[G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998] complaint.
complaint. This shall constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the house
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.
CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a
natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The
answer to this interesting query, certainly not one of first impression, would
have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and jurisprudence, but also
the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of
adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,[2] in
Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption
of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang,
Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners.
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on
January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973;
Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January
3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples relationship was
undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husbands alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the
Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husbands alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a
petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite[3] with the then
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu[4] which rendered a
decision[5] approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing
that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board. They
further agreed:
(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of
ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from the date of the filing of the
and lot jointly owned by the parties situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;
(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement
with any person or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent
of the husband; or any undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husbands
consent as the parties are by this agreement legally separated;[6]
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from
Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody
of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all
reasonable times and places to petitioner.[7]
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized
American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never
remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic
earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month[8] a portion of which was remitted
to the Philippines for his childrens expenses and another, deposited in the
bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano
and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of
Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the
three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The
petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to
his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her
brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in
taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United
States to attend to a family business, leaving the children would be a problem
and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad; and that her
husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children for the
following reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any contract
without the written consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United
States and had been transferring from one place to another to avoid
detection by Immigration authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned
to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although
private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable
of supporting the children while his finances were too meager compared to
theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental
authority over his beloved children.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to
reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred
to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to private
respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect,
relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should
be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver
custody over the minors to petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a
decree of adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the minors
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioners-
spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted
and approved. These children shall henceforth be known and called as Keith
D. Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano
respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties as though
they were in fact the legitimate children of the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the children;
and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this
Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was impelled by these reasons:
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed close filial ties with the
Clavano family, especially their maternal uncle, petitioner Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their printing
press, real estate business, export business and gasoline station and mini-
mart in Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed Menchu,
approved of the adoption because of her heart ailment, near-fatal accident
in 1981, and the fact that she could not provide them a secure and happy
future as she travels a lot.
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual direction as
they would go to church together and had sent the children to Catholic
schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted by the
Clavanos Keith had testified and expressed the wish to be adopted by the
Clavanos while the two younger ones were observed by the court to have
snuggled close to Ronald even though their natural mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner
to rest on a very shaky foundation because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was morally unfit to be the father of his children on account of
his being an improvident father of his family and an undisguised Lothario. This
conclusion is based on the testimony of his alleged paramour, mother of his
two sons and close friend of Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and
petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao,
Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of comparatively recent
dates were attempts at verisimilitude as these were joint deposits the
authenticity of which could not be verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioners claim, the possibility of his reconciliation with
Anna Marie was dim if not nil because it was petitioner who devised,
engineered and executed the divorce proceedings at the Nevada Washoe
County court.
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner is now an alien from the
standpoint of Philippine laws and therefore, how his new attachments and
loyalties would sit with his (Filipino) children is an open question.
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social
Worker in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And
abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute
as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163
Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption will be
allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but even against his
opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp.
131 Cal. 469, 63 P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346,
265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.;
Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. St. Rep. 441; Wilson v.
Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo.
173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.)[9]
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred
in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children if they
were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He
asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to
divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written
consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and
Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners
for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study report required
by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Article 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural
parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the consent
of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio,
92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The question therefore is
whether or not oppositor may be considered as having abandoned the
children. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part
of the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the
child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations
which parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the
withholding of the parents presence, his care and the opportunity to display
voluntary affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered by the
discussion of the first error.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children
and has in fact even maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to
provide support comes from two judicial pronouncements. The first, the
decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the children P1,000.00 a
month. The second is mandated by the divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A.
Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support of US$50.00 for each
child. Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show compliance with the
decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs.
24 to 45) drawn in the childrens names totalling $2,126.98. The last
remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide
support commenced under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of
October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made 53 remittances of $150.00, or
a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were shown to have been made
after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date, oppositor was woefully in
arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And since he was totally in
default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable conclusion is oppositor
had not really been performing his duties as a father, contrary to his
protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in
different banks, as follows
Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank
1) 118-606437-July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings, Daly
4 City, Cal., U.S.A.
Oct. 29, 1987
 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank of
Williamson, West Virginia,
2) 73-166-8 Oct. 26, 1987
U.S.A.
December 31,2,622.19
Security Pacific National
1986
3) 564-146883 Bank, Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
Oct. 29, 1987
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositors name as
trustee for Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In other
words, the accounts are operated and the amounts withdrawable by
oppositor himself and it cannot be said that they belong to the minors. The
second is an `or account, in the names of Herbert Cang or Keith Cang. Since
Keith is a minor and in the Philippines, said account is operable only by
oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer of
evidence `the aim and purpose of providing for a better future and security
of his family.[10]
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He
emphasized that the decree of legal separation was not based on the merits
of the case as it was based on a manifestation amounting to a compromise
agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and his wife agreed upon
the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out by the fact that
prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioners
parents. Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he
and his wife initiated the joint complaint for divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his
children was belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil
Case No. JD-707. He took exception to the appellate courts findings that as
an American citizen he could no longer lay claim to custody over his children
because his citizenship would not take away the fact that he is still a father to
his children. As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another woman, he
had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant
adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family
friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue City seven (7)
kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu
City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not have
been given weight for it was only during the hearing of the petition for
adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to know her and went
to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a witness for monetary
considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of the
Clavanos to claim that they could love the children much more than he
could.[11]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before
this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it
did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31
(2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and
Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Article 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides -
ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the following to
the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the Department of
Social Welfare or any duly licensed child placement agency under whose care
the child may be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
(Underscoring supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code. As thus amended, Article 31 read:
ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the following to
the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving
counselling and appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social
Services and Development or from a duly licensed child-placement agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed
child-placement agency under whose care and legal custody the child may
be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
(Underscoring supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines
the jurisdiction of the court.[12] As such, when private respondents filed the
petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the
Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took
effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws. As amended by the Family Code, the statutory
provision on consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the
adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents,
if living with said parent and the latters spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (Underscoring
supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the
amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such requirement
is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over
and not incompetent, and by the childs spouse, if any, and by each of its
known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned the child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian
or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan
asylum, childrens home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper
officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such persons; but if
the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father
to the adoption shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent
of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child[13] or that such parent
is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction over
the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the
parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to
warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with
the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of
adoption. Thus, the Court declared:
x x x. The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to
adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition
should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give
information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a
pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer
jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all
facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.[14]
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was
attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioners consent, as the natural
father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of
abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father as follows:
3. That the childrens mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO, has
given her express consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of Consent,
Annex `A. Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age
appears on page 2 of this petition; However, the father of the children,
Herbert Cang, had already left his wife and children and had already divorced
the former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the DECREE OF DIVORCE issued
by the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex `B) which was filed
at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his family to live in
the United States as an illegal immigrant.[15]
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the
written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with
jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of
the circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence[16] dispense
with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because
his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had
abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination.The issue of
abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an
adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural
father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his
child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this
Court.[17] This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the
oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.[18] However,
although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and
reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not
conform to the evidence on record.[19]
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[20] this Court has held that the exceptions to the
rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different
conclusion[21] on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his
children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake
or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of
putting under a ban. The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which
a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of
giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim ones rights or
interests.[22] In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations
of care and support which parents owe their children.[23]
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest
a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.Physical estrangement
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment.[24] While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he
was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He
used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioners testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and
children:
1. Exh. 1 a 4-page undated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to Dear
Bert on a C.Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated therein
that it had been a long time since the last time youve heard from me
excluding that of the phone conversation weve had. She discussed petitioners
intention to buy a motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks
that could be engendered by Keiths use of it. She said that in the last phone
conversation she had with petitioner on the birthday of Ma, she forgot to tell
petitioner that Keiths voice had changed; he had become a bagito or a teen-
ager with many fans who sent him Valentines cards. She told him how
Charmaine had become quite a talkative almost dalaga who could carry on a
conversation with her angkong and how pretty she was in white dress when
she won among the candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed so
hard for it. She informed him, however, that she was worried because
Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as she loved clothes. About
Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner that the boy was smart for his
age and quite spoiled being the youngest of the children in Lahug. Joeton was
mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom he would sleep anytime. She
admitted having said so much about the children because they might not
have informed petitioner of some happenings and spices of life about
themselves. She said that it was just very exciting to know how theyve grown
up and very pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic) different characters.
She ended the letter with the hope that petitioner was at the best of health.
After extending her regards to all, she signed her name after the word Love.
This letter was mailed on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address
was P.O. Box 2445, Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of a
note from Menchu on the left upper corner. Anna Marie stated that we wrote
to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and Joeton were very excited
when petitioner called up last time. She told him how Joeton would grab the
phone from Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted to
order. Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed that she missed
petitioners call because she also wanted something that petitioner should
buy. Menchu told petitioner that Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-
colored T-shirts for her walking shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie
informed petitioner that the kids were growing up and so were their needs.
She told petitioner to be very fatherly about the childrens needs because
those were expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked for a subscription
of Glamour and Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he would
incur, she would replace these. As a postscript, she told petitioner that Keith
wanted a size 6 khaki-colored Sperry topsider shoes.
3. Exh. 3 an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. Its nice to be thought of at
Xmas. Thanks again.
Sincerely,
Menchu
4. Exh. 4 a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose Clavano,
Inc. addressed to Dear Dad. Keith told his father that they tried to tell their
mother to stay for a little while, just a few weeks after classes start(s) on June
16. He informed petitioner that Joeton would be in Kinder I and that, about
the motorbike, he had told his mother to write petitioner about it and well
see what youre (sic) decision will be. He asked for chocolates, nuts, basketball
shirt and shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for outing and
perfume. He told petitioner that they had been going to Lahug with their
mother picking them up after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner.
From her aerobics, his mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or
10:00 oclock in the evening. He wished his father luck and the best of health
and that they prayed for him and their other relatives. The letter was ended
with Love Keith.
5. Exh. 5 another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for the
Christmas card with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00 and the card of Joeton with
$5.00 inside. He told petitioner the amounts following his fathers instructions
and promise to send money through the mail. He asked his father to address
his letter directly to him because he wanted to open his own letters. He
informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas season that they
enjoyed eating, playing and giving surprises to their mother. He apprised him
of his daily schedule and that their mother had been closely supervising them,
instructing them to fold their blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed
petitioner that Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine, who was also
smart, was very demanding of their mother. Because their mother was
leaving for the United States on February 5, they would be missing her like
they were missing petitioner. He asked for his things and $200.00. He told
petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he would make the sign of the
cross even when they would pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his
insistence that Aquino was not dead because he had seen him on the
betamax machine. For Keith, Charmaine had become very maldita who was
not always satisfied with her dolls and things but Joeton was full of surprises.
He ended the letter with Love your son, Keith. The letter was mailed on
February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
6. Exh. 6 an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the bathing
suit, key chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She
reminded him of of her birthday on January 23 when she would turn 9 years
old. She informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet was IM.
They had fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on January 9
although Keiths classes had started on January 6. They would feel sad again
because Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep
writing them. She signed, Love, Charmaine.
7. Exh . 7 an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they had
not been remiss in writing letters to him. He informed him of their trip to
Manila they went to Malacaang, Tito Doy Laurels house, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for
one week. He informed him that he got honors, Charmaine was 7th in her
class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred
Heart soon and he was glad they would be together in that school. He asked
for his reward from petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked
for a motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told petitioner that he was
saving the money he had been sending them. He said he missed petitioner
and wished him the best. He added that petitioner should call them on
Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by the
latter. She asked for money from petitioner to buy something for the school
and something else. She promised not to spend so much and to save some.
She said she loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton said hi! to petitioner.
After ending the letter with Love, Joeton and Charmaine, she asked for her
prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been
writing him; that he would like to have some money but he would save them;
that he learned that petitioner had called them up but he was not around;
that he would be going to Manila but would be back home May 3; that his
Mommy had just arrived Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the
official altar boy. He asked petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told petitioner
that he was saving some in the bank and he was proud because he was the
only one in his group who saved in the bank. He told him that Joeton had
become naughty and would claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by
petitioner. He advised petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and
asked for a pair of topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that
he was a member of the basketball team and that his mom would drive for
his group. He asked him to call them often like the father of Ana Christie and
to write them when he would call so that they could wait for it. He informed
petitioner that they had all grown bigger and heavier. He hoped petitioner
would be happy with the letter that had taken him so long to write because
he did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked petitioner to buy him
perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that the latter
should buy something for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 a Christmas card For My Wonderful Father dated October 8, 1984
from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 another Christmas card, Our Wish For You with the year 83
written on the upper right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith,
Charmaine and Joeton.
13. Exh. 13 a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even
when their Mom was there where she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith
asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his mother would not agree to buy him
a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00. He
informed petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco with friends but
their grades were all good with Joeton receiving stars for excellence. Keith
wanted a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire
that petitioner would come and visit them someday.
14. Exh. 14 a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date
January 1986. Keith told his father that they had received the package that
the latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not
Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery
items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-
heeled shoes and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that
would make her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller
and that he was already ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the grocery
even though his mother had told him not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in
the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption,
he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children.[25] Exhibits 24 to 45
are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising
why the courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence
on financial support but also the emotional exchange of sentiments between
petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below emphasized the
meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as
regards the bank deposits, these were withdrawable by him alone. Simply
put, the courts below attached a high premium to the prospective adopters
financial status but totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the
adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt.
However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony
is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as revealed in his letters to
him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keiths testimony was actually
the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption that would certainly have
engendered confusion in his young mind as to the capability of his father to
sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents emotional attachment to the
children. This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives,
the children were used to their presence. Such attachment had persisted and
certainly, the young ones act of snuggling close to private respondent Ronald
Clavano was not indicative of their emotional detachment from their
father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the children, could
not but come to their succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick
and private respondent Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be
entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger measure
of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of
Appeals,[26] the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate child to his
mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his
affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to
go with his mother. The Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private
respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children
according to her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir[27] where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether
to award custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this
Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived
mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable
memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should not
take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even
at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so that
afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of
satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her
dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship
between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child
turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for
him, said parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done
and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even
rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts
and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to the process
and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations with her of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to their father.
child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. x x x. To our consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the
welfare of the children was not exactly the paramount consideration that
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,[28] the Court stated that (I)n ascertaining the
impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant considerations. Thus, in awarding In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children
custody of the child to the father, the Court said: in the country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that
would naturally hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other words, the adoption
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her
appears to be a matter of convenience for her because Anna Marie herself is
counsel are more intent on emphasizing the `torture and agony of a mother
financially capable of supporting her children.[31] In his testimony, private
separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of
respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been out of the country for
her character being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and
two years and came home twice or three times,[32] thereby manifesting the
future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds
fact that it was she who actually left her children to the care of her relatives. It
between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent,
was bad enough that their father left their children when he went abroad,
whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of
but when their mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation
custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the
worsened. The Clavano family must have realized this. Hence, when the
other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of
family first discussed the adoption of the children, they decided that the
either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
prospective adopter should be Anna Maries brother Jose. However, because
consideration. (Italics supplied)[29]
he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the task upon
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were private respondents.[33]
to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A
of parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to
businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu
the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological,
and Manila while his wife, private respondent Maria Clara, is an international
mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.[30] The conclusion of the courts
flight stewardess.[34] Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he
below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support
could take care of the children while their parents are away,[35] thereby
other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his
indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the childrens
admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had
surname changed to Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to
so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his
the United States as it would be difficult for them to get a visa if their surname
guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he
were different from his.[36] To be sure, he also testified that he wanted to
received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more
spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken home.
important emotional tie between him and his children. The children needed
him not only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent
a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs. Ronald, his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable
conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away from their father.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond
One of the overriding considerations for the adoption was allegedly the state
petitioners meager financial support to ferret out other indications on
of Anna Maries health she was a victim of an almost fatal accident and suffers
whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his family. The omission of said
from a heart ailment.However, she herself admitted that her health condition may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to show that thereafter,
was not that serious as she could still take care of the children.[37] An eloquent petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and sent his family
evidence of her ability to physically care for them was her employment at the money, no matter how meager.
Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles[38]- she could not have been employed if
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar
her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos attempt at
as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and
depriving petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their
privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the
notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed
paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
fear that her children would never be at ease with the wife of their father.[39]
child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Courts
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to
womanizer and father to the sons of Wilma Soco.[40] As to whether he was inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.[46] The
telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine society, being comparatively discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic in orientation, it does best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights
not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man, considering the of the parents over the child.[47]
baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents reliance on the
Court place a premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between siring
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie
children and parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner
which became the basis of the decree of legal separation. According to
carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for
private respondents counsel,[48] the authority given to Anna Marie by that
the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit
decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal separation was all
father.[41] Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a
embracing[49] and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to the
bad husband does not necessarily make a bad father. That a husband is not
adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on the wrong premise that
exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive
the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that
him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the
obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into
children.[42] Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children
agreements leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as
when he took the trouble of sending a telegram[43] to the lower court
devoid of a legal basis as private respondents apparent reliance on the decree
expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after learning
of legal separation for doing away with petitioners consent to the adoption.
about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify
about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the
the United States.[44] decree of legal separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental
authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. Article 213
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by
of the Family Code states: . . . in case of legal separation of parents, parental
the agreement with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. In
illegal alien in the United States. As such, he could not have procured gainful
awarding custody, the court shall take into account all relevant
employment. Private respondents failed to refute petitioners testimony that
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
he did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal home,[45] pursuant
unless the parent chosen is unfit.
to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation
case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale It should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse
redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The proceeds the exercise of parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent
spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights with respect to his rearing court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna
and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to the childs services and Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna
earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make decisions regarding Maries motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also
his care and control, education, health and religion.[50] vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that
the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them.[54]
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the
joint exercise of which is vested by the law upon the parents,[51] as The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child
only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation
x x x a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner
purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as
had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their
the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their hearts and
adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree
senses. As regards parental authority, `there is no power, but a task; no
of adoption.[55] But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for
precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the
the welfare of the minor.
courts below on the issue of petitioners abandonment of his family was based
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right record.
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in
of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender
Tenchavez v. Escao[56] that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the
to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the
effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
to State policy. While petitioner is now an American citizen, as regards Anna
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not
Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation
effect.
is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
established customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
Appeals,[57] a case involving the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over
company.[52] (Italics supplied)
his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for
completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of
their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and
custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award
welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the
was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the
parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are
spouses.
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor
compromise,[53] there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and
petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could
deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code,
there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption
proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, as on
the paramount interest of a child who needs the love and care of
parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the
Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic
Act No. 8043 on Intercountry Adoption[58] and Republic Act No. 8552
establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of Filipino children.[59]
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as
the following policies in the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998:
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her
parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security
towards the full and harmonious development of his/her personality.[60]
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her
interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets
set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child.[61]
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological
parent(s).[62]
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to
comply with its mandates. Of particularrelevance to instant case are the
following provisions:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents .
. . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child,
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights
recognized in the present Convention.[63]
States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one
or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both
parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the childs best
interests.[64]
A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to
maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal
relations and direct contacts with both parents . . .[65]
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide
direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent
with the evolving capacities of the child.[66]
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the
domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all
actuations should be in the best interests of the child.This is not, however, to
be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents
to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis--vis that of
their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be
respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and
Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching
eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the
discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that
this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best
interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that
the petition for adoption was filed.[67] Said petition must be denied as it was
filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the
facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE
thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph
Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999]
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate
of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO
PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and
JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of Balalong, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other
than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due
execution and its subsequent loss or destruction.Accordingly, the fact of
marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage
contract.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its
Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it
being more consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged
Decision dated 05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is
AFFIRMED in toto.[2]
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision[3] is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of
[herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa
Guison as follows:
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called reconstructed marriage contract excluded
under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious
and non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing
Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction
earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorneys fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of
deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for
the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage
Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son
of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961
issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the
petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et
al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his
share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredos adopted son and as his sole
surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between
appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint
for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellees claim
as the legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased
Alfredo Jacob was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased
Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo
was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila
sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the
Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr.
Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the
original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage
Contract issued in 1978.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the
execution of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the
solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the
marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his
thumbmark on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the
marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant
Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15
September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as husband and
wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial
court concluded that the thumbmark was logically not genuine. In other
words, not of Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of
the loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned
that he allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose
Centenera for registration. And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose
Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at the date of
the marriage since he was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the
reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one Benjamin Molina who signed on
top of the typewritten name of Jose Centenera. This belies the claim that
Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose
Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage
entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was
allegedly solemnized.
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in
Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein
Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of
Judge Moya.
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moyas
signature in the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of
Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the
facts in judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he
was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering
from glaucoma.
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the
authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moyas signature.
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI
Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen
signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with the questioned signature. He
pointed out irregularities and significant fundamental differences in
handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the
standard signature and concluded that the questioned and the standard
signatures JOSE L. MOYA were NOT written by one and the same person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moyas signature,
appellee presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination
made by a former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who
examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the
thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty.
Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious habitual
pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics between the
standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that the signature of
Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition
for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the
findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the
challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee
sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased
Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and
non-existent.[4] (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this
wise:
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract,
Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the
contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife shall be set
forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and
the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a
marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be
established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of
the document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the
transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and
subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3)
copies of the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents of the reconstructedcontract. Also,
appellant failed to sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the
original document.
With regard to the trial courts finding that the signature of then Judge Moya
in the questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro
Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and
convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya
in issuing the order acted in the performance of his regular duties.
Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was
subjected to a rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates
the possibility of forgery of Judge Moyas signature. The value of the opinion
of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statement of whether a
writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing
out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape
notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed observer. And in the final analysis,
the assessment of the credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the
discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is necessarily a
relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness
of the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court
will not reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial
court in determining qualifications of this case.
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial courts findings of fact when ably
supported by substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight
and respect by the Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts
were overlooked or ignored by the court below which if considered might
vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons that would
warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially when established
by unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence.[5] (citations omitted,
emphasis in the original)
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before
this Court.[6]
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues for the
resolution of this Court:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob
and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E.
Jacob.[7]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious. Petitioners marriage is valid, but respondents
adoption has not been sufficiently established.
First Issue:
Validity of Marriage
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a
voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.[8] Aware of this
fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage
between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there
was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.[9] We cannot sustain
this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void
because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced,
because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years.[10] An affidavit to this effect was
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.[11] Clearly then, the marriage was
exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article
76 of the Civil Code.[12] The Civil Code governs this case, because the
questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the
effectivity of the Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be
produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses.[13] Upon a
showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost,
without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be
adduced to prove its contents.[14]
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when
they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr.
Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the
wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of
Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr.
Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding
had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time
requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization
issued by the Archbishop -- through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr.
Benjamin L. Marino -- ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of
Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the
circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they
have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due
execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v.
Mcgrath,[15] the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence
of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the
execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which
may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is
accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede
proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
xxxxxxxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily
collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic
papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not
necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by
parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when
available, to establish its execution may affect the weight of the evidence
presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this
issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.[16] But even there, we said that
marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.[17]
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves,
by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures
of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated
the execution thereof.[18] The Court has also held that [t]he loss may be
shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or
places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by
the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to
find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy
the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.[19]
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of
Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of
petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by
the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as
well as by petitioners own declaration in court. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence -- testimonial and documentary -- may be admitted to
prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage
contract were certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been
obtained.[20] Even if we were to agree with the trial court and to disregard the
reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is
not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias[21], we have held that marriage may be proven by
any competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:
"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the
witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact
of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent
to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."[22] (emphasis supplied)
In Balogbog v. CA,[23] we similarly held:
[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote
omitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of
marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,[24] in which, because
of the destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted testimonial
evidence in its place.[25]
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry
pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).[26] He finds it
quite bizarre for petitioner to have waited three years before registering their
marriage.[27] On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the
first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes
does not invalidate the marriage.[28] In the second place, it was not the
petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil
registrar.Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.[29]
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
Likewise, we have held:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is xxx of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio -- Always presume
marriage.[30] (emphasis supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude[31], 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12,
1975.31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.[32] Given the undisputed, even
accepted,[33] fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and
wife,[34] we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this
case.
Second Issue:
Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the
signature of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the
Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in the
regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave credence to
the testimony of respondents handwriting expert, for the assessment of the
credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial
court x x x.[35]
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded
great weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the
truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the
present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who
heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined
the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court failed to
notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion.[36] Hence, the present case is an exception to the general
rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.[37]
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moyas signature
on the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this
matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for
Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondents expert and
brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.[38] Respondent Pilapil
justifies the trial judges action by arguing that the Deposition was
ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the
signature on the Order was his and cites the following portion as proof:[39]
"Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A. I said I do not remember.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judges
testimony out of its context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition,
Judge Moyas statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he
answered the queries in the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.[40]
The answer I do not remember did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure
of what he was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the
subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. A deposition[;] will you please recall
whether you issued this Order and whether the facsimile of the signature
appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature
reading Jose[;] I cant make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose
Moya is not my signature.[41]
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of
Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he
positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not
discredit his statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the
newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a
document shown to him.[42] Indeed, we find no reason and the respondent
has not presented any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused
pleaded guilty.[45] Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he
was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the
questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapils
conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as
shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed
thereafter.[46] In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had
treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records
Management[47] in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur,[48] issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro
Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances
inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent. [49]
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship.[50] This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

Judge Moyas declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court
Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared: of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized
Atty. Paraiso and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
examination of this document? SO ORDERED.
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the
standard signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same
person. On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail, the
difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of
letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the capital letter
J.[43]

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having

been sought without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was
recognized even by Respondent Pilapils expert witness, Atty. Desiderio
Pagui.[44]

Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged
Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge
Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only
[G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City
and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y
ANDRADE, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, whats in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any
other name would smell as sweet?
This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which
challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 1994[1] in JDRC Case No. 2964.
Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin
Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the
change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent
spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a
petition[2] to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging
therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for
adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as
the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the
aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private
respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee
to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in
keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his
adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at
private respondents residence.[3]
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief
for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition
dated May 3, 1995,[4]petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the
petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single
proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as
two separate proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the
trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural
parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known as Aaron Joseph
Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van Munson and Regina
Munson effective upon the filing of the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon
as the decree of adoption becomes final and executory, it shall be recorded
in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of the Rules of Court,
and shall be annotated in the record of birth of the adopted child, which in
this case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was born. Likewise,
send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila,
for its appropriate action consisten(t) herewith.[5]
At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by
petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting
parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor. The
records show that the latter have commendably established their
qualifications under the law to be adopters,[6] and have amply complied with
the procedural requirements for the petition for adoption,[7] with the findings
of the trial court being recited thus:
To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court
dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. A) was published
in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila Chronicle, a
newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. B to E and submarkings). x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory
record (Exhs. K to V); and are physically fit to be the adoptive parents of the
minor child Kevin (Exh. W). Their qualification to become the adoptive
parents of Kevin Earl finds support also in the Social Case Study Report
prepared by the DSWD through Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly
individuals. They are found physically healthy, mentally fit, spiritually and
financially capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran a.k.a Aaron Joseph.
Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly
share their time, love and attention to him. They are ready and willing to
continuously provide him a happy and secure home life.
Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the
Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His stay with
the Munsons during the six months trial custody period has resulted to a close
bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl
Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized.[8]
It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower
court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are
accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this
Court.[9] Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the
order of the court below granting the petition for adoption.
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly
as follows: (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for
the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee
embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was
lawful ground for the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the
given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of
name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed
by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely,
a decree of adoption and an authority to change the given or proper name of
the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted
separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under
Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule
103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be
complied with.[10]
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws
and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for
change of name.[11] Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is
the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform
with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus
granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper
name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name,
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being
conformably satisfied.[12]
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2
which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules
against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two
separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the
conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the
court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met.[13]
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change
of name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a system
of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of
justice.[14] Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal
construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of the
adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant
proceeding.[15]
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome
to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights
have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and meticulous
observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is
indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State
nor any third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the petition for
change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year
old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual
obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have
any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It
stands to reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so
prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earls first name. In fact, to
obviate any possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the prayer for
change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for
adoption.[16]
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal
effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall
terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the
spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the
adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood
relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is
the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon
the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of
adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in
the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear
and determine the same,[17] and shall continue to be so used until the court
orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded
in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and
cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory
procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible,
a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court
to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording
such change)[18]
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is
the name appearing therein, If a change in ones name is desired, this can only
be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor
can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional
trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name
resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be
changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the
petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the
change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and
place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or
the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at
such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the
allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the
change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as
prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the
civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the
same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance
with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction for its adjudication.[19] It is an independent and discrete
special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of
rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To
consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding
would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject
petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee,[20] all of which
taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition
sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully
deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a
petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of
imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive
joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on
the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al.[21] and Peyer vs. Martinez, et
al.[22] is misplaced.
A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action
would, therefore, appear to be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is
meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action,
the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.[23] It is the
union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the
basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A
plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.[24]
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not
required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of
separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory
in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of
action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder
rules be joined.[25] Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended
to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of
justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the
litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.[26]
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant,
Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in
one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate
the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of
action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the
parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and
character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits
where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting
in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and
litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite
the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be
construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice
to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should
be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the
same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual
as far as practicable,[27] with the end in view of promoting the efficient
administration of justice.[28]
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to
encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve
kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving
a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal
application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal
or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them.[29] While
the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may
have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and
a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction
thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited
joinder is not authorized.[30]
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting
it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties[31] and
requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented. effectively disallows
unlimited joinder.[32]
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express
prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of
name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two
petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they
present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant
their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test
of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each
other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and
rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for
adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopters fitness
and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly
(Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for
change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked
into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the
proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed
and determined for neither action is dependent on the other.[33]
The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may be
allowed only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and conform
to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2,
Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in
our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for change of
name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other and do not arise
out of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent in an
adoption proceeding is the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to
adopt, a petition for change of first name may only prosper upon proof of
reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change
requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons
justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot be
justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to
adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a
common ground, thus the joinder would be improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in
one petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs.
Briz (p. 4, Comment).
We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the
fact of intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an
application to pronounce the husband an absentee is obviously intertwined
with the action to transfer the management of conjugal assets to the
wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship was deemed a clear
condition precedent to an action to recover the land subject of partition and
distribution proceeding. However, the commonality of relationship which
stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for adoption
and change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the
case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions
was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not indorse an
automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for further proceedings,
granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead additional parties-
defendants for a complete determination of the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43
Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the more emphasizes that although
joinders are generally accepted, they are not allowed where the conditions
are not satisfactorily met.[34]
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will
make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the
coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one
petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in
form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the
adoptee.The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the
rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are
intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which
can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one
judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or
corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken
up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al. ,[35] the Court clarified the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action:
The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as
there is no positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which
compels a party to join all his causes of action and bring them at one and the
same time. Under the present rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff
may, and not that he must, unite several causes of action although they may
be included in one of the classes specified.This, therefore, leaves it to the
plaintiffs option whether the causes of action shall be joined in the same
action, and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or refusal
to do so. He may always file another action based on the remaining cause or
causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor. (Italics supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the
Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for
change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and
adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be
invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency
or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence
of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance
with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike
would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice
requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely
designed to ensure its proper dispensation.[36] It has long been recognized
that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of
judicial business.[37]
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be
ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important
in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the
orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to
hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system
under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the
prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority
they acknowledge.[38]
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own
wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to
be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness,
caprice, or whimsicality.[39] We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot
vs. CA, et al. that:[40]
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial
proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law and adjective law
are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the
concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts
is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and
speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both
substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source
of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
xxx xxx xxx
x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most
persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed. x x x. While it is true that a litigation is not a
game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be
ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation
and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews
anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes
substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the
court. In such situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to
suspend the operation of the rules.[41]
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private
respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the
proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put
to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to
his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would
justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that
stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case,
considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and
in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance, of the Rules is that the violation of
or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the
proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to
the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place,
such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure
laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of
public policy.[42] They are matters of public order and interest which can in no
wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by
parties to an action for their singular convenience.[43]
In Garcia vs. Republic,[44] we are reminded of the definiteness in the
application of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the
appropriate proceeding:
x x x The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse
or misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion in the
application of the proper remedy.
Respondent judges unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at
achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his
prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being
unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted
manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a
regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law
and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition
for change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the
only justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the
adoptees baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been
known since he came to live with private respondents.[45]
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon
the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new
identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name
given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name
as prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the designation
by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives. This
largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron
Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive
parents, have as much right as the natural parents to freely select the first
name of their adopted child.[46]
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on
this point in this manner:
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first
name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is
entitled that is fixed by law. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other
purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman
who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron
Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic
of naming the minor at birth.[47]
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling
of respondent judge and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is a word or
combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished
from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has
two parts:
The given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent
to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[48]
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the civil
register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil
register. That is his name in the eyes of the law.[49] And once the name of a
person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code
seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised
on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.[50]
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed
legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court.[51] For purposes of an application for change of name under Article
376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only
name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance
with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is
essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.[52]
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege,
not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which
has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and
to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be
authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which
appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show
proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such
change.[53]
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being
sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.[54]
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was
baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he
used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned.[55] For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a
change of name.[56] Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using
a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and
reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name.[57] A name given to a
person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the
community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is
unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.[58]
The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such
rulings of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered
to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been
baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private
respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and
known by his family, relatives and friends from the time he came to live with
private respondents.[59] Apart from suffusing their pleadings with
sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a
change of name has been alleged or established by private respondents. The
legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down
as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to
use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register,
would be to countenance or permit that which has always been frowned
upon.[60]
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed
order that
(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first
name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is
entitled that is fixed by law x x x.
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other
purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman
who had all the intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as
Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of their petition for adoption is
symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at
bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change
of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption granted
in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching
the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to change his surname from
Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption. He adduced
proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him embarrassment and
isolation from friends and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry
when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community,
thereby hampering his business and social life, and that his surviving adoptive
mother consented to the change of name sought. This Court granted the
petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere incident in, rather
than the object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given
name, and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at
issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose
with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the
imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through the legally
prescribed procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:
Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is
being named for the first time by his natural parent, as against one wherein,
a child is previously conferred a first name by his natural parent, and such
name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive
parents. In the first case, there is no dispute that natural parents have the
right to freely select and give the childs first name for every person, including
juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, 1987 edition, page 721). In the second
case, however, as in the case at bar, private respondents, in their capacities
as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor adoptee after such right
to name the child had already been exercised by the natural parent. Adopting
parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right asserted
by private respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee
cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a privilege necessitating judicial
consent upon compelling grounds. [61]
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to
the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful
that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child,[62] should be understood in its proper context. It should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the
proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has
theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered,
regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the
purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This
effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain
unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an
appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive
parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of
adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is
unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To
repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption
and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include
the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of
concern to the Court.

Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is
without prejudice to, private respondents privilege to legally change the
proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is
exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the
grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional
requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced
therefor.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent

judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents
shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a
change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other
respects, the order is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF
COURT; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. - With regard to the second assignment
of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of Appeals and the trial
court erred in granting private respondents prayer for the correction of the
name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this- case and because its provision
was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered
the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or
effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable
only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. This
case falls under letter (o), referring to changes of name. Indeed, it has been
the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code - to implement
which Rule 108 was inserted in the Rules of Court in 1964 - covers those
harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly
misspelled. Thus, in Yu v. Republic (21 SCRA 1018 [1967]) it was held that to
change Sincio to Sencio which merely involves the substitution of the first
vowel i in the first name into the vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a
clerical error. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic (168 SCRA 294 [1988]) it was held
that the change of petitioners name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to
Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary
proceeding is appropriate. Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE CIVIL REGISTRAR AS AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY AND TO GIVE NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF THE
PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY RENDERS THE PROCEEDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT NULL AND VOID; CASE AT BAR. - The local civil registrar is thus
required to be made a party to the proceeding.He is an indispensable party,
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not
impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision
of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry,
is void. The absence of-an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all
the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment. Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as
required by Rule 108, 4 which reads: 4. Notice and publication. - Upon filing
of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. While there was notice given by
publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in
compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the
minor was stated. Nothing was, mentioned that in addition the correction of
his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar -
was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be
heard. The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar
as an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for
correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as
the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction
both as to party and as to the subject matter.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Encarnacion, De Guzman & Associates Law Office for respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24453 which affirmed in toto the decision of
Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, granting private
respondents petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon with prayer for the
correction of the minors first name Midael to Michael.
The petition below was filed on September 2, 1988 by private respondents
spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael
C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent
Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents
were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with
them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent
judgement be rendered: multiplicity of actions, and inconvenience to the petitioners.

a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
and purposes;
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered granting the herein petition and
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and declaring that:

c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners 1. Michael C. Mazon is, for all legal intents and purposes, the son by adoption
and that the first name which was mistakenly registered as MIDAEL be of petitioners Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto;
corrected to MICHAEL.
2. Henceforth, the minors name shall be Michael Caranto, in lieu of his
The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof original name of Michael Mazon, or Midael Mazon, as appearing in his record
by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Cavite of birth;
and by service of the order upon the Department of Social Welfare and
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Cavite City, the birthplace of said minor, is
Development and the Office of the Solicitor General.
hereby directed to accordingly amend (and) correct the birth certificate, of
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction said minor; and
of the name of the child from Midael to Michael. He argued that although the
4. This judgement shall retroact to September 2, 1988, the date of filing of
correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not
the herein petition.
be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction
of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his
contention that the correction of names cannot be affected in the same
Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondents Zenaida
proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that
Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Case for adoption because in the
testified. Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department
notice published in the newspaper, the name given was Michael, instead of
of Social Welfare and Development, who endorsed the adoption of the minor,
Midael, which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child.
On January 23,1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the
On May 30, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC dismissed the
RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic,[2] invoked
opposition of the Solicitor General. on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules
by the petitioner in support of its plea that the trial court did not acquire
of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies
jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that case involved a
only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. It cited
substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the petitioners to
Rule 108, 1, which provides that any person interested in an act, event, order
file a separate petition for correction of name would entail additional time
or decree concerning the civil status of the persons which has been recorded
and expenses for them as. well as for the Government and the Courts.
in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto. It held that the correction of names Hence this petition for review. Private respondents were required to
in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, 2 as comment. Despite opportunity given to them, however, they did not file any
entries subject to cancellation or correction. According to the trial court, the comment.
The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only
over the private respondents petition for adoption. Petitioners contention is to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108, 2
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption plainly states:
because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor
2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid
child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic.[3] There the petition for
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
adoption and the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e)
name of the child -(Rosanna E. Cruz) instead of her name in the record of birth
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
(Rosanna E. Bucoy). it was held that this was a substantial defect in the
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
petition and the published order of hearing. Indeed there was a question of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship;
identity involved in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a different
(l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience would indicate.
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name
This case falls under letter (o), referring to changes of name. Indeed, it has
of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely
been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code - to
the substitution of the letters ch for the letter d, so that what appears as
implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the rules of Court in 1964 - covers
Midael as given name would read Michael. Even the Solicitor General admits
those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is
that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from
clearly misspelled.[4] Thus, in Yu vs. Republic[5] it was held that to change
Midael C. Mazon to Michael C Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion,
Sincio to Sencio which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel i in
because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme
the first name into the vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
(tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig). The purpose of the publication
error. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[6] it was held that the change of petitioners
requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the
name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere
adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by
innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate.
publication of notice in this case.
Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now 3 of this Rule provides:
For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for
adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
the decision of the trial court, correctly did so. sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that
both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the
respondents prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final
registry. determination of the case can be had.[7] As he was not impleaded in this case
much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court,
Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The
applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the
absence of an indenpensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of
proceeding subsequent to the filling of the complaint including the
the minor, is void and without force or effect.
judgment.[8]
Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required
by Rule 108, 4 which reads:

4. Notice and publication. - Upon filling of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.

While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the
petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice only
the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that
in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being
sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an

indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for
correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as
the correction of entry was concered, null and void for lack of jurisdiction
both as to party and as to the subject matter.[9]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

MODIFIED by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial Court the order
to the local civil registrar to change the name MIDAEL to MICHAEL in the birth
certificate of the child. In other respects relating to the adoption of Midael C.
Mazon, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
REYES vs. MAURICIO
Subject of this petition is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 10
August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148, affirming the Decision dated 7 July
1998 and Resolution dated 28 September 2004 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located
at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five hundred twenty-
seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from and cancelled
TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings
of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an
extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now
deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for
annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and
Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their
peaceful possession with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo
Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio
through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until
his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and
introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a
residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud,
deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation
of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject
respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized by
Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never
appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the
contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio
took undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence
and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduanrendering
it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal
means to eject respondents from the subject property. Respondents prayed
for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio
to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the
subject property. Respondents likewise demanded payment of
damages.[2] During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract
executed between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy
agreement.[3]
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and
respondents. He clarified that Godofredos occupation of the subject
premises was based on the formers mere tolerance and
accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor
authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that
Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to
the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the
document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the
same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the
jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by respondents is
the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular
courts. Eugenio also asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the
present suit. [4]
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial
Adjudicator[5] concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and
Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful
possession of the subject land.The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiff Librada Mauricio and against defendant Eugenio R. Reyes and
order is hereby issued:
1. Declaring the kasunduan null and void;
2. Ordering defendant to respect the peaceful possession of herein
plaintiff Librada Mauricio over the subject landholding;
3. Ordering plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00 to herein
defendant;
4. No pronouncement as to costs.[6]
On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up by the DARAB, namely:
(1) Whether or not there is tenancy relation between the parties; and (2)
whether or not the Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 is valid and
enforceable. The DARAB held that the Mauricios are former tenants of
Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia,
Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject property. Under the
law, they were subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of
their late parents as the agricultural lessors over the farmholding tenanted
by respondents. Moreover, the DARAB banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan
sa Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed by Susana in favor of
Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB
declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of the
Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such
a contract.[7]
Eugenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the DARAB
on 28 September 2004.[8]
Aggrieved by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. On 10 July 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute
Librada, who died during the pendency of the case.[9] On 10 August 2006, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. It
sustained the factual findings of the DARAB with respect to the tenancy
relation between Godofredo and Spouses Reyes and the nullity of
the Kasunduan.[10]
Undaunted, Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio submits that no
tenancy relationship exists between him and respondents. He insists that
the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan allegedly executed between Godofredo
and Susana in 1993 giving the former the right to occupy and cultivate the
subject property is unenforceable against Eugenio, having been entered into
without his knowledge and consent. Eugenio further asserts that per records
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), no leasehold contract was
entered into by Godofredo and Eugenio with respect to the disputed
property. Eugenio attributes error on the part of the Court of Appeals in
concluding that a tenancy relationship existed between the parties despite
the absence of some of the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship such
as personal cultivation and the subject land being agricultural.Finally, Eugenio
defends the validity of the Kasunduan entered into between him and Librada
wherein the latter agreed to vacate the subject property, in that it was
voluntarily entered into and the contents thereof were mutually understood
by the parties.[11]
In a Resolution dated 7 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for
failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its
challenged decision and resolution. The Court also dismissed the issues raised
as factual. However, upon filing of a motion for reconsideration by Eugenio,
this Court reinstated the petition and required respondent Leonida to
comment on the petition.[12]
In her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because
the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to review of errors of law and not of
facts.[13]
In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between him
and Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the province of this Court in
a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only
questions of law may be raised.[14] Absent any of the obtaining
exceptions[15] to this rule, the findings of facts of the Provincial Adjudicator,
as affirmed by DARAB and especially by the Court of Appeals, are binding on
this Court.
The DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between Godofredo
and the Mauricios came about, thus:
This Board, after a thorough evaluation of the evidences, is convinced that
the Mauricios are former tenants of the parents of the herein Defendant-
Appeallant. A perusal of Exhibit H which is the Tax Declaration of the property
in controversy proves that upon the death of the parents of Defendant-
Appellant, the property was the subject matter of their extra-judicial
partition/settlement and this property was initially under the ownership of
the appellants sisters, Eufracia and Susana Reyes until the same property was
finally acquired/transferred in the name of Respondent-
Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-affirm the fact that the Mauricios are
really the tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily executed the Leasehold
Contract with Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the property and to
prove that she (Susana Reyes) was the predecessor-in-interest of
Respondent-Appeallant Eugenio Reyes. x x x. The Kasunduang Buwisan sa
Sakahan alleging that their tenancy relationship began in the year 1973 and
their agreement as to the rental shall remain until further revised.[16]
This is a contest of Kasunduans. Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of
tenancy. Petitioners swear by a Kasunduan of termination of tenancy.
Librada claims that her late husband had been working on the land since 1936
until his death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang Buwisan sa
Sakahan dated 26 May 1993 and executed by Godofredo and Susana which
reaffirmed the leasehold tenancy over the subject land. On the other hand,
Eugenio disputes the claims of Librada and presented
another Kasunduan executed between him and Librada on 28 September
1994 which effectively terminates the leasehold tenancy when the latter
allegedly agreed to vacate the subject premises in exchange of monetary
considerations.
This second Kasunduan is the subject of the instant complaint. In its
disquisition, the DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:
x x x Insofar as this Kasunduan is concerned, and after reading the transcript
of the testimony of the old woman Librada Mauricio, this Board is convinced
that indeed the purpose of the document was to eject her from the
farmholding but that Librada Mauricio wanted to return the money she
received because the contents of the document was never explained to her
being illiterate who cannot even read or write. This Board is even further
convinced after reading the transcript of the testimonies that while the
document was allegedly signed by the parties in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, the
same document was notarized in Pasig, Metro Manila, thus, the Notary Public
was not in a position to explain much less ascertain the veracity of the
contents of the alleged Kasunduan as to whether or not Plaintiff-Appellee
Librada Mauricio had really understood the contents thereof. This Board
further adheres to the principle that it cannot substitute its own evaluation
of the testimony of the witnesses with that of the personal evaluation of the
Adjudicator a quo who, in the case at bar, had the best opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witness Librada Mauricio while testifying on the
circumstances relevant to the execution of the
alleged Kasunduan. Furthermore, this Board adheres to the principle that in
all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, mental
weakness or other handicap, the courts (and in the case at bar, this Board)
must be vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New Civil Code). In the case at bar,
Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old who can neither read
nor write, thus, she just simply signs her name with her thumbmark.[17]
Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by this
Court, we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed
by DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which clearly had the opportunity to
closely examine the witnesses and their demeanor on the witness stand.
Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is void,
our conclusion remains. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a tenancy
relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in
a leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal
possession of the landholding. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the
Agricultural Tenancy Act provides:
SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. The tenancy relationship is
extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or
incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm
household may continue to work the land until the close of the agricultural
year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, and
the sale or alienation of the land does not of themselves extinguish the
relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee shall assume the
rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In
case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his
rights and obligations. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of
the Philippines) likewise provides:
SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of
Period, etc. The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract
nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the
legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor. (Emphasis supplied)
As an incidental issue, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed by
Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the
death of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that
Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.[18]
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio
cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.[19]
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.[20] Well-
known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book Civil Code of
the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, noted that the aforecited
doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He
explained thus:
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral
attack.[23]
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject
to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,[24] this Court reiterated that adoption
cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedents estate.[25] Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes,[26] the Court declared
that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a
separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral
attack.[27]
Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of
Leonida from the case for annulment of the Kasunduan that supposedly
favors petitioners cause.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a

collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: The contest of
the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper
complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is
void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the
code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the
legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and
within the periods fixed in the present articles.[21]

In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,[22] the

Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised
in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies
middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting
the adoption, thus:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and
in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this
petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners
care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more
than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential
Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural
mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate
child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child
may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle
name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting
an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one
adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name
the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the
adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated;
(5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name,
the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to
be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which
he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known.
It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given
to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may
be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his
status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted
child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage
shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party,
she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent
spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he
were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall
be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other
direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may
use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1),
quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers
surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter,
thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child
of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the
Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle
name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the
wife of the surname and that of the child because the fathers surname
indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on
the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child
may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of
the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is
up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses
the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the
mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present
Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the
following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the
mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David
but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the
effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father
but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle
name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the
Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just
enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be
covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by
Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because
there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to
use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed
by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the
Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if
any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this
is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear
the surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle
name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for
the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree
of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not
to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights
of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that
adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No.
8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19]secures
these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the
intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as
earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her
mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together
in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached
to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they
are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers
surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may

tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure.
It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which
may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.[28]

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her

natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname,
we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly

MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers
surname GARCIA as her middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in
the decree of adoption.

SO ORDERED.
PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner)
seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated
petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to
them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of
their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that
they were the childrens parents. The children[2] were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days
old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.[3] Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners
clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.[4]
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They
sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in all their
school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim
died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an
American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty[5] given under Republic Act No. 8552[6] (RA 8552) to those individuals
who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner
filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the
trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At
the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced
by their Affidavits of Consent.[7] Michael also gave his consent to his adoption
as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.[8] Petitioners husband Olario likewise
executed an Affidavit of Consent[9] for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child
and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.[10] The DSWD
issued a similar Certification for Michael.[11]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner
should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court
ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion
was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial
court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent of
her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are
additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case,
must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court
ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his
parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or
not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

The Courts Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because
it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal
maxim dura lex sed lex is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that
joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore
necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm
the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed
lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a
position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means
of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the
age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for
at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered,
that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt
in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her
consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.[12]
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried
at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining
her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit
of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth
in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency
until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his
own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as
the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and
proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate
children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary
since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of
majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.[13] The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.[14] Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.[15]
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when
he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age[16] emancipation terminates
parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then
be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.[17] However, parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA
8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is
the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and
the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is
entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end,
the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)
had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to:
(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of
each other.[18] Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority,
the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all
the rights[19] of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the
father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to
be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the
benefits to which biological parents are entitled[20] such as support[21] and
successional rights.[22]
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in
the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[23] But, as we have
ruled in Republic v. Vergara:[24]
law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses
petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our
own legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show
that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case
for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is
mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22
in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be
construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and
less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care
and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at
bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the
NERY vs. SAMPANA In an Order dated 25 February 2011,3 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty.
C. Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed to file
Glicerio A. Sampana (Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption
his answer to the complaint and to appear during the mandatory conference.
despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery believe that the petition
Thus, both parties were directed to submit their position papers.
was already filed.
In her position paper,4 Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.
The Facts
On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011,5 Sampana
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010,1 Nery alleged that in June
argued that Nerys allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated.
2008, she engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her
However, Sampana admitted receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both
marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for
cases of annulment of marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that he
annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana.
initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age, civil
As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could
status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being
represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred
adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if the [alien] adopter would be
copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption.
married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien] could
Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00
be possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents,
on 10 September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c) P40,000.00
including the marriage contracts and the certification of the aliens
on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts since she trusted
qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery
Sampana.
furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because
already filed the petition for adoption and it was already published. Sampana he was still waiting for the certification.
further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the hearing.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for
Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5 March 2010
adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding
in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked why she did not receive
for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that the
notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer
annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case,
necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery
Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting his
that the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.
legal services and actual expenses.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
the status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such
petition filed in the court.2 Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery met In his Report and Recommendation,6 Commissioner Antiquiera found
Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed
Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite receiving
worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted, his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera recommended a penalty of
since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.
demanded for the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 from Sampana, but the
demands were left unheeded.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-217 passed on 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquieras report and
recommendation, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, [t]he Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that Respondent is guilty of malpractice by his failure to file a
petition for adoption and made complainant believe that he filed the petition
in Court, Atty. Glicerio Sampana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months and ORDERED to RETURN to complainant the
amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos with legal interest
within thirty days from receipt of notice.7
The Ruling of the Court
The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as
to the penalty.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship
and gives rise to the dutyof fidelity to the clients cause.8 Every case accepted
by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of importance.9 A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients,
and other lawyers to be candid and fair.10 Thus, the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
thatmay come into his possession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. x x x.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee"
for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he
unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty
of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampanas proffered excuse of
waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is
disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the
alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption
could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which
Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt is waived.11
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana
misinformed Nery of the status of the petition.1wphi1 He then conceded
that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily,
Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted tohim. He even kept the
money given him, in violation of the Codes mandate to deliver the clients
funds upon demand. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held
by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for
his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the
public confidence in the legal profession.12
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v.
Sampana,13 we already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act relative to his
double sale of a parcel of land. We imposed upon him the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and warned him that a
repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
In Rollon v. Naraval,14 we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render
any legal service after receiving the filing and partial service fee. Considering
the serious consequence of disbarment and the previous rulings of this Court,
we deem it proper to increase the penalty for Sampanas malpractice and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility to suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law
for THREE (3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act
shall be dealt with more severely. We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana
to RETURN to complainant Melody R. Nery the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with 12% interest per annum from the time
of his receipt of the full amount of money on 17 November 2008 until 30 June
2013, then 6% interest per annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in

the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
CASTRO vs. GREGORIO Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a
(Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the
showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural
time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.10chanrobleslaw
devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a
child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare
be personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not
Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family,
enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The report
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for
mentioned that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the
produce any children.13 It also stated that he met and fell in love with
appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted
Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on
respondents' decree of adoption.3chanrobleslaw
August 1987, and Regina on March 1989.14 Under "Motivation for
Adoption," the social welfare officer noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel
Gregorio (Jd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G.
Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro
(Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not
also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his
nickname, "Jayrose." 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to
legalize their relationship and surname. . . .15
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag
City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina
Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease
temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in his
and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of
custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.17chanrobleslaw
months because of the incompatibilities between them.4chanrobleslaw

On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption,18 having ruled
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to
that "[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any person
Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for
including the government which was represented by the Office of the
about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose
Solicitor General."19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on February 9,
would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated
2006.
permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual
tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V.
(15) years despite their separation(.)"6chanrobleslaw
Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional
remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36
years.22She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial
support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and
alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's
knowledge and consent.23 She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the
trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with
Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with
Larry.24chanrobleslaw
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being
remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that
he always offered help, but it was often declined.25 He also alleged that he
adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate children. He
denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He
also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He
alleged that his income had been diminished because several properties had
to be sold to pay for medical treatments.26 He then implored the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and
equity."27chanrobleslaw
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.28chanrobleslaw
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of
Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court
approving Jed and Regina's adoption.29chanrobleslaw
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the
adoption sometime in 2005.30They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent,
marked by the trial court as "Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege
that Jed and Regina's birth certificates showed different sets of information,
such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They
argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in
another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be
Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover.33 It was further alleged that Jed and
Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate
children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their
birth.34chanrobleslaw
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and
Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit
provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . .
should be personally notified of the hearing."35chanrobleslaw
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by
[Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children]
to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its
hands were bound by the trial court decision that had already attained
"finality and immutability."37chanrobleslaw
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the
determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The
alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be
classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of
judgment.38chanrobleslaw
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July
10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying
the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its
application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a
judgment.40 They argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained by
Jose and the alleged false information shown in the birth certificates
presented as evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were
concealed from them.42chanrobleslaw
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and
misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice,
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in
and non-inclusion of indispensable parties.43 They argue that the adoption
nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and
of illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also
only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought, to be annulled
the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such consent
was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet,
was never secured from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw
the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and
readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not
resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds
have been deprived of their day in court since their interest was "amply
for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by
protected by the participation and representation of the Solicitor General
prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner
through the deputized public prosecutor."45chanrobleslaw
should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through
of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of
publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
the safeguards cannot prosper.
circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to the
world of the adoption proceedings.46 They argue that since the alleged fraud
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment,
was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but
final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards
intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of judgment.47 They also
the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because adoption is
judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts.
an action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose,
state.48chanrobleslaw
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to
The petition is granted.
put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous
conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an
court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to
action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and
the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be
considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights
available if "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
period of time.51 (Emphasis supplied)
petitioner."49chanrobleslaw

In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50chanrobleslaw Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two
grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud,
which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction,
which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or
laches.52chanrobleslaw
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature
of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the
parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or
[that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself
but to the manner in which it is procured."54chanrobleslaw
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial
court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the
favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court
of the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the
proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action."55 As Jose filed the
petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which
applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the
consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first
obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out
of wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may
adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis
supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must
file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re:
Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:57chanrobleslaw
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock.
In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse
seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and
Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose
to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent
to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His
submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be
considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given
notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a
reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they
are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being properly
counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval
of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is
hereby required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures
harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other
children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care,
as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that
she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her
written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court
that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being
notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the
adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic
Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on
the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights
are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne
of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have
been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic
fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59chanrobleslaw
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away
from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where the
defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by
the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within
four years from discovery.61Petitioners alleged that they were made aware
of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007
is within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to
any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte.62 Larry
and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair
born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of
and just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or
Paraaque City, Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however, was filed in
things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and
the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court gave due
determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic
course to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his petition that he was a
fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can
resident of Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home Study Report
guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a
that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68chanrobleslaw
thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the
modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed,
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was able to secure
forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court
birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry
testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any
as merely the informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent
party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic
certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married
fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)
on December 4, 1986 in Manila,71 and another wherein the portion for the
mother's name was not filled in at all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and
Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that their father When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of
was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear contradiction to any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in support of his regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
petition for adoption. documents or perjured testimony during the trial.

Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his
motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were
childless,74 to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of
Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and alleged to be
fraudulent.75chanrobleslaw
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in
approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from
participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as
intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured
testimonies"76 presented during the trial. It failed to understand, however,
that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was either present at
the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or
testimony was presented in court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed
to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition
since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There
can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court
granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its
provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
 now working as a doctor in Canada.81 These accomplishments, however, are
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16,

(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP.
to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos
Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
(P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any
SO ORDERED.
person who shall commit any of the following acts:

(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence,

fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar acts;

(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law
for adoption; or

(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or

exploitation.

(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a
child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological
parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by
prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty
thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his

criminal liabilities.78Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision
on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been
obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19
of Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can only be availed
of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in
law other than the annulment of the judgment.

The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is
reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the
love and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after her
birth. She has never even benefited from any monetary support from her
father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical
degree from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine80 and is
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the
March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)
in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social
Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that
petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines,
as amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since
February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees'
Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to
his untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the
Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS
La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner,
denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because
you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally
adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees Compensation Commission (ECC),
which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against
petitioners entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on
the ground she can no longer be considered Johns primary beneficiary. As
culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their
great grandfather, petitioners grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by
virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court
in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained
finality.8Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies
as Johns primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned,
would petitioner qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary even if it
wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries
are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who
are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries;
Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered
as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the
legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section
1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. This
Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent
of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the
legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of
the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case,
the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who
has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not
herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise
denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECCs Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and
lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased
biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due
course/denying petitioners otherwise meritorious motion for
reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the
covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries
and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the
ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECCs factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioners claim
for death benefits is that eventhough she is Johns biological mother, it was
allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive.
As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the
legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify
the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such
proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to
be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being
the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is
indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her
status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by
law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still
alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded
great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge
and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their
jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial
piece of evidence offered by the petitioner Cornelios death certificate.13
Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father
died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree
of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was
error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive
parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to
law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
death benefits claim in view of Johns work-related demise. The pertinent
provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended,
which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context
indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the
dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural
child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income
benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC
"[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and
the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System,"
the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation,
interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary,
and determined atthe time of employees death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the
employees death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural
children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age,
or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self
- support due to physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired
during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural
child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no
other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income
benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural
children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution,
but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular
support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried,
not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto
physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.
(Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioners claim on the ground that she
is no longer the deceaseds legitimate parent, as required by the
implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the
relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status
of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary
beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation
deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation in light of the
Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an
unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art.
167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision.
Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis
supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune
Tobacco Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect
the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the
provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved
by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its
general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by
it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it
should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the
term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the
law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a
more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any
rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to
use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word
collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it
embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person
spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive
or limited sense which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at
bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in
the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be
taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate
parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should,
therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether
by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not
distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or
assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress
did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate
parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated
"dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply
said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the
provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase
"dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents legitimate,
illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an
affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for
the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from
claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626.
To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires isequality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate
against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by
the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably
failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the
law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest
that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried
parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the
contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 that
employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in
the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the
legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to
strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule
XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as Johns dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule,
the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and
receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise
of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision,
had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still claimed
death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate
parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee
enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such
qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not
overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the
deceaseds legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated
legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as Johns
secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old,
petitioners parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be
overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was
that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the
adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the
case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed
to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and
that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then
left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the
biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No.
855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption]
is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if
known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations
of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
(emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the
restoration of custody is concerned.1wphi1 The manner herein of
terminating the adopters parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between
the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the
adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender
age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552
was enacted after Cornelios death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law
as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual
milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of
cases and the state policies behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount
consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this
disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone will
remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail
or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the
adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as
in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected
to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptees biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental
authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and
the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the
biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as
can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be
governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants
of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate,
one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by
the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the
ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcols death, which was prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or
descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption,
shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their
rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent
provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the
rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis--vis the right to
receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations,
which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the
untimely passing of their minor offsprings adoptive parent. We cannot leave
undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life
under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by deaths
cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted childs quality of life might have been
better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in
the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelios death at the time of Johnsminority
resulted in the restoration of petitioners parental authority over the adopted
child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioners
dependence on John can be established from the documentary evidence
submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to Johns
adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to
care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright
future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to
Cornelios adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelios death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and
John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their
residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in Johns Death
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of
Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John.26 Likewise,
this is Johns known address as per the ECCs assailed Decision.27Similarly, this
same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La
Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be
assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John,
petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together
under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social
Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related
deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are
not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, Johns deliberate act of
indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way,
considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of
circumstances from Cornelios death during Johns minority, the restoration
ofpetitioners parental authority, the documents showing singularity of
address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary -
effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as
a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis.
Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the
right to receive the benefits stemming from Johns death as a dependent
parent given Cornelios untimely demise during Johns minority. Since the
parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner,
John's sole remaining beneficiary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision
of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-
0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release
the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered
employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.