Article 15, NCC

Van Dorn v. Romillo

G.R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1985

Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Alicia Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while Upton is a citizen of the United States; they were
married in Hong Kong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively;
that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

On June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop), is their conjugal property, and he is thus asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner countered that private respondents cause of action is barred
by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.

The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

Issue/s: W/n the divorce decree obtained by Upton is recognized here in the Philippines

Ruling: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In
this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Article 15, NCC

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

G.R. No. 80116; June 30, 1989

Ponente: Regalado, J

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany.After the marriage, the
couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was
born on April 20, 1980.

After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another
man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983"..

Issue/s: W/n Geiling has the legal capacity to initiate the complaint of adultery against Imelda even after
the issuance of a divorce decree

Ruling: The power to institute action to prosecute adultery is exclusively granted to the offended
spouse, it then necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.

The status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint
was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is
meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.

Taking into consideration the rule laid down in the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under
the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Complaint dismissed.

Article 15, NCC

Garcia-Recio v. Recio

G.R. No. 138322; October 2, 2001

Ponente: Panganiban, J

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married
on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo,
on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married
her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only
in November, 1997.

Respondent contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.

On July 7, 1998 while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to
secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down."

The RTC declared their marriage dissolved. The decision rendered was based on the ground that the
divorce decree issued in Australia is valid and recognized here in the Philippines and not on Redericks
lack of legal capacity to marry.

Hence this petition.

Issue/s: W/n the respondent has the legal capacity to remarry at the time he married the petitioner

Ruling: Respondent contends that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Such contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce ora vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional judgment

of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.

The decree itself shows that the decree obtained by the respondent may have been restricted. The
ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry, has no basis.
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal
capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate
is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license. In this case, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner.

Article 15, NCC

Quita v. CA

G.R. No. 124862; December 22, 1998

Ponente: Bellosillo, J

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941
but Fe eventually sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately
from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality
but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died without will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of
the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named
in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
oppositors submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of
divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving
brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escano, which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
1972.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the
distribution of his estate.

Issue/s: W/n the divorce decree obtained by Quita is recognized here in the Philippines

Ruling: Tenchavez v. Escano held that a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction
while Van Dorn v. Romillo held that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are according to their national laws.

We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial
court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was
no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

The case is remanded to the lower court.

Article 15, NCC

Perez v. CA

G.R. No. 162580; January 27, 2006

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig for the second time on May
16, 1968. The first marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central
Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila, while the second took place at the Lourdes
Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The marriage produced four children.

Several years later, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27,
1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil
Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action
under its laws. Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution
of conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in
the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June
23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of
properties between Tristan and Lily.

On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States
and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001.

It was only later during their marriage that Elmar learned of the marriage of Tristan to Lily and the status
of their marriage.

On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Elmar then filed her Motion to Intervene alleging that her status and
as a companion to Tristan for 17 years vest her with the requisite legal interest required of a would
intervenor under the Rules of Court.

Issue/s: W/n Elmar has the legal interest in the annulment of marriage of Lily ad Tristan
Ruling: Petitioners claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan;
hence her claim of legal interest has no basis.

When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The
divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage
bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws
with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity.
Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition
abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.

When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano we held:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)

Thus, petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks
merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for
intervention is based Petition is dismissed.

Article 15, NCC

San Luis v. San Luis

G.R. No. 133743; February 6, 2007

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago , J

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), former governor of the Province of Laguna, contracted three
marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo. She then prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo
San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the respondent has no
legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Rodolfo San Luis was later joined by Linda, his
sister. The trial Court denied both petitions to dismiss.

Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that
the respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo
who was a Filipino citizen.

The Court of Appeals however reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC rationating that Felicisimo
had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo
was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.

Issue/s: W/n a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code

Ruling: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Article 19, NCC

Far East Bank v Pacilan Jr.

G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005

Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Respondent Pacilan opened a current account with petitioner banks Bacolod Branch on May 23,
1980.The respondent had since then issued several postdated checks to different payees drawn against
the said account. Sometime in March 1988, the respondent issued Check No. 2434886 in the amount
of P680.00 and the same was presented for payment to petitioner bank on April 4, 1988.

Upon its presentment on the said date, Check No. 2434886 was dishonored by petitioner bank.
Subsequently, when the respondent verified with petitioner bank about the dishonor of Check No.
2434866, he discovered that his current account was closed on the ground that it was improperly
handled. On April 18, 1988, the respondent wrote to petitioner bank complaining that the closure of his
account was unjustified. When he did not receive a reply from petitioner bank, the respondent filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner bank and Villadelgado.

Issue/s: W/n FEBTC is liable for damages

Ruling: The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or
bad faith is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good faith and any person who
seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in
bad faith or with ill-motive. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of
the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice
connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to close the account of the respondent based on the
provisions of its Rules and Regulations Governing the Establishment and Operation of Regular Demand
Deposits.

The facts of this case do not establish that, in the exercise of this right, petitioner bank
committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the second and third elements for abuse of rights are not
attendant in the present case. The evidence presented by petitioner bank negates the existence of bad
faith or malice on its part in closing the respondents account on April 4, 1988 because on the said date
the same was already overdrawn. The respondent issued four checks, all due on April 4, 1988,
amounting to P7,410.00 when the balance of his current account deposit was only P6,981.43. Thus, he
incurred an overdraft of P428.57 which resulted in the dishonor of his Check No. 2434886. Further,
petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current account of the respondent was overdrawn 156 times
due to his issuance of checks against insufficient funds. In 1987, the said account was overdrawn 117
times for the same reason, and again in 1988, 26 times. There were also several instances when the
respondent issued checks by deliberately using a signature different from his specimen signature on file
with petitioner bank. All these circumstances taken together justified the petitioner banks closure of
the respondents account on April 4, 1988 for improper handling.

Article 19, NCC

Uypitching v. Quiamco

G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006

Ponente: Corona, J.

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan, Josefino Gabutero and
Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery by Quiamco against
them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of
registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never
came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondents
business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public.

It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by
petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto
Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.
Davalan later assumed he obligation to pay but he stopped paying the remaining installments on
September 1982 and told petitioner corporations collector that the motorcycle was allegedly taken by
the respondents men

Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo
Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk
were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a
thief of a motorcycle." When the police were unable to find respondent in his residence, the policemen
went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitchings instruction and over the clerks
objection, took the motorcycle.

On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or
violation of the Anti-Fencing La against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete
City.He sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2)
utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless
and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his
reputation and integrity.

On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated
with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and
filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners acts
were found to be contrary to Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.Hence, the trial court held petitioners
liable. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts decision.

Issue/s: W/n the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/o Officer is in violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the award of damages in favor of the respondent

Ruling: Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not
use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It
seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a
right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the
injured party will attach.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction
with the defamatory statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was
utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an
unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for
which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners actions showed a
calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an
excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused
damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.

Article 19, NCC

Cebu Country Club v. Elizague

G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008

Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and
non-stock private membership club, having its principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu City.
Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors. In 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special
company proprietary member of CCCI, designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice
President and Operations Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member.
The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCIs Board of Directors.

In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. As the price of a
proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered to
sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain Dr.
Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership
Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.

During the other 2 meetings, action on respondents application for proprietary membership was
deferred. In another Board meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondents application was voted upon. On
August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter informing him that the Board disapproved his application
for proprietary membership. Elizague then sent 3 letters to CCCI to inquire regarding the reason of his
applications disapproval. These inquiries remained unheeded.

On December 23, 1998, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners

Issue/s: W/n petitioners are liable for damages to the respondent in disapproving the latters
application for propriety membership with CCCI

Ruling: Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to
approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be
exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide
restrictions.

In rejecting respondents application for proprietary membership, the Court found that petitioners
violated the rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondents
applications. This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for
damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.

It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCIs Amended By-Laws requiring the
unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original
provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of an
applicant as a proprietary member. It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark
wondering why his application was disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of
the Board members was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether
there was an objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him.

In the exercise of a right, though legal by itself, it must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper
norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Article 19, NCC

Calatagan Golf Club v. Clemente

G.R. No. 165443 April 16, 2009

Ponente: Tinga, J.

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of Calatagan, indicating in his application
for membership his mailing address at Phimco Industries, Inc. P.O. Box 240, MCC, complete residential
address, office and residence telephone numbers, as well as the company (Phimco) with which he was
connected, Calatagan issued to him Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May 1990 after
paying P120,000.00 for the share.

Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to meet expenses for general operations, as well as
costs for upkeep and improvement of the grounds and facilities. The provision on monthly dues is
incorporated in Calatagans Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced at the back of
each certificate of stock.

When Clemente became a member the monthly charge stood at P400.00. He paid P3,000.00 for
his monthly dues on 21 March 1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991. Then he ceased paying
the dues. Ten (10) months later, Calatagan attempted to collect Clementes back accounts by sending a
demand letter dated 21 September 1992 and 22 October 1992 to his mailing address as indicated in his
membership application but were sent back to sender with the postal note that the address had been
closed.

Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for having failed to pay his monthly dues and included
Clementes name in the list of delinquent members posted on the clubs bulletin board. On 1 December
1992, Calatagans board of directors adopted a resolution authorizing the foreclosure of shares of
delinquent members, including Clementes; and the public auction of these shares.

On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final letter to Clemente which contains a
warning that unless Clemente settles his outstanding dues, his share would be included among the
delinquent shares to be sold at public auction on 15 January 1993 to the same mailing address that had
already been closed. The auction sale took place as scheduled on 15 January 1993, and Clementes share
was sold.
Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in November of 1997. He filed a claim with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the restoration of his shareholding in Calatagan with
damages. On 15 November 2000, the SEC rendered a decision dismissing Clementes complaint but on 1
June 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the SEC.
Hence this appeal.
Issue/s: W/n Calatagan Golf Club acted in bad faith when it sold Clementes share

Ruling: Calatagan argues that it exercised due diligence before the foreclosure sale and sent several
notices to Clementes specified mailing address.The Court do not agree; Calatagans act of sending
the December 7, 1992 letter to Clementes mailing address knowing fully well that the P.O. Box had
been closed cannot be labeled as due diligence. Due diligence or good faith imposes upon the Corporate
Secretary the chief repository of all corporate records the obligation to check Clementes other address
which, under the By-Laws, have to be kept on file and are in fact on file. One obvious purpose of giving
the Corporate Secretary the duty to keep the addresses of members on file is specifically for matters of
this kind, when the member cannot be reached through his or her mailing address.

Ultimately, the petition must fail because Calatagan had failed to duly observe both the spirit and letter
of its own by-laws. The by-law provisions was clearly conceived to afford due notice to the delinquent
member of the impending sale, and not just to provide an intricate facade that would facilitate
Calatagans sale of the share. But then, the bad faith on Calatagans part is palpable. As found by the
Court of Appeals, Calatagan very well knew that Clementes postal box to which it sent its previous
letters had already been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final letter to the same postal box. It is
noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had provided his residential address along
with his residence and office telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagans By-Laws requires
that the final notice prior to the sale be made solely through the members mailing address.

Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe its own By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss of
Clementes privilege to play golf at its golf course and avail of its amenities, but also in significant
pecuniary damage to him. The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code, under the Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court of
Appeals did apply, enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good
faith towards one another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in
its treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in good
faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if the latter find themselves contractually
bound to perform certain obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a charter of
dehumanization.

Article 19, NCC

Ardiente v Javier

G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013

Ponente: Peralta, J.

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Petitioner Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing unit
at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement selling, transferring and conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration
of P70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement includes a stipulation that the water and power bill of
the subject property shall be for the account of Ma. Theresa Pastorfide, effective June 1, 1994, vis-a-vis
Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente
from the National Home Mortgage.
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never
questioned nor perturbed until on March 12, 1999. Without notice, the water connection of Ma.
Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain,
a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for three (3) months corresponding to
the months of December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date
of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of Joyce
Ardiente that the water line was cut off.

On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills and at the same time, she wrote a letter to
the COWD through her lawyer to explain who authorized the cutting of the water line. On March 18,
1999, COWD, in its answer to the letter, reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the
water line was cut off.

On April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide and her husband filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez. The RTC awarded damages to the complainant
which was later affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.

Issue/s: W/n COWD and Gonzales together with Ardiente may be held to pay for damages

Ruling: Yes. It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to
cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. Based on the principle of abuse of rights which
provides that the exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In the present case, intention to harm was evident
on the part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses water supply
without warning or informing the latter of such request. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their
failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect
respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account.