Legal Medicine

Dr. Mario J. Gapoy

WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017

ASSIGNED CASES FOR MIDTERMS IN LEGAL MEDICINE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pentecostes, Jr. vs People of the Philippines .......................................................... 2
Serrano vs People of the Philippines .................................................................... 15
People vs Villacorta.............................................................................................. 32
People vs Ocaya ................................................................................................... 47
Perpetua vs People of the Philippines .................................................................. 52

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 Legal Medicine
Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
PENTECOSTES, JR. VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167766 April 7, 2010

ENGR. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February
18, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 27458, which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in
Criminal Case No. VI-984, finding petitioner Engr. Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. guilty of
the crime of less serious physical injuries instead of attempted murder, and the
Resolution3 dated April 19, 2005, denying the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents are as follows:

On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig was drinking with his brother-in-law. After
consuming bottle of gin, he left and went to the house of a certain Siababa to
buy coffee and sugar. He was accompanied by his four- year-old son. On their way
there, a gray automobile coming from the opposite direction passed by them.
After a while, he noticed that the vehicle was moving backward towards them.
When the car was about two arms length from where they were, it stopped and
he heard the driver of the vehicle call him by his nickname Parrod. Rudy came

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Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
closer, but after taking one step, the driver, which he identified as the petitioner,
opened the door and while still in the car drew a gun and shot him once, hitting
him just below the left armpit. Rudy immediately ran at the back of the car, while
petitioner sped away. After petitioner left, Rudy and his son headed to the
seashore. Rudy later went back to the place where he was shot and shouted for
help.4

The people who assisted him initially brought him to the Municipal Hall of
Gonzaga, Cagayan, where he was interrogated by a policeman who asked him to
identify his assailant. He informed the policeman that petitioner was the one who
shot him. After he was interrogated, he was later brought to the Don Alfonso
Ponce Memorial Hospital at Gonzaga, Cagayan. The following day, he was
discharged from the hospital.5

On June 1, 1999, an Information6 was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Aparri,

Cagayan, charging the petitioner of frustrated murder, the pertinent portion of
which reads:

That on or about September 2, 1998, in the [M]unicipality of Gonzaga, [P]rovince

of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and shoot one Rudy Baclig, inflicting upon the latter gunshot injuries.

That the accused had performed all the acts of execution which would have
produce[d] the crime of Murder as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will.

That the same was aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Duly arraigned, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as charged.7

During the trial, it was established that at the time the incident occurred,
petitioner was employed by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) as
Irrigation Superintendent assigned at the Baua River Irrigation System (BRIS).
Petitioner vehemently denied any involvement in the incident, alleging that he
was in Quezon City at the time the crime was being committed. He contended

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Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
that he was following-up the funding for one of the projects of NIA in Gonzaga,
Cagayan. He insisted that he reported at the NIA Central Office on September 1,
1998 and stayed in Manila until the afternoon of September 4, 1998. To buttress
his allegations, the petitioner presented a Certificate of Appearance8 issued by
Engr. Orlando C. Hondrade, then NIA Deputy Administrator, who testified thru a
deposition that he indeed signed the document. Engr. Hondrade testified that he
specifically remembered that petitioner personally appeared before him on the
1st and 4th days of September for a duration of 10 to 15 minutes. Petitioner also
submitted his daily time record to prove that he was not at their office in Cagayan
from the afternoon of August 31, 1998, claiming that he traveled to Quezon City
pursuant to a travel authority issued by his superior.9

On February 27, 2003, after presentation of the parties respective evidence, the
RTC rendered a Decision10finding petitioner guilty of the crime of attempted
murder. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Attempted Murder and sentences
him the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Further, the accused is ordered to pay private complainant Rudy Baclig the
amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).

SO ORDERED.11

The RTC concluded that Rudy positively identified the petitioner as the one who
shot him there was sufficient lighting for Rudy to identify the perpetrator and
he knew petitioner ever since he attained the age of reason. As to petitioners
defense of alibi, the RTC ratiocinated that when petitioner personally appeared
before Engr. Hondrade on September 1, 1998, it would not be impossible for him
to immediately return to Gonzaga, Cagayan that afternoon and commit the crime
in the evening of September 2, 1998.12

Petitioner then sought recourse before the CA, arguing that the RTC committed
serious errors in finding that he was guilty of attempted murder and that the RTC
failed to consider the testimonies of his witnesses and the documentary evidence
presented in his favor.13

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 Legal Medicine
Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
On February 18, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision affirming with modification the
decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 27 February 2003 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Pentecostes is only found
GUILTY OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, there being one aggravating
and no mitigating circumstance to offset it.

SO ORDERED.14

In convicting the petitioner to a lesser offence, the CA opined that it was not
established that petitioner intended to kill Rudy when he shot him. Petitioners
act of shooting Rudy once was not followed by any other assault or any act which
would ensure his death. Considering that petitioner was driving a car, he could
have chased Rudy if he really intended to kill the latter, or run him over since
Rudy went to the rear of the car. Petitioners desistance displayed his
nonchalance to cause the death of Rudy. Moreover, Rudy only sustained a
gunshot wound on the arm, which required only 10 days of medical attendance.15

Not satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 but was denied in a
Resolution dated April 9, 2005.

Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:

The honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, committed a grave abuse of
discretion when it gives credence to the statement of the private
complainant presuming that the petitioner-appellant is the assailant allegedly due
to his voice and his alleged ownership of the vehicle, and considering that the
private complainant was then intoxicated, and the crime was committed at
nighttime, such conclusion is entirely grounded on speculations, surmises and
conjectures.

The honorable fourteenth division committed grave abuse of discretion when it

failed to give weight, discuss and consider the arguments and defenses made the
petitioner-appellant in our brief, vis--vis the manifestation and motion of the
solicitor general.

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 Legal Medicine
Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
The honorable fourteenth division committed an error when it relied heavily on
an unfounded, baseless and alleged motive of petitioner, being a crusader of
illegal drugs in their own town, to be the basis that he is the assailant.17

Petitioner questions the conclusion of the CA when it found him guilty of the
crime of less serious physical injuries. He argues that Rudy failed to positively
identify him as the assailant, since Rudy never admitted that he was able to
identify the petitioner through his physical appearance, but only through his
voice, despite the fact that it was the first time Rudy heard petitioners voice
when he allegedly shot him. Petitioner also insists that when the incident
occurred, Rudys vision was impaired as he just drank half a bottle of gin and the
place was not properly lit. Rudy also failed to identify the type of gun used during
the shooting. Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that the car used by
the perpetrator was owned by the petitioner.

Further, petitioner maintains that it was impossible for him to have shot the
victim on the night of September 2, 1998, since he was not in the Province of
Cagayan Valley from September 1, 1998 to September 4, 1998.

The petition is bereft merit.

In sum, petitioner submits before this Court two issues for resolution. First,
whether or not the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner was the one who shot the victim; Second, whether or not petitioners
defense of alibi would prosper.

As regards the first issue, this Court finds that the prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner was the one who shot Rudy that fateful night of
September 2, 1998. Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner indeed shot
Rudy. In arriving at this conclusion, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:

Private complainant Rudy Baclig averred that he personally knew the accused
since he was of the age of reason. Rudy knew accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes
Jr. to be working with the NIA at Sta. Cruz, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Both private
complainant Rudy Baclig and accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr. were residents
of Gonzaga, Cagayan, although they reside in different barangays. Rudy was
residing at Brgy. Batangan, while the accused was living two-and-a-half kilometers
away at Brgy. Flourishing. Rudy Baclig categorically stated that when the car of

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 Legal Medicine
Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
the accused passed by him, it slowly stopped then moved backward and when the
car was at a distance of about two arms length, which was about three (3)
meters, the accused called Rudys nickname Parrod. Hearing his nickname, Rudy
went towards the car, but he was only able to take one step, accused Engr. Carlito
Pentecostes Jr. opened the door of the car and shot Rudy once and afterwards
the accused hurriedly sped away. Asked how he was able to identify Engr. Carlito
Pentecostes Jr. to be the person who shot him when it was night time, Rudy said
that he was able to identify the accused through the lights of the car and on cross-
examination he said that aside from the lights of the car, there were also lights
coming from a store nearby the place of the incident. The Court believes that with
these kinds of lights, Rudy Baclig was able to identify the accused, considering the
distance between the assailant and the victim was only three (3) meters.

x x x x.

Rudy Baclig was not telling a lie when he declared that he was shot at about two
arms length only because the doctor who treated him, Dr. Mila M. Marantan,
declared that Rudy Baclig suffered a gunshot wound, the entry was with powder
burns which is an evidence that Rudy Baclig was shot at a close range.

The defense harped on the fact that the private complainant smelled liquor. The
complainant at first denied having taken liquor, but he admitted he took one-half
bottle of gin before he went to buy coffee and sugar. On cross-examination, the
complainant admitted also that every afternoon, he drank liquor. He admitted
that he could still walk naturally a distance of about one kilometer. He also said
that his vision might be affected. This testimony of Rudy Baclig cannot be
considered as evidence that he was not able to identify the accused. He was
categorical in stating that he was able to identify the accused. The doctor who
treated Rudy of his injury declared the patient smelled liquor, but she could not
tell how much liquor the patient took, however, the patient could answer all her
questions.

x x x x.

There are other evidences that tend to show that Rudy Baclig was able to identify
the assailant. Immediately after he was shot, Rudy told a police investigator, a
certain Torres and Dr. Mila Marantan that it was Engr. Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. who
shot him.18

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 Legal Medicine
Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
This conclusion was concurred into by the CA, which categorically stated in its
decision that "[t]he prosecution was able to present a witness, in the person of
Baclig, who categorically identified petitioner as his assailant and whose
testimony was characterized by frankness."19 Contrary to petitioners contention,
Rudy saw him and positively identified him as his shooter, viz:

Q: When you heard the driver of the car calling you by your nickname
Parrod, what was your reaction?

A: I went near because I thought he was telling me something.

Q: And what made you decide to go near the driver of the vehicle?

A: Because he called me by my name, Sir.

Q: When the driver of the car called you by your [nickname], were you able
to recognize the driver of the car who called you?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And who was that person who called you by your name Parrod?

A: It was Engr. Pentecostes, Sir.

Q: The same person you identified a while ago?

A: Yes, Sir.20

Corollarilly, petitioner already raised these arguments in his motion for

reconsideration of the decision of the court a quo, which the CA addressed point
by point in the assailed resolution denying the motion. We quote with approval
the following discussion of the CA:

On the first allegation, accused-appellant wrongly read the decision. The Court
upheld the trial courts finding that it was indeed accused-appellant who attacked
the private complainant, not because the latter heard accused-appellants voice
but that he was able to see him through the lights of the car when he opened the
window and the door. x x x

xxxx

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 Legal Medicine
Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
Clearly, it was not merely hearing the assailants voice, but that he was able to see
him, that private-complainant was able to identify the accused-appellant. It was
admittedly a fact that private complainant had a drink but it does not mean that
he was intoxicated, especially since he admitted that he drinks everyday. Thus, his
bodys tolerance to alcohol is probably heightened. There was also no proof that
his vision had been affected by the alcohol intake, and that he would have
mistaken someone else for the accused.

Again, positive declaration is given more weight than the denial of the accused-
appellant. In addition, the same findings were previously reached by the trial
court which had the opportunity to observe first-hand the demeanor of the
witnesses, and assess their credibility.

Regarding the Solicitor Generals recommendation, the Court is not bound to

follow it although in some cases, we are persuaded by the same. However, in this
case, it was not able to persuade Us as it only adopted the same arguments
advanced by accused- appellants counsel.

Some of these arguments include the failure to present any document or

evidence showing that the car used was owned by the accused-appellant. The
ownership of the car, however, is immaterial in the light of the positive
identification of the accused. In addition, the statement of the prosecutions
witnesses that the car was often used by accused-appellants father does not
remove the possibility that he may also use it.

On the third allegation of error, again, accused-appellant has misread the decision
and exaggerated by accusing us of relying heavily on the existence of a probable
motive on the part of accused-appellant to commit the act complained of. This is
clear in the decision that the same was meant to assess whether there was a
probable motive for the private complainant to lie.21

It is clear that the arguments advanced by the petitioner in the case at bar,
questioning the conclusion of the RTC and the CA that petitioner shot the victim,
are trivial. The fact remains that Rudy has been shot with a gun and he positively
identified his shooter as the petitioner. Petitioner faulted the RTC and the CA for
giving credence to the testimony of Rudy. However, it is to be noted that even the
lone declaration of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to convict if that testimony is
found to be credible. Credibility of witnesses is to be weighed and should not be

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Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
based on numbers. The matter of assigning values to declaration on the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by
various indicia available but not reflected on the record.22

This Court has meticulously scrutinized the transcripts of stenographic notes of

this case and finds that the RTC, as well as the CA, committed no error in giving
credence to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court has long adhered to the
rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great respect unless it overlooked substantial facts and
circumstances, which if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.
This deference to the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of
witnesses is consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness
meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused.23 This
is especially true when the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed by the
appellate court.24

As regards petitioners defense of alibi, well settled is the rule that alibi is an
inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused by the victim.25 Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper,
it is not enough to prove that the petitioner was somewhere else when the
offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far
away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place
of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.26 In the case
at bar, it was established that petitioner personally appeared before Engr.
Hondrade only on September 1 and 4, 1998. His whereabouts for the two days in
between the said dates are unaccounted for. There was no showing that he could
not have gone back to Cagayan, committed the crime, and went back to Quezon
City during those two days. Petitioners defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail
as against the positive, straightforward and consistent testimony of Rudy that it
was petitioner who shot him on the night of September 2, 1998.

As to the crime committed by petitioner, this Court also concurs with the
conclusion of the CA that petitioner is guilty of the crime of less serious physical
injuries, not attempted murder.

The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the

intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such

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Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.27 In the present case, intent to
kill the victim could not be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.
Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latters
body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple
times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference
that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt.28 When such intent is
lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted
murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate29 issued by
the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10)
days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the
crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical
injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides that "(A)ny person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not
described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for
the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor."1avvphi1

As to the aggravating circumstance of treachery, this Court finds that the CA

erroneously concluded that treachery attended the commission of the crime. To
establish treachery, the following must be proven: (1) the employment of such
means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-
defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the
means of execution.30 The circumstances attending the commission of the crime
negate the existence of treachery in its execution. Although petitioner
deliberately assaulted Rudy and there was suddenness in his attack, he did not
logically plan to assault the latter when he chanced upon him while he was
driving. In treachery, the perpetrator intentionally and purposely employs ways
and means to commit the crime. There was no evidence, however, to show that
petitioner employed such means of execution that would ensure the commission
of the crime without harm to his person. Thus, treachery did not attend the
commission of the crime.

There being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty for the
crime of less serious physical injuries should be taken from the medium period of
arresto mayor, which is from two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months.

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 Legal Medicine
Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in the case at bar, since it
does not apply to those whose maximum term of imprisonment is less than one
year.31

As regards the awards for damages, moral damages may be recovered in criminal
offenses resulting in physical injuries, but there must be a factual basis for the
award.32 We have studied the records and find no factual basis for the award of
moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
February 18, 2005, and the Resolution dated April 19, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No.
27458, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Carlito Pentecostes,
Jr. is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of three (3) months of arresto
mayor.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

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WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a
member of this Court) and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, rollo, pp. 38-63.

2
Penned by Judge Rolando R. Velasco; id. at 71-83.

3
Rollo, pp. 65-70.

4
Id. at 71-72.

5
Id. at 72.

6
Records, p. 1.

7
Id. at 72.

8
Id. at 166.

9
Rollo, pp. 74-77.

10
Id. at 71-83.

11
Id. at 82.

12
Id. at 71-77.

13
Id. at 46.

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14
Id. at 62-63.

15
Id. at 56-59.

16
CA rollo, pp. 127-144.

17
Rollo, p. 18.

18
Id. at 78-79.

19
Id. at 54-55.

20
TSN, April 13, 2000, pp. 7-8.

21
Rollo, pp. 67-69.

22
People v. Coscos, 424 Phil. 886, 900-901 (2002).

23
People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 172470, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 656, 678.

24
People v. Gallego, 453 Phil. 825, 849 (2003).

25
People v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301, 328 (2004).

26
Id. at 329.

27
People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 351 (2001).

28
Id.

29
Records, p. 6.

30
People v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos 149430-32, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 535, 564.

31
People v. Glino, G.R. No. 173793, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 432, 461.

32
Civil Code, Art. 2219 (1); See Civil Code, Art. 2217; See People v. Molina, 391 Phil. 282, 301 (2000).

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WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
SERRANO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175023 July 5, 2010

GIOVANI SERRANO y CERVANTES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated July 20,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29090, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Giovani Serrano y Cervantes." The CA modified the decision dated
October 25, 20043 of the Regional Trial Court4 (RTC), Branch 83, Quezon City, and
found petitioner Giovani Serrano y Cervantes (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, instead of frustrated homicide.

The Facts

The case stemmed from a brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two (2) rival
groups that occurred at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City
(UP) on the evening of March 8, 1999. The incident resulted in the stabbing of
Anthony Galang (victim). Pinpointed as the victims assailant, the petitioner was
charged on March 11, 1999,5 with frustrated homicide in an Information that
reads:

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WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
That on or about the 8th day of March 1999, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one ANTHONY
GALANG Y LAGUNSAD, by then and there stabbing him on the stomach with a
bladed weapon, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of homicide, as a consequence but which nevertheless did
not produce it, by reason of some causes independent of the will of the accused;
that is the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said ANTHONY GALANG
Y LAGUNSAD which prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

On March 20, 2000, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the
prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with the testimonies of SPO2
Isagani dela Paz and the records custodian of East Avenue Medical Center on the
basis of the following stipulations: (1) SPO2 dela Paz was the one who conducted
the investigation; (2) SPO2 dela Paz took the statement of the victim at the East
Avenue Medical Center; (3) the victim was able to narrate the story of the
incident to SPO2 dela Paz before he underwent surgery; (4) SPO2 dela Paz
prepared a referral-letter to the city prosecutor; (5) SPO2 dela Paz had no
personal knowledge of the incident; and (6) the victim was confined for treatment
at the East Avenue Medical Center from March 8, 1999, and the documents
referring to his confinement and treatment were duly executed and
authenticated.7 After these stipulations, trial on the merits immediately followed.

The Prosecutions Evidence

The prosecution presented the victim, Arlo Angelo Arceo, Sgt. Rolando Zoleto,
and SPO2 Roderick Dalit.

These witnesses testified that, at around 9:30 p.m. of March 8, 1999, the victim
and his two friends, Arceo and Richard Tan, were on their way to Fatima II in Pook
Dagohoy, UP Campus when they came across Gener Serrano, the petitioners
brother, who was with his group of friends. The victim, Arceo and Tan approached
Gener and his friends to settle a previous quarrel between Gener and Roberto
Comia. While the victim and Gener were talking, Comia suddenly appeared and

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hurled invectives at Gener. Irked, Gener challenged Comia to a fistfight to settle
their quarrel once and for all; Comia rose to the challenge.

It was at this point that the petitioner appeared with other members of his group.
He was a guest at a party nearby, and was informed that a fight was about to take
place between his brother and Comia. Members of the victims group also started
to show up.

The petitioner watched Gener fight Comia. When Gener lost the fight, the
petitioner sought to get back at the victim and his friends. Thus, the one-on-one
escalated into a rumble between the members of the two groups. During the
rumble, and with the aid of the light emanating from two Meralco posts, the
victim and Arceo saw that the petitioner had a knife and used it to chase away the
members of their group. The petitioner also chased Arceo away, leaving the
victim alone; the petitioners group ganged up on him.

The petitioner went to where the victim was being beaten by Gener and one Obet
Orieta. It was then that the victim was stabbed. The petitioner stabbed the left
side of his stomach while he was standing, with Gener and Orieta holding his
arms. The petitioner, Gener and Orieta thereafter continued to beat and stone
the victim until he fell into a nearby creek. The petitioner and his group left him
there.

From his fallen position, the victim inspected his stab wound and saw that a
portion of his intestines showed. On foot, he went to find help. The victim was
initially taken to the UP Infirmary, but was referred to the East Avenue Medical
Center where he underwent surgery. The victim stayed at the hospital for a week,
and thereafter stayed home for one month to recuperate.

In the investigation that immediately followed, the victim identified the petitioner
as the person who stabbed him. In court, the victim likewise positively identified
the petitioner as his assailant.

The Defenses Evidence

The defense presented the testimonies of the petitioner, Gener, and George
Hipolito.

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The petitioner denied that he stabbed the victim. While he admitted that he was
present during the fistfight between Gener and Comia, he claimed that he and
Gener left as soon as the rumble started. The petitioner testified that as he and
Gener were running away from the scene (to get back to the party), bottles and
stones were being thrown at them.

Hipolito, a participant in the rumble and a member of the petitioners group,

narrated that the rumble happened fast and he was too busy defending himself to
take note of everything that happened. He testified that he did not see the
petitioner and Gener during the fight. He also testified that the place where the
rumble took place was near a steel manufacturing shop which provided some
light to the area. He further testified that the victim was left alone at the scene
and he alone faced the rival group.

The RTC Ruling

After considering the evidence, the trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. It held, thus:

The bare statement of Giovani Serrano that he did not stab Anthony and he really
does not know who might have stabbed Anthony is outweighed by the positive
identification by Anthony that Giovani stabbed him frontally while they faced
each other and also the circumstantial evidence pointing to him as the wielder of
the knife. Naturally, Giovani Serrano would feign ignorance as to who stabbed
Anthony but there is no way that he can avoid said direct and circumstantial
evidences.8

Accordingly, the RTC decision disposed:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of accused GIOVANI

SERRANO Y CERVANTES of the offense of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY thereof and hereby sentences him
to undergo imprisonment of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prisioncorreccional as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as
maximum.

Accused Giovani Serrano is hereby ordered to reimburse to complainant Anthony

Galang the medical expenses incurred by the latter in his hospitalization and
treatment of his injuries in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS

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(P15,000.00) and loss of income for one (1) month in the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) or the total amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P19,000.00).

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.9

The petitioner appealed to the CA. He claimed that the inconsistencies in the
victims testimony rendered it incredible, but the RTC disregarded the claim. The
RTC also disregarded the evidence that the dimness of the light in the crime scene
made it impossible for the victim to identify his assailant.

The CA Ruling

In its decision, the CA agreed with the RTC that the petitioner had been positively
identified as the victims assailant. The CA, however, ruled that the crime
committed was attempted homicide, not frustrated homicide. The CA ruled that
the prosecution evidence failed to conclusively show that the victims single stab
wound was sufficient to cause death without timely medical intervention. In
support of its conclusion, the CA said that:

Thus, in Paddayuman v. People (G.R. No. 120344, 23 January 2002), appellants

conviction for attempted homicide was upheld because there was no evidence
that the wounds suffered by the victim were fatal enough as to cause her demise.
Thus:

x x x petitioner stabbed the victim twice on the chest, which is indicative of an

intent to kill. x x x This can be gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Pintucan who did
not categorically state whether or not the wounds were fatal. x x x (I)n People v.
Pilones, this Court held that even if the victim was wounded but the injury was
not fatal and could not cause his death, the crime would only be attempted.

Similarly, in the case of People v. Costales (G.R. No. 141154, 15 January 2002),
where the offense charged was frustrated murder, the trial court rendered a
verdict of guilty for attempted murder because the prosecution failed to present
a medical certificate or competent testimonial evidence which will prove that the
victim would have died from her wound without medical intervention. Citing

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People v. De La Cruz, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court and stressed
that:

x x x the crime committed for the shooting of the victim was attempted murder
and not frustrated murder for the reason that "his injuries, though no doubt
serious, were not proved fatal such that without timely medical intervention, they
would have caused his death.10

Thus, the CA modified the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that:

1) Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum to FOUR
(4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as maximum;

2) The actual damages is REDUCED to P3,858.50; and

3) The award of loss earnings is DELETED,

The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.11

Undaunted, the petitioner filed this present petition.

The Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION, WHICH WERE BASED ON MERE
SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE
STABBING INCIDENT OCCURRED IN THE MIDDLE OF A STREET BRAWL, WHERE
ANYBODY OF THE NUMEROUS PARTICIPANTS COULD HAVE BEEN THE ASSAILANT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.12

The petitioner claims that the lower courts decisions were erroneous based on
two-pronged arguments first, he cannot be convicted because he was not
positively identified by a credible testimony; and second, if he is criminally
culpable, he can only be convicted of serious physical injuries as the intent to kill
the victim was not sufficiently proven.

The Court Ruling

We do not find merit in the petitioners arguments, and accordingly hold that the
petition is devoid of merit.

At the outset, we clarify that we shall no longer deal with the correctness of the
RTC and the CAs appreciation of the victims identification of the petitioner as his
assailant. This is a question of fact that we cannot entertain in a Rule 45 review,
save for exceptional reasons13 that must be clearly and convincingly shown. As a
rule, we accord the greatest respect for the findings of the lower courts,
especially the evaluation by the trial judge who had the distinct opportunity to
directly hear and observe the witnesses and their testimonies. As we explained in
People v. Lucena14

[It] has been consistently held by this Court that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the
trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to
assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the

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record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact
and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the
angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty
blanch these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his
teeth.15

In this regard, the petitioner cites an exception the lower courts

misappreciation of the testimonial evidence. Due consideration of the records,
however, does not support the petitioners position. We find that the RTC and the
CA did not err in their appreciation of the evidence.

The petitioner was positively identified

The RTCs and CAs conclusions on the petitioners positive identification are
supported by ample evidence. We consider in this regard the following pieces of
evidence of the prosecution: (1) the manner of attack which was done frontally
and at close range, thus allowing the victim to see his assailant; (2) the lighting
conditions at the scene of the stabbing, provided by two Meralco posts;16 the
scene was also illuminated by "white, fluorescent type" light coming from a steel
manufacturing shop;17 and (3) that the victim and the petitioner knew each other
also allowed the victim to readily identify the petitioner as his assailant.

The victims credibility is further strengthened by his lack of improper motive to

falsely accuse the petitioner of the crime. Human experience tells us that it is
unnatural for a victim to accuse someone other than his actual attacker; in the
normal course of things, the victim would have the earnest desire to bring the
guilty person to justice, and no other. We consider, too, that the victim
consistently and positively, in and out of court, identified the petitioner as his
assailant. The victim testified that the petitioner was a neighbor who lived just a
few houses away from his house.

We also take into account the evidence that the petitioner was the only one seen
in possession of a knife during the rumble. The victim testified that he saw the
petitioner holding a knife which he used to chase away others.18Prosecution
witness Arceo testified that he also saw the petitioner wielding a knife during the
rumble.

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Based on these considerations, we find the victims identification of the petitioner
as his assailant to be positive and conclusive.

In contrast, we find the inconsistencies attributed to the victim to be minor and

insufficient to discredit his testimony. These inconsistencies refer to extraneous
matters that happened during the rumble, not directly bearing on the stabbing.
They do not likewise relate to the material elements of the crime.

We also cannot give any credit to the petitioners position that the victims failure
to identify the weapon used to stab him discredited his testimony. The victims
failure to identify the weapon is irrelevant under the circumstances, considering
that the identity of the weapon is not an element of the crime charged.

The intent to kill was sufficiently established

The petitioner posits that he can only be held liable for serious physical injuries
since the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as
homicide, was not sufficiently proven. The assailants intent to kill is the main
element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of
homicide. The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven.

Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external
manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and
immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,19 we considered the following factors
to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately
after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime
was committed and the motives of the accused. We also consider motive and the
words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as
additional determinative factors.20

In this case, the records show that the petitioner used a knife in his assault. The
petitioner stabbed the victim in the abdomen while the latter was held by Gener
and Orieta. Immediately after the stabbing, the petitioner, Gener and Orieta beat
and stoned the victim until he fell into a creek. It was only then that the
petitioner, Gener and Orieta left. We consider in this regard that the stabbing
occurred at around 9:30 p.m. with only the petitioner, Gener, Orieta, and the

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victim as the only persons left in the area. The CA aptly observed that a
reasonable inference can be made that the victim was left for dead when he fell
into the creek.

Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the petitioner, in stabbing,

beating and stoning the victim, intended to kill him. Thus, the crime committed
cannot be merely serious physical injuries.

Frustrated homicide versus attempted homicide

Since the victim did not die, the issue posed to us is the stage of execution of the
crime. The lower courts differed in their legal conclusions.

On one hand, the RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated stage
since the victim was stabbed on the left side of his stomach and beaten until he
fell into a creek.21 The RTC also took into account that the victim had to be
referred by the UP Infirmary to the East Avenue Medical Center for medical
treatment.22

On the other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the
attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was
fatal to cause the victims death.23 The CA observed that the attending physician
did not testify in court.24 The CA also considered that the Medical Certificate and
the Discharge Summary issued by the East Avenue Medical Center fell short of
"specifying the nature or gravity of the wound."25

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended defines the stages of a felony in
the following manner:

ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated

felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.

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There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. [Emphasis and italics supplied.]

In Palaganas v. People,26 we made the following distinctions between frustrated

and attempted felony as follows:

1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted
felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.

2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the

crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the
other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the
crime is a cause or accident other than the offenders own spontaneous
desistance.27

The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be
supported by independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient
to cause the victims death without timely medical intervention.

In discussing the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury sustained by a

victim and its importance in determining criminal liability, the Court in People
v. Matyaong, said:28

In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury to
the function of the various organs, and also the danger to life. A division into
mortal and nonmortal wounds, if it could be made, would be very desirable; but
the unexpected complications and the various extraneous causes which give
gravity to the simplest cases, and, on the other hand, the favorable termination of
some injuries apparently the most dangerous, render any such classification
impracticable. The general classification into slight, severe, dangerous, and mortal
wounds may be used, but the possibility of the slight wound terminating with the
loss of the persons life, and the apparently mortal ending with only a slight
impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. x x x

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The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the
extent of the injury, the form of the wound, the region of the body affected, the
blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved, the entrance of disease-producing
bacteria or other organisms into the wound, the age and constitution of the
person injured, and the opportunities for administering proper surgical
treatment.

When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without
medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt;
under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved
in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not
frustrated, homicide.29

Under these standards, we agree with the CAs conclusion. From all accounts,
although the stab wound could have been fatal since the victim testified that he
saw his intestines showed, no exact evidence exists to prove the gravity of the
wound; hence, we cannot consider the stab wound as sufficient to cause death.
As correctly observed by the CA, the victims attending physician did not testify on
the gravity of the wound inflicted on the victim. We consider, too, the CAs
observation that the medical certifications issued by the East Avenue Medical
Center merely stated the location of the wound.30 There was also no proof that
without timely medical intervention, the victim would have died.31 This paucity of
proof must necessarily favor the petitioner.

The view from the "frustrated" stage of the crime gives the same results. The
elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained
fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and
(3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.32 Since the prosecution failed to
prove the second element, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for frustrated
homicide.

The Penalty

Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that the imposable
penalty for an attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony.

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Under Article 249, the crime of homicide is punished by reclusion temporal.
Applying Article 61 (Rules of graduating penalties) and Article 71 (Graduated
scales), two (2) degrees lower of reclusion temporal is prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence shall be taken, in view of the attending circumstances that could be
properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum
term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code.33 Thus, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
shall be taken within the range of prision correccional, depending on the
modifying circumstances. In turn, the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the penalty one degree lower of
prision correccional, that is arresto mayor with a duration of one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months.

In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the

indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional or two (2) years and four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months.34 The minimum term shall be taken within the range of
arresto mayor. Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA against the petitioner of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum term of the indeterminate penalty, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty, is correct.

The Civil Liability

We modify the CA decision with respect to the petitioners civil liability. The CA
ordered actual damages to be paid in the amount of P3,858.50. This is erroneous
and contrary to the prevailing jurisprudence.

In People v. Andres,35 we held that if the actual damages, proven by receipts

during the trial, amount to less thanP25,000.00, the victim shall be entitled to
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages. The
award of temperate damages is based on Article 2224 of the New Civil Code
which states that temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be
proven with certainty. In this case, the victim is entitled to the award

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of P25,000.00 as temperate damages considering that the amount of actual
damages is only P3,858.50. The amount of actual damages shall be deleted.

Lastly, we find that the victim is also entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P10,000.00 in accordance with settled jurisprudence.36 Under Article 2219,
paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code, the victim is entitled to moral damages in a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition. The decision, dated July 20, 2006, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29090, finding petitioner Giovani Serrano y
Cervantes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Homicide, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is ORDERED to PAY the victim, Anthony
Galang, the following amounts:

(1) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and

(2) P10,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

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I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.

1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2
Rollo, pp. 27-42. Penned by CA Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, with Presiding CA Justice
(now retired Supreme Court Associate Justice) Ruben T. Reyes and CA Associate Justice (now retired)
Monina Arevalo-Zearosa concurring.

3
Criminal Case No. Q-99-81784; id. at 46-73.

4
Penned by Judge Estrella T. Estrada.

5
Rollo, p. 46.

6
Ibid.

7
Id. at 47.

8
Id. at 72.

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9
Id. at 73.

10
Id. at 37-38.

11
Id. at 41-42.

12
Id. at 9-10.

13
They are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of
specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings
of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the
case; and, (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties; Pelonia v. People, G.R. No.
168997, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 207.

14
408 Phil. 172, 183 (2001).

15
Id. at 183.

16
Rollo, p. 33.

17
Id. at 34.

18
Id. at 48.

19
G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 188, 197, citing People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003).

20
Epifanio v. People, G.R. No. 157057, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 552, 562.

21
Rollo, p. 68.

22
Id. at 69.

23
Id. at 32.

24
Ibid.

25
Ibid.

26
G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533.

27
Id. at 535.

28
411 Phil. 938, 948 (2001), cited in Epifanio v. People, supra note 21, at 563.

29
Epifanio v. People, supra note 21, at 563-564; also see Paddayuman v. People, G.R. No. 120344. January
23, 2002, 374 SCRA 278, 288.

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30
Rollo, p. 40.

31
Ingles v. CA, G.R. No. 117161, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 122, 130.

32
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 737, 758.

33
Section 1.

34
Applying Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

35
G.R. Nos. 135697-98, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 141, 152.

36
People v. Flores, G.R. Nos. 143435-36, November 28, 2003, 416 SCRA 612.

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PEOPLE VS VILLACORTA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 186412 September 7, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ORLITO VILLACORTA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02550, which affirmed the Decision2 dated September 22, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No.
27039-MN, finding accused-appellant Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of
murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the sum ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus
the costs of suit.

On June 21, 2002, an Information3 was filed against Villacorta charging him with
the crime of murder, as follows:

That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab

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with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the
victim serious wounds which caused his immediate death.

When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.4

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja)

and Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).

Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store
located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular
customers at Mendejas store. At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz
was ordering bread at Mendejas store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and,
without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruzs body using a
sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruzs body.
Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but
failed to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her
neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruzs body.5 Mendeja
and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.6

Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital.
When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the
Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only
brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died the
following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that he did not personally
treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruzs medical chart and
diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.7 Dr.
Belandres specifically described the cause of Cruzs death in the following
manner:

The wound was exposed x x spurs concerted, the patient developed difficulty of
opening the mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain and the cause of
death is hypoxic encephalopathy neuro transmitted due to upper G.I. bleeding
x x x. Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage III.8

The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who
attended to Cruz at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution and defense
agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias testimony based on the stipulation that it
would only corroborate Dr. Belandres testimony on Cruz dying of tetanus.

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For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz.
Villacorta recounted that he was on his way home from work at around two
oclock in the morning of January 21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank
coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. When Villacorta was
about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacortas shoulder. This
prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did
not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruzs death upon
his arrest on July 31, 2002.9

On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of
murder, qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito
Villacorta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of
Danilo Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim
plus the costs of suit.10

Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a
notice of appeal to assail his conviction by the RTC.11 The Court of Appeals
directed the PAO to file Villacortas brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.

Villacorta filed his Appellants Brief12 on May 30, 2007; while the People, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief13 on October 2,
2007.

On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto
the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.

Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.

Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as he was

adopting the Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of Appeals.14 The OSG,
likewise, manifested that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief. 15

In his Appellants Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of errors:

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THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME, HE

COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.16

Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing

incident. It was Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one who
stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts that
Mendejas account of the stabbing incident is replete with inconsistencies and
incredulities, and is contrary to normal human experience, such as: (1) instead of
shouting or calling for help when Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja
attempted to run after and catch Villacorta; (2) while, by Mendejas own account,
there were other people who witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after
Villacorta, yet, oddly, only Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and
suddenly as Mendeja described, then it would have been physically improbable
for Mendeja to have vividly recognized the perpetrator, who immediately ran
away after the stabbing; (4) after the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran in
opposite directions; and (5) Mendeja had said that the bamboo stick, the alleged
murder weapon, was left at her store, although she had also stated that the said
bamboo stick was left embedded in Cruzs body. Villacorta maintains that the
aforementioned inconsistencies are neither trivial nor inconsequential, and
should engender some doubt as to his guilt.

We are not persuaded.

To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full
weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect. Such
determination made by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling

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examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the
witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.17

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to
the testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of Appeals rejected
Villacortas attempts to impugn Mendejas testimony, thus:

Appellants reason for concluding that witness Mendejas testimony is incredible

because she did not shout or call for help and instead run after the appellant, fails
to impress the Court because persons who witness crimes react in different ways.

"x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently
and there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking
incident.

Equally lacking in merit is appellants second reason which is, other persons could
have run after the appellant after the stabbing incident. As explained by witness
Mendeja, the other person whom she identified as Aron was left to assist the
appellant who was wounded. Further, the stabbing occurred at 2:00 oclock in the
morning, a time when persons are expected to be asleep in their house, not
roaming the streets.

His [Villacortas] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident
rendered impossible or incredible the identification of the assailant cannot
likewise prosper in view of his admission that he was in the store of witness
Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the morning and that he assaulted
the victim by boxing him.

Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot support
appellants argument. Appellant and the victim were known to witness Mendeja,
both being her friends and regular customers. There was light in front of the
store. An opening in the store measuring 1 and meters enables the person
inside to see persons outside, particularly those buying articles from the store.
The victim was in front of the store buying bread when attacked. Further,
immediately after the stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving
her additional opportunity to identify the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the
attack can be credibly ascertained.18

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Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for Mendeja
to fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz on January 23,
2002. We have ruled time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness was
familiar with both the victim and accused, and where the locus criminis afforded
good visibility, and where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for
testifying against the accused, then her version of the story deserves much
weight.19

The purported inconsistencies in Mendejas testimony pointed out by Villacorta

are on matters that have no bearing on the fundamental fact which Mendeja
testified on: that Villacorta stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002,
right in front of Mendejas store.

In the face of Mendejas positive identification of Villacorta as Cruzs stabber,

Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an
exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to
blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.20

Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the

event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for
slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate
cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."21

In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning
of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the
Tondo Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San
Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the
following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of
the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center,

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subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for
follow-up medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities between
January 23 to February 14, 2002.

In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 the Court was confronted with a

case of very similar factual background as the one at bar. During an altercation on
October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound
on Javiers hand. Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses. On November 14, 1980,
Javier was rushed to the hospital with lockjaw and convulsions. Dr. Exconde, who
attended to Javier, found that Javiers serious condition was caused by tetanus
infection. The next day, on November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information was
filed against Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court found Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's
death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano
appealed before this Court, arguing that Javiers own negligence was the
proximate cause of his death. Urbano alleged that when Dr. Meneses examined
Javiers wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and that Javier could have
acquired the tetanus germs when he returned to work on his farm only two (2)
weeks after sustaining his injury. The Court granted Urbanos appeal.

We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening
cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over
80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation
period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of
injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

"Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and

headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients

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often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar
descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes
generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and
sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of
patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the
vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs
and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.

"Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an

interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a
short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by
sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases
rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer
lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by
laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate
ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage
and death.

"Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an

onset time of more than 6 days.Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent
and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a
somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked,
dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation
time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity
and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of
Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body
depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when
he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on
October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the

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symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day,
November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected
by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild case of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time.
The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by
the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.23

The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the
hacking incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts
in the mind of the Court that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from
the hacking incident. We explained in Urbano that:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death
with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v.
Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by

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which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause
of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p.
125)24

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the
conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days
between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San
Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired
severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have
appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe
tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that
exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred
percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab wound
was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might
have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability.1wphi1 Villacorta is

guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for
the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is
for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may
be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former
since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part
of those constituting the offense of murder.25

We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder

because the prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill. In fact,
the Court of Appeals expressly observed the lack of evidence to prove such an
intent beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:

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Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick, hitting
him on the left side of the body and then immediately fled. The instrument used
is not as lethal as those made of metallic material. The part of the body hit is not
delicate in the sense that instant death can ensue by reason of a single stab
wound. The assault was done only once. Thus, there is doubt as to whether
appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which should be resolved in favor of the
appellant. x x x.26

The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every
possible doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The
onus probandi lies not on accused-appellant but on the prosecution. The
inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such
intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but
physical injuries only.27

Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for
medical treatment immediately after the stabbing incident.1avvphi1 Right after
receiving medical treatment, Cruz was then released by the Tondo Medical Center
as an out-patient. There was no other evidence to establish that Cruz was
incapacitated for labor and/or required medical attendance for more than nine
days. Without such evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.28

We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently

alleged in the Information and proved during trial.

The Information specified that "accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon
one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."

Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure
its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the
offended party might make. This definition sets out what must be shown by
evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such
means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-
defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the

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means of execution. To reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the
suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that the attack will take place,
thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring
the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.29 Likewise, even when
the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be
appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.30

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in
this case, and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly,
unexpectedly, and without provocation. It was two oclock in the morning of
January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out buying bread at Mendejas store, was
unarmed. Cruz had his guard down and was totally unprepared for an attack on
his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened
bamboo stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his
body, then swiftly ran away. Villacortas treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with
no opportunity at all to defend himself or retaliate.

Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party from labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.

The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.31 The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since said law excludes from its
coverage cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed one (1) year.32 With
the aggravating circumstance of treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with
imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in the maximum period, i.e.,
twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days. Consequently, we impose upon Villacorta a
straight sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta
has been in jail since July 31, 2002 until present time, already way beyond his
imposed sentence, we order his immediate release.

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Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages
compensate for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by
the victim and his family as being a proximate result of the wrongful act. An
award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, an
award of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) moral damages is appropriate for less
serious, as well as slight physical injuries.33

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries, as defined and
punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor. Considering that Villacorta has been
incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacortas immediate release, unless
Villacorta is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within
five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance with such order.
Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Danilo Cruz moral damages in the
sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

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CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 2-16; penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr. with Associate Justices Amelita
G. Tolentino and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring.

2
CA rollo, pp. 58-60; penned by Presiding Judge Benjamin T. Antonio.

3
Records, p. 1.

4
CA rollo, p. 6.

5
TSN, October 20, 2003, pp. 2-9.

6
Records, p. 72.

7
TSN, May 5, 2003, pp. 1-11; Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. was also referred to as Dr. Domingo
Melendres, Jr. in the TSN.

8
Id. at 6.

9
TSN, March 6, 2006, pp. 2-5.

10
CA rollo, p. 60.

11
Records, p. 144.

12
CA rollo, pp. 37-57.

13
Id. at 67-96.

14
Rollo, pp. 30-32.

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15
Id. at 35.

16
CA rollo, p. 39.

17
People v. Mayingque, G.R. No. 179709, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 123, 140.

18
CA rollo, pp. 9-10.

19
People v. Alcantara, 471 Phil. 690, 700 (2004).

20
People v. Barde, G.R. No. 183094, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 187, 211.

21
Calimutan v. People, 517 Phil. 272, 284 (2006).

22
241 Phil. 1 (1988).

23
Id. at 9-11.

24
Id. at 11-12.

25
People v. Vicente, 423 Phil. 1065, 1078 (2001).

26
CA rollo, p. 13.

27
People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 351-352 (2001).

28
Li v. People, 471 Phil. 128, 150 (2004).

29
People v. Casta, G.R. No. 172871, September 16, 2008, 565 SCRA 341, 356-357.

30
People v. Napalit, G.R. No. 181247, March 19, 2010, 616 SCRA 245, 252.

31
Revised Penal Code, Article 27.

32
People v. Tan, 411 Phil. 813, 843 (2001).

33
Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, 464 Phil. 650, 679 (2004); People v. Loreto, 446 Phil. 592, 614
(2003).

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PEOPLE VS OCAYA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47448 May 17, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. EMETERIO C. OCAYA, as District Judge, 15th Judicial District, Branch VI,
Province of Bukidnon, and ESTERLINA MARAPAO, LETICIA MARAPAO and
DIOSDADO MARAPAO, respondents.

Arcadio D. Fabria and Camilo E. Tamin, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of

Malaybalay, Bukidnon for petitioner.

Eusebio P. Aquino for private respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court declares the questioned orders of respondent judge dismissing the
information for supposed lack of jurisdiction as null and void. Respondent judge
wrongfully dismissed the case before him in disregard to the elemental rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information and that the
offense of serious physical injuries charged in the information had duly vested his
court with jurisdiction. The Court orders the transfer of the case below to another
branch of the Bukidnon court of-first instance, since it is doubtful that the State
and offended party may expect a fair and impartial hearing and determination of
the case from respondent judge who with his erroneous pre-conceptions and
predilections has adversely prejudged their case for serious physical injuries as
one merely of slight or less serious physical injuries.

The office of the provincial fiscal of Bukidnon, after preliminary investigation filed
an information dated October 13, 1977 in the court of respondent judge, charging

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the three private respondents- accused (Esterlina Marapao, Leticia Marapao and
Diosdado Marapao) for serious physical injuries committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1977, in Don Carlos, Bukidnon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloneously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Mrs.
LOLITA ARES, a mother who was then still on the twelfth (12th) day
from her child delivery, by then and there wrestling her to the
ground and thereafter throwing and hitting her with a fist-size stone
at the face thereby inflicting upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES:-

lacerated wound, transverse right at about 2.5 cm. x 0.5 cm. in width
at the level of the m arch of the face, with contusion and swelling all
around the inflicted area

which injury considerably deforms her face, and further causing upon said Mrs.
LOLITA ARES to suffer a relapse (nabughat in the local dialect) arising from her
weak constitution due to her recent child delivery, which relapse incapacitated
her from performing her customary labor for a period of more than thirty days.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised

Penal Code.

The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has been held,
much less that warrants for the arrest of the accused had been issued. Instead,
after "scanning the records of (the) case" and noting that the thereto attached
medical certificate stated that the injuries suffered by the victim Lolita Ares would
require medical attention from 7 to 10 days and, therefore, 4 "may either be
slight or less serious physical injuries only" contrary to victim's affidavit that she
was incapacitated from her customary labor for more than 30 days and the fiscal's
findings as to the prominent sear left on the victim's face as a result "which
considerably deforms her face" (as duly alleged in the information), respondent
judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight or less
physical injury is not within the jurisdiction of the court" as per his Order of
October 27, 1977, stating as his reason that

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The Court is of the opinion that what governs in the filing of a
physical injury case is the certificate issued by the physician regarding
the duration of treatment, and not what the victim declares because
the same is self-serving.

The fiscal's motion for reconsideration proved futile with respondent judge in his
Order of November 16, 1977 denying the same, evaluating the case without
having heard the parties or their witnesses (particularly the physician who issued
the medical certificate) nor having received their evidence and ruling against the
deformity alleged in the information on the basis of his perception from a reading
of the medical certificate and the fiscal's written resolution finding proper basis
for the filing of the information, that

Now, does the finding of the fiscal to the effect that he observed a
big scar at the left cheek bone of Mrs. Lolita Ares justify the filing of
the charge of serious physical injuries, under Article 263 of the
Revised Penal Code, when the attending physician certified that what
he found was a lacerated wound on the right side of the face?
Clearly, the scar found by the investigating fiscal could not be the
result of the acts imputed to the accused but for some other cause,
for how could the scar be found on the left side when the injury
inflicted was on the right side? (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the petition at bar as filed by the provincial fiscal for nullification of
respondent judge's orders.

The Solicitor General in his comment has noted that there is ample legal and
factual basis for the information charging serious physical injuries, stating that
"(T)hat the allegations in the Information that a fist-size stone hit the face of
Lolita Ares causing lacerated wound on the maxillary arch of the face which
considerably deformed her face (are) not only supported by the medical
certificate, but also by the admission of accused Diosdado Marapao during the
pre investigation that he threw a fist-size stone which hit the face of Lolita Ares
and the personal finding of Fiscal Tamin during the preliminary in. investigation
that there is a prominent scar on her face," and that the offense as charged falls
under Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes thereon
a penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and is
therefore properly cognizable by respondent judge's court.

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The Court finds that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
precipitately dismissing the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction on the mere basis
of his totally wrong notion that what governs in the filing of a physical injury case
is the medical certificate regarding the duration of treatment and "not what the
victim declares because the same is self-serving."

It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by

the allegations of the information or criminal complaint and not by the result of
the evidence presented at the trial,' much less by the trial judge's personal
appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the record of the
case without hearing the parties and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence
at a proper trial.

It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial
would indicate that a lesser offense outside the trial, 1 court's jurisdiction was
committed does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which had vested in
it under the allegations of the information as filed since "(once) the jurisdiction
attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent
happening of events, although they are of such a character as would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust
jurisdiction already attached. 2

Indeed, the Solicitor General has aptly commented that "the dismissal of the case
had only resulted in duplication of work and wasted time in the remand of
records when respondent trial judge dismissed the instant case for want of
jurisdiction, when it could have immediately proceeded to arraign the accused
and try him. "

Once more the Court is constrained to admonish the trial courts to proceed with
proper study and circumspection before summarily dismissing cases duly filed
within their court's cognizance and needlessly burdening the appellate courts
with cases such as that at bar which should not have reached us at all in the first
instance. Respondent judge's disregard of the established rule that the
information for serious physical injuries properly vested his court with jurisdiction
to try and hear the case, and that if from the evidence submitted a lesser offense
was established, that he equally had jurisdiction to impose the sentence for such
lesser offense, is difficult of comprehension. Besides, the doctor who issued the
medical certificate had yet to be presented at the trial and conceivably could

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corroborate the victim's testimony that her injuries had taken longer to heal than
had at first been estimated by him as well as clearify the location of he victim's
facial scar.

Respondent judge's actions and premature and baseless declaration that the
victim's declaration as to the period of her incapacity is "self-serving" raise serious
doubts as to whether the State and the offended party may expect a fair and
impartial hearing and determination of the case from him, since seemingly with
his erroneous pre-conceptions and predilections, he has adversely prejudged their
case as one merely of slight or less serious physical injuries. The case below
should therefore be transferred to another court presided by another judge.

ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent judge are declared null and
void. The case below for serious physical injuries is remanded and ordered
transferred to Branch V of the court of first instance below, and the judge
presiding the same is ordered to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest and
to proceed with dispatch with the arraignment of the respondents-accused and
the trial and determination of the case on the merits. Let copy of this decision be
attached to the personal record of respondent judge. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 People vs. Cottiok 62 Phil. 501, 503; see U.S. vs. Mallari, 24 Phil.,
366, 368; and People vs. Cells, 101, Phil 586-590.

2 Ramos vs. Central Bank, 41 SCRA 565, 583, citing People vs.
Pegarum.

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PERPETUA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 198400 October 7, 2013

FE ABELLA y PERPETUA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 from the Decision2 and

Resolution3 dated October 26, 2010 and August 11, 2011, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN affirming with modifications
the conviction4 by the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 39 of Fe Abella y Perpetua petitioner) for the crime of frustrated
homicide committed against his younger brother, Benigno Abella Benigno). The
RTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six 6) years
and one 1) day to eight 8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to ten 10) years
and one 1) day to twelve 12) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay
Benigno P100,000.00 as consequential damages, P10,000.00 for the medical
expenses he incurred, plus the costs of suit.5 The CA concurred with the RTCs
factual findings. However, the CA modified the penalty imposed to six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as maximum. The CA
also deleted the RTCs award in favor of Benigno of (a) P10,000.00 as actual
damages corresponding to the medical expenses allegedly incurred; and
(b) P100,000.00 as consequential damages. In lieu of the preceding, the CA

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ordered the petitioner to pay Benigno P30,000.00 as moral damages
and P10,000.00 as temperate damages.6

Antecedent Facts

On October 7, 1998, the petitioner, who at times worked as a farmer, baker and
trisicad driver, was charged with frustrated homicide in an Information7 which
reads:

That on or about September 6, 1998, at 11:00 oclock in the evening, more or less,
at Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to kill,
attack, assault, harm and hack one, BENIGNO ABELLA y PERPETUA, with the use of
a scythe, hitting the latters neck, thereby inflicting the injury described below, to
wit:

hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and

incised wound left hand dorsal aspect thus performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence,
but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely and able
intervention of the medical attendance rendered to the said victim.

Contrary to Article 249 in relation to 250 of the RPC.8

After the Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large and was only
arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation on October 7, 2002.9

During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Pre-trial and trial thus proceeded.

The Prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) Benigno;10 (b) Amelita
Abella11 (Amelita), Benignos wife; (c) Alejandro Tayrus12 (Alejandro), with whom
the petitioner had a quarrel; and (d) Dr. Roberto Ardiente13 (Dr. Ardiente), a
surgeon from J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, who rendered
medical assistance to Benigno after the latter was hacked by the petitioner.

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The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around 11:00
p.m., Benigno was watching television in his house. A certain Roger Laranjo
arrived and asked Benigno to pacify the petitioner, who was stirring trouble in a
nearby store. Benigno and Amelita found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro
and a certain Dionisio Ybaes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to convince the
petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and along the way, they
dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to apologize for the petitioners
conduct.

Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandros house when the petitioner arrived
bringing with him two scythes, one in each of his hands. Benigno instructed
Alejandro and Dionisio to run away and the latter two complied. The petitioner
wanted to enter Alejandros house, but Benigno blocked his way and asked him
not to proceed. The petitioner then pointed the scythe, which he held in his left
hand, in the direction of Benignos stomach, while the scythe in the right hand
was used to hack the latters neck once.14 Benigno fell to the ground and was
immediately taken to the hospital15 while the petitioner ran to chase
Alejandro.16 Benigno incurred an expense of more than P10,000.00 for
hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills.17 He further claimed that after the
hacking incident, he could no longer move his left hand and was thus deprived of
his capacity to earn a living as a carpenter.18

Dr. Ardiente testified that Benigno sustained: (a) a "hacking wound left lateral
aspect neck 11 cm"; and (b) an "incised wound left hand dorsal aspect 4
cm".19 Benigno was initially confined in the hospital on September 6, 1998 and
was discharged on September 23, 1998.20 From Dr. Ardientes recollection, since
the scythe used in the hacking was not sterile, complications and infections could
have developed from the big and open wounds sustained by Benigno, but
fortunately did not.21

The defense offered the testimonies of: (a) the petitioner;22 (b) Fernando
Fernandez23 (Fernando), a friend of the petitioner; and (c) Urbano
Cabag24 (Urbano).

The petitioner relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from
September 2, 1998 to October 2002, he and his family resided in Buenavista,
Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the hacking
incident occurred, is about four (4) hours drive away. Fernando testified that on

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September 6, 1998, he saw the petitioner gathering woods to make a hut.25 Later
in the evening, at around 5:00 p.m., Urbano spotted the petitioner drinking tuba
in the store of Clarita Perpetua.26

The RTC Ruling

On July 13, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo
of the Judgment27 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding the evidence presented by the
prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of the [petitioner] beyond reasonable
doubt, judgment is rendered finding petitioner Fe Abella GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as defined and penalized
by Article 249 in relation to Article 50 and Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, petitioner Fe Abella is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years of prision mayor as
minimum to Ten (10) years and One (1) day to Twelve (12) years of prision mayor
as maximum; to indemnify offended-party complainant Benigno Abella the sum of
Ten Thousand ([P]10,000.00) Pesos for the medical expenses incurred; to pay the
sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ([P]100,000.00) PESOS as consequential
damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.28

The RTC found the petitioners defenses of alibi and denial as weak. No
disinterested witnesses were presented to corroborate the petitioners claim that
he was nowhere at the scene of the hacking incident on September 6, 1998.
Fernando and Urbanos testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies. The RTC
accorded more credence to the averments of the prosecution witnesses, who,
without any ill motives to testify against the petitioner, positively, categorically
and consistently pointed at the latter as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides,
medical records show that Benigno sustained a wound in his neck and his scar
was visible when he testified during the trial.

The RTC awarded P10,000.00 as actual damages to Benigno for the medical
expenses he incurred despite the prosecutions failure to offer receipts as
evidence. The petitioner was likewise ordered to pay P100,000.00 as

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consequential damages, but the RTC did not explicitly lay down the basis for the
award.

The petitioner then filed an appeal29 before the CA primarily anchored on the
claim that the prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
existence of intent to kill which accompanied the single hacking blow made on
Benignos neck. The petitioner argued that the hacking was merely accidental
especially since he had no motive whatsoever which could have impelled him to
hurt Benigno, and that the infliction of merely one wound negates intent to kill.

The CA Ruling

On October 26, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision30 affirming the
petitioners conviction for the crime of frustrated homicide ratiocinating that:

Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number
of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e)
the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on
the victim.

Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution. The petitioner
attacked Benigno with deadly weapons, two scythes. The petitioners blow was
directed to the neck of Benigno. The attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting
Benigno was swift and sudden. The latter had no means, and no time, to defend
himself.

Dr. Roberto Ardiente, Jr., who attended and issued the Medical Certificate,
testified that Benigno suffered from a hack wound on the left neck, and an incised
wound on the left hand palm. He said that the wounds might have been caused
by a sharp, pointed and sharp-edged instrument, and may have resulted to death
without proper medical attendance. Benigno was hospitalized for about a month
because of the injuries. The location of the wound (on the neck) shows the nature
and seriousness of the wound suffered by Benigno. It would have caused his
death, had it not been for the timely intervention of medical science.31 (Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)

However, the CA modified the sentence to "imprisonment of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years

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and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum."32 The CA
explained that:

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime of
consummated homicide is reclusion temporal , or twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years. Under Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty for a
frustrated crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated
homicide is punishable by prision mayor , or six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty should be taken from the medium period of prision mayor . To determine
the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor should be reduced by
one degree, which is prision correccional , with a range of six (6) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty may be taken
from the full range of prision correccional.33 (Citation omitted)

The CA also deleted the RTCs order for the payment of actual and consequential
damages as there were no competent proofs to justify the awards. The CA instead
ruled that Benigno is entitled to P30,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
temperate damages,34 the latter being awarded when some pecuniary loss has
been incurred, but the amount cannot be proven with certainty.35

Issue

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari36 anchored on the issue of
whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in rendering judgments which are not in
accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence and which if not corrected, will
cause grave injustice and irreparable damage to the petitioner.37

In support thereof, the petitioner avers that the courts a quo failed to appreciate
relevant facts, which if considered, would justify either his acquittal or the
downgrading of his conviction to less serious physical injuries. The petitioner
points out that after the single hacking blow was delivered, he ran after Alejandro
and Dionisio leaving Benigno behind. Had there been an intent to kill on his part,
the petitioner could have inflicted more wounds since at that time, he had two
scythes in his hands. Further, the CA erred in finding that the hacking blow was
sudden and unexpected, providing Benigno with no opportunity to defend
himself. Benigno saw the petitioner arriving with weapons on hand. Benigno

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could not have been unaware of the danger facing him, but he knew that the
petitioner had no intent to hurt him. Benigno thus approached the petitioner, but
in the process, the former was accidentally hit with the latters scythe.

The petitioner also cites Pentecostes, Jr. v. People38 where this Court found the
downgrading of a conviction from attempted murder to physical injuries as
proper considering that homicidal intent was absent when the accused shot the
victim once and did not hit a vital part of the latters body.39

Further, as per Dr. Ardientes testimony, no complications resulted from

Benignos hacking wound in the neck and incised wound in the hand. Such being
the case, death could not have resulted. The neck wound was not "so extensive
because it did not involve a big blood vessel on its vital structure" while the
incised wound in the hand, which only required cleansing and suturing, merely
left a slight scarring.40 Besides, Benigno was only confined for seventeen (17) days
at the hospital and the injuries he sustained were in the nature of less serious
ones.

In its Comment,41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the dismissal of
the instant petition. The OSG stresses that the petitioner raises factual issues,
which call for a re-calibration of evidence, hence, outside the ambit of a petition
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the petitioners argument
that the development of infections or complications on the wounds is a necessary
factor to determine the crime committed is specious. The petitioners intent to kill
Benigno can be clearly inferred from the nature of the weapon used, the extent of
injuries inflicted and the circumstances of the aggression. Benigno could have
died had there been no timely medical assistance rendered to him.

If it were the petitioners wish to merely get Benigno out of the way to be able to
chase Alejandro and Dionisio, a kick, fist blow, push, or the use of a less lethal
weapon directed against a non-vital part of the body would have been sufficient.
However, the petitioner hacked Benignos neck with an unsterile scythe, leaving
behind a big, open and gaping wound.

This Courts Ruling

The instant petition raises factual issues which are beyond the scope of a petition
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

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Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua v. Eleto B. Baas 42 is instructive anent
what is the subject of review in a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, viz:

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a

lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances
that we admit and review questions of fact.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the
issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.43 (Citations omitted)

In the case at bar, the challenge is essentially posed against the findings of the
courts a quo that the petitioner had a homicidal intent when he hacked Benignos
neck with a scythe and that the wounds the latter sustained could have caused his
death had there been no prompt medical intervention. These questions are
patently factual in nature requiring no less than a re-calibration of the contending
parties evidence.

It is settled that the general rule enunciated in Century Iron Works, Inc. and
Benito Chua admits of exceptions, among which is, "when the judgment of the CA
is premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to notice certain relevant
facts that would otherwise justify a different conclusion x x x."44 However, the
factual backdrop and circumstances surrounding the instant petition do not add
up to qualify the case as falling within the exceptions.

Even if this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and allow a review of factual
issues, still, the instant petition is susceptible to denial.

To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be

proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the
accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was

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not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of
parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the
acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause
the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance.45

In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accuseds intent to take
his victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to
exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is
often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the
nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.46

The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had no motive to
attack, much less kill Benigno. The petitioner likewise invokes the doctrine in
Pentecostes, Jr.47 to argue that homicidal intent is absent in a case where the
accused shot the victim only once when there was an opportunity to do
otherwise. The petitioner belabors his claim that had he intended to kill Benigno,
he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latters death, and not leave
right after the blow to chase Alejandro instead.

The analogy is flawed.

In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of
the body. The attending physician certified that the injury would require medical
attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged from the
hospital the following day.

In Benignos case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck

and a 4-cm long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe
used by the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have
complications resulting from these injuries because the wounds were extensive
and they were big and they were open wounds, so there is a possibility of
infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the instrument used was not
a sterile instrument contaminated with other things."48 No complications
developed from Benignos wounds which could have caused his death, but he was
confined in the hospital for a period of 17 days from September 6, 1998 to
September 23, 1998.

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From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use
of a scythe against Benignos neck was determinative of the petitioners homicidal
intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to
figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be
enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead. While no complications
actually developed from the gaping wounds in Benignos neck and left hand, it
perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not
fatal considering the period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing
injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.

This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioners claim that an intent to
kill is negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from
further hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already
delivered and there was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from
the hacking incident by reason of a timely medical intervention provided to him,
which is a cause independent of the petitioners will.1wphi1

All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the
RTCs conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.

The Court modifies the award of damages.

As to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA was correct in deleting the
payment of the consequential damages awarded by the trial court in the absence
of proof thereof. Where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined
because of the absence of supporting receipts but entitlement is shown by the
facts of the case, temperate damages may be awarded.49 In the instant case,
Benigno certainly suffered injuries, was actually hospitalized and underwent
medical treatment. Considering the nature of his injuries, it is prudent to award
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages.50

Furthermore, we find that Benigno is entitled to moral damages in the amount

of P25,000.00.51 There is sufficient basis to award moral damages as ordinary
human experience and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on
Benigno would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral
shock, and similar injury.52

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WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated
October 26, 2010 and August 11 2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The petitioner, Fe
Abella y Perpetua is ORDERED TO PAY the offended party moral damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
Further, the monetary awards for damages shall be subject to interest at the legal
rate of six percent ( 6%) p r annum from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.53

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the

conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

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 Legal Medicine
Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
*
Acting member per Special Order No 1545 Revised, dated September 16, 2013.

1
Rollo pp. 11-31.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, with Associate Justices Edgardo A.
Camello and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring; CA rolla pp. 74-82.

3
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Abraham B. Borreta
and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang, concurring; id. at 112-116.

4
Issued by Judge Downey C. Valdevilla, id. at 31-43.

5
Id. at 43.

6
Id. at 81.

7
Original Records, p. 1-2.

8
Id. at 1.

9
Id. at 10.

10
TSN, February 20, 2003, pp. 2-20.

11
TSN, January 23, 2003, pp. 2-21.

12
Id. at 21-35.

13
TSN, May 12, 2003, pp. 3-12.

14
TSN, January 23, 2003, pp. 9, 17.

15
Id. at 13-14.

16
Id. at 17-18.

17
CA rollo, p. 33.

18
Id.

19
TSN, May 12, 2003, p. 7; see also Medical Certificate and Clinical Cover Sheet, Original
Records, pp. 69-70.

20
Original Records, p. 70; TSN, May 12, 2003, p. 9.

21
TSN, May 12, 2003, pp. 9-11.

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 Legal Medicine
Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
22
TSN, April 26, 2004, pp. 1-26.

23
TSN, January 22, 2004, pp. 1-32.

24
TSN, October 27, 2004, pp. 1-27.

25
TSN, January 22, 2004, p. 13.

26
TSN, October 27, 2004, pp. 5-6.

27
CA rollo, pp. 31-43.

28
Id. at 43.

29
Id. at 19-30.

30
Id. at 74-82.

31
Id. at 79-80.

32
Id. at 81.

33
Id. at 80.

34
Id. at 81.

35
Id., citing Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 704, 719 (2004).

36
Rollo, pp. 11-31.

37
Id. at 19.

38
G. R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 504.

39
Id. at 516-517.

40
Rollo, pp. 25-27.

41
CA rollo, pp. 129-150.

42
G. R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013.

43
Id.

44
Rollo, p. 20, citing Fuentes v. CA, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997).

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 Legal Medicine
Dr. Mario J. Gapoy
WMSU LLB 3A S.Y. 2016-2017
45
People v. Badriago, G.R. No. 183566, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 820, 832, citing SPO1 Nerpio v.
People, 555 Phil. 87, 94 (2007); People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 176385, February 26, 2008, 546
SCRA 671, 695.

46
Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 266, 275-276, citing
People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 351 (2001); Rivera v. People, 515 Phil. 824, 832 (2006).

47
Supra note 38.

48
TSN, May 12, 2003, p. 9.

49
Esqueda v. People, G.R. No. 170222, June 18, 2009 589 SCRA 489, 512-513; Article 2224 of the
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES provides: "Temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the Court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty."

50
Esqueda v. People, id; Serrano v. People, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 20 0, 623 SCRA 322, 341.

51
People of the Philippines v. Rodel Lanuza y Bagaoisan, G.R. No. 188562, August 17, 2011;
People of the Philippines v. Jesus Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2 2009 580 SCRA 436.

52
Esqueda v. People, supra note 49, at 513.

53
Please see People of the Philippines v. Jonathan Uto Veloso Rama, G.R. No. 188849, February
13, 2013.

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