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Self-Regulation
Advances in Research
VOLUME 1
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Consciousness and
Self-Regulation
Advances in Research
VOLUME 1
Edited by
GARY E. SCHWARTZ
Yale University
and
DAVID SHAPIRO
University of California, Los Angeles
vii
Preface
The first and foremost concrete fact which every one will affirm to belong to
his inner experience is the fact that consciousness of some sort goes on. I
-William James, 1893
I William James, Psychology: Briefer Course (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1893),
p.152.
ix
x PREFACE
2 Ibid., p. 1.
3 Jacobson, "Electrophysiology of Mental Activities and Introduction to the Psychologi-
cal Process of Thinking." In F. J. McGuigan and R. A. Schoonover (Eds.), The
Psychophysiology of Thinking (New York: Academic Press, 1973), p. 14.
PREFACE xi
... I submit that it was this anti theoretical stance that prevented any
close attention to physiology . . . . If the mechanisms we postulate are
"like" physiological mechanisms, then we will have heeded James in
modem terms. But if we are, as we were, afraid to postulate complex
mental mechanisms, we will never find the corresponding complex phy-
siological mechanisms.'
4 G. Mandler, "Acceptance of Things Past and Present: A Look at the Mind and the
Brain." In R. B. MacLeod (Ed.), William James: Unfinished Business (Washington, D.C.
American Psychological Association, 1969), pp. 13, 14.
Overview of Volume 1
1 A Model of Consciousness 1
E.ROY]OHN
I. Levels of Information 3
II. A Personal Research Strategy 8
III. EEG Studies 10
A. Changes in Synchrony 10
B. Tracer Technique 11
IV. Average Evoked Potentials 14
A. Appearance of New Components and Increased
Similarity of AERs from Different Brain Regions
during Learning 15
B. Readout to Absent but Expected Events 15
C. Propagation of Readout from Central Structures 17
D. Differential Readout in Differential
Generalization 17
E. AER Correlates of "Meaning" in Human
Perception 21
F. Anatomical Distribution of the "Engram" 24
V. Unit Studies 26
VI. Brain Stimulation Studies 31
A. Rapid Transfer to Direct Electrical Stimulation of the
Brain 32
B. Peripheral-Central Conflict 32
C. Perceptual Integration 33
D. Loci Responsible for Perceptual Integration 33
E. Role of Cortex and Thalamic Reticular Nuclei 35
VII. Theoretical Discussion of Electrophysiological
Evidence 38
References 46
xvii
xviii CONTENTS
I. Introduction 101
II. Sensory Experience and Augmenting/Reducing 101
CONTENTS xix
I. Introduction 173
II. The Assessment of Hypnotic Susceptibility 175
A. Early Objectification 175
B. Modem Hypnotic Susceptibility Scales 176
III. Stability of Hypnotic Susceptibility 180
IV. Modification of Hypnotic Susceptibility 181
V. Hypnotic Susceptibility and Personality 182
A. Age and Development 183
B. Motivation 184
VI. Hypnosis and the EEG 185
VII. EEG and Hypnotic Susceptibility: Indirect
Relationships 187
A. Age 187
B. Perceptual or Sensory Deprivation 188
VIII. EEG and Hypnotic Susceptibility: Direct Evidence 189
A. Base-Rate Alpha Density 189
B. Base-Rate Alpha Amplitude 191
C. EEG Asymmetry 192
D. Evoked Potentials 192
E. Conclusion 192
CONTENTS xxi
I. Introduction 223
II. Conclusions from Treatment 224
A. How Shall We Treat Our Clients' Cognitions? 225
B. Cognitions as Final Common Pathways 238
C. Initial, Conceptualization Phase of Therapy 239
III. A Cognitive Theory of Self-Control 243
A. A Three-Stage Process 243
B. How Does Behavior Change through Internal
Dialogue? 248
IV. Summary 253
References 255
E.RoYJOHN
1
2 E.RoYJOHN
I. LEVELS OF INFORMATION
and some evidence for associative learning has been forthcoming. The
capacity for complex learning clearly appears in the phylum Platyhel-
minthes, with the advent of a brain, defined sensory systems, and
complex nerve bundles.
We choose to define perception, as well as sensation, provisionally
as preconscious or unfelt categories of information processing. Sensa-
tions and perceptions are unimodal, referring to the detection and
interpretation of stimuli within individual sensory modalities. These
functions can be performed by machines, which do not possess con-
sciousness. We contend that under ordinary circumstances, fundamen-
tal sensations and much of perception, as defined, do not enter con-
sciousness, although we can make ourselves aware of them by an
analytic process.
3. Consciousness is a process in which information about multiple
individual modalities of sensation and perception is combined into a
unified, multidimensional representation of the state of the system and
its environment and is integrated with information about memories
and the needs of the organism, generating emotional reactions and
programs of behavior to adjust the organism to its environment. Con-
sciousness is third-order information. Many levels of consciousness can
exist, in which these dimensions are present in variable amounts. The
content of consciousness is the momentary constellation of these differ-
ent types of information.
At the same time that consciousness is the product of an integra-
tion of preconscious sensations and perceptions structured in the light
of previous experience and reflecting emotional state, drive level, and
behavioral plans, feedback from consciousness to these more funda-
mental levels must take place. Memories are activated, attention is
focused, perceptions influenced, emotions aroused, drive priorities
altered, and plans of behavior revised as a result of this feedback,
producing a continuous reorganization of basic processes because of
the influence of higher-level integrative and analytical functions.
4. Subjective experience derives from information about the content
of consciousness. It is a process which reorganizes the sequential series
of events into a single experiential episode, which merges sequential
constellations of multisensory perceptions, memories, emotions, and
actions into a unified and apparently continuous event, or "experi-
ence," which has a beginning and end. Two critical transformations
occur as a result of the process which generates this fourth-order infor-
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 5
probably more powerful than any described thus far. This feedback can
be expected to activate trains of memories of other relevant life experi-
ences, with a high probability that important occurrences (high drive
level, high-emotion events) will be followed by systematic or "rational"
memory searches. The relatively global feedback resulting from the
integration of lower-level information as it enters consciousness is
modulated and made far more selective and better-focused. Among the
consequences envisaged as resulting from this highest level of informa-
tion are systematic evaluation of a flood of memories, identification of
appropriate perceptions and rejection of more inappropriate percep-
tions which arose earlier in the experience, selection of the most appro-
priate emotional response, adjustment of drive levels to correspond to
the exigencies and possibilities of the moment, and rational construc-
tion of the optimal program of behavior. These processes are far more
deliberate and analytical than those previously described.
A characteristic of self-awareness is the capacity for cognitive proc-
esses. By cognition or thought we mean the ability to have subjective
experience vicariously, by activating stored memories about percep-
tions and prior experiential episodes in a fashion which may be arbi-
trarily organized rather than occurring according to a previously estab-
lished sequence. Because of this ability to manipulate, recombine, and
reorganize the accumulated store of memories, the self is continuously
in the process of modification and of analysis of its own experience.
A cognitive process is the representation of an experience in an
abstract symbolic fashion, whether or not that experience actually oc-
curred in that form in the personal history of the individual. The
distinction between the memory of a rudimentary sensation postulated
as essential for perception and the memory of a subjective experience is
the amount and diversity of the stored information. The basic neuro-
physiological mechanisms may be quite the same, and even the ana-
tomicalloci may be shared. I see no compelling need to separate those
mechanisms conceptually. Under some circumstances, particularly
when cross-modal stimulation is utilized, generalization affords evi-
dence for the presence of cognitive processes. In generalization, an
organism interprets the meaning of a sensory stimulus as equivalent to
some other sensation because of similarities in the abstract properties
common to both stimuli. If the two stimuli are in different sensory
modalities, it is clear that some nonsensory specific abstraction has
been performed. If the stimuli are in the same senso'ry modality,
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 7
I
ENVIRONMEHT
,I SEQUENCE OF I
I I SEQUENCE OF
1 1
SENSATIONS - - - VISUAL STIMULI AUDITORY STIMW
MEMORIES OF I
I
1
PAST SENSATIONS
1 J
PERCE PTIONS-- SEQUENCE OF I. I
-
VISUAL PERCEPTS I '~
j SEQUENCE OF
AUDITORY PERCEPTS
.-----l EMOTIONS .~
l'
I DRIVE LEVELS
,(.
~
f---- - -1 PR~m~I~R OF t: . ~
t ,(.
INTEGRATION OF UNIMODAL PERCEPTS, MEMORIES, EMOTIONS,
CONSCIOUSNESS- DRIVE LEVELS,AND PROGRAMS OF BEHAVIOR INTO A SEQUENCE OF
MULTIVARIATE "FRAMES'
1
CONTE NT OF -
CONSC IOUSNESS
--- - - --- -I MOMENTARY CONTENT
OF CONSCIOUSNESS
I
SUBJE CTIVE
EXPER IENCE - -
MERGING OF SEQUENTIAL EPISODES
INTO UNIFIED AND CONTINUOUS
I
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
!
SELF MEMORIES OF PREVIOUS SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES I
SELF-AWARENESS-
_l INTERPRETATION OF MOMENTARY ~
CONTENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS
FIGURE 1. Flow scheme for the levels of information involved in consciousness and self-
awareness.
8 E. Roy JOHN
survey this body of research. I will rely mostly upon the work of my
own laboratory, because phenomena observed by me personally have
had the most impact upon my thinking.
Electrophysiological methods have provided unique insights into
the details of physiological processes within various anatomical regions
and the dynamic transactions between as well as within those regions
which take place during learning and which occur when memories are
activated. These insights allow us to construct a description of how
experiences build an anatomically distributed mediational system in
which different parts of the brain cooperate in the representation and
procession of information. Detailed reviews of the voluminous evi-
dence on which this description is based are available elsewhere (John,
1961, 1967b, 1971, 1972, 1974; John and Thatcher, 1976; Morrell, 1961b;
Thompson, Patterson, and Teyler, 1972). In this article, we have
ignored the problem of the chemical processes involved in information
storage, which we have discussed elsewhere in detail (John, 1967b).
A. Changes in Synchrony
Since the discovery that tiny electrical voltage fluctuations could be
recorded from the scalp, the EEG correlates of conditioning have been
studied by numerous workers. The general features of the EEG changes
observed in such studies are that when a conditioned stimulus (CS), to
which the subject has previously been habituated, is initially paired
with an unconditioned stimulus (US), widespread changes from rela-
tively low-frequency high-voltage activity (synchronization) to higher-
frequency low-voltage activity (activation) occurs in the scalp EEG. As
training proceeds, this activation or desynchronization pattern be-
comes limited to only a few "relevant" regions, for example, over the
motor cortex if the conditioned response (CR) requires a movement,
over the visual cortex if the CS is a visual signal. Usually changes in the
EEG occur prior to the appearance of the first behavioral CRs. During
extinction, learning-induced EEG changes persist beyond the disap-
pearance of CRs, with a gradual reversal of the changes seen during
acquisition.
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 11
B. Tracer Technique
CORRECT INCORRECT
L MOT ,.-..}o-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ...}--I-._..,.,..._ _......._ _ _ _...-_......_ _..-_ _
R MOT""",,_ .'PII~.,-
... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LAUDJ~~~...~~
RAUD ..~.;o.vJ~,~At-..J.,.~
LVIS,.Jw-WV~rtw~~..~"'W\~
RVIS.-J'v..~IM~-I'Mf~...\\W......,..~~~
LVPL~"~ ...~~,....,..W\"......~~~~
L GL ,~"'.:;M,"trWtr.,.i'i"",-y.y,...,~.- ~~'A.'t'..I."PfWrMrl'~l~
R GL"J'I\N""Y....",......v..~oJ/V' ~"'."v."'N~"~Wwr~
L GM~ _ _--............""""-""""""""""'.......""",..,.....,.,..,.,.,.."""__....
RGM""W"'-~'"".y..".,...._ _~
L MRF',.,..Jtv~""-'\~~,...,.J-r...,.'HV.....JI"'.f'.......,..~~
FLICKER 0
Zubin, and John, 1967; Weinberg, Walter, and Crow, 1970; Weinberg,
Walter, Cooper, and Aldridge, 1974). Similar findings in the cat were
reported by John (1963). These cerebral events, termed readout or
emitted potentials, have been interpreted by Weinberg et al. to reflect
the generation of processes corresponding to the memory of past or
imaginary stimuli.
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 17
CONDITIONED
RESPONSE
To IO/SEC
II
GENERALIZATION
RESPONSE
TO 7.7/SEC
NO RESPONSE
TO 7.7/SEC
I I
GENERALIZATION TO
,..',
I/S TEST STIMULATION
,, '
B
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 19
FIGURE 4. (A) Computations of average responses obtained from the lateral geniculate
nucleus and nucleus reticularis of the cat under various conditions during the same
experimental session. First row of averages is based upon 100; second and third rows are
based upon 42 repetitions of the same stimulus applied during a number of behavioral
trials. Analysis epoch was 90 msec. First row: Average responses evoked in structures by
the 10-Hz CS (flicker) actually used in training, during repeated correct behavioral
performances. Second row: Average responses evoked by a novel 7.7-Hz CS, during
repeated generalization behavior. Test trials with the 7.7-Hz stimulus were interspersed
among trials with the actual 10-Hz CS and were never reinforced. Third row: Average
responses evoked by the 7.7-Hz flicker on presentations when no generalization behavior
was elicited. The waveshape elicited by the actual CS is similar to the response evoked by
the novel stimulus during generalization behavior. Notice the absence of the second
positive component in the EP when generalization behavior failed to occur. (Data from
Ruchkin and John, 1966.) (B) (Top) Records of AER's and PSH's obtained during 18 trials
that resulted in CR to the 2-Hz CS (dotted curves) and during 32 trials that resulted in
behavioral generalization in response to a I-Hz flicker used as a test stimulus (solid
curves). The test stimuli were randomly interspersed between presentations of 2-Hz
(dotted curves) and 8-Hz flickers in a long experimental session. (Bottom) Records of
AER's and PSH's obtained during 17 trials that resulted in failure to elicit generalization
behavior in response to the test stimulus. Note change in late components. Analysis
epoch, 100 msec. (Data from John and Morgades, 1969a.)
20 E. Roy JOHN
RPOST "A::t~
L.POSTSS~
R.MRF
R.N.VENT 7\r
R.MARG
R'OORS""~
R.N.LAT p~
I AS A NUMBER
I AS A LETTER
DIFFERENCE WAVE
P4 T5
I AS A NUMBER JV\N I'-,,~
I AS A LETTER
rJ\; ~~
I 396 msee. I
ard deviations from each deviation for the vertical line in the two
different sequences. The AER to the vertical line perceived as a number
was then subtracted from the AER to the vertical line perceived as a
letter. The significance of the resulting difference wave was assessed at
many points along the wave, each representing successive latency
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 23
0.01
IIvel
't
Tlst
P3 01
Diff. V"'"" 0", "'V Q ....,.,... 6, V., ..."'-"
...
Wave
FIGURE 8. (Top) The difference wave (Line 1) and the t test (Line 2) obtained
by comparison of average EPs (100 samples) elicited by a big A and a little Q.
Only the occipital location shows a statistically significant difference. (Bottom)
The same calculations, but now of EPs elicited by a capital A and capital E. All
the locations show highly significant differences between these EPs.
24 E. Roy JOHN
.40
FLICKER
. ~, L
CLICK 0 VISUAL /
~ SYSTEM
C
;:)
.30
0
en....
a:
fI)
;:) NON SPECIFIC, MESENCEPHALIC
0
z .20 NON SPECIFIC
.... MOTOR,
SYSTEM
'"
0
0
z.... .15
z S~~~~Y
........ AUDITORY SYSTEM
~
....
I-
CD
Z
.10 LIMBIC
0 .09 SYSTEM
~
.......Ja: .08
a: .07
0
u
z .06
<r
'":l .05
.04
.00 .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60
FIGURE 9. Plot of mean correlation coefficients between exogenous residuals versus
endogenous residuals for different neural systems and for different cue modalities.
Closed circles: Flicker frequencies as stimuli. Auditory system: N = 305; aud. cx. (16
cats), med. genic. (16), brach. info coil. (1). Limbic system: N = 303; hippocampus (16),
dentate (5), cingulate (5), septum (5), prepyriform (6), med. forebrain bundle (6), mamm.
bodies (5), hypothalamus (7). Mesencephalic nonspecific: N = 158; retic. form. (18), cent.
gray (1), cent. teg. tract (1). Motor system: N = 146; motor cs. (4), subs. nigra (10), nuc.
ruber (4), nuc. vent. (9), subthal. (5). Other sensory: N = 54; sensorimotor CX. (4), nuc.
post. lat. (1), nuc. vent. post. lat. (5), nuc. vent. post. med. (1) Thalamic nonspecific: N =
139; cent. lat. (13), nuc. retic. (6), nuc. reuniens (1), med, dors. (5), pulvinar (1). Visual
system: N = 394, visual cX. (18), lat. genic. (18), sup. coil. (2).
Open circles: Click frequencies as stimuli. Auditory system: N = 48; aud. cx. (5 cats),
med. genic. (5). Limbic system: N = 69; hippocampus (5), dentate (3), cingulate (3),
septum (3), prepyriform (2), med. forebrain bundle (3), mamm. bodies (3), hypothalamus
(2). Motor system: N = 37; motor cx. (1), subs. nigra (4), nuc. ruber (1), nuc. vent. ant. (5),
subthal. (2). Nonspecific system: N = 50, mesen. retic. form. (6), cent. gray (1), cent. teg.
tract (1), cent. lat. (3), nuc. retic. (3). Visual system: N = 55; visual cX. (6), lat. genic. (6),
sup. coli. (1).
N denotes the number of independent measurements within the designated system.
Data from monopolar and bipolar derivations were combined. Replications varied across
cats and structures. (Data from Bartlett et a/., 1975.)
26 E.RoYJOHN
V. UNIT STUDIES
The EEG and AER observations thus far described suggest that
neurons in widespread regions of the brain are involved in the media-
tion of learning and memory. A large body of evidence supports this
conclusion and has been thoroughly reviewed (John, 1967a,b, 1971,
1972; John and Thatcher, 1976). Abundant documentation has estab-
lished the existence of strong correlations between spontaneous or
evoked activity on one hand and neural discharge on the other. In
view of the anatomically extensive changes in slow waves during
learning, these correlations lead one to expect that changes in single
unit activity during learning should be detected with ease. That such
is indeed the case can be seen from studies of single neurons during
conditioning, which consistently report that a large proportion of cells
(10%-60%) alter their response to the CS during conditioning (Jasper,
Ricci, and Doane, 1960; Morrell, 1961a; Morrell, 1967; Olds and Olds,
1961; Bure!!, 1965; Bure~ and Bure!!ova, 1965, 1970; Kamikawa, Mc-
nwain, and Adey, 1964; Buchwald, Halas, and Schramm, 1965; Hori
and Yoshii, 1965; Adam, Adey, and Porter, 1966; Yoshii and Ogura,
1960; Woody, Vassilevsky, and Engel, 1970; Travis and Sparks, 1967,
1968; Travis, Hooten, and Sparks, 1968; Travis, Sparks, and Hooten,
1968; O'Brien and Fox, 1969a, 1969b; Olds and Hirano, 1969; Olds,
Disterhoft, Segal, Kornblith, and Hirsch, 1972; Leiman and Cristian,
1973).
The fact that such a large percentage of neurons change their
behavior during even the simplest learning task constitutes a strong
argument against connectionistic formulations which localize learning
as synaptic alterations causing facilitation of the firing of cells in se-
lected pathways, with such firing constituting the activation of memory
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 27
S.D.
o 125 msec o 125 msec 0 125 msec
FIGURE 10. (Top left) The top curve shows the grand average of the AERs elicited
by the 2-Hz es across all electrode positions in the mapped region, while the
lower curve shows the standard deviation (S.D.) of the group of AERs. (Bottom
left) The top curve shows the grand average of the poststimulus histograms
(PSHs) elicited by the 2-Hz es across the same electrode positions and the lower
curve shows the standard deviation. (Top center) The grand average of the AERs
elicited by the 8-Hz es and the corresponding S.D. (Bottom center) The grand
average PSH elicited by the 8-Hz es and its S.D. (Top right) The top curve shows
the difference waveshape resulting from the subtraction of the grand average AER
elicited by the 8-Hz es from the grand average AER elicited by the 2-Hz es. The
lower curve shows the p value, as computed by the t test, for each point of the
difference wave. (Bottom right) The top curve shows the difference waveshape
resulting from the subtraction of the grand average PSH elicited by the 8-Hz es
from the grand average PSH elicited by the 2-Hz es. The lower curve shows the p
value for each point of the difference. (Data from John and Morgades, 1969b.)
o
left
response
~PSH
AEP 30jlV
~
0
8
0
2Qijms 20I~60jlV
:. AEP
AvJVv ~30)lV
right
response
20I~60jlV
200ms
FIGURE 11. On the left of this figure is shown the way in which single
evoked responses obtained from the ends of several differential generaliza-
tion trials were classified by use of a multidimensional scaling technique.
Open circles represent EPs from trials resulting in eN.. The open and
closed circles fall into domains which are clearly different, showing that a
consistent waveshape or mode difference existed between the two sets of
EPs referred as Mode 1 and Mode 2. In the middle of the figure are shown
the average of the EPs in the two portions of the signal space. On top is the
average of the EPs classified as Mode 1, while the average of the EPs
classified as Mode 2 is on the bottom. These two averages display clear
differences in a late component. On the right of the figure are shown two
PSHs of the firing pattern of two different cells separated by computer
spike-height discriminators during each mode. The two PSHs on the top
show the firing pattern of these two cells during Mode 1 corresponding to
the readout of memory related to CR,. The two bottom PSHs show that one
of these cells displayed a completely different firing pattern during Mode 2
corresponding to the readout of memory relating to eN..
tional value. All units thus far observed not only fire "spontaneously"
and show great variability in response to any stimulus but show a
differential response consisting of differences in graded temporal patterns,
rather than an all-or-none behavior.
As yet, we have not observed a single neuron which fired only
during one memory readout mode and not during the other. An exam-
ple of these findings, showing the different AER readout modes and the
corresponding firing patterns of well-resolved units isolated by elec-
tronic discriminators, is presented in Figure 11.
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 31
B. Peripheral-Central Conflict
After transfer of the discriminated behaviors from the peripheral
modalities to direct electrical stimulation, "conflict" studies were car-
ried out in which RF stimuli at either frequency were pitted against
concurrent discordant visual or auditory stimuli of the other frequency
(RFl vs. V2, RF2 vs. Vl t RFl vs. Az, RF2 vs. Al). Parametric tests were
performed that explored the effects of ascending and descending series
of RF current values. In every case, values of RF stimuli were found
such that central stimulation at either frequency completely or substan-
tially controlled the behavioral outcome, preempting the decision and
effectively contradicting the concurrent visual or auditory cue. These
results are illustrated in Figure 12.
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 33
C. Perceptual Integration
Processes of perceptual integration were investigated in the same
animals. The cats were trained using a 4-Hz signal and a 2-Hz signal as
the discriminated cues. After stimuli at this repetition rate had been
established as effective signals whether delivered via vision, audition,
or electrical stimulation of RF, VIS, LG, MG, or INT, temporal summation
studies were carried out. Modalities of input were studied two at a
time, in all possible combinations. In each study, simple stimuli at 4 Hz
and 2 Hz were delivered in random order via the two selected modali-
ties in random sequence. This series of simple stimuli served as control
measures. Interspersed within this series were two kinds of compound
stimuli. "In-phase" compound stimuli consisted of 2 Hz signals deliv-
ered simultaneously via the two modalities. These signals served as a
control for total current and modality interaction effects. "Out-of-
phase" compound stimuli consisted of 2-Hz signals delivered via the
same two modalities but occurring 250 milliseconds out of phase. These
signals served to test whether the animal would behave as if the two
separate signals were perceived as individual 2-Hz cues, or whether
they would be perceived as a unified 4-Hz cue. Although some pairs of
modalities showed a much higher capability for cross-stimulus integra-
tion than did others, highly significant levels of integration were found
for most of the combinations studied (John and Kleinman, 1975). Thus
it appeared that informational events in many different brain regions
could be integrated into a perceptual whole.
-
::>
E 40
I II
c:
~ 150 200 250 300 350 40 50 60 70 80
.a
,., Cat No. 1 (--) Cat No. 5 (--)
.a
N = 114 N = 112
g 100 100
c:
-'"
80 80
o
(.)
60 60
c: , .....' ..
.A.,
,,
40
........._.......
40
~
'"
c..
20 20
-' ,
.
30 50 70 90 110 25 30 35 40 45
Stimulus (u.a) V, _ _
V2 ~--..
~E :: /~;""""".
80
60
40 , . 40 /
'';::;
III 20
c:
60 80 100 120 140 50 60 70 80 90
- 100 100
c: 80 80
-
o ,
,
(.)
60 60
c:
'" 40 40
~ /
'" 20
.' 20
c.. .'
100
---150 200 250 150 200 250 300
Stimulus (J.ta)
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 35
FIGURE 12. Each graph shows the effectiveness with which stimulation of the mesence-
phalic RF at either of two frequencies (RFl and RF2 ) contradicted simultaneously pre-
sented visual stimuli (V2 and Vl' top) or auditory stimuli (Ao and At< bottom), plotted as a
function of increasing current intensity. For cats 1, 3, and 6, frequency 1 was 4/sec and
frequency 2 was 2/sec. For cats 2, 4, and 5, frequency 1 was 5/sec and frequency 2 was 1.81
sec. Solid lines show the outcomes when peripheral stimulation at the higher frequency
(Vl in top graphs, Al in bottom graphs) was pitted against RF stimulation at the lower
frequency (RF2 ), while the dotted lines show the outcomes when the higher-frequency
stimulus was delivered to the RF. Cats 1, 5, and 6 were trained to perform an avoidanc~
avoidance discrimination (- -), while cats 2, 3, and 4 were trained to perform approach-
approach discrimination (+ + ). N refers to the total number of conflict trials carried out in
each cat, accumulated in three sessions for cats 2, 5, and 6 and four sessions for cat 1
(visual-RF conflict), and in three sessions for cat 2, four for cat 6, five for cat 4, and seven
for cat 3 (auditory-RF conflict). (Data from Kleinman and John, 1975.)
36 E. Roy JOHN
CR as 2
LATERAL
GENICULATE _----\'----".--.....J._____'..... ~I_____'.I___'.~\____.\____.~.~.~.~I_____
STIMULUS
VISUAL
CORTEX
,.,.: ~~~{1\{4Vl)RM.
I~VRU'
2+2 ~ 2
FLICKER - - - - 4 - -........""""'-.................................-......-------
f- 1 SEC -lj
VISUAL
CORTEX
FLICKER ., \ \ \ I I I I \ I \ \ I \ \ I I
MRF
STIMULUS " , \ I , .
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 37
o .v'J.'1~1 ~~"'1~"MV;-."
BEGINS TO MAKE MOVES AWAY FROM PERFORMS CR AS 2
CR AS 4 LEFT LEVER ON RIGHT LEVER
FLICKER
~1 SEC~
MRF
anatomical design for integration to take place. Anatomy also favors the
effective and widespread distribution of activation from the RF
throughout a host of other brain regions. These factors may well give
the RF of the mesencephalon and thalamus a unique ability to achieve a
high SIN both for convergent afferent input and divergent efferent
output. The brain may well come to rely upon this high SIN, setting
thresholds as a result of experience such that it comes to depend upon
these regions both for integrative processes and for the maintenance of
consciousness, in the sense of organizing excitability in the system so
that sufficiently high levels of coherence may be achieved. Single-stage
lesions in this system, as attested by a huge volume of literature, do
result in long-lasting or permanent loss of consciousness. Perhaps the
ability of the brain to maintain consciousness and integrative activity
when this sytem is destroyed in multiple stages is due to systematic
increases in the relative SIN of other regions participating in the same
functions, increased absolute coherence in those regions as the func-
tional inhibition is extinguished, and lowering of the threshold for
acceptable SIN as the series of lesions is inflicted.
Thus, as with many other functions, it may well be fruitless to ask
whether any brain region is uniquely responsible for consciousness
and subjective experience. These functions are probably distributed
over a widespread anatomical substrate, every region of which makes
a contribution to the overall process and many of which may be capable
of sustaining the process if damage occurs elsewhere in the system.
Is this an evasion of the issue? Is the whole system conscious?
Under normal circumstances, whether or not "backup" systems exist, is
there some circumscribable system which mediates consciousness of
the fluid patterns of information and the continuity of subjective expe-
rience? What is the nature of the process constituting the intimate basis
of the emergent property of subjective experience, which transcends
the activity of the constituent elements of the system?
The electrophysiological data reviewed above indicate that sensa-
tions are encoded as organized spatiotemporal patterns of average activ-
ity in stimulus-bound neurons whose density varies from region to
region of the brain, with a concomitant variation in SIN. Perceptions are
similarly encoded as average spatiotemporal patterns, but in ensembles
of neurons capable of responding to the arrival of information from the
stimulus-bound ensemble with a firing pattern creating a facsimile of
responses previously displayed to other events. These intermingled
firing patterns, rapidly evolving into a common mode which represents
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 43
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
REFERENCES
ADAM, G., ADEY, W. R., AND PORTER, R. W. Interoceptive conditional response in cortical
neurones. Nature, 1966,209,920-921.
ADAME1Z, J. H. Rate of recovery of functioning in cats with rostral reticular lesions.
Journal of Neurosurgery, 1959,16,85-97.
ASRATYAN, E. A. Changes in the functional state and pattern of electrical activity in
cortical areas involved in the establishment of conditioned connection. Proceedings of
XXIII International Congress of Physiological Sciences (Tokyo), 1965,4, 629-636.
BARLOW, J. S., MORRELL, L.,AND MORRELL, F. Some observations on evoked responses in
relation to temporal conditioning to paired stimuli in man. Proceedings of Interna-
tional Colloquium on Mechanisms of Orienting Reactions in Man (Bratislava-Smolenice,
Czechoslovakia), 1967.
BARTLETT, F., AND JOHN, E. R. Equipotentiality quantified: The anatomical distribution of
the engram. Science, 1973, 181, 764-767.
BARTLETT, F., JOHN, E. R., SHIMOKOCHI AND KLEINMAN, D. Electrophysiological signs of
readout from memory. II. Computer classification of single evoked potential
waveshapes. Behavioral Biology, 1975, 14, 409-449.
BEGLEITER, H., AND PLA1Z, P. Modifications in evoked potentials by classical condition-
ing. Science, 1969, 166, 769-771.
BUCHWALD, J. S., HALAS, E. S., AND SCHRAMM, S. Progressive changes in efferent unit
responses to repeated cutaneous stimulation in spinal cats. Journal of Neurophysiol-
ogy, 1965,28, 200-215.
BURES, J. Discussion. In D. P. KIMBLE (Ed.), Anatomy of memory. Palo Alto: Science
Behavior Books, 1965, pp. 49-50.
BUREs,J., AND BURESOVA, O. Plasticity at the single neuron level. Proceedings of the XXIII
International Congress of Physiological Sciences (Tokyo), 1965,4, 359--364.
BURE~, J., AND BURESOVA, O. Plastic changes of unit activity based on reinforcing
properties of extracellular stimulation of single neurons. Journal of Neurophysiology,
1967,30,98-113.
BURE~, J., AND BURESOVA, O. Plasticity in single neurons and neural populations. In G.
Hom and R. A. Hinde (Eds.), Short-term changes in neural activity and behavior.
London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 9-35.
CHESLER, P. Maternal influence in learning by observation in kittens. Science, 1969, 166,
901-903.
CHOW, K. L., AND RANDALL, W. Learning and retention in cats with lesions in reticular
formation. Psychonomic Science, 1964, 1, 259--260.
CORNING, W. c., DYAL, J. A., AND WILLOWS, A. O. D. Invertebrate learning (Vol. 1). New
York: Plenum Press, 1973.
DRU, D., WALKER, J. P., AND WALKER, J. B. Self-produced locomotion restores visual
capacity after striate lesions. Science, 1975,187,265-266.
DUMENKO, V. N. The electrographic study of relationships between various cortical areas
A MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 47
KARL H. PRIBRAM
A. Introduction
51
52 KARL H. PRffiRAM
B. Case History
FIGURE 2. Points of stimulation in the somatosensory motor cortex of the lateral extent
of the hemisphere giving rise to changes in blood pressure, heart rate, respiratory rate,
and discrete movement.
well as visceral responses. In fact, William James (1950) had stated the
issue clearly:
If the neural process underlying emotional consciousness be what I
have now sought to prove it, the physiology of the brain becomes a simpler
matter than has been hitherto supposed. Sensational, associational, and
motor elements are all that the organ need contain. The physiologists who,
during the past few years, have been so industriously exploring the brain's
functions, have limited their explanations to its cognitive and volitional
performances. Dividing the brain into sensory and motor centres, they have
found their division to be exactly paralleled by the analysis made by
empirical psychology of the perceptive and volitional parts of the mind into
their simplest elements. But the emotions have been so ignored in all these
researches that one is tempted to suppose that if these investigators were
asked for a theory of them in brain-terms, they would have to reply, either
that they had as yet bestowed no thought upon the subject, or that they had
found it so difficult to make distinct hypotheses that the matter lay among
the problems of the future, only to be taken up after the simpler ones of the
present should have been definitely solved.
58 KARL H. PRIBRAM
And yet it is even now certain that of two things concerning the
emotions, one must be true. Either separate and special centres, affected to
them alone, are their brainseat, or else they correspond to processes occur-
ring in the motor and sensory centres already assigned, or in others like
them, not yet known. If the former be the case, we must deny the view that
is current, and hold the cortex to be something more than the surface of
"projection" for every sensitive spot and every muscle in the body. If the
latter be the case, we must ask whether the emotional process in the sensory
or motor centre be an altogether peculiar one, or whether it resembles the
ordinary perceptive processes of which those centres are already recognized
to be the seat. Now if the theory I have defended be true, the latter
alternative is all that it demands. Supposing the cortex to contain parts,
liable to be excited by changes in each special sense-organ, in each portion
of the skin, in each muscle, each joint, and each viscus, and to contain
absolutely nothing else, we still have a scheme capable of representing the
process of the emotions. An object falls on a sense-organ, affects a cortical
part, and is perceived; or else the latter, excited inwardly, gives rise to an
idea of the same object. Quick as a flash, the reflex currents pass down
through their preordained channels, alter the condition of muscle, skin, and
viscus; and these alterations, perceived, like the original object, in as many
portions of the cortex, combine with it in consciousness and transform it
from an object-simply-apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt. No new
principles have to be invoked, nothing postulated beyond the ordinary
reflex circuits, and the local centres admitted in one shape or another by all
to exist. (Vo!. II, pp. 472-474)
Ootnlnilnl
DAve 1
Self-Assured. Feared
71
..
.
~.::::"",,, RIVA3
A9\lfturve. Ac:1rve
LARRy 8
Submiui"'e, Cowering, SHORTY 7
Frequenlly Atl,ac:ktd ARNIE 6
wi1k
OoMi~nt
ZeKE 1
J\wrtlsive
RIVA 2
Oarinv. Competes With Zeke
1
LARRY 7
AnKk1. O;we
Oomln.alIH .. nd
R.~
?
,
1 "-
'-
~
DAVE 8 ARN1E 5
Comploto'v s..bm;"'v F.. "u'
SHORTY 6
~ ~
RIVA'
BENNY 3
ZEKE 7
~
SubmluiwlII 10 Others,
Intarminenlly Aljlgu!'UI'I.
TOWlrd 0.."".
oo -
LARRY 6 SHORTY 5
DAve 8
Ctingtor. Avoids Int.rlKlion
FIGURE 3(C) Same as (A) and (B) except that both Dave and Zeke have
received bilateral amygdalectomies.
ZEKE 7
Contin .... n In,ermi11enlJy Aggressh,"
Tow.rd O.....e
DAVE 8
Out<asc FI ... I'om All 717'~
t
~ ~
FIGURE 3(0) Final social hierarchy after Dave, Zeke and Riva have all had
bilateral amygdalectomies. Note that Riva fails to fall in the hierarchy. Minimal
differences in extent of locus of the resections do not correlate with differences in
the behavioral results. The disparity has been shown in subsequent experiments
to be due to Herby's nonaggressive "personality" in the second position of the
hierarchy.
70~~--~-----r-----r-----r-----------r----~----~
ANTEROFRONTAL,
FRONTOTEMPORAL.
ME DIAL-FRO NT AL-CING ULATE,
AND AMMON'S FORMATION
o OCCIPITO-PARIETAL AND
INFEROTEMPORAL
6SHAM OP.
0-10 5
TEST TRIALS - 1st DAY TEST DAYS
FIGURE 4(A) Graph of the percentage of time spent by various groups of animals in the
dark (previously shocked) compartment of a shuttle box during postoperative extinction
of a preoperatively acquired conditioned avoidance. The scores for the first extinction
day are recorded in lO-trial blocks; subsequent extinction trials are plotted in 50-trial
blocks (one test day). Vertical bars indicate range of performance.
64 KARL H. PRmRAM
60
I-
Z
~ 50
I-
0::
~
~ 40
u
'"C!i
0::
30
~
w
::;;
f= 20
....
10
5
TEST TRIALS - 1st DAY TEST DAYS
FIGURE 4(B) Graph of the percentage of time spent by the various groups of animals in
the dark (previously shocked) compartment of a shuttle box during postoperative
reextinction of postoperatively reacquired conditioned avoidance. Trial blocks divided
as in 4(A). Bars indicate range of performance.
tively, and this increased food intake usually lasted for months (Pri-
bram and Bagshaw, 1953).
Further analysis almost immediately uncovered a paradox. Despite
this marked increase in feeding in an ad libitum situation, Schwartz-
baum and I (Schwartzbaum, 1961) found that the monkeys with lesions
were less sensitive to food deprivation or satiation when made to work
for their food. They appeared "hungrier" when food was available but
less "hungry" when they were deprived and food could be obtained
only by the pressing of a lever to obtain pellets (on a variable interval
schedule). But this was not all; the loss of sensitivity was not limited to
variations in the internal state produced by the deprivation but ex-
tended as well to variations in the external characteristics of the food,
~220~
190
~
~160
II:: 130
...J
- Normals 175-480
~ 00 Amygdalas 274-375
FIGURE 5(A) Effect of food dep- gloo
rivation on number of responses 2 3 4 5
emitted by normal and bilater- SESSION
ally amygdalectomized monkeys
in a fixed-interval operant-con-
ditioning situation. Note that ~ B LARGE REWARD
the percentage change in total z
~ 140
~ ~o
number of responses is plotted u
on the graph. Absolute values ~ ..
are indicated in the right lower o 120 o 0
LU
comer. 5(B) The effects of the ~
changing of reward size on bi- II:: 100
LU
laterally amygdalectomized and
~ -Normals
normal monkeys on response ~ 80 o 0 Amygdalas
rate in a fixed-interval situation. ffl
Note that normal animals satiate II::
A. Transfer of Training
TABLE 1
Number of Transposed Responses Made on Transposition Tests
Normals Amygdalectomized
Day
439 441 443 447 Mdn. 397 405 438 442 Mdn.
1 6 5 6 6 2 5 2 4
2 5 5 5 6 3 6 2 2
Total 11 10 11 12 11.0 5 11 4 6 5.5
The effects of amygdalectomy on transfer of training to a new but related task. Note that
the amygdalectomized monkeys treat the task as completely novel. whereas their
normal controls transpose their responses on the basis of their earlier experience.
68 KARL H. PRffiRAM
B. Psychophysiological Experiments
The observations on response to novelty made in these neurobe-
havioral experiments were considerably enhanced by some obtained in
psychophysiological studies. One possibility, consonant with the Jame-
sian hypothesis, would be that motivation involved the somatomotor
system while emotion invoked visceroautonomic processes. Thus, de-
spite the juxtaposition of their central mechanism, peripheral differ-
ences could account for the behavioral distinction. This possibility was
put to direct test in a series of experiments which assayed the effects on
visceroautonomic indicators of resections rather than stimulations of
portions of the mediobasal, limbic motor mechanism. Such experi-
ments allowed observations to be made under physiologically normal
conditions for many months and even years in a variety of environmen-
tal circumstances that ordinarily produce visceroautonomic reactions.
The question was asked as to which of these circumstances produced
altered reactions or absence of reaction in the lesioned monkeys.
To summarize a decade of experiments, Muriel Bagshaw, Daniel
Kimble, and I (Bagshaw, Kimble, and Pribram, 1965; Kimble, Bagshaw,
and Pribram, 1965) found that the forebrain lesions had, as might be
expected, no effect on peripheral, reflexly produced visceroautonomic
reactions. Galvanic skin responses (GSR), heart, and respiratory
changes occurred in normal amount and frequency when the monkeys
moved or when gentle electric shock was applied to the soles of their
feet. We found (Bagshaw and J. Pribram, 1968), if anything, that the
threshold for obtaining such reactions was lower than in normal sub-
jects. By contrast, however, when response to novel stimulation or to
conditioning was tested, visceroautonomic reactivity was grossly defi-
cient. The visceroautonomic components of orienting and conditioning
were markedly attenuated or completely eliminated by the lesions
(Bagshaw and Benzies, 1968).
Analysis showed that the deficit in conditioning was to some
considerable extent due to a restriction in anticipatory reactions to the
unconditional stimulus which occurred in control subjects (Bagshaw
and Coppock, 1968). Thus the situations in which the deficit was
manifest were those that demanded reactions to recurring events, not
reactions to the events themselves. The fact that limbic forebrain struc-
tures, the mediobasal motor mechanisms, are critically involved in the
reaction to novelty as well as in motivational and emotional reactions
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY 69
- -..... N
80 x, 'X H
00 IT
x ..
.AM
\~ ..........
60
\,\ ........
\, \ ..",...
....
AVG
~.
.~..::>\:;:::.... ~ "
PERCENT
GSR
u \\
40
...... - -
'!- ::.~: Ji............ .:!.
\\..
"..., ,., ...
\,. ............... 0
20
.......................................
..........
.........
o 5
234
10 TRIAL BLOCKS
FIGURE 6. Curves for overall percentage of GSR responses to the first 50
presentations of an irregularly presented 2-sec tone. Amygdalectomized
(AM), hippocampectomized (H), control (IT), and unoperated (N) groups.
C. Habituation
The simplest expression of such sets or expectations is habituation.
And, in fact, habituation of a locomotor response in a repetitive situa-
70 KARL H. PRIBRAM
100~-------------------------------'
A
10
................
;. v/- - - - . \.
::: 60 / . . ....~
............ \
~
&"
.... '..
.~
&.20. ~
,:' '.
OL-------------------------------~
o .1-4 41 I I 1-4 4 .1 o
d SHOCK
60 B ...... AM
... -N
'"z ,...........
...'"240 .:
.../
......
...................
...z
III
:::20
III
=:
.
..
.IA .4-.1 .11.2 1.21.6 1.6-2.0
IIA SHOCK
FIGURE 7(A) Curves of percentage GSR generated by three runs
of stimuli of ascending and descending intensity (in map) by the
amygdalectomized (AM) and control (N) groups. 7(B) A finer
breakdown of stimulus values from .1 to 1.0 mamp, pooled
ascending and descending values.
A 6~t A
ON OFF S S ON
TRIALS GRP 5-10 SEC ON 10-15 SEC ON 5-10 SEC OFF 10-15 SEC OFF
FIRST 40 NORM 3.7 7. Om': 3.9 7.0
AMX 3.2 3.3 3.9 6.3
~
FIGURE 8. Mean number of GSR occurring in 10-sec period of light on just preceding light offset (CS) in the first 40 and in the second 40 ~
trials for each group. Conditioning paradigm presented above table. E::
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY 73
D. James Reconsidered
is effort that resolves whether the organism will react emotionally (i.e.,
by attempted self-regulation) or motivationally (i.e., by entering into
practical action). Effort is a measure of the resistance which must be
overcome in order to do a certain amount of work in a specified time. It
is analogous to force in physical systems and an expression of the
capacity for exerting power, the rate of doing work. And work is a
measure of the energy required to change the state of a system (see
McFarland, 1971, p. 4, for the derivation of these definitions).
The critical question is, therefore, What are the variables which
constrain a system to resist a change in state? A homeostatic system, by
definition, is one that resists change by virtue of its negative feedback.
But additional constraints develop (hyperstability) when several such
systems interact (Ashby, 1960). Thus a drop in basal temperature may
result in shivering, in motor activity, in sleeping, or in eating. Motor
activity and eating have been shown to be reciprocally related over
short time periods-they appear constrained by the basal temperature
variable. It therefore takes effort to attempt to eat during or immediately
after exercising and vice versa (see Brobeck, 1963, for a thought-provok-
ing and thorough review of these data).
There is considerable evidence as to the neural organization that
invokes such constraints. Electrical stimulations in the hypothalamic
region, when carried out with small electrodes, give rise to only parts of
behavioral acts, such as jaw or tongue movements, swallowing, pilo- or
genital erection, head thrusts, etc. Further, these part behaviors appear
to be more or less randomly interspersed with one another. Adjacent
stimulations do not produce a completed behavior pattern (Roberts,
1969).
When larger electrodes are used, a different pattern emerges. Now
chewing, drinking, sexual, or aggressive behaviors are elicited full-
blown. But interestingly, which behavior is elicited depends to some
considerable extent on the environmental situation in which the stimu-
lation occurs. Thus a rat, when initially stimulated, may drink every
time the electrical current is applied to his brain. He is now left
overnight in a cage with no opportunity to drink but with several pieces
of wood to chew on. The brain stimulation is kept up intermittently all
night. The next morning the rat is provided with the opportunity either
to drink or to chew. Now, brain stimulation from the identical site will
as often elicit chewing as drinking (Valenstein, Cox, and Kakolewski,
1969; Valenstein, 1970).
76 KARL H. PRffiRAM
B
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY 77
kg
14
12
10
8
C 6
4 -
8
2
6
4
2 -
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
nC
n/3
FIGURE 9(A) Subject in black costume with white tape. (Reprinted with permission
from N. Bernstein, 1967.) 9(B) Cinematograph of walking. Movement is from left to
right. The frequency is about 20 exposures per second. (Reprinted with permission from
N. Bernstein, The Co-ordination and Regulation of Movements. Pergamon Press Ltd.,
1967.) 9(C) Force curves at the center of gravity of the thigh in normal walking.
(Above) vertical components. (Below) Horizontal components. (Reprinted with permis-
sion from N. Bernstein, The Co-ordination and Regulation of Movements. Pergamon
Press, Ltd., 1967.)
78 KARL H. PRIBRAM
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY 79
FIGURE 10(A) View of the lateral surface of the cerebral cortex showing the distribution
of potentials evoked by the stimulation of a cutaneous or a muscular branch of an arm
nerve. Plus (+) indicates a response of 100 microvolts or more; triangle (Il) indicates a
response of from 50 to 100 microvolts; and open circles indicate response of from 0 to 50
microvolts. 10(B) Cortical responses evoked by sciatic nerve stimulation before resec-
tion of postcentral cortex and cerebellum. (1) Upper trace, postcentral; lower trace,
precentral. Time: 10 msec. (2) Same immediately after resection of both cerebellar
hemispheres. (3) Same immediately after resection of both cerebellar hemispheres. (3)
Same following additional resection of anterior lobe of cerebellum. (4) Same after
additional resection of both postcentral gyri. Note that postcentral record how registers
only white matter response.
80 KARL H. PRIBRAM
A. The Model
Load
Load
:0
Position
B Control Motor Limb muscle Limb
centre outflow control system
Joint
receptors
FIGURE l1(A) Eyeball position control system: (open-loop, feedforward) and (B) limb
position control system: (closed-loop, feedback). (Reprinted with permission from D. J.
McFarland, Feedback Mechanisms in Animal Behavior. Academic Press, 1971.)
constant. The associative links which make up this and similar systems
have been studied extensively (e.g., see review by Brobeck, 1963) and
their operating characteristics thoroughly analyzed (Ashby, 1960).
Combinations based primarily on feedforward processes are ubiq-
uitous; they constitute our computer technology. For the most part,
such combinations contain feedbacks as well. Biologically, combina-
tions of feedforwards occur in parallel, processing signals simultane-
ously by virtue of overlapping neighborhood interactions, and consti-
tute one class of cognitive processes (see Neisser, 1967; Eccles, 1967;
Pribram, 1971). When feedback loops are included, hierarchical se-
quential arrangements called plans or programs are constituted (Miller,
Galanter, and Pribram, 1960). Parallel and hierarchical processing
mechanisms provide the foundations of contemporary cognitive
theory.
In biology, homeostatic processes, oscillating phenomena such as
biological rhythms and clocks, and load-adjusting mechanisms such as
those regulating muscular contraction have all been shown dependent
upon feedback organization (Pribram, 1971). The essential characteris-
tic of such systems is that they depend upon a match between two
settings. A mismatch produces an error signal which controls the
operation of the system until equilibrium-match-is reestablished.
This homeostatic conservation of equilibrium is akin to that described
by the first law of thermodynamics, which states that the conservation
of energy is maintained because change elicits an "equal and opposite
reaction." Energy concepts are therefore appropriate to a description
and an understanding of feedback organizations and, in fact, are regu-
larly used, as for example in the description of the "effort" or "work"
involved in load-adjusting mechanisms.
Information concepts, by contrast, have often been linked to the
second law, and in fact, information has often been termed (e.g., by
Brillouin, 1962) neg-entropy (see also von Foerster, 1965). Confusion
has arisen because there has been a tendency to label "error" (the
mismatch signal) information. But "error" has nothing in common with
this type of "information": The amount of information contained in a
message does not depend on the processing of its errors. Ashby (1963)
details the distinction in terms of the constraints (limits on the
independence of the functioning parts) operating on the processing
system, the constraints on variety. Information is a measure of variety;
redundancy (repetition), a measure of constraints. (For a comprehen-
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY 87
'OPU'-rl Tcst
l-r""
r
I
I
I
I
I
I
I I
...
I I
I reedback
I
I reedf'orward
I
I
I
I
I
Operatc
1
1
I I
I-j
I I
I I
I reedbaC}.J I I
l_1 Bia5
the overt acts themselves. If we divide all possible physiological acts into
adjustments and executions, the nuclear self would be the adjustments
collectively considered. (Vol. I, p. 302)
C. Central Competency
bos, Norton, and Frommer, 1967; Chow, 1970). The remainder of any
input channel appears to be redundant, spare channel capacity, under
most circumstances. The results on the control of input channels by
posterior and frontal cortex were therefore interpreted (Pribram, 1967c)
as influencing redundancy, not sensory capacity in the usual information
theoretic sense. Specifically, it was suggested that the input systems
acted as channels in which spatial and temporal multiplexing could
occur, a suggestion similar to that put forward by Lindsay (1970).
On the basis of the data reviewed above, Kahneman's (1973) con-
cept that arousal involves an increase in the number of sensory chan-
nels available can be generalized to include constraints involving the
redundancy characteristics (the competency) of that capacity. Kahne-
man's discussion approached such a generalization when he spoke of
changes in "structural connections between components." In technical
language, such changes in competency would be reflected in changes in
the equivocation of the channel (defined as the sum of noise and
redundancy). Competency is the reciprocal of equivocation. Effort can
then be defined as the measure of the attention "paid" to increase
or maintain efficiency by reducing equivocation, i.e., enhancing
competency.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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ASHBY, W. R. An introduction to cybernetics. New York: Wiley, 1963.
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3 Self-Regulation of
Stimulus Intensity:
Augmenting/Reducing and the
Average Evoked Response
MONTE BUCHSBAUM
I. INTRODUCTION
101
102 MONTE BUCHSBAUM
ences between values of such reliability will have much lower reliability
(Platt et al., 1971). Second, individual differences in contrast effects
(judging the standard as smaller after rubbing the large block and larger
after rubbing the small block) are probably much more prominent than
Petrie credited (1967). Hilgard, Morgan, and Prytulak (1968) found
large-group contrast effects, not augmenting/reducing, predominating
in their sample. Broadhurst and Millard (1969) and Schooler and Silver-
man(1971) found nonsignificant correlations between large- and small-
block augmenting/reducing scores. Since individuals with large con-
trast effects would show negative correlations and individuals with
small contrast effects would show positive ones, these negligible corre-
lations are expected. In our own studies, individual consistencies in
large-blocklsmall-block contrast effects and in ascending/descending
starting-position effects were much more reliable than the augmenting/
reducing (prestimulation minus poststimulation) measure. Silverman's
(1964) KFA procedure was similar to the Petrie in this respect. Contrast
effects also seem to operate across days (Hilgard et al., 1968), further
interfering with large-blocklsmall-block differences. While it might be
argued that contrast effects are balanced out from the augmenting/
reducing score by the opposite directions of contrast in the use of the
small and large blocks, the assumptions that contrast effects are entirely
linear, equivalent in both size directions, and independent of augment-
ing/reducing are probably unjustified.
Thus since size estimation and contrast effects were tapped as well
as the hypothetical augmenting/reducing dimension, the Petrie proce-
dure might give very different scores or reliabilities across patient
groups or experimental treatment depending upon the relationships of
these perceptual styles. These problems may help to explain the failure
of Morgan, Lezard, Prytulak, and Hilgard (1970) to confirm the pain
tolerance of reducers and the failure of Peters, Benjamin, Helvey,
and Albright (1963) to confirm the sensory deprivation tolerance of
augmenters.
FIGURE 1. Average evoked responses (AERs) to four intensities of flash: top to bottom,
dim to bright. The individual on the left shows "augmenting"-increasing amplitude
with increasing stimulus intensity for component PI (PI00)-Nl (N140). The individual on
the right shows "reducing"-decreasing amplitude with increasing stimulus intensity for
PI-Nl (from Buchsbaum and Pfefferbaum, 1971).
A. Visual AERs
cal system and still found saturation for first harmonic components and
marked reducing for second harmonic components.
B. Auditory AERs
Stage 3
~
z
z 2
0
~ Stage 4
<{
:>w
0
Z Awake
<{
w
:!: Rem
" . ; : Stage 2
Stage 1
-o~~------~------~----~~
50 60 70 80
STIMULUS INTENSITY IN dB
FIGURE 2. Mean amplitude (deviatiori in microvolts) for P200
(168-248 ms) for four click intensities for awake, REM sleep, and
Stages 1-4.
(reducing). They further suggested that lead Cz-Oz produces the most
linear amplitude/intensity functions, but this was not borne out in
another report from the same laboratory (Klingaman and Anch, 1972).
Data pooled across three subjects showed a 15% drop in AER B-C
amplitude (about P80-N110) as stimulus intensity increased from 75 to
85 dB. Similarly, in a recent report (Schweitzer and Tepas, 1974), two of
the three subjects showed trivial (.21 and .10) correlations between
stimulus intensity and AER amplitude for component B-C, for lead
Cz-Oz.
C. Somatosensory AERs
.......
.......
VJ
114 MONTE BUCHSBAUM
ms), and P200 (168-248 ms). They correspond fairly well to time inter-
vals chosen by Lewis, Dustman, and Beck (1972), and the critical P100
band is similar to that used by So skis and Shagass (75-150 ms).
Two techniques of areal integration were compared. For the first,
termed "absolute area relative to mean," the mean value of each AER,
used as a baseline, was subtracted from each AER coordinate; within
each time band, the mean of the absolute values of successive coordi-
0.7
!z 0.6
LU
u
1-Li:0.5
"'
LULU.....
t;J 8 0.4
a::;z
~~0.3
"'
LU....J
I- ~ 0.2
a:: -p<0.05
80.1
0
I-
a::
LU
'"
~
(J)
::;:
; 3
....J
0
a:: I-
u 0 2
:i ~
<!>
~ 0
LU ....J
~
....J
;; '" 0
~
0
~ -I ~-I
LJ.J
::;:
a::
u
:E -2
FIGURE 3. Analysis of AER amplitude and slope for consecutive 4 ms time intervals. The
actual AER value for the highest-intensity AER and the slope for each coordinate (calcu-
lated across four intensities) were obtained for each of two AER sessions on 128 subjects.
Data are shown for 300 ms following the stimulus mean across the 128 subjects (lower),
and test-retest correlations across the two sessions (upper) are presented for amplitude
data (left) and slope data (right). Thus the curve in the lower left is the mean AER for the
group. Circled points are the mean latencies (across intensities) for P100, N140, and P200
for the entire group as determined by visual inspection. Note that P100 and P200 fall on
maxima for test-retest reliability (above) both for raw amplitude (left) and slope (right).
P100 falls on the minimum for the slope function (lower right) and P200 on the maximum;
note that the P100 slope value is actually negative as well as reliable. (Data from
Buchsbaum, 1974.)
SELF-REGULATION OF STIMULUS INTENSITY 115
nates was calculated. For the second, "signed area relative to prestimu-
Ius baseline," the pre stimulus baseline was subtracted from each AER
coordinate and the mean of the signed values of successive coordinates
was calculated. A root-mean-square measure was also calculated. The
line-length measure was the sum of the absolute values of point-to-
point differences. In addition, the individual AER points (after removal
of AER mean) were used. Table 1 compares the test-retest reliability
and Mz-twin similarity for the seven techniques.
All techniques showed statistically significant test-retest correla-
tions for PIOO and P200 (for r > .16, p < .05, 1 tailed). Positive peaks
PIOO and P200 appear to have more reliable amplitude/intensity slopes
than negative peak N140. Measurements referred to the mean level of
the AER appear to be more reliable than those referred to the prestimu-
Ius baseline. Generally reliability and Mz-twin similarity are in high
agreement. Overall, the absolute area relative to the mean technique
(closest to that of Shagass, 1972) seems to have the highest reliability
and heritability, and we have adopted this technique.
The data from the point-by-point analysis on the total group of 128
subjects indicate that considerable information is carried in the single
AER coordinates (Figure 3). The circled dots are the mean latencies (as
visually identified) for PIOO, N140, and P200. For both amplitude and
slope, the pattern of higher test-retest correlations for positive peaks is
seen. The plot for the mean slope illustrates that the minimum slope on
the entire curve coincides exactly with PIOO--and is actually negative,
indicating that AER values were lower for high-intensity flashes than
for low ones. The high positive peak at P200 is consistent with our
reports and those of others (see Section IILA) that P200 shows far higher
slopes than PIOO.
A. Twin Studies
FIGURE 4. Visual AERs in two pairs of Mz twins. Illustrated are AERs to four intensities
of light, as in Figure 1. For each pair, the AER is shown as a solid line for one twin and
as a dotted line for the co-twin. Note similarity in latency of peaks, waveform, and
changes with stimulus intensity. For Pair 1 on the left, component P100-N140 increases
markedly with stimulus intensity (augmenting) and for Pair 2 the component decreases
with stimulus intensity (reducing) (Buchsbaum, 1974).
A. Pain Tolerance
76-112 MS 168-248 MS
~0
>
0 6 PAIN
INTOLERANT
II:
~
::iE PAIN
z 4 PAIN INTOLERANT
/~ TOLERANT
Z
0 ,.. ~
~
~
~ 2 .- ~
.- / PAIN
~~~~~---. TOLERANT
:>w ,-~~...,
~~
~~
C
Z
w
0
2 9 16 23 2 9 16 23
::iE
STIMULUS INTENSITY IN MA
FIGURE 5. Mean somatosensory AER amplitude for four intensities of electric shock for
the 76-112 ms and 168-248 ms time bands (generally equivalent to PIOO and P200).
Subjects were divided into pain-tolerant and -intolerant groups on the basis of their
subjective ratings of shock unpleasantness. Note that the pain-tolerant subjects are
relative reducers--have lower rates of increase in AER amplitude with increasing stimu-
lus intensity. Group differences are greatest at the highest intensities.
B. Noise Tolerance
~
Z
<J)
6.0 2.5 ~
>< Tone
where '" is the psychological magnitude and cf> the stimulus intensity
(Stevens, 1963, 1971). This relationship holds fairly well when data are
averaged across subjects, but the exponent f3 varies widely from
subject to subject (e.g., Stevens and Guirao, 1964)-suggesting that
the subjective intensity of a stimulus may increase more or less rapidly
with increasing stimulus intensity. These individual differences in
power-function exponent seem quite reliable across session and mod-
alities (Jones and Marcus, 1963; Rule, 1966; Ekman, Hosman, Lind-
man, Ljungberg, and Akesson, 1968; Reason, 1972; Wanschura and
Dawson, 1974). Luce (1972) cogently reviewed the problems of com-
paring psychophysical responses and physical units.
C. Determination of Strength
C. Conclusion
As progress is made in the neuroanatomicallocalization of specific
AER components, increasingly specific neural models will be possible
for the important stimulus-intensity-control mechanisms. The general
importance of such processes can be recognized in the diverse sources
of such concepts as Petrie's "augmenting/reducing," Pavlov's
"strength," Freud's "stimulus barrier," and others. An understanding
of such mechanisms may provide important clues about psychiatric
dysfunction: AER tools for diagnostic evaluation, drug selection, and
identification of genetic vulnerability are all potential applications
(Buchsbaum, 1975; Silverman, 1972).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to thank Dr. Robert Lavine for helpful com-
ments, Sherry Buchsbaum for editorial assistance, and Cathy King and
Arlene Ammerman for technical and secretarial aid.
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4 Neodissociation Theory of
Multiple Cognitive
Control Systems
ERNEST R. HILGARD
Man does more than one thing at a time-all of the time-but the
representation of these actions in consciousness is never complete. On
occasion he becomes conscious of much that happens within his body
and of much that is happening currently in the external world, as well
as of remembered or imagined events. His awareness can shift from one
to another of these happenings, and there is some question about how
much he can comprehend at once.
All of this is familiar, but problems arise when a scientific account
is attempted. The total problem is usually seen as too large, so that the
investigator approaches it topically, that is, by selecting some manage-
able features that can be appropriately labeled and then studying them.
The recent upsurge of interest in locus of control represents an approach
taken largely by those committed to the study of personality and social
psychology; selective attention in its various manifestations becomes
the focus of experimental psychologists, extending into various studies
of task interferences. Those with psychophysiological interest become
concerned with hemispheric laterality or with state-dependent learn-
ing. Psychopathologists are again studying multiple personalities. I am
proposing that it is time to take a look at the whole problem and to see if
some unifying framework may not bring together the various lines of
evidence into a general theory of consciousness and of cognitive control
systems.
The study of hypnosis moves headlong into this set of problems
because hypnotic procedures change the balance between voluntary
ERNEST R. HILGARD Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford,
California.
137
138 ERNEST R. HILGARD
the first place from mediumistic seances), Janet uncovered the roots of
her terror. She had been severely frightened at the age of 7 by two men
hiding behind a curtain and trying to playa joke on her. A second
personality, Adrienne, relived this experience during her fits of terror.
It should be noted that the dissociation was not complete; the emotion
broke through to the normal consciousness, although the events
that were the occasion of the emotion lay concealed behind a veil of
amnesia. Janet relieved her of her symptoms through a combina-
tion of hypnosis and automatic writing and the second personality
disappeared.
Janet's theory was supported for a time in America by Boris Sidis
and Morton Prince, but it gradually died out, in part through being
superseded by psychoanalysis, in part by failures in experiments to
show complete dissociation between events conscious and subcon-
scious. The epitaph was written by White and Shevach (1942), who felt
that the concept was no longer useful. Little has been heard of it since,
except for occasional purely descriptive references to some of the dis-
junctions between events and their conscious representation.
f Amnesic Barrier
z Not
o Cs Available
Available
~ and to
Consciousness to
!t
IJ.J
Pcs Consciousness
IJ.J
a:::
u ~======~======~ ____ Repression
~ Barrier
~
~ Available to Consciousness
~ Ucs Only Indirectly
a..
DISSOCIATION
FIGURE 2. A distinction between the divisions of consciousness in dissociation and in
psychoanalytic theory. In psychoanalytic theory (simplified for this purpose) the available
memories lie in the conscious (Cs) and the preconscious (Pes), while the hidden ones are
concealed under a repression barrier and lie in the unconscious (Ues). The unavailable
ideas are largely those bound up with affect and impulse, and they enter consciousness
only indirectly. In a dissociation through amnesia the split is among the usually available
memories, and the unavailable memories need have no special affective or impulsive
significance.
sentences that were not heard, the nothingness that was seen as a
playful dog.
The hypnotic experience does not stop with this double conscious-
ness, one of distorted reality as perceived within hypnosis, the other of
undistorted reality as described in automatic talking. There is a third
split that can best be described as an observing consciousness, so far as
its conscious role is concerned. By inference it is also an active monitor-
ing and controlling agent. In its phenomenal role the observing con-
sciousness is present during hypnosis, knows whether the person feels
hypnotized or not, is sometimes surprised by how effective the hypno-
sis is, is disappointed when the hypnotic suggestions do not work.
Subjects often describe the situation as if the hypnotized self were
taking the center of the stage, performing the acts called for by the
hypnotist, while the observing part is in the wings, watching what is
going on. This observing part does not have access directly to the
hidden observer and hence is separated from it by an amnesic block.
At the same time it may be inferred that this observing, monitoring,
and controlling part is not powerless; when the hypnotist desires access
to the hidden observer, there must be some central controlling part that
allows this. In self-hypnosis, it must be the observing-monitoring part
that gives the self-suggestions that the hypnotized part then carries out.
There are puzzling metaphors in this kind of commentary on what goes
on, but the puzzles cannot be resolved satisfactorily by shortcuts such
as labeling everything as role behavior or by assuming that everything
is confabulated.
The hypnotic model, as I have described it, is not an explanatory
one. It serves to dramatize the phenomenal or inferred splits that a
theory has to account for in more general terms.
persistence in time and the passing thought as the thinker, but this
extreme possibility cannot be ignored. In different words, this view
asserts that all behavior is merely a modification of the entering behav-
ior, and that way of putting it sounds more modem than James.
The idea of a control system, however, also finds contemporary
expression. If one examines the concept of planning, it appears that a
sort of planner must be inferred. Even a simple matter such as making
an appointment for luncheon next week is negotiated with those in-
volved, is written down, and is then acted upon at a later time. This
planfulness controls the possible behavior on that future date quite
effectively. The many competing thoughts that occur the morning of the
luncheon do not appear to be as determinative of what is going to
happen in the midday as the plans that were made by some responsible
part of the cognitive apparatus during the prior week. Appointments of
this kind are kept with a very high probability-perhaps as high as 90%
of the time--so that the planning function must be taken seriously. The
event may be trivial, but its implications are not.
The support for a special executive function has come into the open
from an unlikely source--the computer. Heuristic computer programs
commonly have an executive program that monitors the computer's
attempts to solve problems (e.g., Newell and Simon, 1972). If one
direction goes on too long without reaching a solution, the executive
calls a halt and a new direction is taken. This close analogy to what a
thinker does makes the idea of an executive ego a plausible one.
The diagram of Figure 3 is therefore all right as a suggestion of
some of the features of cognitive control systems, but it has to be
developed in far greater detail in order to lead to decisive experimenta-
tion. For one thing, the indication of separate inputs and outputs for
each system does not take into account that the organism has a limited
set of receptors and effectors and that the subsystems will be in compe-
tition for information sources through these receptors. There is compe-
tition also for the final common path leading to action and for cognitive
capacities that are limited. To make this more concrete, we may exam-
ine the kind of thing that happens when a person is immersed in one
activity, controlled by one structure, and a strong invitation to another
activity intrudes. To what extent will the conflict be resolved at the level
of these structures themselves, and to what extent will a higher-order
control process intervene?
150 ERNEST R. HILGARD
Central Monitor
and
Control
Planned Output A
FIGURE 4. Resolution of a conflict between two cognitive systems: piano playing and
telephone answering. At issue is the question whether the conflict between the two
systems can be resolved by their relative strengths, or whether some intervention is
needed by the central monitor and control.
1 More complex motivations may enter, such as a preference for self-initiated activities as
against those externally imposed, perhaps along with some unconscious ones based on
the individual life history. For the purposes of illustration, the conflict is treated at a
simplified level.
152 ERNEST R. HILGARD
which a move from the left extreme to the right had to be made. He told
me that he talked to himself a lonb time about this, while playing right
along, trying to decide whether or not he could do it accurately and
what would happen if he omitted it. He decided to omit it, lest he make
an error, and so far as I know nobody detected his omission. Does the
central control have to be involved? This is somewhat problematical
when everything is in the open, as in these illustrations, but many
aspects of memory and of plans unrelated specifically to telephones and
piano playing enter the picture. The ultimate weight of factors influenc-
ing the decision may well go beyond the two structures primarily
involved. One way of putting it is that if there were an identifiable
central agency, the chance of intrusion would be great. Here again the
hypnotic model is of some pertinence: in a practiced hypnotic subject
the monitoring part could simply assure not listening to the telephone
by a self-suggestion not to hear it. This favors the piano player, but it
does not seem to be something on which the piano-playing system
alone would take the initiative.
I have deliberately chosen an illustration in which the question of
consciousness is secondary to the question of control. Once the notion
of multiple controls is familiar, the possibility of inhibited cognitive
structures becomes more plausible, and then one is ready to consider
splits in consciousness.
Figure 4 supplements Figure 3 by making more explicit the manner
in which cognitive control structures compete, both in attention to
stimulus inputs and for the final common path in outputs, and it shows
circumstances in which the central mechanism might conceivably step
in to influence a decision by throwing its weight (presumably via
information from other sources) to resolve the conflict. This begins to
get close enough to concrete situations that one senses the empirical
problems that may be amenable to study, but it is not yet specific
enough to define a program of research.
which the drug wore off he was commonly amnesic for all that had
happened and showed no retention of the material learned. However,
when the subject was then hypnotized and asked to recall, there was
some slight recovery of memory, especially in the more hypnotizable
subjects (Osborn, Bunker, Cooper, Frank, and Hilgard, 1967). State-
dependent learning was not demonstrated, in that under the drug
there was no forgetting of material learned in the prior waking state,
and when the drug was readministered there was no recall of the
material learned in the earlier session and later forgotten. The experi-
ment should be repeated, especially with selected highly hypnotizable
subjects, because some pretest subjects, who were more hypnotizable
than those used in the experiment, did show more dramatic recovery
of their memories for things learned in the drugged state. There have
indeed been some reports of the recall of things said by the surgeon in
ordinary general chemoanesthesia, when later tested by hypnotic
methods (Cheek, 1966; Levinson, 1965). In these experiments the
action of the drugs was the primary consideration; hypnosis was used
merely as a method of inquiry to determine whether or not the
amnesia produced was recoverable. It makes a difference whether the
absent memories have simply not made their way into the permanent
memory store or whether they are present and in some sense disso-
ciated and unavailable to recall by ordinary methods.
One would like to know the physiology behind these states, but
the physiology of consciousness is elusive in any case. One lead that
has proved interesting is the differential function of the two hemispheres,
which, at least in the split-brain studies, represents a massive dissocia-
tion of two brains in one head (Sperry, 1968; Gazzaniga and Sperry,
1966; Gazzaniga, 1970). As these studies are carried over into the study
of normal laterality of function, it is quite possible that additional
aspects related to dissociation will emerge. For example, it has been
shown that in well-Iateralized right-handed males, a preference for
right-hemisphere function is associated with hypnotizability (Gur and
Gur, 1974). The distinction has to be made between specialization of
function and preference, for those who consistently do "right-hemi-
sphere tasks" with evidence that they are using the right hemisphere,
and "left-hemisphere tasks" with evidence that they are using the left
hemisphere, do not by these signs indicate hypnotizability. Given both
kinds of tasks, the hypnotizable right-hander tends to use his right
156 ERNEST R. HILGARD
Phantom limb pains fall into this category, that is, the pains that are felt
in an amputated limb that no longer exists. The possibility that this is
merely an illustration of the "law of specific energies," with pain
produced through stimulation of the cut ends of nerves formerly serv-
ing the limb, is not a sufficient explanation, for the pain may persist
even when the stump is anesthetized. Melzack (1973) points out that the
pain is seldom felt unless there was pain in the bodily member prior to
its loss. Hence there is perhaps a memory component that assigns the
pain to the phantom. The persistence of pain reduction, as in the
continuing effects of superficial stimulation of large fibers after the
stimulation ceases, also has to be accounted for by explanations that go
beyond any immediate sensory process of stimulation and response.
The explanation again must be in terms of some sort of persisting
process, whether peripheral or central.
There is much more that might be said about pain; for example,
many social and psychological factors are known to influence it. There
is the athlete who completes the game without being aware of his injury
until the game is over, or the wounded soldier who does not express
pain until stuck by a hypodermic needle (Beecher, 1956). The modem
"pain clinic" takes advantage of these facts and has numerous methods
by which to ease the pain of patients without the use of drugs or
surgery. Sternbach (1970, 1974) has listed a number of these such as
desensitization, progressive relaxation, biofeedback and conditioning
methods, and strategems of distracting attention, as well as hypnosis.
Our earlier experiments on laboratory pain did not distinguish
between pain and suffering, confusing the issue slightly by using an
aversive component in defining the pain scale as one on which 10
would be a pain so severe that the subject would wish to terminate it.
This did not matter for the original purposes, but it became important
when the experiments were extended to the study of the distinction
between pain and suffering.
The first published experiment from our laboratory which clearly
used the distinction was that of Knox, Morgan, and Hilgard (1974). The
experiment employed two reporting scales, one for sensory pain, one
for suffering. In the ordinary nonanalgesic hypnotic condition, the
subjects were asked for separate reports of pain and suffering at 2-
minute intervals. They found it easy to make the distinction; both pain
and suffering rose with time of ischemia, the suffering mounting more
slowly than the pain, as shown in Figure 5. To determine whether there
NEODISSOCIATION THEORY OF MULTIPLE COGNITIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS 161
12~~----------r---------.----------r---------'--'
N=8
Critical Level
IO~---------------------------
8
~
0
u
(f)
C7'
c 6
0Co
<I>
a::
4
Sensory Pain
0--0 Hypnotic Verbal (Open)
...-- Automatic Talking (Hidden)
2 Suffering
0- -{) Hypnotic Verbal (Open)
... -e Automatic Talking (Hidden)
OL-~----------L---------~--------~--------~--~
o 2 4 6 8
Minutes of Ischemia
FIGURE 5. Reports of pain and suffering in ischemia in the hypnotic nonanalgesic state.
Reports of pain and suffering were obtained every 2 minutes in the usual way and plotted
as Open reports. Immediately following each open report, a report was obtained by the
method of automatic talking and plotted as Hidden reports. In the hypnotic nonanalgesia
condition the two sets of reports are essentially alike, indicating no amnesic effect on the
open reports. (From Knox, Morgan, and Hilgard, 1974, p. 844.)
concealed under amnesia, was of almost full pain and suffering. This
was puzzling because there were no overt signs of suffering within
hypnotic analgesia, and retrospective accounts following hypnotic anal-
gesia with other subjects had indicated that the concealed pain was felt
normally in hypnotic analgesia but that it was not aversive. Some
doubts were expressed in the report about the findings. One possibility
noted there was that the hypnotic nonanalgesia may have itself resulted
in a quiescent subject, so that although the pain was normal, the
suffering was not very severe to begin with. Perhaps the report of
suffering was inferred to be the amount of suffering that ought to be felt
for that amount of pain, in view of the definition of both scales as
converging at a pain state of 10, for at that point the subject would find
the pain (hence the suffering) sufficiently aversive as to want the
experiment terminated. Owing to the repeated call for concealed reports
while the stimulation was occurring, the subject might have adopted a
practice of "sampling" the sensory pain by momentarily turning off the
analgesia and then turning it back on, inferring what suffering would
accompany that amount of pain if the analgesia were broken for a
longer time. In any case, it seemed desirable to repeat the experiment in
some other manner. A few pilot subjects have shown what the results
are likely to be; the new experiments are still in progress and a full
account is not yet available, but the direction of the results differs
enough from the reported experiment to justify some comments.
The pilot subjects of the new experiment have been run first in a
normal waking condition, rather than a nonanalgesic hypnotic one,
with reports of pain and suffering at 30-second intervals. They have
responded as the earlier subjects did, by reporting pain and suffering
both increasing with time in ischemia, with the suffering less than the
concurrent pain. Then, in another session, the ischemia was continued
with hypnotic analgesia for a sufficient time after exercising for the pain
and suffering to have become quite aversive, according to the reports
obtained without analgesia. The earlier findings were repeated: no pain
and no suffering were reported. After the ischemic arm was restored to
normal, the subject, while still hypnotized, was questioned in the
manner that provides the hidden report, breaking the amnesia for the
experience. The consistent finding with two pilot subjects has been that
the hidden sensory pain was essentially normal, reaching the level of
the non analgesic day, but the suffering was entirely absent. This contra-
dicts the results of Knox et al. (1974) but is more coherent with other
NEODISSOCIATION THEORY OF MULTIPLE COGNITIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS 163
NORMAL WAKING
Voluntary
Components
PHYSIOLOGICAL Present
CONCOMITANTS
Involuntary
Components
Present
NONANALGESIA
FIGURE 6. The dissociation between the usual verbal reports in hypnotic analgesia and
those revealed through automatic key-pressing or automatic talking, interpreted accord-
ing to an amnesia barrier. The diagram on the left represents the situation in normally
experienced pain, with the central control permitting the pain and suffering; the central
monitor is aware of all that is going on. The diagram on the right represents the situation
HYPNOSIS
Verbal
Report
Central Central
Control Monitor
------,
L- - ---'1
II
II
Pain Felt JI
I
I
I
Suffering Reduced J
or not Felt
o
Voluntary
.,
.iii
c
Components E
<l
Absent
Involuntary
Components
Present
HYPNOTIC ANALGESIA
-HIDDEN ASPECT
in hypnotic analgesia, the central control having set up the amnesia barrier, making the
experiences of pain and suffering unavailable to the central monitor. Only when the
central control releases the amnesia barrier (through the automatic methods) will the
experience of pain and reduced suffering be available to the central monitor.
way coherent with the physiological and anatomical evidence and with
one aspect of the gate-control theory. There is a dissociation here
between the normally simultaneous sensory pain and suffering.
3. Because the reduction in suffering is accompanied by a reduc-
tion in the voluntary components of the total reaction, those who favor
166 ERNEST R. HILGARD
VII. CONCLUSION
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
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5 Hypnotic Susceptibility,
EEG-Alpha, and Self-
Regulation
DAVID R. ENGSTROM
I. INTRODUCTION
173
174 DAVID R. ENGSTROM
A. Early Objectification
The oldest problem for systematic investigators of hypnosis is
response specification, that is, the identification of a set of criterion
behaviors elicited following hypnotic instructions. Many clinical prac-
ticioners of hypnosis have developed observational systems for the
assessment of responsiveness to or of depth of hypnosis. Braid (1843)
used the criterion of spontaneous amnesia for events occurring during
trance to differentia~e highly susceptible subjects. From this early
specification of a single criterion as a measure of response or state,
there developed a large number of more complex systems, specifying
discrete kinds of hypnotic states. Charcot (1882) and his co-workers
described three discrete types of hypnotic state: catalepsy, lethargy,
and somnambulism. Each was characterized by unique behavioral
attributes including waxy flexibility of the limbs, passive unrespon-
siveness, and automatic responsiveness to verbal suggestion, respec-
tively. From the time of Charcot through the end of the 19th century,
methods of scaling hypnotic susceptibility were qualitative and
evolved in two ways. First, there was the addition of many more
176 DAVID R. ENGSTROM
discrete states to earlier criteria, still with the assumption that each
state was unique and separate from the others. And second, there is
evidence of beginnings of the idea that hypnosis can be measured
unidimensionally and continually, that subjects who respond to a
given degree of depth would show all of the symptoms of lesser
degrees on the same scale (Bernheim, 1888; Liebeault, 1889).
Hilgard (1965) has suggested that, in a sense, these continuous
categories have the properties of a Guttman-type scale, in that re-
sponse at one level indicates that a subject will probably be able to
perform all of the behaviors at lower levels. Another important
characteristic of this scale is the emergence of a continuous ability
factor that varies from person to person.
Fortunately records of subjects were frequently kept by investiga-
tors in the late 19th century. Hilgard, Weitzenhoffer, Landes, and
Moore (1961) have combined these records and standardized subject
classification on a four-point scale of responsiveness. The distribution
they obtained for 14 early investigators, including 19,534 subjects in
these categories, was (1) refractory or nonsusceptible, 9%; (2) drowsy-
light, 29%; (3) hypotaxy-moderate, 36%; and (4) somnambulistic-
deep, 26%. Hilgard (1965) cautioned that there are several uncontrolla-
ble variables in such a study that would be crucial for definitive
results, including individual variations in criteria for specifying differ-
ent states, differences in induction procedures, and semantic-opera-
tional differences among hypnotists.
induction procedure, objective criteria for scoring each item, and self-
scoring by the experimenter. Because of these features, the scale has
higher interrater reliability than its predecessors.
The development and refinement of the modem hypnotic suscep-
tibility scales used in current research has built upon the progressively
more systematic methods of earlier scales. This effort has resulted in a
number of scales for different purposes which are thoroughly stand-
ardized and easily administered and have good psychometric proper-
ties. The bulk of this work has been done at the Laboratory of
Hypnosis Research at Stanford University under the direction of
Ernest R. Hilgard.
The Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scales, Forms A and B
(SHSS:A and B) were the original scales, developed by Weitzenhoffer
and Hilgard (1959) and are parallel alternate forms for repeated
measurements, when necessary. They are partly derived from earlier
scales, but with the addition of easier items to normalize the distribu-
tion of obtained scores and to avoid the piling up of scores at the
lower end of the range. The scales have 12 items, all scored on a pass-
fail basis and all given equal weights. The items included in Forms A
and B are described in Table 1. They include a "waking suggestion"
for postural sway, before eye closure, in which the hypnotist stands
behind the subject and repeatedly suggests that he will sway back-
ward into the hypnotist's arms. This item is described by the experi-
menter as a nonhypnotic suggestion, to prepare the subject for future
suggestions. The hypnotist then gives eye-closure suggestions, fol-
lowed by "deepening suggestions," intended to increase hypnotic
responsiveness once the eyes have closed. The items are presented in
a mixed sequence of difficulty, so that the subject does not reach a
plateau and meet with repeated failures beyond that point. The scale,
which has served as a prototype for others, is constructed like a good
aptitude test.
In describing the factorial composition of the SHSS:A items,
Hilgard (1965) reported that three unrotated factors account for 69% of
its total variance. These are (1) the "challenge" or "negative sugges-
tion" items, involving loss of voluntary control over bodily muscula-
ture, which accounts for 53% of the variance; (2) the direct suggestion
motor items, in which there is a muscular response to direct sugges-
tion (10% of the variance); and (3) the cognitive items, represented
......
"I
~
TABLE 1
Items on the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scales, Forms A and B"
~
=::
HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTffiILITY, EEG-ALPHA, AND SELF-REGULATION 179
B. Motivation
A. Age
The relationship between age and hypnotic susceptibility, de-
scribed earlier in this chapter, has been explored by a number of
different investigators (Barber and Calverley, 1963; London, 1965;
Moore and Lauer, 1963; Stukat, 1958). Among 240 children, London
found marked changes in responsiveness to hypnosis which were age-
related, with the maximum susceptibility scores attained between ages
9 and 14, falling slightly to stable adult levels between 14 and 16 years
of age.
A similar age-related pattern has been reported for changes in
slow-wave EEG activity. Stevens, Sachdev, and Milstein (1968) found
that the EEG in infancy and early childhood is slower and higher in
amplitude and shows less regional differentiation of wave forms than
the EEG of older children and adults. Maturation of the EEG is
gradual, and 4-7 Hz theta predominates early from all regions. By
mid-childhood (6-8 years old) a strong 8--12 Hz alpha component
appears posteriorly, and average frequency increases through the
alpha range throughout early adolescence.
Figure 1 shows fitted curves representing the developmental
patterns of both susceptibility and brain-wave changes for ages 4
through 16. Hypnotic susceptibility scores are combined means re-
ported in two studies using a standardized scale with hypnotic
induction procedures (London, 1965; Stukat, 1958). The scores from
188 DAVID R. ENGSTROM
12 12
11 11
--------
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til ~
e
N
~ 10 10
0
U
'"~
til
9 9
&l
:a
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8 8
~ 7 7 '"~
~H
e 6 6
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~
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~
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4 Alpha Rate 4
'"
H
H
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U
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1 1
0 0
4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
AGE (YEARS)
Cooper, and Hart, 1970; Ulett, Akpinar, and Hil, 1972) have related
hypnotic susceptibility to quantitative digital computer methods of
cross-spectral EEG-frequency-analysis data collection. Galbraith et al.
gave the HGSHS:A to 80 subjects and 2 weeks later selected 59 of these
to participate further in an ostensibly independent "study of brain-
waves." Quantitative EEG data were analyzed through stepwise
multiple linear regression to isolate the EEG frequencies most closely
related to susceptibility, but alpha variables did not significantly
predict susceptibility scores. Conversely, Ulett et al. found decreased
slow-wave activity (4-7 Hz) and increased alpha and very-high-
frequency superimposed beta activity (40-50 Hz) correlated with
hypnotizability, defined by the Barber Suggestibility Scale.
These results are confusing. They include significant positive
correlations and nonsignificant correlations, as well as no correlation
at all between alpha and susceptibility. Additionally there are consid-
erable data suggesting a correlation limited to especially selected
subgroups of subjects (Hartnett, Nowlis, and Svorad, 1969), particu-
larly to low susceptibles (Engstrom et al., 1970; Evans, 1972; and
Nowlis and Rhead, 1968).
Evans (1972) has correctly noted that in the only two studies in
which subjects were not told of the connection between susceptibility
and EEG measures (Evans, 1972; Galbraith et al., 1970), no correlation
was obtained.
C. EEG Asymmetry
The proposition that the two hemispheres of the brain operate
somewhat autonomously and perform different functions has resulted
in several relevant studies involving EEG differences between hemi-
spheres. Lateral asymmetry is the measured difference in electrical
activity between the same part of the two hemispheres of the cerebral
cortex, and hemispheric dominance has been shown to be related to
subjective reports of thought process and type of task.
Morgan, McDonald, and MacDonald (1971) recorded EEG alpha
activity bilaterally in a sample of 10 high-susceptible and 10 low-
susceptible subjects under task conditions designed to activate first the
left and then the right hemisphere. More alpha was recorded from the
right than the left in both conditions, and there was significantly less
alpha in the right hemisphere when it was engaged in a task.
Morgan and MacDonald (1973) found significant asymmetry in
lateral alpha between analytic and spatial tasks, and between eyes-
open baseline and eyes-open measurement during hypnotic amnesia,
in 26 right-handed subjects, but no differences were found between
low- and high-hypnotizables in the percentage difference (laterality)
measure. Results suggest a relationship between EEG asymmetry and
type of task, but not susceptibility.
D. Evoked Potentials
The sudden, high-amplitude spike responses in the EEG tracing
that typically follow presentation of an unexpected stimulus, called
evoked potentials, have been reported to be alterable by hypnotic
suggestion (Clynes, Kohn, and Lifshitz, 1963). These almost reflexive
patterns, which apparently reflect the attentional process at some
level, have enormous appeal to hypnosis researchers. Unfortunately an
abundance of recent evidence (Beck and Barolin, 1965; Beck, Dustman,
and Beier, 1966; Halliday and Mason, 1964) has failed to find a
significant relation between hypnosis and evoked potentials.
E. Conclusion
In reviewing the experimental findings on hypnotic susceptibility
and alpha, Evans (1972) has stated that "in spite of conflicting results
HYPNOTIC SusCEPTmILITY, EEG-ALPHA, AND SELF-REGULATION 193
i'
.... Eyes Closed - - - -
::<:
......
u 60f
50 Eyes Open __ _
-----
e
J>l
~
....
'"~
40
30 : -
--------, ...----...... "
-------
c:l
20
i:;] " ............ "
10
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
SESSION
FIGURE 2. Mean eyes-closed and eyes-open alpha density over
eight base-rate recordings.
TABLE 2
Mean Seconds of Alpha per 240 Seconds of EEG: Raw Scores
Training sessions
Base Posttraining:
Group rate 1 2 3 4 5 6 SHSS:B
Experimental
X 27.26 46.47 62.26 74.16 71.79 87.32 104.79 109.95
SD 16.78 35.50 45.96 44.73 43.37 35.09 35.92 39.99
Control
X 33.00 45.14 41.14 51.00 48.14 57.14 74.00 79.28
SD 35.53 26.59 20.76 22.77 23.48 30.69 46.52 54.71
198 DAVID R. ENGSTROM
six training sessions these figures represent the mean alpha output
during the initial 4-minute base-rate phase of each training session
prior to the feedback training phase. Thus they reflect the effect of the
learning from the previous session.
It had been anticipated that there would be a positive relation
between base-rate alpha output and initial hypnotic susceptibility.
The findings clearly supported this expectation. For the experimental
group, the correlation between pretraining susceptibility and pretrain-
ing base-rate alpha was .80 (p < .001); and for the control group, the
correlation was .88 (p < .05). These correlations did not differ
significantly from each other.
Both the experimental (contingent-feedback) group and the con-
trol (pseudofeedback) group increased their base-rate alpha produc-
tion over the six sessions; however, the experimental group increased
significantly more. The experimental mean was 104.79 seconds (SD =
35.92) at the beginning of the sixth training session, while the control
mean was only 74.00 seconds (SD = 46.52) at that point (Table 2). This
indicates that the training procedure was successful in increasing
alpha output.
A cursory examination of the means and variances of the two
groups over all sessions suggested that the two are related. A more
formal analysis revealed that the means and variances correlated .55 (p
< .05). Consequently, a square-root transformation (Winer, 1971) was
performed to obtain more independent sample variances. The trans-
formed means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3 (from
London, Cooper, and Engstrom, 1974).
It will be noted that the control-group means for Sessions 4 and 5
are slightly larger than the corresponding means of the experimental
group. As would be expected, however, the experimental means for
Session 6 are higher than the control means. In all training sessions,
moreover, the raw experimental means exceeded the raw control
means.
An analysis of covariance was performed between the alpha-
duration measures of the control and experimental groups for Session
6 using the base-rate measure as the covariate. The means for the two
groups differed significantly from one another (F = 4.88, dt = 1/23, p <
.05).
These findings are further supported by the alpha production
measured during the administration of the SHSS: B, which occurred
:x
~
rl
U'l
~~
;)
TABLE 3 ~
Mean Seconds of Alpha per 240 Seconds of EEG: Transformed Scores gJ
C')
Training sessions
Posttraining:
Group Base rate 1 2 3 4 5 6 SHSS:B j
Experimental
X 9.9976 16.0839 17.6393 19.3613 18.1485 19.1286 21.6227 20.6672 ~
SD 3.4202 3.7621 5.0845 4.3688 5.0984 4.4831 3.8810 3.9326 ~
Control ~
X 10.3268 16.7366 22.07?3 18.7929 20.5162 21.1919 19.5416 17.0718
SD 5.6471 6.0159 4.0437 4.1985 3.9075 1.7465 3.0782 5.6838
(
Z
,.....
\0
\0
200 DAVID R. ENGSTROM
TABLE 4
Means and Standard Deviations of Number of Seconds of Alpha Production
per 240 Seconds during Training Phase and Correlation with Base-Rate Alpha
Production
Session
Statistic 1 2 3 4 5 6
Experimental group
X 69.11 82.26 100.00 90.21 98.05 119.89
SD 29.96 39.91 39.94 46.59 42.35 40.63
r with base-rate alpha .66" .83" .53" .82" .72" .75"
Control group
X 79.29 128.00 98.00 11D.43 115.71 97.00
SD 53.89 45.21 47.19 40.82 18.69 32.07
r with base-rate alpha -.14 .59 .58 .52 .48 .33
.p < .05.
after the sixth session. The raw mean number of seconds of alpha per
240 seconds was 109.95 (SD = 39.99) for the experimental group, while
for the control group it was only 79.28 (SD = 54.71).
An analysis of covariance was performed between the correspond-
ing transformed means of the alpha measures (obtained during the
administration of the SHSS: B) by use of the base-rate measure as the
covariate. These differed significantly from one another (F = 4.45, df =
1/23, P < .05).
A more striking perspective of the differential effects of the
training procedures on the two groups can be noted in the alpha
production during the actual training itself, rather than during the 4-
minute base rate of each session. The latter was thought to be the
more conservative measure of the effects of feedback and, as indi-
cated, did yield different results for the experimental and control
groups.
Table 4 presents the mean alpha production per 240 seconds of
both groups during the actual feedback and the correlation for each
group between its feedback alpha production and its base-rate alpha
production in each session. There is a fairly steady monotonic
increase in the mean alpha production of the experimental group over
the six sessions, but there are large and erratic variations for the control
group. The variations of the control group are certainly not typical of
HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTffiILITY, EEG-ALPHA, AND SELF-REGULATION 201
experimenter. The means of the combined scale scores were 10.7, 2.6,
and 2.3 for each group of 10 subjects. Each of the 30 subjects was
scheduled for two laboratory sessions, spaced 1-4 days apart.
At the first session, on the day after individual susceptibility
screening, base-rate EEG and EMG measures were taken for each
subject.
Both EEG and EMG signals were input to a Grass Model 7
polygraph. Amplified output was displayed on a strip-chart recorder
for on-line monitoring, and amplified EEG and EMG signals were put
into two EPUT meters which were set to indicate the percentage of
time of brain-wave activity in the alpha range and the EMG activity in
microvolts, peak-to-peak, for each 5-minute trial. The subjects were
told to relax, sit still, and close their eyes, while 5 minutes of occipital
(02 ) EEG and frontalis EMG records were taken simultaneously.
On the second visit each subject was told that he would be given
approximately 45 minutes to become acquainted with the laboratory
surroundings. During this time 10 unsusceptible subjects were each
exposed to 45 minutes of observational information and coaching in
hypnosis. Two identical 45-minute presentations were videotaped
with a male and a female model presented to same-sex subjects. The
information presented was divided into the following general cate-
gories: (1) verbal modeling cues, consisting of both disinhibitory
information and facilitative information, 18 minutes (adapted from
Diamond, 1972); (2) motivational information, 7 minutes; (3) coaching
in the role skills involved in hypnosis and the behavior expected from
a hypnotized subject, 20 minutes. The other 20 subjects (10 susceptible
and 10 un susceptible) were left alone to read magazines or study in
the laboratory during the time. Although a monitor was present in the
room during the time, the subjects were instructed not to interact with
him. At the end of this time EEG and EMG electrodes were again
attached to each subject and a blind experimenter administered a
standardized hypnotic trance induction adapted from the SHSS:A,
with additional deepening instructions. During this 20-minute induc-
tion, 5-minute EEG and EMG records were taken at 5- and IS-minute
intervals. After trance induction and a 5-minute rest period, all
subjects were given the SHSS: B.
The results are presented in Table 5, Base-rate alpha was signifi-
cantly higher for the susceptible group than for either group of
unsusceptibles (p < .01), duplicating earlier findings that base-rate
N
~
TABLE 5
Changes in Mean Susceptibility Scores before and after Treatment and in Alpha Density prior to and during Hypnotic
Induction
~
HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTIBILITY, EEG-ALPHA, AND SELF-REGULATION 207
TABLE 6
Mean Maximum Bilateral Temperature Differences and Mean Changes in EEG Alpha Density during Test Periods for All
Subjects and Conditions
Temperature
difference during test Alpha during test Significance of change
Group (F') Base-rate alpha (%) period (%) Change (%) (one-tailed)
7 100 100
1\,
"
75 I
I ,
I ,
50
,, , 50
~
H
Ul
ffi
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-------- 25 25
1 1
a -+--------10 a a
a b
1 2 3 1 2 3
TEST PERIOD TEST PERIOD
7 100 7
100
75
,/
I
50
,I
I
50
~
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~
I
I
I ""
I
...... ... I
I
25 25
1 1
O~----------------~ 0-11--------------10
c d
1 2 3 1 2 3
TEST PERIOD TEST PERIOD
FIGURE 3. Mean bilateral skin temperature and alpha density scores for all subjects over
three test periods: (a) unsusceptible/hypnosis group, (b) Susceptible/hypnosis group, (c)
unsusceptible/biofeedback group, (d) susceptible/biofeedback group. - - Tempera-
ture, - - - - alpha density.
HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTIBILITY, EEG-ALPHA, AND SELF-REGULATION 215
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
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6 Toward a Cognitive
Theory of Self-Control
DONALD MEICHENBAUM
I. INTRODUCTION
223
224 DONALD MEICHENBAUM
Let me first state the general conclusions that have issued from
our treatment research; then we can explore each of them in more
detail. First, it has become increasing clear that there are a host of
different ways to view our clients' cognitions but that at present we
have few or no data to determine the relative merit or long-term
effectiveness of these different approaches. A related point is that no
matter how one views his client's cognitions, the distinction between
a purely behavioral versus a cognitive intervention program is mis-
leading and mistaken. Perhaps we can help put to rest the false
distinction between behavioral and cognitive therapies by an interac-
tional model, in which the behavioral and the cognitive processes that
underlie change are interdependent.
Another general conclusion is that therapeutic change comes
about by means of a sequential, mediating process, in which (1) the
client becomes aware of his maladaptive intra- and interpersonal
behaviors; (2) this self-recognition is the occasion for the client to emit
a set of incompatible images and self-statements and incompatible
behaviors; (3) finally, what the client says to himself (i.e., his
appraisals, attributions, self-statements, and images), following the
emission of the new behavioral act and its accompanying conse-
quences, will influence the nature and stability of the change. As far
as we, as therapists, can anticipate and subsume the content of the
client's internal dialogue in our treatment package, we will be that
much more effective. By analogy, the neurological concept of final
common pathway explains how behavior change follows from diverse
therapy procedures. It is suggested that clients who see therapists of
wholly different persuasions go through similar psychological proc-
esses in achieving behavioral change. The final common pathway to
behavior change is the alteration in the internal dialogues in which
our clients engage.
The final and perhaps the most important conclusion is that we as
TOWARD A COGNITIVE THEORY OF SELF-CONTROL 225
1. Cognitions as Behaviors
How shall we treat our client's cognitions? Shall we view the
client's thoughts that precede, accompany, and follow the maladaptive
226 DONALD MEICHENBAUM
Okay, what is it I have to do? You want me to copy the picture with
the different lines. I have to go slowly and carefully. Okay, draw the line
down, down, good; then to the right, that's it; now down some more and
to the left. Good, I'm doing fine so far. Remember, go slowly. Now back
up again. No, I was supposed to go down. That's okay. Just erase the line
carefully . . . Good. Even if I make an error I can go on slowly and
carefully. I have to go down now. Finished. I did it!
In the thinking-out-Ioud phase the model displays several per-
formance-relevant skills: (1) problem definition ("What is it I have to
do?"); (2) focusing attention plus response guidance ("Be care-
ful ... draw the line down."); (3) self-reinforcement ("Good, I'm
doing fine."); and (4) self-evaluative coping skills plus error-correcting
options ("That's okay, even if I make an error I can go slowly.").
Such training, provided over a number of different tasks, was
successful in causing hyperactive children to learn to think before they
act, to employ mediational processes, and to develop verbal control of
behavior (Meichenbaum and Goodman, 1971). A number of other
investigators have also successfully trained children to bring their
behavior under self-instructional and imagery control (d. Bem, 1967;
Palkes, Stewart, and Kahana, 1968; Blackwood, 1970; Ridberg, Parke,
and Hetherington, 1971; Monahan and O'Leary, 1971; Palkes, Stewart,
and Freedman, 1972; Denny, 1972; Hartig and Kanfer, 1973; Mischel,
1974; Schneider, 1974). In each of these studies self-control was
enhanced as the involuntary act was made voluntary. This was
accomplished as the child's behavior was brought under his own
cognitive control through the emission of deliberate self-statements
and images. Then, with the development of task proficiency, or what
Kimble and Perlmutter (1970) call the "automatization of voluntary
acts," the child's private speech became more abrupt, incomplete, and
whispered and then completely vanished. This process of abbreviation
and interiorization of private speech also applies to adults as they
acquire skills. For example, one can imagine a similar sequence in the
learning of a new motor skill such as driving a car. As Henry Murray
(1938) noted some years ago;
When one is learning to drive an automobile, one is, at first, aware of
every accessory intention and subsequent motor movement, but later,
when proficiency has been attained, the details of the activity are seldom
in consciousness. (p. 51)
Thus the therapist can assess the role of his client's cognitions as
part of the response chain and help his client produce intentional,
adaptive cognitions (Le., self-instructions and images) that will inter-
rupt the maladaptive behavioral chain and foster incompatible, adap-
tive behavior. It should be noted that the client must learn to use his
own behaviors, feelings, and thoughts as well as the behavior of
others as cues or signals to engage in this newly acquired, internal
dialogue. The importance of self-observation in the change process
will be more fully discussed below.
A research area that may prove most heuristically valuable for the
behavior modifier who is interested in such cognitive manipulations
is the work on mental practice. Richardson (1967a,b) has summarized
a considerable body of evidence that indicates that in a variety of
different physical tasks, subjects improve their performance after
spending varying amounts of time in "thinking about" or imagining
themselves in the act of performing. Increased motivation as a result of
mental practice and increased task sophistication, analogous to test
sophistication, might account for improvement. The importance of
internalizing a very clear model of what a good performance of the
task is like is indicated by the fact that the more familiar a task has
become the greater the relative gain that can be expected from mental
practice. Thus an examination of such factors as the degree of task
familiarity, accuracy of anticipated outcomes, clarity and control of
visual and kinesthetic imagery, degree of proficiency on the task,
length of time provided for imagery, and the alternation of mental and
physical practice, which have been found to be important in the
mental practice area, is likely to be of importance to the cognitive-
behavior therapist.
behavior and the cognitions will take their natural course. Haven't you
heard the old adage, "It is easier to act your way into a new way of
thinking, than to think your way into a new way of acting"? Can
behavior therapy be viewed as simply as the adage suggests? Indeed
not! It is suggested that cognitions play a substantial role in the
change process. It is proposed that there is an interactional process
between cognitions and behaviors, one preceding and following the
other. Each time we attempt to modify some aspect of the client's
behavior (e.g., teaching him to become more interpersonally assertive
or to exert self-control in areas of eating or smoking), the client is also
changing his internal dialogue or what he says to himself. The
evidence as reviewed by Mahoney (1974) and Meichenbaum (1973)
suggests that treatment efficacy is enhanced when the client's internal
dialogue is incorporated into the treatment regimen. Even in such
behavioral therapy procedures as operant conditioning, the client's
perceptions or attributions or what he says to himself about the
dispensed reinforcement influence the outcome. (For example, see
work of de Charms, 1968, Deci, 1971, and Steiner, 1970.) Bandura
(1974), in his APA presidential address, also questioned the automat-
icity of reinforcing consequences in the absence of mediating cogni-
tive processes:
So-called conditioned reactions are largely self-activated on the basis of
learned expectations rather than automatically evoked. The critical factor,
therefore, is'not that events occur together in time, but that people learn to
predict them and to summon up appropriate anticipatory reactions. (p. 2)
The Singer quote nicely illustrates two points that I would like to
make. First, in order to bring about change, the client must recognize
some behavior that he emits (e.g., a set of thoughts, images, and
physiological and motoric responses) or the interpersonal response of
someone else. This recognition is the necessary but not sufficient
condition for change. This recognition, this self-awareness, acts as the
cue, the bell ringer, the discriminative stimulus for producing a set of
incompatible thoughts and behavior. Following therapy the client no
longer responds impulsively, in a stimulus-response manner, to
externally or internally generated events. Instead, a mediational proc-
ess is elicited by stimuli and such internal processes now precede the
emission of the overt response. Insofar as stimuli or situations elicit
the same mediational processes or internal dialogue, the treatment
effects will generalize. It should be noted that generalization is
engineered into the treatment package. For now the client's own
maladaptive behavior is always the reminder to use the coping skills
that were taught in therapy.
What incompatible thoughts and behavior the client emits at this
TOWARD A COGNITIVE THEORY OF SELF-CONTROL 239
point vary with the orientation of the therapy and the nature of the
conceptualization that has evolved between patient and therapist. The
client's internal dialogue may be in terms of pscyhoanalytic interpreta-
tions as in the Singer example, or learned response habits a la Wolpe,
or faulty belief systems a la Ellis. Indeed it is suggested that our clients
have sufficient life experiences to provide data consistent with any
one of these therapy conceptualizations, whether psychoanalytic,
Jungian, Rogerian, Gestalt, semantic, or behavioral. The human life
condition provides sufficient experience to maintain the employment
of a host of therapists of widely different persuasions. The important
point is that our clients have a need to fabricate a meaning, some
understanding, a conceptualization about what is happening to them
and what can be done to help them to change. What becomes essential
for the cognitive-behavior therapist is how to have the client adopt a
conceptualization of his problem that will lead to specific behavioral
and cognitive changes that can be transferred to real-life situations.
This leads me to the important role of the initial, conceptualization
phase in therapy.
A. A Three-Stage Process
1. Stage 1: Self-Observation
Once the client has become an observer of his behavior and these
self-observations have been reinforced by, and in tum, reinforce, the
conceptualization process, the second stage in the change process
occurs. The process of self-observation becomes the occasion or
stimulus for the client to emit different cognitions and behaviors. This
point was illustrated before, with the quote from Singer's book. The
content of what the client now says to himself will vary with the
conceptualization that emerged in therapy. If the client's behavior is to
change, then what he now says to himself, and/or imagines, must
initiate a new behavioral chain, one which is incompatible with his
maladaptive behaviors.
The third step in the change process, what the client says to
himself about his newly acquired behaviors, determines whether the
behavioral change will be maintained and will generalize. As the
246 DONALD MEICHENBAUM
4. Summary
But how exactly does changing the client's internal dialogue lead
to behavior change? The answer to this question is surely complex.
Indeed, there are likely to be a number of answers, given the
heterogeneity of private speech. In part, if will depend upon which
popUlation and which behaviors one is trying to change. The psychol-
ogical mechanisms involved in altering the internal dialogue of hyper-
active children, versus adult psychotics, versus adult neurotics, may
be quite different. We may find value in developing a number of
minitheories of verbal control of behavior.
the present theory is, then, that changing the client's internal dialogue
effects behavior change specifically by causing differential attentional
behaviors.
The literature on the effect of instructional sets of autonomic
functioning indicates that changing the client's style of self-instruc-
tions can have directive physiological effects (Barber, 1965; May and
Johnson, 1973; Platonov, 1959; Schwartz, 1971; Sternbach, 1964; Zim-
bardo, 1969). Cognitive activity has been suggested as a mediational
factor (Le., facilitator or inhibitor) in operant, autonomic condition-
ing. Katkin and Murray (1968) proposed that an internal source of
stimulation, rather than the external, experimenter-controlled reinfor-
cers, may be controlling the autonomic responses. The subject may be
involved in arousing or inhibiting subvocal activity (thinking), which
produces a previously conditioned autonomic response. An illustra-
tion of the role of cognitive set is the work on emotion by Schachter
(1966), who provided evidence for the important role that the client's
restructuring of a situation plays in mediating behavior. In our own
research the clients, following cognitive-behavior modification treat-
ment, came to label their physiological arousal as facilitative rather
than debilitative (Meichenbaum, 1972; Wine, 1970). Sweaty palms,
increased heart and respiratory rates, and muscular tension now
became allies, bell ringers, cues to use the coping techniques for
which they had been trained. The physiological arousal that the
client had previously labeled as totally debilitating anxiety and fear,
the harbinger of further behavior deterioration leading to feelings of
helplessness, was now relabeled as eagerness to demonstrate his
competence, as a desire to get on with a task, and as a sign to cope.
The result was a change to a sense of "learned resourcefulness,"
replacing a sense of "learned helplessness." In other words, the client
learns to respond to the same physiological cues when they do arise
with different cognitions: originally he entertained cognitions that
mediated further autonomic arousal (e.g., "I'm really nervous; I'm
sweating; others will see it; I can't handle this"); after treatment, his
cognitions have a coping orientation and move the focus away from
his arousal toward response alternatives. This shift in cognitions in
itself may mediate a shift in autonomic functioning.
The present theory postulates that it is not the physiological
arousal per se that is debilitating, but rather what the client says to
himself about that arousal that determines his eventual reactions. The
TOWARD A COGNITIVE THEORY OF SELF-CONTROL 251
IV. SUMMARY
The alternative ways the therapist may view his clients' cogni-
tions were reviewed. These included cognitions as behaviors, auto-
matic thoughts, and thus part of the response chain, reflections of
cognitive styles and faulty belief systems, inadequate problem-solving
and coping skills, and defense mechanisms. Each conceptualization
leads to different therapeutic interventions. However, it was sug-
gested that even though the therapy procedures differ in emphasis
and techniques, clients go through a similar cognitive process in
254 DONALD MEICHENBAUM
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Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1973.
MEICHENBAUM, D. Examination of model characteristics in reducing avoidance behav-
ior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971,17,298-307.
MEICHENBAUM, D. Cognitive modification of test anxious college students. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1972, 39, 370-380.
MEICHENBAUM, D. Cognitive factors in behavior modification: Modifying what clients
say to themselves. In C. FRANKS AND T. WILSON (Eds.), Annual review of behavior
therapy: Theory and practice. New York: Bruner/Maze!, 1973.
MEICHENBAUM, D. Cognitive behavior modification. Morristown, N. J.: General Learning
Press, 1974a.
MEICHENBAUM, D. Self-instructional training: A cognitive prosthesis for the aged.
Human Development, 1974b, 17, 27~280.
MEICHENBAUM, D. Therapist manual for cognitive behavior modification. Unpublished
manuscript, University of Waterloo, 1974c.
MEICHENBAUM, D. A self-instructional approach to stress management: A proposal for
stress inoculation training. In C. SPEILBERGER AND 1. SARASON (Eds.), Stress and
anxiety in modern life. New York: Winston and Sons, 1975a.
MEICHENBAUM, D. Self-instructional methods. In F. KANFER AND A. GOLDSTEIN (Eds.),
Helping people change. New York: Pergamon Press, 1975b.
MEICHENBAUM, D., AND CAMERON, R. An examination of cognitive and contingency
variables in anxiety relief procedures. Unpublished manuscript, University of
Waterloo, 1973a.
258 DONALD MEICHENBAUM
THOMAS D. BORKOVEC
For the past five years we have been engaged in a program of research
whose ultimate goal has been the development and evaluation of
therapeutic methods for reducing anxiety. A basic assumption under-
lying our work has been that the successful evolution of such strate-
gies will be facilitated by advances in our knowledge about the nature
of anxiety itself. Consequently the majority of the research has
attempted to identify basic conditions (environmental and subject)
that serve to maintain or reduce the anxiety response.
In the present chapter I would like to share with you a descriptive
model of anxiety process that has guided our research and studies
from our program that relate to portions of that model. As will become
clear later on, the central focus emerging from our work has been the
role of physiological arousal, cognitive processes, their interaction,
and the importance of individual differences in those variables in
determining the maintenance and the reduction of anxiety.
An early, behavioristic account of anxiety suggested an essentially
physiological model based on simple Pavlovian conditioning. Re-
peated pairings of a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned
stimulus (UCS) ultimately result in the elicitation of a conditioned
response (CR) by the CS alone. In the aversive conditioning situation,
that CR involves both autonomic and skeletal responses. Maintenance
of the CS-CR relationship is viewed as a function of the frequency and
intensity of CS-UCS presentations. Extinction is a simple matter of
repetitious CS presentation in the absence of the UCS. The model was
THOMAS D. BORKOVEC Department of Psychology, University of Iowa, Iowa City,
Iowa.
261
262 THOMAS D. BORKOVEC
it seems necessary to assume that there are two basic learning processes: The
process whereby the solutions to problems, i.e., ordinary "habits," are
acquired; and the process whereby emotionalleaming, or "conditioning,"
takes place. (p. 114)
behavior therapy researchers and has been the point of departure for
our own hypothesis. Specifically, we are concerned with the response-
produced feedback arising from the CR and stressed by Mowrer in
establishing the drive properties of anxiety which motivate skeletal
coping responses. Four additional considerations have contributed to
our developing model, however. First, the important work of Schach-
ter (1964) has indicated that specific emotional experience and behav-
ior may be mediated by the subject's interpretation of his own
physiological arousal and the extant environmental cues. The subse-
quent influence of his theory and research has been broadly felt, with
numerous writers such as Beck, Epstein, Lazarus, Mandler, and
Spielberger (d. Spielberger, 1972) emphasizing a central role for
cognitive factors in current anxiety theory. We feel that such a
cognitive model offers important dimensions to the role of CR feed-
back in human anxiety. Second, all of the previous learning models
assume that extinction of anxious behavior will take place as long as
feared stimuli are presented, avoidance precluded, and the UCS
absent. In clinical work, however, it is clear that the anxious client
often confronts the feared situation repeatedly in his daily life and yet
anxiety maintains despite the absence of skill deficits, overt coping
responses, or clear aversive consequences from the environment.
Among several alternatives there are two positions regarding these
observations that have interested us. Mowrer's model might be
extended to allow the substitution of cognitive avoidance behavior for
overt instrumental behavior. Alternately there may be conditions of
nonreinforced CS exposure which do not lead to extinction. Very little
direct data from anxious humans have been collected relevant to these
hypotheses. Third, while the physiological component has long been
central in behavioral definitions of anxiety, the investigation of
physiological variables has been relatively ignored. Renewed empha-
sis on its functional role in theories of anxiety appears to be appropri-
ate. Finally, although individual differences have entered into various
general theories of anxiety (e.g., Spielberger's A-trait; Taylor'S Mani-
fest Anxiety Scale), little attention has been devoted to the functional
importance of those differences in the behavior therapy literature. The
absence of that consideration has contributed to a great deal of
ambiguity regarding the theoretical mechanisms both of treatment
techniques and of the anxiety response itself.
264 THOMAS D. BORKOVEC
8
~
TABLE 1 no
A Descriptive Model of Anxiety Process ~
Subsequent maintaining and reducing
Current stimulus conditions Immediate anxiety reaction reactions
~
'"0
Z
~
o>rJ
~
N
8;
266 THOMAS D. BORKOVEC
lc. Physiological Reactions to Fear Cues May Set the Occasion for
Subsequent Overt Behavior Which Maintains the Anxiety Response.
mon's (1967) review found weak support for the mediational hypothe-
sis. But their conclusion was only that CRs are not required for
avoidance behavior. There is evidence that CRs may serve such a
mediational role, and these authors readily admitted that avoidance
may be "mediated by a complex of CRs, both autonomic and skeletal;
no one of these may be necessary for operant behavior, but each
contributes to that behavior" (p. 163). It is sufficient for our purposes
that there is some evidence for CR mediation (e.g., Gantt and
Dykman, 1957; Black, 1959), not as a necessary condition but as a
potentially sufficient contributor to avoidance behavior.
3c. Immediate Fear Behavior May Set the Occasion for Continued Fear
Behavior.
D. Intervention Strategies
iors have been employed: snake phobias and social anxiety. In the
course of our research, it has been found that these two groups are
quite different in two important respects. First, the behavioral compo-
nent of the fear reaction of snake phobics, as typically selected in
outcome research, is very susceptible to modification by demandi
suggestion (Borkovec, 1973a; Bernstein, 1973). Simply ask the subject
(implicitly or explicitly) to show behavioral improvement and suggest
that he will be less anxious, and reduced behavioral fear will be
observed. The fear behavior of socially anxious subjects has not been
so influenced (Borkovec, Stone, O'Brien, and Kaloupek, 1974). Second,
on rare occasions when physiological measurement has been obtained
during snake avoidance tests (e.g., Borkovec, 1973a; Craighead, 1973),
maximal average heart rate has been no greater than 96 beats per
minute. In studies of speech and social anxiety, similar measurements
have revealed increases in arousal typically between 113 and 118 beats
per minute (Borkovec, Wall, and Stone, 1974; Borkovec, Stone,
O'Brien, and Kaloupek, 1974; Singerman, 1974). On the basis of the
demand studies, it is clear that the use of snake phobics requires
controls for demand and suggestion effects. What often appears to be
fear reduction in therapy outcome studies with this target behavior
may often simply reflect the influence of extratherapeutic variables on
avoidance behavior. On the basis of the heart-rate data, it is equally
clear that the physiological response will oridinarily be a relevant fear
component in studies involving social anxiety and an irrelevant
component in those employing snake phobias. Since we have used
both targets, we have had an opportunity to observe the effects of
physiological and cognitive manipulations on two anxiety problems
differing in the extent to which the physiological response is function-
ally relevant. In the following presentation of research studies, there-
fore, I will refer to investigations with low physiological reactors
(snake phobics) and high physiological reactors (social- and speech"
anxious subjects).
These two characteristics (demand/suggestion susceptibility and
level of physiological arousal) appear to be related to each other and
give rise to one of the central theses of our work. To the extent that the
immediate anxiety reaction involves a weak physiological component,
simple manipulations of the cognitive and behavioral components of
fear (such as demandisuggestion) will be effective in changing those
components. To the extent that the immediate anxiety reaction in-
278 THOMAS D. BORKOVEC
ing during the slide presentation task indicated that pretested subjects
displayed significantly greater heart-rate reactivity to the snake slides
than did nonpretested subjects regardless of feedback conditions. The
original predictions of the study were based on the notion that fear
occurring during an in vivo pretest would mitigate the effects of
feedback manipulations during symbolic CS presentations. Under
those conditions the only modified cognition that might result would
be, "I am afraid of the actual snake, but I am not afraid of slides-
of snakes." In addition, however, the heart-rate data during slide
presentations suggested that in vivo exposure to the feared situ-
ation sensitized the subject to symbolic presentations of that feared
object and resulted in maintained autonomic arousal during those
presentations.
In terms of the descriptive model, symbolic CS presentations were
paired with a tape-recorded sound. Depending on whether the sounds
were labeled as noise or physiological arousal, the subject's subse-
quent cognitive interpretation either was irrelevant to his fear and
therefore to its modification or was relevant and resulted in reduced
fear. This effect importantly occurred only on the behavioral compo-
nent of anxiety and only in the absence of a pretest exposure. Such an
outcome suggests that cognitive manipulations regarding physiologi-
cal cues will be effective only if subjects are low physiological reactors.
The fact that pretest exposure both increased actual physiological
arousal and mitigated the effects of the cognitive manipulation sug-
gests that in vivo presentations can lead to arousal maintenance to
both symbolic CS exposures and subsequent in vivo exposures, even
among subjects who ordinarily display little physiological reactivity to
the feared stimulus. Thus while false feedback experiments may
supply evidence for the role of physiological cues in maintenance or
modification of fear, actual physiological arousal may produce an
overriding effect.
feared situation, fear behavior maintained. Given the Valins and Ray
and the Borkovec and Glasgow studies demonstrating posttest behav-
ioral differences subsequent to feedback tasks and the above study
demonstrating a lag in false feedback effects during repeated expo-
sures to the feared situation, some process must occur between the
feedback experience and the subsequent exposure to the feared
situation to result in maintenance of behavioral anxiety. If phYSiologi-
cal feedback is considered to be a response-produced stimulus and if,
in agreement with Eysenck (1968), such conditioned responses may
serve as aversive stimuli, then it can be hypothesized that awareness
of the physiological component of the CR can in itself serve to
maintain fear behavior during nonreinforced CS presentations. False
physiological feedback may then facilitate or maintain fear because of
its similarity to actual history of experience with real feedback,
assumed to contain aversive properties. An alternative hypothesis in
line with Valins and Ray's theory regarding systematic desensitization
is that internal cuing sets the occasion for verbal mediators generated
by the subject in response to perceived autonomic functioning. In the
case of the speech-anxiety study, subjects in the heart-rate-increasing
condition had an opportunity during the preparation period prior to
the third speech and subsequent to the feedback speech to verbalize to
themselves interpretation and/or evaluation of their arousal as repre-
sented by the false feedback. Focusing of attention on such cognitions
stimulated by the false feedback experience may have disrupted the
preparation of a subsequent speech, or the cognitions themselves
elicited additional arousal which interfered with subsequent speech
performance and increased reported anxiety.
It is important to note that self-report and behavioral-anxiety
measures of the heart-rate-decreasing and no-change conditions did
not show significantly greater reductions relative to the control condi-
tions. In contrast to snake-phobic samples, in which cognitive manip-
ulations may, under limited circumstances, result in reduced avoid-
ance behavior relative to controls, it appears necessary to modify the
strong physiological component present in speech anxiety before
cognitive interpretations can result in decreases in fear behavior. The
facilitated behavioral and self-reported fear in the heart-rate-increas-
ing condition, however, indicates that fear behavior can be main-
tained under conditions of both high actual arousal and a cognitive
interpretation of high arousal.
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 287
perspiring, and headache. When the normal samples were pooled and
compared to the clinic sample, neither female nor male patients were
found to differ significantly from normal subjects of the same sex on
total APQ score. Clinic females did score significantly higher than
their n6rmal counterparts on frequency of awareness of bodily reac-
tions and muscle tension. Clinic males displayed significantly higher
scores than normal males on frequency of awareness, lump in throat,
upset stomach, and bothersomeness of the bodily reactions, while
they scored significantly lower on perception of hot face and perspira-
tion. The greater frequency of awareness of bodily reactions among
the clinic samples suggests the particular relevance of those cues to
clinical problems.
TABLE 2
APQ Item Means for Females and Males from Normal and Clinic Samples
a I-tests (p < .05) for same-sex scores between clinic sample and pooled normal samples.
I-tests (p < .05) for between-sex scores within a sample.
292 THOMAS D. BORKOVEC
TABLE 3
Mean Latency in Touching Feared Object (in Seconds) and
Pulse-Rate Change Scores (Beats/Minute) for Low and High
Autonomic Perceivers in the Three Attention-Focusing
Conditions
Attention-focusing condition
Latency
Low 11.3 14.0 29.5
High 33.6 17.8 10.3
Pulse-rate change
Low -1.16 -4.56 6.28
High 5.72 0.0 -3.44
TABLE 4
APQ Items and Labels Associated with Extreme (0 and 9) Scores
weighted scores for each type. The arrays were then converted to z-
scores, which represent the degree to which each item contributes to
the characterization of a given type (cf. Talbott, 1971).
In Sample 1, the APQ item scores from 100 female and 100 male
students from the 1971 spring semester were randomly selected and
submitted to the Q analysis. Sample 2 (100 females and the remaining
81 males from the same semester) was similarly analyzed. Finally,
cross-validation Sample 3 of 100 females and 100 males was randomly
selected from the 1971 fall semester. Because of significant differences
between sexes on specific APQ items (see Table 2), analyses of female
and male data were performed separately. While various solutions
were calculated, a three-factor solution was chosen for simplicity of
presen tation.
Table 4 provides a summary of the 21 APQ items and the labels
associated with extreme scores (0 and 9) as a reference for subsequent
figures and tables. Figures 1-5 present the z-score profile types for
3.0
0-0 Sample # I
2.0 . - . Sample # 2
. - - . Sample # 3
/.0
ILl
a:
0
(.)
rJ)
0
-/.O
-2.0
-3.0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
APQ ITEM
FIGURE 1. Type I z-score profiles of APQ items from the three normal-female samples.
300 THOMAS D. BORKOVEC
3.0
2.0
UJ
1.0
I ",e---\ I I \ ~
Y"
0: I I I \
0 \ I \ .,-
(.) 0 I I ." \ 0
(J)
II 1I II \ 0.,
N
I :::~\.~I /"J{./~ ,,\'6/j~ 0 \
-1.0
\\ ,,
\ ,
I\ 0-l,v../-- \ /
I \
1/
Q \
I I
\ I
-2.0 II
-3.0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1---'
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
APQ ITEM
FIGURE 2. Type II z-score profiles of APQ items from the three normal-female samples.
females and males which resulted from the Q analysis and which were
replicated in all three samples. In the description of each profile, those
APQ items whose z-scores were above + 1.0 and were replicated at
that z-score level across emerging factors in all three samples were
considered to be particularly characteristic of that profile, while items
whose z-scores were below -1.0 and were replicated across samples
were considered uncharacteristics of that profile.
Figure 1 presents Type I female profiles from the three samples.
The displayed profiles, emerging as the first factor type in each sample
analysis and accounting for the greatest amount of variance in each
sample (.155%, .139%, and .152% in Samples 1, 2, and 3, respec-
tively), are highly similar across the samples. Type I females were
found to be associated with high awareness of stomach activity and
perspiration when anxious and with low awareness of breathing and
blood rushing to the head.
Figure 2 displays Type II female profiles. The sample profiles
emerged as the second factor type in Samples 1 and 2 and as the third
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 301
3.0
2.0
1.0
UJ
0:
0
(.)
(J)
0
-1.0
-2.0
-3.0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
APQ ITEM
FIGURE 3. Type III z-score profiles of APQ items from the three normal-female samples.
302 THOMAS D. BORKOVEC
3.0
2.0
~Jrv
1.0
LLI
~\~! ~ \
0:::
0
U 0
en
N
I
-1.0 I
I
I
o lit
1/
-2.0
-3.0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
APQ ITEM
FIGURE 4. Type I z-score profiles of APQ items from the three normal-male samples.
3.0
2.0
0
p,
0 __ ,
/..~
~,,
1.0
/.,/I
A
./~\
/ \
UJ
0:: , .0 - .
' / // ):Q
0 I-
t) 0 ... , /0
<n
N \
o I ~_-.
,- \ ..p
/'
'i~
I
\ 'I \ ,\ I
-1.0
0
-2.0
-3.0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
APQ ITEM
FIGURE 5. Type II z-score profiles of APQ items from the three normal-male samples.
304 THOMAS D. BORKOVEC
TABLE 5
Z-Scores for Each of the Three Types for Female and Male Clinic Patients
reactions, and they were unassociated with awareness of hot face, cold
hands, headaches, shallow breathing, and blood rushing to the head.
Muscle tension and frequent bodily reactions were characteristic of
Type II male patients, while heart activity was uncharacteristic. Type
III involved stomach activity and mouth dryness, with low awareness
of hot face, shallow breathing, blood rushing to the head, and talking
difficulty.
Unfortunately a cross-validation sample has not yet been obtained
from the clinic population. Less confidence can, therefore, be placed
on the reliability of the patient profiles in contrast to the five (of six)
replicated types found in the normal samples. The available profiles
do suggest, however, that psychiatric patients fall into autonomic-
perception types which differ between sexes and are characterized by
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 305
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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BLANCHARD, E. B., YOUNG, L. D., AND McLEOD, P. Awareness of heart activity and self-
control of heart rate. Psychophysiology, 1972,9, 63--68.
BORKOVEC, T. D. The comparative effectiveness of systematic desensitization and
implosive therapy and the effect of expectancy manipulation on the elimination of
fear. Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois (Urbana), 1970.
BORKOVEC, T. D. Effects of expectancy on the outcome of systematic desensitization and
implosive treatments for analogue anxiety. Behavior Therapy, 1972,3,29--40.
BORKOVEC, T. D. The effects of instructional suggestion and physiological cues on
analogue fear. Behavior Therapy, 1973a,4, 185-192.
BORKOVEC, T. D. The role of expectancy and physiological feedback in fear research: A
review with special reference to subject characteristics. Behavior Therapy, 1973b,4,
491-505.
BORKOVEC, T. D. Heart-rate process during systematic desensitization and implosive
therapy for analogue anxiety. Behavior Therapy, 1974,5, 636--641.
BORKOVEC, T. D., FLEISCHMANN, D. J., AND CAPUTO, J. A. The measurement of anxiety in
analogue social situation. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1973,41, 157-
161.
BORKOVEC, T. D., AND GLASGOW, R. E. Boundary conditions of false heart-rate feedback
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and Therapy, 1973,11, 171-177.
BORKOVEC, T. D., KALOUPEK, D. G., AND SLAMA, K. The facilitative effect of muscle
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BORKOVEC, T. D., STONE, N. M., O'BRmN, G. T., AND KALOUPEK, D. G. Evaluation of a
clinically relevant target behavior for analogue outcome research. Behavior Therapy,
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BORKOVEC, T. D., WALL, R. L., AND STONE, N. M. False physiological feedback and the
maintenance of speech anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1974,83, 164-168.
BOULOUGOURIS, J. c., MARKS, I. M., AND MARSET, P. Superiority of flooding (implosion)
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BRESNITZ, S. Incubation of threat: Duration of anticipation and false alarm as determi-
nants of the fear reaction to an unavoidable frightening event. Journal of Experimen-
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BYRNE, D. The repression-sensitization scale: Rationale, reliability, and validity. Journal
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CAUTELA, J., FLANNERY, R, AND HANLEY, E. Covert modeling: An experimental test.
Behavior Therapy, 1974,5, 494--502.
CRAIGHEAD, W. E. The role of muscular relaxation in systematic desensitization. In R D.
RUBIN, J. P. BRADY, AND J. D. HENDERSON (Eds.), Advances in behavior therapy (Vol.
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DmNSTBmR, R A., AND MUNTER, P. O. Cheating as a function of labeling of natural
arousal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 17, 208-213.
ELLIS, A. Rational psychotherapy. Journal of General Psychology, 1958,59,35-49.
EYSENCK, H. J. A theory of the incubation of anxiety/fear responses. Behaviour Research
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310 THOMAS D. BORKOVEC
DAVID B. COHEN
This chapter organizes into three sections diverse strategies for the
empirical investigation of dreaming. The first is addressed to the
question of how the dream becomes known to the individual and the
investigator though the process of recall. The second deals with the
assumption that dreaming reflects or represents in an explicable
fashion factors such as personality traits, interpersonal events, and
physiological activity. The third discusses two hypotheses: (1) that
dreaming is a psychological process which can be studied apart from
the neurophysiological process of sleep and (2) that dreaming is a
functional process, specifically that dreaming is adaptive. For purposes
of discussion, dreaming refers to a psychological process (analogous to
thinking) presumably inherent in the neurophysiological activity of
the sleeping nervous system. Dream or dream experience refers to
conscious awareness of dreaming while it is occurring. The dream
report refers to the communication about a dream.
1. DREAM RECALL
313
314 DAVID B. COHEN
(1953) concluded "that during the night the resistance loses some of its
power ... [and] ... having gained its full strength at the moment of
awakening, it at once proceeds to get rid of what it was obliged to
permit while it was weak" (p. 526). Modem empirical research has
attempted to validate this general hypothesis about dream recall by
testing the following kinds of hypotheses: (1) infrequent dream
recallers should be repressors and (2) presleep stress designed to
increase the probability of generating dreams that are "candidates for
repression" (Goodenough, 1967, p. 139) will, especially for repressor-
type subjects, be associated with a diminution of dream recall.
The first hypothesis, that infrequent dream recall is a sign of
repressiveness, has faired rather poorly (Cohen, 1974c). Measures of
frequency of dream recall (derived from questionnaire and home
dream-diary methods) have been shown to correlate at best around .25
with various measures of repressiveness (e.g., Byrne repression-
sensitization, Barron ego strength, field dependence, leveling, etc.),
thus leaving most of the variation in dream-recall frequency unac-
counted for.
The second hypothesis has fared little better. It assumes that
stressful presleep conditions will generate more threatening dreams
(Goodenough, Witkin, Lewis, Koulack, and Cohen, 1974), which are
more likely to be repressed (Cartwright, Bernick, Borowitz, and Kling,
1969). While some studies tend to support this hypothesis (Cartwright
et al., 1969; Cohen, 1972), most do not (Cohen, 1974a,b; Cohen and
Cox, 1975; Cohen and Wolfe, 1973; Goodenough et al., 1974). There is,
in fact, evidence that subjects classified as "repressors," as well as
"sensitizers," tend to have more dream recall under distressing pres-
leep conditions. This finding has obtained whether classification was
made on the basis of established measures (e.g., repression-sensitiza-
tion) or presumptive measures (e.g., dream-recall frequency).
Figure 1 shows two sets of idealized relationships, one derived
from the results summarized above and one from results to be
described in the next section. In the first set the dependent variable is
situational diary dream recall, and in the second set it is dream affect
(relative unpleasantness reported for both laboratory and home
dreams). For both sets, the predictor variable is presleep condition
(positive versus negative) either subjectively reported or experimen-
tally manipulated. Note that the first set of relationships (a) shows an
DREAMING 315
a
Infreq Rec-".
~
~',
Freq Rec"" ......... 10 Erno
~"
.... "
\
Positive Negative
._-""..._-----_._--
PRESLEEP CONDITION
b
Low
---
ErnO~
---
/
I
/
/
/
I
FIGURE 1. Empirically derived
I
idealized relationships denoting I
the differential effects of pres- I
leep condition on situational I
dream recall (a) and dream affect
(b) for subjects preselected on
the basis of habitual dream re-
Positive Negative
call frequency or for the trait of
emotionality. PRESLEEP CONDITION
316 DAVID B. COHEN
I remember being in prison, and there was one particular girl ... every
day she would make up a new game ... it would be names, you know, of
different sounds, and it was all so odd ... I can't remember exactly what
DREAMING 321
she did. She kept making these songs. She put them all together ... and
they spelled Coca Cola. Isn't that weird?
likewIse Galin reviews evidence that dream recall may be
influenced by dream-salience characteristics mediated by right-hemi-
sphere activity. Patients with right posterior lesions or injuries have
been reported to experience a diminution or cessation of dream recall.
In addition, there is evidence that convergent thinkers (who perform
better on test of rational thinking than on tests of fluency and
imaginativeness and who are presumably more left-hemisphere domi-
nant) are poorer REM dream recallers than are divergent thinkers
(Austin, 1971).
Finally, it would be interesting to test the right-hemisphere-
dream-salience-dream-recall hypothesis by studying the dream recall
of alcoholics. There is evidence that chronic alcoholism eventuates in a
relatively greater deterioration of right- than left-hemisphere mediated
functions (Jones and Parsons, 1975). Were it also established that
frequent recallers who subsequently became alcoholics also experi-
enced a diminution of REM dream recall, a more direct link between
sleep physiology and dream recall could be established.
A third process hypothesized to account for dream recall is
interference. Interference refers to events that distract attention from
the dream material. For example, Cohen and Wolfe (1973) manipulated
postsleep interference by having half their subjects dial the weather-
information number and record the expected temperature immediately
after awakening and just prior to recording any dream material they
could remember. The subjects of the control group were asked to lie
quietly in bed for the roughly 1.5 minutes required by the experimen-
tal subjects to carry out the distracting task. The results were clear-cut.
Of the 40 control group subjects, 63% reported some dream content.
The corresponding figure for the 46 experimental subjects was 33%.
This finding was replicated within the context of a second study. In
addition, it was found that the experimental condition markedly
increased the percentage of con tentless reports, that is, reports of
having been dreaming of something without being able to describe
details. Con tentless reporting has been hypothesized to be a pheno-
menological representation of the repression process (Witkin, 1969, p.
32). However, marked elevation of contentless reporting after an
un threatening, psychodynamically neutral task suggests the more
parsimonious conclusion that the phenomenon is the result of interfer-
ence.
322 DAVID B. COHEN
::l 6
Short Sleepers
Note that with the exception of the last hour, REM dream recall of
short sleepers is lower that than of long sleepers.
These data were obtained on small samples of subjects sleeping
only one night in the laboratory. However, they do support some
interesting speculations. Do short sleepers get "better" sleep, sleep
that is "deeper" and more restorative during the early part of the
night, sleep that is psychobiologically more "distant" from wakeful-
ness until the last hour when these subjects are normally ready to
wake up? Do long sleepers require more sleep because their sleep is
psychobiologically "closer" to wakefulness throughout the night?
Evidence that certain conditions like presleep exercise reduce both
REM dream recall throughout the night and spontaneous duration of
sleep in long sleepers would reinforce the hypothesis that dream recall
is a useful indication of "efficient sleep."
In addition, it might be possible to discriminate between long
sleepers who have "deep" (low-recall) sleep-that is, long sleepers for
whom the last few hours of sleep provide no extra restorative bene-
fits-and long sleepers who require long sleep because their sleep is
less efficient. The former group would presumably find it easier to
reduce sleep time gradually over a period of weeks or months without
adverse psychological effects, while the latter group should find this
change more disruptive. The soundness of these speculations could be
tested by the establishment of individual dream-recall curves for each
of a number of long sleepers and the prediction of (1) which subjects
could most easily reduce their sleep time and (2) at what point in time
the adverse effects of further reduction of sleep time would manifest
themselves (e.g., in terms of fatigue, dysphoric mood, and loss of
intellectual efficiency).
The data briefly reviewed above lend themselves to the conclusion
that the principles of salience and interference can account for most of
324 DAVID B. COHEN
1. Clinical Approaches
2. Empirical Approaches
Much of the research on dream content is predicated on the
assumption that the dream reflects chronic or situational events in
some more or less systematic, measureable, and predictable manner.
The capacity of the dream to reflect presleep and sleep events external
to it has been explored in a number of ways. (For an excellent
discussion of important, unresolved methodological and theoretical
problems in the study of dream content, see the symposium on dream
content in Chase, 1972, also see Hall, 1969; Hall and Van de Castle,
1966; Van de Castle, 1969). One method is to study correlations
between categories of dream content (e.g., emotionality) and concur-
rent indicators of sleep phYSiological activity (e.g., heart-rate variabil-
ity). Since an excellent review of the results of psychophysiological
correlates is available (Rechtschaffen, 1973), a detailed discussion of
this area of research will not be pursued here. In general, evidence for
consistent patterns has been somewhat equivocal. One obvious expla-
nation is that the same physiological event may have markedly
different psychological correlates across individuals. For example, I
have some unreported results suggesting that under "positive" pre-
sleep conditions, the eye-movement activity of REM sleep (REM
density) is greater for subjects scoring high on a measure of neuroti-
cism (emotionality) than for subjects scoring low on this measure.
Conversely, REM density was greater for the low- than for the high-
neuroticism subjects under "negative" (stressful) presleep conditions.
DREAMING 333
course this is not to deny the fact that college men tend to dream of
football games more often than do college females. What is different is
the way in which the dream is constructed; the way that reality is
experienced is somewhat predictable on the basis of waking personal-
ity. It is noteworthy that the obtained differences between sex-role
orientation groups in agency and communion were significantly
greater for males than for females. The findings strongly support the
contention that socialization of sex-role orientation is a more difficult
"problem" for boys than for girls (Bardwick, 1971; Seyfried and
Hendrick, 1973). For example, in our culture it is generally more
distressing for adults to witness the behavior of a sissy than that of a
tomboy. Girls seem to have more latitude in their orientations, and
they appear less clearly differentiated and less conflicted over mascu-
line and feminine orientations within their personalities. The dreams
of feminine males tended to be more unpleasant than those of
masculine females, suggesting that sex-role orientation contrary to
stereotype is more disturbing for males than for females.
It should be pointed out that unless the dreams of subjects
classified according to major personality dimensions are obtained over
a long period of time, studies like the ones just reviewed can give only
limited support for the continuity hypothesis. Over the short run there
is a great deal of variability within subject groups, variability which
might have been considered as "error variance" but which reflects
meaningful personality-by-situation interactions that could not be
assessed in the study. This leads us to research which considers the
effect on dream content of both personality and presleep conditions.
In a major ongoing investigation, Witkin, Goodenough, and their
colleagues (Witkin, 1969) are exploring the effect of field dependence
and presleep stress on dream content. Only preliminary results have
been reported. But the discussion of procedure and initial observa-
tions indicates that a personality-by-condition experimental design
can be useful to define factors that influence the process of dream-
work. The present author has carried out a number of studies along
somewhat similar lines whose results are relevant to the continuity
hypothesis.
In the first (Cohen, 1974b) college women reported dreams at
home over a period of a week during which they also recorded
pre sleep mood. Results suggested that the positive or negative quality
of dream affect was correlated with the quality of presleep mood. This
338 DAVID B. COHEN
seemed especially true for subjects who rated their presleep mood
throughout the study as generally dysphoric, but limited sample size
made such a conclusion tentative. In the second study (Cohen, 1974a)
another set of college women provided additional data. This time they
were preclassified into "sensitizers" and "repressors" on the Byrne
scale (1964). It was predicted that only for the sensitizers would there
be a correlation between pre sleep mood and dream affect. This
prediction was clearly supported by the data. A more elaborate follow-
up experiment has confirmed these findings (Cohen and Cox, 1975).
The results of these three studies are summarized by the dashed lines
in Figure l(b).
Before we describe that experiment, an important theoretical
point should be made. For the personality dimension of "emotional-
ity" (estimated by sensitization, anxiety, or neuroticism tests), we
expect that affect should be more strongly and lastingly affected by
conditions for high-emotionality than for low-emotionality individu-
als. When subjects are used who characterize the extremes of this
emotionality dimension, contrasting predictions with respect to affect
can be made. The results of the study should make this point clear.
Cohen and Cox (1975) preselected male college students on the
basis of high or low Maudsley Personality Inventory Neuroticism
(emotionality) scores. The subjects of each group were randomly
assigned to one of two laboratory presleep conditions. The positive
condition included treating the subject in a friendly and personal
fashion, giving him a great deal of information about procedures and
techniques of sleep research, spending a lot of time with the subject,
and presenting him with easy items from an IQ test. The negative
condition included treating the subject in a perfunctory and imper-
sonal fashion, giving him no explanation about procedures, isolating
him for at least 15 minutes after the recording electrodes had been
placed, and exposing him to difficult items on the IQ test. Postsleep
questionnaire data clearly indicated that subjects in the two conditions
had perceived the major components of the manipulation.
For the high-neuroticism group, there were positive and signifi-
cant intercorrelations among condition, pre sleep affect (subjective
ratings made prior to sleep), and affect associated with dream content
retrieved from REM and NREM awakenings throughout the single
night that subjects slept in the laboratory. None of these correlations
was significant for the low-neuroticism group. The affect of presleep
DREAMING 339
High N
o Low N
.60
.~
I:
:eo .50
'"C
I:
8
a. .40 o
(I)
(I)
en
-
~
c.. .30
.I:
'i
I:
o
. 20
:;:;
I
...o
~ -0
.10
()
AFFECT
FIGURE 3. Degree of association (point-biserial correla-
tion) between valence of presleep condition and valence of
dream affect at three points in time for high- versus low-
neuroticism (N) groups separately.
cism subjects (10%) reported that their dreams had taken place in the
past (p = .05). How can such a difference be interpreted? One
possibility is that certain subjects, when stressed (e.g., experience
failure, separation, and rejection, are more susceptible to the reactiva-
tion of thought processes (represented by conscious associations,
fantasies, and dreams) relevant to earlier attempts to adjust to stress.
That is, they are more susceptible to a kind of "regression" by which
current perceptions are altered by temporally more remote schemas.
The reactivation of the latter may account for the tendency of high-
neuroticism subjects to report more dysphoric mood on the presleep
DREAMING 341
So far, the dream is more directly about the experimenter, and both he
and the subject are together during an important event. The experi-
menter is portrayed as the person in control (pitcher). Later the subject
says that the pitcher is upset, that things aren't going so well, but that
it doesn't seem to bother the subject; in fact he is happy just to be in
the game. It appears then that the subject recognizes the fact that the
game (testing) isn't going well, but he feels all right. So far, this dream
DREAMING 343
tions for research methodology, and the most prevalent strategy has
been the use of REM deprivation with NREM sleep interruption (or
NREM-Stage 4 deprivation) controls.
While a comprehensive review of REM deprivation work on
animals is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter, some examples of
research strategy and findings will focus attention on the central
theme of dreaming as an adaptive psychological process. A number of
studies (usually with mice or rats) have used REM deprivation prior to
learning (to test hypotheses regarding acquisition) or after learning (to
test hypotheses regarding memory consolidation). For example, Hart-
mann and Stem (1972) trained a group of REM-deprived and a group
of stress-control rats in an active avoidance task. The REM-deprived
rats required more trials to learn the task than the stress-control group
or a REM-deprived group administered L-Dopa (a catecholaminergic
precursor). The investigators concluded that REM sleep facilitates
learning and that this process is catecholaminergically mediated. (See
Hartmann, 1973, for a discussion of this hypothesis.) In another study
Pearlman and Greenberg (1972) trained three groups of rats on an
active avoidance-learning task. One group was then allowed 5 hours
of REM-deprived sleep and then 5 hours of recovery sleep. One group
was allowed 5 hours of normal sleep and then 5 hours of REM-
deprived sleep. A third group was allowed 10 hours of normal sleep.
The first group had the worst retention scores, which suggested to the
investigators that REM sleep is implicated in the early phases of
memory consolidation. Other studies of the effect of REM deprivation
on latent learning and preextinction exposure to discriminative stimuli
support their hypothesis. Pearlman has provided support for an
interesting theoretical advance of the REM-learning hypothesis with
evidence that "biologically prepared" (i.e., instinctively prepared, see
Seligman, 1970) learning is less affected by immediate REM depriva-
tion than is biologically unprepared learning (Pearlman and Becker,
1973). In a third variant of the REM-learning hypothesis, Fishbein and
Kastaniotis (1973) demonstrated that after active avoidance learning
REM time increased over that of yoked controls, while both groups
showed a (stress-related) increase in NREM sleep time. While these
psychobiological investigations are of great heuristic value, they are
somewhat difficult to interpret in the light of more equivocal results
arising from studies of human sleep. For example, most recent
investigations have not substantiated Dement's now-"classic" find-
DREAMING 349
2.00
0
Incorp
Nonincorp
I-
Z
w
::;:
a::
1.75
1.50
3.00 f w
a..
x
w 1.25
1.00
0
I-
1.00
0.75
z 0.75
a::
0.50 ::l
I-
I- w 0.50
u 0.25 a::
w
lJ.. 0 0.25
lJ.. I-
<t 0.00
en 0.00
IJ ~
-0.25 en
w
~ -0.25
f IJ
-0.50 z
r1
j -0.50
-3.00
i -2.00 1~ If1
Presleep Post sleep Post sleep Approx.
(predebrief 1 (predebriefl I Month
later
FIGURE 4. Changes in affect and attitude toward experimental participation for
incorporator and nonincorporator subjects.
354 DAVID B. COHEN
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deprivation" on dream content: An attempted cross-right replication. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 1968,73, 403-415.
FOULKES, D., AND RECHTSCHAFFEN, A. Presleep determinants of dream content: Effects of
two films. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1964,19, 983-1005.
FREUD, S. The interpretation of dreams. New York: Basic Books, 1953.
FROMM, E. The forgotton language. New York: Grove Press, 1951.
GALIN, D. Implications for psychiatry of left and right cerebral specialization. Archives of
General Psychiatry, 1974,31, 572-583.
GOODENOUGH, D. R. Some recent studies of dream recall. In H. A. WITKIN AND B. LEWIS
(Eds.), Experimental studies of dreaming. New York: Random House, 1967.
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Repression, interference, and field dependence as factors in dream forgetting.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1974,83, 32-44.
GREENBERG, R., AND PEARLMAN, C. Sleep and dream patterns in a patient in psychoanal-
ysis: An attempt at psychophysiological correlations. Paper presented to the
Association for the Psychophysiological Study of Sleep, Lake Minnewaska, New
York, May, 1972.
GREENBERG, R., AND PEARLMAN, C. A. Cutting the REM nerve: An approach to the
adaptive role of REM sleep. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Summer, 1974, 513-
521.
HALL, C. S. The meaning of dreams. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
HALL, C. S. Normative dream-content studies. In M. KRAMER (Ed.), Dream psychology
and the new biology of dreaming. Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1969.
HALL, C. S., AND VAN DE CASTLE, R. 1. The content analysis of dreams. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966.
HARTMANN, E. The functions of sleep. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973.
HARTMANN, E., AND STERN, W. E. Desynchronized sleep deprivation: Learning deficit
and its reversal of increased catecholamines. Physiology and Behavior, 1972,8, 585-
587.
HAURI, P. Evening activity, sleep mentation, and subjective sleep quality. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 1970,76, 270-275.
HAURI, P. White noise and dream reporting. Sleep Research, 1972, 1, 124.
HISCOCK, M., AND COHEN, D. B. Visual imagery and dream recall. Journal of Research in
Personality, 1973,7.,. 179-188.
JOHNSON, 1.,c. Are stages of sleep related to waking behavior? American Scientist, 1973,
61, 326-338.
JONES, B. M., AND PARSONS, O. A. Alcohol and consciousness: Getting high and coming
down. Psychology Today, January, 1975, 53-58.
KLEITMAN, N. Basic rest-activity cycle in relation to sleep and wakefulness. In A. KALES
(Ed.), Sleep: Physiology and pathology: A symposium. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1969.
KLINGER, E. Struciure and Function of Fantasy. New York: Wiley-lnterscience, 1971.
KLINGER, E. Consequences of commitment to and disengagement from incentives.
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KOELLA, W. P. AND LEVIN, P. (eds.). Sleep: Physiology, Biochemistry, Psychology,
Pharmacology, Clinical Implications. Basel, Switzerland: S. Karger, 1973.
DREAMING 359
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360 DAVID B. COHEN
THOMAS H. BUDZYNSKI
361
362 THOMAS H. BUDZYNSKI
2 Kubie and Margolin (1942) used respiratory-sound feedback with patients to facilitate
the recovery of emotionally charged material. While concentrating on the sound of
their own breathing the patients would enter a hypnagogic state which was said to
enhance free association.
BIOFEEDBACK AND THE TWILIGHT STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 367
1. Attitude Change
subject's present belief system. Further support for this notion has
been generated by the experimentation on sensory deprivation. Heron
(1961) found that a group of sensory-deprived subjects showed signifi-
cantly greater changes in attitude toward psychic phenomena than
did a control group which was not sensory-deprived. Both groups
heard a record which argued for belief in various types of psychical
phenomena.
In a more clinical vein, Gibby and Adams (1961) reported that the
self-concepts of sensorially deprived psychiatric patients showed more
change in response to a taped message than did those of a nonde-
prived group. Adams (1965) later reported a case in which a program
BIOFEEDBACK AND THE TWILIGHT STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 369
4. "Suggestopaedia"
The presentation of information to individuals who are in low-
arousal states has been the focus of a great deal of attention ever since
the work of Lozanov, a Bulgarian scientist, became known several
years ago (see Ostrander and Schroeder, 1970). Lozanov allowed
students in his tutorial "suggestopaedia" program to relax in comfort-
able chairs while focusing their attention on classical music. The
learning material was presented along with the music, and the voice
intonation of the instructor was synchronized to the changes of tempo
and volume of the music. The students were not to concentrate on the
learning material but rather on the music. Comprehension is said to
be very high even for students with "mental blocks" for the material.
It is reported that the learning is both qualitatively and quantitatively
different from that occurring in the normal, waking state. Lozanov
claimed that the learning is more intuitive and more holistic and is
retained longer than the rote, specific, often short-lived learning
usually associated with that obtained under the normal, alert condi-
tions. An interesting observation is that after a session of suggesto-
370 THOMAS H. BUDZYNSKI
3 Pink noise is essentially white noise filtered to produce a more pleasant sound.
376 THOMAS H. BUDZYNSKI
C. Retrieval Difficulties
Retrieval of emergent, ongoing material generated during a twi-
light state is a troublesome dilemma. If the subject is awakened and
4 See Schwartz (1974) for a description of research relating to lateralization testing in
intact humans.
382 THOMAS H. BUDZYNSKI
asked to report, he may have difficulty slipping back into the state.
We have found that if subjects are asked to give only one word or a
short phrase to describe the imagery, they can readily return to the
twilight state. Later, upon awakening, subjects usually can free-
associate and flesh out the image or images.
Given the ability to produce and maintain an altered state which
optimizes creative associations, the problem for the future will be the
development of efficient retrieval techniques.
D. Cognitive Balance
There is a growing feeling that perhaps our technologically
oriented Western culture has selectively favored one cognitive mode
over the other (Fischer and Rhead, 1974; Ingrasci and Kimura-Buch-
oltz, 1974). Thus the emphasis on the major, dominant, or "Aristote-
lian" hemisphere, with its analytical, rational, sequence-perceiving
processes. Largely ignored in our culture has been the minor, non-
dominant, or "Platonic" hemisphere, with its nonverbal, synthesis-
oriented, intuitive functions. As Fischer and Rhead have noted, the
problem lies in the implicit belief that the rational and unlimited
technological conquest of nature will necessarily lead to a better life.
The corollary to such a belief is that any non technological approach to
the good life is reactionary, irrational, and primitive. However, the
overemphasis on the scientific, rational belief-system has, in fact,
resulted in a rebound effect in the form of a swing toward the minor-
hemisphere mode of thinking. This is evidenced by the growing
interest in Eastern meditation, the occult, astrology, and parapsychol-
ogy and a declining interest in organized science and religion.
Perhaps men and women in our culture can benefit by training in the
use of minor-hemisphere processes. Perhaps feelings, emotions, intui-
tions, and creative ideas can be brought to awareness and then
integrated into a rational approach. Perhaps, too, biofeedback may be
one of the ways for a technological culture to acquire this balance.
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WILLIAMS, H. L., MORLOCK, M. c., AND MORLOCK, J. V. Instrumental behavior during
sleep. Psychophysiology, 1966,2, 208-216.
Author Index
387
388 AUTHOR INDEX
Ervin, F. R., 167 GaIim, D., 320, 321, 380 Hagbarth, K. E., 110
Evans, C. R., 370 Gantt, W. H., 270 Halas, E. 5., 26
Evans, F. J., 186, 190, 191, Garner, W. R., 91, 92 Hall, C. 5.,328,331,332
192, 193, 203, 204, 343, Gastaut, H., 12 Hall, R. A., 104, 112
378 Gath, D. H., 281 Halliday, A. M., 192
Evarts, E. V., 79 Gawpp, L. A., 283 Hallsten, L., 123
Eysenck, H. J., 269, 286, Gazzaniga, M., 155 Hamasaki, D. I., 106
294,295 Gelder, M. G., 281 Hance, A. J., 15
Genest, M., 254 Hanel, J., 233
Faw, V., 183
Gibbey, R. G., 368 Hanley, E., 270
Fedoravicus, A., 231
Gill, M. M., 148, 181, 183 Hart, B., 156
Felipe, A., 367
Gillin, J. c., 107 Hart, J. T., 182, 189, 191,
Fenwick, P. B., 370
Gilmore, B., 231 195
Fibiger, H. c., 73
Glascow, R. E., 283, 285, Harter, M. R., 120
Finkenzeller, P., 15
286 Hartig, M., 228
Fishbein, W., 348
Glass, L. B., 179 Hartley, L. R., 120
Fischer, R., 382
Glivenko, E. V., 12 Hartman, E., 324, 327,
Fisher, c., 316
Goff, W. R., 109 347, 348, 352
Fiss, H., 319, 329, 350
Goldfried, M., 230, 232, Hartman, H., 148
Fitts, P. M., 92
235,242 Hartnett, J., 191
Flannery, R., 270
Goldstein, A., 166, 167 Harvey, E. N., 186
Fleishman, D. J., 295
Goldstein, A. P., 280, 281 Hastey, J. M., 156
Ford, W. L., 186
Goldstein, R., 110 Hauri, P., 327, 333
Foster, R., 102
Goodenough, D. R., 314, Hearst, E., 67
Foulkes, D., 316, 317, 328,
317, 324, 337, 351 Hebb, D.O., 147
333, 334, 350, 362
Goodman, J., 118, 223, Heckhausen, H., 233
Fox, S. 5., 26
227, 228, 233 Helvey, W. M., 103
Frank, G. 5.,155
Goodman, W. 5., 107 Hendrick, c., 337
Frank, J., 223, 240
Goodwin, F., 106, 111 Hendrickson, J. L., 80
Franzen, 0., 110
Gottlieb, A. E., 80 Henkin, R. I., 117, 125
Freedman, J., 228
Gough, P., 183 Henry, G. B., 107
Freeman, W., 158
Freud,S., 128,313,331, Graham, J. T., 107 Heron, W., 368
347 Gray, J. A., 125, 126 Hetherington, M., 228
Green, A., 362, 363, 364, Hilgard, E. R., 103, 144,
Freyberg, J., 233
365 147, 160, 161, 176, 177,
Friedlander, J. W., 176
Green, A. M., 209 178,179,180,181,183
Friedman, H. J., 280
Green, D., 233 Hilgard, J. R., 184
Fromme, E., 330, 347
Green, E., 362, 364, 365, Hillman, P., 109
Frommer, C. P., 91
366,374 Hillyard, S. A., 15
Fruhstorfer, H., 15
Hilz, R., 124
Fry, A., 105 Green, E. E.. 209, 210
Hirano, T., 26
Fuhrer, M., 185 Greenberg, R., 348, 349
Hirsch, R., 26
Fukuma, E., 335 Griffin, R. B., 104, 112
Hirsh, S. K., 107
Fulton, J. F., 55 Grindberg-Zylberbaum, Hobart, G., 186
Gagne, R., 248, 249 J., 7, 21 Holland, T., 102
Galambos, R., 12, 15,91 Guilbaud, G., 107 Holzman, P. 5., 102, 103
Galanter, E. H., 51, 52, Guirao, M., 123 Homme, L., 226
84, 86, 147 Gur, R. c., 155 Hooten, T. F., 26
Galbraith, G. c., 190, 191, Gur, R. E., 155 Hopkins, H. K., 104, 112
295 Gustafson, L. A., 343, 378 Hori, Y., 26
390 AUTHOR INDEX
Uttal, W. R., 109 Walters, D., 362, 364, 365 Winters, R. W., 106
Uviller, E. T., 292 Wanschura, R. G., 123 Wiseman, R. J., 181
Ward, A. A., 55 Witkin, H. A., 314, 321,
Vale, T. c., 7 Watson, J. B., 262 329,333,334,337,351,
Vassilevsky, N. N., 26 Watson, P. D., 117 374
Valenstein, E. S., 75 Watts, J. W., 158 Wittner, W., 122
Valins, S., 282, 283, 285, Webb, W. B., 319 Wogan, M., 280
286 Weinberg, H., 16 Wolfe, G., 314, 321
Van de Castle, R. L., 328, Weinberg, L., 230 Wolfer, J., 235
329,332 Weiskrantz, L., 60, 64 Wolk, I., 102
Vander Tweel, C. H., 106 Weisz, R., 328 Wolpe, J., 239
Van Lehn, R., 298 Weitzenhoffer, A. M., Woody, C. D., 26
Vaughn, c., 344 176, 177, 178, 179, 181, Woolsey, T. A., 80
Vaughn, H. G., 105, 106 183, 186 Wooten, B. R., 106
Venables, P. H., 127 Weitzenhoffer, G. B., 183 Worrell, L., 235
Verduyn Lunel, H. F. E., Welch, G., 188 Wundt, W., 1, 3, 81, 88
106 White, R. W., 141
Villegas, J., 12 White, T. C., 120 Yakolev, P. L., 167
Vogel, G., 362 Whitman, R. M., 334 Yeager, C. L., 186
Vogel, G. W., 349 Whittle, P., 15 Yoshii, N., 12, 13, 26, 107
von Bonin, G., 55 Wicke, J. D., 105, 188 Young, L. D., 292
von Foerster, H., 86 Wickram, I., 182 Young, M. L., 106
von Hartman, 138 Wickramasekera, L, 182
Vranceanu, M., 371 Wilbur, C. B., 156 Zapporozhets, A., 249
Vygotsky, L., 227, 249 Wilcox, W. W., 183 Zerlin, S., 107
Wilkins, W., 274, 281 Zimbardo, P., 208, 250,
Waggoner, R., 106 Williams, H. L., 371 287
Walker, J. P., 40 Willows, A. 0., 3 Zubeck, J. P., 125, 188,
Wall, P. D., 55, 109, 110, Wilson, G. T., 274, 283 189
127, 158,240 Wilson, M., 92 Zubin, J., 16
Wall, R. L., 277, 285 Wilson, W. A., 71 Zuckerman, M., 104, 111,
Walter, W. G., 16 Winer, B., 198 127
Subject Index
395
396 SUBJECT INDEX