G.R. No. 48006, Barredo v. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil.
607 The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 8, 1942
G.R. No. 48006
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner
herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia
caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said
Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between
Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision
between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one
of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision
correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right
to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and
Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the
sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On
July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor
of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages
to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is
undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he
was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's
responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that
he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing
Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile
Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the records of
the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore,
he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary,
and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person
criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The
petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure
to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the
respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the
case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to
a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because
Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of
article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations)
arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission notpunishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be
imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony
or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed
in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection
or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this
separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and
directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being
punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is
only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been
sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the
main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many
confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the
Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless
principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in
our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown
jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous
cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several
sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is
a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or
crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the
Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely
anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as
follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts,
and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault
or negligence intervenes.
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxxxxxxxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for
any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons
subject to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any
damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the
service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent,
but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom
properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons
mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may
recover from the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption
from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12
and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine
years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault
or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said
insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in
proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate
amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to
the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the
damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons
using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily,
or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving
always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and
proprietors of establishment. In default of persons criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation
shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall
attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code
seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case,
nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence,
the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently
been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse
confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of
scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between
the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or
culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito orculpa extra-
contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early
ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The
Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence
under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says:
"Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a
sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to
article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution
of cuasi-delito orculpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga
cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this
kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV,
meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively
devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquilianaor cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the
latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal
law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when
nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil,"
Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of
quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903
of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia
Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y
comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil
propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad
criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que
nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises
different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking,
which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which
is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony
or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There
had been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter
had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been
made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had
been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del
Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the
Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part
(Maura,Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de
los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa
juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y
menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda
la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el
cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones
penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los
derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones,
que cual la pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen
encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta
via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa
procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los
efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir
indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no
vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902
del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios,
en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes
son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la
Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y
121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y
politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del
regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a
precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo
entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de
culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que
en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos
culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los
establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con
caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean
responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo
articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible,
no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas
de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales
figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas,
sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto
acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de
intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su
responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y
condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante
los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando
verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia
punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de
fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder,
habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la
Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones,
parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le
irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue
sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de
marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose
mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues
del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad
dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos
juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se
patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece
incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems
less tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil
obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of
the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be
confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists
in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating
aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The
injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires
restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself,
affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office
of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and
damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another
relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of
civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults
which are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according
to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses
and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that
such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal
courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal
Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that
Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a
crime, separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is
known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus
Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the
former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account
of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such
differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the
civil responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of
felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to
enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service,
but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the
Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard,
the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation
imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and
employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it
happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or
enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary
civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separatelywith regard to the obligation, before the civil
courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between
punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial
system, so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as
well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa del
Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case and
has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the
action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the
collision was notsub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the
subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21
was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has
already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after
the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence
of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the
crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del
Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege,
and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is
not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil
Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose
provisions on cuasi-delito orculpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the
Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code
which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for
another), without including the author of the act. The action against the
principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial
act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it
can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at
least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility
(of the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French
Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429,
430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not
subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las
acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder,
es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario
saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente
se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera
vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima
universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de
aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se
impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino
por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del
padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc.
Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores
de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley
presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de
negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga.
No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en
realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa
responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or
principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first
place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a
responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but
such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that
all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be
imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of
a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito,
that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian,
proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors,
incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law
presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is
condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a
responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for
one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore,
completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al
Codigo Civil Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su
propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de
la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o
vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es
directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue
entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera
(articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden
civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del
articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de
aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is
liable only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by
exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a
bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or
subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes
between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other
persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct
(article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the
scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should
be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it
imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court
has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the
civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is,
under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the
negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21,
1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run
over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion."
The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted.
Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company,
paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court
awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal,
alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final
judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The
Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado
supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica
Madrilea al pago del dao causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente
Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria
deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es
lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as
pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su
competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no
haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo
este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o
negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los
Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por sus
dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil,
al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la
compaia recurrente a la indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus
empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el
articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido
estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia,
ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken
supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the
payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal
rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is
a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its
different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of
its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there
was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of
acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is
not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of
the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other
persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the
damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest
that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter
aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity
for the damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal
provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which are
beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision
in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or
with the street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present
case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone
or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence,
but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-
existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the
conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi
driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for
his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held
subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo,
on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence
which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two
liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second,
Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs
were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second
remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed
in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective
method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been
released, and besides, he was probably without property which might be
seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the
employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee
(the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should
Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil
suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree
of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of
the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous
criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two
years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above
quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an
action was brought against a railroad company for damages because the
station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently,
refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the
Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos
que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones
facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las
vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las
devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que llegadas a su
destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el
jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la
falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el
demandante le originaron daos y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante
importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por
las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que
se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro
motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que
se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de
transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las
mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes
contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo
de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se
limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el
patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la
entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la
sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo
1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia demandada
como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter
economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts
which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice
issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the
empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the
consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise
reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the
station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the
lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff
caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a
wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits
when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the
receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four
assignments of error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of
action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the
action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual
relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable;
but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the
patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent
refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated
by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article
1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the
damage by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the
agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of
a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359,
362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a
laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a
tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being
transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured
the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing
the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed,
payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this
subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults
or negligencenot punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II
of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there
is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of
the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
xxxxxxxxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for
the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxxxxxxxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be
sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer
penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen.
His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil
rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We
should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob
some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from
the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the
selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery
doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions.
Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be
unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of
the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal),
which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a
suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while
the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article
112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought
therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly
reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone
was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private
complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These
provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal
Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of
these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be
merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as
expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a
negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek
out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees
only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine
the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation
under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby
unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal
proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the
provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction
renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil
liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has
been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in
the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case
appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the
words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to
the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal
Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his
relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived
from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and
1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of
acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are
applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties
of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of
those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code.
A typical application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of
a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His
liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to
the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured
bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of
9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to
recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run
over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court
rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana
Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met
vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the
opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he
again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way
along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the
auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had
completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run
over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident
could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside
from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and
entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in
the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on
the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the
automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had
already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a
distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the
automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without
the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by
the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child
would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either
of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of
an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been
fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and
for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same
doctrine. InBernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal,
brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of
burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening
of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from
another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the mother and
the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front
of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants
J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The
little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street
gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that
same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of
the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal,
that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in
damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the
holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of
the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her
child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on
the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the
mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing
and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf
and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code
must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense
could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was
for damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been
caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the
child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering
gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International
Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta
of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as
damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to
Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a
good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence
under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a
reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The
workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed
by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice,
either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of
negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused
by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs.
Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that
the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was
operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and
damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and
following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the
owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are
committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such
owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The
latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his
seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his
sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the
boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and
Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant
Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying
articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship
of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38
Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil.,
517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition
of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the
defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf
collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a
vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because
of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so,
we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant
has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines
laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is
therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability
is negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these
cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in
relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We
study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A
collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila
Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the
amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the
crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence.
He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the
City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila
filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment,
claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was
that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal
Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion
that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily
understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability.
The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations
arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of
the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling
under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a
wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the
civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of
the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while
the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence
out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxxxxxxxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not
to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling
would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving
that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its
servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly
civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or
predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of
parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are offered
to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that
article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093
and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition,
because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the
defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and
not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In
other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is
predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of
an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the
foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the
employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have
already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by
the defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company
had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among
other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action
was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as
employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the
motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court
held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1)
that the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil
Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is
not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal
Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the
instant case, because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of
the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at
bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and
direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above
case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates
the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of
the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under the
Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has
failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime,
which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give
the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327).
That case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved
was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the
two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality
of cuasi-delitosor culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above
cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence
even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold
the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would
be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property
first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and
productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional
drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient
means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be
required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and
probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored
to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised
in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who
principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has
said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to
Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should
fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise
such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in
the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base
this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation
of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited
(Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen
a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en
la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging
of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.")
All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it
comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating
the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana,
there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although
this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based onculpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we
are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle
of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil
Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may
no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-
establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged
or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and
is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald
Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin
Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by
Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1,
Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in
res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,
because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration
of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the
following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on
January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein
contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING
THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION
OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS
APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW
FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE
CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION
BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case
No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because
appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's
decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their
son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not
reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time
of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and
getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and
further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the
nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa
or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that
the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code
but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist.
come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action
of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been
the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be
noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
(pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either
of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of
an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for
which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal
case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this
civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly
to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of
culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of
negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through
the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs,
what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold
the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910
of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would
be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana,
there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although
this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we
are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of
the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters
may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This
will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because
it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results
of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621,
73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact
it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions
in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)"
And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that
Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or
interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that
giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin
and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no
longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that
the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character
or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar
to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission,
p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth
the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the
civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule
111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the
spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"-
to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it
refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has
not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar
to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation
by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already
free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes
place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall
enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not
controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question.
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the
joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article
2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in
order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other
hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a
minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their
minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against
appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of
liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J.
in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600).
See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in
a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same
extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs.
Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of
First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR,
respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for
Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and
Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as
follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way
vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan,
involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep
owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand
truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya.
As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless
Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar
and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race
against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was
for causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of
Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit
and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes
Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal
Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of
petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver
Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going
towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila.
Petitioner further testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped from
the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from
behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident
was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the
other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya,
he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion
of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was
directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at
the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the
jeep, which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was
coming from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta.
Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie
Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and hereby
sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in
the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged in
Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his bond is ordered
canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil
and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep
and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from
behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded
damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner
filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against
respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being
the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification
for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving
their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were
joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum allegedly for the
reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief
against both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil
Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior
judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An
Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the
Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore-
mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought
before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave due
course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent
Judge also dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent Judge
reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil action for liability
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of
the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of
Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation
of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same
would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated February 23, 1971,
with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court
"for a more decisive interpretation of the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us,
also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-
owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970,
dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge
sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint
judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no
reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the
latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against
jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a cause of
action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-
owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered
by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a
subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final
judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity
of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present.
However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action
between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is
the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted
for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-
owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the
owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused
Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo
Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the
criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability
arising from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.
5 separate civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. individuality of
cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above
cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant- petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on
quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while
petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan,
a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's)
lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep
was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya,
Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the
same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision,
petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that
he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and
attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must
consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a
Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which
violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of
jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck,
causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were
alleged in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict,
respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit
against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver
Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of
his right to file an independent civil action bars the institution of such
says:
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent
civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shau proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages
may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-
delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had
its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may
proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule
111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to
the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and
are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is
now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be
regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33
and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in
the proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo
further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code
create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the
offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation,
therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is
inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not within the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but
adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an
enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil
Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in
the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on
quasi-delict.

The suit against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in
Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with
criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option
between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The
action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with
the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate
application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that
petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver
Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his
active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit
against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the
criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need
for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his
action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No.
SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the
acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the
trial Court in this wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused
Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear
portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar
and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the
hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this
Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for the
damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the
case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages
sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of
action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been
extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
10 which provides:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included
in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil night arise did not exist. ...
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the
judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon
reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be
instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted
here under:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned,
therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971
dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil
Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and
respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the
hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and
February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against
respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.
G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.
FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff,
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the
capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San
Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's
office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the
company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of
charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose
from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his
exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing
the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station
there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient
some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of
said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As
the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an
employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at
the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground.
When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco
stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell
violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was
drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car
moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the
railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance
away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to
discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where
the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it was the customary season for
harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for
the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which
has been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony
shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of
platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his
foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the
platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is
readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and
it appeared that the injuries which he had received were very serious. He
was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where
an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this
operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another
hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was
again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the
plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical
fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company,
founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of
the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving
them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from
the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his Honor,
the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew
therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was
attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons
were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting
from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was
accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff
appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty
of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above
stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the
train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant
company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is
barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem
it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary
responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff should be separately examined.

It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant
is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage
which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by
reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.
That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal
viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its
servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by
proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article
1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu,
but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of
the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction, which was also recognized
by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly
points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent,
which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not
formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in
the performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest
squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are
applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties
of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of
those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code.
(Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the
Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to
damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to
whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English
Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior if it were, the
master would be liable in every case and unconditionally but upon the
principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all
persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation
of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile
in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of
managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence which
makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation
to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful
servant, while acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury.
The liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not
been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the
servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the
scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not
amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person
injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and
control of the servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts
on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never existed. As
Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is
always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent,
but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A
master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking
into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of
the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with
equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is
bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason
of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment,
such third person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil
Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the
selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and
yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found
in the Porto Rico Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of
extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico
Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the
case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an
action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the
defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his
employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The Court, after
citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused
by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of
the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to the
American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the
servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-
contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall
have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the
last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is
in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol.
12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of
the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or
superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and
the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent
acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions
cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon
a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control,
and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not
relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual.
Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those
mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which
arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of
society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal
rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the
corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence
of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of
these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if
productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party.
The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those
which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual
obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates
the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties
when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether
of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect and our
Legislature has so elected whom such an obligation is imposed is morally
culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that
liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include
responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts or mission are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil
Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined
exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to
the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a
position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract
to render service to another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903
relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of
action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon
plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But when
the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit
of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the
contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the
breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the
defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a
suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only
fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of
negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if
the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not
necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p.
76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract
to show that the breach was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of
his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is
obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of
his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute
a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be
invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the
anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of agents
or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better
position than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to
watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent
act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to
free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the
duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it
was his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could
be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity
from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by
negligent acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through
agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that
reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of such servants.
If one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are
lost by reason of the negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would
it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the
breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the debt by
proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction of the
clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and
culpa contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract has
frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of
June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the
decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex
contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of
article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court
rejected defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by
fault or negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code
relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the
undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of
employers for damage done by the negligent acts of their servants will show
that in no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of the
defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an action for
damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the
owner of a carriage was not liable for the damages caused by the negligence
of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact that no evidence
had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been negligent in
the employment of the driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill
or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil.
Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss
of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift by the
negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a
contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if
the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a contract made between it and
the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903
are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued
the defendant to recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the
negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in
which defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages
were caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held that
the master was not liable, although he was present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time
as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct
the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act complained of must be continued
in the presence of the owner for such length of time that the owner by his
acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage &
Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion as
to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the facts disclosed
that the injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him
arising out of the contract of transportation. The express ground of the
decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a
master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between
private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates
a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of
servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of negligence had
not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated
plaintiff's action as though founded in tort rather than as based upon the
breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and
of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this
theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must
have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the
defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that
defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper
discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for
the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be
regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa
points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs an incident in
the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the
source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of
damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant.
Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages for
having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise
proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result
is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred,
because the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for the
damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it was
bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was
negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the
court would have held that it would have been a good defense to the action,
if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for
defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and
control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to
the relative spheres of contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field
of non- contractual obligation is much more broader than that of contractual
obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human
relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say,
the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve
him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that
the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation
had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication,
the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and
leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was
direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by
proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting
that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the
platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of
approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the
injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to
wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the
doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if
the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed
upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to
his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to
ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full
stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have
occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support of the
contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a
moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute
form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at
variance with the experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that
the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by
the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he
stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these
conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company
has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to
believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as
he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to
provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that
expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of
ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily
prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have
acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or
should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of
ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
(Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart
vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was there
anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted
from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence
that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If
so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to
desist was contributory negligence.1awph!l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a
conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly
the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In
considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the
plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was
caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the
defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its
passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to
assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary,
that the platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark,
or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the
defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were
by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of
alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so that their presence
would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted: The
company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car
to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the
platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping
off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also
assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train
was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing
such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or
recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should
be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less
capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the
nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs.
Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it
was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the
step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he
was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking
to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning
P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have
permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has
not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His
expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is
approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair
compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is
the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the
additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other
incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered
plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It
may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full
stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have
occurred." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory
negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from
a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points together,
should be absolved from the complaint, and judgment affirmed.
G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907
M. H. RAKES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
A. D. Gibbs for appellant.
F. G. Waite, & Thomas Kepner for appellee.
DECISION
TRACEY, J.:
This is an action for damages. The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro
laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron
rails from a barge in the harbor to the companys yard near the malecon in
Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The
defendant has proved that there were two immediately following one another,
upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so
that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the
cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of
the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also
in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the waters edge the
track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off
and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at
about the knee.
This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the accident happened
through the negligence of the defendant. The detailed description by the
defendants witnesses of the construction and quality of the track proves that
if was up to the general stranded of tramways of that character, the
foundation consisting on land of blocks or crosspieces of wood, by 8 inches
thick and from 8 to 10 feet long laid, on the surface of the ground, upon
which at a right angle rested stringers of the same thickness, but from 24 to
30 feet in length. On the across the stringers the parallel with the blocks were
the ties to which the tracks were fastened. After the road reached the waters
edge, the blocks or crosspieces were replaced with pilling, capped by timbers
extending from one side to the other. The tracks were each about 2 feet wide
and the two inside rails of the parallel tracks about 18 inches apart. It was
admitted that there were no side pieces or guards on the car; that where no
ends of the rails of the track met each other and also where the stringers
joined, there were no fish plates. the defendant has not effectually overcome
the plaintiffs proof that the joints between the rails were immediately above
the joints between the underlying stringers.
The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie, which was
the immediate occasion of the accident, is not clear in the evidence, but is
found by the trial court and is admitted in the briefs and in the argument to
have been the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the
water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon. The superintendent of the
company attributed it to the giving way of the block laid in the sand. No effort
was made to repair the injury at the time of the occurrence. According to
plaintiffs witnesses, a depression of the track, varying from one half inch to
one inch and a half, was thereafter apparent to the eye, and a fellow
workman of the plaintiff swears that the day before the accident he called the
attention of McKenna, the foreman, to it and asked by simply straightening
out the crosspiece, resetting the block under the stringer and renewing the
tie, but otherwise leaving the very same timbers as before. It has not proven
that the company inspected the track after the typhoon or had any proper
system of inspection.
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a
breach of duty on its part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron
to vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in
proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as
the depression in it became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to
repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below
based his judgment.
This case presents many important matters for our decision, and first among
them is the standard of duty which we shall establish in our jurisprudence on
the part of employees toward employees.
The lack or the harshness of legal rules on this subject has led many
countries to enact designed to put these relations on a fair basis in the form
of compensation or liability laws or the institution of insurance. In the
absence of special legislation we find no difficulty in so applying the general
principles of our law as to work out a just result.
Article 1092 of the Civil Code provides:
Civil obligations, arising from crimes or misdemeanors, shall be governed by
the provisions of the Penal Code.
And Article 568 of the latter code provides:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that if done with
malice would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished.
And Article 590 provides that the following shall be punished:
4. Those who by simple imprudence or negligence, without committing any
infraction of regulations, shall cause an injury which, had malice intervened,
would have constituted a crime or misdemeanor.
And finally by articles 19 and 20, the liability of owners and employers for the
faults of their servants and representatives is declared to be civil and
subsidiary in its character.
It is contented by the defendant, as its first defense to the action, that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured
the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing
the tract, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed,
payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this
subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults
or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter
11 of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is
fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for
the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to avoid the damages.
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be
sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer
penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen.
His obligation therefore is one not punished by the law and falls under civil
rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We
should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob
some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants their will from the civil
courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection
for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful
by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if
these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be
unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of
the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal),
which, though n ever in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a
suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while
the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article
112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought
therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly
reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone
was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced by only on
private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These
provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal
Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citations
of these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be
merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as
expressly provided by law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent
act or omission, it is not required that the inured party should seek out a third
person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to
the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees
only while they are process of prosecution, or in so far as they determinate
the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation
under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby
unless by election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal in question,
the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction
renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil
liability in penal actions survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been
abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the
Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case
appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the
words of article 1093, fault or negligence not punished by law, as applied to
the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal
Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his
relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived
from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1092 and
1093. More than this, however, it can not be said to fall within the class of
acts unpunished by the law, the consequences of which are regulated by
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are
applicable are understood to be those and growing out of preexisting duties
of the parties to one another. But were relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of
those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104, of the same code.
A typical application of the distinction may be found in the consequences of a
railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His
liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to
the passengers out of the contract for passage. while that to that injured
bystander would originate in the negligent act itself. This distinction is thus
clearly set forth by Manresa in his commentary on article 1093.
We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be
understood in two difference senses; either as culpa, substantive and
independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between
two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in
the performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which can not be
presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising
from the already exiting obligation.
Of these two species of culpa the first one mentioned, existing by itself, may
be also considered as a real source of an independent obligation, and, as
chapter 2, title 16 of this book of the code is devoted to it, it is logical to
presume that the reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto and
that it does not extend to those provisions relating to the other species of
culpa (negligence), the nature of which we will discuss later. (Vol. 8, p. 29.)
And in his commentary on articles 1102 and 1104 he says that these two
species of negligence may be somewhat inexactly described as contractual
and extra-contractual, the letter being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman law
and not entailing so strict an obligation as the former. This terminology is
unreservedly accepted by Sanchez-Roman (Derecho Civil, fourth section,
Chapter XI, Article II, No. 12), and the principle stated is supported be
decisions of the supreme court of Spain, among them those of November 20,
1896 (80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151), and June 27, 1894 (75
Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182). The contract is one for hire and not one of
mandate. (March 10, 1897, 81 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 107.)
Spanish Jurisprudencia prior to the adoption of the Working Mens Accident
Law of January 30, 1900, throws uncertain light on the relation between
master and workman. Moved by the quick industrial development of their
people, the courts of France early applied to the subject the principles
common to the law of both countries, which are lucidly discussed by the
leading French commentators.
The original French theory, resting the responsibility of owners of industrial
enterprises upon articles 1382, 1383, and 1384 of the Code Napoleon,
corresponding in scope to articles 1902 and 1903 of the Spanish Code, soon
yielded to the principle that the true basis is the contractual obligation of the
employer and employee. (See 18 Dalloz, 196, Title Travail, 331.)
Later the hardships resulting from special exemptions inserted in contracts
for employment led to the discovery of a third basis for liability in an article of
the French Code making the possessor of any object answerable for damage
done by it while in his charge. Our law having no counterpart of this article,
applicable to every kind of object, we need consider neither the theory
growing out of it nor that of professional risk more recently imposed by
express legislation, but rather adopting the interpretation of our Civil Code
above given, find a rule for this case in the contractual obligation. This
contractual obligation, implied from the relation and perhaps so inherent in its
nature to be invariable by the parties, binds the employer to provide safe
appliances for the use of the employee, thus closely corresponding to
English and American Law. On these principles it was the duty of the
defendant to build and to maintain its track in reasonably sound condition, so
as to protect its workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one
respect or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not have
occurred; consequently the negligence of the defendant is established.
Another contention of the defense is that the injury resulted to the plaintiff as
a risk incident to his employment and, as such, one assumed by him. It is
evident that this can not be the case if the occurrence was due to the failure
to repair the track or to duly inspect, it for the employee is not presumed to
have stipulated that the employer might neglect his legal duty. Nor may it be
excused upon the ground that the negligence leading to the accident was
that of a fellow-servant of the injured man. It is not apparent to us that the
intervention of a third person can relieve the defendant from the performance
of its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the consequences of an act or
omission not his own. Sua cuique culpa nocet. This doctrine, known as the
fellow-servant, rule, we are not disposed to introduce into our jurisprudence.
Adopted in England by Lord Abinger in the case of Prescott vs. Fowler (3
Meeson & Welsby, 1) in 1837, it has since been effectually abrogated by the
Employers Liability Acts and the Compensation Law. The American States
which applied it appear to be gradually getting rid of it; for instance, the New
York State legislature of 1906 did away with it in respect to railroad
companies, and had in hand a scheme for its total abolition. It has never
found place in the civil law of continental Europe. (Dalloz, vol. 39, 1858, Title
Responsibilite, 630, and vol. 15, 1895, same title, 804. Also more recent
instances in Fuzier-Herman, Title Responsibilite Civile, 710.)
The French Cour de Cassation clearly laid down the contrary principle in its
judgment of June 28, 1841, in the case of Reygasse, and has since adhered
to it.
The most controverted question in the case is that of the negligence of the
plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what
legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with
carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work;
and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead
of along the boards, either before or behind it.
As to the first point, the depression in the track night indicate either a serious
or a rival difficulty. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the plaintiff
did or could see the displaced timber underneath the sleeper. The claim that
he must have done so is a conclusion drawn from what is assumed to have
been a probable condition of things not before us, rather than a fair inference
from the testimony. While the method of construction may have been known
to the men who had helped build the road, it was otherwise with the plaintiff
who had worked at this job less than two days. A man may easily walk along
a railway without perceiving a displacement of the underlying timbers. The
foreman testified that he knew the state of the track on the day of the
accident and that it was then in good condition, and one Danridge, a witness
for the defendant, working on the same job, swore that he never noticed the
depression in the track and never saw any bad place in it. The sagging of the
track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported in his hearing to the
foreman who neither promised nor refused to repair it. His lack of caution in
continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not
of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under
the severe American rule. On this point we accept the conclusion of the trial
judge who found as facts that the plaintiff did not know the cause of the one
rail being lower than then other and it does not appear in this case that the
plaintiff knew before the accident occurred that the stringers and rails joined
in the same place.
Were we not disposed to agree with these findings they would, nevertheless,
be binding upon us, because not plainly and manifestly against the weight of
evidence, as those words of section 497, paragraph 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure were interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
De la Rama case (201 U. S., 303).
In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the
judgment below is not so specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence
does not justify the finding that the car was pulled by means of a rope
attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the
circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons necessary to
operate the car could not walk upon the plank between the rails and that,
therefore, it was necessary for the employees moving it to get hold upon it as
best they could, there is no specific finding upon the instruction given by the
defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the
necessity of the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to
get hold upon the car. Therefore the findings of the judge below leave the
conduct of the plaintiff in walking along the side of the loaded car, upon the
open ties, over the depressed track, free to our inquiry.
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not
forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman
to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify
that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang
against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he
repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the
defendants contention to the extent of the general order being made known
to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not
as its primary cause. This conclusion presents sharply the question, What
effect is to be given such an act of contributory negligence? Does it defeat a
recovery, according to the American rule, or is it to be taken only in reduction
of damages?
While a few of the American States have adopted to a greater or less extent
the doctrine of comparative negligence, allowing a recovery by a plaintiff
whose own act contributed to his injury, provided his negligence was slight
as compared with that of the defendant, and some others have accepted the
theory of proportional damages, reducing the award to a plaintiff in proportion
to his responsibility for the accident, yet the overwhelming weight of
adjudication establishes the principle in American jurisprudence that any
negligence, however slight, on the part of the person injured which is one of
the causes proximately contributing to his injury, bars his recovery. (English
and American Encyclopedia of law, Titles Comparative Negligence and
Contributory Negligence.)
In Grant Trunk Railway Company vs. Ives (144 U. S., 408, at page 429) the
Supreme Court of the United States thus authoritatively states the present
rule of law:
Although the defendants negligence may have been the primary cause of
the injury complained of, yet an action for such injury can not be maintained if
the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of
ordinary care and caution in the person injured; subject to this qualification,
which has grown up in recent years (having been first enunciated in Davies
vs. Mann, 10 M. & W., 546) that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by
the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the injured partys negligence.
There are may cases in the supreme court of Spain in which the defendant
was exonerated, but when analyzed they prove to have been decided either
upon the point that he was not negligent or that the negligence of the plaintiff
was the immediate cause of the casualty or that the accident was due to
casus fortuitus. Of the first class in the decision of January 26, 1887 (38
Jurisprudencia Criminal, No. 70), in which a railway employee, standing on a
car, was thrown therefrom and killed by the shock following the backing up of
the engine. It was held that the management of the train and engine being in
conformity with proper rules of the company, showed no fault on its part.
Of the second class are the decision of the 15th of January, the 19th of
February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubillas Index of that year;
and of the third class the decision of the 4th of June, 1888 (64 Jurisprudencia
Civil, No. 1), in which the breaking down of plaintiffs dam by the logs of the
defendant impelled against it by the Tajo River, was held due to a freshet as
a fortuitous cause.
The decision of the 7th of March, 1902, on which stress has been laid, rested
on two bases, one, that the defendant was not negligent, because expressly
relieved by royal order from the common obligation imposed by the police
law of maintaining a guard at the road crossing; the other, because the act of
the deceased in driving over level ground with unobstructed view in front of a
train running at speed, with the engine whistle blowing was the determining
cause of the accident. It is plain that the train was doing nothing but what it
had a right to do and that the only fault lay with the injured man. His
negligence was not contributory, it was sole, and was of such an efficient
nature that without it no catastrophe could have happened.
On the other hand, there are many cases reported in which it seems plain
that the plaintiff sustaining damages was not free from contributory
negligence; for instance, the decision of the 14th of December, 1894 (76
Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 134), in which the owner of a building was held
liable for not furnishing protection to workmen engaged in hanging out flags,
when the latter must have perceived beforehand the danger attending the
work.
None of those cases define the effect to be given the negligence of a plaintiff
which contributed to his injury as one of its causes, though not the principal
one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other
countries.
In France in the case of Marquant, August 20, 1879, the cour de cassation
held that the carelessness of the victim did not civilly relieve the person
without whose fault the accident could not have happened, but that the
contributory negligence of the injured man had the effect only of reducing the
damages. The same principle was applied in the case of Recullet, November
10, 1888. and that of Laugier of the 11th of November, 1896. (Fuzier-
Herman, Title Responsibilite Cirile, 411, 412.) Of like tenor are citations in
Dalloz (vol. 18, 1806, Title Trail, 363, 364, and vol. 15, 1895, Title
Responsibilite, 193, 198).
In the Canadian Province of Quebee, which has retained for the most part
the French Civil Law, now embodied in a code following the Code Napoleon,
a practice in accord with that of France is laid down in many cases collected
in the annotations to article 1053 of the code edited by Beauchamps, 1904.
One of these is Luttrell vs. Trottier, reported in La Revue de Jurisprudence,
volume 6, page 90, in which the court of Kings bench, otherwise known as
the court of appeals, the highest authority in the Dominion of Canada on
points of French law, held that contributory negligence did not exonerate the
defendants whose fault had been the immediate cause of the accident, but
entitled him to a reduction of damages. Other similar cases in the provincial
courts have been overruled by appellate tribunals made up of common law
judges drawn from other provinces, who have preferred to impose
uniformally throughout the Dominion the English theory of contributory
negligence. Such decisions throw no light upon the doctrines of the civil law.
Elsewhere we find this practice embodied in legislation; for instance, section
2 of article 2398 of the Code of Portugal reads as follows:
If in the case of damage there was fault or negligence on the part of the
person injured or in the part of someone else, the indemnification shall be
reduced in the first case, and in the second case it shall be appropriated in
proportion to such fault or negligence as provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
section 2372.
And in article 1304 of the Austrian Code provides that the victim who is partly
changeable with the accident shall stand his damages in proportion to his
fault, but when that proportion is incapable of ascertainment, he shall share
the liability equally with the person principally responsible. The principle of
proportional damages appears to be also adopted in article 51 of the Swiss
Code. Even in the United States in admiralty jurisdictions, whose principles
are derived from the civil law, common fault in cases of collision have been
disposed of not on the ground of contradictor negligence, but on that of equal
loss, the fault of the one part being offset against that of the other. (Ralli vs.
Troop, 157 U. S. 386; 97.)
The damage of both being added together and the sum equally divided, a
decree is entered in favor of the vessel sustaining the greater loss against
the other for the excess of her damages over one-half of the aggregate sum.
(The Manitoba, 122 U. S., 97)
Exceptional practice appears to prevail in maritime law in other jurisdictions.
The Spanish Code of Commerce, article 827, makes each vessel for its own
damage when both are the fault; this provision restricted to a single class of
the maritime accidents, falls for short of a recognition of the principle of
contributory negligence as understood in American Law, with which, indeed,
it has little in common. This is a plain from other articles of the same code;
for instance, article 829, referring to articles 826, 827, and 828, which
provides: In the cases above mentioned the civil action of the owner against
the person liable for the damage is reserved, as well as the criminal liability
which may appear.
The rule of the common law, a hard and fast one, not adjustable with
respects of the faults of the parties, appears to have grown out the original
method of trial by jury, which rendered difficult a nice balancing of
responsibilities and which demanded an inflexible standard as a safeguard
against too ready sympathy for the injured. It was assumed that an exact
measure of several concurring faults was unattainable.
The reason why, in cases of mutual concurring negligence, neither party can
maintain an action against the other, is, not the wrong of the one is set off
against the wrong of the other; it that the law can not measure how much of
the damage suffered is attributable to the plaintiffs own fault. If he were
allowed to recover, it might be that he would obtain from the other party
compensation for his own misconduct. (Heil vs. Glanding, 42 Penn. St. Rep.,
493, 499.)
The parties being mutually in fault, there can be no appointment of damages.
The law has no scales to determine in such cases whose wrongdoing
weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief. (Railroad vs.
Norton, 24 Penn. St. 565, 469.)
Experience with jury trials in negligence cases has brought American courts
to review to relax the vigor of the rule by freely exercising the power of
setting aside verdicts deemed excessive, through the device of granting new
trials, unless reduced damages are stipulated for, amounting to a partial
revision of damages by the courts. It appears to us that the control by the
court of the subject matter may be secured on a moral logical basis and its
judgment adjusted with greater nicety to the merits of the litigants through the
practice of offsetting their respective responsibilities. In the civil law system
the desirable end is not deemed beyond the capacity of its tribunals.
Whatever may prove to be the doctrine finally adopted in Spain or in other
countries under the stress and counter stress of novel schemers of
legislation, we find the theory of damages laid down in the judgment the most
consistent with the history and the principals of our law in these Islands and
with its logical development.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is
simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the
event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts
of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under
review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this
produced the event giving occasion for damages that is, the shrinking of
the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff
in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an
element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out
of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would
have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which
he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he
may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.
ACCEPTING, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the trial court,
fixing the damage incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos, the equivalent of
2,500 dollars, United States money, we deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the
amount fairly attributable to his negligence, and direct judgment to be
entered in favor of the plaintiff for the resulting sum of 2,500 pesos, with cost
of both instances, and ten days hereafter let the case be REMANDED to the
court below for proper action. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47772 August 31, 1978
INOCENCIO TUGADE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF PEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Manuel M. Camacho for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and Solicitor Francisco J. Bautista for
respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
There is nothing impressive about this petition sinking to justify a review of a
decision of respondent Court of Appeals on the ground that instead of relying
on what counsel considers applicable rulings of: respondent Court,. the
judgment was based, on a case decided by this Tribunal Moreover, counsel
for petitioner ignored earlier doctrines of this Court consistently holding that a
mishap caused by defective brakes could not be considered as fortuitous in
character and thus caged for an acquittal of the driver if subsequently haled
to court. This Court, nonetheless, was persuaded to give due course to the
petition primarily for clarifying the state of the law and thus hopefully avoid
any further lurking doubt on the matter. It is quite evident that the reversal of
the decision sought to be reviewed is not justified.
The decision of respondent Court, with Justice Julia Agrava as ponente, set
forth the relevant facto thus: "At about 9:15 o'clock in the morning of January
4,, 1972, Rodolfo [Rayan- dayan] was driving a Hodlen Kingswood car (the
[Holden] car), plate No. 52-19V (L-Rizal '71) owned by the Sta. Ines Corp.
and assigned for use of its manager, an Ayala Avenue in Makati, Rizal, going
northwards. At the intersection of Ayala Avenue will Mabati Avenue, [Rayan-
dayan] was going to turn left on Makati Avenue but he stopped to wait for the
left-turn signal and because a jeep in front of him was also at a stop ... While
in that sup position, the [Holden] car was bumped from behind by Blue Car
Taxi bearing Plate No. 55-71R (TX-QC '71) and by Inocencio [Tugade]
causing damage to the [Holden] car, the repairs of which cost P778.10 ...
[Tugade] was then charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property. He pleaded not guilty and while admitting that the collision was
caused by faulty brakes of his taxicab, sought to expeculate himself with an
explanation that this fault could not and should not be traced to him. after
trial, the lower court held: '[Accordingly], the court finds that accused
Inocencio Tugade guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and hereby sentences him to
pay a [fine of one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos], with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency in accordance with the provisions of Article 39 of the
Revised, Penal Code, as amended, to indemnify the Sta. Ines Mining
Corporation in the amount of P778.10 by way of actual damages; and to pay
the costs.' While [Tugade] admitted the facts of the case as set out above,
he, nevertheless, appealed from the judgment reiterating that 'the
malfunctioning of the brakes at the time of the accident was due to a
mechanical defect which even the exercise of due diligence of a good father
of a family cannot have prevented.' As the lower court had found: "this
witness ([Tugade]) testified that after the accident, he admitted that his
taxicab bumped the car on his front because the brakes of his vehicle
malfunctioned; and that the document, ..., is the handwritten statement he
prepared to this effect." 1 Respondent Court of Appeals, after stating that
upon review of the record, it agreed with the trial court, its decision affirming
in toto their judgment appealed from.
As noted at the outset, petitioner is not entitled to acquittal. His plea for the
reversal of the decision reached by respondent Court is not impressed with
merit. At the most, as was likewise previously mentioned, the fine imposed
could be reduced.
1. Counsel for petitioner vigorously contends that respondent Court of
Appeals ought not to have applied the pronouncement in La Mallorca and
Pampanga Bus Co. vs. De Jesus 2 on the ground that it was obiter dictum.
That is not the case at all. A little more time and attention in the study of the
above decision could have resulted in its correct appraisal He would have
realized then that respondent Court acted correctly. This Tribunal passed
squarely on the specific issue raised. The opinion penned by the then
Justice, later Chief Justice, Makalintal, is categorical: "Petitioner maintains
that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for
negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez V. Red
Line Transportation Co., CA-G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People
v. Palapal, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings, however, not
only are not binding on this Court but were based on considerations, quite
different from those that obtain in the case at bar." 3 The above doctrine is
controlling. The reference to the Court of appeals decisions is of no moment.
4 It may be printed out that they were not ignored in the opinion of Justice
Agrava, six of its nine pages being devoted to distinguishing them. Even
without the La Mallorca ruling then, the decision of respondent Court sought
to be reviewed can stand the test of strict scrutiny. It is this Tribunal, not
respondent Court of Appeals, that speaks authoritatively.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all.
It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This
Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is
relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera: 5 "The delicate task of
ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory
provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is
committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that
appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of
law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak
with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the
highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial
heirarchy. They have to defer and to submit." 6 The ensuing paragraph of the
opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: "Such a thought was
reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in
these words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the
Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has
the last word on what the law is it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other
courts should take their bearings." 7
3. The lack of merit in this petition becomes even more obvious when it
is recalled that the La Mallorca decision did not enunciate a new principle. As
far back as Lasam v. Smith, 8 promulgated more than half a century ago, in
1924 to be exact, this Court has been committed to such a doctrine. Thus;
"As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary
circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an
essential element of a caso fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at once
apparent that this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in
question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which could
not have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was
caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of
its driver. That is not a caso fortuito." 9 Lasam was cited with approval in the
two subsequent cases of Son v. Cebu Autobus Co. 10 and Necesito v.
Paras. 11
WHEREFORE, The decision of respondent Court of Appeals of December
15, 1977 is affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985
ROBERTO JUNTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and BERFOL CAMORO,
respondents.
Valentin A. Zozobrado for petitioner.
Ruperto N. Alfarara for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review, on questions of law, of the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu which reversed the decision of the City Court of
Cebu and exonerated the respondents from any liability arising from a
vehicular accident.
The background facts which led to the filing of a complaint for breach of
contract and damages against the respondents are summarized by the Court
of First Instance of Cebu as follows:
The facts established after trial show that the plaintiff was a passenger of the
public utility jeepney bearing plate No. PUJ-71-7 on the course of the trip
from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by defendant Berfol
Camoro. It was registered under the franchise of defendant Clemente
Fontanar but was actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon. When the
jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the
vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front
seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff
momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found that
he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. Aside from this, he suffered
injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back. (Exh. "D"). Because of his
shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way, he
discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao
City, he immediately entered the Danao City Hospital to attend to his injuries,
and also requested his father-in-law to proceed immediately to the place of
the accident and look for the watch. In spite of the efforts of his father-in-law,
the wrist watch, which he bought for P 852.70 (Exh. "B") could no longer be
found.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed Civil Case No. R-17378 for breach of contract
with damages before the City Court of Cebu City, Branch I against Clemente
Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and Berfol Camoro.
The respondents filed their answer, alleging inter alia that the accident that
caused losses to the petitioner was beyond the control of the respondents
taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was
only slightly used at the time it blew up.
After trial, Judge Romulo R. Senining of the Civil Court of Cebu rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants and the latter are hereby ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P750.00 as reimbursement for the
lost Omega wrist watch, the sum of P246.64 as unrealized salary of the
plaintiff from his employer, the further sum of P100.00 for the doctor's fees
and medicine, an additional sum of P300.00 for attorney's fees and the costs.
The respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
XIV.
Judge Leonardo B. Canares reversed the judgment of the City Court of Cebu
upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered exonerating the defendants
from any liability to the plaintiff without pronouncement as to costs.
A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of First Instance.
The petitioner raises the following alleged errors committed by the Court of
First Instance of Cebu on appeal
a. The Honorable Court below committed grave abuse of discretion in
failing to take cognizance of the fact that defendants and/or their employee
failed to exercise "utmost and/or extraordinary diligence" required of common
carriers contemplated under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
b. The Honorable Court below committed grave abuse of discretion by
deciding the case contrary to the doctrine laid down by the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Necesito et al. v. Paras, et al.
We find the petition impressed with merit.

The City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu found that the right
rear tire of the passenger jeepney in which the petitioner was riding blew up
causing the vehicle to fall on its side. The petitioner questions the conclusion
of the respondent court drawn from this finding of fact.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu erred when it absolved the carrier from
any liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event. The
Court of First Instance of Cebu ruled that:
After reviewing the records of the case, this Court finds that the accident in
question was due to a fortuitous event. A tire blow-out, such as what
happened in the case at bar, is an inevitable accident that exempts the
carrier from liability, there being absence of a showing that there was
misconduct or negligence on the part of the operator in the operation and
maintenance of the vehicle involved. The fact that the right rear tire exploded,
despite being brand new, constitutes a clear case of caso fortuito which can
be a proper basis for exonerating the defendants from liability. ...
The Court of First Instance relied on the ruling of the Court of Appeals in
Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation Co., CA G.R. No. 8136, December 29,
1954, where the Court of Appeals ruled that:
A tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old
and should not have been used at all. Indeed, this would be a clear case of
fortuitous event.
The foregoing conclusions of the Court of First Instance of Cebu are based
on a misapprehension of overall facts from which a conclusion should be
drawn. The reliance of the Court of First Instance on the Rodriguez case is
not in order. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v. De Jesus, et al. (17
SCRA 23), we held that:
Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to
no liability for negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in
Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation Co., CA G.R. No. 8136, December 29,
1954, and People v. Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These
rulings, however, not only are not binding on this Court but were based on
considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. The
appellate court there made no findings of any specific acts of negligence on
the part of the defendants and confined itself to the question of whether or
not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to the causative
factors, would generate liability. ...
In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the
respondents. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and
jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The
evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed
before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a
public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a
ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show that the
passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner
stated that there were three (3) passengers in the front seat and fourteen
(14) passengers in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the
grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the
explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show
that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions
were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to
cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused
by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the
jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
In Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657), we laid down the following essential
characteristics of caso fortuito:
xxx xxx xxx
... In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso
fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must
be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it
can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. (5
Encyclopedia Juridica Espanola, 309.)
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence
was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused either
through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the
tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their
vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct
measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers
at all times. Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects, we held in
Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al. (104 Phil. 75), that:
... The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger
is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a
defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears
that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised
the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it,
with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. For the
purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the
agent or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the
appliance. According to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will
not relieve the carrier from liability' (10 Am. Jur. 205, s, 1324; see also
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451; 20 L. Ed. 141; Southern R. Co. v.
Hussey, 74 ALR 1172; 42 Fed. 2d 70; and Ed Note, 29 ALR 788.: Ann. Cas.
1916E 929).
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither
choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment
and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the
manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no
remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore,
that the carrier, while not an insurer of the safety of his passengers, should
nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws
were at all discoverable. ...
It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability
is the contract of carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it binds
itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due
regard for all the circumstances. The records show that this obligation was
not met by the respondents.
The respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any
amount for failure to prove such damages during the trial. The respondents
submit that if the petitioner was really injured, why was he treated in Danao
City and not in Mandaue City where the accident took place. The
respondents argue that the doctor who issued the medical certificate was not
presented during the trial, and hence not cross-examined. The respondents
also claim that the petitioner was not wearing any wrist watch during the
accident.
It should be noted that the City Court of Cebu found that the petitioner had a
lacerated wound on his right palm aside from injuries on his left arm, right
thigh and on his back, and that on his way back to Danao City, he discovered
that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. These are findings of facts of the City
Court of Cebu which we find no reason to disturb. More so when we consider
the fact that the Court of First Instance of Cebu impliedly concurred in these
matters when it confined itself to the question of whether or not the tire blow
out was a fortuitous event.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IV
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of
the City Court of Cebu, Branch I is REINSTATED, with the modification that
the damages shall earn interest at 12% per annum and the attorney's fees
are increased to SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00). Damages shall earn
interests from January 27, 1975.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29640 June 10, 1971
GUILLERMO AUSTRIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), PACIFICO ABAD and
MARIA G. ABAD, respondents.
Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioner.
Jose A. Buendia for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Guillermo Austria petitions for the review of the decision rendered by the
Court of Appeal (in CA-G.R. No. 33572-R), on the sole issue of whether in a
contract of agency (consignment of goods for sale) it is necessary that there
be prior conviction for robbery before the loss of the article shall exempt the
consignee from liability for such loss.
In a receipt dated 30 January 1961, Maria G. Abad acknowledged having
received from Guillermo Austria one (1) pendant with diamonds valued at
P4,500.00, to be sold on commission basis or to be returned on demand. On
1 February 1961, however, while walking home to her residence in
Mandaluyong, Rizal, Abad was said to have been accosted by two men, one
of whom hit her on the face, while the other snatched her purse containing
jewelry and cash, and ran away. Among the pieces of jewelry allegedly taken
by the robbers was the consigned pendant. The incident became the subject
of a criminal case filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against certain
persons (Criminal Case No. 10649, People vs. Rene Garcia, et al.).
As Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its value notwithstanding
demands, Austria brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action
against her and her husband for recovery of the pendant or of its value, and
damages. Answering the allegations of the complaint, defendants spouses
set up the defense that the alleged robbery had extinguished their obligation.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and
ordered defendants spouses, jointly and severally, to pay to the former the
sum of P4,500.00, with legal interest thereon, plus the amount of P450.00 as
reasonable attorneys' fees, and the costs. It was held that defendants failed
to prove the fact of robbery, or, if indeed it was committed, that defendant
Maria Abad was guilty of negligence when she went home without any
companion, although it was already getting dark and she was carrying a
large amount of cash and valuables on the day in question, and such
negligence did not free her from liability for damages for the loss of the
jewelry.
Not satisfied with his decision, the defendants went to the Court of Appeals,
and there secured a reversal of the judgment. The appellate court overruling
the finding of the trial court on the lack of credibility of the two defense
witnesses who testified on the occurrence of the robbery, and holding that
the facts of robbery and defendant Maria Abad's possesion of the pendant on
that unfortunate day have been duly published, declared respondents not
responsible for the loss of the jewelry on account of a fortuitous event, and
relieved them from liability for damages to the owner. Plaintiff thereupon
instituted the present proceeding.
It is now contended by herein petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that there was robbery in the case, although nobody has been found
guilty of the supposed crime. It is petitioner's theory that for robbery to fall
under the category of a fortuitous event and relieve the obligor from his
obligation under a contract, pursuant to Article 1174 of the new Civil Code,
there ought to be prior finding on the guilt of the persons responsible
therefor. In short, that the occurrence of the robbery should be proved by a
final judgment of conviction in the criminal case. To adopt a different view,
petitioner argues, would be to encourage persons accountable for goods or
properties received in trust or consignment to connive with others, who would
be willing to be accused in court for the robbery, in order to be absolved from
civil liability for the loss or disappearance of the entrusted articles.
We find no merit in the contention of petitioner.
It is recognized in this jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that would
exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that (1) the event must
be independent of the human will (or rather, of the debtor's or obligor's); (2)
the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation
in a normal manner; and that (3) the obligor must be free of participation in or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor. 1 A fortuitous event, therefore, can
be produced by nature, e.g., earthquakes, storms, floods, etc., or by the act
of man, such as war, attack by bandits, robbery, 2 etc., provided that the
event has all the characteristics enumerated above.
It is not here disputed that if respondent Maria Abad were indeed the victim
of robbery, and if it were really true that the pendant, which she was obliged
either to sell on commission or to return to petitioner, were taken during the
robbery, then the occurrence of that fortuitous event would have extinguished
her liability. The point at issue in this proceeding is how the fact of robbery is
to be established in order that a person may avail of the exempting provision
of Article 1174 of the new Civil Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
It may be noted the reform that the emphasis of the provision is on the
events, not on the agents or factors responsible for them. To avail of the
exemption granted in the law, it is not necessary that the persons responsible
for the occurrence should be found or punished; it would only be sufficient to
established that the enforceable event, the robbery in this case did take
place without any concurrent fault on the debtor's part, and this can be done
by preponderant evidence. To require in the present action for recovery the
prior conviction of the culprits in the criminal case, in order to establish the
robbery as a fact, would be to demand proof beyond reasonable doubt to
prove a fact in a civil case.
It is undeniable that in order to completely exonerate the debtor for reason of
a fortutious event, such debtor must, in addition to the cams itself, be free of
any concurrent or contributory fault or negligence. 3 This is apparent from
Article 1170 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, providing that:
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty
of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
It is clear that under the circumstances prevailing at present in the City of
Manila and its suburbs, with their high incidence of crimes against persons
and property that renders travel after nightfall a matter to be sedulously
avoided without suitable precaution and protection, the conduct of
respondent Maria G. Abad, in returning alone to her house in the evening,
carrying jewelry of considerable value would be negligent per se and would
not exempt her from responsibility in the case of a robbery. We are not
persuaded, however, that the same rule should obtain ten years previously,
in 1961, when the robbery in question did take place, for at that time
criminality had not by far reached the levels attained in the present day.
There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that to allow the fact of
robbery to be recognized in the civil case before conviction is secured in the
criminal action, would prejudice the latter case, or would result in
inconsistency should the accused obtain an acquittal or should the criminal
case be dismissed. It must be realized that a court finding that a robbery has
happened would not necessarily mean that those accused in the criminal
action should be found guilty of the crime; nor would a ruling that those
actually accused did not commit the robbery be inconsistent with a finding
that a robbery did take place. The evidence to establish these facts would not
necessarily be the same.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals under
review, the petition in this case is hereby dismissed with costs against the
petitioner.
G.R. No. L-42926 September 13, 1985
PEDRO VASQUEZ, SOLEDAD ORTEGA, CLETO B. BAGAIPO,
AGUSTINA VIRTUDES, ROMEO VASQUEZ and MAXIMINA CAINAY,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FILIPINAS PIONEER LINES, INC.,
respondents.
Emilio D. Castellanes for petitioners.
Apolinario A. Abantao for private respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This litigation involves a claim for damages for the loss at sea of petitioners'
respective children after the shipwreck of MV Pioneer Cebu due to typhoon
"Klaring" in May of 1966.
The factual antecedents, as summarized by the trial Court and adopted by
respondent Court, and which we find supported by the record, read as
follows:
When the inter-island vessel MV "Pioneer Cebu" left the Port of Manila in the
early morning of May 15, 1966 bound for Cebu, it had on board the spouses
Alfonso Vasquez and Filipinas Bagaipo and a four-year old boy, Mario
Marlon Vasquez, among her passengers. The MV "Pioneer Cebu"
encountered typhoon "Klaring" and struck a reef on the southern part of
Malapascua Island, located somewhere north of the island of Cebu and
subsequently sunk. The aforementioned passengers were unheard from
since then.
Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez and Soledad Ortega are the parents of Alfonso
Vasquez; plaintiffs Cleto Bagaipo and Agustina Virtudes are the parents of
Filipinas Bagaipo; and plaintiffs Romeo Vasquez and Maxima Cainay are the
parents of the child, Mario Marlon Vasquez. They seek the recovery of
damages due to the loss of Alfonso Vasquez, Filipinas Bagaipo and Mario
Marlon Vasquez during said voyage.
At the pre-trial, the defendant admitted its contract of carriage with Alfonso
Vasquez, Filipinas Bagaipo and Mario Marlon Vasquez, and the fact of the
sinking of the MV "Pioneer Cebu". The issues of the case were limited to the
defenses alleged by the defendant that the sinking of the vessel was caused
by force majeure, and that the defendant's liability had been extinguished by
the total loss of the vessel.
The evidence on record as to the circumstances of the last voyage of the MV
"Pioneer Cebu" came mainly, if not exclusively, from the defendant. The MV
"Pioneer Cebu" was owned and operated by the defendant and used in the
transportation of goods and passengers in the inter-island shipping.
Scheduled to leave the Port of Manila at 9:00 p.m. on May 14, 1966, it
actually left port at 5:00 a.m. the following day, May 15, 1966. It had a
passenger capacity of three hundred twenty-two (322) including the crew. It
undertook the said voyage on a special permit issued by the Collector of
Customs inasmuch as, upon inspection, it was found to be without an
emergency electrical power system. The special permit authorized the vessel
to carry only two hundred sixty (260) passengers due to the said deficiency
and for lack of safety devices for 322 passengers (Exh. 2). A headcount was
made of the passengers on board, resulting on the tallying of 168 adults and
20 minors, although the passengers manifest only listed 106 passengers. It
has been admitted, however, that the headcount is not reliable inasmuch as
it was only done by one man on board the vessel.
When the vessel left Manila, its officers were already aware of the typhoon
Klaring building up somewhere in Mindanao. There being no typhoon signals
on the route from Manila to Cebu, and the vessel having been cleared by the
Customs authorities, the MV "Pioneer Cebu" left on its voyage to Cebu
despite the typhoon. When it reached Romblon Island, it was decided not to
seek shelter thereat, inasmuch as the weather condition was still good. After
passing Romblon and while near Jintotolo island, the barometer still indicated
the existence of good weather condition continued until the vessel
approached Tanguingui island. Upon passing the latter island, however, the
weather suddenly changed and heavy rains felt Fearing that due to zero
visibility, the vessel might hit Chocolate island group, the captain ordered a
reversal of the course so that the vessel could 'weather out' the typhoon by
facing the winds and the waves in the open. Unfortunately, at about noontime
on May 16, 1966, the vessel struck a reef near Malapascua island, sustained
leaks and eventually sunk, bringing with her Captain Floro Yap who was in
command of the vessel.
Due to the loss of their children, petitioners sued for damages before the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 67139). Respondent
defended on the plea of force majeure, and the extinction of its liability by the
actual total loss of the vessel.
After proper proceedings, the trial Court awarded damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay:
(a) Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez and Soledad Ortega the sums of
P15,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Alfonso
Vasquez, P2,100.00 for support, and P10,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) Plaintiffs Cleto B. Bagaipo and Agustina Virtudes the sum of
P17,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of deceased Filipinas Bagaipo, and
P10,000.00 for moral damages; and
(c) Plaintiffs Romeo Vasquez and Maximina Cainay the sum of
P10,000.00 by way of moral damages by reason of the death of Mario
Marlon Vasquez.
On appeal, respondent Court reversed the aforementioned judgment and
absolved private respondent from any and all liability.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, the basic issue being the
liability for damages of private respondent for the presumptive death of
petitioners' children.
The trial Court found the defense of caso fortuito untenable due to various
decisive factors, thus:
... It is an admitted fact that even before the vessel left on its last voyage, its
officers and crew were already aware of the typhoon brewing somewhere in
the same general direction to which the vessel was going. The crew of the
vessel took a calculated risk when it proceeded despite the typhoon advisory.
This is quite evident from the fact that the officers of the vessel had to
conduct conferences amongst themselves to decide whether or not to
proceed. The crew assumed a greater risk when, instead of seeking shelter
in Romblon and other islands the vessel passed en route, they decided to
take a change on the expected continuation of the good weather the vessel
was encountering, and the possibility that the typhoon would veer to some
other directions. The eagerness of the crew of the vessel to proceed on its
voyage and to arrive at its destination is readily understandable. It is
undeniably lamentable, however, that they did so at the risk of the lives of the
passengers on board.
Contrariwise, respondent Appellate Court believed that the calamity was
caused solely and proximately by fortuitous event which not even
extraordinary diligence of the highest degree could have guarded against;
and that there was no negligence on the part of the common carrier in the
discharge of its duties.
Upon the evidence and the applicable law, we sustain the trial Court. "To
constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is
necessary that (1) the event must be independent of the human will; (2) the
occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a
normal manner; and that (3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or
aggravation of, the injury to the creditor." 1 In the language of the law, the
event must have been impossible to foresee, or if it could be foreseen, must
have been impossible to avoid. 2 There must be an entire exclusion of
human agency from the cause of injury or loss. 3
Turning to this case, before they sailed from the port of Manila, the officers
and crew were aware of typhoon "Klaring" that was reported building up at
260 kms. east of Surigao. In fact, they had lashed all the cargo in the hold
before sailing in anticipation of strong winds and rough waters. 4 They
proceeded on their way, as did other vessels that day. Upon reaching
Romblon, they received the weather report that the typhoon was 154 kms.
east southeast of Tacloban and was moving west northwest. 5 Since they
were still not within the radius of the typhoon and the weather was clear, they
deliberated and decided to proceed with the course. At Jintotolo Island, the
typhoon was already reported to be reaching the mainland of Samar. 6 They
still decided to proceed noting that the weather was still "good" although,
according to the Chief Forecaster of the Weather Bureau, they were already
within the typhoon zone. 7 At Tanguingui Island, about 2:00 A.M. of May 16,
1966, the typhoon was in an area quite close to Catbalogan, placing
Tanguingui also within the typhoon zone. Despite knowledge of that fact,
they again decided to proceed relying on the forecast that the typhoon would
weaken upon crossing the mainland of Samar. 8 After about half an hour of
navigation towards Chocolate Island, there was a sudden fall of the
barometer accompanied by heavy downpour, big waves, and zero visibility.
The Captain of the vessel decided to reverse course and face the waves in
the open sea but because the visibility did not improve they were in total
darkness and, as a consequence, the vessel ran aground a reef and sank on
May 16, 1966 around 12:45 P.M. near Malapascua Island somewhere north
of the island of Cebu.
Under the circumstances, while, indeed, the typhoon was an inevitable
occurrence, yet, having been kept posted on the course of the typhoon by
weather bulletins at intervals of six hours, the captain and crew were well
aware of the risk they were taking as they hopped from island to island from
Romblon up to Tanguingui. They held frequent conferences, and oblivious of
the utmost diligence required of very cautious persons, 9 they decided to
take a calculated risk. In so doing, they failed to observe that extraordinary
diligence required of them explicitly by law for the safety of the passengers
transported by them with due regard for an circumstances 10 and
unnecessarily exposed the vessel and passengers to the tragic mishap. They
failed to overcome that presumption of fault or negligence that arises in
cases of death or injuries to passengers. 11

While the Board of Marine Inquiry, which investigated the disaster,

exonerated the captain from any negligence, it was because it had
considered the question of negligence as "moot and academic," the captain
having "lived up to the true tradition of the profession." While we are bound
by the Board's factual findings, we disagree with its conclusion since it
obviously had not taken into account the legal responsibility of a common
carrier towards the safety of the passengers involved.

With respect to private respondent's submission that the total loss of the
vessel extinguished its liability pursuant to Article 587 of the Code of
Commerce 12 as construed in Yangco vs. Laserna, 73 Phil. 330 [1941],
suffice it to state that even in the cited case, it was held that the liability of a
shipowner is limited to the value of the vessel or to the insurance thereon.
Despite the total loss of the vessel therefore, its insurance answers for the
damages that a shipowner or agent may be held liable for by reason of the
death of its passengers.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby REVERSED and the

judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch V, in Civil
Case No. 67139, is hereby reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.