I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Administrative Law That branch of modern law under which the executive department of the government acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial capacity, interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the community, as under laws
regulating public corporations, business affected with public interest, professions, trade and calling, rates and prices, laws for the protection of the
public health and safety and the promotion of the public convenience and advantage.

Administrative Code of 1987

Sec. 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the Administrative Code of 1987.

Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. - Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different
meaning:

(1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of the
government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through
which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.

(2) National Government refers to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local
governments.

(3) Local Government refers to the political subdivisions established by or in accordance with the Constitutions

(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality,
or government-owned or controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

(7) Department refers to an executive department created by law. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any instrumentality, as herein
defined, having or assigned the rank of a department, regardless of its name or designation.

(8) Bureau refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any principal subdivision
or unit of any instrumentality given or assigned the rank of a bureau regardless of actual name or designation, as in the case of department-
wide regional offices.

(9) Office refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to any major functional unit of a department or bureau including
regional offices. It may also refer to any position held or occupied by individual persons, whose functions are defined by law or regulation.

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested within special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations.

(11) Regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate matters affecting
substantial rights and interests of private persons, the principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission,
board or council.

(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges and then monetary authority of the State.

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock:
Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of Budget, the Civil Service
Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

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Sec. 16 Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment
of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

Kinds of Administrative Law

1. Statutes setting up administrative authorities

2. The body of the doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation, and effect of determinations and regulations of such
administrative authorities
3. Rules, regulations, or orders of such administrative authorities in pursuance of the purposes for which administrative authorities were
created or endowed
4. Determinations, decisions, and orders of such administrative authorities in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular
fields.

The 1987 Administrative Code did not entirely repeal or modify the Revised Administrative Code and special legislations because what
the 1987 Code repealed or modified are only those all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly (Sec. 27 Book VII of AC of 1987)

Administrative Codes in question depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause.

2 Administrative Codes

1. General laws
2. Between the codes and special legislations on specific subject matters,
Special legislations will prevail as an exception to the former

Statutory principle: General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally so interpreted as to embrace only
cases in which the special provisions are not applicable .

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affair of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by
the organic law of its existence.

Presumption: is that special statutes are exceptions to general law because they pertain to a special charter granted to meet a particular set of
conditions and circumstances

Sources of Administrative Law:

1. Constitution
2. Statutes creating administrative bodies
3. Court decisions interpreting the charters of administrative bodies
4. The body of rules, regulations and orders issued by administrative agencies

CASES:

1. Mecano v. COA (Reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses)

F - Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total
amount of which he is claiming from the COA. Reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section
699 of the RAC.

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I WON RAC was repealed by AC 1987?

H RAC was not repealed by AC 1987. As a gen. rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not substitute for the first act and
will continue so for as the two acts are the same from the time of first enactment. Thus, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear
showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear
and manifest.

It is settled that repeal of a statute by implication is not favoured.

It is clear that the earlier law is culled (Cull select from a group) in a general repeal clause. In the absence of an expressed repeal, there will be an
implied repeal only if the later law and the earlier law are clearly and convincingly irreconcilable. However, there is no implied repeal in this case
because the later and earlier laws can be reconciled through a reasonable construction of a statute.

2. Leveriza . IAC (Contract of Lease)

F - Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case:
Contract A a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and
Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.
Contract B a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land,
but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; and
Contract C a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000
square meters, for 25 years.

Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and
depends has already been cancelled by the defendant CAA and maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only valid and subsisting
contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned.

Defendants Leverizas claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is
Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be declared void.

CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A
because of the violation committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAA
further asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the Director of Public Works and Communications is not valid.

I - There is no dispute that Contract A at the time of its execution was a valid contract. The issue therefore is whether or not said contract is still
subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B) without the consent of
CAA and the execution of another contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C)
The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of Contract A

H YES. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.

Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee specifically for the purpose of operating and managing a gasoline
station by the latter, to serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.

As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased premises, the provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:

7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in such eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall
first be secured. In any event, such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of this agreement.

Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms and conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:

8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for
revocation of this contract by the Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.
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It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease (Contract B) with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor).
The cancellation of the contract was made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza.

H Cancellation of contract is valid.

It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the government under the third category
(Art. 567. )Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the CAA has the power to execute the deed or contract involving leases of real
properties belonging to the RP, not because it is an entity duly designated by the President but because the said authority to execute the same is,
by law expressly vested in it, which in this case is RA 776.

Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its creation and existence,
administers properties belonging to the RP and it is on these properties that the Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty
to enter into, make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold,
purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or necessary. (The exception, however, is the
sale of properties acquired by CAA or any other real properties of the same which must have the approval of the President of the Philippines.) The
Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of such proviso in the other transactions contemplated in paragraph (24) and is convinced
as we are, that the Director of the CAA does not need the prior approval of the President or the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in
the execution of Contract C.

3. <ADMINISTRATIVE LAW>Finally, petitioners contend that the administrator of CAA cannot execute without approval of the Department
Secretary, a valid contract of lease over real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, citing the Revised Administrative Code, which
provide that Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract of lease must be executed:
(1) by the President of the Philippines, or

(2) by an officer duly designated by him or

(3) by an officer expressly vested by law.

On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the CAA Administrator has the authority to lease real property belonging to the RP under its
administration even without the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, which authority is expressly vested in it by law,
more particularly Section 32 (24) of Republic Act 776, which reads:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the general control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall
have, among others, the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx

(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport and all government aerodromes except those
controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines including such power and duties as: (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts
of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity; (c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property;
right of ways, and easements which may be proper or necessary: Provided, that no real property thus acquired and any other real property of the
Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be sold without the approval of the President of the Philippines.

There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law while Republic Act 776 is a special law nor in the fact that the real
property subject of the lease in Contract C is real property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the government under the third category
(Art. 567. )Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the CAA has the power to execute the deed or contract involving leases of real
properties belonging to the RP, not because it is an entity duly designated by the President but because the said authority to execute the same is,
by law expressly vested in it, which in this case is RA 776.

Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its creation and existence,
administers properties belonging to the RP and it is on these properties that the Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty
to enter into, make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold,
purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or necessary. (The exception, however, is the

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sale of properties acquired by CAA or any other real properties of the same which must have the approval of the President of the Philippines.) The
Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of such proviso in the other transactions contemplated in paragraph (24) and is convinced
as we are, that the Director of the CAA does not need the prior approval of the President or the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in
the execution of Contract C.

In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable; that
specific statute prevails over a general ; and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefor specially should prevail.

3. Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Dev. Bank Employees (Voluntary Arbitrator)

F - From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to
resolve the following issue: Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and the MOA on promotion. At a conference, the parties
agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBEs Position Paper ;
LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23,
1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. Without LDBs Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing
the same.

I - WON a voluntary arbitrator is an instrumentality

H - Instrumentality is anything used as a means or agency. Thus the term governmental agency or instrumentality are synonymous in the sense
that either of them is a means by which the government acts or by which certain government act or function is performed.

Since a voluntary arbitrator performs quasi-judicial functions, he/she does performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated
to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code. Thus, he/she falls in the contemplation of the term instrumentality.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must
become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions
have the same legal effect as judgments of a court.

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested within special functions
or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

4. Iron and Steel Authority v. CA (expropriation proceedings, eminent domain, non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of RP)

F - Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by P.D. No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the
Philippines.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly
owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel
mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proc. No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines withdrawing from
sale or settlement a large tract of public located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.

Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and
related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), Letter of Instruction (LOI), No. 1277, was issued directing the NSC to

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negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the
subject land. LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days
from the date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation
proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the plant itself and related
facilities and to cede the same to the NSC.

Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against MCFC in the
RTC of Iligan City, praying that it be placed in possession of the property involved upon depositing in court representing ten percent (10%) of the
declared market values of that property.

A writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and control of the land occupied by MCFCs
fertilizer plant installation.

The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired. MCFC then filed a motion to
dismiss, contending that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its
opposition to this motion.

The trial court granted MCFCs motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The dismissal was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court
stating that only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case.
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied.

ISA went on appeal to the CA, which affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court. At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals held that it
was premature for the trial court to have ruled that the expropriation suit was not for a public purpose, considering that the parties had not yet
rested their respective cases.

Hence this Petition for Review.

I - WON the RP is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISAs term.

RP is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little
differently, the expiration of ISAs statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities
are properly regarded as folded back into GRP and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to
have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

The principal or the real party in interest is thus the RP and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved
should the condemnation suit be eventually successful.

When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that
agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code.

(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

Inc. Agency (GOCC, SSS, GSIS, LANDBANK, PUP

1. Look at the charter is the charter prescribes the government to enter.

2. Apply the Corporation Code Articles of Incorporation
3. In the absence look for the Gen. Law

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5. Ignacia Balicas v. Fact-Finding and lntelligence Bureau (FFIB) (neglect of duty)\

F - Respondent BALICAS, PENRO senior environmental management specialist, monitored the implementation of the CHS Project Development to
check compliance with the terms and conditions in the ECC. She conducted another monitoring on the project for the same purpose. In both
instances, she noted that the project was still in the construction stage hence, compliance with the stipulated conditions could not be fully
assessed, and therefore, a follow-up monitoring is proper. It appeared from the records that this August 23, 1995 monitoring inspection was the
last one conducted by the DENR. Immediately after the tragic incident on August 3, 1999, a fact-finding investigation was conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman through its Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), which duly filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several officials of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), and the local government of Antipolo. The charge against petitioner involved a supposed failure on her part to monitor and inspect the
development of CHS, which was assumed to be her duty as DENR senior environmental management specialist assigned in the province of Rizal.
For her part, petitioner belied allegations that monitoring was not conducted, claiming that she monitored the development of CHS as evidenced
by 3 monitoring reports .She further claimed good faith and exercise of due diligence, insisting that the tragedy was a fortuitous event. She
reasoned that the collapse did not occur in Cherry Hills, but in the adjacent mountain eastern side of the subdivision.

I WON Balicas is guilty of gross neglect of duty

H The petition is hereby GRANTED, The CA decision affirming the Ombudsmans dismissal of petitioner IGNACIA BALICAS from office is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and petitioners REINSTATEMENT to her position with back pay and without loss of seniority rights is hereby ordered.

In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of duty, we have to look at the lawfully prescribed duties of petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR
regulations are silent on the specific duties of a senior environmental management specialist. Internal regulations merely speak of the functions of
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to which petitioner directly reports.

The responsibility of monitoring of housing and land development projects is not lodged with the DENR but with the HLURB which is the sole
regulatory body for housing and development. Hence there is no legal basis for a government employee under DENR be held liable for gross
neglect of duty pertaining to another agency.

Regulatory Agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights
and interests of private persons, the principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body such as a commission, board or council.

6. Malaga v. Penachos (Bidding and award of the project)

F Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC against the Chairman and members of the PBAC (Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee) on
the ground of their refusal to accept the documents submitted without just cause that resulted of not being included in the pre-qualified bidders
and unable to participated on the scheduled bidding. Also asking not to grant the awards of the project pending resolution of their complaint.

I WON ISCOF is covered by PD 1818

H - Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) as a chartered institution as well as instrumentality is covered by PD 1818.

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested within special functions
or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges and then monetary authority of the State.

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is covered by PD 1818. However, it must be noted that this law was not intended to shield from
judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies.

7. Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan (Corrupt Practice of the petitioner as a public officer)

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F Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3 (b) RA 3019 as amended, known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice
Act.

The Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial Technology Development Institute, a component of the DOST employed petitioner as Project
Manager to supervise the construction of the JICA Bldg. at the DOST Compound Bicutan Taguig.

I WON the accused is a public officer

H The accused falls under the non-career service category of CSC pursuance to the definition of Sec. 2 (b) RA 3019 includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary whether in the career service and non career service. Hence, he is a public officer.

Officer as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to a person whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of
discretion in the performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or
perform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power, officer includes any government employee, agent or body having authority
to do the act or exercise that function.

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II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Creation, Establishment and Abolition of Adminstrative Agencies

2003 Bar Exams: Validity of abolition of long-standing Bureau under DILG by the President

The President can also abolish a long standing bureau in the DILG provided it is done in good faith because the president has been
granted the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of his office and the executive departments to effect
economy and promote efficiency and the power includes the abolition of government offices.

1. Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was the President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), appointed by the President of the
Philippines (Pres. Marcos) on July 17, 1974. During the incumbency of petitioner, 2 administrative cases were filed against him for: 1.) illegal
use of government vehicles, 2.) misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the college, 3.) oppression and harassment, 4.)
grave misconduct, 5.) nepotism and dishonesty.

Administrative cases were filed with the Office of the President and subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation. Charges of violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3(e), RA 992 Sec. 20-21 and RA 773 Sec. 14 were filed against him in the Office of the
Tanodbayan. On June 14, 1976, 3 information for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graf and Corruption Practices Act (RA 3019) were filed
against the Petitioner. The information alleged that he appropriated for himself a bahay kubo which was intended for the college and
construction materials worth P250,000 more or less. Petitioner was also accused of using a driver of the college as his personal and family
driver.

On October 22, 1976, Petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to RA 3019 Sec. 13, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was
designated as officer in charge on Nov. 10, 1976 and then Acting President on May 13, 1977.

On April 1, 1978 PD 1341 was issued by Pres. Marcos, converting the PCC into a PUP. Mateo continued as the head of the new University.
On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980 as President for a term of 6 years.

On July 11, 1980 the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of the charges against him and ordered the
reinstatement of the latter. By virtue or reinstatement, he is entitled to receive the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

Cases filed before the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) were likewise dismissed on the ground that they had become moot and academic.

Moot and Academic - An action is considered moot when it is no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involving
have become academic or deed as when subsequent events have undertaken the position and the court has nothing left to resolve.

On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for execution of judgment; particularly the part ordering his reinstatement
to the position of President of PUP and the payment of his salaries and benefits during the period of suspension. Motion was granted.
However, Pres. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting President of PUP following the expiration of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio
Prudente who had succeeded Dr. Mateo.

In his return, the sheriff stated that he had executed the writ by installing petitioner as President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not
vacate the office as he wanted to consult the President of the Philippines. Petitioner assumed the Office of the President of PUP.

On May 18, 1992, People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the writ of execution before CA. CA
issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the petitioner to cease and desist from acting as President of PUP.

On July 15, 1992, the 7th Division of CA rendered decision and set aside the writ of execution rendered by the trial court payment of
salaries and benefits to petitioner was disallowed. Hence, petition before SC

Issue: W/N PD 1314 which converted the PCC into PUP, did not abolish the PCC

Held: Petitioner argues that PD 1314 did not abolish PCC, and PUP is merely continuation of the existence of the PCC and could be reinstated
to his former position.

PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the former PCC into PUP. What took place was a change in academic status of the education
institution not in its corporate life.
As petitioner correctly points out when the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it with
another one, lawmaking authority says so.

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 But the reinstatement of Petitioner could not be ordered because PD 1437 had been promulgated fixing the term of the office of the
President of the State Universities and Colleges into 6 years, renewable for another 6 years and authorizing the President of the
Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbent who were not re-appointed.

Ruling: CA decision modified by setting aside the orders of TC with regard to the non payment of the salaries and benefits which the
Petitioner failed to receive during his suspension.

With the result petitioners term was cut short. Hence, the petitioner became entitled only to retirement benefits or the payment of
separation pay.

2. Viola vs. Alunan, III (Cesar G. Viola, Chairman, Brgy. 167 Zone 15 Dist. II Mla. vs. Rafael Alunan III, Sec. of DILG)

Facts: Petitioner brought an action against Respondent, Alex David, President/Secretary General of the National Liga ng mga Barangay, and
Leonardo Angat, President of the City of Manila Liga ng mga Barangay to RESTRAIN them from carrying out the election for the questioned
positions.

Local and National Liga 1.) President, 2.) Executive Vice-President, 3.) 1st VP, 4.) 2nd VP, 5.) 3rd VP, 6.) Auditor, 7.) 5 Directors

Contention: Petitioners contention is that the positions in question are in excess of those provided in the Local Government Code
(RA7160) Section 493 of which mentions as elective positions only those of Presidentt, Vice-President, and 5 members of Board of Directors in
each chapter at the Municipality, City, Provincial, Metropolitan Political Subdivisions and National Levels.

Issue: W/N additional positions have been created without authority of law according to Petitioner?

Held: Contention is untenable. Creation of these positions was actually made in the constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga Barangay w/c
was adopted by the 1st Barangay National Assembly on Jan. 11, 1994.

The creation of additional positions in the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters is authorized by the LGC pursuant to Sec. 493
The board shall create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter.

Sec. 493 grants the power to create positions not only to the boards of the local chapters but to the board of the Liga at the National
Level as well.

The creation by the board of the National Liga of the positions of 1 st, 2nd, and 3rd VP was intended to provide uniform officers for the
national chapters.

Additional positions to be created pursuant to Sec. 493 of LGC need not be limited to the appointive positions because management
positions are not necessarily limited to appointive positions.

Ruling: Petition for Prohibition is DISMISSED.

3. Louis Barok Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission

Facts: Petitioners raised in Court that EO 1 which created the PTC should be declared unconstitutional and to enjoin PTC from performing its
functions.

The petitioners alleged contention: that EO 1 violates separation of powers as it encroaches the power of congress to create Public
Office and appropriate funds for its operation.

Petitioners: They also asserted the fact that the role of the President in the 1987 Constitution does not include the power to create an
entirely / new public office.

Respondents contested that EO 1 did not arrogate the powers of the Congress to create Public Office because the Presidents executive
power and control necessarily includes the inherent power to conduct investigation to ensure laws are faithfully executed.

Issue: 1. Does EO 1 transgress on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of Public Office?

2. Whether it violates the equal protection clause?

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Held: There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Because whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will the very source of the funds for the commission. And thus be subject to auditing
rules and regulations.

The Chief Executive power to create Ad Hoc investigating Committee is valid. Having been constitutionality granted full control of the
Executive Department, which respondents belong. The legality of investigation is sustained. However, Petitioners contend that EO 1 violated
the equal protection clause because it does not apply to all members of the same class such intent of focusing only in previous administration
as the sole subject of PTC. It must be cover all administrations previous to that former Pres. Arroyo.

Ruling: Petition Granted. EO 1 declared unconstitutional insofar it is violative of the equal protection clause.

4. Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board vs. Commissioner Fe Barin of Energy Regulatory Commission

Facts: RA 9136, known as EPIRA (for electric Power Industry Reform Act) was enacted on June 8, 2009 and took effect on June 26, 2009. Sec.
38 of RA 9136 provides for the abolition of the ERB (Energy Regulatory Board) and creation of ERC (Energy Regulatory Commission).

At the time of filing the petition, the ERC was composed of:

1. Commissioner Fe Barin
2. Dept. Commissioners Carlos Alindada, Leticia Ibay, Oliver Butalid and Mary Anne Colayco
Commissioners assumed office on Aug. 15, 2009

Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and hiring of ERC employees. A portion of the guidelines reflects the
Commissioners view on the selection and hiring of the ERC employees vis--vis Civil Service rules.

Nov. 5, 2005, KERB sent a letter to the commissioners stating their objection to the commissioners stand that Civil Service laws, rules and
regulations have suppletory application in the selection and placement of the ERC employees.

Contention:

KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or change the ERBs character, it merely changed the ERB name to ERC and expanded
functions and objectives.

Commissioner Barin replied to KERB, the creation of a placement committee is no longer necessary because there is already a prescribed
set of guidelines for recruitment of personnel.

KERB filed a petition to enjoin Termination of Petitioners ERB employees

Issue: 1. W/N Sec. 38 of RA 9136 abolishing the ERB is constitutional?

2. W/N Commissioners of the ERC were correct in disregarding and considering merely suppletory in character the protective mantle of
RA 6656 as to the ERB employees.

Held:

All laws enjoy the presumption of Constitutionality. To justify the nullification of law, there must be a clear and convincing breach of the
constitution.
Power to create the office has been delegated by the legislature. The power to create an office carries with it the power to abolish.
Pres. Aquino, then exercisingly her legislative powers, created the ERB by issuing EO 172 on May 8, 1987.
The question whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent.
Sec. 38 of RA 9136 explicitly abolished the ERB
ERC indeed assumed the functions of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded functions which are intended to meet the specific needs
of a deregulated power industry.

Ruling: Impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure DOES NOT arise in the abolition of an office.

There is no occupant in an abolished office, where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak.

Petition is DISMISSED.

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5. Commission on Human Rights Employees Association vs. Commission on Human Rights

Facts: On Feb. 14, 1998, Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to all constitutional officers enjoying fiscal autonomy.

Last portion of Art. 33 covers the appropriations of CHR.

CHR, through its Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Recina and other Commissioners promulgated resolution No A98-047 adopting an updating
and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.

Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of 10 additional plantilla positions

1. Director IV salary grade 28 for the CARAGA Region Office

2. 4 Security Officer II salary grade 15
3. 5 Process Servers salary grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners

By virtue of Resolution No A98-062, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding, for said
staffing modification . among the positions collapsed were:

1. Atty. III
2. 4 Atty. IV
3. Chemist III
4. 3 Special Investigator I
5. Clerk III
6. Accounting Clerk II

CHR forwarded said staffing position and upgrading scheme to the DBM, but DBM Sec. Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the ground
that Being a member of the fiscal autonomy, group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions
without approval of DBM.

This would elevate the field units to a bureau or regional office, a level even higher than the one previously denied.

In light of DBMs disapproval, the CSC-NCR Office, through a Memorandum, recommended the CSC Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected. CHREA, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of CSC-Regional Office.

CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve
matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.

CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.

CHREA filed Motion for Reconsideration but CSC-Central Office denied, CHREA elevated it to CA which affirmed the pronouncement of the
CSC-Central Office. (Rule in favor of Central Office)

Petition before SC.

Issue: Can the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla
positions which approval of DBM?

Held:

Contention: Petitioners contention that CA gravely erred when it held that under 1987 Constitution, the CHR enjoys Fiscal Autonomy.
And it includes the action taken by it in collapsing, upgrading and reclassification of positions.

Respondent CHR said that petitioner has no locus standi because no official written record in the commission recognizing the petitioner
as bona fide organization of its employees nor there is anything in the records to show that its president, Marcial Sachez Jr., has the authority
to sue the CHR.

CHR contends that it has the authority to cause the upgrading, reclassification, creating and collapsing plantilla schemes without approval
of DBM because it enjoys fiscal autonomy.

SC: Proper Party is one who has sustained an injury as a result of the act complaint of. Here, petitioner, which consist of rank and file
employees of respondent CHR protests that the upgrading, reclassification and collapsing of positions benefited only select few in the upper
level position in the commission. This sufficiently meet the injury test.

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 The regulatory power of DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. DBM has the sole
power and discretion to administer the compensation and POSITION CLASSIFICATION of the National Government (RAC of 1987 Sec. 3 Chapter
I Title 17).

The approval of DBM must first sought prior to implementation of any or upgrading of positions in government.

From the 1987 Consti. and the Administrative Code, it is clear that CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions, NOR enjoys
fiscal autonomy.

Fiscal Autonomy freedom from outside control and limitations, it is a constitutional grant, not obtainable by membership.

CHR is not a member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy.

Salary Standardization law, for this purpose, Congress has delegated to the DBM the power to administer the salary standardization law.

Ruling: Petition GRANTED, decision of CA reversed and set aside.

Reorganization of Administrative Agencies

a. Definition of Reorganization
b. Presidents power to reorganize; basis
c. Power of other agencies to reorganize; limitations

Reorganization is the process of restructuring the bureaucracys organizational and functional set up, to make it more viable in terms of
economy, efficiency, effectiveness and to make it more responsive to the needs of its public clientele as authorized by law.

- Is a means used by the legislature to reorganize or abolish offices which t may do so directly or indirectly by authorizing an executive
department or agency to reorganize its office.

The President can also abolish a long standing bureau in the DILG provided it is done in good faith because the president has been
granted the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of his office and the executive departments to effect
economy and promote efficiency and the power includes the abolition of government offices.

1. Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. The Executive Secretary

Facts: Petitioner represented by Rep. Muji S. Hataman, Respondent is Hon. Eduardo Ermita, and the Secretary of Agrarian Reform Hon. Rene
Villa.

Petitioner (AMIN) assail the constitutionality of EO 364 and 379 both issued in 2004, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition EO
364 issued by GMA on Sept. 27, 2004 which transforming the DAR into Dept. of Land Reform (DLR).

EO 379 amending EO 364 which states that National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) shall be attached agency of the DLR

Contention:

Petitioner contends that 2 Presidential issuances are unconstitutional for violating:

1. Principle of Separation of Powers.

2. Constitutional scheme and policies for Agrarian Reform.
3. Constitutionality right of the people in reasonable participation in decision making including through adequate consultation.

Issue: W/N EO 364 and EO 379N is unconstitutional? Is the reorganization valid?

Held: The issued on the transformation of DAR into DLR became moot and academic because by virtue of EO 456 which issued on Aug. 23,
2005, DLR having reverted into its former name.

OSG on behalf of Respondent concedes that AMIN has a legal standing to file suit as member of Congress.

Petitioner averred that Executive which injures the institution of Congress which can be questioned by a member of Congress, and
Powers of Congress are impaired.

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 Co Petitioner Mamalo Descendants Organization Inc. (MDOI) alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of NCIP becoming an
attached agency of the DAR on the processing of Ancestral Domain claims filed with its members.

MDOI raises no transcendental importance to relate to the merits of petition because of lack of any other party with more direct and
specific interest in the question raised.

AMIN contends that since DAR, NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed, merged not by mere executive orders and
reorganization of these administrative agencies should be the subject of statutes.

The Constitution confers, by EXPRESS provision, the power of control over executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone.

Pres. Justifies an executive action to carry out re-organization measures under broad authority of law.

Pursuant to AC of 1987 Sec. 39, states that: The President shall have continuing authority to re-organize the administrative structure of
the Office of the Pres. And he may take the ff actions:

Transfer agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other departments or agencies.

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

2. Drianita Bagaoisan vs. National Tobacco Administration represented by Antonio De Guzman and Perlita Baula

Facts: President ERAP issued on Sept. 1998 EO 29 entitled Mandating the Streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration (NTA) a
government agency under the Department of Agriculture (DA).

Order was followed by EO 36 amending EO 29 by increasing from 400 to not exceeding 75 the positions affected thereby.

In compliance therewith, NTA prepared and adopted a new Organization Structure and Staffing Patter (OSSP) which was submitted to the
Office of the Pres.

On Nov. 11, 1998, the rank and file employees of NTA, Batac (Petitioners) filed a letter appeal with CSC and sought the assistance in
recalling OSSP.

On Dec. 4, 1998, OSSP was approved by DBM subject to certain revisions.

On June 10, 1999, petitioners, all occupying different position of NTA Office in Batac, Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of
termination of their employment effective 30 days from receipt thereof.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before RTC of Batac Ilocos Norte. The RTC ordered the NTA to
appoint petitioners in the new OSSP positions similar to their respective former assignments.

Motion for Reconsideration (MR) filed by NTA was denied by RTC, then NTA filed on appeal with CA, and CA reversed and set aside the
assailed orders of the TC.

Petitioners, elevated the matter to SC; SC denied for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error of CA, MR denied. Petitioners
submitted a Motion to admit Petition for en banc resolution.

Issue: Whether NTA may be re-organized by an executive fiat, not by legislative action

Held:

Contention:

Petitioners contention, re-organization through the issuance of EO cannot be done without the benefit of due deliberation, debate and
discussion of members of both chambers of the Congress of the Philippines.

A public office is either created by the constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Where the office was created by Congress, it may
be abolished by them. The EXCEPTION, is as far as bureaus, agencies, or offices in the executive department, the Pres. Power of control may
justify him to inactivate the function of a particular office and grant him the broad authority to carry out re-organization measures.

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

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3. National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs. Civil Service Commission and Violeta Garcia

Facts: In 1977, Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Law graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII
under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529 which she appointed under
permanent status up to Sept. 1984

She was for 2 years designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan by virtue of EO 649 which authorized the
restricting of the Land Registration Commission to NLTDRA.

Petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on Oct. 1, 1984 under Temporary status for not being a
member of the Bar.

She appealed to Sec. of Justice but her request was denied; MR was denied as well.

Petitioner was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the best interest of the Service. While said case was pending
decision, her temporary appointment was renewed in 1985.

In Memorandum dated Oct. 30, 1986, minister and now Secretary of Justice notified petitioner of the termination of her services as
Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground she was receiving bribe money.

Appeal to Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred to appeal to the Merit System Protection Board which denied on the
ground that termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment. MR DENIED.

However, in Resolution dated June 30, 1988, the CSC directed Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds II because
the new requirement of BAR membership would not apply to her but only to filling up of vacant lawyer position on after Feb. 9, 1981. Since
she had been holding the position from 1977-1984, she would not be affected by EO 649.

NALTDRA filed present petition to assail the validity of the Resolution of the CSC.

Contention:

Sec. 8 and 10 of EO 649 abolished all existing positions in LRC and transferred to NALTDRA and Garcia is not a member of the Bar and she
cannot be reinstated.

Issue: W/N Membership of the Bar is the qualification requirement for appointment of Deputy Register of Deeds under EO 649?

Held: EO 649 authorized the re-organization of LRC into NALTDRA. It abolished all the positions and required new appointments to be issued
to all employees of the NALTDRA.

Law mandates from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in LRC are deemed NON-EXISTENT. After Abolition,
there is No Occupant, No Tenure to Speak.

Its requirement of BAR membership for Deputy Register of Deeds is valid reorganization measure. A reorganization carried in good faith
for the purpose to make bureaucracy more efficient.

4. Eliseo Sinon vs. Civil Service Commission, Dept. of Agriculture Re-organization Appeals Board and Juana Banan

Facts: Prior to re-organization of then Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Private Respondent Banan was the incumbent Municipal Agricultural
Officer of Region II, Cagayan.

Petitioner Eliseo Sinon occupied position of Fisheries Extension Specialist II in BFAR in the same region. However, the re-organization of
the MAF into Department of Agriculture with the issuance of EO 116 called for the evaluation of 29 positions of Municipal Agriculture Officer
(MAO) in Region II, Cagayan. Petitioner is included but Banan is excluded.

Thus, Respondent Banan filed an appeal with the DARAB for re-evaluation of qualifications. And was re-evaluated. And Sinon was
displaced by Banan and the resolution was approved by Sec. of Agriculture, Carlos G. Dominguez.

However, on Aug. 30, 1988, Sinon received an appointment as MAO for Region II Cagayan as approved by the Regional Director
Gumersindo Lasam on the basis of 1st evaluation.

Thus, Sinon filed an appeal to CSC, then DARAB Resolution Set Aside. Banan filed an MR which she pitted her qualifications against Sinon.
And granted Banans MR.

15
 Sinon filed MR, but CSC denied it. Hence, Petition before SC to assailed the resolution of CSC.

Issue: W/N CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the rating or qualification of petitioner.

Held:

Contention:

Petitioners argued that CSC revoked the appointment that the petitioner received early and which deemed permanent by virtue of the
approval of the Regional Director of the Dept. of Agriculture.

CSC departed from its power which is limited only to REVIEW and hence encroached upon the appointing power exclusively lodged in
the appointing authority.

Under RA 6656 Sec. 6, In order that the best qualified and most deserving persons shall be appointed in any re-organization, there shall
be created a placement committee in each department or agency to assist the appointing authority in placement of personnel.

Placement committee was charged with the duty of exercising the discretionary functions as the appointing authority.

Purposes of Re-organization is the process of restructuring the bureaucracys organizational and functional set-up to make it more
viable in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and make it more responsive to the needs of its public clientele as authorized by
law.

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

5. Luis B. Domingo vs. DBP and CSC

Facts: Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and Career Development Officer on permanent status from Feb. 1979 to Dec. 1986.

On Dec. 3, 1986 EO 81, the Revised Charter of IBP was passed authorizing the re-organization of DBP. Pursuant to the Executive Order,
DBP issued Board Resolution allowing the issuance of Temporary Appointments to DBP Personnel in order to fully implement the re-
organization. Such Temporary Appointments issued had max. period of 12 months.

Petitioner was issued a Temporary Appointment on Jan. 2, 1987 for a period of 1 year which was renewed for another period up to Nov.
30, 1988.

A Memorandum issued by the Final Review Committee, Petitioner got a performance rating of Below Average by reason of which his
appointment was made lapse.

Petitioner, together with certain Evangeline Javier filed with CSC a joint verified complaint against DBP for illegal dismissal. Complainants
alleged that dismissal constitute violation of Civil Service Law against issuance of Temporary Appointments to permanent employees, as well
as of their right to Security of Tenure and due process.

On Nov. 27, 1989, CSC issued a resolution directing the re-appointment of Mr. Domingor and Ms. Javier as Senior Training and Career
Development Officer and Research Officer or any such equivalent rank under staffing pattern of DBP.

DBP filed a MR, then CSC issued resolution setting aside its previous resolution and affirming the separation of Petitioner. Hence, Petition
before SC.

Issue: Does the validity of the re-organization implemented by DBP violates petitioners right to Security of Tenure?

Held: Petitioner contends that government re-organization to terminate the services of government employees cannot be valid ground
pursuant to the ruling of Dario vs. Mison.

Petitioner also maintains that average and below average efficiency ratings are not valid grounds for his Termination from Service.

He also contends that he should be afforded a day in court pursuant to the requirements of procedural due process.

1. Re-organization is recognized a valid ground for separation of Civil Service Employees, subject ONLY to the condition it be done in good
faith.
Constitution and Sec. 33 and 34 of EO 81 and Sec. 9 of RA 6656 states that all those not appointed in the implementation of said re-
organization shall be deemed separated from service.

16
2. Appointment in the Civil Service shall be made only according to the Merit and Fitness requiring Public Officers and Employees to serve
with the highest degree.
3. There is no violation of due process even no hearing was conducted as long as the party was given a chance to present his evidence and
defend himself.

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

6. Aida D. Eugenio vs. Civil Service Commission, Hon. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Hon. Salvador Enriquez, Jr.

Facts: Aida Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for Career Executive Service Eligibility and
a CESO Rank.

On Aug. 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility and on Sept. 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the
Career Executive Service Board.

However, on Oct. 1, 1993, Respondent CSC passed resolution abolishing the Career Executive Service Board and turn it to Office for
Career Executive Service of CSC.

The said resolution became an impediment to the appointment of the Petitioners as Civil SERvice Officer, Rank IV. Petitioner filed a
petition to annul the Resolution of CSC.

Issue: Whether CSC has the power to abolish the Career Executive Service Board?

Held: Petitioner contends that CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it abolished the CESB, an office create by law.

CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it legally authorized the transfer of Public Money.

Respondent contends that the integration of the CESB into the CSC is authorized by law pursuant to Sec. 12(1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V
of 1987 Admin. Code.

CESB was created by PD 1 on Sept. 1, 1974. Therefore, CESB was created by law, it can only be abolish by the legislature. Creation and
Abolition of Public Officer is primarily a legislative function.

Legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of CESB.

CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity.

On the contrary, Legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CSB.

Commissions power to re-organza is limited to offices under its control.

The essential autonomous character of CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent commission.

Attachment purpose is inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy program and coordination.

Ruling: Petition GRANTED.

Reason / purposes for creating administrative agencies

Common types of administrative agencies

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III. POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Legislative, Judiciary, Executive are the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances among them.

- While one branch is not to invade the domain of the other, no one branch can act without any participation or check from the other
branches which the Constitution recognizes and permits.
- Administrative falls to Executive Department

2 Most Important Powers

1. Quasi-legislatve or rule-making power promulgate IRR

- The authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the
provisions of a law and implement legislative policy.

2. Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power interpret and apply such regulations

- Power to a wit of execution for the enforcement of decision
- The power of the administrative authorities to make determination of facts in the performance of their official duties and to apply
the law as they construe it to the fact so found.

Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance.

Discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment.

Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations:

1. Legislative Rule designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; it is in the nature of subordinate
legislation.

a. Supplementary Regulation intended to fill in the details of the law and to make explicit what is only general (IRR of Labor
Code)
b. Contingent Regulation issued to enforce or suspend the operation of a law, after the ascertainment by the administrative
agency of existence of a particular contingency.
2. Interpretative Rule those which purport to do no more than interpret the statute being administered for proper observance by the
people (BIR Circulars)

Requisites for validity of administrative rules and regulations

1. Must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law

2. Conform to the standards that the law prescribes
3. Must be reasonable
4. Must be related solely to carrying into effects the general provision o the law

CASES:

1. Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission

It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him by the statute and those necessarily implied in
the exercise thereof.

It is beyond the power of the commission to impose because it results in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. The results in
discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. The commissions permission amounted to a prohibition.

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2. Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez

I WON the Sec. of Agriculture has the power to remove the directors and officers of a cooperative

The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Sec. of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the powers of the KBPMBPBM who are
authorized to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Sec. 8 of PD175 which grants him the power to supervise
and regulate cooperatives. This section does not give him that right

The administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Theses
powers should be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

3. Sen. Robert Jaworski v. PAGCOR

SAGE

The grant of franchise is stated in a clear and unequivocal language, hence the grantee must abided by the limits set by its franchise and strictly
adhere to its term and conditions.

4. RCPI v. NTC

Doctrine is settled that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those
granted in the legislation creating such body.

The EO neither grant the power to impose fines on public utilities which have failed to render adequate service to its customer nor expanded the
supervisory and regulatory power of the agency.

5. Matienzo v. Abellera

In the grant of the authority, there was no mention of time limitation. Hence, to determine whether a board or commission has a certain power,
the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created and that which is incidentally necessary for
the full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the
appropriation means are deemed given.

6. Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc.

I WON CDA has adjudicatory powers

It can be gleaned from RA 6939 that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions which consist of policy making.
Registration, fiscal and technical assistance to coop and implementation of cooperative laws. There was no grant of adjudicatory powers to CDA.

7. LLDA v. CA

Re: Open Dumpsite

I Does LLDA have the power and authority to issue ceases and desist order

19
 While it is fundamental that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its expressed powers. (toothless paper agency)

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER (RULE MAKING POWER)

Legislative power

Power to make, alter, and repeal laws.

Doctrine of Separation of Powers
Non-delegation of legislative power
Power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
Exception to the doctrine of Non-delegation of legislative power

a. Delegation to the President (e.g. Sec. 23(2) (war) and 28(2) (tariff rates), Art. IV, Constitution)
b. Delegation to the local governments (e.g. Sec. 48, Local Government Code)
c. Delegation to the people
d. Delegation to the Supreme Court (e.g. Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, Constitution)
e. Delegation to Administrative Agencies.

Cases:
1. US v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908) (criminal case, penalty impose, non-delegation of legislative power)

Lesson: Fixing of penalties for violation of laws is a matter purely within the hands of the legislature.

F Respondent was charged with a violation of par. 70 and 83 of Circular 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs, published in OG and approved by
the Sec. of Finance and Justice. That being the capt. of the Lighter Maude he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden in
Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external power.

I WON the penalty for violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature?

H - Fixing of penalties for violation of laws is a matter purely within the hands of the legislature. In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners
of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal., 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under
statutes authorizing them to do so, the court saying: "Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and
regulations with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the
hands of the legislature."

"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the
constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.

2. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) (Probation, undue delegation of legislative power)

Lesson: Old Probation Law violated the doctrine of non-delegation when it placed the discretion to the local governments the decision to allocate
for the salary of the probation officer.

F Respondent Judge ad interim of the Branch of CFI, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in his criminal
case.

I WON Act 4221 is unconstitutional, as undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces.

H Act 4221 is declared unconstitutional and void due to the inequality from unwarranted delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards.
Sec. 11 creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed such as statute adjudge unconstitutional because of
their effect in operation and denying equal protection of the law.

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Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among 3 independent branches of government. The power to make
laws is vested in the legislature. Any attempt to delegate this power is unconstitutional on the principle of potestas delegate non-delegari
potest (a delegated power cannot be delegated). The rule however is not absolute and inflexible. An exception sanction by immemorial practice
permits delegation to local authorities.

The PA does not fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a
roving commission which enable the provincial board to exercise arbitrary discretion. By Sec. 11 of Act 4221, the legislature does not seemingly
in its own authority extend to the benefits of the PA to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to
determine.

If the provincial does not wish to have the act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline the appropriate needed amount for the salary
of probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial board.

The legislature has not made the PA contingent upon specific facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the operation
or non-operation of law upon the provincial board. The Act is unconstitutional.

3. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988) (Death and burial benefits of an employee who is allegedly not an overseas
workerbut nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction

Lesson: 2 tests explained. Also, the reason for the delegation.

F Vitaliano Saco was a Chief Officer of the MV Eastern Polaris who was killed in accident in Tokyo Japan. Widow sued for damages under EO 797
and MC 2 of POEA, the latter awarded the sum of 192K for the death of her husband (180K for death benefit and 12K for burial expenses). The
petitioner challenged the decision of POEA on the ground that no jurisdiction over the case as the deceased husband was not an overseas worker.

POEA was created under EO 797, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino Contract workers, including seamen.

MC 2 by POEA prescribed an standard contract to be adopted by foreign and domestic shipping companies in hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas
employment.

I WON MC 2 is a violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power

Even if there is no expressed provision, delegation can be sustained if the exercise of power is pursuant to the implementation of the purpose for
which it is created.

The standard contract is valid for it passed the tests of valid delegation of legislative power.

SCs words: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,, the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14 Both
tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number
of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract
is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the
executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of
the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted.

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The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say,
specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned
to them.

4. Rabor v. CSC, 61 SCAD 569 or 244 SCRA 614 (1995) (Retirement benefit of a government employee)

Lesson: High degree of detail not necessary in a law that delegates power to administrative agencies to exercise subordinate legislation.

F Petitioner Rabor is a utility worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. Entered in the service at the age of 55. Alma Pagatpatan an official in
the Office of the Mayor advised Rabor to apply for his retirement because he had already reached 68 years of age and 7 months, 13 years and 1
month of government service. Rabor responded to the advice by exhibiting Cert. of Membership issued by GSIS Statement at the bottom service
extended to comply 15 year service requirement in order to avail the retirement benefit given to the employees of the Government. The Regional
Director respond that his service is non extendible and the City Mayor furnished the copy of letter to petitioner and advised him to stop reporting
for work.

I WON Rabors employment should be extended

H - SCs words: Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be implemented, went against
prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little
need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many)
possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative
agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately
applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.

We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined in the present Civil Service law - found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of
Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 - and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known
as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65)
years of age is an area that is covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of
many provisions of the present civil service law.

The standards may either be expressed or implied. If the former, non-delegation is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled
out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.

The CSC was acting as a central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient,
responsible and effective personnel administration of the government. It was also discharging its function of administering the retirement program
for government officials and employees and of evaluating qualifications for retirement.

It is difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee reached the age of 65 years of age has no
reasonable relationship or is not germane to the provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes
associated with the ageing of human being are in fact related to efficiency and quality of service that may be expected from individual persons.

5. Re: Entitlement to Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel (same with US v Barrias case)

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 Delegation of legislative power to Administrative Agencies
a. Quasi-legislative or rule-making powers of administrative agencies

b. Kinds of rule-making power

1. Rule-making by reason of particular delegation of authority (subordinate legislation)
2. Rule-making by the constructuion and interpretation of a statute being administered (interpretative legislation)
3 kinds:

Interpretation as incident of the execution of a law

Interpretation handed down by the Secretary of Justice upon the request of a government agency or official
Intyerpretation in adversary proceedings
3. Determination of facts under a delegated power as to which a statue shall go into effect (contingent legislation)

c. Reasons for delegation of legislative power

Delegation of legislative pwer has become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This has led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

The reasons for the delegation of legislative power are the increasing complexity of the tast of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activites and created peculiar
and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary.
d. What can and cannot be delegated
What can be delegated Legislature may properly delegate to administrative agency any legislative power other than the making, altering or
repealing of a law, the determination of legislative policies and objectives to be achieved, and the formulation and promulgation of a defined and
binding rule of conduct. It can delegate the discretion as to how the law shall be enforced, to issue rules to fill in details, to ascertain facts on which
the law will operate, to exercise police power, and to fix rates. To be valid, however, the delegation has to pass the competence and sufficiency of
standard tests.
What cannot be delegated Doctrine of separation of pwers prohibits the delegation of that which is purely legislative in nature. This consists of
the power to make the law, or to determine what the law shall be, and to alter or repeal it.
e. Test to determine validity of delegation
1. Completeness test The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - There must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.

Case:

1. ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

Lessons: (1) Clarifying the 2 tests. (2) It is unlawful for congress to exercise veto on the IRRs of an administrative agency.

SCs words:

On the 2 tests: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A
law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard
when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.

RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out
the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees
to exceed their revenue targets.

Section 4 canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing the delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:

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SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from
the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection of the Excess the Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to
Revenue Targets Accrue to the Fund

30% or below 15%

More than 30% 15% of the first 30%

plus 20% of the
remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue collection target was exceeded
and shall be released on the same fiscal year.

Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the
Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC
the distribution of the agencies revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the
case of the BOC.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as
approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest
solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Boards authority and identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at
least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collectionas provided in the rules and
regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:

On legislative veto: The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing
the law may be considered moot and academic.

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over
the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste
and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

a. Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to
determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request
information and report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency
involved.

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b. Congressional investigation - While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the
1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI,
c. Legislative supervision - The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision.
Supervision connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regardingexecutive operations in a given
administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence
future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and
permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. It can itself
formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those
standards.

In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left
for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the
force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been
written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are
set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon
their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

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