1

THIRD DIVISION

[CBD Case No. 176 . January 20, 1995.]

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW; REPRESENTING CONFLICTING INTERESTS; NEGATED IN CASE AT BENCH. In a sworn letter-
complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with
unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a
judgment which complainant might obtain. It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty.
Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number, to wit: Permanent Light
Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88. After hearing, the IBP Board
of Governors issued its Resolution with the following findings and recommendations: Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by
Bongalonta and attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful
reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on said TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of
Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in said title on February 7, 1989; whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on
October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered
property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin. Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing
conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might
obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE BY COUNSEL OF ANOTHER'S IBP RECEIPT NUMBER CONSTITUTES FALSEHOOD. As to the fact that indeed
the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-88," respondent Atty.
Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be suspended for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent
Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current
membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on
Bar Discipline. The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March
4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and
pleadings of Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for
it is the bounden duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he
practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court. Wherefore, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija. The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby dismissed for lack of evidence. (pp. 24, Resolution). The Court agrees
with the foregoing findings and recommendations. Finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty of committing a falsehood in
violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to suspend him from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition
of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE ON THOSE WHO SHOW THAT THEY POSSESS AND CONTINUE TO POSSESS THE
QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY LAW. It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and
honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that
expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J p:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National Grievance
Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M.
Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a
scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. cdasia

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No. 7653-55, for
estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to
obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the
name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid
criminal and civil cases.
 2

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed Civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a sum of money based on
a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by
Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and
evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of
execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty.
Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number, to wit: Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.

Thus, complainant concluded that Civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps.
Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution with the following findings and recommendations:cdasia

Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT
No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly
appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on said TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her
husband was registered and annotated in said title on February 7, 1989; whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on
October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the
said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel
spouses) has no leg to stand on.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same
IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-88," respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently
thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of
the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20,
1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated
March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija
in the appearance and pleadings of Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her
employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he
pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme
Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 24, Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath
and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant. cdasia

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.

||| (Bongalonta v. Castillo, CBD Case No. 176 (Resolution), [January 20, 1995], 310 PHIL 320-326)
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EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005.]

MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and nonpayment of debts.

The complaint, 1 dated 25 September 1972, was filed in this Court by Maria Elena Moreno on two causes of action. The first cause of action
involved Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 issued by the Land Registration Commission in favor of Lira, Inc., and indorsed by Araneta,
purportedly as president of the said corporation, to Moreno, in consideration of the amount of P2,177. The complaint alleged that almost a
year later, the warrant was dishonored.

The second cause of action involved Araneta's nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000. Moreno alleged that sometime in October
1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly to show to his associates, with the assurance that he would return the said amount
within the shortest possible time. Again in May 1972, Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the same assurance.
Thereafter, since he failed to make good on both promises, Moreno sought repayment in the aggregate amount of P11,000. Araneta issued
two Bank of America checks in her favor, the first dated 30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15 July 1972 for P5,000. However,
when Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored and returned to her marked "Account Closed." She referred the
matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand letter. Araneta, however, ignored the same.

In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500 from him. To accommodate her, he allegedly endorsed
to her the Treasury Warrant in question, worth P2,177, which he received from Lira, Inc., as part of his attorney's fees, and gave her an
additional P323 in cash. aATCDI

Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued the two undated checks in her favor, but maintains
that he had no intention of negotiating them. He avers that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly upon her request, only so she could show
the bank where she was working that she "had money coming to her." Araneta further claims that he warned her that the checks belonged
to the unused portion of a closed account and could not be encashed. To protect himself, he asked the complainant to issue a check in the
amount of P11,000 to offset the two "borrowed" checks. The respondent offered this check in evidence.

Moreno, however, contended 2 that this check for P11,000 "belonged" to the Philippine Leasing Corporation, which she managed when her
father passed away. She claimed she signed the check in blank sometime in 1969 when she fell seriously ill and gave them to Araneta who
was then helping her in the management of the corporation. She concluded that Araneta falsely filled up the check "in a desperate bid to
turn the tables on her." 3

On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 4

The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine o'clock in the morning, when the complainant and her counsel appeared.
Araneta was absent despite due notice. Upon motion, however, of Moreno, and to give the respondent a chance to defend himself, the
hearing was reset to 23 and 24 January 1973, both at nine o'clock in the morning. Service of the notice for the new dates of hearing were
effected to the respondent through a certain Mely Magsipoc on 22 January 1973. 5 On 23 January 1973, Araneta once more did not appear,
so the case was called again the following day, 24 January 1973.

In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was conducted on 24 January 1973 with the complainant, Moreno, taking the
stand. 6 On 27 February 1973, Araneta appeared for the scheduled hearing, only to ask for a postponement to prepare his defense. 7 No
further hearings appear to have been conducted thereafter. A hearing is shown to have been scheduled on 28 May 1973, however, on said
date, Araneta filed a joint motion for postponement with the conform of Moreno's lawyer, as he, Araneta, was "earnestly pursuing a
possible clarification of complainant's basic grievance."

Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta. On 14 September 1988, records of the case were forwarded to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Two days later, the Commission notified 8 both parties of a
hearing to be held on 2 November 1988, on which date neither of the parties nor the complainant's counsel appeared despite due notice. It
appears that notice could not be served on Araneta, as he no longer resided in his indicated address, and his whereabouts were unknown.
An inquiry 9 made at his IBP chapter yielded negative results. The Commission reset the hearing to 18 November 1988 at two o'clock in the
afternoon. 10 Again on this date, none of the parties appeared. Thus on the basis of the evidence so far adduced, the case was submitted
for resolution on such date. 11

On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion Buencamino submitted her Report, 12 which reads in part: cEaDTA

The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in evidence. Be that as it may, it is worthwhile considering.
The "stop payment" of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 was an act of Lira, Inc. and not that of the respondent.
 4

There was a subpoena issued for the appearance of Lilia Echaus, alleged President of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun,
the alleged Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to explain about why the "stop payment" of the treasury warrant was
done but neither witness appeared (as evidenced by the records) before the Office of the Solicitor General to testify.
At the dorsal portion of Exh. "B," the photocopy of the Treasury Warrant is a signature which complainant claims to
be that of the respondent beneath which is the word "President" and above the signature are the words Lira, Inc. but
an ocular examination of said signature in relation to the signature on the checks Exhibits "G" and "H" do not show
definitely that they were the signatures of one and the same person, so there is no basis to form the conclusion that
the respondent did sign the treasury warrant as president of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the complainant was merely
that [the] same treasury warrant was given to her by Atty. Araneta, which she deposited [in] her account. There is no
evidence to prove that she saw him sign it.

There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing the respondent about the "stop payment" or even any
written demand by the complainant to the respondent that the payment of the treasury warrant having been
"stopped" he should reimburse her with what he received as consideration for this check.

Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for the first cause of action.

On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for
P6,000.00 to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when in fact he is
presumed to have been aware when he issued said checks that his account with the bank against which [these]
checks were drawn was already closed, as was discovered from the fact that the checks were dishonored for said
reason.

Even disregarding the complainant's evidence and considering the answer of the respondent, the act of the
respondent in issuing the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 which he gave to the
complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when there was none and the
respondent knew such fact was an act of connivance of the respondent with the complainant to make use of these
useless commercial documents to deceive the public. However beneficial it may have been to the complainant, this
act of the respondent as a lawyer is abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required
of a member of the Bar.

The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of which was, as in this case, committed by the respondent,
belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and morality. In the Bar, moral integrity as
a virtue is a necessity which the respondent lacks.

The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as a lesson the respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) months arising from his irresponsible conduct as a member of the bar to take effect upon
notice by him of the decision of suspension. AICTcE

The IBP Board of Governors adopted 13 the above report, but increased its recommended period of suspension from three months to six
months.

Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted 14 the records of this case back to
this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. 15 On 8 July 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a
Report 16 regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution 17 from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. The
Resolution, which was attached to the report, states:

L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) Considering that the motion of petitioner Ernesto S.
Araneta for reconsideration of the resolution of September 16, 1977 which denied the petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 18553-R which affirmed the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila convicting the said petitioner of the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial
document, was denied in the resolution dated October 17, 1977 of the Second Division of this Court for lack of merit,
which denial is final, the Court Resolved: (a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta from the practice of law and
(b) to require the said petitioner to SHOW CAUSE within ten days from notice why he should not be disbarred.

Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant revealed that the above case had been archived on 20 November 1992.

It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein respondent's last filed pleading dated 28 May 1973, when he sought a
postponement of the scheduled hearing on this case to settle matters amicably between himself and Moreno, and the present, Araneta
had been found guilty and convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and indefinitely suspended.

We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Buencamino. However, we disagree with the penalty sought to be imposed.
 5

Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts is irrelevant, because by his own admission, the
respondent issued two checks in favor of Moreno knowing fully well that the same were drawn against a closed account. And though Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 had not yet been passed at that time, the IBP correctly found this act "abhorrent and against the exacting standards of
morality and decency required of a member of the Bar," which "belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity
and morality."

Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 18 as the effect "transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers
"can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he
owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals." 19

Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral
turpitude. 20

In Co v. Bernardino 21 and Lao v. Medel, 22 we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year's
suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. 23

In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended. AIECSD

Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 24 It involves "an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 25

Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are
constrained to impose a more severe penalty.

In fact, we have long held 26 that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, 27 "[t]he review of respondent's conviction no
longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has
proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice." 28

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let
a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Carpio Morales, J., is on leave.

||| (Moreno v. Araneta, A.C. No. 1109, [April 27, 2005], 496 PHIL 788-798)
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EN BANC

[A.C. No. 7332. June 18, 2013.]

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, complainant, vs. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Eduardo A. Abella (complainant) against Ricardo G. Barrios,
Jr. (respondent) based on the latter's violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code).

The Facts

On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT&T) before the
Cebu City Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as RAB-VII-01-0128-99. Finding
merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA) Ernesto F. Carreon, through a Decision dated May 13, 1999, 2 ordered PT&T to pay complainant
P113,100.00 as separation pay and P73,608.00 as backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LA's Decision to the NLRC.

In a Decision dated September 12, 2001, 3 the NLRC set aside LA Carreon's ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate complainant to his
former position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, including moral damages and attorney's
fees. On reconsideration, it modified the amounts of the aforesaid monetary awards but still maintained that complainant was illegally
dismissed. 4 Consequently, PT&T filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).

In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision), 5 the CA affirmed the NLRC's ruling with modification, ordering PT&T to pay
complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial reconsideration, claiming that all his years of service
were not taken into account in the computation of his separation pay and backwages. The CA granted the motion and thus, remanded the
case to the LA for the same purpose. 6 On July 19, 2004, the CA Decision became final and executory. 7

Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Cebu City RAB on October 25, 2004. At this point,
the case had already been assigned to the new LA, herein respondent. After the lapse of five (5) months, complainant's motion remained
unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution on March 3, 2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still, there was no action on
complainant's motion. Thus, on November 4, 2005, complainant proceeded to respondent's office to personally follow-up the matter. In the
process, complainant and respondent exchanged notes on how much the former's monetary awards should be; however, their computations
differed. To complainant's surprise, respondent told him that the matter could be "easily fixed" and thereafter, asked "how much is
mine?"Despite his shock, complainant offered the amount of P20,000.00, but respondent replied: "make it P30,000.00." By force of
circumstance, complainant acceded on the condition that respondent would have to wait until he had already collected from PT&T. Before
complainant could leave, respondent asked him for some cash, compelling him to give the latter P1,500.00. 8

On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a writ of execution, 9 directing the sheriff to proceed to the premises of PT&T and collect the
amount of P1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. PT&T moved to quash 10 the said writ which was, however, denied through
an Order dated November 22, 2005. 11 Unfazed, PT&T filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash dated December 2, 2005, 12 the contents of
which were virtually identical to the one respondent earlier denied. During the hearing of the said supplemental motion on December 9,
2005, respondent rendered an Order 13 in open court, recalling the first writ of execution he issued on November 7, 2005. He confirmed the
December 9, 2005 Order through a Certification dated December 14, 2005 14 and eventually, issued a new writ of execution 15 wherein
complainant's monetary awards were reduced from P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.

Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction before the NLRC. In a Resolution dated March 14, 2006, 16 the
NLRC annulled respondent's December 9, 2005 Order, stating that respondent had no authority to modify the CA Decision which was already
final and executory. 17

Aside from instituting a criminal case before the Office of the Ombudsman, 18 complainant filed the instant disbarment complaint 19 before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money
from complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and advantage to PT&T.

In his Comment, 20 respondent denied the abovementioned accusations, maintaining that he merely implemented the CA Decision which
did not provide for the payment of backwages. He also claimed that he never demanded a single centavo from complainant as it was in fact
the latter who offered him the amount of P50,000.00.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 2008, 21 IBP Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco)
found that respondent tried to twist the meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical, reasonable and grammatical context in order to favor
PT&T. 22 He further observed that the confluence of events in this case shows that respondent deliberately left complainant's efforts to
 7

execute the CA Decision unacted upon until the latter agreed to give him a portion of the monetary award thereof. Notwithstanding their
agreement, immoral and illegal as it was, respondent later went as far as turning the proceedings into some bidding war which eventually
resulted into a resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was found to be guilty of gross immorality and therefore, Commissioner
Limpingco recommended that he be disbarred. 23

On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345 (IBP Resolution), 24 adopting and approving
Commissioner Limpingco's recommendation, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for
Respondent's violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is
hereby DISBARRED. 25

Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule
6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

The pertinent provisions of the Code provide:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.

CANON 6 THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR
OFFICIAL TASKS.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyer's responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves
the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes
lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man's cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is
particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one's public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2)
advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. 26 It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a
government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. 27

In this light, a lawyer's compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules should be taken into consideration in determining his
moral fitness to continue in the practice of law.

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the
Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." 28 This proceeds from the lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of morality in
order to safeguard the Bar's integrity. 29 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private
activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment. 30

In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to re-compute the monetary awards due to the complainant who sought to
execute the CA Decision which had already been final and executory. When complainant moved for execution twice at that respondent
slept on the same for more than a year. It was only when complainant paid respondent a personal visit on November 4, 2005 that the latter
speedily issued a writ of execution three (3) days after, or on November 7, 2005. Based on these incidents, the Court observes that the sudden
dispatch in respondent's action soon after the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that he did not extort
money from the complainant.
 8

The incredulity of respondent's claims is further bolstered by his complete turnaround on the quashal of the November 7, 2005 writ of
execution.

To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&T's initial motion to quash through an Order dated November 22, 2005 but later
reversed such order in open court on the basis of PT&T's supplemental motion to quash which was a mere rehash of the first motion that
was earlier denied. As a result, respondent recalled his earlier orders and issued a new writ of execution, reducing complainant's monetary
awards from P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.

To justify the same, respondent contends that he was merely implementing the CA Decision which did not provide for the payment of
backwages. A plain and cursory reading, however, of the said decision belies the truthfulness of the foregoing assertion. On point, the
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION, ordering
petitioner PT&T to pay private respondent Eduardo A. Abella separation pay (as computed by the Labor Arbiter) in lieu
of reinstatement. 31

Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC's rulings dated September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 which both explicitly
awarded backwages and other unpaid monetary benefits to complainant. 32 The only modification was with respect to the order of
reinstatement as pronounced in both NLRC's rulings which was changed by the CA to separation pay in view of the strained relations between
the parties as well as the supervening removal of complainant's previous position. 33 In other words, the portion of the NLRC's rulings which
awarded backwages and other monetary benefits subsisted and the modification pertained only to the CA's award of separation pay in lieu
of the NLRC's previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion, palpable as it is, can be easily deduced from the records.

Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its decision, propounding that the CA's award of
separation pay denied complainant's entitlement to any backwages and other consequential benefits altogether. In his Verified Motion for
Reconsideration of the IBP Resolution, 34 respondent stated:

From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is very clear and categorical in directing PT&T to pay complainant
his separation pay ONLY in lieu of reinstatement. Clearly, the Court did not direct the PT&T to pay him his backwages,
and other consequential benefits that were directed by the NLRC because he could no longer be reinstated to his
previous position on the ground of strained relationship and his previous position had already gone, and no equivalent
position that the PT&T could offer. . . . .

Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct from separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and
are awarded conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally dismissed. 35 There is nothing in the records that could confound the
finding that complainant was illegally dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC, and the CA were all unanimous in decreeing the same. Being a labor
arbiter, it is hardly believable that respondent could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to backwages in view of the standing
pronouncement of illegal dismissal. In this regard, respondent's defense deserves scant consideration.

Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise, the Court gives credence and upholds Commissioner Limpingco's and the IBP Board of
Governor's pronouncement of respondent's gross immorality. Likewise, the Court observes that his infractions constitute gross misconduct.

Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. 36It treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the community's sense of decency. 37 On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment." 38

In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross
misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred:

SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as respondent's violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his disbarment should come as a matter of
course. However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps.
Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., 39 which therefore precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing,
 9

the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 40 in order to penalize respondent's transgressions as
discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar acts in the future.

As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of law is a privilege 41 accorded only to those who continue to
meet its exacting qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which the profession brings lies the greater responsibility to uphold
its integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is quintessential that its members continuously and unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and
protect moral uprightness in their activities, both in their legal practice as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the Bar holds no place
for the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct in violation of Rules
1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of
P40,000.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.

||| (Abella v. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 7332, [June 18, 2013])
 10

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 553 . June 17, 1993.]

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW, MEANING AND EXTENT OF. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation
of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. In the
practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and
instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. When a
person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to
their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving
advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law.
One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.

2. ID.; ID.; LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES IN CASE AT BAR CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range
of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law." The contention
of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit: . . . While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function
is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce
and adoptation, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said
law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely
within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does
not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to
legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in
the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight
into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales: . . .

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARALEGAL OR LEGAL ASSISTANT; CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES. Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals.
As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are
none in the Philippines. As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also
evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants.
There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of
Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES. In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules
or regulations granting permission therefor. (Illustrations: . . .)

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL POLICY ON PARALEGAL. We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the
concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may
be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done. . . . Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered
by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. That policy should continue to be one of
encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in
the state.
 11

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW IN CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE PERFORMED BY PARALEGALS; REASON. It should be noted that in
our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a
person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who
is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. . . .

7. ID.; ADVERTISEMENT BY LAWYER; RULE. Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of
the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance
of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS BEST ADVERTISEMENT. We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISEMENT OF TALENT OR SKILL. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. . . .

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include
only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists;
the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." . . . The use of an
ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he
is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening
of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR LAW LIST. The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes.
For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or
society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and
so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION IN BATES, ET AL. vs. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA (433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691) AS TO
PUBLICATION OF LEGAL FEES, NOT APPLICABLE; REASONS. The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that
the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to
publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of
Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso
that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the
canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar. It bears mention that in a survey
conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly with respect to these characteristics of lawyers: . . . Secondly, it is our
 12

firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of
such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to
exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J p:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that
of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise
of the law profession other than those allowed by law." cdrep

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's
Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for
Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession,
and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession,
he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted. cdphil

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged
in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should
be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federation International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers
on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services
and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of. cdphil
 13

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts
from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues
involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business
registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it
to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent
(to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and
of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed 4 .

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question give
the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services
for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the
term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with
(the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar
and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person
being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the
nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether
it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements
in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order
and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and any
law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce, is recognized,
and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law.
 14

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can
avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a
divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least,
this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the
sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice. LibLex

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition,
which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those
planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy,
which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license. LLpr

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may
gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts
does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in
the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in
question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from
further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services
to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal
profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields, such
as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the
exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will
deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form,
not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention
of, illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services
are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical
assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service
may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
 15

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts
which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void
under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law,
that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear
and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services. cdrep

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as
a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Articles of Incorporation
and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers
and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and
3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty.
Don Perkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal rights and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court (See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1948 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an
odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the
business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline.
The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am.
Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are, to wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services"
to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation.
 16

(See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly
show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside the court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investment Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the legal principles and procedures
related thereto, the legal advises based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and
are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the
general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the
practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor
of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice
law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in
those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general
public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact
remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to
take measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public
in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by
advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers
but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling
prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services." 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that information
regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters, will be given to them if they avail of its services.
The Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent
will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided
for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold
letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not
only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized
to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise
their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of this petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act
even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such as act could become
justifiable. LLphil
 17

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in
this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here, when it
cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should
not be done. LLjur

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars
of advertisements, is unprofessional and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion International de Abogadas:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business
of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does
not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

". . . Of necessity, no one . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar
with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law
forbids. It seems . . . clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a
factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . .. It is not
only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with
the broad features of the law . . .. Our knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct
not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and
laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specifications in harmony with the
law. This is not practicing law.

"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision
of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no
separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem.

"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him
and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function
would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of
the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of industrial relations experts are
the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to
a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matters, and without regard to
legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendant have tendered to the smaller
employers the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate
courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given
by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

"In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular
client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primary
 18

efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that
if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of
the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

"Another branch of defendant's work is the representation of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of
the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs. cdphil

"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal
government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination
or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National
Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear `in person, or by counsel, or by other representative.'
Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. `Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and
`other representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the
Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal." (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the
law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar;

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succinctly states the
rule of conduct:

"Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity."

1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A", Petition). Services on
routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in Rx for Legal
Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B", Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute practice of law. The business
is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply
the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of
law.

"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amounts to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted
by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . Apparently it is urged that the
 19

conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts.
Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney
and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on
common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport `to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular
situation in the publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the unlawful
practice of law . . .. There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating
to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that
for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of
necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems
of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought
and should be affirmed." (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.)

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory." It is not controverted,
however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law
(Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that
there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related
to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services" or "legal support services", and not
legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for a proper determination of the issues raised by the
petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation.
The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into
account. LLjur

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments
and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and
instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, inorder to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises
them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the later to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing
law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain
acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
 20

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients
as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)."

This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177), stated:

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of,
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering
an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144)."

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar,
we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition
is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which
are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology
in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as
computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers;
document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance
to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage,
property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
 21

clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful,
like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country,
and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and other
entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services." 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce
and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof
to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to
the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That
is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent
clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine
of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as
the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are "specialists" in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters
to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what
doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you
for the symptoms, and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists."

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes
of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital, the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait
basis. Again, kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich realtive who died
and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist
in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to
deal with that problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relative's will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the
case." 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the
practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. prcd

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of
respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals,
but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions
of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral
and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction where from respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there
also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various
statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied
with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of
attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the
construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the
bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in
legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation
separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this
should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer
studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards, or guidelines
was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered, as paralegal service. As pointed out
by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not
been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion
of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are
unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The proscription against advertising
of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case
of The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao R. Bavot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the
present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of
the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
 23

Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome
of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well
as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name
and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of
birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in
legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and,
with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine,
trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement
of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch
of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the time definitely
do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows
a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation
or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable
in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception.
Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar. LLpr

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about
lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics
of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%

Honest from 65% to 14%

Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of
the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose
integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance
 24

in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should
be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be
promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation
cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services. llcd

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute
the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's
corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for
such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication
or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office
of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

||| (Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553 (Resolution), [June 17, 1993])
 25

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6622. July 10, 2012.]

MANUEL G. VILLATUYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office of the Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya
(complainant) charges Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos (respondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondent's first marriage
was subsisting. 1

In a Resolution 2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March
2005. 3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the record. 4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a Notice 5 setting the mandatory conference of the
administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They
submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant,

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. 6 IcaEDC

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position Paper, 7 on 15
July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005. 8

Complainant's Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial consultant to assist the latter on technical and
financial matters in the latter's numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had
a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to P50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in
addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to
rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was
entitled to the amount of P900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a total of
P4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients. 9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the
fees he believes are due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc.,
and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his Position
Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, 10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates 11 and proofs of
payment made to the latter by their clients. 12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other
women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar
General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July
1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarias, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in
the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. 13 cHDEaC

Respondent's Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos
and Associates Law Office 14 but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder. 15 Respondent alleged that
complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the latter's dismissal of many
rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases. 16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them
regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of
complainant had been paid. 17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend
to the financial aspect of the case' such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this contention,
 26

respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates
Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.; 18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said
company. 19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. 20 Respondent did not specifically address
the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. 21 To the said Motion, he attached the certified
true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO. 22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the
dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into
by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarias,
Cavite, on 15 July 1980. 23 The second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place at the
Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987. 24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between
respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts,
respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status. TcHEaI

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that the document was not
marked during the mandatory conference or submitted during the hearing of the case. 25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the
opportunity to controvert those documents. 26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and
Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-
3270. 27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271. 28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in
the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for
their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. 29 While
complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not attend the hearing, 30 respondent manifested his willingness to attend and
moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with the
RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name. 31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of
Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos." 32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while his marriage with Pilar
Lozano was still valid. 33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for
contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting. 34 Each of the Informations
recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases. 35 cCaEDA

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to
suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTC-Laguna. Thus, the Commission
resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution. 36

IBP's Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the specific charges against
respondent. 37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only empowered to determine respondent's
administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent. 38 On the second charge, the
Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully
solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he
violated. 39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary
evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latter's first marriage was subsisting. 40 Due to
the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of
attorneys. 41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the
recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings
pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered
into those contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter
 27

committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately
filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts. 43 SEAHcT

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008
recommending respondent's disbarment. 44

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

While we affirm the IBP's dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the rationale behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former's share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on an
agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree
to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to
share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer
convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David 46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured
by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant's
allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services through various business entities.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and
used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latter's legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these
allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that
was breached. aADSIc

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise
his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of
the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a
nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when
the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak
for indirect solicitation on the lawyer's behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law. 48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and
legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" 49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the
engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would
render legal services related to the former's loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the
Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.

Rule 15.08 50 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing
the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other. 51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear
whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, we affirm the
recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.

Third Charge:
Bigamy

The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted
NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the
introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus
giving him no opportunity to controvert them. 52 We are not persuaded by his argument. TEcCHD
 28

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership
in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido: 53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions,
or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we
see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration
of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may
inquire into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against
the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. 54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies
to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter's first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering
into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the
authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he
had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other in Calamba to declare the second and the third Marriage
Contracts null and void. 55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the
NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the former's marriages to two other women aside from
his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and
convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were
certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person. Having
been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of
regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents. cTCaEA

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts.
We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts
as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke
any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondent's regard for marriage contracts
as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of
action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting.
In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:

[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct which
demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their
admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected
to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high
degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence
in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage,
a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. 57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
 29

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another
copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. aHTEIA

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Velasco, Jr., J., took no part relationship to a party.

Bersamin and Abad, JJ., are on leave.

||| (Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, [July 10, 2012], 690 PHIL 381-399)
 30

February 10, 2009

[B.M. No. 2012]

PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR PRACTICING LAWYERS

RESOLUTION

Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C. Corona re: Comment of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on our Suggested Revisions to the Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, the Court Resolved
to APPROVE the same.

This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the said Rule and its implementing regulations in at
least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE

SECTION 1. Title. This Rule shall be known as "The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service". ITSCED

SECTION 2. Purpose. This Rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to society as agents of social change and to the courts
as officers thereof by helping improve access to justice by the less privileged members of society and expedite the resolution of cases
involving them. Mandatory free legal service by members of the bar and their active support thereof will aid the efficient and effective
administration of justice especially in cases involving indigent and pauper litigants.

SECTION 3. Scope. This Rule shall govern the mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to render free legal aid services
in all cases (whether civil, criminal or administrative) involving indigent and pauper litigants where the assistance of a lawyer is needed.
It shall also govern the duty of other members of the legal profession to support the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule:

(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and
quasi-judicial agencies, including but not limited to the National Labor Relations Commission, National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of Labor and Employment Regional Offices, Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and National Commission for Indigenous Peoples. The term "practicing
lawyers" shall exclude:

(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice;

(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;

(iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited legal clinics of law
schools and lawyers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and peoples' organizations (POs)
like the Free Legal Assistance Group who by the nature of their work already render free legal aid
to indigent and pauper litigants; and

(iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who are employed in the private
sector but do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.

(b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those defined under Rule 141, Section 19 of the Rules of Court and Algura v. The
Local Government Unit of the City of Naga (G.R. No. 150135, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);

(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and controversies that are criminal, civil and administrative in nature in
whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper litigants need legal representation; TaDAIS

(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or quasi-judicial body for and in behalf of an indigent or pauper
litigant and the preparation of pleadings or motions. It shall also cover assistance by a practicing lawyer to
indigent or poor litigants in court-annexed mediation and in other modes of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR). Services rendered when a practicing lawyer is appointed counselde oficio shall also be considered as
free legal aid services and credited as compliance under this Rule;

(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official national organization of lawyers in the country;

(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked with handling legal
aid cases;

(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked with disciplining members
of the Bar;
 31

(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines located in the different geographical areas
of the country as defined in Rule 139-A; and

(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the practicing lawyer rendered free legal aid services. In the
case of quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to an officer holding an equivalent or similar position.

The term shall also include an officer holding a similar position in agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or a responsible
officer of an accredited PO or NGO, or an accredited mediator who conducted the court-annexed mediation proceeding.

SECTION 5. Requirements.

(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of sixty (60) hours of free legal aid services to indigent
litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within a period of twelve (12) months, with a minimum of
five (5) hours of free legal aid services each month. However, where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer
to render legal aid service for more than five (5) hours in one month, the excess hours may be credited to
the said lawyer for the succeeding periods.

For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court for cases where he may render free legal
aid service. He may also coordinate with the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire about
cases where he may render free legal aid service. In this connection, the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP
Chapter shall regularly and actively coordinate with the Clerk of Court. cHSTEA

The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within ten (10) days of the last month of each
quarter of the year.

(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate from the Clerk of Court attesting to
the number of hours spent rendering free legal aid services in a case. The certificate shall contain the
following information:

(i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was rendered, the party or parties in the said case(s) for
whom the service was rendered, the docket number of the said case(s) and the date(s) the service
was rendered.

(ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing or conducting trial on a particular case in the
court or quasi-judicial body.

(iii) The number of hours actually spent attending mediation, conciliation or any other mode of ADR on a
particular case.

(iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file a pleading or for postponement of hearing or
conference) or pleading filed on a particular case shall be considered as one (1) hour of service.

The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy to be retained by the practicing lawyer,
one (1) copy to be retained by the Clerk of Court and one (1) copy to be attached to the lawyer's
compliance report. DSEIcT

(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter within the court's
jurisdiction. The Legal Aid Chairperson shall then be tasked with immediately verifying the contents of the
certificate with the issuing Clerk of Court by comparing the copy of the certificate attached to the compliance
report with the copy retained by the Clerk of Court.

(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to the concerned lawyer. The IBP Chapter
shall also submit the compliance reports to the IBP's NCLA for recording and documentation. The submission
shall be made within forty-five (45) days after the mandatory submission of compliance reports by the
practicing lawyers.

(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies the number and date
of issue of their certificate of compliance for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to
disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings
from the records. cDTSHE

(f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4 (a) (i) and (ii), shall fill up a form
prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are employed with the government or
incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice or lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear
in court. The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together with
 32

the payment of an annual contribution of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000). Said contribution shall accrue to a
special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.

(g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4 (a) (iii) shall secure a
certification from the director of the legal clinic or of the concerned NGO or PO to the effect that, during that
year, they have served as supervising lawyers in a legal clinic or actively participated in the NGO's or PO's
free legal aid activities. The certification shall be submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office.

(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4 (a) (iv) shall fill up a form
prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are neither practicing lawyers nor covered by
Section (4) (a) (i) to (iii). The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office
together with the payment of an annual contribution of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by way of support for
the efforts of practicing lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid services. Said contribution shall accrue
to a special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.

(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the lawyer to a penalty of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) for that
year which amount shall also accrue to the special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.

SECTION 6. NCLA.

(a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid committees of the IBP local chapters for the proper handling
and accounting of legal aid cases which practicing lawyers can represent. CSDAIa

(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of the Legal Aid Office with respect to the coordination with
Clerks of Court on legal aid cases and the collation of certificates submitted by practicing lawyers.

(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records in compliance with this Rule.

(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate to be issued by the Clerk of Court and forms mentioned in
Section 5 (e) and (g). CEDHTa

(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the contributions and penalties that will be paid by lawyers pursuant
to this Rule to effectively carry out the provisions of this Rule. For this purpose, it shall annually submit an
accounting to the IBP Board of Governors. The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to the
Supreme Court in connection with its request for the release of the subsidy for its legal aid program.

SECTION 7. Penalties.

(a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet the minimum prescribed 60 hours of legal
aid service each year shall be required by the IBP, through the NCLA, to explain why he was unable to render
the minimum prescribed number of hours. If no explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds the
explanation unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall make a report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors
that the erring lawyer be declared a member of the IBP who is not in good standing. Upon approval of the
NCLA's recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors shall declare the erring lawyer as a member not in good
standing. Notice thereof shall be furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP Chapter which submitted the
lawyer's compliance report or the IBP Chapter where the lawyer is registered, in case he did not submit a
compliance report. The notice to the lawyer shall include a directive to pay Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000)
penalty which shall accrue to the special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.

(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective for a period of three (3) months from the receipt of the
erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Governors. During the said period, the lawyer cannot appear
in court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel. Provided, however, that the "not in good standing" status shall
subsist even after the lapse of the three-month period until and unless the penalty shall have been paid.

(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least three (3) consecutive years shall be the
subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu proprio by the CBD. The said proceedings shall
afford the erring lawyer due process in accordance with the rules of the CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court. If found administratively liable, the penalty of suspension in the practice of law for one (1) year shall
be imposed upon him. TCcDaE

(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form required to be submitted under this Rule or any contents thereof
shall be administratively charged with falsification and dishonesty and shall be subject to disciplinary action
by the CBD. This is without prejudice to the filing of criminal charges against the lawyer.
 33

(e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any Chairperson of the Legal Aid
Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case is pending or by the Director of a legal clinic or responsible
officer of an NGO or PO shall be a ground for an administrative case against the said Clerk of Court or
Chairperson. This is without prejudice to the filing of the criminal and administrative charges against the
malfeasor.

SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for
the required number of hours in a year for the three year-period covered by a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be
credited the following: two (2) credit units for legal ethics, two (2) credit units for trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for
alternative dispute resolution, four (4) credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, four (4) credit units for substantive and procedural
laws and jurisprudence and six (6) credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2 (g), Rule
2 of the Rules on MCLE.

A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for at least two consecutive years
within the three year-period covered by a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: one (1) credit
unit for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit for trial and pretrial skills, one (1) credit unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2) credit
units for legal writing and oral advocacy, two (2) credit units for substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and three (3) credit
units for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2 (g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE. 1uplaw09

SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby given authority to recommend implementing
regulations in determining who are "practicing lawyers", what constitute "legal aid cases" and what administrative procedures and
financial safeguards which may be necessary and proper in the implementation of this rule may be prescribed. It shall coordinate with
the various legal chapters in the crafting of the proposed implementing regulations and, upon approval by the IBP Board of Governors,
the said implementing regulations shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final approval.

SECTION 10. Effectivity. This Rule and its implementing rules shall take effect on July 1, 2009 after they have been published
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. IESAac

Published in The Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 14, 2009.

||| (Proposed Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, B.M. No. 2012, [February 10, 2009])
 34

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003.]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.

[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003.]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR.,
in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

For advertising himself in several leading newspapers as an "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo was charged for
improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services. Respondent admitted the act imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts.

The practice of law is not a business but a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Although
solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession, made
in a modest and decorous manner that wood bring no injury to the lawyer and the bar. Here, for advertising himself as an annulment of
marriage specialist, Atty. Simbillo undermined not only the stability but also the sanctity of marriage. Thus, for violation of Rules 2.03 and
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, Atty. Simbillo was suspended from the
practice of law for one year, with stern warning against repetition of the same or similar offense.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; PROHIBITION AGAINST SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS. Rules 2.03 and
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read: Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

2. ID.; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS BY THE SUPREME COURT, GROUNDS THEREFOR. Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules
of Court states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do
so.

3. ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW AS A PROFESSION, NOT A BUSINESS; ELUCIDATED. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not
a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be
a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a
business: 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without
making much money; 2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability; 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness,
and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients.

4. ID.; LAWYER ADVERTISING HIMSELF AS MARRIAGE ANNULMENT SPECIALIST UNDERMINES THE STABILITY AND SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE.
What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he
wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be
obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

5. ID.; SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS; PROPER MANNER THEREOF. The solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed.
However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the
office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.
 35

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT' OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667." 1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone
number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an
expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve
separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable
at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star. 2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office,
filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation
of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that
the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by
the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the
decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as
it is dignified. 4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306, 6finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1)
year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on
November 11, 2002. 7 HESIcT

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606
dated October 19, 2002 9

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This
petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court's Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings. 10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP's Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
 36

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. 12 It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is
the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. 13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. 14 The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe
to themselves. 15 The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients. 16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the
advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court's indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he
advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper. 17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18 Such
acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court's authority. TSHEIc

What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly
or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four
to six months from the time of the filing of the case, 19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar. 20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as
well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable. 21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.: 22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of
birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership
and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact
of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity
or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name,
the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis
and italics supplied)
 37

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. aDHScI

Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., abroad, on official business.

||| (Khan, Jr. v. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, 157053, [August 19, 2003], 456 PHIL 560-568)
 38

October 2, 2001

EN BANC

BAR MATTER 850 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

RESOLUTION

ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES

Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the
Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised
Rules for proper implementation:

RULE 1

Purpose

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.

RULE 2

Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court
En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules.

SECTION 2. Requirements of Completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every
three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:

(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units. cHSIAC

(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit units.

(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5) credit units.

(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and
jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.

(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units.

(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions equivalent to two (2)
credit units.

(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.

RULE 3

Compliance Period

SECTION 1. Initial Compliance Period. The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the
adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the
program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance
period. TECcHA

SECTION 2. Compliance Groups. Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be divided into three
(3) compliance groups, namely:

(a) Compliance group 1. Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned to
Compliance Group 1.

(b) Compliance group 2. Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group 2.
 39

(c) Compliance group 3. Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group 3.

Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may be available to earn credit unit
toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.

SECTION 3. Compliance Period of Members Admitted or Readmitted After Establishment of the Program. Members
admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group
based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or readmission.

The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month of admission or
readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.

(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or readmission, the
member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial compliance.

(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or readmission, the
member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal education activities
equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance period in which the member is admitted or
readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in
proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be
rounded up to the next whole number.

RULE 4

Computation of Credit Units (CU)

SECTION 1. Guidelines. CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the
MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyer's participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the
guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents required therefor:

PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS,

DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED

RULES

1.1 PARTICIPANT/ATTENDEE 1 CU PER HOUR OF ATTENDANCE CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

WITH NUMBER OF HOURS

1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR

RESOURCE SPEAKER PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSOR'S CERTIFICATION

1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION FROM

COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD

COORDINATOR/

FACILITATOR
 40

2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT PUBLISHED BOOK

LESS THAN 100 PAGES PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK WITH PROOF AS

AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY EDITOR

2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED

INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER

CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE

LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER

COMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED

LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT CERTIFICATION OF LAW DEAN OR

BAR REVIEW LECTURE PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR

LAW TEACHING/

RULE 5

Categories of Credit Units

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit Units. Credit units are either participatory or non-participatory. AHCETa

SECTION 2. Claim for Participatory Credit Units. Participatory credit units may be claimed for:

(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia, in-house education
programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.

(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker, moderator,
coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.

(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.

SECTION 3. Claim for Non-Participatory Credit Units. Non-participatory credit units may be claimed per compliance period
for:

(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of
an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of the author member,
which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the member's practice or employment.

(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

 41

RULE 6

Computation of Credit Hours (CH)

SECTION 1. Computation of Credit Hours. Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an education activity in
hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.

RULE 7

Exemptions

SECTION 1. Parties Exempted from the MCLE. The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:

(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive
Departments;

(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary,
incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine
Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;

(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice;

(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;

(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;

(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman;

(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in
accredited law schools;

(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the
Philippine Judicial Academy; and

(l) Governors and Mayors.

SECTION 2. Other Parties Exempted from the MCLE. The following members of the Bar are likewise exempt:

(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.

(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors. AHCaES

SECTION 3. Good Cause for Exemption from or Modification of Requirement. A member may file a verified request setting
forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from
compliance with or modification of any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a
procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.

SECTION 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a member ceases
to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance
Group.

SECTION 5. Proof of Exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under
oath and supported by documents.

RULE 8

Standards for Approval of Education Activities

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE Program. Subject to the implementing regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE
Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is
 42

an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically
mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.

SECTION 2. Standards for All Education Activities. All continuing legal education activities must meet the following
standards:

(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.

(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the legal profession,
including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the
ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.

(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.

(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be distributed to all
participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is offered.

(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from interruption like
telephone calls and other distractions.

RULE 9

Accreditation of Providers

SECTION 1. Accreditation of Providers. Accreditation of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee. CSIDEc

SECTION 2. Requirements for Accreditation of Providers. Any person or group may be accredited as a provider for a term
of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-
house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:

(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;

(b) Contain all information requested in the form;

(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.

SECTION 3. Requirements of All Providers. All approved accredited providers shall agree to the following:

(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider for at least four (4)
years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official record of attendance
only if the member's signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of
attendance shall contain the member's name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the
time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be
furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.

(b) The provider shall certify that:

(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of _______ hours of which
_______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the
activity;aTEACS

(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by these Rules and
such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.

(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date, location,
subject matter and length of the activity.

(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE
COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP
Staff Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.

(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time devoted to each topic and
identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE MCLE
COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.

(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one
(1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
 43

(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a spurious certificate in
violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.

SECTION 4. Renewal of Provider Accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may
be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities
for the preceding period.

SECTION 5. Revocation of Provider Accreditation. The accreditation of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked
by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.

RULE 10

Fee for Approval of Activity and Accreditation of Provider

SECTION 1. Payment of Fees. Application for approval of an education activity or accreditation as a provider requires
payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.

RULE 11

General Compliance Procedures

SECTION 1. Compliance Card. Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of
his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or
that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later than
the day after the end of the member's compliance period. ScaAET

SECTION 2. Member Record Keeping Requirement. Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or
exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to
Section 3(c) of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall
also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.

RULE 12

Non-Compliance Procedures

SECTION 1. What Constitutes Non-Compliance. The following shall constitute non-compliance:

(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;

(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;

(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed
period;

(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from
receipt of non-compliance notice;

(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;

(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with
the MCLE requirements.

SECTION 2. Non-compliance Notice and 60-day Period to Attain Compliance. Members failing to comply will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response
clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language
near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:

IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60
DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to attain the adequate
number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward
compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in
which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. DCAEcS

RULE 13
 44

Consequences of Non-Compliance

SECTION 1. Non-compliance Fee. A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance
period shall pay a non-compliance fee.

SECTION 2. Listing as Delinquent Member. A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the sixty (60) day
period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-
finding arm of the MCLE Committee.

SECTION 3. Accrual of Membership Fee. Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active rate against a member
during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.

RULE 14

Reinstatement

SECTION 1. Process. The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the member provides proof
of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary
credit units to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These
credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during the period of
non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting
the current compliance period requirement.

SECTION 2. Termination of Delinquent Listing is an Administrative Process. The termination of listing as a delinquent
member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.

RULE 15

Committee on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely, a retired Justice of the
Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center
designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a
term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the Court.

SECTION 2. Duty of Committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be
necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule
of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.

SECTION 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ
such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions. AacSTE

SECTION 4. Submission of Annual Budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme Court for approval, an annual
budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines.

Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.

||| (Revised Rules on the Continuing Legal Education for IBP Members, BAR MATTER 850, [October 2, 2001])
 45

June 3, 2008

[B.M. No. 1922]

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008

"Bar Matter No. 1922. Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All
Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. The Court Resolved to
NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education
and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE
practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of
issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding
compliance period.Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records.

The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation". Carpio-Morales,
Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave. (adv216a)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Clerk of Court
Supreme Court of the Philippines

||| (Requirement to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption, B.M. No.
1922, [June 3, 2008])
 46

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 191837. September 19, 2012.]

MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARILYN LIM and GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY
OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA CITY, respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated October 15, 2009 1 and March 11, 2010 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265.

The facts leading to the filing of this petition are undisputed.

Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4.4 hectares and located at Bignay, Valenzuela City. The
property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-73892, registered in the names of George and Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim).

On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition to be recognized as a tenant of a property located at Bignay, Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato (Deato).
At that time, the property, which has an approximate area of 4.4 hectares, was covered by TCT No. 24759 under Deato's name. During the
pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The sale was registered on December 21, 2004 leading to the issuance of
TCT No. V-73892 in favor of Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed a motion on March 3, 2005 to implead Spouses
Lim as respondents. 3

The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012-04, was granted by Regional Adjudicator Conchita C. Mias (RA Mias) in
a Decision 4 dated December 2, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by succession from her deceased father;

2) Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
obligation of spouses Danilo and Divina Deato;

3) Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to maintain petitioner in peaceful possession
and cultivation of the agricultural land subject hereof;

4) Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption of the subject parcel of agricultural land
pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844 as [a]mended; and

5) Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny Boy Rivera for having no proximate tenurial
relationship with the petitioner hence beyond the jurisdictional ambit of this Office. aEACcS

SO ORDERED. 5

On July 7, 2006, the foregoing decision became final. 6

Upon Consolacion's motion for execution filed on January 7, 2008, RA Mias issued a writ of execution on January 8, 2008. 7

On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the Registrar of Deeds of Valenzuela City praying for the issuance
of an order directing Spouses Lim to accept the amount of P10,000,000.00 which she undertook to tender during the initial hearing, declaring
the property redeemed, and cancelling TCT No. V-73892. 8 Consolacion consigned with the RARAD the amount of P10,000,000.00 on March
3, 2008. 9

Consolacion's petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-001-08, was given due course by RA Mias in a Decision 10 dated
June 2, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. As prayed for, declaring that the landholding subject of the petition as lawfully redeemed;

2. Ordering respondent spouses to accept and withdraw the amount of the redemption price consigned with
this Office which was deposited for safekeeping indicated in Manager's Check No. 0000004518
issued by Allied Bank in the name of Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication
Board Region IV-A in the amount of ten (10) million pesos;
 47

3. Upon acceptance and the withdrawal of the redemption price as ordered in paragraph 2 hereof, ordering
respondent spouses to execute a Deed of Redemption in favor of petitioner;

4. In case of refusal and/or failure of respondent spouses to execute the Deed of Redemption as ordered
above, the Regional Clerk of the Board is hereby ordered to execute a Deed of Redemption in the
name of the petitioner; and

5. Directing the Register of Deeds for Valenzuela City to cause the cancellation of TCT No. V-73892 registered
in the name of respondent spouses Marilyn and George Lim and a new one issued in the name of
petitioner upon presentment of the Deed of Redemption.

SO ORDERED. 11

On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a Decision 12 on February 18, 2009 reversing RA Mias
Decision dated June 2, 2008. Specifically:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated 02 June 2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered:

1. DECLARING the landholding to be not lawfully redeemed;

2. DECLARING petitioner-appellee not a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding;

3. DECLARING that petitioner-appellee cannot redeem the subject parcel registered in the names of the
respondents-appellants;

4. ORDERING the respondents-appellants to be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject

landholding[; and]

5. DIRECTING the Clerk of the Board of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Region IV-A to return
the Manager's Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of Spouses Marilyn and
George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the amount of Ten Million pesos to
herein petitioner-appellee. IcHTAa

SO ORDERED. 13

On April 13, 2009, Consolacion moved for reconsideration, 14 which the DARAB denied in a Resolution 15 dated June 8, 2009 for being filed
out of time.

SECTION 12 Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides that a Motion for Reconsideration shall be filed within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of notice of the order, resolution, or decision of the Board or Adjudicator. Records show that
both the petitioner-appellee and her counsel received a copy of the Decision dated 18 February 2009 on 27 February
2009 and that Legal Officer Nancy Geocada[,] the alleged new counsel of the herein petitioner[-]appellee[,] filed the
Motion for Reconsideration only on 13 April 2009, clearly the Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen
(15) days (sic) reglementary period thus the herein Decision has already become final and executory. . . . 16

On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA. 17

On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacion's counsel to submit within five (5) days from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended Verification and Certification Against Non-Forum-
Shopping. 18 Apparently, Consolacion's counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number as
required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of Consolacion's verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to
indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion's identity apart from her community tax certificate.

Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a Resolution 19 on October 15, 2009 dismissing the petition.

On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the above-mentioned Resolution. However, the counsel for the
petitioner failed to comply with the said Resolution which was due on July 19, 2009.

For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the Resolution dated July 1, 2009, despite receipt of the
notice thereof, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 20

Consolacion moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution 21 dated March 11, 2010.

Consolacion is, before this Court, claiming that the CA's summary dismissal of her petition on technical grounds is unwarranted. Consolacion
invoked substantial justice against the CA's strict application of the rule requiring her counsel to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption
 48

Certificate Number and the rule rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-forum-shopping defective in the absence of
the details of any one of her current identification document issued by an official agency bearing her photograph and signature. That there
was merit in her petition and that she complied, albeit belatedly as her counsel's MCLE Compliance Certificate Number was indicated and a
verification and certificate on non-forum-shopping with a proper jurat was attached to her motion for reconsideration, should have sufficed
for the CA to reverse the dismissal of her petition and decide the same on its merits. Consolacion alleged that procedural rules or technicalities
are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid application should be avoided if this would frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.

The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Consolacion's petition before
it on the ground of petitioner's unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural requirements attendant to the filing of a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the opportunity afforded to
them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this took place, however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of
Consolacion's petition and without reasonable cause proffered to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence
and negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality
in the observance of procedural rules appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need meriting the
relaxation of the rules. Neither does this Court see any.

The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally construed. However, in these cases, outright dismissal is
rendered unjust by the presence of a satisfactory and persuasive explanation. The parties therein who prayed for liberal interpretation were
able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court's intent "to forge a bastion
for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." 22

This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of every member of the bar to comply with these rules.
They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking on liberal
construction. While it is the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate result, she is bound by such. cDTCIA

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated October 15, 2009 and March 11, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion * and Bersamin, JJ., concur.

||| (Rivera-Pascual v. Spouses Lim, G.R. No. 191837 (Resolution), [September 19, 2012], 695 PHIL 543-550)
 49

May 26, 2014

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 79-14

The Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Shari'a
District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
TO :
Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Shari'a Circuit Courts, the Office of the State
Prosecutor, Public Attorney's Office and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Bar Matter No. 1922 (Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
SUBJECT : [MCLE] Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption)

In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated January 14, 2014 in the above-cited administrative matter, the Court RESOLVED,
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to:

(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to
disclose the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action"; and

(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure of current MCLE compliance/exemption number in the
pleadings:

(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of P2,000.00 for the first offense, P3,000.00 for the second offense
and P4,000.00 for the third offense;

(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a delinquent member of the Bar pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850 and its implementing rules and regulations; and aSTcCE

(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from the case and the client/s shall be allowed to secure
the services of a new counsel with the concomitant right to demand the return of fees already
paid to the non-compliant lawyer.

This revokes OCA Circular No. 66-2008 dated July 22, 2008, and any prior circular from the Office of the Court Administrator
on this matter which is contrary to the foregoing is hereby superseded.

For your information, guidance and strict compliance.

JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ

Court Administrator

||| (Bar Matter No. 1922, OCA Circular No. 079-14, [May 26, 2014])
 50

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005.]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division),
LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE,
MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N.
SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO,
JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY
CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS
CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND
TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS & RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS,
INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY.
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J p:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics
of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial
support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. 1 It was
later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling
P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible. 2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended
emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million. 3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial
woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to
its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. 4 A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from March 26
to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. 5Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a
petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated
by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his
family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P.
Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng
Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim,
Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic
Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and
Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco
Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred
to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry
and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. 6 In connection therewith,
the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their
close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. HaIESC

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs
of sequestration issued by the PCGG. 7 After the filing of the parties' comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their
counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 8 and 0096-0099. 9The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General 10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK
by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, headvised the Central Bank's officials on the procedure to bring
about GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
 51

On April 22, 1991, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza
in Civil Case No. 0005. 11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former
function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take
a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. 12 It further ruled that respondent
Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act
No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from
practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement
or separation from public office. 13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. 14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan's Second Division to the Fifth Division. 15 In its resolution
dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza. 16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in
substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied
in its resolution dated December 5, 2001. 17

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 The PCGG alleged that
the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending
that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection
with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection
to respondent Mendoza's appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res
judicatadoes not apply. 19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states:
"A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service."

I.A.

The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early
statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were
comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored
the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at
times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement
alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the
poor originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies
and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was
in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was
far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of
setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional
core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of
litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were
filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of
uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of
the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were
working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought
a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed
lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions persisted in some
 52

states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized
basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-
client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had
some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a
comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties,
and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics. 21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association
code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources
of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory
statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official
imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding
rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations
formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar
associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably
the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for
their members. 22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the
model for several states' codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. 23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which
the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics. 24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the "revolving door"
or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service." 25 These concerns were classified as
"adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by
the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. 26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts"
are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. 27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct
and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and
added thirteen new canons. 28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them
both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts." 29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a
concern that the government lawyer's largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the
government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. 30Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted
in a judicial capacity. TDcAaH

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively. 31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the
ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The
committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the
inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in
matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 33 The basic ethical
principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which
the lawyer must adhere. 34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b) 35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee
reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code. 36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
 53

Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following
each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were
the black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing
comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of
substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. 37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the
hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm's indefinite nature. 38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980
which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to
conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. 39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to
both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest
problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest
conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B.

The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds
of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific
party,and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor
General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor
General, viz: 40

The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the
closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. TaCDAH

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the
Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy
Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then
Assistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank
Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General
(Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the
said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the
following procedure should be taken:

1) Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation
had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that
the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume
business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.

2) If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate
the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
 54

3) The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate
the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4) The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty.
Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court
the petition for assistance in the bank's liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the
Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies
of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as
amended by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with
its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then
CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is "advising the
Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine,
the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department
head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the
statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall
designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to
immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and
administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including,
but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions.

xxx xxx xxx

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court
of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central
Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of
the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient
speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
 55

paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover
accounts and assets of such institution. ICTDEa

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if
there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second
paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly
arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the
action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining
order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which
shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the
petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal
or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable
and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining
order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic
commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in
the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within
the scope of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter
per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent
Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale
of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to
liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject
"matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096.
Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they
are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the
shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK.
GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other
words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply
to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between
points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur
or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .) 41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others. 42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene" includes participation
in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only
 56

includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. 44 We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate
to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be
remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as ". . . drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law." HTCAED

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer "should
not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of
former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which
the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule.
MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For
one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed,
the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the
petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings
is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics
of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without
difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy
considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other
values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At
present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be
able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have
them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private
practice. 45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure
should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the
firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. 46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it
less appealing to enter." 47

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client
of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings,
deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent
in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary." 48 Even the United States Supreme Court found
no quarrel with the Court of Appeals' description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." 49 In the case at bar, the new attemptto
disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was
resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact,
the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099. 50 At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's
motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication.
It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual
lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work
done by the latter. 52 The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial
of due process. SIHCDA

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the
government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon
 57

leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal
demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53 He adds: "Any system
that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence." 54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be
overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that
allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend
officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue diminution of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect
on the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the
current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. 55 Former
government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible
appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is
a highly speculative exercise at best 56 which can lead to untoward results. 57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of
restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-
client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect. 58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 59 and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual
conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the
public. 60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed
that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process.
But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank
on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might
be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no
question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the
contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their
interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in
Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might
be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. 61The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer
who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62In
the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may
well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government policies." 63 Prof. Morgan,
however, considers this concern as "probably excessive." 64 He opines ". . . it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding
someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms
want the 'best' government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates." 65 But
again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank
on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the
interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former officials" or their
"clout." 66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what
appears to be an employee's influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon
departure from government . . ." 67 More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him
further: ". . . The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem
justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance
of favoritism." 68

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent
Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03
has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of
time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if
 58

applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the
IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court. TaEIAS

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.

Carpio Morales, J., please see dissenting opinion.

Callejo, Sr., J., please see my dissenting opinion.

Azcuna, J., took no part. I was former PCGG chairman.

Tinga, J., please see separate opinion.

Chico-Nazario, J., took no part.

||| (Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, [April 12, 2005], 495 PHIL 485-619)