VERZOSA VS LIM

FACTS: This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila by Vicente Verzosa
and Ruiz, Rementeria y Compania, as owners of the coastwise vessel Perla, against Silvino Lim and Siy
Cong Bieng & Company, Inc., as owner and agent, respectively, of the vessel Ban Yek, for the purpose of
recovering a sum of money alleged to be the damages resulting to the plaintiffs from a collision which
occurred on March 9, 1921, between the two vessels mentioned, it being alleged that said collision was
due to the inexperience, carelessness and lack of skill on the part of the captain of the Ban Yek and to his
failure to observe the rules of navigation appropriate to the case. The defendants answered with a
general denial, and by way of special defense asserted, among other things. that the collision was due
exclusively to the inexperience and carelessness of the captain and officers of the steamship Perla; for
which reason the defendants in turn, by way of counterclaim, prayed judgment for the damages suffered
by the Ban Yek from the same collision. At the hearing the trial judge absolved the defendants from the
complaint and likewise absolved the plaintiffs from the defendants' counterclaim. From this judgment
both parties appealed.

The court ruled in favor of plaintiff

Upon the point of responsibility for the collision we have no hesitancy in finding that the fault is to be attributed
exclusively to the negligence and inattention of the captain and pilot in charge of the Ban Yek. The Perla
undoubtedly had the right of way, since this vessel was navigating with the current, and the officers in charge of the
Perla were correct in assuming, from the failure of the Ban Yek to respond to the single blast of the Perla, that the
officers in charge of the Ban Yek recognized that the Perla had a right of way and acquiesced in her resolution to
keep to the right. The excuse urged for the Ban Yek is that this vessel is somewhat larger than the Perla and that it
was desirable for the Ban Yek to keep on the side of the long are of the curve of the river; and in this connection it is
suggested that the river is deeper on the outer edge of the bend that on the inner edge.

Having determined the amount which the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, it becomes necessary to consider the
person, or persons, who must respond for these damages.

ISSUE: W/N the shipowner is solely responsible to pay damages to plaintiff.

HELD: NO. We note further that in article 826 of the Code of Commerce it is declared that the owner of any vessel
shall be liable for the indemnity due to any other vessel injured by the fault, negligence, or lack of skill of the
captain of the first. We say "owner," which is the word used in the current translation of this article in the Spanish
Code of Commerce. It is to be observed, however, that the Spanish text itself uses the word naviero; and there is
some ambiguity in the use of said word in this article, owing to the fact that naviero in Spanish has several
meanings. The author of the article which appears under the word naviero in the Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola tells us that in Spanish it may mean either owner, outfitter, charterer, or agent, though he says that the
fundamental and correct meaning of the word is that of "owner." That naviero, as used in the Spanish text of article
826, means owner is further to be inferred from article 837, which limits the civil liability expressed in article 826 to
the value of the vessel with all her appurtenances and all the freight earned during the voyage. There would have
been no propriety in limiting liability to the value of the vessel unless the owner were understood to be the person
liable. It is therefore clear that by special provision of the Code of Commerce the owner is made responsible for the
damage caused by an accident of the kind under consideration in this case; and in more than one case this court
has held the owner liable, when sued alone (Philippine Shipping Co. vs. Garcia Vegara, 6 Phil., 281; G. Urrutia & Co.
vs. Baco river Plantation Co., 26 Phil., 632).

But while it is thus demonstrated that Silvino Lim is liable for these damages in the character of owner, it does not
necessarily follow that Siy Cong Bieng & Co., as charterer or agent (casa naviera), is exempt from liability; and we
are of the opinion that both the owner and agent can be held responsible where both are impleaded together. In
Philippine Shipping Co. vs. Garcia Vergara (6 Phil., 281), it seems to have been accepted as a matter of course that
both owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the damage done; and this must, we think, be true. The
liability of the naviero, in the sense of charterer or agent, if not expressed in article 826 of the Code of Commerce,
is clearly deducible from the general doctrine of jurisprudence stated in article 1902 of the Civil Code, and it is also
recognized, but more especially as regards contractual obligations, in article 586 of the Code of Commerce.
Moreover, we are of the opinion that both the owner and agent (naviero) should be declared to be jointly and
severally liable, since the obligation which is the subject of this action had its origin in a tortious act and did not
arise from contract. Article 1137 of the Civil Code, declaring that joint obligations shall be apportionable unless
otherwise provided, has no application to obligations arising from tort.

NATIONAL DEV COMPANY VS CA

FACTS: The evidence before us shows that in accordance with a memorandum agreement entered into between
defendants NDC and MCP on September 13, 1962, defendant NDC as the first preferred mortgagee of three ocean
going vessels including one with the name 'Doa Nati' appointed defendant MCP as its agent to manage and
operate said vessel for and in its behalf and account (Exh. A). Thus, on February 28, 1964 the E. Philipp Corporation
of New York loaded on board the vessel 'Doa Nati' at San Francisco, California, a total of 1,200 bales of American
raw cotton consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila and the People's Bank and Trust
Company acting for and in behalf of the Pan Asiatic Commercial Company, Inc., who represents Riverside Mills
Corporation (Exhs. K-2 to K7-A & L-2 to L-7-A). Also loaded on the same vessel at Tokyo, Japan, were the cargo of
Kyokuto Boekui, Kaisa, Ltd., consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation consisting of 200 cartons of
sodium lauryl sulfate and 10 cases of aluminum foil (Exhs. M&M-1). En route to Manila the vessel Doa Nati figured
in a collision at 6:04 a.m. on April 15, 1964 at Ise Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel 'SS Yasushima Maru' as a result
of which 550 bales of aforesaid cargo of American raw cotton were lost and/or destroyed, of which 535 bales as
damaged were landed and sold on the authority of the General Average Surveyor for Yen 6,045,-500 and 15 bales
were not landed and deemed lost (Exh. G). The damaged and lost cargoes was worth P344,977.86 which amount,
the plaintiff as insurer, paid to the Riverside Mills Corporation as holder of the negotiable bills of lading duly
endorsed (Exhs. L-7-A, K-8-A, K-2-A, K-3-A, K-4-A, K-5-A, A-2, N-3 and R-3). Also considered totally lost were the
aforesaid shipment of Kyokuto, Boekui, Kaisa Ltd., consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila,
acting for Guilcon, Manila. The total loss was P19,938.00 which the plaintiff as insurer paid to Guilcon as holder of
the duly endorsed bill of lading (Exhibits M-1 and S-3). Thus, the plaintiff had paid as insurer the total amount of
P364,915.86 to the consignees or their successors-in-interest, for the said lost or damaged cargoes. Hence, plaintiff
filed this complaint to recover said amount from the defendants-NDC and MCP as owner and ship agent
respectively, of the said 'Doa Nati' vessel.

NDC appealed. The main thrust of NDC's argument is to the effect that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act should
apply to the case at bar and not the Civil Code or the Code of Commence. Under Section 4 (2) of said Act, the
carrier is not responsible for the loss or damage resulting from the "act, neglect or default of the master, mariner,
pilot or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship." Thus, NDC insists that
based on the findings of the trial court which were adopted by the Court of Appeals, both pilots of the colliding
vessels were at fault and negligent, NDC would have been relieved of liability under the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act.

ISSUE: W/N THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONERS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY AND MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES TO PAY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO HEREIN
RESPONDENT DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION

HELD: NO.

It is well settled that both the owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the damage done where both
are impleaded (Philippine Shipping Co. v. Garcia Vergara, 96 Phil. 281 [1906]); that in case of collision, both the
owner and the agent are civilly responsible for the acts of the captain (Yueng Sheng Exchange and Trading Co. v.
Urrutia & Co., supra citing Article 586 of the Code of Commerce; Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Lopez Castelo, 42
Phil. 256, 262 [1921]); that while it is true that the liability of the naviero in the sense of charterer or agent, is not
expressly provided in Article 826 of the Code of Commerce, it is clearly deducible from the general doctrine of
jurisprudence under the Civil Code but more specially as regards contractual obligations in Article 586 of the Code
of Commerce. Moreover, the Court held that both the owner and agent (Naviero) should be declared jointly and
severally liable, since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a tortious act and did not
arise from contract (Verzosa and Ruiz, Rementeria y Cia v. Lim, 45 Phil. 423 [1923]). Consequently, the agent, even
though he may not be the owner of the vessel, is liable to the shippers and owners of the cargo transported by it,
for losses and damages occasioned to such cargo, without prejudice, however, to his rights against the owner of the
ship, to the extent of the value of the vessel, its equipment, and the freight (Behn, Meyer Y Co. v. McMicking et al.,
11 Phil. 276 [1908.

Further, it has been established that the goods in question are transported from San Francisco, California and
Tokyo, Japan to the Philippines and that they were lost or damaged due to a collision which was found to have
been caused by the negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding vessels. Under the above ruling, it is evident
that the laws of the Philippines will apply, and it is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters,
such as Ise Bay, Japan.

YU CON VS IPIL

FACTS: Respondent, Yu Con (Yu Con), chartered the banca Maria owned by petitioner Narciso Lauron (Lauron)
with Gilcerio Ipil (Ipil) as its master and Juto Solamo (Solamo) as it supercargo to transport certain merchandise
and money from the port of Cebu to Catmon. Yu Con loaded the merchandise and delivered the money, placed in a
trunk, to Ipil and Solamo. Allegedly because there was no more room for Yu Cons trunk, Ipil and Solamo
transferred the money to their own trunk in the stateroom. Before the ship could sail, the trunk and the money
placed therein disappeared.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners liable for the loss.

HELD: YES. It is therefore beyond all doubt that the loss of the money occurred through the manifest fault and
negligence of Ipil and Solamo. They failed to take the necessary precautions in order that the stateroom containing
the trunk in which they kept the money should be properly guarded by members of the crew and they also did not
expressly station some person inside the stateroom for the guarding and safe-keeping of the trunk.All of these
circumstances, together with that of its having been impossible to know who took the trunk and the money, make
the conduct of Ipil, Solamo, and the other crew members eminently supicious and prevent our holding that the
disappearance or loss of the money was due to a fortuitous event, to force majeure.Ipil and Solamo were
depositaries of the sum in question and, having failed to exercise the diligence required by the nature of the
obligation of safe-keeping assumed by them and by the circumstances of the time and the place, it is evident that
they are liable for its loss or misplacement and must restore it.

With respect to Lauron, he is also liable in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Commerce in force
because, as the proprietor and owner of the vessel who executed a contract of carriage with Yu Con, there
occurred the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to Yu Con through the negligence of Ipil and Solamo
and which theft does not appear to have been committed by a person not belonging to the craft.

The old Code of Commerce absolved the shipowner from liability for the negligence of the captain and its crew but,
in the light of the principles of modern law, this doctrine on the non-liability of the shipowner for the unlawful acts,
crimes or quasi crimes, committed by the captain and the crew can no longer be maintained in its absolute and
categorical terms.

In maritime commerce, the shippers and passengers in making contracts with the captain do so through the
confidence they have in the shipowner who appointed him; they presume that the owner made a most careful
investigation before appointing him, and, above all, they themselves are unable to make such an investigation, and
even though they should do so, they could not obtain complete security, inasmuch as the shipowner can, whenever
he sees fit, appoint another captain instead.

Thus, it is only proper that the shipowner should be made liable.

WING KEE COMPRADORING COMPANY vs. THE BARK MONONGAHELA, et.al.

FACTS: Wing Kee Compradoring Company furnished various goods, wares and merchandise for the use of the crew
of Bark Monongahela. These supplies were delivered to The Admiral Line, acting as agent of the bark, as stipulated
in the requisitions. All the requisitions were made by the steward and the master of the bark and returned to the
Admiral Line along with six copies of invoice immediately upon delivery of the goods. On August 2, 1921, a notice
was published in the Manila Day Bulletin stating that The Admiral Line ceased to act as agent for Monongahela.
Notwithstanding such notice, Wing Kee continued to furnish supplies for Monongahela. When the respondent
refused to pay, herein plaintiff filed a complaint for the recovery of sum of money amounting to P 17,675.64, with
interest and costs. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: W/N the Admiral Line, as agent of the Bark Monongahela, liable for the goods delivered by Wing Kee
Compradoring.

HELD: Yes, the Admiral Line, as agent of the Bark Monongahela, is liable to the plaintiff for supplies furnished
between March 16 and August 2, 1921 but is not responsible for supplies furnished after that date. Article 586 of
the Code of Commerce provides that The owner of a vessel and the agent shall be civilly liable for the acts of the
captain and for the obligations contracted by the latter to repair, equip, and provision of the vessel, provided the
creditor proves that the amount claimed was invested therein. Hence, Admiral Line is liable as an agent.
WALTER SMITH & CO VS CADWALLER GIBSON LUMBER

FACTS: On August 30, 1926, the steamer Helen C, belonging to the defendant, the Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co.,
under the command of Captain Miguel Lasa, in the course of its maneuvers to moor at the plaintiff's wharf in the
port of Olutanga, Zamboanga, struck said wharf, partially demolishing it and throwing the timber piled thereon into
the water. Whereupon the plaintiff brought the instant action to recover of the defendant the sum of P9,705.83 as
damages for the partial demolition of the wharf and for the loss of the timber piled thereon.

The defendant denied the plaintiff's causes of action, and in defense alleged that the demolition of the wharf was
due to the excessive weight of thousands of board feet of timber piled upon it by the plaintiff to be loaded and
shipped on the steamer Helen C and to the bad condition of the piles supporting said wharf.

ISSUE: W/N DEFENDANT IS LIABLE

HELD: NO. it is to be noted that the witness, Dionisio Pascua (for the plaintiff) testified that the 60,000 board feet
occupied one-fourth of the wharf. In other words, by the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses it has been proved
that the plaintiff company piled up on the wharf a quantity of timber which exceeded its capacity of resistance,
because if the whole wharf had a capacity of 100,000 board feet of timber, one-fourth of it could sustain one-
fourth of that amount, or, about 25,000 board feet of timber. But it appears that the plaintiff company loaded
60,000 board feet, weighing over 100 tons, within a space capable of supporting only 25,000 board feet. This must
have helped to bring about the collapse of the wharf on the eastern side and the consequent sliding down of the
timber piled up on the one side.

The defendant contends in its answer that the captain and all the officers of the steamer Helen C were duly
licensed and authorized to hold their respective positions at the time when the wharf in question collapsed, and
that said captain, officers, and all the members of the crew of the steamer had been chosen for their reputed skill
in directing and navigating the steamer Helen C, safely, carefully, and efficiently. The evidence shows that Captain
Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a
vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain,
according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant
is therefore absolved from all liability.

By virtue of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

MANILA STEAMSHIP COMP VS INSA ABDULHAMAN

FACTS: "From 7:00 to 8:00 o'clock in the evening of May 4, 1948, the M/L "Consuelo V", laden with cargoes and
passengers left the port of Zamboanga City bound for Siokon under the command of Faustino Macrohon. She was
then towing a kumpit, named "Sta. Maria Bay". The weather was good and fair. Among her passengers were the
plaintiff Insa Abdulhaman, his wife Carimla Mora and their five children already mentioned. The plaintiff and his
wife paid their fare before the voyage started.

On that same night the M/S "Bowline Knot" was navigating from Maribojoc towards Zamboanga.
Between 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening the dark clouds bloated with rain began to fall and the gushing strong wind
began to blow steadily harder, lashing the waves into a choppy and roaring sea. Such weather lasted for about an
hour and then it became fair although it was showering and the visibility was good enough.

When some of the passengers of the M/L "Consuelo V" were then sleeping and some were lying down awake, all of
a sudden they felt the shocking collision of the M/L "Consuelo V" and a big motorship, which later on was identified
as the M/V "Bowline Knot".

Because the M/L "Consuelo V" capsized, her crew and passengers, before realizing what had happened, found
themselves swimming and floating on the crest of the waves and as a result of which nine (9) passengers were
dead and missing and all the cargoes carried on said boat, including those of the plaintiff as appear in the list,
Exhibit "A", were also lost.

Among the dead passengers found were Maria, Amlasa, Bidoaya and Bidalla, all surnamed Inasa, while the body of
the child Abdula Inasa of 6 years of age was never recovered. Before the collision, none of the passengers were
warned or informed of the impending danger as the collision was so sudden and unexpected. All those rescued at
sea were brought by the M/V "Bowline Knot" to Zamboanga City." (Decision of C. A., pp. 5-6).

Petitioner Manila Steamship Co. pleads that it is exempt from any liability to plaintiff under Article 1903 of the Civil
Code because it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees,
particularly Third Mate Simplicio Ilagan, the officer in command of its vessels, the M/S "Bowline Knot", at the time
of the collision.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner Manila Steamship Co. p is exempt from any liability to plaintiff under Article 1903 of the Civil
Code because it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees

HELD: NO. While it is true that plaintiff's action against petitioner is based on a tort or quasi-delict, the tort in
question is not a civil tort under the Civil Code but a maritime tort resulting in a collision at sea, governed by
Articles 826-939 of the Code of Commerce. Under Article 827 of the Code of Commerce, in case of collision
between two vessels imputable to both of them, each vessel shall suffer her own damage and both shall
be solidarily liable for the damages occasioned to their cargoes. The characteristic language of the law in making
the "vessels" solidarily liable for the damages due to the maritime collision emphasizes the direct nature of the
responsibilities on account of the collision incurred by the shipowner under maritime law, as distinguished from the
civil law and mercantile law in general. This direct responsibility is recognized in Article 618 of the Code of
Commerce

It is easy to see that to admit the defense of due diligence of a bonus paterfamilias (in the selection and vigilance of
the officers and crew) as exempting the shipowner from any liability for their faults, would render nugatory the
solidary liability established by Article 827 of the Code of Commerce for the greater protection of injured parties.
Shipowners would be able to escape liability in practically every case, considering that the qualifications and
licensing of ship masters and officers are determined by the State, and that vigilance is practically impossible to
exercise over officers and crew of vessels at sea. To compel the parties prejudiced to look to the crew for indemnity
and redress would be an illusory remedy for almost always its members are, from captains down, mere wage
earners.
YU BIAO SANTUA VS OSORIO

FACTS: On the evening of the 13th of March, 1920, a fire broke out on board the motor boat Alfonso when this
boat was in the Pasig River, city of Manila, ready to weigh anchor. A short distance from the Alfonso the steamer Y.
Sontua was lying alongside moored to the wharf of said river.

The fire in the motor boat Alfonso spread to the steamer Y. Sontua, causing damages to her deck, according to
plaintiff, amounting to P67,400.

The plaintiff, which is a regular partnership and the owner of the steamer Y. Sontua, brought this action to recover
from the defendant, the owner and agent of said motor boat Alfonso, the aforementioned sum as indemnity for
the damages alleged by the plaintiff to have been sustained by him through the negligence of the agents and
employees of the said defendant, which caused the fire in the aforesaid motor boat Alfonso, wherefrom it spread,
and caused said damages to the steamer Y. Sontua. These damages are specified in the two causes of action set
forth in the complaint, in the first of which are mentioned the appurtenances and parts of the aforesaid vessel that
were destroyed and damaged by the said fire, and for the repair of which the sum of P40,000 was expended. In the
second cause of action it is alleged that the plaintiff sustained damages to the amount of P27,400 for the
demurrage and delay in the ordinary voyages of the aforesaid vessel Y. Sontua. After denying generally and
specifically the allegations of the complaint, the defendant alleges, as special defense, that he has taken no part
either directly or indirectly in the acts alleged in the complaint; that if the plaintiff has sustained any damages, they
are not the result of the act said to have been committed by the agents and employees of the defendant; and that
such damages were caused by a fortuitous event and are not imputable to the negligence of the defendant, or any
of his agents, employees, or mandatories.

ISSUE: W/N the court erred in ruling that defendant is liable for the negligence of his agents and employees.

HELD: NO. It is proven that the agents and employees, through whose negligence the explosion and fire in
question occurred, were agents, employees, and mandatories of the defendant. Where the vessel is one of freight,
a public concern on public utility, its owner or agent is liable for the tortuous acts of his agents (arts. 587, 613, and
618, Code of Commerce; and arts. 1902, 1903, 1908, Civil Code). This principle has been repeatedly upheld in
various decisions of this court.

The doctrines cited by the appellant in support of his theory have reference to the relations between principal and
agent in general, but not to the relations between ship agent and his agents and employees; for this reason they
cannot be applied in the present case.

In American law, principles similar to those in force in the Philippines and contained in the Code of Commerce
above cited, are prevailing:

"Vessel owner's liability in general. The general liability of a vessel owner extends to losses by fire arising from
another vessel, or from the shore; and the fact that fire produces the motive power of a boat does not affect the
case. Such losses are not within the exceptions either of act of God, or peril of the sea, except by local custom,
unless proximately caused by one of these events. In jurisdictions where the civil law obtains, however, it has been
held that if property on a steamboat is destroyed by fire, the owners of the boat are not responsible, if it was being
navigated with proper diligence, although the accident occurred at night. The common law liability extends even to
loss by fires caused entirely by spontaneous combustion of the cargo, without any negligence on the part of master
or crew." (R.C.L. vol. 24, pp. 1324-1325.)
With regard to the allegation that the obligations enumerated in article 612 of our Code of Commerce are inherent
in the master such inherent duties do not limit to the latter the civil liability arising from their nonfulfillment, but
while the master is responsible to the ship agent, the ship agent, in turn, is responsible to third persons, as is
clearly provided in article 618 of said Code, in which express mention is made, in subsections 5 and 7, of the duties
enumerated in the said article 612.

Therefore there is also no ground for holding that the second error assigned by the appellant has been committed.

INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES VS NLRC

FACTS: Private respondent Rizalino Tayong, a licensed Master Mariner with experience in commanding ocean-going
vessels, was employed on 6 July 1989 by petitioners Trenda World Shipping (Manila), Inc. and Sea Horse Ship
Management, Inc. through petitioner Inter-Orient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. as Master of the vessel M/V Oceanic
Mindoro, for a period of one (1) year, as evidenced by an employment contract. On 15 July 1989, Captain Tayong
assumed command of petitioners' vessel at the port of Hongkong. His instructions were to replenish bunker and
diesel fuel, to said forthwith to Richard Bay, South Africa, and there to load 120,000 metric tons of coal.

On 16 July 1989, while at the Pork of Hongkong and in the process of unloading cargo, Captain Tayong received a
weather report that a storm code-named "Gordon" would shortly hit Hongkong. Precautionary measures were
taken to secure the safety of the vessel, as well as its crew, considering that the vessel's turbo-charger was leaking
and the vessel was fourteen (14) years old.

On 21 July 1989, Captain Tayong followed-up the requisition by the former captain of the Oceanic Mindoro for
supplies of oxygen and acetylene, necessary for the welding-repair of the turbo-charger and the economizer. 1 This
requisition had been made upon request of the Chief Engineer of the vessel and had been approved by the
shipowner. 2

On 25 July 1989, the vessel sailed from Hong Kong for Singapore. In the Master's sailing message, Captain Tayong
reported a water leak from M.E. Turbo Charger No. 2 Exhaust gas casing. He was subsequently instructed to block
off the cooling water and maintain reduced RPM unless authorized by the owners. 3

On 29 July 1989, while the vessel was en route to Singapore, Captain Tayong reported that the vessel had stopped
in mid-ocean for six (6) hours and forty-five (45) minutes due to a leaking economizer. He was instructed to shut
down the economizer and use the auxiliary boiler instead. 4

On 31 July 1989 at 0607 hrs., the vessel arrived at the port of Singapore. 5 The Chief Engineer reminded Captain
Tayong that the oxygen and acetylene supplies had not been delivered. 6 Captain Tayong inquired from the ship's
agent in Singapore about the supplies. The ship agent stated that these could only be delivered at 0800 hours on
August 1, 1989 as the stores had closed. 7

Captain Tayong called the shipowner, Sea Horse Ship Management, Ltc., in London and informed them that the
departure of the vessel for South Africa may be affected because of the delay in the delivery of the supplies. 8

Sea Horse advised Captain Tayong to contact its Technical Director, Mr. Clark, who was in Tokyo and who could
provide a solution for the supply of said oxygen and acetylene. 9
On the night of 31 July 1989, Mr. Clark received a call from Captain Tayong informing him that the vessel cannot
said without the oxygen and acetylene for safety reasons due to the problems with the turbo charger and
economizer. Mr. Clark responded that by shutting off the water to the turbo charger and using the auxiliary boiler,
there should be no further problem. According to Mr. Clark, Captain Tayong agreed with him that the vessel could
sail as scheduled on 0100 hours on 1 August 1989 for South Africa. 10

According to Captain Tayong, however, he communicated to Sea Horse his reservations regarding proceeding to
South Africa without the requested supplied, 11 and was advised by Sea Horse to wait for the supplies at 0800 hrs.
of 1 August 1989, which Sea Horse had arranged to be delivered on board the Oceanic Mindoro. 12 At 0800 hours
on 1 August 1989, the requisitioned supplies were delivered and Captain Tayong immediately sailed for Richard
Bay.

When the vessel arrived at the port of Richard Bay, South Africa on 16 August 1989, Captain Tayong was instructed
to turn-over his post to the new captain. He was thereafter repatriated to the Philippines, after serving petitioners
for a little more than two weeks. 13 He was not informed of the charges against him. 14

On 5 October 1989, Captain Tayong instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration ("POEA"), claiming his unpaid salary for the unexpired portion of the written
employment contract, plus attorney's fees.

Petitioners, in their answer to the complaint, denied that they had illegally dismissed Captain Tayong. Petitioners
alleged that he had refused to said immediately to South Africa to the prejudice and damage of petitioners.
According to petitioners, as a direct result of Captain Tayong's delay, petitioners' vessel was placed "off-hire" by the
charterers refused to pay the charter hire or compensation corresponding to twelve (12) hours, amounting to US
$15,500.00, due to time lost in the voyage. They stated that they had dismissed private respondent for loss of trust
and confidence.

The POEA dismissed Captain Tayong's complaint and held that there was valid cause for his untimely repatriation.
The decision of the POEA placed considerable weight on petitioners' assertion that all the time lost as a result of
the delay was caused by Captain Tayong and that his concern for the oxygen and acetylene was not legitimate as
these supplies were not necessary or indispensable for running the vessel.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") reversed and set aside the decision of the POEA. The
NLRC found that Captain Tayong had not been afforded an opportunity to be heard and that no substantial
evidence was adduced to establish the basis for petitioners' loss of trust or confidence in the Captain. The NLRC
declared that he had only acted in accordance with his duties to maintain the seaworthiness of the vessel and to
insure the safety of the ship and the crew.

Petitioners, before this Court, claim that the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners allege that
they had adduced sufficient evidence to establish the basis for private respondent's discharge, contrary to the
conclusion reached by the NLRC. Petitioners insist that Captain Tayong, who must protect the interest of
petitioners, had caused them unnecessary damage, and that they, as owners of the vessel, cannot be compelled to
keep in their employ a captain of a vessel in whom they have lost their trust and confidence. Petitioners finally
contend that the award to the Captain of his salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract and one
(1) month leave pay, including attorney's fees, also constituted grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is right that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: NO. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that confidential and managerial employees cannot be arbitrarily
dismissed at any time, and without cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation. Such
employees, too, are entitled to security of tenure, fair standards of employment and the protection of labor laws.
The captain of a vessel is a confidential and managerial employee within the meaning of the above doctrine. A
master or captain, for purposes of maritime commerce, is one who has command of a vessel. A captain commonly
performs three (3) distinct roles: (1) he is a general agent of the shipowner; (2) he is also commander and technical
director of the vessel; and (3) he is a representative of the country under whose flag he navigates. Of these roles,
by far the most important is the role performed by the captain as commander of the vessel; for such role (which, to
our mind, is analogous to that of "Chief Executive Officer" [CEO] of a present-day corporate enterprise) has to do
with the operation and preservation of the vessel during its voyage and the protection of the passengers (if any)
and crew and cargo. In his role as general agent of the shipowner, the captain has authority to sign bills of lading,
carry goods aboard and deal with the freight earned, agree upon rates and decide whether to take cargo. The ship
captain, as agent of the shipowner, has legal authority to enter into contracts with respect to the vessel and the
trading of the vessel, subject to applicable limitations established by statute, contract or instructions and
regulations of the shipowner. To the captain is committed the governance, care and management of the vessel.
Clearly, the captain is vested with both management and fiduciary functions.

MIDWEST SHIPPING CO VS D.I. HENRY

*CANT BE FOUND*

SWEET LINES VS CA

FACTS: For having by-passed a port of call without previous notice, petitioner shipping company and the ship
captain were sued for damages by four of its passengers, private respondents herein, before the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch VIII,

Briefly, the facts of record show that private respondents purchased first- class tickets from petitioner at the latter's
office in Cebu City. They were to board petitioner's vessel, M/V Sweet Grace, bound for Catbalogan, Western
Samar. Instead of departing at the scheduled hour of about midnight on July 8, 1972, the vessel set sail at 3:00 A.M.
of July 9, 1972 only to be towed back to Cebu due to engine trouble, arriving there at about 4:00 P.M. on the same
day. Repairs having been accomplished, the vessel lifted anchor again on July 10, 1972 at around 8:00 A.M.

Instead of docking at Catbalogan, which was the first port of call, the vessel proceeded direct to Tacloban at around
9:00 P.M. of July 10, 1972. Private respondents had no recourse but to disembark and board a ferryboat to
Catbalogan.

Hence, this suit for damages for breach of contract of carriage which the Trial Court.

ISSUE: W/N the carrier is liable for damges.

HELD: YES. ART. 614. A captain who, having agreed to make a voyage, fails to fulfill his undertaking, without being
prevented by fortuitous event or force majeure, shall indemnify all the losses which his failure may cause, without
prejudice to criminal penalties which may be proper.
and

ART. 698. In case of interruption of a voyage already begun, the passengers shall only be obliged to pay the fare in
proportion to the distance covered, without right to recover damages if the interruption is due to fortuitous event
or force majeure, but with a right to indemnity, if the interruption should have been caused by the captain
exclusively. If the interruption should be caused by the disability of the vessel, and the passenger should agree to
wait for her repairs, he may not be required to pay any increased fare of passage, but his living expenses during the
delay shall be for his own account

The crucial factor then is the existence of a fortuitous event or force majeure. Without it, the right to damages and
indemnity exists against a captain who fails to fulfill his undertaking or where the interruption has been caused by
the captain exclusively.

As found by both Courts below, there was no fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented the vessel from
fulfilling its undertaking of taking private respondents to Catbalogan. In the first place, mechanical defects in the
carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that exempts the carrier from responsibility. 1

In the second place, even granting arguendo that the engine failure was a fortuitous event, it accounted only for
the delay in departure. When the vessel finally left the port of Cebu on July 10, 1972, there was no longer any force
majeure that justified by-passing a port of call.

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING VS CA

FACTS: On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the
Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space.
Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel.
Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking
maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.

Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the
vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its
cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The
sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. - When the vessel reached the landmark (the big
church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the
vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the
orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor
did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew
members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was
all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. - After Gavino noticed that the
anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed
that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino
thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow
of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained
damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report
to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. - The rehabilitation of the
damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25.

PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE

- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to
Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85:

SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or
straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or
another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.

- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the
master have been specified by the same regulation:

SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing
the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to
his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural
calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage.

The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or
overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to
life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability
of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master

Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in
appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. The duties and responsibilities of the
Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxx xxx

f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof
until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment
the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order.

- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the
responsibilities of pilots:

Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control
thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the
master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions.

xxx xxx xxx

Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by
the master of such vessels.

ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent
HELD: YES. The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a
presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). It then went on to determine
who between the pilot and the master was negligent.

PILOT

- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or
in certain waters. He is an expert whos supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know
because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the
safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake.

- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor
not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly
to any such happenings.

MASTER

- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. The master, however
may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of
the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. - Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never sensed the any danger even when
the anchor didnt hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence
on his part. He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was
seeing and hearing.

- The masters negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the
part of FESC.

CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS

- As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an
injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the
proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, person is not relieved
from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person
charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and
that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that
the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it
may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not
the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence
of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury. - There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of
them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury
to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of
them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third
party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code.