Pablo G.

Utolo

Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac for the administration of his property (special proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia,
the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The said deceased
left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are
the presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia died during the pendency of the administration proceedings,
now survived by her husband Pablo Utolo and her mother. The latter commenced in the same court the
judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife (special proceedings No. 4188) on the share
of the latter in her deceased fathers estate. While, the mother opposed the judicial administration of
her deceased daughter property, and claimed that she has the better right to be the administratix. The
trial court did not appoint either of the applicant and oppositor. Hence, the oppositor-appellant
appealed.

Issue: WON the trial court erred by not appointing either of the applicant and the oppositor as
administrator of the property of the deceased.

Ruling: In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code,
all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted
immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil.,
321; Marin vs. Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 27
Phil., 73; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)

If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately to his heirs, as owners, and
there are no debts, what reason can there be for the appointment of a judicial administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano,
discussing this question, said: Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs
succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs
at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered
to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the
heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it
jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual
agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate
may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. (Sections
182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)

We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly applied.
We are convinced that if the courts had followed it in all cases to which it has application, their files
would not have been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as they are now. There is no
weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect that his appointment as judicial
administrator is necessary so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased
Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of the representation, it would
suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife
who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living . In order to
intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is not necessary that the
administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted an administration which will take up
time and occasion inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.

In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the parties has preferential right
to the office of administrator.
REYES, A., J.:

Javier VS Magtibay

Rufina Mercado died intestate on September 20, 1949, survived by her second husband Eulogio
Magtibay, her only living daughter Catalina Javier and the descendants of her two deceased daughters.
Catalina Javier, petitioned the court for letters of administration and the appointment of herself as
administratrix. The other heirs opposed the petition on the ground that there was not necessity for
subjecting the estate to judicial administration since, according to them, the decedent left no debts, all
her properties had already been partitioned and the heirs were all of age or represented by guardian.
But the Court overruled opposition and granted the petition. Hence this appeal.

Issue: whether in a case like the present where recourse to partition without letters of administration is
authorized, the estate or what remain of it after the part already partitioned has been segregated
and nevertheless be subjected to an administration preceeding despite the opposition of the majority of
the heirs..

Ruling: The question is not new. Time and again this Court has had to pass upon it in cases arising under
section 596 (as amended by Act 2331) of the old Code of Civil Procedure, from which the precept
embodied in the above copied provision of the present Rules of Court was taken Resolving that question
in those cases, this Court has repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are bound to submit the property to judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by
the court, "for in such the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superflous and unnecessary proceedings." (Utulo vs. Pasion, 66 Phil., 302 citing Ilustre Alaras Frondosa,
17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs.
Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; and Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., Phil., 317.)

The question is not new. Time and again this Court has had to pass upon it in cases arising under section
596 (as amended by Act 2331) of the old Code of Civil Procedure, from which the precept embodied in
the above copied provision of the present Rules of Court was taken Resolving that question in those
cases, this Court has repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be
paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are bound to submit the property to judicial administration, which
is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court, "for in such
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superflous and unnecessary
proceedings." (Utulo vs. Pasion, 66 Phil., 302 citing Ilustre Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs.
Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; and Fule
vs. Fule, 46 Phil., Phil., 317.)

The words in quotation sum up the doctrine of the cases cited, which, though rendered under section
596 of the former code of civil procedure, has equal validity under section 1 of the Rule 74, because the
two sections are fundamentally the same. It is, therefore, our view that, now as before, the rule is that
where administration proceeding is unnecessary because the estate has no debts and the more
expeditious remedy by partition is available the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to
submit the estate to such proceeding.

There appearing to be no good reason for burdening of the estate of the deceased Rufina Mercado with
the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding, the trial court was not justified in issuing letters
of administration. With this ruling, it is no longer necessary to decide which, as between the appellee
Catalina Javier and the widower Eulogio Magtibay, should be preferred in the appointment of an
administrator.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the appointment of the appellee Catalina Javier as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Rufina Mercado revoked.

With costs against the appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Eligio Llanera vs Ana Lopos

Gorgonio Llanera died single and intestate on October 13, 1942. He left an estate consisting of the
proceeds of an insurance policy amounting to $5,150.00. Upon the request of Remedios Ayque Altavano
who claimed to be a relative of the deceased, a petition for settlement of his estate was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Albayon January 22, 1948, wherein one Elias Ayque was appointed
administrator of the estate. The deceased died without compulsory heir, but left the following relatives:
Ana, Eustaquio, Julia and Maximina, surnamed Lopos, brothers and sisters of Aniceta Lopos, who was the
mother of Gorgonio Llanera, and Casiana, Teodoro, Petronilo, Cenen, Felix, Sotero and Ambrosia, all
surnamed Lopos, first degree cousin of the deceased, being the children of a brother and sister of
Aniceta Lopos. The estate distributed among the said heirs.

However, the deceased has a brother named Zacarias who died, leaving a son, Eligio.Eligio on September
30, 1954 filed a motion in said proceedings in order to assert his claim over the property as the sole heir
of the deceased, which motion however he later withdrew because he intended to file a separate civil
action for the vindication of his right in the proper court. And so on February 21, 1955, Eligio
commenced this action in the Court of First Instance of Laguna to recover the proceeds of the insurance
policy left by his uncle against those to whom they were illegally adjudicated alleging that the latter
misrepresented that they were the only heirs of the deceased when in fact they knew well that he left a
nephew who was alive and was the only one entitled to inherit his property.

Only Elias Ayque answered the complaint, and so upon plaintiff's motion, they were declared in default.
And then the case was called for trial where not even Elias appeared, the Court alloted the plaintiff to
present his evidence. However, on February 18, 1957, the Court rendered decision dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the venue was improperly laid and plaintiff's cause of action had already
prescribed. This appeal was taken to this Court on purely questions of law.

Issue: WON Rule 75 is applicable in the present case. WON the action prescribed.

Ruling: The flaw we find in this reasoning is that is presuposes that the instant action is for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Gorgonio Llanera. Such is not the case for his estate has already
been settled by the Court of First Instance of Albay so much so that the proceedings were declared
closed and terminated on May 28, 1949. The present action is to recover the property illegally
adjudicated to the defendants on the ground of fraud and being an action in personam the same can be
filed either at the residence of any of the defendants or at the residence of the plaintiff, at the election
of the latter(sec. 1, Rule 5). Plaintiff chose to institute the action in the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
where he is a resident, and so it is incorrect to say that the venue of the present case has been
improperly laid.

In holding that the present action has already prescribed, the trial court also said: "The claim of the
plaintiff, in the opinion of the Court, was filed out of time. In summary settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, any heir deprived of his lawful participation therein should file the corresponding
petition in the court having jurisdiction of the estate within two years after the settlement and
distribution thereof (sec. 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court).While the Rules of the Court do not prescribed any
time limit during which an heir deprived of his lawful participation in the state of a person which was
settled in a regular testate or intestate proceeding, Article 1100 of the Civil Code, however, provides that
action for rescission on account of "lesion" shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition
was made. Considering that judicial partition of the estate of Gorgonio Llanera was made on May 17,
1949, hence plaintiff's action was commenced beyond the prescriptive period provided by law.".

Again, we find this reasoning incorrect, for it overlooks the fact that the present action is not for
rescission of a contract based on "lesion" but an action to recover property based on fraud which under
our law may be filed within a period of four years from the discovery of the fraud. (sec. 43 par. 3, Act
190). Since, as alleged in the complaint, fraud was discovered only in 1953 and the action was brought in
1955, it is clear that plaintiff's action has not yet prescribed. It is therefore an error to dismiss the
complaint based on prescription.
MENDOZA, J

Ancog VS CA

The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of the spouses Gregorio Yap
and Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio Yap died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario Diez, and
children, petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap as his
heirs.

In 1954 and again 1958, Rosario Diez obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on
the disputed land, which was annotated on its Original Certificate of Title No. 622. When Rosario Diez
applied again for a loan to the bank, offering the land in question as security, the bank's lawyer, Atty.
Narciso de la Serna, suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land as
a means of facilitating the approval of her application. The suggestion was accepted and on April 4, 1961,
Atty. de la Serna prepared an extrajudicial settlement, which the heirs, with the exception of petitioner
Gregorio Yap, Jr., then only 15 years old, signed. The document was notarized by Atty. de la Serna on
April 12, 1961. As a result, OCT No. 622 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3447 (T-2411)
was issued on April 13, 1961. On April 14, 1961, upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on the
land, the loan was approved by the bank.

Petitioner Jovita Ancog learned that private respondent Rosario Diez had offered the land for sale.
Together with her brother petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. they filed this action for partition in the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3094.

Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and therefore void. They claimed that
in signing the instrument they did not really intend to convey their interests in the property to their
mother, but only to enable her to obtain a loan on the security of the land to cover expenses for
Caridad's school fees and for household repairs.

The trial court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners' action.

The trial court also mentioned that Petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor at the time the extrajudicial
settlement was executed, his claim, according to the court, was barred by laches.

Issue: WON Gregorio Yaps is barred by laches.

Ruling: We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the claim of petitioner Gregorio
Yap, Jr. was barred by laches. In accordance with Rule 74, 1 9 of the Rules of Court, as he did not take
part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. 10 It is uncontroverted that, at the time the
extrajudicial settlement was executed, Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor. For this reason, he was not included
or even informed of the partition.

Instead, the registration of the land in Rosario Diez's name created an implied trust in his favor by
analogy to Art. 1451 of the Civil Code, which provides:
When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of
another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.

A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years from the time the trust is
repudiated. 15 Although the registration of the land in private respondent Diez's name operated as a
constructive notice of her claim of ownership, it cannot be taken as an act of repudiation adverse to
petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim, whose share in the property was precisely not included by the parties
in the partition. Indeed, it has not been shown whether he had been informed of her exclusive claim
over the entire property before 1985 when he was notified by petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog of their
mother's plan to sell the property. 16

This Court has ruled that for prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated by
unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and proved by clear and conclusive evidence.
Furthermore, the rule that the prescriptive period should be counted from the date of issuance of the
Torrens certificate of title applies only to the remedy of reconveyance under the Property Registration
Decree. 17 Since the action brought by petitioner Yap to claim his share was brought shortly after he was
informed by Jovita Ancog of their mother's effort to sell the property, Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim cannot be
considered barred either by prescription or by laches.