G.R. No.

158540 July 8, 2004

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT MANUFACTURERS CORP., THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE &
INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

FACTS:

The Philippines, for one, enacted Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8751 (on the imposition of countervailing
duties), Rep. Act No. 8752 (on the imposition of anti-dumping duties) and, finally, Rep. Act No. 8800,
also known as the Safeguard Measures Act ("SMA")2 soon after it joined the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.3

The SMA provides the structure and mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures, including
tariffs, to protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict
serious injury on them.4 The wisdom of the policies behind the SMA, however, is not put into question
by the petition at bar. The questions submitted to the Court relate to the means and the procedures
ordained in the law to ensure that the determination of the imposition or non-imposition of a safeguard
measure is proper.

Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation ("Southern Cross") is a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation. Its principal
stockholders are Taiheiyo Cement Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation, purportedly the largest
cement manufacturers in Japan.5

Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation6 ("Philcemcor") is an association of

domestic cement manufacturers. It has eighteen (18) members,7 per Record.

On 22 May 2001, respondent Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI") accepted an application from
Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement9 in increased quantities has caused
declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as
caused depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition at first of provisional,
then later, definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to the SMA. Philcemcor
filed the application in behalf of twelve (12) of its member-companies.10

After preliminary investigation, the Bureau of Import Services of the DTI, determined that critical
circumstances existed justifying the imposition of provisional measures.11 On 7 November 2001, the DTI
issued an Order, imposing a provisional measure equivalent to Twenty Pesos and Sixty Centavos
(P20.60) per forty (40) kilogram bag on all importations of gray Portland cement for a period not
exceeding two hundred (200) days from the date of issuance by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) of the
implementing Customs Memorandum Order.12 The corresponding Customs Memorandum Order was
issued on 10 December 2001, to take effect that same day and to remain in force for two hundred (200)
days.13

In the meantime, the Tariff Commission, on 19 November 2001, received a request from the DTI for a
formal investigation to determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on
imports of gray Portland cement, pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. A notice of commencement of formal investigation was published in the newspapers on 21

A preliminary conference was held on 27 November 2001, attended by several concerned parties,
including Southern Cross.15 Subsequently, the Tariff Commission received several position papers both
in support and against Philcemcor's application.16

On 13 March 2002, the Tariff Commission issued its Formal Investigation Report.

Accordingly, the Tariff Commission made the following recommendation, to wit:

The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury not having been
established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed
on the importation of gray Portland cement.24

The DTI received the Report on 14 March 2002. After reviewing the report, then DTI Secretary Manuel
Roxas II ("DTI Secretary") disagreed with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission that there was no
serious injury to the local cement industry caused by the surge of imports.25 In view of this
disagreement, the DTI requested an opinion from the Department of Justice ("DOJ") on the DTI
Secretary's scope of options in acting on the Commission's recommendations. Subsequently, then DOJ
Secretary Hernando Perez rendered an opinion stating that Section 13 of the SMA precluded a review
by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commission's negative finding, or finding that a definitive safeguard
measure should not be imposed.26

On 5 April 2002, the DTI Secretary promulgated a Decision. After quoting the conclusions of the Tariff
Commission, the DTI Secretary noted the DTI's disagreement with the conclusions. However, he also
cited the DOJ Opinion advising the DTI that it was bound by the negative finding of the Tariff
Commission.

The DTI hereby issues the following:

The application for safeguard measures against the importation of gray Portland cement filed
by PHILCEMCOR (Case No. 02-2001) is hereby denied.27 (Emphasis in the original)

Philcemcor received a copy of the DTI Decision on 12 April 2002. Ten days later, it filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus28 seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as
well as the Tariff Commission's Report. Philcemcor likewise applied for a Temporary Restraining
Order/Injunction to enjoin the DTI and the BOC from implementing the questioned Decision and Report.

After conducting a hearing on 19 June 2002 on Philcemcor's application for preliminary injunction, the
Court of Appeals' Twelfth Division31 granted the writ sought in its Resolution dated 21 June
2002.32 Seven days later, on 28 June 2002, the two-hundred (200)-day period for the imposition of the
provisional measure expired. Despite the lapse of the period, the BOC continued to impose the
provisional measure on all importations of Portland cement made by Southern Cross. The uninterrupted
assessment of the tariff, according to Southern Cross, worked to its detriment to the point that the
continued imposition would eventually lead to its closure.33

Southern Cross timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution on 9 September 2002.
Alleging that Philcemcor was not entitled to provisional relief, Southern Cross likewise sought a
clarificatory order as to whether the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction could extend the earlier
imposition of the provisional measure beyond the two hundred (200)-day limit imposed by law

Despite the efforts of Southern Cross, the Court of Appeals failed to directly resolve the Motion for
Reconsideration. Instead, on 5 June 2003, it rendered a Decision,36 granting in part Philcemcor's petition.

On 7 July 2003, Southern Cross filed with the Court a "Very Urgent Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction" ("TRO Application"), seeking to enjoin the DTI
Secretary from enforcing his Decision of 25 June 2003 in view of the pending petition before this Court.
Philcemcor filed an opposition, claiming, among others, that it is not this Court but the CTA that has
jurisdiction over the application under the law.

On 1 August 2003, Southern Cross filed with the CTA a Petition for Review. It points out that Southern
Cross's TRO Application seeks to enjoin the DTI Secretary's second decision, while its Petition before the
CTA prays for the annulment of the same decision.44

ISUE;

whether a Temporary Restraining Order is warranted.

HELD;

Propriety of the Temporary Restraining Order

On Southern Cross's application for provisional relief. It sought to enjoin the DTI Secretary from
enforcing the definitive safeguard measure he imposed in his 25 June 2003 Decision. The Court did not
grant the provisional relief for it would be tantamount to enjoining the collection of taxes, a peremptory
judicial act which is traditionally frowned upon,49 unless there is a clear statutory basis for it.50 In that
regard, Section 218 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 prohibits any court from granting an injunction to
restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the internal
revenue code.51 A similar philosophy is expressed by Section 29 of the SMA, which states that the filing
of a petition for review before the CTA does not stop, suspend, or otherwise toll the imposition or
collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the adoption of other appropriate safeguard
measures.52 This evinces a clear legislative intent that the imposition of safeguard measures, despite
the availability of judicial review, should not be enjoined notwithstanding any timely appeal of the
imposition.
G.R. No. 118216 March 9, 2000

DELTAVENTURES RESOURCES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. FERNANDO P. CABATO, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 62;
HON. GELACIO L. RIVERA, JR., Executive Labor Arbiter, NLRC-CAR, Baguio City, ADAM P. VENTURA,
Deputy-Sheriff, NLRC-CAR, Baguio City; ALEJANDRO BERNARDINO, AUGUSTO GRANADOS, PILANDO
TANGAY, NESTOR RABANG, RAY DAYAP, MYRA BAYAONA, VIOLY LIBAO, AIDA LIBAO, JESUS GATCHO
and GREGORIO DULAY, respondents.

FACTS;

On July 15, 1992, a Decision3 was rendered by Executive Labor Arbiter Norma Olegario, National Labor
Relations Commission entitled "Alejandro Bernardino, et al, vs. Green Mountain Farm, Roberto Ongpin
and Almus Alabe rendered declaring the respondents guilty of Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice
and ordering them to pay the complainants

On May 19, 1994, complainants in the abovementioned labor case filed before the Commission a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution as respondent's appeal to the Commission and this
Court5 were respectively denied.

On June 16, 1994, Executive Labor Arbiter Gelacio C. Rivera, Jr. to whom the case was reassigned in view
of Labor Arbiter Olegario's transfer, issued a writ of execution6 directing NLRC Deputy Sheriff Adam
Ventura to execute the judgment against respondents, Green Mountain Farm, Roberto Ongpin and
Almus Alabe Sheriff Ventura then proceeded to enforce the writ by garnishing certain personal
properties of respondents. Findings that said judgment debtors do not have sufficient personal
properties to satisfy the monetary award, Sheriff Ventura proceeded to levy upon a real property .

On July 27, 1994, a month before the scheduled auction sale, herein petitioner filed before the
Commission a third-party claim7 asserting ownership over the property levied upon and subject of the
Sheriff notice of sale.

However, on August 16, 1994, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet a
complaint for injunction and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary retraining order
against Sheriff Ventura, reiterating the same allegations it raised in the third party claim it field with
the Commission.The next day, August 17, 1994, respondent Judge Cabato issued a temporary
restraining order, enjoining respondents in the civil case before him to hold in abeyance any action
relative to the enforcement of the decision in the labor case.

Further, on September 20, 1994, petitioner, filed with the Commission a manifestation11 questioning the
latter's authority to hear the case, the matter being within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
manifestation however, was dismissed by Labor arbiter Rivera on October 3, 1994.12

Meanwhile, on September 20, 1994, private respondent-laborers, moved for the dismissal of the civil
case on the ground of the court's lack of jurisdiction.13 Petitioner filed its opposition to said motion on
October 4, 1994.14
On November 7, 1994, after both parties had submitted their respective briefs, respondent court
rendered its assailed decision, this Court is equal rank with the NLRC, hence, has no jurisdiction to issue
an injunction against the execution of the NLRC decision

present amended Complaint under the forum shopping rule.15

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by respondent Judge, 16 petitioner promptly filed
this petition now before us.

ISSUE:

whether or not the trial court may take cognizance of the complaint filed by petitioner and consequently
provide the injunction relief sought

HELD:

Having established that jurisdiction over the case rests with the Commission, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge Cabato in denying petitioner's motion for the issuance of an
injunction against the execution of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.

Moreover, it must be noted that the Labor Code in Article 254 explicitly prohibits issuance of a
temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor
disputes by any court or other entity (except as otherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264). As correctly
observed by court a quo, the main issue and the subject of the amended complaint for injunction are
questions interwoven with the execution of the Commission's decision. No doubt the aforecited
prohibition in Article 254 is applicable.1wphi1

Petitioner should have filed its third-party claim before the Labor Arbiter, from whom the writ of
execution originated, before instituting said civil case. The NLRC's Manual on Execution of
Judgment,26 issued pursuant to Article 218 of the Labor Code, provides the mechanism for a third-party
claimant to assert his claim over a property levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to an order or decision
of the Commission or of the Labor Arbiter. The power of the Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution
carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of the execution of his decision and to consider
whatever supervening events might transpire during such execution.

Moreover, in denying petitioner's petition for injunction, the court a quo is merely upholding the time-
honored principle that a Regional Trial Court, being a co-equal body of the National Labor Relations
Commission, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of
any decision of the latter.27

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 184778 October 2, 2009

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS MONETARY BOARD and CHUCHI FONACIER, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. NINA G. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA, in her capacity as Regional Trial Court Judge of Manila, Branch
28; RURAL BANK OF PARAAQUE, INC.; RURAL BANK OF SAN JOSE (BATANGAS), INC.; RURAL BANK OF
CARMEN (CEBU), INC.; PILIPINO RURAL BANK, INC.; PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, INC.;
RURAL BANK OF CALATAGAN (BATANGAS), INC. (now DYNAMIC RURAL BANK); RURAL BANK OF
DARBCI, INC.; RURAL BANK OF KANANGA (LEYTE), INC. (now FIRST INTERSTATE RURAL BANK); RURAL
BANK OF BISAYAS MINGLANILLA (now BANK OF EAST ASIA); and SAN PABLO CITY DEVELOPMENT
BANK, INC., Respondents.

FACTS

In September of 2007, the Supervision and Examination Department (SED) of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) conducted examinations of the books of the following banks: Rural Bank of Paraaque,
Inc. (RBPI), Rural Bank of San Jose (Batangas), Inc., Rural Bank of Carmen (Cebu), Inc., Pilipino Rural
Bank, Inc., Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, Inc., Rural Bank of Calatagan (Batangas), Inc. (now
Dynamic Rural Bank), Rural Bank of Darbci, Inc., Rural Bank of Kananga (Leyte), Inc. (now First Interstate
Rural Bank), Rural Bank de Bisayas Minglanilla (now Bank of East Asia), and San Pablo City Development
Bank, Inc.

After the examinations, exit conferences were held with the officers or representatives of the banks
wherein the SED examiners provided them with copies of Lists of Findings/Exceptions containing the
deficiencies discovered during the examinations. These banks were then required to comment and to
undertake the remedial measures stated in these lists within 30 days from their receipt of the lists,
which remedial measures included the infusion of additional capital. Though the banks claimed that
they made the additional capital infusions, petitioner Chuchi Fonacier, officer-in-charge of the SED, sent
separate letters to the Board of Directors of each bank, informing them that the SED found that the
banks failed to carry out the required remedial measures. In response, the banks requested that they
be given time to obtain BSP approval to amend their Articles of Incorporation, that they have an
opportunity to seek investors. They requested as well that the basis for the capital infusion figures be
disclosed, and noted that none of them had received the Report of Examination (ROE) which finalizes
the audit findings. They also requested meetings with the BSP audit teams to reconcile audit figures. In
response, Fonacier reiterated the banks failure to comply with the directive for additional capital
infusions.

On May 12, 2008, the RBPI filed a complaint for nullification of the BSP ROE with application for a TRO
and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC docketed as Civil Case No. 08-119243 against Fonacier,
the BSP, Amado M. Tetangco, Jr., Romulo L. Neri, Vicente B. Valdepenas, Jr., Raul A. Boncan, Juanita D.
Amatong, Alfredo C. Antonio, and Nelly F. Villafuerte. RBPI prayed that Fonacier, her subordinates,
agents, or any other person acting in her behalf be enjoined from submitting the ROE or any similar
report to the Monetary Board (MB), or if the ROE had already been submitted, the MB be enjoined from
acting on the basis of said ROE, on the allegation that the failure to furnish the bank with a copy of the
ROE violated its right to due process.

The Rural Bank of San Jose (Batangas), Inc., Rural Bank of Carmen (Cebu), Inc., Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc.,
Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, Inc., Rural Bank of Calatagan (Batangas), Inc., Rural Bank of Darbci,
Inc., Rural Bank of Kananga (Leyte), Inc., and Rural Bank de Bisayas Minglanilla followed suit, filing
complaints with the RTC substantially similar to that of RBPI, including the reliefs prayed for, which were
raffled to different branches and docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 08-119244, 08-119245, 08-119246, 08-
119247, 08-119248, 08-119249, 08-119250, and 08-119251, respectively.

On May 13, 2008, the RTC denied the prayer for a TRO of Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc. The bank filed a
motion for reconsideration the next day.

On May 14, 2008, Fonacier and the BSP filed their opposition to the application for a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 08-119243 with the RTC. Respondent Judge Nina Antonio-
Valenzuela of Branch 28 granted RBPIs prayer for the issuance of a TRO.

The other banks separately filed motions for consolidation of their cases in Branch 28, which motions
were granted. Judge Valenzuela set the complaint of Rural Bank of San Jose (Batangas), Inc. for hearing
on May 15, 2008. Petitioners assailed the validity of the consolidation of the nine cases before the RTC,
alleging that the court had already prejudged the case by the earlier issuance of a TRO in Civil Case No.
08-119243, and moved for the inhibition of respondent judge. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration regarding the consolidation of the subject cases.

On May 16, 2008, San Pablo City Development Bank, Inc. filed a similar complaint against the same
defendants with the RTC. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Lift/Dissolve the TRO and an Opposition
to the earlier motion for reconsideration of Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc.

On May 19, 2008, Judge Valenzuela issued an Order granting the prayer for the issuance of TROs for the
other seven cases consolidated. On May 21, 2008, Judge Valenzuela issued an Order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration regarding the consolidation of cases in Branch 28. On May 22,
2008, Judge Valenzuela granted the urgent motion for reconsideration of Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc. and
issued a TRO similar to the ones earlier issued.

On May 26, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss against all the complaints (except that of the San
Pablo City Development Bank, Inc.), on the grounds that the complaints stated no cause of action and
that a condition precedent for filing the cases had not been complied with. On May 29, 2008, a hearing
was conducted on the application for a TRO and for a writ of preliminary injunction of San Pablo City
Development Bank, Inc.

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)/Writ of Preliminary Injunction, questioning the Decision dated September 30, 20081 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103935. The CA Decision upheld the Order2 dated June 4, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28 in Manila, issuing writs of preliminary injunction

ISSUE:

Whether injunction was properly issued

HELD: NO. These requirements are absent in the present case.

The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is
material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing
right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The twin requirements of a valid
injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an
injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown.8

In granting the writs of preliminary injunction, the trial court held that the submission of the ROEs to the
MB before the respondent banks would violate the right to due process of said banks.

This is erroneous.

The respondent banks have failed to show that they are entitled to copies of the ROEs. They can point to
no provision of law, no section in the procedures of the BSP that shows that the BSP is required to give
them copies of the ROEs. Sec. 28 of RA 7653, or the New Central Bank Act, which governs examinations
of banking institutions, provides that the ROE shall be submitted to the MB; the bank examined is not
mentioned as a recipient of the ROE.

The respondent banks cannot claim a violation of their right to due process if they are not provided with
copies of the ROEs. The same ROEs are based on the lists of findings/exceptions containing the
deficiencies found by the SED examiners when they examined the books of the respondent banks. As
found by the RTC, these lists of findings/exceptions were furnished to the officers or representatives of
the respondent banks, and the respondent banks were required to comment and to undertake remedial
measures stated in said lists. Despite these instructions, respondent banks failed to comply with the
SEDs directive.

The issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction is an unwarranted interference with the
powers of the MB. Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 765310 refer to the appointment of a conservator or a receiver
for a bank, which is a power of the MB for which they need the ROEs done by the supervising or
examining department. The writs of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court hinder the MB
from fulfilling its function under the law. The actions of the MB under Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 7653 "may
not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action
taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction." The writs of preliminary injunction order are precisely what cannot be done under the
law by preventing the MB from taking action under either Sec. 29 or Sec. 30 of RA 7653.

As to the third requirement, the respondent banks have shown no necessity for the writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent serious damage. The serious damage contemplated by the trial court
was the possibility of the imposition of sanctions upon respondent banks, even the sanction of closure.
Under the law, the sanction of closure could be imposed upon a bank by the BSP even without notice
and hearing. The apparent lack of procedural due process would not result in the invalidity of action by
the MB. This was the ruling in Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals.11 This "close now, hear
later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of
the banks assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors,
stockholders, and the general public. The writ of preliminary injunction cannot, thus, prevent the MB
from taking action, by preventing the submission of the ROEs and worse, by preventing the MB from
acting on such ROEs.

The respondent banks cannotthrough seeking a writ of preliminary injunction by appealing to lack
of due process, in a roundabout manner prevent their closure by the MB. Their remedy, as stated, is
a subsequent one, which will determine whether the closure of the bank was attended by grave abuse
of discretion. Judicial review enters the picture only after the MB has taken action; it cannot prevent
such action by the MB. The threat of the imposition of sanctions, even that of closure, does not violate
their right to due process, and cannot be the basis for a writ of preliminary injunction.

The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection of the
public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits.
Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and
mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the
national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and
stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government.13

The respondent banks have failed to show their entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. It
must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the
pleader.14 The respondent banks cannot rely on a simple appeal to procedural due process to prove
entitlement. The requirements for the issuance of the writ have not been proved. No invasion of the
rights of respondent banks has been shown, nor is their right to copies of the ROEs clear and
unmistakable. There is also no necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Indeed the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction tramples upon the powers of the MB and prevents it from fulfilling its
functions. There is no right that the writ of preliminary injunction would protect in this particular case.
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.15 In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified.16

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision dated September 30, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 103935 is hereby REVERSED. The assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction of
respondent Judge Valenzuela in Civil Case Nos. 08-119243, 08-119244, 08-119245, 08-119246, 08-
119247, 08-119248, 08-119249, 08-119250, 08-119251, and 08-119273 are hereby declared NULL and
VOID.