PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,

FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,

BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration

in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact
an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of
speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of
their business with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed
through with the rally.

the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No
Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty
of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court
of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

Issue:

Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?

Held:

No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can
be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the
rights to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential
to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.
Kilosbayan vs. Morato (G.R. No. 118910. July
17, 1995)
 25APR
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO
C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S.
DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,
and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Ponente: MENDOZA
FACTS:
[T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the
Contract of Lease nullified in the first case [decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)]. Petitioners maintain
(1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a
joint venture which were found in the Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case; (2) that the ELA did not
have to be submitted to a public bidding because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301, 1
(e); (3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in the
Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds the PCSO cannot purchase its own on-line lottery
equipment and has had to enter into a lease contract; (5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this
suit is to further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the Court as their forum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corp. is invalid.
HELD:
NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was dismissed. Pertinent to the issue, the SC held:
xxx
(3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to the charter of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;
(4) that under 1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has authority to
enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or
joint venture with another party, so long as it itselfholds or conducts such lottery; and
(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to be submitted to public bidding
as a condition for its validity.
RATIO:
E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. It does
not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in 6 and 7
but they refer to the lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government-
owned buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions do not require public bidding. It is thus
difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be
thought of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to
buy is not of course a contract of purchase and sale.
Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint venture agreement the present lease
contract is [more] advantageous to the government. The question is whether under the circumstances,
the ELA is the most advantageous contract that could be obtained compared with similar lease agreements
which the PCSO could have made with other parties. Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms
could have been obtained by the PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO concluded with the
PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.

TANADA v. ANGARA
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment

272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts :

This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said

agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its

exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost

and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as

reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic

sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives

foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,

cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted

principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda

international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally

binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a

regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it

consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a

valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of

judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows

withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation

of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for

the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction.

Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
 1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

PEOPLE VS MARTI
People of the Philippines vs. Andre Marti
G.R. No. 81561, January 18 1991

Facts:
The appellant and his common law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Filipino Complex Ermita, Manila carrying with
them four gift wrapped packages to be sent in Zurich Switzerland. The proprietress, Anita Reyes
(not related to Shirley Reyes) then asked the appellant if he could examine and expect the
packages however appellant refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were just gifts to a friend. Anita no longer insisted. Before delivery of
appellants box to the bureau of Customs and or bureau of Post, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and
husband of Anita, following standard procedure opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
opened a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. He squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing
gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Job prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting laboratory examination sample he extracted from the cellophane. Therefore, job and
three NBI agents and a photographer went to the Reyes office at Ermita. Job brought out the
box in which appellants packages were places and in the presence of the NBI agents, open the
top flaps, removed the Styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves.
Dried marijuana leaves are found inside the cellophane.

Issue:
 Whether or not there is violation of appellants constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that it is not the NBI who made the search. Records of the case
clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job who made search and inspection of the said packages. Said
inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Job as a
precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Custom or Post. If the search
is made upon the request of law enforces, a warrant must generally must be secured first if it to
pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made in the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purpose, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of the police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcer, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individual as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.

The alleged violation against unreasonable search and seizure may only invoked against
the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise by the sovereign authority.

Ang Tibay v CIR (1940) 69 Phil 635

J. Laurel

Facts:
Toribio claimed to have laid off workers due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang Tibay factory.
The Court of industrial relations forwarded a motion for recon with the supreme court.
In pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial Relations, the national labor union, the respondent,
averred:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the breach of obligation with the
Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldnt be used to interpret a legislation of American industrial origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.

Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue for the trial?

Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR

Ratio:
There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity.
The nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court with judicial and quasi-judicial functions for
the purpose of settling disputes and relations between employers and employees. It can appeal to
voluntary arbitration for dispute. It can also examine the industries in a locality by order of the
president.
There is a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which constitutes a departure from the
separation of powers.
The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and is
not bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also include any matter necessary for solving
the dispute.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.
Some examples that it must follow are:
1. right to a hearing
2. consideration of evidence by the court
3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached
4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial decisions in an admin court so as to
free them from technical rules
5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the hearing. The court may also
delegate some powers to other judicial bodies.
6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy. It mustnt merely accept the
views of a subordinate.
7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the decision.
The record is barren and doesnt satisfy a factual basis as to predicate a conclusion of law.
Evidence was still inaccessible.
The motion for a new trial should be granted and sent to the CIR.

Diosdado Guzman vs National

University
July 5, 2015
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142 SCRA 699 Political Law Bill of Rights Due Process Due Process in Educational Institutions
I n 1984, Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University (NU) barred
them from enrolling in the said university. NU argued that their failure to enroll was due to the
students fault. It was alleged that Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass actions within the
university premises; that such mass actions were violative of school policies; that due to their mass
actions, Guzman et al incurred bad grades; that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they
be allowed to enroll; that it is in the best interest of both parties for the students not to be enrolled.
ISSUE: Whether or not National University may not admit the Diosdado Guzman et al in the case at
bar.
HELD: No. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed which
school policies or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may be expelled
from. NU failed to show that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial type one)
to determine Guzman et als liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions.
Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others to freely
choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations. Guzman
et al were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools which provides that no penalty shall be imposed upon
any student except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as
duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed sanction upon the
students without due investigation such act is illegal.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; and these are:
1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel,
if desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs

CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
GR # l-24693 July 31, 1967 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Ordinance)
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Manila Ordinance No. 4760 regulating the operation of hotels,
motels and lodging houses on the ground that it is unreasonable and hence violative to the due process clause,
wherein it requires establishments to provide guest registration forms on the lobby open for public view at all times.

RespondentCityMayor contends that the challenged ordinance was a valid and proper exercise of police power
measure for the proper purpose of curbing immorality. An explanatory note for the challenged ordinance made
mention of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication inManilatraceable in great part to
the existence of motels and the like.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is violative of the due process clause.

HELD: No, the challenged ordinance as an exercise of police power was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. As a due process requirement, an ordinance must not outrun the bounds of reason
and result in sheer oppression for it to be valid. Thus it would be unreasonable to stigmatize an ordinance enacted
precisely for the well-being of the people, specially if there is no factual foundation being laid to prove its alleged
violation of due process and offset the ordinances presumed validity.