Philippine National Bank v.

RJ Ventures Realty & Development Corporation and Rajah Broadcasting

Network, Inc., 2006

First Womens Credit Corporation (FWCC) received an invitation to bid from PNB anent the sale of an 8,000
square meter property, located at Paseo de Roxas corner Sen. Gil. Puyat Avenue, Makati City, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-15223 (Buendia Property). FWCC bid. Accordingly, FWCC deposited
with PNB an additional amount of P4,000,000.00. FWCC was awarded the Buendia Property. FWCC,
invoking Section 7.2 of the PNB Rules requested PNB to finance the entire balance of the purchase price.
Pending action on its loan application, FWCC assigned all its rights, claims, interest, and title over the
Buendia Property to RJVRD. RJVRD assumed the right to purchase the Buendia Property and the
obligations of FWCC to PNB on the balance of the bid price.

PNB agreed to grant a loan to RJVRD equivalent to eighty percent (80%) of the purchase price or for the
amount of P2,944,000,000.00. But RJVRD was required to raise an additional amount of P368,000,000.00
as deposit.

Following the payment by RJVRD to PNB of the additional deposit of P368,000,000.00, the parties entered
into a loan agreement wherein PNB will finance the balance of the purchase price in the amount of
P2,944,000,000.00 subject to conditions, inter alia, that after the transfer of the Buendia Property in the
name of RJVRD, it shall be mortgaged in favor of PNB. On even date, RJVRD and PNB executed a Loan
Agreement.

RBN secured another loan from PNB in the amount of P100,000,000.00, part of which was used in paying
the interest for the loan it had secured in favor of RJVRD.

As and by way of security, RBN assigned in favor of PNB, all its rights and interest over radio and television
frequencies issued by the National Telecommunications Commission, located in Tuguegarao, Baguio,
Manila, Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo, including those in Cagayan de Oro (FM Stations), and Manila (AM Station
and TV-UHF Station).

On 25 January 1999, PNB, through its counsel, sent RBN a demand letter, requiring the latter to settle
their outstanding account of P841,460,891.91. In a letter similarly dated 25 January 1999, PNB by counsel,
demanded from RJVRD the settlement of its total obligation of P5,405,301,470.82.

RJVRD and RBN failed to settle their accounts.

On 18 February 1999, PNB made a demand to RBN to turn over the possession and/or control of
Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at No. 33, Dominican Hills, Baguio City. On 18 February 1999,
RJVRD received a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale, dated 1 February 1999 for the sale of the Buendia Property
to be held on 2 March 1999 at the City Hall, Makati City.

Respondents RJ Ventures Realty & Development Corporation (RJVRD) and Rajah Broadcasting Network,
Inc. (RBN) filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioner PNB and Juan S. Baun, Jr.

RTC did not grant the application for TRO.

On 2 March 1999, the Buendia Property was sold in a public auction conducted by Atty. Juan S. Buan,
Notary Public of Makati City.
On 3 May 1999, RBN received a Notice of Extrajudical Sale from PNB, specifying therein that the property
covered by Broadcating Equipment Inventory located at No. 33 Dominical Hills, Baguio City will be sold for
cash at public auction.

Respondents filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. RTC issued an Order granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction respondents
application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), upon posting of a bond in the amount
of P1,000,000.00. On 27 May 1999, the RTC issued an Order, granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
enjoining PNB from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by respondents to PNB. Subsequently,
on 28 May 1999, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued.

Respondent (RBN): the damage to RBNs image, loss of listenership, advertisers, staff and employees is
unquantifiable in monetary terms. Irreparable damage would be caused to RBN if PNB is allowed to
foreclose its equipment. It would also disrupt, if not, paralyze, the operations of RBNs stations.

Are RJVRD and RBN entitled to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction?

Ruling: YES. For a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present, to wit:
(1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed
that the very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of
action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the
prevention of multiplicity of suits.

First, respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the subject
collaterals. Evidently, as owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be extrajudicially foreclosed,
respondents are entitled to the possession and protection thereof. RBN as the owner and operator of the
subject radio equipment and radio stations have a clear right over them.

Second, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage. Indeed, an injunctive
remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which
cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. PNB assails the existence of this ground by raising
the argument that there is, in actuality, a pecuniary standard by which RBNs damage can be measured, as
evidenced by the testimony of RBNs witness that it will suffer a loss of P1.2 Billion for the next ten (10)
years.

To be sure, this court has declared that the term irreparable injury has a definite meaning in law. It does
not have reference to the amount of damages that may be caused but rather to the difficulty of measuring
the damages inflicted. If full compensation can be obtained by way of damages, equity will not apply the
remedy of injunction.

The direct and inevitable result would be the stoppage of the operations of respondents radio stations,
consequently, losing its listenership, and tarnishing the image that it has built over time. It does not stretch
ones imagination to see that the cost of a destroyed image is significantly the loss of its good name and
reputation. As aptly appreciated by the appellate court, the value of a radio stations image and reputation
are not quantifiable in terms of monetary value.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Hon. Jose B. Majaducon and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, 2003

On August 28, 1998, Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No. 157 directing the Committee on
National Defense and Security to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense
Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers were organizing a coup
detat to prevent the administration of then President Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund
irregularities in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution No. 160, directing the appropriate
senate committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the
funds and investment portfolio of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS) xxx.

The Senate President referred the two resolutions to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee) and the Committee on National Defense and Security.

During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (hereafter called the
Committee), it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot in General Santos City, designated as Lot X,
MR-1160, for P10,500.00 per square meter from private respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the
deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00
per square meter.

The Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to respondent Atty. Flaviano, directing him
to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to appear at the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition
for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 23, which was docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496.

On October 21, 1998, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the Committee to
CEASE and DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry in P.S. 160 particularly in General Santos City and/or
anywhere in Region XI or Manila on matters affecting the patenting/titling and sale of Lot X, MR-1160-D
to AFP-RSBS, and from issuing subpoenas to witnesses from Region XI, particularly from General Santos
City, pending the hearing of the petition for prohibition and injunction.

On November 5, 1998, the Committee filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of (a) lack of
jurisdiction, and (b) failure to state a valid cause of action. It further argued that the issuance of the
Temporary Restraining Order was invalid for violating the rule against ex-parte issuance thereof; and that
the same was not enforceable beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.

On November 11, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss and granted the writ of
preliminary injunction.

Did Judge Jose Majaducon committ grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed petitioners motion to
dismiss the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction?

Ruling: YES. There is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of any
factual and legal justification.
The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to
the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the
domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano
to appear and testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, thus:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to
prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent to appear and testify before it.

The ruling in Bengzon, cited by respondent, does not apply in this case. We agree with petitioner
Committee that the factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon,
no intended legislation was involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more within the province
of the courts rather than of the legislature. More specifically, the investigation in the said case was an
offshoot of the privilege speech of then Senator Enrile, who urged the Senate to look into a possible
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by the relatives of then President Corazon Aquino,
particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, in connection with the alleged sale of 36 to 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin Romualdez. On the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, as stated in
Senate Resolution No. 160, and the appropriate Senate Committee was directed to look into the reported
misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation
to protect the rights and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Further, in Bengzon, the validity of the sale of Romualdezs corporations was pending with the
Sandiganbayan when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee decided to conduct its investigation. In short,
the issue had already been pre-empted by the court.

In the instant case, the complaint against respondent Flaviano regarding the anomaly in the sale of Lot X,
MR-1160 was still pending before the Office of the Ombudsman when the Committee served subpoena
on him. In other words, no court had acquired jurisdiction over the matter. Thus, there was as yet no
encroachment by the legislature into the exclusive jurisdiction of another branch of the government.
Clearly, there was no basis for the respondent Judge to apply the ruling in Bengzon. Hence, the denial of
petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition amounted to grave abuse of discretion.

The Heirs of Yadno v. The Heirs of Anchales, 2012

On December 1, 1982, the Spouses Mauro and Elisa Anchales (Spouses Anchales), respondents'
predecessors, filed with the then Urdaneta RTC, a Complaint for ownership, delivery of possession,
damages with preliminary injunction and attachment against the spouses Augusto and Rosalia Yadno
(Spouses Yadno), Orani Tacay (Orani), and the spouses Laura Yadno and Pugsong Mat-an (Spouses Mat-
an), petitioners' predecessors, docketed as Civil Case No. U- 3882.

The Urdaneta RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Spouses Mauro and Elisa Anchales. The decision
became final and executory. A Writ of Execution was issued on September 20, 1988. The sheriff of the
Urdaneta RTC issued a Notice of Levy dated October 10, 1988 on the property registered under the name
of Orani, one of the defendants, covered by TCT No.T-13845 of the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. A
public auction was held on November 14, 1988 and Mauro Anchales emerged as the highest bidder. A
Certificate of Sale dated December 20, 1988 was issued to Mauro Anchales which was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Baguio City on August 7, 1989. The Sheriff's Final Certificate of Sale was issued on
March 7, 1991 and was annotated at the back of TCT No. 13845 on April 3, 1991.

Earlier, on February 10, 1989, petitioners' predecessors, the Spouses Mat-an, filed with the RTC of Baguio
City (Baguio RTC), an Action for injunction and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
against respondents predecessors, the Spouses Anchales, Spouses Yadno, and the Provincial Sheriff of
the RTC. The Spouses Mat-an claimed that on December 16, 1988, the Provincial Sheriff of Urdaneta,
without any authority from the trial court, indiscriminately levied and conducted a public auction sale of
the property registered under the name of Orani Tacay covered by TCT No. 13845, thus, saving the real
property of the Spouses Yadno. The Spouses Mat-an further argued that Orani died on December 28,
1986, which was before the Urdaneta RTC had rendered its decision; thus, Orani's property became the
estate of her legal heirs and had since been with a distinct personality which cannot be subjected to levy.

Baguio RTC dismissed the case.

Was the dismissal proper?

Ruling: YES. No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court
of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or
equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much
less with their orders or judgments.

Sustaining the injunction would go against the principle of judicial stability where the judgment or order
of a court of competent jurisdiction, the Urdaneta RTC, may not be interfered with by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction (i.e., another RTC), for the simple reason that the power to open, modify or vacate
the said judgment or order is not only possessed by but is restricted to the court in which the judgment
or order is rendered or issued.

Nor was the Urdaneta RTC apprised at all of Orani's death, since there was no notice of her death filed
with it. In fine, it is the fault of spouses Laura Yadno Mat-an and Pugsong Mat-an (now substituted by
petitioners) in not informing the trial court (RTC 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan) about the alleged death of
Orani Tacay.

The Baguio RTC had no jurisdiction to nullify the final and executory decision of the Urdaneta RTC. To
allow it would open the floodgates to protracted and endless litigations, since the counsel or the parties,
in an action for recovery of money, in case said defendant dies before final judgment in a regional trial
court, is to conceal such death from the court and thereafter pretend to go through the motions of trial,
and after judgment is rendered against his client, to question such judgment by raising the matter that
the defendant was not substituted by her intestate heirs.

RCBC Capital Corporation v. Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc., 2012

On May 24, 2000, RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement5 (SPA) with Equitable-PCI Bank, Inc.
(EPCIB), George L. Go and the individual shareholders6 of Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) for the sale to RCBC of
226,460,000 shares (Subject Shares) of Bankard, constituting 67% of the latters capital stock. After
completing payment of the contract price (1,786,769,400), the corresponding deeds of sale over the
subject shares were executed in January 2001.

The dispute between the parties arose sometime in May 2003 when RCBC informed EPCIB and the other
selling shareholders of an overpayment of the subject shares, claiming there was an overstatement of
valuation of accounts amounting to 478 million and that the sellers violated their warranty under Section
5(g)of the SPA.

As no settlement was reached, RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings.

On October 26, 2007, RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC, Branch 148 (SP Proc. Case No. M-6046)a motion
to confirm the First Partial Award, while Respondents filed a motion to vacate the same.

The Makati City RTC, Branch 148 issued an order in SP Proc. Case No. M-6046 confirming the First Partial
Award and denying Respondents separate motions to vacate and to suspend and inhibit Barker and
Kaplan.

On May 28, 2008, the Arbitration Tribunal rendered the Second Partial Award. The Makati City RTC,
Branch 148 issued the Order dated June 24, 2009 confirming the Second Partial Award and denying EPCIBs
motion to vacate the same.

On April 14, 2010, EPCIB filed in the CA a petition for review with application for TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 113525) in accordance with Rule 19, Section 4 of the Special Rules
of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules).

On June 16, 2010, the Arbitration Tribunal issued the Final Award. On November 10, 2010, Branch 148 (SP
Proc. Case No. M-6046) issued an Order confirming the Final Award "subject to the
correction/interpretation thereof by the Arbitral Tribunal pursuant to the ICC Rules and the UNCITRAL
Model Law," and denying BDOs Opposition with Motion to Dismiss.

Immediately thereafter, RCBC filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. On August 22,
2011, after approving the execution bond, Branch 148 issued a Writ of Execution for the implementation
of the said courts "Order dated August 8, 2011 confirming the November 10, 2010 Order that judicially
confirmed the June 16, 2010 Final Award x x x.

BDO then filed in the CA, a "Petition for Review (With Application for a Stay Order or Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 120888. BDO sought
to reverse and set aside the Orders dated November 10, 2010 and August 8, 2011, and any writ of
execution issued pursuant thereto, as well as the Final Award dated June 16, 2010 issued by the
Arbitration Tribunal.

To avert the sale of the BPBI shares scheduled on September 15, 2011 and prevent further disruption in
the operations of BDO and BPBI, paid under protest by tendering a Managers Check in the amount of
637,941,185.55, which was accepted by RCBC as full and complete satisfaction of the writ of execution.
BDO manifested before Branch 148 that such payment was made without prejudice to its appeal before
the CA.
The CA denied BDOs application for a stay order and/or TRO/preliminary injunction for non-compliance
with Rule 19.25 of the Special ADR Rules. The CA ruled that BDO failed to show the existence of a clear
right to be protected and that the acts sought to be enjoined violated any right. Neither was BDO able to
demonstrate that the injury to be suffered by it is irreparable or not susceptible to mathematical
computation. BDO did not file a motion for reconsideration and directly filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari with urgent application for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

Was CAs denial proper?

Ruling: YES. Injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and
interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in itself, but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main
suit. When the act sought to be enjoined has become fait accompli, the prayer for provisional remedy
should be denied.

Thus, the Court ruled in Gov. Looyuko that when the events sought to be prevented by injunction or
prohibition have already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited. Indeed, it is a universal
principle of law that an injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done. This
is so for the simple reason that nothing more can be done in reference thereto. A writ of injunction
becomes moot and academic after the act sought to be enjoined has already been consummated.

It would be premature to address on the merits the issues raised by BDO in the present petition
considering that the CA still has to decide on the validity of said court's orders confirming the Final Award.
But more important, since BDO had already paid 637,941,185.55 manager's check, albeit under protest,
and which payment was accepted by RCBC as full and complete satisfaction of the writ of execution, there
is no more act to be enjoined.

Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester Guerzon, 2012

In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid
for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000)
pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the countrys Rural
Electrification Project. The said contract consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or
woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEAs projected allocation for Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders, such as private respondent [Nerwin], were required
to submit their application for eligibility together with their technical proposals. At the same time, they
were informed that only those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit
their financial bids.

Following a thorough review of the bidders qualifications and eligibility, only four (4) bidders, including
private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 contract. Eventually, in
the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery
of Woodpoles and Crossarmsdated October 4, 2000, NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III
recommended to NEAs Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all
schedules for IBP No. 80.
However, on December 19, 2000, NEAs Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the
material requirements for IBP No. 80 given the time limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx, and
with the loan closing date of October 2001 fast approaching. In turn, it resolved to award the four (4)
schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent [Nerwin]. Private respondent [Nerwin]
protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.

NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private
respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an
injunction, which injunctive application was granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila.

In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the Department of

Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles
needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project.

Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil
action in the RTC in Manila, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion
of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents
proposed bidding for the wooden poles.

The RTC granted a TRO. Then, it granted a writ of preliminary injunction.

Is the preliminary injunction proper?

Ruling: NO. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court,
from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory
injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any
person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring,
clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b) bidding
or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting,
executing, implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such
contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract or project.

Section 4 of the same law provides: Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.

Respondent Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under
the single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise.

Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ
of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or project
acts contrary to law.

Limitless Potentials, Inc. v. CA, Crisostomo Yalung, and Atty. Roy Villasor, 2007
Digital Networks Communications and Computers, Inc. (Digital) and herein petitioner Limitless Potentials,
Inc. (LPI), a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, entered into a
Billboard Advertisement Contract whereby petitioner was to construct one billboard advertisement for
Digitals product for a period of one year, with an agreed rental of 60,000.00 per month plus Value Added
Tax (VAT). It was agreed, among other things, that Digital will make a three-month deposit.

The billboard, however, was destroyed by unknown persons. Digital demanded for the return of their
rental deposit for two months, but the petitioner refused to do so claiming that the loss of the billboard
was due to force majeure and that any cause of action should be directed against the responsible persons.

Petitioner filed a ThirdParty Complaint against Macgraphics Carranz International Corporation

(Macgraphics) and herein private respondents Bishop Crisostomo Yalung (Bishop Yalung) and Atty. Roy
Manuel Villasor (Atty. Villasor) alleging that it had entered into a contract of lease with Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila (RCAM), as represented by the private respondents, over a space inside San Carlos
Manor Seminary in Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, where petitioner erected the subject billboard.
Petitioner further averred that despite its full compliance with the terms and conditions of the lease
contract, herein private respondents, together with their cohorts, maliciously dismantled and destroyed
the subject billboard and prevented its men from reconstructing it. Thereafter, petitioner learned that
Macgraphics had "cajoled and induced" RCAM, through the private respondents, to destroy the subject
billboard to enable Macgraphics to erect its own billboard and advertising signs.

In response, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss against the Third-Party Complaint. But it was
denied.

Private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, assailing the Orders of
the MeTC of Makati City denying their Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint and Motion to Dismiss
Amended Third-Party Complaint.

RTC thus enjoined the MeTC from hearing the Third-Party Complaint. But, eventually, the RTC rendered a
Decision on 28 April 2000, dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by private respondents. Thereafter,
petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment against Respondents Bond.

Can petitioner recover on the injunction bond even without malice or bad faith on respondents part?

Ruling: YES. Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. This must be so,
because to require malice as a prerequisite would make the filing of a bond a useless formality. The
dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a
determination that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond
immediately accrues. Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the injunction bond, the dissolution of the
injunction because of petitioners main cause of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of
recovery upon the bond.

We, therefore, agree with the petitioner that indeed, malice or lack of good faith is not a condition sine
qua non for liability to attach on the injunction bond.
Spouses Daisy and Socrates Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank and The Register of Deeds of
Paraaque City, 2012

Petitioners obtained from respondent Bank a 2,100,000 loan secured by a mortgage on their property
situated in Muntinlupa. Due to their failure to pay the loaned amount, the Bank undertook to extra-
judicially foreclose the mortgage. The Clerk of Court issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale and set the auction
sale on 21 and 28 April 2009.

Petitioners thereafter filed the First Complaint wherein they asked for the nullification of interests,
penalties and other charges, as well as for specific performance with an application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the then impending auction sale of
their Muntinlupa property.

The trial court ruled that, as a precondition for the issuance of the writ and pursuant to the Procedure on
Foreclosure, petitioners were directed to pay 12% per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated
in the application for foreclosure sale. Otherwise, the writ shall not issue.

Petitioners did not pay the required interest; thus, no writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Aggrieved,
petitioner Spouses Arevalo filed a Rule 65 Petition with the CA to assail the Orders of the trial court
involving the non-issuance of the injunctive writ.

Meanwhile, proceedings for the First Complaint ensued at the trial court. Acting on the Motion to Dismiss
filed by respondent Bank, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the First Complaint for lack of
cause of action. Petitioner Spouses Arevalo then proceeded again to the CA to appeal the dismissal of the
main case.

On 12 November 2010, petitioners filed yet another Complaint dated 11 November 2010[27] (Second
Complaint) with the trial court. This time, they prayed for the nullification of the real estate mortgage, the
extra-judicial foreclosure sale, and the subsequent proceedings, with a prayer for preliminary injunction
and TRO.

Is the requirement to pay 12% interest per annum before the issuance of an injunctive writ to enjoin an
impending foreclosure sale applicable to the instant case?

Ruling: A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or useful purpose that can be served in passing upon the merits. There remains no actual
controversy in the instant Petition because the First Complaint has already been dismissed by the trial
court. Upon its dismissal, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction necessarily
died with it.

The writ of preliminary injunction is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of
during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon
the result of the main action.

There will be no practical value in resolving the question of the non-issuance of an injunctive writ in this
case. Setting aside the assailed Orders is manifestly pointless, considering that the First Complaint itself
has already been dismissed, and there is nothing left to enjoin. The reversal of the assailed Orders would
have a practical effect only if the dismissal were set aside and the First Complaint reinstated. In this case,
however, petitioner Spouses Arevalo admitted to the impossibility of the reinstatement of the First
Complaint when they filed their Second Complaint.