1. Plaintiff-appellee Siari Valley Estates Inc. vs.
defendant-appellant Filemon Legal Provisions: Articles 472-473 of RA 386 (The New Civil Code) states:
Lucasan
GR No. L-7046, 31 August 1955, 97 Phil 987
Facts: In 1921, plaintiff-appellee and duly-organized agricultural corporation Siari
Valley Estate Inc. started raising livestock on its 950-hectare ranch with 7 native
cattle. It acquired in 1923 thirty (30) native cattle and two Indian bulls. Through a
native black bull, native stock was introduced into its herd and the male offspring of
that bull were castrated. Prior to Japanese occupation, the fence enclosing Siari
Valley's pasture was well kept. But in 1943, a portion of that fence was destroyed,
causing some of the cattle straying into defendant-appellant Filemon Lucasan's
adjoining unfenced range in Sindangan, Zamboanga. Several men employed under
him took advantage of the situation and willfully, deliberately rounding up and
driving many animals from Siari pasture towards his grazing land. In December
1948, Siari Valley Estate Inc. filed an action to recover about 200 head of cattle that
were driven or wandered from its pasture lands into defendant's adjoining ranch. It
asked for return of its animals with their offspring or for payment of those disposed
of by defendant, plus damages. Lucasan denied in his answer that he appropriated
or retained any cattle belonging to Siari Valley and alleged on the contrary that the
plaintiff took away from his pasture 105 heads of cattle through force and
intimidation. He also demanded suitable compensation.
Farmer Jesus Pandi testified that during the war he saw Lucasan's men Angel
Galimon, Francisco Ramos and Bilingan Subane driving 30 heads of cattle from Siari
Valley Estate to defendant's ranch, and his testimony remained uncontradicted.
Galimon, Ramos and Bilingan were available during the trial, but Lucasan did not
place them on the witness stand to contradict Pandi's testimony.
After submission of several motion and petitions by both parties, a trial was held,
and the Court of First Instance (CFI) Zamboanga on 30 June 1952 (via Hon. Judge
Patricio Ceniza) decided in favor of Siari Valley Estate, affirming its right to recover
the (alleged) strayed animals and its offspring. The said trial court also ordered
Filemon Lucasan to deliver all the cattle in his ranch, especially the 323 animals and
its offspring demanded by Siari Valley. He was also found guilty of contempt
proceedings and he is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P500.00 pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of one day, for every PhP2.50 that he fails to pay.
Issues: Defendant Filemon Lucasan appealed CFI Zamboanga's decision raising the
issue whether Siari Valley Estate's cattle were commingled with his cattle, and was
such mix-up (commixtion) was made in bad faith?
Art. 472 - If by the will of their owners two things of the same or different kinds are
mixed, or if the mixture occurs by chance, and in the latter case the things are not
separable without injury, each owner shall acquire a right proportional to the part
belonging to him, bearing in mind the value of the things mixed or confused. (381)
Art. 473 - If by the will of only one owner, but in good faith, two things of the same
or different kinds are mixed or confused, the rights of the owners shall be
determined by the provisions of the preceding article. If the one who caused the
mixture or confusion acted in bad faith, he shall lose the thing belonging to him
thus mixed or confused, besides being obliged to pay indemnity for the damages
caused to the owner of the other thing with which his own was mixed. (382)
Held by the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court denied Lucasan's appeal and
affirmed CFI Zamboanga's decision that held him guilty of appropriating or retaining
Siari Valley's Cattle and its offspring. The Supreme Court also applied Article 473 of
the New Civil Code in the present case and it held that Lucasan acted in bad faith:
Lucasan's cowboys and even his sons Rafael and Vicente rounded up and drove Siari
Valley's cattle into his pasture. He knew that he had the plaintiff's cattle, but
refused to return them despite plaintiff's demands. He even threatened Siari
Valley's men when it tried to retrieve the animals. He harassed them with false
prosecutions for their attempts to get the said animals back. He would not allow
plaintiff' s cowboys to get into his pasture to identify its flock. Lastly, he rebranded
several Siari Valley cattle with his own brand and sold those cattle without
registering the sales. Also, after some cattle impounded were entrusted to his
custody as trustee, he disposed of not less than 5 head of cattle among those he
received as such trustee. He disposed of much more cattle than he had a right to.
2. Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot
with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-
contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioners
corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a
complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in
Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The
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latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by
him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of
law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said
article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners
included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded
the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form
attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.
3. VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, Petitioners, vs. JOHN
NABOR C. ARRIOLA, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]
Facts:
Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor Arriola (respondent)
,his son with his first wife , and Vilma G. Arriola, his second wife and his other son,
Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners).
On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel
of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by
and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of
creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.
However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above mentioned
property and so the respondent proposed to sell it though public auction. The
petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house standing
on the subject land. The respondent then filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
for Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, the respondent
elevated the case to the CA with a petition for certiorari and prayed that he be
allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land including the house
built on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of the
subject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion. Hence this petition for review
on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgement of partition
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of
partition but in view of the suspended proscription imposed under Article 159 of
the family code, the subject house immediately partitioned to the heirs.
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by
an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family
reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues
to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of
the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the
deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as
a family residence 20 years back.
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless
the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
4. Patricio vs Dario
Topic: Family Home
Facts:
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent
Marcelino G. Dario III.
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 He left a residential house and a pre-school building situated at Cubao, Quezon
City.
Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extra judicially settled the
estate of Marcelino V. Dario.
Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership.
O Private responded refused to partition the property.
O Petitioner and Marcelino Marc filed an action for partition before RTC Quezon
City
Trial court ordered the partition of the property.
O Private respondents motion for reconsideration denied.
Appeal to the Court of Appeals denied:
O Upon motion for reconsideration, CA dismissed the petitioners motion for
partition.
It held that family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses
as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the
property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. [Son of the
private respondent was a minor beneficiary of the family home]
Issue: Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners
refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
Held: Petition granted as the minor son does not satisfy all the requisites to be
considered as a beneficiary of the family home.
Ratio:
Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits
of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they
live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head
of the family.
On the first requisite:
o The beneficiaries of the family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate.
o Descendants- contemplate all descendants of the person or persons who
constituted the family home without distinction. It includes the grandchildren and
great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home
On the second requisite:
o The grand son has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10
years from the death of the decedent
On the third requisite [fail! Did not satisfy!]:
o Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him.
o Marcelino IV is dependent on the legal support of his father and not his
grandmother.
o Hence, no legal impediment in partitioning the property.
*No co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and
may insist on partition on the common property at any time. An action to demand
partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property.
5. JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN
Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric,
Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners.
The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the respondents back-
wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision
became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy
Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying
a property in Ramos name situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt
from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to
quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home
there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the
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business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by
the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be
made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what
requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors
claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home
was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988,
then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided
under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to
242 governs extrajudicial constitution.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or
judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein. Moreover,
the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership,
or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the
other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not
apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable
must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for
exemption must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was
constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the
procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos family
home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy
upon the Pandacan property valid.
6. CAMELO CABATANIA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND CAMELO
REGODOS, RESPONDENTS.
Mere Physical Resemblance Between Child And Alleged Father Not Enough To
Establish Paternity And Filiation
Facts: Florencia filed a petition for recognition in behalf of her child Camelo, against
Camelo. According to her, when her husband left her, she sought employment as a
household helper and it was there that she met Camelo who hired her as house
helper. While working as a maid, Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where they
had sexual intercourse. Twenty seven days after their sexual intercourse, she
discovered that she was pregnant. Their tryst was repeated in March, 1982.
Camelos housewife, suspecting her to be pregnant, sent her home. Instead of
bringing her home, Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where he rented a house
for her. On September 9, 1982, she gave birth to Camelo. On the other hand,
Camelo, the alleged father, denied fathering Camelo the son. He averred that in the
course of her employment, Florencia would often go home to her husband and
return to work the next morning, which displeased his wife and sent home
Florencia. On the way to Cadiz City, they were onboard a Ceres bus so he invited
her to dinner, where she confided that she was financially hard-up. They had sexual
intercourse, but felt something jerking. It was then that she admitted being
pregnant.
Held: The RTC, after trial, believed the testimony of Florencia, and declared that
owing to the physical resemblance between Camelo the father and Camelo the son
who was presented in open court, there can be no doubt that Camelo is the father
of Camelo. Thus it ruled that Camelo is entitled to support from Camelo the father.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Camelo thus
elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties
so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
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(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand
in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to
record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration
of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with
respect to the childs paternity.[9] Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar
and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation
and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same.
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her
in Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of
voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and
the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition
for recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which
did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias
husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to
the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and
the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the
extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not
suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
7. Concepcion vs. CA
Facts: The spouses Nestor and Allem Nicolas were the lessees of Florence
Concepcion. The spouses were engaged in an office supply business where they
cater to various government agencies. In 1985, the spouses agreed to let Florence
in on the business. Hence, Florence contributed capital.
But sometime in July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion, the brother of the dead husband of
Florence, called Florence interrogating her about the rumored affair that she was
having with Nestor. Florence denied the said rumor. Unsatisfied, Rodrigo met with
Nestor face-to-face. Nestor denied the allegations of Rodrigo. Rodrigo then dared
Nestor to meet the neighbors, friends, and relatives, who allegedly know of the
relationship. Nestor agreed. And so in front of these neighbors, friends, and
relatives, Rodrigo reiterated his allegations but then these neighbors, friends, and
relatives denied having ever known any illicit affair between Nestor and Florence.
Because of the incident, Nestor felt debased so much so that he was ashamed of
going out in public. As a result, his business started to decline. Florence also
stopped contributing capital. Even his wife started doubting his fidelity. Nestor then
wrote a letter to Rodrigo asking him to publicly apologize for the incident as well as
to pay the spouses damages. Rodrigo refused hence he was sued by the spouses.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the spouses and
awarded in their favor a total of P85k in moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorneys fees.
On appeal, Rodrigo insisted that there was no legal basis for the award of damages
against him because the acts complained of are not those found in Article 26 and
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The provisions of Articles 26 and 2219 are as follows:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of anothers
residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another; (3) Intriguing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs,
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery
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or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7)
Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts
mentioned in Art. 309 (referring to disrespect for the dead or wrongfully interfering
in a funeral); (10) Acts or actions referred to in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35 x x x x
Certainly, what Rodrigo did is a violation of Nestors person. The Supreme Court
went on to explain the rationale behind Article 26 and why the enumerations
therein are not exclusive: The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that
the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a
concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone
of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it
dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly
humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed
defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and
damages are provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind.
8. Liyao vs Liyao GR No 138961 Mar 7 2002
FACTS: Petitioner, represented by his mother Corazon, filed an action for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the late William Liyao
against herein respondents, the legitimate wife and children of the deceased.
Corazon is legally married but living separately from her husband allegedly
for more than ten years at the time of the institution of this civil case. She
cohabited with the late William until his death. Petitioner alleged that he was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William
Liyao, having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent
during his lifetime and presented witnesses and evidence to prove his allegations.
On the other hand, respondents painted a different picture of the story.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioner.
CA reversed the ruling of RTC, favoured the presumption of legitimacy of the child
and gave weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the respondents that
Corazon and her husband were seen together during the period she cohabited with
the deceased.
ISSUE:
WON the petition initiated by Corazon to compel recognition by
respondents can prosper.
WON petitioners action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.
RULING: No. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.(Art 167,FC)
No. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and
subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional
circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and
subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child,
then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of
his mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy
is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully
defeated the presumption. (Art 170-171, FC)
9. TEOFISTA BABIERA VS PRESENTACION CATOTAL
FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She
asserted that the birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth,
the signature of informant forged, and contained false entries, to wit:
That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariosa;
Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is falsified;
Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;
Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate child;
It was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a child at 54 years
of age; her last child birth was when Presentacion was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and
ineffective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the
hereditary rights of Presentacion who inherited the estate.
Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed
therein her certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card.
She also filed a motion on the grounds that:
the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child
of Hermogena and Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the
petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family Code;
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and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of
the Family Code.
The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings
pursuant to Art. 171;
2. Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the statute of
limitation;
3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to the oral
testimony of Presentacion.
RULING:
Petition is not meritorious.
1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows
that it applies to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's
child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed child
of the mother. Present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
Teofista. The present action does not impugn Teofista's filiation to Eugenio and
Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. The reason
why Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is to protect the former's
successional rights.
2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period
for action to impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the
cancellation of Teofista's Birth Certificate, it does not impugn her legitimacy. The
action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe because it was allegedly
declared void ab initio.
3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence
presented during trial, sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the
issuance of birth certificate.
First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the
mother's signature was different from other signatures. Second, no medical
records or doctor's prescription that provide as evidence of Hermogena's
pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of age. Third,
the disposition of Hermogena which states that she did not give brith to Teofista
and that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.
10. MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA VS CA
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various properties. They both
died intestate. The special proceedings for administration of the properties were
filed with the trial court. Vicente's sister Victoria B. Lirio filed for issuance of letters
of administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa opposed the petition, saying that
she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is capable of administering his
estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the
spouses treated her as their own daughter. The relatives of Vicente tried to prove
through testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed to beget a child during their
marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the biological child of
the spouses who were unable to physically procreate.
Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of
Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court decision and declared Marissa
Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of the late spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child and the sole heir of
the late spouses.
RULING:
No. The SC find no merit to the petition
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at
bar. The above provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged
not to be the biological child of a certain couple.
In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his
child;
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(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within which the husband or
any of his heirs should file an action impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this
case, it is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that Marissa is not
his child or a child by Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not born to
Vicente and Isabel.
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate of
Live Birth was repudiated by the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
the late Isabel by Vicente, saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of
the estate.
11. Cobatbat-Lim vs IAC 166 SCRA 451
Facts: Case at hand is a squabble over the estate of late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat.
Petitioner is Violeta Cabatbat-Lim who claims to be the only child of Esperanza
while the resps are the sisters and children of a deceased brother.
Priv resps (sisters of Esperanza) filed @ CFI Pangasinan for partitioning of
Esperanzas estate (died intestate on 4/23/77). Part of her estate is the Calasiao
Bijon Factory which is in possession of Violeta (alleged child of Esperanza and
Proceso Cabatbat). They were saying that Violeta is only a ward (ampon) through
the ff evidences:
Absence of any records that Esperanza was admitted to hospital where Esperanza
was supposedly born
Absence of birth certificate in the live birth section of the Provincial Hospital
(1947-1948)
Civil registry certification of 3/9/77 that there is no birth record of Violeta
Cabatbat from 5/26/48 or 49
Certification that Esperanza and Proceso were only guardians (from Principal II of
the Pilot School)
Amparo Resides testimony on 5/21/48 that she was in the Provincial Hospital to
watch a cousin give birth and there she met Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to an
IC Baby Girl Lastimosa on 5/26/48 (now known as Violeta Cabatbat)
Violeta on the other hand tried to adduce evidence that will support her claim.
Among which he showed are the following:
Her birth record filed 6/15/48 showing her birth of 5/26/48 and that shes an LC
of Esperanza and Prospero
Procesos testimony that shes his child w/ Esperanza
Benita Lastimosas denial that she delivered at Provincial Hospital
MC of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao showed that Esperanza is the mother of the
bride
Deed of Sale 5/14/60 where minor Violeta is assisted by mother Esperanza
Deed pf Absolute Sale 4/21/61 assisted by father Proceso
TC held that Violeta is NOT natural child of E and P therefore NOT a legal heir.
Issue: WON Violeta is a natural child of Esperanza and Proceso
Held: NO. TC and CA findings on filiation is given great accord, conclusive upon the
SC. TC then said that the Registry Book of hospital admission doesnt even
Esperanza was a patient on 5/26/48 and it doesnt even show that Esperanza was
ever admitted from 12/1/47 6/15/48. On 5/26/48, Records only show that there
was one birth at that day and that was Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to an IC
baby girl Lastimosa.
Absence of birth record in the Civil Regitry makes her exhibit doubtable. Moreover,
her reliance on NCC 263 is misplaced as such action is not to impugn legitimacy but
to claim inheritance as legal heirs from a childless aunt. They do not claim that shes
an IC
12. CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the
deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father
Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without
any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October
3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving
spouse executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself,
8
allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private
respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latters name.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in
question by right of representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the
legitimacy of Hermogenes.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone
witness, with documentary evidences offered to prove petitioners filiation to their
father and their aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a
written offer of the exhibits.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence on the
ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased
Teodora Guerrero.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. Respondent Court of
Appeals upheld the dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence presented
by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint
affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence,
this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the father nor an
heir, may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation.
Ruling:
1. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy
of herein petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in
view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none
even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory.
The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more
clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: The contest of
the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper
complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code
confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This
action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed
by law.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the
presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The
obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from
being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to
settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to
the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the
conception of the child, may still be easily available.
2. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by
which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the
conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining
half shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are
entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only
validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property
9
to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are
deemed co-owners of the property covered by the Transfer Certificate of Title in
the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share
thereof, respectively.
13. Tayag vs. Court of Appeals and Leyva
Facts:
Siblings Juan Galicia Sr. and Celerina Labuguin entered into a contract to sell a
parcel of land in Nueva Ecija to a certain Albrigido Leyva:
o 3K upon agreement
o 10K ten days after the agreement
o 10K representing vendors indebtedness to Phil Veterans Bank
o 27K payable within one year from execution of contract.
Leyva only paid parts of the obligation.
But even after the grace period for payment made in the contract and while
litigation of such case, the petitioners still allowed Leyva to make payments.
With regards to the obligation payable to the Phil Veterans bank by the vendee, as
they deemed that it was not paid in full, such obligation they completed by adding
extra amount to fulfill such obligation. This was fatal in their case as this is Leyvas
argument that they constructively fulfilled the obligation which is rightfully due to
him. (Trivia: It was Celerina, Juans sister, that paid the bank to complete such
obligation).
Petitioners claim that they are only OBLIGEES with regards to the contract, so the
principle of constructive fulfillment cannot be invoked against them.
Petitioners, being both creditor and debtor to private respondent, in accepting
piecemeal payment even after the grace period, are barred to take action through
estoppel.
Issue:
1. WON there was constructive fulfillment in the part of the petitioners that shall
make rise the obligation to deliver to Leyva the deed of sale? YES
2. WON they are still entitled to rescind the contract? NO, barred by estoppel.
Held:
1.
In a contract of purchase, both parties are mutually obligors and also obligees, and
any of the contracting parties may, upon non-fulfillment by the other privy of his
part of the prestation, rescind the contract or seek fulfillment (Article 1191, Civil
Code).
In short, it is puerile for petitioners to say that they are the only obligees under the
contract since they are also bound as obligors to respect the stipulation in
permitting private respondent to assume the loan with the Philippine Veterans
Bank which petitioners impeded when they paid the balance of said loan. As
vendors, they are supposed to execute the final deed of sale upon full payment of
the balance as determined hereafter.
2.
Petitioners accepted Leyvas delayed payments not only beyond the grace periods
but also during the pendency of the case for specific performance. Indeed, the right
to rescind is not absolute and will not be granted where there has been substantial
compliance by partial payments. By and large, petitioners actuation is susceptible
of but one construction that they are now estopped from reneging from their
commitment on account of acceptance of benefits arising from overdue accounts of
private respondent.
14. Jison vs. CA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner,
Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed
20 years after her mothers death and when she was already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he
impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since
childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate
child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that
petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA
and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11
witnesses.
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.
10
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172
thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations
of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts
must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but
also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by
Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was employed by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and
conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of
participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render
the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the
affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco
was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Franciscos
illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great
lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the
high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones
illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous
possession. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina
filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A
denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and
unjust. Petition was denied.
15. DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
- Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V.
Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister.
- A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin
was left in the care of her father and grandparents.
- Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted
the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian.
- Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement and the court set aside the original
judgement and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the court issued a resolution
granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.
- Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous
decision and granted Edgar custody over Gardin.
- Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a
matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority
upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
Issue:
Is Dinah entitled to the custody of Gardin?
Ruling:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a
mother has seen her baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule
has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child.
A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of
age for compelling reasons. Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If
older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the
court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by
disregarding the childs preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit,
in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third
person.
11
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find
that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her
familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people
and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.
16. EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S.
REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, petitioners,
vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO, respondents.
FACTS:
1. Eugenio owns a parcel of land in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan (4,527 square
meters, more or less, and covered by a TCT --- property was adjudicated to Eugenio
by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his
parents).
2. Librada F. Mauricio (Librada, DECEASED) and her daughter Leonida F.
Mauricio (Leonida) filed a complaint before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan alleging
that theyre the legal heirs of Godofredo Mauricio who was the lawful and
registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject
land( that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on
the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees,
seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements; that
through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the
preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994
to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized by
Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never
appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of
the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue
advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other
handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of
consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject
respondents from the subject property).
3. Leonida and Librada prayed for the declaration of nullity of the
Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful
possession and cultivation of the subject property.
4. According to Eugenio: Godofredos occupation of the subject premises
was based on the formers mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied
signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an
agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily
affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents
of the document. Moreover, Librada receivedP50,000.00 from Eugenio on the
same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the
jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by respondents is the
annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts.
Provincial Adjudicator Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being
the surviving spouse, should have peaceful possession of the land.
DARAB - Mauricios are former tenants of Spouses Reyes.
CA - affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB.
ON APPEAL, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio.
Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of
Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a
mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
ISSUE: WON Eugenio can question the filiation of Leonida in a case regarding land
dispute.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio
cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known
civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book Civil Code of the Philippines,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence, noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted
from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in
the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a
child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void. This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because
12
they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought only
by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court
stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject
to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, this Court reiterated that adoption cannot
be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate.
Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of the
adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that
purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
17. LUCAS versus-LUCAS
FACTS: Petitioner, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for
the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)2 before RTC of Valenzuela City.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent
learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial
court and obtained a copy of the petition. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC,
finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order3
setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the
petition to file his opposition.
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.5 Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and
substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that
were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a
mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover,
jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
ISSUE: Should a court order for DNA testing be considered a search which must
be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid?
RULING: Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a
proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances
of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts
in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary
showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood
testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before
the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing
order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider
whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would
only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
18. De Jesus vs Dizon G.R. No. 142877
Prayer of the Petitioner: Petitioners maintain that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself
sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.
Facts:
The case involves two illegitimate children who having been born in a lawful
wedlock; claim to be the illegitimate children of the decedent, Juan G. Dizon in
order to enforce their respective shares in the latters estate under the rules on
succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on August 23,
1964 and during this marriage, herein petitioners, Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie A. de Jesus were born. However, in a notarized document dated June 07,
1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Subsequently, on the following year,
Juan G. Dizon died intestate leaving behind a considerable amount of assets. Thus,
on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment, herein petitioners filed a
complaint for Partition with Inventory and accounting of the Dizon estate. On the
other hand, herein respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the
decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a
stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case. They argued that the complaint, even
while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering
the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de
Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. But, the trial court denied their motion to dismiss
as well as their motion for reconsideration, which prompted the respondents to
elevate the issue before the Court of Appeals but still the latter upheld the decision
of the lower court and ordered that case be remanded for further proceedings.
Years later, respondents, notwithstanding with their submission of their answers
13
and several motions, they filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal of the
complaint. They contend that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the
recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G.
Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners
would have been able to establish their status as such heirs. They also asserted that
an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to ascertain the question of
paternity and filiation because the same could only be taken up in an independent
suit or proceeding. And at this instance, the trial court favored with the
respondents and therefore dismissed the complaint of the petitioners for lack of
cause of action and being improper.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate off springs of the
decedent.
Ruling:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission
of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of
an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record,
or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to
prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of
limitations is essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment.
However, based on the records presented, they showed that petitioners were born
during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify
Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law
more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing
reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that
the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in
Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect
on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer
be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable. In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.
Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children
of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents .Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one
that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress. WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions
considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
20. David vs CA
21. Fernandez vs. Fernandez
22. In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966, March 30 2005, 454 SCRA 2155
Case Doctrines:
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child
contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be
denied.
That the continued use of a middle name would cause confusion and difficulty
does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from one's registered
complete name.
Facts: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang
and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of
14
legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a
sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the
Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name
in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The
reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be
discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name
since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not
carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within
the grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in
the name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the
bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right
should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches
majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his
middle name, added the RTC.
Issues:
Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?
Held:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as
well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and
surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or
private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his
middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name,
a middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right,
so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in
his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or
any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper
or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his
true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his
middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on
which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change
of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of
majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the
value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
23. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed
to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to
Catindig, his surname.
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Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and
heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie
Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie

should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.

The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and
hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of
her mother.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name.

RULING:

Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to
what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family
Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by
virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother.

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