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Explanation in archaeology, overview

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DOI: 10.1016/B978-012373962-9.00108-4

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Stanish Charles, EXPLANATION IN ARCHAEOLOGY, OVERVIEW. In:

Encyclopedia of Archaeology, ed. by Deborah M. Pearsall. 2008, Academic
Press, New York.
 Author's personal copy
1358 EXPLANATION IN ARCHAEOLOGY, OVERVIEW
Meldgaard M and Rasmussen M (1996) Arkologiske eksperimen-
ter i Lejre. Lejre: HAF Lejre.
Pearce PL (1988) The Ulysses Factor: Evaluating Visitors in Tourist
Settings. New York: Springer Verlag.
Reynolds PJ (1999) The Nature of Experiment in Archaeology. In:
Harding AF (ed.) Experiment and Design, Archaeological Studies
in Honour of John Coles, pp. 156162. Oxford: Oxbow Books.
Relevant Websites
http://www.archeon.nl Archaeological themepark Archeon.
http://www.biskupin.pl Biskupin Muzeum Archeologiczne
w Biskupinie.
http://www.butser.org.uk Butser Ancient Farm.
http://www.history.org Colonial Williamsburg Living History
Museum.
EXPLANATION IN ARCHAEOLOGY, OVERVIEW
Charles Stanish, University of California, Los
Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA
2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Glossary
critical theory A philosophical position in the humanities and
social sciences that seeks human liberation and social
transformation through knowledge and action.
empiricism A theory of knowledge emphasizing the role of
experience in the formation of ideas, while discounting the
notion of innate ideas.
epistemology The study or a theory of the nature and grounds
of knowledge.
hermeneutics An epistemological theory with roots in the
study of biblical texts that understanding is based on the
dialectical (back-and-forth) relationship between the whole
and its parts.
New Archaeology A movement that began in America in the
1960s, aimed at making archaeology more scientific by
employing empiricist and neo-positivist principles.
positivism A philosophy that the only authentic knowledge is
scientific knowledge, and that such knowledge can only come
from positive affirmation of theories through strict scientific
method.
postprocessualism A school of archaeological thought that
uses critical theory and interpretative methods while cautioning
against the shortcomings of scientific archaeology.
processualism A school of archaeological thought that uses
empiricist theories of knowledge and scientific methods to derive
testable models of human behavior.
Throughout its 200 years as a recognizable intellec-
tual activity, archaeology has focused on both the
recovery of ancient objects and explaining what
precisely those objects mean about the societies that
Encyclopedia of Archaeology (2008), vol. 2, pp. 1358-1364
http://www.ex.ac.uk/archaeology Department of Archaeology at
the University of Exeter.
http://www.eketorp.se Eketorp History Brought to Life on
Southern Oland.
http://www.exarc.eu EXARC, a European Network of Open
Air Museums and Other Facilities Involved in Experimental
Archaeology.
http://www.imtal-europe.org IMTAL Europe International
Museum of Theatre Alliance.
http://www.pfahlbauten.de Lake Dwellings of Unteruhldingen.
http://www.lejre-center.dk Lejre Forsgscenter: Lejre Experimen-
tal Center.
http://www.middelaldercentret.dk Medieval Centre.
http://iron.wlu.edu The Rockbridge Bloomery.
http://www.primitive.org The Society of Primitive Technology.
http://www.bachritterburg.de Bachritterburg Kanzach.
produced them. In this sense, explanation in archae-
ology is historically and culturally contingent, and the
aims and techniques of archaeological explanation
shift as the epistemological and ontological founda-
tions of the discipline shift. The purpose of this entry
is to define precisely what explanation in archaeology
is in contemporary terms.
Explanation is defined by most dictionaries as the
act of giving the reason for, the justification of, or the
cause of phenomena. Historically and linguistically,
the terms explanation and cause are associated with
scientific approaches in the social, behavioral, and
natural sciences. Within contemporary archaeology,
however, there are both scientific and nonscientific
approaches to studying the past. A proper exami-
nation of explanation in archaeology therefore
requires a broadening of the definition of explana-
tion to include any epistemology that gives meaning
to the past as derived from the material record. This
entry will therefore be an expansive treatment of
the topic to cover both nonscientific and scientific
approaches.
Archaeological Approaches in
the Twenty-First Century
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, we can
profitably define four broad kinds of archaeological
research based upon their philosophical foundations
and the implicit and explicit goals stated by their prac-
titioners. These kinds of archaeology, ranging from
the least to the most scientific: are (1) critical theory,
 Author's personal copy
(2) hermeneutic or interpretative archaeology, (3) his-
toricist archaeology, and (4) scientific archaeology. In
short, contemporary critical theorists seek to create
narratives of the past consistent with broad moral
and political principles and to examine the discipline
of archaeology itself as a constructed social practice.
Hermeneutic or interpretative archaeology seeks to
read multiple meanings into the archaeological record.
Historicist archaeology seeks to explain the archaeo-
logical record of objects and archaeological contexts in
space and time. Scientific archaeology seeks to sub-
sume the empirical archaeological record into broader
principles of human behavior. Each of these kinds of
archaeology begins with different logical principles
and assumptions. For each kind of archaeology, ex-
planation has different meanings, if any meaning at
all. Even more complex, many archaeologists adopt
the principles of two or more of these intellectual
traditions simultaneously as they do their work.
Idealist Philosophical Traditions
Critical archaeology Critical theory practitioners
stand at the end of one continuum in the philosophy
of social science. Generally antagonistic to modern
philosophies of science (logical positivism and empir-
icism), the core goal of critical theory is not to define
what is in the archaeological record, but rather de-
fine: (1) what the archaeological record ought to
teach us about the past and (2) to deconstruct archae-
ology as a power-infused social activity and rectify
what they see as past errors in the way archaeology
has been practiced. Critical theorists begin with the
assumption that all knowledge is socially constructed,
a tradition drawn largely from philosophical ideal-
ism. Furthermore, in this tradition, no socially con-
structed knowledge base is better or worse than any
other by any a priori criteria. As such, critical theorists
in archaeology seek explanation of the past in terms of
their implications for social action in the present.
Explanation, or more appropriately stated, providing
meaning to the archaeological record and to the act of
explanation itself, is subsumed under broad social,
political, cultural precepts, and/or moral mandates.
As Hodder and Hutson note, such approaches inter-
pret . . . past cultural meanings in relation to such
issues as power and domination, history and gender.
Critical archaeology is essentially a morally based
social and political activity in the sense described
by Scheper-Hughes (1995) for anthropology in gen-
eral. In this tradition, any pretext of logical realism
(whether in the positivist sense used by Salmon
(1982:162) or in the postpositivist sense of Gibbon
(1989:142172); see Wylie (2003)) or its related phil-
osophical positions of materialism, instrumentalism,
Encyclopedia of Archaeology (2008), vol. 2, pp. 1358-1364
EXPLANATION IN ARCHAEOLOGY, OVERVIEW 1359
empiricism, and so forth, is considered inappropriate
for archaeological interpretation. Any scientific epis-
temology assumes that a real and knowable world
exists apart from the human observers that is,
what scientists study is independent of the analytical
process and has an independent ontological status
with its own a priori properties. Scientific epistemol-
ogies assume that data and history are real, and that
the process of interpretation, in theory (if not neces-
sarily in practice), can be morally neutral. Scientific
philosophies eschew the metaphysical. Extreme logi-
cal positivism even denied the existence of abstract
truths not verifiable by the human senses, although
most archaeological scientists today hold much more
moderate views as described below.
Archaeologists working in this critical theory tra-
dition would ideally expect the interpretation of those
power relationships to contribute to some kind of
broader social activity that weakens asymmetrical
relationships of power in contemporary society. Iron-
ically, while maintaining a hyper-relativistic stance as
an ideal, interpretations of the past that conform to
morally sound principles of social justice are usually
considered superior to those that are perceived to
reinforce asymmetrical power relationships in con-
temporary society. Insofar as explanation exists in
this tradition, it is intimately linked to the degree to
which an interpretation can inspire or effect social
and political action. Given that all interpretations
are valid, one is not only free to choose the most
socially correct one, one is in a sense obligated to
choose the most moral interpretation.
An archaeologist working in the critical theory
tradition who discusses, say, an early Greek theatre,
a Southwestern US kiva, or Peruvian sunken court
would seek to define the power relationships repre-
sented by that architecture in the material record.
These public constructions are interpreted as reinforc-
ing ideologies of power, or, conversely, may be seen as
means by which the majority of people resist such
social power. As a critique of existing archaeological
practice, critical theorists have provided useful insights
into how archaeologists conduct research. It has been
far less successful as a positive research framework,
given its general rejection of explanation as a feasible
or desirable goal.
Hermeneutic or interpretative archaeology Herme-
neutic or interpretative archaeology draws off many
of the principles of critical theory, most crucially the
assumption that all knowledge is socially constructed.
They likewise share a general rejection of scientific
determinism or any variant of logical positivism or
empiricism. Hermeneutics is defined by the Oxford
English Dictionary (OED) as the art or science of
 Author's personal copy
1360 EXPLANATION IN ARCHAEOLOGY, OVERVIEW
interpretation. . . . Beginning at least with the phi-
losopher Collingwood (with strong ties to Hegel and
Kant), hermeneutic approaches to history and culture
generally reject scientific epistemologies.
As culturally constituted and irreducible, human
behavior cannot be explained with reference to exter-
nal factors such as the environment, technology, and
so forth in hermeneutic archaeology. As with critical
archaeology, hermeneutic archaeology also rejects
any simple or direct relationship between material
culture and human behavior. As hermeneutic practi-
tioners would put it, culture creates objects and
objects create culture in a recursive and complex
relationship not reducible to simple linear proposi-
tions. Avidly antipositivistic, knowledge is not cumu-
lative, but constantly reformulated. Knowledge that
reinforces asymmetrical power relations is conscious-
ly resisted (or decentered) as an explicit goal. In this
tradition, culture and the archaeological record are
ambiguous cultural texts to be read interpreted
and reinterpreted not explained in any scientific
sense. The texts are highly affected by the readers
social, political, and cultural biases; for many herme-
neutic archaeologists, the context in which the ar-
chaeological record is read is as important as data
themselves. Therefore, an archaeologist working in
this tradition who encounters an early Greek theatre,
a Southwestern US kiva, or Peruvian sunken court
would seek to create a narrative of meaning that is
represented in the material record. That meaning can
be different for different interpreters, and there is no
hierarchy of these interpretations. What is meaning-
ful from one perspective is as equally valid as any
other perspective. Ambiguity and imprecision, con-
sidered anathema by historicist and scientific archae-
ologists, are essential components of hermeneutic
archaeology. It is essential precisely because such
language evokes different meanings from different
people, a process that enriches the narrative.
While usually denying it, most practitioners of
hermeneutic and critical archaeology implicitly rely
heavily upon some form of philosophical idealism. A
prominent example is Hodder and Hutson (2003:4),
who, in describing the epistemological foundations of
interpretative archaeology, note that cultural behav-
ior is not reducible to broader generalizations because
culture is meaningfully constituted (i.e., not an in-
dependent phenomenon apart from the observer) and
cultural relationships are not caused by anything
else outside themselves. They just are. This state-
ment, of course, betrays a classic idealist stance vis-
a-vis culture and history. It must be pointed out that
some readings of this tradition suggest that external
and noncultural factors constrain the production of
cultural meaning and therefore may result in some
Encyclopedia of Archaeology (2008), vol. 2, pp. 1358-1364
broad cross-cultural similarities, a process that scien-
tific archaeologists would call convergent evolution.
However, as the above quote demonstrates, herme-
neutic archaeology is firmly rooted in idealist epis-
temologies of philosophy not amenable to any kind
of reductionist statement or empirical verification/
falsification procedure.
Combined, critical and hermeneutic archaeology
constitute a large part of what is known as postpro-
cessual archaeology in Anglo-American traditions (see
Postprocessual Archaeology). Most objective observers
now agree that postprocessualism provided a useful
critique of the excesses of the new archaeology and
the nave adoption of logical positivism (see Processual
Archaeology). That critique gave rise to a richer
approach to explaining the past with variables beyond
technology, demography, and subsistence. In other in-
fluential intellectual traditions, particularly those in
Spain and Latin America, the term social archaeol-
ogy is usually associated with these and/or some vari-
ant of Marxist or structural Marxist approaches (see
Social Theory; Marxist Archaeology). Postproces-
sual archaeology constitutes a rich and diverse set
of approaches that is not readily definable. Some self-
described postprocessualists actually work within
empiricist epistemologies as described below, but
reject the traditional processual archaeological
focus on the strictly material. In this sense, they are
post-processual only insofar that they test models
of cultural process that privilege ideology, gender,
power, and other variables traditionally considered
epiphenomenal by the New Archaeology. However,
all critical and hermeneutic archaeologies are post-
processual, and all are based upon the general rejec-
tion of scientific philosophies and the implicit
adoption of philosophical idealism in one guise or
the other. Explanation and causation in such tradi-
tions is not an attainable goal. Creating multiple
meaning of the past while critiquing the practice of
archaeology is the central goal.
Empiricist Philosophical Positions
Historicist archaeology Historicist archaeology
seeks to precisely define objects and events in the
archaeological record in space and time. The term
historicist is used to differentiate this school from
historical archaeology. The latter is a subdiscipline
of archaeology focusing on time periods that have
contemporary textual information (see Historical
Archaeology: As a Discipline). Historical archaeolo-
gy can be conducted in any one of the four traditions
described here (see Historical Archaeology: Meth-
ods). The former, described in this article, refers to a
particular approach in archaeology that has its own
epistemological principles.
 Author's personal copy
Scholars working within this historicist tradition
generally accept key principles of scientific ontology
and epistemology, particularly the assumption of
a real, independent, and knowable universe. They
combine these philosophical assumptions with induc-
tive methodologies to reconstruct the archaeological
record. Inductive methodologies begin with the exist-
ing database and confine explanation to within what
can be known about the empirical record. Historicist
archaeology shares many of the philosophical princi-
ples of scientific archaeology, but eschews the sub-
suming of particular historical events into broader
theoretical principles.
Explanation in this tradition centers on the ability
to locate the remains in or on the ground in either
a known historical sequence as derived from inde-
pendent data sets such as texts, or within existing
archaeological data sets. Successful explanation is
based upon the degree to which the interpretation
generally conforms and adds to previously estab-
lished knowledge. Unlike scientific approaches, his-
toricist archaeology sees the past as contingent,
developing out of earlier historical moments in a
particular cultural sequence. It is not, in their view,
subsumable to larger processes. Given this assump-
tion, historicists seek to explain particular historical
phenomena through a rigid methodology of empirical
testing and verification.
For instance, the discovery in 1974 of the tomb of
the Chinese Emperor Qin Shihuangdi represents a
classic instance of explanation in this tradition. The
tomb had been described in texts, the dates were
known to the precise year, and the archaeological
data confirmed and expanded the empirical knowl-
edge of this important culture. Prior to archaeological
research, the tomb was not explained but was merely
part of a large mound that was assumed to be archae-
ological. After the discovery of terra cotta figures and
after problem-oriented research was conducted at
the site, the archaeologists were able to define who
built the tomb, when it was built, when it was aban-
doned, and even in some cases which individuals were
represented by the terra cotta figures. From an histori-
cist perspective, explanation was very successful
because the tomb, the buildings, and the associated
objects were precisely located in space and time;
empirical knowledge was increased, the canon of his-
torical knowledge about this dynasty was expanded,
and a richer history was created.
Explanation in this tradition only begins at this
level; eventually more data (either empirical data
derived from additional field work or data derived
from new analysis of existing data sets) should ideally
provide the archaeologist with a richer understanding
of the history of the object or social phenomena.
Encyclopedia of Archaeology (2008), vol. 2, pp. 1358-1364
EXPLANATION IN ARCHAEOLOGY, OVERVIEW 1361
Historicist archaeology deals with questions such as:
why did Cahokia collapse, what was the origin of
divine kingship among the Maya, what motivated
Akkadian expansion, did humans or climate kill off
the late Pleistocene megafauna in the Americas, who
was buried in this tomb, and so on? In this sense, the
historical tradition again breaks with critical and her-
meneutic approaches in seeing knowledge as cumula-
tive. While interpretations may be refined, revised,
and/or discarded, the collection of new empirical
knowledge adds to the ever-increasing canon of his-
torical data in any particular cultural area. It is in this
fundamentally empiricist activity that explanation is
located in historicist archaeology.
To continue with our example, an archaeologist
working in the historicist tradition who discovers an
early Greek theater, a kiva, or Peruvian sunken court
would seek to assess the time and culture within
which that architecture was constructed. The degree
to which these objects can be associated with known
historical events and even individuals, as with the Qin
Shihuangdi tomb, is the major criterion of explana-
tory success. The same applies to any and all sorts of
objects and the contexts within which those objects
are found. As empirical knowledge accumulates, an
increasingly richer historical narrative of past socie-
ties can be constructed. Explanation is not precisely
linear, since new data will alter interpretations.
However, there is general sense borrowed from soft
neopositivist assumptions that the addition of new
data from any particular area will enhance the ability
of the archaeologist to explain the cultural historical
record in any particular place and time.
Scientific archaeology Scientific archaeology ac-
cepts many of the principles of historicist archaeology
but goes further in that the primary goal is to subsume
the archaeological record into broader patterns of
human behavior in space and time. Scientific archae-
ology is viewed by its practitioners as a branch of
comparative behavioral and social science. As such,
it is most closely associated with explanation and
causality, as generally understood in the philosophy
of science.
Contemporary scientific archaeology is an out-
growth of the New Archaeology popular in the
1960s and 1970s. The philosophical standards of
this perspective can be found in the book Explanation
in Archaeology by P. Watson, S. Le Blanc, and
C. Redman (1971). The New Archaeology explicitly
borrowed from the logical positivism and extreme
empiricism of the Vienna School and its later practi-
tioners. When the critique of logical positivism
among philosophers of science in the 1950s and
1960s gained ground later in archaeology, the New
 Author's personal copy
1362 EXPLANATION IN ARCHAEOLOGY, OVERVIEW
Archaeology modified its epistemological underpin-
nings. In particular, modifications by the work of the
philosopher Hempel (in particular, the recognition of
statistical laws) and, to a lesser extent, the influence
of Popper, contributed to a reformulation that served
as the philosophical basis of the next generation of
scientific archaeology that developed out of the New
Archaeology.
Eliminating some of the excesses of the extreme
empiricism of logical positivism and adopting more
elastic criteria of verification, scientific archaeology
has shifted its focus since the 1980s. It is a safe gener-
alization to say that the New Archaeology was largely
associated with Hempelian deductive-nomological
explanation, while contemporary scientific archaeol-
ogy is more associated with Popperian falsification
epistemologies and instrumentalist philosophies of
science. Instrumentalist assumptions reject the notion
that absolute truth can be known and instead rely on
best fit models, as described below.
Likewise, unlike much of the New Archaeology,
contemporary scientific archaeology assumes that
there is usually no direct relationship between ma-
terial culture and behavior; both natural and cultural
processes work to alter the archaeological record in
space and time. Most contemporary scientific archae-
ologists also accept the fact that cultural biases affect
both the interpretation and the analytical categories
used to study the archaeological record. However,
since science is viewed as a replicable, rule-bound
social activity and not a reflective and subjective
activity as in idealist traditions, scientific archaeology
assumes that these biases can be made explicit and
therefore controlled.
Like the New Archaeology, contemporary scientific
archaeology relies heavily on empiricist and realist
assumptions about the structure of the natural and
social world as independent and knowable, while
adopting a much stronger reliance on propositions
derived from existing theoretical knowledge. Again,
the influence of the post-Vienna School empiricists is
evident here. Contemporary scientific archaeology
also accepts the methodological precept of parsimo-
ny, best defined by the OED as the logical principle
that no more causes or forces should be assumed than
are necessary to account for the facts.
Processual archaeology used to be synonymous
with the New Archaeology. Now it is simply another
term for scientific archaeology. While this school is
not formally named, it is a type of archaeology that
encompasses a number of frameworks that evolved
from the New Archaeology. The key goal of the disci-
pline today is to understand the general processes
or underlying logic of human cultural evolution in
Encyclopedia of Archaeology (2008), vol. 2, pp. 1358-1364
the same way that evolutionary biologists construct
generalizing principles to understand the origin and
evolution of the worlds plants and animals. Within
evolutionary biology, there is a wide range of theoreti-
cal approaches. Within contemporary scientific archae-
ology, there is an equally broad range of approaches.
Some approaches privilege economics, some privilege
technology, some ideology, ecology, polity, or demog-
raphy, and most combine these factors into complex,
multivariate explanations. All scientific approaches
share, by logical necessity, reductionist assumptions
and seek empirical confirmation or rejection in one
form or another. They are therefore diametrically
opposite to hermeneutic and critical archaeologies.
Virtually all contemporary scientific neoevolu-
tionary theory rejects the universalizing and totalizing
features of early unilineal or, to a lesser extent, multi-
lineal cultural evolutionary theory. Universalizing is
understood to mean that a particular theory covers
all cultural phenomena in all places and all times.
Totalizing refers to the assumptions of nineteenth
century evolutionary theory that saw all aspects of
cultures as evolving. Instead, contemporary neoevo-
lutionary cultural theory recognizes distinct evolu-
tionary pathways in different environmental and
social circumstances, and, except for doctrinaire (and
now largely marginal) Darwinian archaeology, it iso-
lates only certain aspects of culture that are subject
to selection.
In this light, concepts such as typologies, chief-
doms, states, and so forth are not assumed to be
inherent stages through which societies must evolve.
Such a position, in fact, represents a discredited pre-
Darwinian (read Spencerian or Lamarkian type of
philosophical idealism) kind of evolutionary process
that has little theoretical or empirical foundation
in contemporary scientific archaeology. Rather, neo-
evolutionary theory in contemporary scientific archae-
ology is more faithful to Darwinian evolutionary
principles of descent with modification with some
kind of selective mechanism providing the means by
which societies develop. Terms such as chiefdom
and state, as Flannery has consistently pointed
out for two decades, are merely heuristic categories
that help sort out a very complex empirical reality. A
chiefdom has an ontological status similar to the
category of reptile or mammal in evolutionary bi-
ology. In the same way that there is no inherent
process by which a reptile must evolve into a mammal,
there is no inherent process by which a chiefdom must
necessarily evolve into a state. However, being able to
distinguish mammals from reptiles allows palaeontol-
ogists to reconstruct evolutionary sequences and devel-
op general principles of evolution better than if no
 Author's personal copy
such categories existed; the analogy holds for scientific
archaeology as well.
In this sense, explanation in contemporary scientif-
ic archaeology differs from the New Archaeology in
several critical ways. At the epistemological level, the
most important is the recognition that social scientific
laws do not exist as immutable phenomena, even if a
real world exists apart from our observations of it
this is a clear effect of the influence of Popperian
philosophies of science in the discipline. The limita-
tions of our sensory capacities necessarily (in a logical
sense) make it impossible to discover immutable laws.
Rather, scientific theories are the best descriptions of
the observed archaeological record, as deduced by
patterns of behavior seen in ethnographic or histori-
cal peoples. Likewise, a criterion of utility (or philo-
sophical instrumentalism in some discussions) is the
basis by which theories are judged; more simply put,
whatever theory explains the most phenomena in
the most parsimonious way at a particular moment
is considered better than other theories. Again, this is
a position unequivocally derived from the philoso-
phies of Popper as he modified logical positivism.
As mentioned above, the heuristic categories used
by processual archaeologists, such as chiefdom, pro-
vide a means of comparing societies across space and
time. This analytical technique is the cornerstone of
scientific archaeology. Put another way, comparative
analysis is the fundamental logic by which general
principles can be derived from the archaeological
record. In a number of cases around the world, chief-
doms indeed evolved into states. But the reality is that
the vast majority of chiefdoms did not evolve into
states, and in some cases of secondary state forma-
tion, states developed out of socio-political organiza-
tions that were not chiefdoms at all. The same can be
said for virtually any analytical category utilized
by scientific archaeologists. However, in those rare
instances where a clear pattern emerges where struc-
turally similar societies in independent geographical
areas followed similar patterns of development, ex-
planation in a classic scientific sense is demanded. In
fact, the cornerstone of contemporary scientific ar-
chaeology rests on the numerous observations that
patterns in the historical and archaeological record
occur across space and time. Given this empirical
reality, some kind of reductionism is logically ines-
capable and necessary for scientific archaeology.
Explaining the Past
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that only
scientific and historicist archaeology explain past
human behavior as traditionally understood in the
Encyclopedia of Archaeology (2008), vol. 2, pp. 1358-1364
EXPLANATION IN ARCHAEOLOGY, OVERVIEW 1363
philosophy of social science. Historicist archaeology
explains the empirical record by placing objects,
monuments, and texts in their historical context.
Scientific archaeology views explanation as a logical
reductive process. Historicist archaeology, in turn,
focuses on what was once known as spacetime sys-
tematics; this is the locating and explanation of
objects in an ordered sequence around the world in
different places and times.
There are a number of logical means by which
archaeologists seek to explain the past. Perhaps the
most common is the ethnographic analogy. Ethno-
graphic analogy is based upon the principle that
people in similar cultural and environmental circum-
stances faced with similar goals, resources, and con-
straints will behave in similar ways. Ethnographic
analogy works best where the consequences of failure
to obtain the desired goals can result in death or
extinction of the individual or group. In these
instances, it is assumed that optimal solutions will
independently develop among peoples in space and
time, irrespective of any kind of cultural meaning
associated with those solutions. Suboptimal choices
will be selected out in any competitive environment.
Examples here include defensive constructions, irri-
gation agriculture, hunting techniques, and the like.
While there are many ways to protect a group of
people against another group in a premodern context,
there is a very limited set of optimal choices given the
iron logic of war and extreme consequences of failure
(see Arkush and Stanish (2005) for examples of this
logic with premodern military architecture). There-
fore, around the world in space and time and effec-
tively independent of cultural factors, premodern
fortresses are strikingly similar in architectural style
and function. Likewise, given the invariant laws of
the physics of water movement, there are very few
successful ways to construct irrigation systems. As
with defensive architecture, irrigation works around
the world in similar environments tend to be very
similar in design and use.
Given this, and given the precept of parsimony,
archaeologists can make high-probability interpreta-
tions of the function and use of irrigation systems,
defensive architecture, and other such features in the
archaeological record, even without any textual in-
formation. Ethnographic analogy works with other
kinds of human behavior to varying degrees. It is
successful to the degree that selective pressures oper-
ate on the choices made by people. Where cultural
choices, such as language syntax or dress styles, do
not alter the fitness of individuals or groups in a
selective environment (both social and ecological),
then ethnographic analogy is of little or no use.
 Author's personal copy
1364 EXPLANATION IN ARCHAEOLOGY, OVERVIEW
Ethnoarchaeology and experimental archaeology
are logically similar to ethnographic analogy (see
Ethnoarchaeology; Experimental Archaeology).
Ethnoarchaeology studies modern peoples to provide
more precise ethnographic analogs to aid in the ex-
planation of past behaviors. Experimental archaeo-
logy seeks to replicate the behaviors by which
archaeological data are created. Both rely on empiri-
cist epistemological assumptions and the precept of
parsimony. These two fields are simply formal proce-
dures of ethnographic analogy used to derive analogs
from the known record of human behavior.
The direct historical approach can be used with
great success in a number of archaeological contexts
around the world. The basis of the direct historical
approach is that objects used by ethnographically
documented peoples that are similar in key ways to
objects found in archaeological contexts of those
same peoples ancestors, carry a high probability of
having the same function. Likewise, the adoption
of the principle of parsimony is necessary. For this
approach to work, there must also be a direct cultural
relationship between an archaeological data set and
a living group of people. Therefore, if one excavates
a round structure with similar features to a historic
hogan in Arizona, and if there is no evidence of cultural
disruption, then one can make a high-probability state-
ment that the excavated structure functioned in
the same way as the historic hogan. The utility of
the direct historical approach is proportional to the
closeness in age and space of the archaeological and
ethnographically known analog.
The comparative approach is often confused with
ethnographic analogy and the direct historical ap-
proach. The comparative approach is epistemologi-
cally different, though it is often used in conjunction
with ethnographic analogy by scientific archaeolo-
gists. What distinguishes it logically from ethno-
graphic analogy is that the comparative approach is
feasible only if one adopts some kind of broadly
processual and evolutionary theory. A theory is only
evolutionary in the modern sense of the term if it
contains some kind of selective mechanism. Given
this assumption, plus the assumption of parsimony,
organizationally similar societies in similar environ-
mental circumstances can be used as analogs to
archaeological complexes.
Encyclopedia of Archaeology (2008), vol. 2, pp. 1358-1364
Conclusion
Archaeology is a rich and diverse discipline with
theoretical approaches that range from the most
humanistic to the most scientific. Archaeology can
be practiced as an interpretative narrative, as a histor-
ical discipline, or as a comparative social or behavior-
al science. All forms of archaeological practice that
are executed well can enrich our understanding of the
past. Explanation in archaeology takes many forms
and depends upon the kind of archaeology that is
practiced. The most explicit use of explanation in
archaeology is found in the historicist and scientific
traditions. As such, contemporary archaeology has
moved well beyond a focus on the object to permit
us to define meaning and explain past behaviors
around the world in space and time.
See also: Ethnoarchaeology; Experimental Archaeolo-
gy; Historical Archaeology: As a Discipline; Methods;
Interpretive Models, Development of; Marxist Archae-
ology; Philosophy of Archaeology; Postprocessual
Archaeology; Processual Archaeology; Social Theory.
Further Reading
Arkush E and Stanish C (2005) Interpreting conflict in the ancient
Andes: Implications for the archaeology of warfare. Current
Anthropology 46(1): 328.
Flannery K (1995) Prehistoric Social Evolution. In: Ember C and
Ember M (eds.) Research Frontiers in Anthropology, pp. 126.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Flannery K (1999) Process and agency in early state formation.
Cambridge Archaeological Journal 9(1): 321.
Gibbon G (1989) Explanation in Archaeology. London: Basil
Blackwood.
Hodder I and Hutson S (2003) Reading the Past. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Salmon M (1982) Philosophy and Archaeology. New York:
Academic Press.
Scheper-Hughes N (1995) The primacy of the ethical. Propositions for
a militant anthropology. Current Anthropology 36(3): 409440.
Shanks M and Tilley C (1987) Social Theory and Archaeology.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Spencer CS (1997) Evolutionary approaches in archaeology. Jour-
nal of Archaeological Research 5(3): 209264.
Watson PJ, LeBlanc S, and Redman C (1971) Explanation in
Archaeology, An Explicitly Scientific Approach. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Wylie A (2003) Thinking from Things: Essays in the Philosophy of
Archaeology. Berkeley: University of California Press.