representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific
(CIRDAP).
"When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an
extension of said leave of absence for another year, but was denied by Dr. Eulogio Castillo, the
then Director of the Agricultural Credit Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLB. In the same letter, Dr.
Castillo advised Dr. De Torres to report for duty at UPLB not later than September 15, 1989. Dr.
De Torres did not report to work.
"On June 9, 1995, Dr. De Torres and the University of the Philippines at Los Baos (UPLB) filed
separate requests for reconsideration of aforesaid CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 dated May 5, 1995.
In its CSC Resolution No. 96-1041, the commission denied the motion for reconsideration, further
stating that CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 [stood] and that since separation from the service was
non-disciplinary in nature, the appointing authority may appoint Dr. De Torres to any vacant
position pursuant to existing civil service law and rules."6
The CSC rationalized its ruling in this manner:
 "It could be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that De Torres was already on AWOL
beginning September 1, 1989 since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year was
denied by then Chancellor De Guzman. It is a fact that De Torres' absence from work was not duly
authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should report for
duty on or before September 5, 1989, De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to assume duty as
ordered caused his automatic separation from the service."
Issue: Whether or not the issuance by the COMMISSION of Resolution Nos. 95-3045 and 961041, was in
excess of its authority.
Ruling: Yes. Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals and the
Respondent Civil Service Commission's Resolution Nos. 95-3045 and 96-1041 are SET ASIDE. No costs.
There is no question that the UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner on the Civil Service Rules regarding
leaves. The former warned the latter of the possibility of being considered on AWOL and of being dropped
from the service, if he failed to return and report for duty upon the expiration of his authorized leave.
However, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the
UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from
the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. Indeed, as Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs Emiliana N. Bernardo explained to the CSC in her October 12, 1994 letter:12 "UPLB records show
that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB
Chancellor.
17. Navarro v. Civil Service Commission 226 SCRA 522
Facts:
On June 21, 1989, cable drums were stolen worth P21, 250 from Ford Stockyard in Mariveles Bataan. The
cable drums were owned by Takaoka Engineering Construction Co. Ltd. The suspect for the stolen cable
drums is the Petitioner Mario Navarro.
On October 18, 1990, the Senior Deputy Administrator of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
approved an Order terminating the services of Navarro and finding him guilty as charged.
Navarro appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). On July 25, 1991, the MSPB rendered its
decision setting aside the Order issued by the Senior Deputy Administrator of EPZA on October 18, 1990.
The decision of the MSPB also reinstated Navarro with payment and back wages and other benefits due him
from the time of his dismissal. On December 11, 1991, the MSPB denied the motion for reconsideration of
the EPZA.
On November 6, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Bataan dismisses the criminal case filed against Navarro
and his co-accused for qualified theft. EPZA sought to reverse the decision of the MSPB before the CSC and
on July 16, 1992, the CSC rendered its decision setting aside the MSPBs decision dated December 11, 1991
and the CSC found Navarro guilty of grave misconduct and reimposed the penalty of dismissal. The CSC
also denied in its Resolution dated September 11, 1992 the motion for reconsideration of Navarro.
In the recourse, Navarro claims that the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess jurisdiction in deciding the case without considering other pertinent evidence but the EPZA filed for
the dismissal of the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a manifestation to support the
plea of the Petitioner in the argument that there can be no appeal in the MSPBs decision exonerating
Navarro. On May 6, 1993, the OSG granted the CSC 10 days to comment but no comment was filed and on
August 5, 1993, the CSC filed for extension time to comment but no comment was still filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission and the Export Processing Zone Authority acted without
jurisdiction.
HELD:
The MSPB rendered a favorable decision for Navarro and this fact alone should have prevented EPZA from
appealing to the Commission on the bases of prevailing jurisprudence.
Under P.D. 807 or The Philippine Civil Service Law, the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction over MSPBs
decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges and P.D. 807 does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees. The Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative cases involving suspension for more than thirty days or removal or dismissal from
office. P.D. 807 provides that appeals shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision. The
party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee whom the administrative case is
filed for the purpose of disciplinary action.
EPZA, for appealing MSPBs decision and exonerating Navarro from administrative charge and CSC, for
taking recognizance of, and deciding the appeal shows that both EPZA and CSC acted without jurisdiction.
18. Civil Service Commission vs Dacoycoy
Facts:
On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter,
Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O.
Dacoycoy (Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar) , for habitual
drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. After a fact-finding investigation, the CSC RO8- Tacloban City
found a prima facie case against respondent, and, on March 5, 1996, issued the corresponding formal
charge against him. Accordingly, the CSC conducted a formal investigation, and, on January 28, 1997, the
Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge
of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission found respondent Pedro
O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped
Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision
and control as the Vocational School Administrator, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the
service. Dacoycoy invoked the power of the Court of Appeals via special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission ruling that respondent did not appoint or
recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism.
Issue:
Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism
Ruling:
Yes. Sec 59 of EO 212, (1) ) defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city
and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the:
1. appointing or
2. recommending authority, or of the
3. chief of the bureau or office, or of
4. the persons exercising immediate supervision over him.
The word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third
degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
CSC found respondent guilty of nepotism as a result of the appointment of his 2 sons Rito, a driver
and Ped, a utility worker, as there are under his immediate supervision and control as the school
administrator. It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and
utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the
Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. However, it was
respondent Dacoycoy who certified that "funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito
Dacoycoy" and even rated his performance as "very satisfactory".
Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school
administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his
immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and
placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school.
Both positions are career positions.
19. Santos v. Yatco
FACTS:
Petitioner files for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent Judge Yatco for cancelling his previous order
for execution on the parcel of land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land is being occupied by
Fernando Mendoez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land to the petitioners and that he shall
voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously made shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A
civil case was filed by the petitioner against Mendoez for failure to pay as per agreement of both parties.
Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to take the land back. Defendant Mendoez moved for
postponement to give both parties sufficient time to come to an agreement which was allowed by the
respondent judge. It was settled by both parties that Mendoez will secure a GSIS loan however when he was
ready to make the payment the petitioner refused to abide with their agreement and now asking for a higher
amount of money for payment. Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of execution, Judge Yatco
quashed said order hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted in lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
Dissatisfied, respondent sought relief before the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On May 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of Alfonso.
Issue:
whether the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed against Alfonso.
Held:
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance
of and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees,
whether they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first
and foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints
lodged by a citizen against them as public servants. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a
complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the
case, although it may opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 21, 2007 Decision and August 23, 2007 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97284 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil
Service Commission Resolution Nos. 061821 and 061908 dated October 16, 2006 and November 7, 2006,
respectively, as well as its Order] dated December 11, 2006 placing respondent under preventive suspension
are hereby REINSTATED. The CSC is ordered to proceed hearing the administrative case against
respondent with dispatch.

RULING:
The court held that any judge has the jurisdiction to quash any writ of execution issued by him especially
when it was improvidently issued. There is no abuse of discretion by the judge since the defendant made an
opposition and proved that there is subsequent verbal agreement that amended the compromise hence the
execution cannot be validly decreed without a hearing. The consequent ability of the defendant to meet his
obligations by securing a GSIS loan also justifies the courts refusal to eject him from the premises by an
execution.

20. CSC, Anicia De Lima v. Larry M. Alfonso

Facts:
Respondent Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management Department of PUP.
On July 6, 2006, Dr. Zenaida Pia, Professor IV in PUP-Sta. Mesa, and Dindo Emmanuel Bautista, President
of Unyon ng mga Kawani sa PUP, jointly filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Alfonso for violation of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, charging the latter with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the Service, and violation of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The affidavit-complaint was
lodged before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In their affidavit, Dr. Pia and Bautista alleged, among
others, that respondent repeatedly abused his authority as head of PUPs personnel department when the
latter prepared and included his name in Special Order Nos. 0960 and 1004 for overnight services,
ostensibly authorizing him to work for 24 hours straight from May 16 to 20, May 22 to 27 and May 29 to
June 2, 2006. As a result thereof, Alfonso made considerable earnings for allegedly working in humanly
impossible conditions 24 hours straight daily, for three consecutive weeks.

Without ruling on the motion, Assistant Commissioner Atty. Anicia Marasigan-de Lima, head of CSC-NCR,
issued an Order dated December 11, 2006 directing the Office of the President of PUP to implement the
preventive suspension order against respondent.