Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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MEANING OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER (Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Republic)
Question: May subject matter jurisdiction be conferred by the acquiescence of the parties?
Answer: No. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on whether a suit comes within the
penumbra of a statutory conferment is determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless of
whether or not the suitor will be entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted.
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JURISDICTION OF COURTS (PLEASE READ THIS CAREFULLY)
SUPREME COURT (Star Electric Corp vs. R&G Construction)
Question: In what instances may the Supreme Court resolve not only questions of law but questions
of fact as well?
Answer: It is an established rule that in the exercise of its power of review under Rule 45, the
Supreme Court only resolves questions of law and not questions of facts. However, this rule is not
absolute. Jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved
by the Supreme Court, such as: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (4) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (5) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (7) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (8) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (9) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CAUSE OF ACTION; MEANING OF CAUSE OF ACTION (St. Michael School v. Masaito
Development Corp) (Please read carefully)
Question: What are the requirements to establish a cause of action in an easement complaint under
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Article 649 (Easement of Right of Way) of the Civil Code?
Answer: For a complaint to state a cause of action in an easement case, more specifically, Art. 649
of the Civil Code has laid down the following requirements: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) there is
payment of proper indemnity; and (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of
the dominant estate. The Complaint, first, asserts that petitioners have a right to an easement of
right-of-way that cuts across respondents property; second, it refers to respondents correlative
obligation not to fence off and close the single gate which is used as the only entry and exit points
of the school population; and third, it refers to respondents expansion and excessive terms and
conditions, constituting the acts violating petitioners right. Hence, the Complaints material
allegations are enough to entitle petitioners to a favorable judgment if these are assumed to be true.
LITIS PENDENCIA
(Subic Telecom v. SBMA)
Question: What factors will indicate that there exists litis pendencia?
Answer: For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites or elements must concur: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with
respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (EPCIB v. RCBC) (Please read this very well)
Question: What is the mode of appeal in assailing the RTC decision that confirmed an arbitral
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award?
Answer: The proper mode of appeal assailing the decision of the RTC confirming an arbitral award
is an appeal before the CA pursuant to Sec. 46 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known
as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, or completely, An Act to Institutionalize the Use
of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for
Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for other Purposes, promulgated on April 2, 2004 and became
effective on April 28, 2004 after its publication on April 13, 2004.
TRIAL
CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE OF HEARING OR TRIAL (Steel Corp. V. Equitable
PCIB)
Question: The trial court approved the Petition for Rehabilitation and appointed a Receiver for X
Corp. X Corp. filed its own counter rehabilitation plan and submitted it for the consideration of the
court. Other creditors filed their respective comments on the petition and the Receiver submitted his
recommended rehabilitation plan which the court approved. From this order by the Rehabilitation
Court sprung several appeals filed with the CA. Should the CA consolidate the appeals filed?
Answer: Yes. Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Sec. 1, Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court. The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the
trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the
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parties-litigants. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of
affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts.
Further, it results in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
courts in two or more cases, which would otherwise require a single judgment.
MODES OF APPEAL
RULE 45, LIMITED TO QUESTIONS OF LAW (Lim v. Desierto)
Question: May the Supreme Court under Rule 45 review the exercise of discretion of the
Ombudsman in determining whether probable cause exists?
Answer: No. An appeal under Rule 45 should be limited to questions of law only, not questions
of facts. The main issue of whether probable cause exists that will warrant the filing of the
appropriate complaint is a question of fact. In this case, resolving the issues presented by petitioner,
however, would require a review of the factual findings of the Ombudsman. Thus, it is beyond the
ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or
dismissing a complaint filed before it. However, while the Ombudsmans discretion in determining
the existence of probable cause is not absolute, nevertheless, petitioner must prove that such
discretion was gravely abused to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsmans findings by this Court. In
this respect, petitioner fails. This Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-
interference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause,
provided there is no grave abuse of discretion.
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ISSUES TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL (Bote v. Sps. Veloso)
Question: May a party change his cause of action or theory of the case on appeal? Is there an
exception to the rule?
Answer: The settled rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of
action on appeal. It affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a
question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate
something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and
invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. Nevertheless, such rule admits of
an exception as enunciated in Canlas v. Tubil(G.R. No. 184285, 2009) to wit: When the factual
bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to
enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, as in this case, the Court may give due
course to the petition and resolve the principal issues raised therein
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REVIEW OF FINAL JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN (Aguilar
v. Hernandez)
Question: What is the remedy to question the Ombudsman's decision in administrative disciplinary
cases?
Answer: The nature of the case before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) determines the proper
remedy available to the aggrieved party and with which court it should be filed. In administrative
disciplinary cases, an appeal from the OMBs decision should be taken to the CA under Rule 43,
unless the decision is not appealable owing to the penalty imposed. In the case at bar, the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of his administrative disciplinary jurisdiction had, after due
investigation, adjudged petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty and meted the
corresponding penalty. Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is the proper mode of appeal.
Rule 43 governs appeals to the CA from decisions or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (Republic v. Estate of Lim)
Question: The Republic filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint averring that Lim, Sr. and
Lim, Jr., acted in unlawful collusion with the Marcoses, and took undue advantage of their
relationship with the latter. The Republic then prayed for the reconveyance of all funds and property
acquired by them in abuse of power through unjust enrichment. When Lim, Sr. passed away, his
estate filed a motion to lift the sequestration over certain real properties. Such motion was opposed
by the Republic alleging that the sequestered lots stand as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment the Republic may obtain against the estate of Lim, Sr.
The Sandiganbayan then lifted the sequestration order. The estate of Lim, Sr. then filed a demurrer
to evidence alleging that the Republics evidence did not prove or disprove that the defendants on
their own or in concert with the Marcoses, amassed ill-gotten wealth. The Republic also filed a
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against respondents in the amount of
its claims, to counter the effects to the lifting of the sequestration order. However, the
Sandiganbayan, stating that bare allegations of the commission of fraud by respondents in incurring
the obligations are not sufficient for the granting of the writ of preliminary attachment, denied the
motion. Is the Sandiganbayan correct?
Answer: No. For a writ of attachment to issue under Sec.1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court,
the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought. The Court
ruled that the Republic has sufficiently discharged the burden of demonstrating the commission of
fraud committed by the respondents as a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. The main supporting proving document of the Republic was unqualifiedly
admitted in evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It is incongruous, therefore, for the Sandiganbayan to
deny the writ of preliminary attachment when the pieces of evidence on record which it used and
based its findings and conclusions in denying the demurrer to evidence were the same ones which
demonstrate the propriety of the writ of preliminary attachment. The denial of the prayed writ, thus,
evidently constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sandiganbayan.
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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (St. James College v. Equitable PCI Bank)
Question: Spouses Jaime and Myrna Torres, owner of St. James College, defaulted in their loan of
PhP25M secured by REM in favor of EPCIB. EPCIB made a counter proposal on the restructuring
of the loan. Jaime Torres chose and agreed to pay the equal annual amortizations of PhP 6,100,000
payable every May. However, they failed to pay. Thereafter, partial payment was accepted by the
bank. EPCIB reminded Spouses that its receipt of the check payment is without prejudice to the
bank's rights considering the overdue nature of Spouses loan. The Spouses ordered stop payment of
the check. The bank demanded full settlement of spouses loan which was unheeded. And so the
bank filed a Petition for Sale to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged property. However, RTC
issued an Order granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Spouses. Was the RTC
Correct?
Answer: No. The injunctive writ is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of
the applicant which should be protected, the writ being the strong arm of equity, an
extraordinary peremptory remedy which can be availed of only upon the existence of well-
defined circumstances. Foreclosure proceedings will not preclude the property to owner participate
in the auction; title does not ipso facto pass title to the winning bidder over the mortgaged property;
and the same is subject to the right to redeem within one year from the auction sale.
The one-year redemption period is another grace period accorded petitioners to pay the outstanding
debt, which would be converted to the proceeds of the forced sale pursuant to the requisites under
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 3135, as amended, for the redemption of a property sold in an
extrajudicial sale, also in accordance with Sec. 78 of the General Banking Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1828. It is only upon the expiration of the redemption period, without the
judgment debtors having made use of their right of redemption, does ownership of the land sold
become consolidated in the purchaser or winning bidder.
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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTION OF COMELEC
AND COA; APPLICATION OF RULE 65 UNDER RULE 64 (Querubin v. COMELEC)
Question: Are Orders issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions
covered by Rule 64?
Answer: No. The Court has consistently held that the phrase "decision, order, or ruling" of
constitutional commissions, the COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the
Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those
rendered in the commissions' exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case of
the COMELEC, this would limit the provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued
pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective offices. Consequently, Rule 64, which
complemented the procedural requirement under Article IX-A, Section 7, should likewise be read in
the same sensethat of excluding from its coverage decisions, rulings, and orders rendered by the
COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions.
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entry?
Answer: For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the complaint must contain two mandatory allegations:
(1) prior physical possession, possession de facto, not possession de jure, of the property by the
plaintiff; and (2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth. The purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession. The person claiming rightful possession cannot be permitted to exclude the actual
possessor and thereby disturb social order and violate individual security. The burden of instituting
an action to try the property right is upon he who claims rightful possession
The proper remedy in the instant case is to file an accion publiciana case which differs from a
forcible entry action in that it does not require prior physical possession in order to prosper.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS (Rebusquillo v. Sps. Domingo)
Question: May issues on heirship be decided in a civil action?
Answer: It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that
recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a
good and compelling reason for such recourse. Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule
requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon
the issues it defined during the pre-trial.
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Answer: The Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has
accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by a
Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake.
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a direct
injury as a result of a government action, or have a material interest in the issue affected by the
challenged official act.
The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in
a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act.
NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES (HEIRS of MESINA vs. HEIRS of FIAN, G.R. NO. 201816
(2013))
Question: What is the remedy of a party who failed to include an indispensable party to case?
Answer: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
remedy in non-joinder of a party is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
CAUSE OF ACTION
Question: What constitutes sufficiency of cause of action?
Answer: A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements
of a cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right
APPEAL OF CRIMINAL CASE (PEOPLE vs. GALLO, G.R. NO. 187730 (2010))
Question: What will trigger a review of findings of facts in a criminal case?
Answer: It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the findings of fact of the trial court are not
disturbed on appeal except when it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have materially affected the outcome of
the case.
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and bare denials
of the accused, on the other hand, the former must prevail. Moreover, the Supreme Court accords
the trial courts findings with the probative weight it deserves in the absence of any compelling
reason to discredit the same.
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CONVICTION BY NEW JUDGE (PEOPLE vs. PALING and VILBAR, G.R. NO. 185390
(2011))
Question: Is judgment valid despite the fact that the judge who rendered it was not the one who
heard the case?
Answer: The fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses
does not adversely affect the validity of conviction. The new judge can rely on the transcripts of
stenographic notes and calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to
common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate
substantive and procedural due process of law.
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
(PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA, G.R. NO. 188601 (2010))
Question: What is the general rule in appreciating the testimonies of witnesses in case which is a
subject of an appeal?
Answer: It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and
their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court. The trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under
grilling examination. This rule admits of exceptions, however, such as when the trial courts
findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or when certain facts
of substance and value, likely to change the outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower
court, or when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS
Question: Will a valid extrajudicial confession bind his co-accused?
Answer: An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted
against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them under the principle of res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.
Tamargo vs. Awingan elaborated on the reason for this rule, viz.: [O]n a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So
are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a
party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him. The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court to the rule allowing the admission of a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the
conspiracy by evidence other than the confession.
VALIDITY OF WARRANTLESS ARREST (PEOPLE vs. NG YIK BUN, G.R. NO. 180452
(2011))
Question: When may a law enforcer effect a valid warrantless arrest?
Answer: In People v. Alunday, 564 SCRA 135 (2008), the Court held that when a police officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at
once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.
In flagrante delicto arrest must consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding
the arrest of accused- appellants.
SWEETHEART DEFENSE IN RAPE (PEOPLE vs. CIAS, G.R. NO. 194379 (2011))
Question: Can an accuse claim sweetheart defense in a rape case?
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Answer: Yes, the sweetheart defense can be claimed as an affirmative defense but it must be
supported by convincing proof.
The theory that Cias and AAA were having an illicit affair is unsupported by evidence. As held in
People v. Cabanilla, 635 SCRA 300 (2010), the sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense that
must be supported by convincing proof. In the case at bar, accused-appellant relied solely on
his testimony and that of his wife. He did not offer any other evidencesuch as a love letter, a
memento, or even a single photographto substantiate his claim that they had a romantic
relationship. Besides, granting they had an illicit affair, this fact alone does not rule out rape as it
does not necessarily mean that consent was present. As the Court held, A love affair does not
justify rape for a man does not have an unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires
against her will.
Q. A filed a case for forcible entry before a first level court of Manila against B praying that the
latter be ejected from a parcel of land situated at the boundary of Manila and Quezon City. B
filed a motion to dismiss claiming venue was improperly laid as the larger part of the real
property is situated in Quezon City. Is B correct?
A. No. Section 1. of Rule 4 states that actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. It is also worth pointing out
that B should not have filed a motion to dismiss based on an objection to venue as said motion is a
prohibited pleading in an ejectment case under Sec. 13 Rule 70.
Q. What if A filed a motion to dismiss based on the fact that resort to conciliation had not been
previously resorted to?
A. The motion to dismiss may be allowed as the rules allow said motion if based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and failure to comply with the conciliation
requirement under Section 12, Rule 70. (Sec. 13, Rule 70 in relation to Section 12, Rule 70)
Q. Suppose an action for reconveyance of real property valued at P19,999.99 is filed before a
Municipal Trial Court, would it be correct to ask for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter as reconveyance is incapable of pecuniary estimation?
A. No. In a number of cases, the Court has held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation
of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that
involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein. (San Pedro v. Asdala, 2009)
This means that the jurisdiction over the case will be determined based on the assessed value of the
real property involved. *Please refer to previous question.
Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction over money claims and personal property?
A. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interests, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property exceeds Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) outside Metro Manila or Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00)
in Metro Manila, the Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction. (Section 19 (8) of BP 129, as
amended - paraphrased)
Q. Atty. Santos filed a pleading before the trial court. In the Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping, he signed it on behalf of his client. Atty. Reyes, opposing counsel, moved to dismiss the
case. As judge, will you grant the Motion to Dismiss?
A. I will grant the Motion to Dismiss. The Court held in a decided case: In this light, the Court
finds that the CA correctly dismissed Andersons Petition for Review on the ground that the
certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any
authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later submitting
an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the petition, this does not
automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a defective certification is
generally not curable by its subsequent correction, and while it is true that in some cases the Court
considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it did so only on sufficient and
justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the
intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. (Anderson v. Ho, 2013)
Q. May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a case without conducting any proceeding without
violating the principle of due process?
A. Yes. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss
the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res
judicata; and (d) prescription of action.
Q: X was the Chancellor for University of Science and Technology (UST). He retired as
chancellor and was subsequently hired by Aliga, the Dean for the College of Law, in the same
University, to teach Law subjects as a substitute professor. Musli, the new chancellor, wrote a
letter addressed to X requiring him to retire. X then filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the RTC. The
case was dismissed by the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the case is an
illegal dismissal complaint. X then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied,
prompting him to file a petition under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA granted the petition filed by
X and reversed the omnibus motion dismissing the complaint directing the RTC to hear the case.
The case being remanded back to the RTC, X filed an amended complaint impleading UST as a
defendant. X then filed a motion for summary judgment. The RTC then granted the summary
judgment ruling in favor of X and subsequently the motion for execution pending appeal. Musli,
aggrieved, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari in his personal capacity. The CA denied the
petition. Musli then filed a motion for reconsideration. UST then decided to intervene. May UST
intervene?
A. No. While undoubtedly, UST has a legal interest in the outcome of the case, it may not avail
itself of the remedy of intervention in this particular case where Musli filed the present appeal in his
personal capacity; and not on behalf of UST. Therefore, UST is not a third party in the proceedings
herein. Jurisprudence describes intervention as a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. The right to intervene is not
an absolute right; it may only be permitted by the court when the movant establishes facts which
satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing it. In X's Amended Complaint before the RTC, UST
was already impleaded as one of the defendants in the first civil case. UST came under the
jurisdiction of the RTC when it was served with summons and participated in the case. Evidently,
the rights and interests of UST were duly presented before the RTC in the former Civil Case.
Intervention requires that they were not impleaded in a former proceedings so as not to enable them
to protect or preserve their right. (The Board of Regents of Mindanao State University v. Osop,
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2012).
Q. An election protest was filed by Montilla against Datu. The service of summons has been done
through registered mail: this is according to their internal rules: In cases filed before the
Tribunal involving distant legislative districts and provinces, it has been its practice to serve the
summons through registered mail, it being impracticable to send the same by personal service to
protestee or respondents who reside in said far provinces. Datu was unable to file his answer to
counter the protest even after 43 days so HRET entered a general denial for him. When Datu
learned this, he filed a motion for reconsideration to accept his answer but it was denied. May
summons in HRET cases be served by registered mail?
A. The 2004 HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the summons should be served on the
protestee. Significantly, Rule 80[15] of the 2004 HRET Rules provides that the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure applies by analogy or suppletorily in so far as the latter may be applicable and not
inconsistent therewith as well as with the orders, resolutions and decisions of the HRET. In view of
the failure of the HRET Rules to specify the authorized modes of service of summons, resort then is
necessary to Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
In the case at bar, the service of the summons was made through registered mail, which
is not among the allowed modes of service under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In Federico S.
Sandoval II v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Aurora Rosario A.
Oreta, this Court has held that in the matter of service of summons, Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the Rules of the HRET. If in ordinary civil cases (which
involve only private and proprietary interests) personal service of summons is preferred and service
by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional and due process grounds, with more reason
should election cases (which involve public interest and the will of the electorate) strictly follow the
hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of Court. (Mangudadatu v. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 2008).
Q. Under the Rules, what are the two concepts of res judicata and when can each be applied?
A. Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior
judgment as enunciated in Section 47(b) of the said Rule and (2) conclusiveness of judgment as
explained in Section 47(c) of the same Rule.
Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res
judicata in its aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two cases, only
identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as
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conclusiveness of judgment applies.
Q.Valentino Development Co. moved to dismiss the case filed by Production Bank against it since
the new complaint raises the same issues in a prior case which has become final and executory?
As judge, will you grant the motion?
A. Yes. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is binding and conclusive on the parties.
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity
for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them .(LZK Holdings and Development
Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, 2014)
Q: Members of the Ibaloi Tribes of Baguio City claim that their parents inherited from their
ancestors several parcels of land in the Busol Watershed Reservation. They then applied for a
TRO before the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) seeking to enjoin The
Baguio Cleaning Movement Inc. and others from fencing the Busol Watershed Reservation. The
NCIP granted the TRO application. It also ruled that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims
and dispute involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous
Peoples, and thus may issue injunctive writs. The Baguio Cleaning Movement Inc. argued that
NCIP has no jurisdiction over the case. Does RA 8975, the law which prohibits TROs against
national government project cover TROs issued by NCIP?
A. No. The law provides:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary
Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court,
shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary in junction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any
person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the governments direction, to
restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any
national government project; Bidding or awarding of cont ract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof; Commencement, prosecution, execution,
implementation, operation of any such contract or project; Termination or rescission of any
such contract/project; and The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract/ project.
xxx
Should a judge violate the preceding section, RA 8975 provides the following penalty:
Section 6. Penal Sanction. In addition to any civil and criminal liabilities he or she may
incur under existing laws, any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3 hereof,
shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions of RA. 8975 that the prohibition against government
projects covers only judges, and does not apply to the NCIP or its hearing officers. In this respect,
Republic Act No. 8975 conforms to the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 605and Presidential
Decree No. 1818, both of which enjoin only the courts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, cannot
nullify the preliminary injunction order issued by NCIP on the ground of violation of said laws (The
Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng, 2013).
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Q: Under the foregoing facts, is Baguio Cleaning Movement, Inc. entitled to its own application
of injunction against the tribes?
A: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not convinced that the tribes were entitled to the
relief granted by the Commission. 23 Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of the tribes ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but does not acknowledge vested
rights over the same. Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that
claimants show the existence of a right to be protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately
granted the petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside the writ of preliminary
injunction issued therein.
The conclusions of this Court in both the case at bar and that in G.R. No. 180206 as regards
private respondents ancestral land claim should therefore be considered provisional, as they are
based merely on the allegations in the complaint or petition and not on evidence adduced in a
full-blown proceeding on the merits by the proper tribunal. The tribes are therefore not barred
from proving their alleged ancestral domain claim in the appropriate proceeding, despite the
denial of the temporary injunctive relief prayed for (The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v.
Masweng, 2013).
Q. Esteban is not a party to a case which has become final and executory. He was forewarned
that the sheriff is about to execute the judgment which would adversely affect his substantive
right. What remedy is available to Esteban?
A. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies
of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property
not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent separate action to vindicate
his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, the person other
than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded
from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. The right of a third-party claimant to file a
terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can
exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the
restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his
ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260 Phil. 401 [1990]) we
declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently
establish his right on the property. (Villasi v. Garcia 2014)
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Q. Distinguish a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 from a petition for review under Rule 43.
A. A petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special civil action for certiorari is an
extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the two
remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive, and antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is
proper if the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without
or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. A petition for review, on the other hand, seeks to
correct errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer (Dee Ping Wee v. Lee Hiong
Wee, 2010).
Q. If a decision is rendered with grave abuse of discretion, should there always be resort to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65?
A. No. The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the
merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering
the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess
thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision
(Sawadjaan v. CA, 2005) Besides, the Rules expressly provide: Section 1. Petition for certiorari.
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Q. Gabby filed an unlawful detainer case against Ali and won. Ali filed a petition for relief from
judgment before the same MTC that rendered the decision in the unlawful detainer case. Was Ali
correct?
A. No. A Petition for relief from judgment is a prohibited pleading in an ejectment case
under Section 13(4) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Q. May Ali file his petition for relief from judgment before the RTC?
A. No. The RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition. Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
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provides:
SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. - When a judgment
or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.
Q. Rosario filed a suit in the Small Claims Court. The judge ruled in her favor. When can she
ask for execution of the judgment?
A. Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that the decision
shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy
thereof forthwith served on the parties.
Q. Can Fernando, the losing party appeal the ruling of the Small Claims Court?
A. No, because said decision is unappealable. To question the decision, a petition for certiorari must
be filed. Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their
corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for
certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. (A.L. Ang
Network, Inc. v. Mondejar, 2014)
Q: May the determination of heirs be made in an action for recovery of ownership of property?
A. No. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in
a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
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its departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory
where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of
international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal
Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed(the case must be filed,
generally, where the crime is committed exceptions are provided by law and the rules such as the
venue of actions for libel under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code which provides multiple
venues)
Q. What are the distinctions between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts?
A. The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant,
while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. Applying this
analogy to [a case under BP22 or the Bouncing Checks Law], knowledge of insufficiency of funds is
the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check
presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge. (Bautista v. CA,
2001)
Q. What is the relevance of the distinction between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts?
A. Every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence as
distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense do not need to be alleged.
Q. Does it, then, follow, that a motion for bill of particulars cannot be used by an accused to
request that he be furnished with evidence?
A. Yes. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the prosecution.
Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence
relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the people
intend to prove any item of factual information included in the bill of particular. (Enrile v. People,
2015)
Q. Is it possible that an action before an administrative body may be the basis to suspend a
criminal case due to a prejudicial question?
A. Yes. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet,
contrary to San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak
of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific
performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings
determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but
could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was
exclusive and original. (San Miguel v. Perez, 2013)
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
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(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015)
Q. Is it the trial court that determines whether the evidence of guilt is strong?
A. Yes. For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,
2015)
Q. What must the trial judge consider in granting bail in favor of an accused charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment?
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
1. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8,)
2. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution; and
3. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19) Otherwise petition should be denied. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,
2015)
Q. Can bail be granted based on humanitarian grounds, independent of the legal merits of the
case?
A. Yes. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during
the trial. Granting bail x x x on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already
held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court: x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in
the particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a
circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the
charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the
prisoner to bail;47 x x x [G]ranting provisional liberty to [ill accused] will then enable him to have
his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. [The grant of bail is proper if it will aid in accuseds] adequate preparation
of his defense [and], more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. 1. (Enrile
v. Sandiganbayan, 2015)
Q. Gerry, Ricky and Nikki were charged with violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Upon finding probable cause, the Ombudsman directed that a case be filed against the three
accused. During trial, the Ombudsman wanted to grant the request for immunity sought by Gerry
and Ricky so that they may testify against the mastermind of the corrupt act, Nikki. Is the power
of the Ombudsman to grant immunity still subject to the provisions of the Rules of Court?
A. Yes. RA 6770 provides: Sec. 17. Immunities. x x x. Under such terms and conditions as it may
43 | P a g e
determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may
grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and
production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing,
inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the
performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The
immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness
from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or
removal from office. (Quarto v. Ombudsman, 2011)
Q. What are the requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness? What is the
effect of an order granting the discharge of an accused as a state witness?
A. The requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are provided under Section
17 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly charged
with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case,
the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence
and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that: (ADSuMM)
(a) There is Absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b) The is no other Direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be Substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the Most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving Moral
turpitude. (Baviera v. Zoleta, 2006) or an order granting immunity to an accused (Quarto v.
Ombudsman, 2011) and there is grave abuse of discretion, the party may question the orders
or resolutions before the Supreme Court via Rule 65.
Q: Can the courts interfere in the COMELEC's finding that probable cause exists?
A: Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELECs exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election
laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. The established rule is
that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence. It is for the presentation of only such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed, and the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Q. Mr. Cayetano is the custodian of the record of birth of Charie Mae. He executed an affidavit
attesting to the truthfulness of the fact of birth of Charie Mae and he attached her duly-
authenticated birth certificate of birth to his affidavit. Must Mr.Cayetano affirm his affidavit in
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open court?
A. No. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that
entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
officials attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty.
The documents trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. (Dimaguila v. Monteiro, 2014)
Q. Can a trial court issue a Temporary Protection Order without hearing without violating the
constitutional guarantee to due process?
A. Yes. Since time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented, the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order
is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to
ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a
perpetrator to the victim. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative
of the right to due process. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests. (Tua v. Hon.
Mangrobang, 2014)
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It is designed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure to respond only to an incident in the main case, if
one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since it is at most incidental to the main
criminal case, an order granting or denying a motion to quash a search warrant may be questioned
only via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Q: After receiving a complaint from PLDT of the illegal activity of X Corporation of using
Mabuhay card and other equipment capable of receiving and transmitting calls from the USA to
the Philippines without these calls passing through the facilities of PLDT, PAOCTF filed two
applications for the issuance of search warrant for Violation of Article 308 of the RPC for Theft
of Telephone Services and for Violation of P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of telephone
communication. The trial court issued two search warrants for the said violations. In
implementing the search warrants, the police team searched the premises of X Corporation and
seized the articles specified in the search warrants. Subsequently, the prosecutor conducted a
preliminary investigation and found that the officers of X Corporation were probably guilty
thereof. X Corporation and its officers sought to quash the search warrants on the grounds that
there was no probable cause; and that the search warrants were general warrants and were
wrongly implemented. Should the trial court grant the Motion to Quash? What is probable
cause? Are the search warrants in this case in the nature of general warrants
A. The court should not grant the Motion to Quash the search warrants on the ground that there was
no probable cause. Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such
reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his
action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched. PLDT was able to produce pieces of evidence that, if taken together, are more than
sufficient to support a finding that probable cause necessary to engender a belief that X
Corporation, et al. had probably committed the crime of Theft through illegal activities. Evidence to
show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be distinguished from proof beyond reasonable
doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required.
The subject search warrants are not general warrants because the items to be seized were
sufficiently identified and specifically identified by stating their relation to the offenses charged
which are Theft and Violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 through the conduct of illegal ISR
activities. A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which
is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution.
In Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, the Court explained the purpose of the aforementioned requirement for a
valid search warrant, to wit: A Search Warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things
to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - what articles they
shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, - that abuses may
not be committed (HPS Software and Communication v. PLDT, 2012).
Q: Does the issuance of a Hold Departure Order impair one's right to travel and is the violation
of the right to travel covered by the Writ of Amparo?
A. A Hold Departure Order does not automatically impair a person's right to travel. There should be
proof to establish that the right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy (Reverend Father Robert Reyes v. CA, 2009).
Q: May a writ of amparo or other reliefs granted by the writ be filed in another court if a
criminal action has been filed or is pending?
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A. No. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed.
The writ or any relief available under the writ should be filed by filing in the same court where the
criminal action was pending (Reverend Father Robert Reyes v. CA, 2009).
Q: Does failure to photograph or inventory the seized illegal drugs render them inadmissible as
evidence against the accused? May this failure be raised as a ground for the first time on appeal?
A. Failure to photograph or inventory the confiscated illegal drugs is not fatal to the prosecution of
the case against the accused. The seized items may still be admitted in evidence as long as the
evidentiary value thereof is preserved. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA9165 reads:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.-The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof [.]
On the other hand, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
9165, which implements said provision, stipulates:
(a)The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/ or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds
may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with
Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of
the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of
Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first
time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in
the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise
the question for the first time on appeal (People vs. Taculod, 2013).
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