G.R. No.

190912, January 12, 2015

GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, v. ELPIDIO

MALICSE, SR. AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dated January 20, 2010 , of petitioners
Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva assailing the Decision2 dated August 31,
2007 and Resolution3 dated January 7, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.
R. CR. No. 31719, affirming the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 93-127049, finding petitioners
guilty of attempted murder.

The following are the antecedents:

On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the
house of his sister Isabelita Iguiron (Isabelita) in Pandacan, Manila when all of a
sudden, he heard Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus,
Elpidio confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him, which prompted the former to
slap the latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of alcohol.

The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the
commotion was taking place in order to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio
was eventually persuaded to go home where he drank some coffee. Thereafter,
Elpidio went back to the house of Isabelita to offer reconciliation. On his way
there, he passed by the house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and requested the latter
to accompany him, but was instead told to go back home, leaving Elpidio to
proceed alone.

Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus)
and her son-in-law Gary Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find
their parents. Titus and Gary responded, putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas
ka, punyeta ka.

In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and
saw Isabelita's elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a
rattan stick or arnis. Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced
the latter to bow his head but Salvador delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on
the right eyebrow. Salvador attempted to hit Elpidio for the third time but the
latter got hold of the rattan stick and the two wrestled on the floor and grappled
for the possession of the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two and
sprayed something on Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the
clutches of Salvador and to extricate himself, Elpidio bit Salvador's head.

Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter
was about to go out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to
take the tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio walked away from Titus but Gary, still
armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador, with his arnis, including Titus, chased
him.

Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head
with a lead pipe which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his
assailants to stop, but to no avail. Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs,
legs and knees using the rattan stick. While he was simultaneously being beaten
up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene and Tommy, he tried to cover
his face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his right leg,
between the knees and the ankle of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs
and knees. Rolly hit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe, while Tommy hit him with a
piece of wood on the back of his shoulder.

Thereafter, a certain Mang Gil tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted
at him: Huwag makialam, away ng mag-anak ito and the two continued to maul
Elpidio. The people who witnessed the incident shouted maawa na kayo but they
only stopped battering him when a bystander fainted because of the incident.
Elpidio then pretended to be dead. It was then that concerned neighbors
approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH).

Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron,
Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao
and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva. The Information
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength, commence the commission of the crime of
murder directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there hitting the head of Elpidio
Malicse, Sr. y de Leon with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of wood and
mauling him, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes
other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon
Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
They all pleaded not guilty. The defense, during trial, presented the following
version of the events that transpired:

Around 4:30 p.m. of June 27, 1993, Salvador was at the second floor of their
house when he heard his tenth son Winston crying while the latter was being
castigated by Elpidio. He went down and told Elpidio to come back the next day to
settle. His wife Isabelita called the Barangay Chairman two blocks
away. Barangay Chairman Joseph Ramos and Elpidio's wife and daughter went to
the house and Elpidio was given warm water, but he showered his daughter and
Winston with it. Elpidio was brought to his house and the former told
the Barangay Chairman that it was a family problem. Elpidio went back to the
house of Salvador where Titus was sitting on the sofa. Elpidio asked Titus to open
the door until the former kicked the door open. Titus escaped through the open
door and Salvador went out of the house because another child was on the roof,
afraid that the said child might fall. Thereafter, Elpidio went to the street.

According to petitioner Gary Fantastico, he was inside their house with his wife
and Titus when the incident occurred. He and his wife ran upstairs, while Titus
went out when Elpidio hit the door. Elpidio had a reputation for hurting people
when drunk and Gary learned that Elpidio was brought to the hospital because he
was mauled by the people.

During trial, one of the accused, Salvador Iguiron died. Eventually, the trial court,
in a Decision dated March 31, 2008, acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and
Tommy Ballesteros but found Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. The dispositive portion of the said
decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds Gary Fantastico
and Rolando Villanueva GUILTY of the crime of attempted murder and sentences
them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1)
day as minimum, to ten (10) years as maximum. They are also ordered to pay the
actual damages of P17,300.00 and moral damages of P10,000.00.

Accused Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners appealed the case to
the CA, but the latter court affirmed the decision of the RTC and disposed the case
as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, we hereby
AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.

SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied by the same court.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners stated the following arguments:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT
FROM THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE INCORRECT.

THE INFORMATION ITSELF IN THIS CASE DOES NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS
AND THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS OF THE SPECIFIC CRIME OF ATTEMPTED
MURDER.

NOT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF ATTEMPTED MURDER ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.

THERE IS NO TREACHERY OR ANY OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO SPEAK

OF IN THIS CASE.

THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
PRESENCE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

THERE ARE MANIFEST MISTAKES IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT OF

APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT.

THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS WAS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE

DEFENSE EVIDENCE, NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDENT THAT IT WAS THE PETITIONERS WHO

ATTACKED HIM IS INDEED UNCORROBORATED AND THUS SELF-SERVING.

CLEARLY, THERE ARE SO MUCH REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THE DECISION OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT THAT INJURIOUSLY AFFECTED THE
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS AND THESE SHOULD BE CORRECTED
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
At the outset, it bears stressing that under the Rules of Court, an appeal
by certiorari to this Court should only raise questions of law distinctly set forth in
the petition.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the present case, the issues and arguments presented by the petitioners involve
questions of facts. Therefore, the present petition is at once dismissible for its
failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, that the
petition should only raise questions of law.

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is settled.

There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other
hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact,
the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a
question of law.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

At any rate, the arguments of herein petitioners deserve scant consideration.

It is the contention of the petitioners that the Information filed against them was
defective because it did not state all the elements of the crime charged. However,
a close reading of the Information would show the contrary. The Information
partly reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of the execution which
should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes
other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon
Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is clear that all the elements
of the crime of attempted murder has been included.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to
commit a felony, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;

The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other
than his spontaneous desistance.8
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements,
namely:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.9
The Court in People v. Lizada10 elaborated on the concept of an overt or external
act, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance
of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The
raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases,
the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never
ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared
intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act
becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the
crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is
necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent
step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one
for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal
relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense.11
Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase not necessarily mortal in the
allegations in the Information. According to them, the inclusion of that phrase
means that there is an absence of an intent to kill on their part. Intent to kill is a
state of mind that the courts can discern only through external
manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and
immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,12 this Court considered the following
factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after
the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. This Court also considers motive and
the words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as
additional determinative factors.13 All of these, were proven during the trial.
Needless to say, with or without the phrase, what is important is that all the
elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the Information. Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.
In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the
Information on the ground that the elements of the crime of attempted murder are
lacking. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i)
of section 3 of this Rule.
Anent the probative value and weight given to the testimony of Elpidio by the CA
and the RTC, the same is not ridden with any error. In People v. Alvarado,14 we
held that greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witness than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the
commission of the crime. This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-serving
evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is clear from the records that Elpidio was able to make a positive identification
of the petitioners as the assailants, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q. Then what happened next Mr. Witness?

A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador Iguiron, I got out of the door of
the house, then, I saw Gary was hiding in the kitchen door holding an axe.
Tonahawk with blade of ax was dull and had a handle of one foot, with the
diameter of one inch.

Q. Why did you know that the ax blade of the tom was dull? (sic)

A. I also used that.

Q. Where do you usually keep that in the house of Iguiron?

A. In the kitchen.
Q. How far is that kitchen from where Gary emerged from?

A. He is right in the kitchen.

Q. Then what happened?

A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador, Gary Iguiron was hiding in the
kitchen door and holding a tomhack (sic) whose edge is dull and he hit me on my
right side and my head and I got injury (sic) and blood profusely oozing, I want to
get hold of the tomhawk (sic).

Q. Were you able to get of the tomhawk (sic) from Gary?

A. No sir.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

Q. You said while on that street somebody hit you from behind, who was that?

A. Rolly Villanueva.

Q. Why do you say that it was Rolly Villanueva, considering that it was hit from
behind?

A. Because they were about 5 of them at the main gate of the compound.

Q. Who are they?

A. Rolando Villanueva, Nestor Ballesteros, Tommy Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao,

Saligan Iguiron.

Q. You said you were hit by Rolando from behind, do you have occasion to see
first before you were hit?

A. When I was hit I fell down and I was able to see who hit (sic0, I saw him.

Q. When you fell down, you were able to realize it was Rolando Villanueva who hit
you, you mean you realized what he used in hitting you from behind?

A. It was a pipe. 1/2 inch thick, 24 inches in length.

Q. You said you fell down because of the blow of Rolando Villanueva and you saw
him holding that pipe, how was he holding the pipe when you saw him?

A. When I fell down he was about trying to hit me again.17

In connection therewith, one must not forget the well entrenched rule that findings
of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties
as well as its conclusion on its findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at
close range, the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witness as they
testify.18 The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings
are sustained by the Court of Appeals.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of Elpidio is corroborated by the

medico-legal findings as testified by Dr. Edgar Michael Eufemio, PGH Chief
Resident Doctor of the Department of Orthopedics. He testified as to the
following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q. And as head of that office, Mr. Witness, why are you here today?

A. Actually, I was called upon by the complainant to rectify regarding, the findings
supposedly seen when he was admitted and when I saw him in one of the sessions
of our Out Patient Department.

Q. When was this follow-up session at your department did you see this
complainant?

A. Based on the chart, I think it was four (4) months post injury when I first saw
the patient.

Q. Why does he has (sic) to make a follow up in your department?

A. Based on this chart, he sustained bilateral leg fractures which necessitated

casting. Normally, casting would take around three (3) months only but since the
nature of his fracture was relatively unstable, I think it necessitated prolong
immobilization in a case.

PROSECUTOR TEVES:

Q. Did you personally attend on his needs on that date when you saw him?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And what could have been the cause of these injuries he sustained?

A. I think one of his leg has close fracture, meaning, probably it was caused by a
blunt injury rather than a hacking injury, one on the left side, with an open wound
which was very much compatible with a hack at the leg area.20
Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of
treachery or any other qualifying circumstance.

In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning
and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to
be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.21 From the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident was
spontaneous, thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The incident,
which happened at the spur of the moment, negates the possibility that the
petitioners consciously adopted means to execute the crime committed. There is
no treachery where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but
was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of
the provocative act of the victim.22chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of

abuse of superior strength, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit
Elpidio Malicsi, Sr. twice on the head as he was entered (sic) the house of the
former. Gary Fantastico hit the victim on the right side of the head with an axe or
tomahawk. The evidence also show that Rolando Rolly Villanueva hit the victim
on the head with a lead pipe. And outside while the victim was lying down, Gary
hit the legs of the victim with the tomahawk. lvador also hit the victim with the
rattan stick on the thighs, legs and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private
organ with a piece of wood. The Provisional Medical Slip (Exh. D), Medico Legal
Certificate and Leg Sketch (Exh. D-2) and the fracture sheet (Exh. D-4) all
prove that the victim suffered injuries to both legs and multiple lacerations on his
head. The injury on one leg which was a close fracture was caused by a blunt
instrument like a piece of wood. This injury was caused by Salvador Iguiron. The
other leg suffered an open fracture caused by a sharp object like a large knife or
axe. This was caused by Gary Fantastico who used the tomahawk or axe on the
victim. The multiple lacerations on the head were caused by Gary, Rolly and
Salvador as it was proven that they hit Elpidio on the head. There is no sufficient
evidence that the other, accused, namely Saligan Iguiron Y Malicsi, Tommy
Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros and Eugene Surigao harmed or injured the victim.
Titus having sprayed Elpidio with the tear gas is not sufficiently proven. Neither
was the alleged blow by Titus, using a piece of wood, on the victim's private organ
sufficiently established as the medical certificate did not show any injury on that
part of the body of the victim.

The said injuries inflicted on the complainant after he went back to his sister
Isabelita's house. When he kicked the door, the melee began. And the sequence of
the injuries is proven by victim's testimony. But it was a lopsided attack as the
victim was unarmed, while his attackers were all armed (rattan stick,
tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This establishes
the element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness of the blow
inflicted by Salvador on Elpidio when he entered the premises show that
the former was ready to hit the victim and was waiting for him to enter. It
afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador consciously
adopted the said actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is
present in this case and must be considered an aggravating circumstance
against Salvador Iguiron. Rolly Villanueva, Gary Fantastico and Salvador
Iguiron were all armed while Elpidio, inebriated, had nothing to defend himself
with. There is clearly present here the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage
of by him in the commission of the crime."24 "The fact that there were two persons
who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed
with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of
the aggressors and the victim."25 The evidence must establish that the assailants
purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this
advantage.26 "To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked."27 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the
age, size, and strength of the parties.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Anent the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, which is an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum, to ten (10)
years as maximum and ordered them to pay actual damages of P17,300.00 and
moral damages of P10,000.00, this Court finds an obvious error.

For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code states that a penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the
principals in an attempt to commit a felony.29 Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed
in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the
sentence should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium term, which
has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years; and that the
minimum should be within the range of prision correccional, which has a duration
of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Therefore, the penalty imposed
should have been imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated January 20, 2010 of
petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva is hereby DENIED.
Consequently, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution dated January
7, 2010 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the petitioners are sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioners are
also ORDERED to pay P17,300.00 as actual damages, as well as P10,000.00
moral damages as originally ordered by the RTC. In addition, interest is imposed
on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of
finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

CASE DIGEST

Fantastico vs Malicse, Sr
745 SCRA 123 GR No. 190912, January 12, 2015
PERALTA, J.

Doctrine: Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Question of Law and Question of Fact,

Distinguished

Facts:

A case for Attempted Murder was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus
Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros,
Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva.

On or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the above
mentioned accused conspired and confederated together and helped one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with
treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, commence the commission
of the crime of murder directly by overt acts by then and there hitting the head of
Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of wood
and mauling him. However, said accused did not perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of
causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted
upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.

In their Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, the
petitioners stated the following arguments:
1. The conclusions drawn by the Court of Appeals and the trial court from the
facts of the case are incorrect.
2. The information itself in this case does not allege all the elements and the
necessary ingredients of the specific crime of attempted murder.
3. Not all of the elements of attempted murder are present in this case.
4. There is no treachery or any other qualifying circumstance to speak of in this
case.
 5. The lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the presence of
mitigating circumstances.
6. There are manifest mistakes in the findings of facts by the court of appeals
and the trial court.
7. The conviction of the petitioners was based on the weakness of the defense
evidence, not on the strength of the prosecution evidence.
8. The testimony of the respondent that it was the petitioners who attacked
him is indeed uncorroborated and thus self-serving.
9. Clearly, there are so much reversible errors in the decision of the court of
appeals and the lower court that injuriously affected the substantial rights of
the petitioners and these should be corrected by this honorable court.

Issue:

Whether or not the case is dismissible for its failure to comply with the
requirement that petitions should only raise questions of law.

Ruling:

Yes. The case is dismissible at once.

In the present case, the issues and arguments presented by the petitioners
involve questions of facts. Therefore, the present petition is at once dismissible for
its failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, that the
petition should only raise questions of law.

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is

settled. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the
other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as
to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct,
is a question of law.

Therefore, the Petition for Review on Certiorari was hereby denied.

G.R. No. 183652 February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case
No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel
Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's failure to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents

Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola werecharged, together with Christian John
Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and
Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,3 to wit:

That on or about 10:30 oclock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alsons Palace,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor
and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at
Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal
knowledge against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd
designs, kissed her against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea

of not guilty to the offense charged.5

Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim,
however, remains at-large.

The factual antecedents follow:

On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation
ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding,
Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to the
Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an
election campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about
7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be attending a graduation dinner
party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate
dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After
eating, Lim invited them to go to Alsons Palace, which was merely a walking
distance away from Gemenos house. Outside the Alsons Palace, they were
greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while,
they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they
again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz,
Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they
have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.

They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks two (2)
bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the
drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing
the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA
refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the
session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was AAAs turn, she
became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The
glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of
Emperador Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on
Oportos lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her
baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide
her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At
that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot.
They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say, "Hubuga
na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard
someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oportos lap again, then
she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle
to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she
drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.

The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs,
and then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that
she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place
because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and
wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw
Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having
intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in
her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room,
watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana
was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop.
Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell
unconscious.

When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. She was all alone.
Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but
without her lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but
her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing
up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her
father was waiting for her and was already furious. When she told them that she
was raped, her mother started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police
Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for
her medical examination.

Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning
of March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 oclock position and
hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise
revealed the presence of sperm.

On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense
witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA
had dinner at Gemenos house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the
graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alsons Palace, owned by the latters
family. When they reached the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave
for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and
Carampatana returned to Alsons Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party
subsequently ended, but the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas,
Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy
and one (1) liter of Pepsi. Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA,
Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also
present but did not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al
Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno
told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell
her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on Oportos lap. She even
showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoys
crotch, she remarked, "What was that, penis?" Roda then approached AAA to kiss
her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the sameand AAA also kissed him.
After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.

Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the
Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They
stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany
her to Alsons Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor
and there they saw AAA lying on Oportos lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because
her mother might get angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her
head, and said, "I just stay here." Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging
house. After thirty minutes, they went to Alsons Palace again,and saw AAA and
Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck.
Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.

After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead
instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big
problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house.
When they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep
here for the meantime." Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto,
and Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a double-
sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter
approached her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily
raised her hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the
while, Oporto was at the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her
pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her underwear
down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the
other hand, placed himself in between AAAs legs and had intercourse with her.
When he finished, he put on his shorts and went back to Alsons Palace to get
some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then
entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said, "Come Kuya, embrace me
because I have a problem." Alquizola thus started kissing AAAs breasts. Oporto
stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on him.
Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name.
Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto
then had intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to
Alsons Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back
to the lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they
just left and went home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00
a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.

On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto
and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however,
acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered:
 a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount
of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;

b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00
as moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as

ACCOMPLICE in the commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount
of P30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and by
way of civil indemnity;

d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda,

Harold Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and e) Ordering
accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally,
the amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigations; and
the costs of suit.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto

and Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms
provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and

detained since then up to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered
voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to this time, while
accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004
was ordered released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31
March 2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17
September 2004 duly approved by this court, thus resulted to an order of even
date for his release from the custody of the DSWD.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the
prosecution to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as
he is apprehended.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA.
On June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the
trial courts ruling and, consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal
portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA
are instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the
defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide
awake and aware of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse.
She never showed any physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never
fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the
medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAAs
genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a
man before. The CA also stressed that AAAs mothers unusual reaction of hitting
her when she discovered what happened to her daughter was more consistent with
that of a parent who found out that her child just had premarital sex rather than
one who was sexually assaulted.

On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for
Certiorari9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private
respondents conviction and ardently contending that the same was made with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10

The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated
November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:

I.

A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE

PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II.

THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART
OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.

III.

CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST

FILED. IV. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL
OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.11

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009.
It assigns the following errors:

I.

THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS

TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.

II.

THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.12
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.

At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to
facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must
not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is
sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules
should be liberally construed.13 Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling
principle to effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural
rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when
compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus,
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
sheer technicalities.14

As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that
a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is
barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
be violated.15 Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal,
but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of
acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed
not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process,
thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse of
discretion, granting petitioners prayer is not tantamount to putting private
respondents in double jeopardy.17

As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in
People v. Santiago:18

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the
civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is
limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by
the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal
aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only
the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The
private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the
said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the
rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case,
the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant.
The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such
special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name
of said complainant.19 Private respondents argue that the action should have been
filed by the State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the
Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the authority to
represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the
CA is solely vested in the OSG.20

Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her
private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the
right to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She
has an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is
the subject of the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court
sustained the private offended partys right in a criminal case to file a special civil
action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled
that the Solicitor Generals intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the
complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not
in that of the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioners
cause in its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.23

Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of
argument, that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating
their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioners
failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration. True, a motion for
reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by reexamination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-
defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of
due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
where public interest is involved.24

Here, petitioners case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same
questions as those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving
on the guilt of the private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to
resolve the issues, for any further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of
the petitioner, but likewise that of the Government. And, as will soon be
discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due process and for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An
acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that
the prosecutions right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was
a sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that
the respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its
very power to dispense justice.25

AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial
discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial courts findings of
fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents narration of
facts.

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.26 There is grave abuse of
discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of
discretion thus effecting an injustice.27

The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of
proving that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion
in acquitting private respondents.

It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence
presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first,
it may seem that its narration of the facts28 of the case was meticulously culled
from the evidence of both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it
was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused,
especially that of Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the accused-
appellants in the case before it. The appellate court merely echoed the private
respondents testimonies, particularly those as to the specific events that
transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at Gemenos house to the
following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it presented the
private respondents account and allegations as though these were the established
facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of
acquittal.

Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the
entire evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same.32 It
simply cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the
other. It cannot appreciate one partys cause and brush the other aside. This rule
becomes particularly significant in this case because the parties tendered
contradicting versions of the incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused
are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CAs blatant disregard
of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense
constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioners right to
due process.33

Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC
and made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.

First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole
ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for
help, and never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the
latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.

But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the
assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

 b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is

demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present;

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in

paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force
or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or when the victim is under twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally
made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her
to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied
having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason
or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA,
however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she
did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she
was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission
of the crime.35 The appellate court never provided any reason why AAAs
testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded
any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and
should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be
credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been
raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be
convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the
sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is
the complainants testimony itself.36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was
not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and
tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those
who were listening as she narrated her harrowing experience.37

AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her.
She tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still
prevailed. The RTC found AAAs testimony simple and candid, indicating that she
was telling the truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the
lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and straightforward, negating the
possibility of a rehearsed testimony.38 Thus:

Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):

xxxx

Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when
did you regain your consciousness?

A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the
bottle of Emperador Brandy.

xxxx
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining
contained (sic) of the bottle of Emperador Brandy?

A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.

Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?

A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.

Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: When did you regain your consciousness?

A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.

Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying
you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who?

A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.

Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy
carry you?

A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened, if any?

A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.

Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was
awakened by the flash of light.

Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that
(sic) flash of light.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.

xxxx
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what
happened?

A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.

Q: So, you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?

A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.

Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?

A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.

Q: He was on top of you?

A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)

Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on
top of you?

A: I was starting to cry, sir.

Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?

A: I was saying dont because I feel pain my private organ (sic).

Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?

A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually

abused me.

ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the

witness is crying.

xxxx

ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.

COURT: Continue.

ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you,
who else was there inside that room?

A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.

Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?

A: He was at my feet while looking at us.

Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?

A: Dressed up, sir.

Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?

A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.

Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?

A: I could not remember, sir.

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened?

A: I went asleep again, sir.

Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?

A: When I feel (sic)pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw

Raymund Carampatana, sir.

Q: On top of you?

A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him dont.

Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund
Carampatana?

A: Only the three of them, sir.

Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was he doing?

A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.

Q: Where in particular?

A: In my face, sir.

Q: Then after that, what happened?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said
that you feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw Raymund
Carampatana?

A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.

Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?

A: I woke up at about 7:00 oclock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the
defense. It noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and
incredible.40 Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked
and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never
mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only came to
know about it when it was their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court
by surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a
rape case claims that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant
was consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he
is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must be established with
sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual.42 Generally, the
burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the
crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its commission. This is
because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of
guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any
particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to
overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party
having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding
and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.44 However, when the accused
alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes,
mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship
between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal
knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his
defense by substantial evidence.45

Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but
unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana
narrated that upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the
bed and looked at him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her
shirt and brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAAs lower garments and
then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in between AAAs legs
and had intercourse with her.46 On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he
had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. While Carampatana was removing
AAAs shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of the bed. Then he
removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it
easier for him to pull the clothes down. When Carampatana left after having
sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his
pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside
and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went
back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and
after some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he
made love with AAA for the third and last time.47 Despite said shameless
admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any
physical resistance on AAAs part amounts to approval or permission. They failed
to show that AAA had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and
not simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could
not have given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.

The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and
exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused
after her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the
testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the attending circumstances.49

When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight,
and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having
the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly
evaluate testimonial evidence.50 Matters of credibility are addressed basically to
the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the
weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally
appeared before him.51 The appellate courts are far detached from the details and
drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review.
On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court
acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court
whose findings must be given due deference.52 Since the CA and the private
respondents failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on
the findings of fact of the trial court, these findings deserve great weight and are
deemed conclusive and binding.53

The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old
hymenal laceration on AAAs private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration,
which is expected to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary,
could mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr.
Acusta, when sex is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion
of the penis will not cause any laceration. It presumed that complainant,
therefore, was no longer innocent considering the presence of old hymenal
laceration that could have resulted from her previous sexual encounters. The
defense, however, failed to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known
for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a minor,
barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated from high
school on that same day. In a similar case,54 the Court held: x x x Indeed, no
woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse with two men or
three, according to Antonio Gallardo in the presence of each other, unless she
were a prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us
contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school
student, can be so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced
the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even
suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission
of the crime charged.55

No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,

allow an examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and
humiliation if her claim were not true.56 And even if she were indeed highly
promiscuous at such a young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was
actually committed. Even a complainant who was a woman of loose morals could
still be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victims
moral character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that the
victim was deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through intoxication to
enable the private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of
rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent.57 A freshly broken
hymen is not one of its essential elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was
still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by
entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen,
is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or
laceration of any part of the womans genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction
for rape.58 Neither does AAAs mothers act of hitting her after learning about the
rape prove anything. It is a truism that "the workings of the human mind when
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react
differently."59 Different people react differently to a given type of situation, and
there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the
frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had been
defiled after partying late the night before. It is a settled rule that when there is
no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper motive in making
the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and
credence.61 So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to
immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself?
Why did she ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making
love with any of the private respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a
relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved.63 She never
became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her
reputation, why would she have to drag the private respondents into the case and
identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating the contrary, she
brought the charge against the private respondents simply because she was, in
fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case,
even after the CA had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth
that she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been
debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence.
Its findings are against the logic and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in
support of her complaint,65 contrary to common human experience, and in utter
disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.

Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy
because his participation in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It
found that his participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit
the crime of rape.68 The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that
Alquizolas liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To
establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous
agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have
acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense
in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.69 Proof of conspiracy
need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the
collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the
crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense.70

In Lobrigo, the Court declared:

We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and

Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on material points.

Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during
the mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by more than just
boxing the victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that they did.

In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not

necessary.1wphi1 In this case, the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with
respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation in the
crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)

In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that
there was conspiracy:

The RTC held that:

While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim
based on the testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in
inserting his penis to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie
Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can
likewise be held liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that
the three of them conspired and mutually helped one another in raping the young
victim.

The Court of Appeals held that:

[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and
spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep,
molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made him
a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in the
commission of the crime.73

Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizolas participation in the crime
is not at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he
provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He
was likewise inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana
sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his
companions. He even admitted to kissing AAAs lips, breasts, and other parts of
her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and
Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and
each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is
true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed
from the decision of the trial court,74 he waived the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant.75

Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single
Information, it, however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a
general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise,
the same is defective.76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous
complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the
charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The
State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse
him in his defense.77 Non-compliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule117 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he
enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.80 The accused herein,
however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to
quash questioning the validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus,
they are deemed to have waived their right to question the same. Also, where the
allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts
specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there
is no duplicity to speak of.81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against them because the Information, in
fact, stated that they "took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of
AAA" on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations made and the evidence presented
to support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times.
Here, according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana
positioned himself in between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other
hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When
two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for
each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for
more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy
extant among the three of them during the commission of each of the four
violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape
committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his
sexual organ into AAAs mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through
sexual assault therefor because the same was not included in the Information.
This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual
assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.

Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more

persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the
RPC. But in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and the absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the
lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them,84 for each
count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion
temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a
divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor(the
penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which
shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being
the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no
aggravating circumstance. 85 With that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum,
for each count of rape committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87which extends even to
one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he
committed the crime when he was still a child,88 and provides for the confinement
of convicted children as follows:89

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other

Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.

Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing
provision should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord
children in conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21)
years of age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.

As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case.
Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an
example and to deter others from committing the same bestial acts.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-
MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment:

a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case;

b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of four ( 4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six ( 6) years and
one ( 1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and
 c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of four ( 4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and
severally, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts
of rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. Let the records of this case
be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of judgment.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

CASE DIGEST

People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appelas 21st Division, Mindanao
Station, Raymund Carampatana, Jeofhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015

FACTS:

After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with her friends, went to
Alsons Palace for a drinking session to celebrate their graduation. During such
session, they shared their problems with each other. AAA became emotional and
started crying, prompting her to take her first shot of Emperador Brandy. After
consuming more or less five glasses of drinks, she felt dizzy so she laid her head
down on Oportos lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would
remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply
tried to hide her face with the cap. The group just laughed at her and still made
her drink more. She fell asleep but was woken up so that she could drink the
remaining liquor inside the Brandy bottle. She refused but they insisted so she
drank. Again, AAA fell asleep.

When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola
Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there before. She
would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times
that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different
parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. At one point, AAA woke up
while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. Alquizola then
joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.

Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged with the

crime of rape of a 16-year old girl. The RTC convicted Carampatana and Oporto
guilty as principals and Alquizola as an accomplice while the CA acquitted them of
the crime charged, hence, this present appeal, alleging that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in acquitting respondents.

Private respondents aver that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and

executory and that the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
The OSG stated the following error:

The appellate decision of acquittal is null and void for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, an exception
to the principle of double jeopardy.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the
private respondents?

HELD:
YES, the Court of Appeals erred in acquitting private respondents. As a general
rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is
barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
be violated.

Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal,
but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of
acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed
not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process,
thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void.

If there is grave abuse of discretion, however, granting petitioners prayer is not

tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.

The petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting
private respondents. It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied
on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the
prosecution. A more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not
altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of
Oporto, Carampatana, and Alquizola. It presented the private respondents
account and allegations as though these were the established facts of the case,
which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court held that the assailed CA decision be Reversed
and Set Aside and finding private respondents guilty of the crime of rape.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNEL

VILLALBA Y DURAN AND RANDY VILLALBA Y SARCO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION
 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court is the Decision1 dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00844-MIN, which affirmed, with modifications as
to the amount of damages imposed, the Judgment[2 dated February 18, 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No.
11736, finding accused-appellants Arnel Villalba y Duran (Arnel) and Randy
Villalba ySarco (Randy) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of
Maximillian Casona y Lacroix (Maximillian).

In the Information dated May 1, 2006 filed with the RTC, accused-appellants were
charged as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

That on or about the 29th day of April 2006 at 2:30 o'clock in the morning, more or
less, at Capitol Avenue, near Gaisano Mall, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab one MAXIMILLIAN
CASONA Y LACROIX, with the use of an ice pick, hitting the latter at his left breast
and left portion of his stomach, which directly caused his death incurring damages
which maybe proven in Court.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty during their arraignment on August 8,

2006.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

At the pre-trial conference held on July 19, 2007,5 the parties stipulated only as to
the time and place of the stabbing incident, i.e., at around 2:00 in the early
morning of April 29, 2006 near the Gaisano Mall in Butuan City. Thereafter, trial
ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of three persons who witnessed the
stabbing incident: Maximillian's widow Josephine B. Casona (Josephine),6 Homer
Ferdinand B. Hermosura (Homer),7 and Frederick L. Apolinario (Frederick).8 The
prosecution also called to the witness stand the physicians who attended to
Maximillian before his death, namely, cardiologist Dr. Annalisa A. Gonzalez
(Gonzalez)9 and surgeon Dr. Edesio C. Urag (Urag).10 Last to testify for the
prosecution was Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Inocencio T. Amora (P/Insp.
Amora),11 the investigator assigned to the case and the apprehending officer of
accused-appellants.

The documentary exhibits of the prosecution consisted of the respective Sworn

Statements, all dated May 1, 2006, of Josephine, Homer, and Frederick;12 the
police blotter entry dated April 29, 2006 which reported Maximillian's stabbing and
death;13 the police blotter entry dated April 30, 2006 which reported the
subsequent arrests of accused-appellants for illegal gambling and concealment of
deadly weapon;14 the Affidavit of Apprehension dated April 30, 2006 jointly
executed by P/Insp. Amora, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Antonio A. Claros, Police
Officer (PO) 3 Rey Gabrielle B. Maderal, and PO2 Judan Q. Alvizo;15 three
photographs depicting Frederick's identification of accused-appellants as
Maximillian's assailants;16 a sketch and description of the puncture wounds found
on Maximillian's body prepared by Dr. Urag;17 Maximillian's Certificate of
Death;18 and the hospital and burial expenses in the total amount of P55,225.60
incurred by Josephine.19 These exhibits were all admitted in evidence by the RTC
in its Order dated February 29, 2008.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The prosecution's evidence established the following version of

events:cralawlawlibrary
Maximillian, a college instructor, attended a farewell party for his students at Moff
s Restaurant and Cocktail Lounge along JC Aquino Avenue in Butuan City on the
night of April 28, 2006. Maximillian was accompanied by his wife Josephine and
their friends Frederick, Homer, and Homer's wife Marilou.

Around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006, Josephine begged Maximillian that
they already go home. Josephine reminded Maximillian of the lateness of the hour
and of the great amount of liquor that he had already consumed. Maximillian still
did not want to leave, but Josephine insisted. Angry, Maximillian rushed out of the
restaurant and headed towards the direction of the Gaisano Mall in Butuan City.
Josephine asked Frederick to catch up with Maximillian. Josephine, Homer, and
Marilou then trailed about 10 meters behind Maximillian and Frederick.

When they turned the corner of JC Avenue and Capitol Drive, Maximillian and
Frederick chanced upon accused-appellants and their girlfriends, Maximillian's
group and accused-appellants' group did not know each other prior to the early
morning of April 29, 2006. Maximillian suddenly ordered accused-appellants to
wear their shirts, and then asked accused-appellant Arnel, "How much is that?"
referring to accused-appellant Arnel's girlfriend. Frederick intervened and told
accused-appellant Arnel, "Brod, don't mind him. He is a little bit drunk." Accused-
appellant Arnel replied, "That was nothing, Kuya." However, Maximillian and
accused-appellant Arnel continued to stare at each other. Moments later,
Maximillian tried to get hold of accused-appellant Arnel's left arm but the latter
was able to wave away Maximillian's hand. Accused-appellant Randy blocked
Maximillian's way and held Maximillian's hand/s as accused-appellant Arnel hit
Maximillian on the chest and abdomen. At this point, it appeared to eyewitnesses
Frederick, Josephine, and Homer that Maximillian was just being boxed by
accused-appellant Arnel. Frederick tried to break the scuffle, as Josephine and
Flomer, who were only five meters away, came running to help. Accused-
appellants stepped back and then ran away. Despite telling Josephine that he was
stabbed, Maximillian still chased accused-appellants, with Frederick and Homer at
his heels. Stones were thrown their way but none of them were hit. All of a
sudden, Maximillian fell to the ground. Josephine checked Maximillian's body yet
found no blood or wound. Assuming that Maximillian was simply drunk and in pain
because of the fist fight, Josephine, with the help of Frederick and Homer, brought
Maximillian home on board a motorized "trisikad." During the ride home,
Maximillian was unconscious but snoring heavily. However, when they were
already at their house, Josephine felt that Maximillian had no more pulse and his
eyes had turned white. Josephine, again with Frederick and Homer, rushed
Maximillian to Manuel J. Santos Hospital.

Maximillian arrived at the hospital at around 3:00 in the morning of April 29, 2006.
Dr. Gonzalez, the attending physician at the emergency room, noticed that
Maximillian was already unresponsive and had no more heartbeat. Dr. Gonzalez
performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation and was able to revive Maximillian. Dr.
Gonzalez conducted close physical examination of Maximillian's body and
discovered two hardly visible stab wounds located at the latter's left chest and
abdomen. Dr. Gonzalez immediately referred Maximillian to Dr. Urag, a surgeon.

As a result of his own examination, Dr. Urag reported that Maximillian's stab
wounds both had a lateral width of about 3-5 mm, and that the stab wound on
Maximillian's chest penetrated the pericardium of his heart, which caused the
entry of fluid into the said organ. The delay in the discovery of the fatal chest
wound and the lack of hospital facilities rendered it too late to save Maximillian.
Resultantly, Maximillian died of "Cardio Pulmonary Arrest secondary to Pericardial
Tamponade secondary to penetrating stab wound left chest." Dr. Urag called
Maximillian's wounds as puncture wounds, which could be caused by any sharp
instrument or bladed weapon, or even nails.
Josephine reported Maximillian's stabbing and death to the police on April 29,
2006. P/Insp. Amora, then the Chief of the General Investigation Section of the
Butuan City Police Office, took charge of the investigation of Maximillian's case.
P/Insp. Amora conducted an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime and was
able to identify accused-appellants as the suspects. The following day, April 30,
2006, P/Insp. Amora came upon information that accused-appellants were in P-l
Barangay Imadejas Subdivision, Butuan City. P/Insp. Amora proceeded to the
given location and there found accused-appellants playing and betting on a game
of cards. The police immediately arrested accused-appellants for illegal gambling
and brought them to the police station. Upon being informed of accused-
appellants' arrest, Josephine and Frederick arrived at the police station and
identified accused-appellants as Maximillian's assailants.

Accused-appellants testified in their own defense.

Accused-appellant Arnel21 while admitting his presence at the time and scene of
the crime, narrated a different version of the events surrounding Maximillian's
stabbing.

According to accused-appellant Arnel, at around 2:30 in the morning of April 29,

2006, he was with his girlfriend Jenny and friends Johndale and Tata in the vicinity
of Gaisano Mall, waiting for a tricycle. When Jenny was about to board a tricycle,
four persons, who all looked drunk, came out of a store. One of these four
persons, who turned out to be Maximillian, approached and asked accused-
appellant Arnel how much was the girl he was with. Maximillian's crude remark
angered Jenny, who immediately left with Tata, on board the tricycle. A companion
of Maximillian approached accused-appellant Arnel and requested him to bear with
Maximillian who was already drunk. Accused-appellant Arnel expressed that he
understood the situation. However, Maximillian suddenly blocked the way of
accused-appellant Arnel and Johndale. Maximillian punched accused-appellant
Arnel, hitting the latter on the neck, just below his left ear. Johndale was able to
run away. Accused-appellant Arnel asked Maximillian why the latter hit him.
Instead of answering the question, Maximillian threw back another question,
asking if accused-appellant Amel was brave. Accused-appellant Arnel looked for a
stone to throw at Maximillian to fend off the latter, but saw none. What accused-
appellant found and grabbed as a weapon to defend himself was a barbeque stick,
about six inches long. Accused-appellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian once with the
barbecue stick on the left side of the body, after which, the barbecue stick broke.
When stabbed, Maximillian did not show any reaction but just walked away from
accused-appellant. At that point, Maximillian's three companions also began to
attack accused-appellant Arnel. After their attack, Maximillian's three companions
left. Accused-appellant Arnel sat down for a while near Gaisano Mall, then went
home. The following day, accused-appellant Arnel was apprehended by the police.
Accused-appellant Arnel was surprised to learn from the police that Maximillian
had died. Accused-appellant Arnel insisted that he had no intention of killing
Maximillian and denied any knowledge of how Maximillian sustained the second
stab wound. Accused-appellant Arnel further clarified that it was his friend
Johndale, not his cousin accused-appellant Randy, who was with him when he
encountered Maximillian the early morning of April 29, 2006.

Accused-appellant Randy22 narrated on the witness stand that he was at his house
in Barangay Doongan with his wife and children in the early morning of April 29,
2006. Accused-appellant Randy knew nothing about Maximillian's stabbing and
death. Accused-appellant Randy was with his wife at the house of a traffic aide
called Puspus in Lower Doongan when he was accosted by the police. The police
asked accused-appellant Randy for the whereabouts of his cousin accused-
appellant Arnel. When accused-appellant Randy answered that he did not know,
the police immediately arrested him and brought him to the police station. At the
police station, the police promised that they would drop the charges against
accused-appellant Randy if the latter would reveal where accused-appellant Arnel
was. Accused-appellant Randy thus told the police that accused-appellant Arnel
was in Pareja Subdivision. Accused-appellant Arnel was indeed found and arrested
in Pareja Subdivision and was also brought to the police station. Accused-
appellants were then presented before a witness to Maximillian's stabbing. The
witness was wearing a cap and a cover on his face. The witness first pointed only
at accused-appellant Arnel, but after some coaching from the police, the witness
also pointed at accused-appellant Randy.

On February 18, 2010, the RTC promulgated its Judgment convicting accused-
appellants as charged. The trial court found that the prosecution had duly
established the essential elements of murder, and rejected the uncorroborated
claim of self-defense of accused-appellant Arnel and defenses of denial and alibi of
accused-appellant Randy. The trial court held that Maximillian's killing was murder
given the presence of the qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength
and treachery, but not evident premeditation. The RTC sentenced accused-
appellants thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds accused Arnel Villalba and
Randy Villalba guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery
and abuse of superior strength, with no mitigating circumstance. Pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346, banning the imposition of the death penalty, said accused
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without
possibility of parole. The accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Maximillian Casona the amounts of SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND (P75,000.00)
PESOS as civil indemnity, TWENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS as
exemplary damages, FIFTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY[-]FIVE
PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P55,225.60) as actual damages, FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages, and TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)
PESOS as attorney's fees.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accused-appellants appealed their conviction before the Court of Appeals, based

on the following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[I] THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE

CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREM[E]DITATION

[II] THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE TFIE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

[III] THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE EXISTENCE
OF SELF-DEFENSE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARNEL VILLALBA.24

On September 25, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision
affirming the conviction of accused-appellants for murder. Like the RTC, the
appellate court gave scant consideration to accused-appellants' unsubstantiated
defenses. The appellate court likewise agreed with the finding of the RTC that
treachery attended Maximillian's killing, reasoning thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The court a quo for its part, had this to say about its finding of
treachery:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. Frontal attack
can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.
What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
victim to defend himself or to retaliate (People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 173197,
April 24, 2007).

Thus, there was treachery when accused Randy Villalba held the hand of the victim
who was drunk while his co-accused Arnel Villalba simultaneously boxed and
stabbed the deceased, thereby insuring its execution to kill the victim without risk
to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder (Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code).
We agree with the court a quo.

Jurisprudence abounds in holding that an altercation between the victim and the
accused immediately before the attack upon the victim does not necessarily
negate the presence of treachery. This was reiterated in People v. Jabian [G.R. No.
132913-14, April 4, 2001], viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Accused-appellant Jabian's suggestion that an argument between the parties
preceded the slaying as testified to by Ruel Lipalam, coupled with the fact that the
attack was frontal, as shown by location of the wound, and that therefore the
killing of Jose Sammy was not sudden or unexpected as to negate a finding of
treachery, cannot be sustained. There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend to directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Thus, it has been held that the fact that the attack was preceded by a fight,
or even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person does not negate
treachery. In this case, accused-appellant Jimmy Magaro held both arms of the
victim behind his back, effectively rendering the latter incapable of defending
himself while the other accused stabbed him in the chest. As correctly pointed out
by the trial court, the victim was "a virtual
sitting duck when stabbed by Jabian because he was hand clasped by Magaro in
order to be so stabbed, without any risk whatsoever to the two accused arising
from any useful defense which Jose Sammy might make."
In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled in a number of cases that treachery
attends the killing of a person who is drunk, unarmed, has no opportunity to
defend himself and the attack is sudden.

In the case at hand, it was established by the prosecution witnesses that appellant
Randy held an intoxicated Maximillian while appellant Arnel stabbed him.
Consequently, at the time of the attack, the victim was not in the position to
defend himself. Clearly then, the court a quo's finding of treachery is justified. At
the same time, this collaborative manner of the attack supports the finding of
conspiracy.25cralawredChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court of Appeals though modified the amount of damages awarded. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appeal is DENIED. The RTC Decision in Criminal
Case No. 11736 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS;

1. Moral damages are awarded in the increased amount of

Php75,000;chanrobleslaw

2. Exemplary damages are awarded in the increased amount of Php30,000;

and

3. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages from April 29, 2006
up to the finality of this Decision, and interest at 12% per annum on these
 damages from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid shall likewise be
paid by accused- appellants to the heirs of Maximillian Casona.26

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Court gave the parties the opportunity to file their respective supplemental
briefs[27 but the parties manifested that they had already exhausted their
arguments before the Court of Appeals.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accused-appellant Arnel asserts that he cannot be adjudged criminally liable for

the resulting death of Maximillian as he only stabbed Maximillian in self-defense.
Accused-appellant also argues that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the
killing of Maximillian to murder, as even the prosecution admits that provocation
and aggression came from Maximillian and that an altercation between accused-
appellant Arnel and Maximillian preceded the stabbing.

Accused-appellant Randy insists on his alibi, i.e., that he was at home with his
family and not in the company of accused-appellant Arnel on April 29, 2006 near
the Gaisano Mall.

The Court finds partial merit in the instant appeal.

At the outset, the Court bears in mind the following pronouncement in People v.
Gerolaga29:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this Decision, this Court emphasizes the need to review the facts and details of
appealed cases with meticulous, laser-like precision. While, as a rule, the findings
of fact of trial courts are accorded great respect by appellate tribunals, still, the
latter must wade through the mass of evidence in order to ensure that the trial
court did not overlook or misapprehend little details that could spell the innocence
of the accused, or at least mitigate their guilt. This is but consistent with the
doctrine that all doubts must be resolved in their favor. Indeed, it is far better to
set free a thousand guilty persons than to unjustly punish an innocent one.

The Court, after a meticulous review of the records of the case, finds bases to
downgrade accused-appellant Arnel's crime from murder to homicide and to
absolve accused-appellant Randy of any criminal liability for Maximillian's death.

The Court begins with the undisputed facts: Maximillian and Frederick, followed by
Josephine, Homer, and Marilou, chanced upon accused-appellant Arnel, his
girlfriend Jenny, and two other companions, somewhere along Capitol Drive, near
the vicinity of Gaisano Mall in Butuan City, at around 2:30 in the morning of April
29, 2006. These two groups did not know each other prior to April 29, 2006.
Maximillian addressed an insulting remark towards Jenny causing tension between
Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel. A scuffle ensued between the two men
and accused-appellant Arnel eventually stabbed Maximillian on the chest with a
sharp instrument, causing a puncture wound that penetrated Maximillian's heart
and ultimately caused Maximillian's death.

Prosecution witnesses Josephine and Frederick had positively identified both

accused-appellants at the police station soon after accused-appellants' arrest. The
same prosecution witnesses, together with Homer, would again positively identify
both accused-appellants in open court during trial. Hence, accused-appellant
Randy's presence at the time and place of Maximillian's stabbing was duly
established. Accused-appellant Randy was not able to attribute any ill motive on
the part of the three prosecution witnesses that could have impelled them to
testify against him. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical
declarations on the witness stand, under the solemnity of an oath, deserve full
faith and credence. It necessarily prevails over alibi and denial, especially when
neither alibi nor denial is substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.[30 Nonetheless, accused-appellant Randy's presence at the time and
place of Maximillian's stabbing does not necessarily mean that the former should
bear criminal liability for the latter's death, as the Court will subsequently discuss
herein.

The Information charged accused-appellants with Maximillian's murder, alleging

that accused-appellants, acting in conspiracy with each other, and with abuse of
superior strength, treachery, and/or evident premeditation, stabbed Maximillian
with an icepick.

On conspiracy

Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need
not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons
met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert,
each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the
victim.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is no clear evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill

Maximillian. To recall, Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group
completely met by chance that fateful early morning of April 29, 2006 near
Gaisano Mall. They did not know each other before this meeting. The events
swiftly happened, in a matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to
Maximillian's insulting remark to Jenny, to the scuffle between Maximillian and
accused-appellant Arnel, and to accused-appellant Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian.

The scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel broke out because
the former tried to grab the latter's arm. It was at this point that prosecution
witnesses saw accused-appellant Randy block Maximillian's way and hold
Maximillian's hand/s. Josephine testified that accused-appellant Randy held only
Maximillian's left hand, and Frederick narrated that accused-appellant Randy held
both of Maximillian's hands; but neither of these witnesses was able to describe
the extent that Maximillian's ability to defend himself or flee was impaired by
accused-appellant Randy's hold on his hand/s. Given the circumstances, the Court
has serious doubts that accused-appellant Randy so acted to ensure that accused-
appellant Arnel would be able to stab and kill Maximillian. It is completely
reasonable and plausible that accused-appellant Randy was merely stepping in to
stop Maximillian from further attacking his cousin accused-appellant Arnel. There
was no proof that accused-appellant Randy had prior knowledge that accused-
appellant Arnel carried a sharp weapon with him or that accused-appellant Arnel
intended to stab Maximillian.

In fact, there is no strong evidence of the weapon accused-appellant Arnel used in

stabbing Maximillian. None of the prosecution witnesses actually saw accused-
appellant use an ice pick or any other weapon. Josephine, Homer, and Frederick
did not even know that Maximillian was stabbed, believing that he was just
punched by accused-appellant Arnel.

For his part, accused-appellant Arnel admitted stabbing Maximillian but asserted
that he used only a barbecue stick which he found in the area. A barbecue stick,
with a sharp end, could cause a puncture wound consistent with that which killed
Maximillian. That accused-appellant Arnel used a barbecue stick he found in the
area as weapon shows that he acted instantaneously and spontaneously in
stabbing Maximillian, thus, further negating the possibility that he conspired with
accused-appellant Randy to commit the stabbing.

On the qualifying circumstances for murder

The prosecution likewise failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the
alleged circumstances which would qualify the killing of Maximillian to murder.

The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, already found that there was no
evident premeditation. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution
of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive
at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.32As the Court
already discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the events leading to the stabbing
of Maximillian by accused-appellant Arnel happened swiftly and unexpectedly, with
accused-appellant Arnel instantaneously and spontaneously stabbing Maximillian
with a barbecue stick he found in the area. Accused-appellant Arnel clearly had no
opportunity for cool thought and reflection prior to stabbing Maximillian.

Unlike the RTC and the Court of Appeals, however, the Court finds no treachery in
accused-appellant Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian. That accused-appellant Randy
was present or that Maximillian was unarmed and drunk at the time of the
stabbing are not sufficient to constitute treachery. Neither do said circumstances
constitute abuse of superior strength.

Treachery is defined under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code as

follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing the means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.

Based on the above definition, two conditions must be present in order to

constitute treachery: (1) the employment of such means of execution that gave
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the
means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Jurisprudence,
however, has qualified that the suddenness of the attack, the vulnerability of the
position of the victim at the time of the attack, or even the fact that the victim was
unarmed, do not by themselves render the attack as treacherous, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the
wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the
time the attack was made, or the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not
by themselves render the attack as treacherous. This is of particular
significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he
gained an advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell
and was rendered defenseless. The means employed for the commission of
the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously
or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the
crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from
the intended victim. For the rules on treachery to apply, the sudden attack
must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim,
and without provocation on the part of the latter. Treachery is never
presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is required that the manner of attack
must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime
itself.33(Emphasis supplied.)

The elements of treachery are wanting in this case. At the risk of sounding
repetitive, the Court once more emphasizes the swiftness of the events that took
place on April 29, 2006 when Maximillian's group unexpectedly came upon
accused-appellants' group. The tension and physical violence between Maximillian
and accused-appellant Arnel quickly escalated from a verbal exchange, to a
physical scuffle, and then to the stabbing of Maximillian by accused-appellant
Arnel. Accused-appellant Arnel merely found a barbecue stick in the area which he
used to stab Maximillian. The barbecue stick could hardly be a weapon of choice
and accused-appellant Arnel obviously used it only in desperation. Moreover, it
cannot be said that Maximillian did not expect at all some form of attack from
accused-appellant Arnel. Maximillian provoked accused-appellant Arnel by making
a crude remark about the latter's girlfriend, then grabbing accused-appellant
Arnel's arm, and taunting accused-appellant Arnel if he was brave. It would appear
that Maximillian was, in fact, spoiling for a fight. In addition, as the Court
previously observed herein, it cannot simply assume in the absence of proof that
accused-appellant Randy held Maximillian's hand/s to prevent the latter from
retaliating as accused-appellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian. Accused-appellant
Randy could just as well be holding Maximillian's hand/s to stop Maximillian from
further attacking accused-appellant Arnel during the scuffle. Lastly, the Court is
unconvinced that accused-appellant Arnel took advantage of Maximillian's drunken
state. No clear and convincing evidence has been presented to show the degree of
Maximillian's intoxication or if it had even affected his strength and intelligence.

As for abuse of superior strength, it is present whenever there is a notorious

inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there
were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime
was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the
relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish
that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the case at bar, Maximillian was with Frederick when they first chanced upon
accused-appellants, an even match of two against two, therefore disputing any
allegation of inequality of forces between the two sides. Moreover, given the
doubts as to accused-appellant Randy's actual participation in the stabbing, it
cannot be said that the two accused-appellants had used their combined strength
against Maximillian to ensure the latter's death.

Without any qualifying circumstance, the stabbing and death of Maximillian is a

homicide rather than a murder.

The respective criminal liabilities of accused-appellants

In the absence of conspiracy, the respective criminal liability of accused-appellants

would depend on the precise participation of each in the crime.

Accused-appellant Arnel had already admitted to stabbing Maximillian with a

barbecue stick, which eventually caused the latter's death. Unless he is able to
prove to the satisfaction of the Court his claim of self-defense as a justifying
circumstance, accused-appellant Arnel's conviction for the crime of homicide
becomes inevitable.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is a hornbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of

evidence shifts to the appellant to prove the elements of that claim, i.e., (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accused-appellant Arnel failed to establish the unlawful aggression of Maximillian

at the time he stabbed the latter.

Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful

aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing as
there is nothing to repel. The unlawful aggression of the victim must put the life
and personal safety of the person defending himself in actual peril. A mere
threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful
aggression.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this case, accused-appellant Arnel's contemplated threat to his life or limb when
he stabbed Maximillian was not real or imminent. Maximillian merely uttered
insulting remarks to accused-appellant Arnel and the latter's girlfriend, Jenny.
Accused-appellant Arnel even admitted that Frederick, Maximillian's companion,
immediately intervened and apologized for Maximillian's unruly conduct. Granting
that Maximillian did punch accused-appellant Arnel and hit the latter below his left
ear, accused-appellant Arnel could have simply hit Maximillian back. Instead,
accused-appellant Arnel used a barbeque stick to stab Maximillian on the chest,
which was evidently not commensurate, and well overboard, as compared to the
aggression exhibited by Maximillian to him.

The penalty prescribed by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of
homicide is reclusion temporal. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of
the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of

the sentence should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium term
which has a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; and that the minimum should be
within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years. In the instant case, the Court sentences accused-
appellant Arnel to imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As to the civil indemnity and damages, based on current jurisprudence, the Court
orders accused-appellant Arnel to pay Maximillian's heirs the amount of Fifty-Five
Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Five Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P55,225.60) as
actual damages, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages,
and another Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity.

Absent any evidence that accused-appellant Randy acted with criminal intent in
holding Maximillian's hand/s at about the same time that accused-appellant Arnel
stabbed Maximillian, the Court absolves accused-appellant Randy of any criminal
and civil liability for Maximillian's death.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal of accused-appellants

is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The Court finds accused-appellant ARNEL VILLALBA y DURAN GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, for which he is SENTENCED to
imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Maximillian Casona the amounts of P55,225.60 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and another P75,000.00 as civil indemnity plus interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
decision until fully satisfied.

The Court ACQUITS accused-appellant RANDY VILLALBA y SARCO on the crime

charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 209373 July 30, 2014

JOEL YONGCO and JULIETO LAOJAN, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209414

ANECITO TANGIAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This treats of the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 in
relation to Rule 125 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00549-MIN, dated January 21, 2013
and September 10, 2013, respectively. Said rulings affirmed the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Decision convicting petitioners of qualified theft.

The Facts
Petitioners Joel Yongco, Julieta Lafiojan, and Anecito Tangian, Jr. were employees
of the City Government of Iligan. Tangian worked as a garbage truck driver for the
city, while Yongco and Laojanwere security guards assigned to protect the
premises of the City Engineers Office (CEO). On November 14, 2005, an
Information was filed before the RTC, Branch 5 in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte
charging the three with Qualified Theft. The information docketed as Crim. Case
No. 12092 reads:

That on or about April 16, 2005, in the City of Ilagan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then regular and
casual employees of the City government as drivers and helpers respectively, of a
garbage truck with Plate No. 496, conspiring and confederating togetherand
mutually helping each other, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon them
by the city government, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following articles, to wit:
one (1) unit transmission, boom, differential of Tamaraw and l-beam of Nissan
with a total value of P40,000.00, belonging to the City government of Ilagan,
represented by Atty. Rommel Abragan of the City Legal Office, Iligan City,
withoutthe consent and against the will of the said owner in the aforesaid sum
of P40,000.00, Philippine Currency.2

During the arraignment held on February 16, 2006, accused petitioners entered a
plea of not guilty tothe offense charged. Pre-trial was then conducted and closed
on July 25, 2006. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as one ofits witnesses a casual employee of the city
government, Pablo Salosod,who testified that on April 16, 2005 at around 1:30
a.m., while attending a wake at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor, he was fetched
and requestedby petitioner Tangian to accompany him to the CEO. At the office
garage, Salosod and his fellow garbage collectors were allegedly directed by
petitioners Tangian and Yongco to load car parts that petitioners considered
aswaste items, the subject items of the theft, on the truck driven by Tangian. They
then drove to Tominobo, Iligan City where the materials were unloaded in front of
Delfin Junk Store, and before the truck left the shop, Salosod allegedly saw
petitioner Laojan giving a thumbs-up sign to Tangian. On the way back, Tangian
allegedly confessed to Salosod that it was Laojan who requested that the items
be brought at the junk shop. Another employee, Rommel Ocaonilla, corroborated
the testimony of Salosod.

Prosecution witness Oliveros Garcia meanwhile testified witnessing the unloading

of the items in front of the junk store, after which, Laojan covered the items up
with a sack. The following morning, he allegedly saw Laojans brother-in-law,
who coincidentally works at the shop, take the items inside.

Witnesses Dioscoro Galorio and Atty. Ulysses Lagcao, employee and consultant of
the city government, respectively, testified that they conducted investigations
relative to the incidentand found out that the items stolen consisted of one Nissan
transmission,one unit boom, one Nissan I-beam, and one differential of Tamaraw,
with total valuation of PhP 12,000. Upon their investigation, they recommended
tothe city legal officer the filing of the present criminal case against the three
petitioners.

Version of the Defense

In defense, petitioners testified intheir behalves. Their testimony is summarized by

the CA in the Decision now on appeal in the following wise:
Joel Yongco, 34, single, x x x and a casual employee, testified that, on August 9,
2004, he was issued a Job Order and detailed at the Civil Security Unit (CSU). He
was assigned to guard the building installation of the CEO. On April 15, 2005, he
was on duty with his companion, one Mr. Quintana. They relieved Laojan and one
Mr. Enumerables. Laojan gave him (Yongco) four gate passes and saidthat the
area would have to be cleared because the "Bacod" Iliganvehicle would be
arriving. Yongco read the entries on one of[the] gate passes. Theyread: "Loaded
assorted scraps with remark to be thrown atthe dump site." At the bottom of the
gate pass was the "note" of EngineerCabahug with the signatures of the guards,
Laojan and Enumerables. From 5:00 PM to 12:00 midnight on April 15, 2005,
there was only one shipment of scrap iron to the dump site. The dump truck
driven by Tangian entered the CEO premises at around 11:00 oclock in the
evening of the same date. Tangian went to the yard where the scrap iron were
situated and asked Yongco to accompany and help him. Tangian gathered the
scrap materials and the four of them (Tangian, Yongco, and the 2 helpers of
Tangian) loaded the said scrap to the dump truck. At around 12:45 P.M., after
loading the items, Tangian drove away without giving a gate pass to the guards on
duty. Yongco did not ask Tangian for a gate pass because Yongco had one
companion in the guard house to get the gate pass.

Julieto Laojan, 48, who was working in the CSU division for 20 years and
assigned to guard the CEO, testified that he was not on duty on April 15 and 16,
2005; he was on duty on April 14, 2005 at 7:00 A.M. up to April 15, 2005 of the
same time. When Yongco and Quintana relieved him on April 15, 2005 at 7:00 in
the morning, he gave the four gate passes which were used to ship outassorted
scrap irons to them to be kept for the file. Engineer Cabahug was the one who
directed the removal of the scrap iron because the area of the CEO would have to
be cleared since new trucks for the government were coming. His house, which
was along the national highway, was about 40-50 metersaway from Delfin Junk
Store. He knew Oliveros Garcia who was a kagawad of Tominobo, Iligan City.
Aside from that, Garcia had filed an ejectment case against him (Laojan), which
was still pending in court.

xxxx

Anecito Tangian, Jr., 59, garbage truck driver at the City Engineers Office for 16
years, testified that his highest level of educational attainment was Grade I. It was
his tour of duty on April 15, 2005 at 9:00 oclock in the evening up to April 16,
2005 at 6:00 oclock in the morning. At around 5:30 in the morning of April 15,
2005, Laojan asked him to load scrap materials onto the garbage truck and to
bring them to the Delfin Junk Store in Tominobo. He asked Laojan if there were
any problems about the loading ofthe said items. Laojan answered that there
were no problems about the loading of the same, that the City Garbage would
have to be cleared considering that "BACOD" trucks would be arriving at thatarea.
He followed Laojan because the latter was the guard at the City Garage. When
hearrived for duty at the City Garage at around 9:00 in the evening, Yongco asked
him if Laojan already informed him about the loading of the items. After that he
checked up the garbage truck while Yongco and the two helpers were loading the
items. He did not know how many items were loaded because he only helped the
three of them during the loading of the differential. After loading the scrap
materials, Tangian and the two helpers drove away from the City Garage. They
dropped by the Cosmo Funeral Homes for more than an hour before they
proceeded to Tominobo. When they reached Delfin Junk Store, Laojan gave a
thumbs-up sign to Tangian, which meant okay. He then left and started his work
collecting garbage.3

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 11, 2008, the RTC held petitioners liable for qualified theft via conspiracy.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Julieto Laojan,
Anecito Tangian, Jr., and Joel Yongco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Theft defined and penalized under Article 310 in relation to
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and the said accused are hereby
sentencedto a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years, eight (8) monthsand
twenty (20) days of prision correccionalmaximum as the minimum term, to ten
(10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayormaximum, as the maximum
term, of their indeterminate sentence including the accessory penalties thereof.

SO ORDERED.4

Aggrieved, petitioners, in their appeal, prayed that the CA reverse the RTC
Decision. Petitioner Tangian reiterated in his Brief that he should not be considered
as a conspirator since he merely innocentlyobeyed Laojans instructions on the
assumption that the latter was his superior and that Laojan was authorized to get
rid of the scrap materials in the CEO premises and that he had no criminal intent
whatsoever.

In their joint brief, Yongco and Laojan also disclaimed the existence of a
conspiracy. Yongco, in his defense, argued that Tangian and his two other helpers
asked for his assistance which he extended ingood faith, in view of Laojans
statement earlier that day that the office garage has to be cleared. Laojan, on
the other hand, insisted that he cannot be considered as a conspirator since he
was not present at the time of taking, and that the mere giving of a thumbs-up
sign to Tangian when the latter delivered the materials to the junk shop does not
amount to conspiracy.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 21, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying petitioners
appeals. In affirming the RTC Decision in toto, the CA ruled that there was indeed
conspiracy because Tangian could nothave taken out the items without a gate
pass, but with the security guard Yongcos participation, he was able to do
justthat. The CA also ruled that it is implausible that Tangian would just leave the
items in front of the junk shop unattended. Thus, the appellate court appreciated
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Laojans presence was not
merely coincidental and that his thumbs-up and his subsequent act of covering the
materials with sacks indicate that the plan was for him to receive the said items.
Petitioners, via motion for reconsideration, sought the CAs reversal of the
Decision only for the appellate court to deny the same through its challenged
Resolution dated September 10, 2013.

Not contented with the adverted Decision of the CA as reiterated in the Resolution,
petitioners Yongco and Laojan jointly filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
while petitioner Tangian separately filed his own.1wphi1 The two petitions were
later consolidated by this Court for resolution herein.

The Issue

As with most criminal cases, the main issue in the instant case is whether or not
the CA erred in sustaining petitioners conviction. Central to resolving this issue is
determining whether or not there indeed existed conspiracy between petitioners in
committing the offense charged.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are bereft of merit.

Article 310, in relation to Art. 308,of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines
Qualified Theft, thusly:

ART. 308. Who are liable for theft.Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain but without violence, against, or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same
to the local authorities or to its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of

another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage
caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner,
shall hunt or fishupon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other
forestor farm products.

xxxx

ART. 310. Qualified Theft.The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or
if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fishtaken from a fishpond or
fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
(emphasis added)

Synthesizing the foregoing provisions, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed

with grave abuse of discretion, can simply be enumerated as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owners consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against

persons, nor of force upon things; and

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.5

As correctly observed by the appellatecourt, all of the elements of Qualified Theft

are present in this case, viz:

There is no dispute that the items (transmission, boom arm, differential assembly,
and I-beam) which are the subject matter of this case belong to the CEO of Iligan
City.1wphi1 There is no dispute that these items, although considered "heap of
scrap," have not yet been declared unserviceable or waste by the proper authority
or office. Nor have they been marked for proper disposal. Unless properly disposed
in accordance with Section 379 of the Local Government Code, these items are still
government properties or owned by the City of Iligan.

There is also no dispute that these items were taken away from the CEO and were
already under completeand effective control of the persons taking the same. This
is because these items were loaded onto the garbage truck driven by Tangian and
brought to Tominobo at the Delfin Junk Store.

Apparently, the taking of these items was without the consent of the CEO of Iligan
City because there was no gate pass issued to that effect. Evidence shows that
when the garbage truck left the premises of the CEO, no gate pass was
surrendered by Tangian. Yongco did not bother to ask for a gate pass on the
pretext that there was another guard on duty at the gate.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject to asportation. Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. Since these items
werebrought to the junk store, intent to gain becomes obvious. The presumption
of animus lucrandihas not been overturned.

It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done with grave abuse of
confidence. The accused in this case, itbears stressing, were guards and drivers
with access tothe entrance and exit of the CEO premises. In other words,they
enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed on them by their employer (the City
ofIligan) to haveaccess throughout the CEO premises on account of their
respective duties. More so since the primary function of the CSU is to guard the
properties, including the said items, of the CEO. It was this trust and confidence
that was gravely abused by them that makes the theft qualified.6

Concisely stated, the fact of taking without consent is indubitable. Indeed,

petitioners hinge their plea for acquittal and supporting argument primarily on
their lack of criminal intent and the observed conspiracy.

Addressing the issue head on, We uphold the findings of the appellate court. No
error can be ascribed to the CA when it determined the existence of conspiracy
between and among petitioners in this case.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

a felony and decide to commit it.7Well-settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct
proof of a previousagreement is not necessary as it may be deduced from the
mode, method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated.8 It may be
inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or after the commission of
the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of
criminaldesign, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidenceof a
chain of circumstances.9

In the case at bar, even though there is no showing of a prior agreement among
the accused, their separate acts taken and viewed together are actually connected
and complementedeach other indicating a unity of criminal design and purpose.10

Tangians complicity in the illicit deedwas manifest from the fact, as he himself
admitted, that he was the one who personally transported the stolen items from
the CEO to the junkshop. His claim that he was not aware of any irregularity in the
act he performed is rendered dubious by his 16 years of service as truck driver for
the City of Iligan. To be sure, his record of service argues against his claim of
ignorance of the standard protocol that a gate pass to be issued by the CEO
property custodian should first be secured before taking out items from the CEO
compound, including alleged waste materials. He should also know better than to
assume that Laojan can authorize the withdrawal of items without the requisite
gate pass since Laojans duty, as security guard, is precisely to prevent the
same.

Similarly, Yongcos claim of good faith is belied by his own admission that he knew
of the office procedure that a gate pass is required every time something is taken
out of the CEO premises. In fact, four gate passes were given to him that morning
by Laojan, covering waste materials withdrawn during the latters shift. At the
very least, this should have reminded him of his duty to demand a gate pass for
property leaving the CEO premises. Neither memory lapses orlapses in the
performance of his duty will explain Yongcos failure to demand a gate pass.The
only viable explanation is that he was in connivance with other petitioners.11

Lastly, the RTC, with valid reason, tagged Laojan as having instigated and
marshalled the entire scheme. To quote the trial court:

x x x As shown above, it appears that Laojan broached the idea to Yongco that
the items subject of this case will be withdrawn under the pretext of clearing the
CEO scrap yard of unserviceable waste materials. Then Laojan gave Yongco 4
gate passes apparently to be used to coverup or camouflage the actual
withdrawallater that evening. Then Laojan told Tangian to load the items under
the same ploy of clearing the scrap yard of unserviceable waste materials and that
they will not encounter any problem. Finally, Laojan was seen by Brgy. Kag.
Oliveros Garcia at 1:30 oclock in the morning of April 16, 2005 receiving the items
as they were dumped near the Delfin Junk Store,Tominobo, Iligan City. After the
items were dumped, Laojan then gave Tangian the "thumbs-up" sign, meaning
everything is okay clear proof of meeting of minds between Tangian and
Laojan, and their collusion to steal the items under the pretext of disposing
unserviceable waste materials. This non-verbal "thumbs-up" sign was also seenby
the truck helper Salosod.12 x x x

In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Once conspiracy is established, all
the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree
of their participation.13 The guilt of one is the guilt of all. It is common design
which is the essence of conspiracyconspirators may act separately or together in
different manners but always leading to the same unlawful result. The character
and effect of conspiracy are not to be adjudged by dismembering it and viewing its
separate parts but only by looking at it as a wholeacts done to giveeffect to
conspiracy may be, in fact, wholly innocent acts.14 Applying this doctrine in the
case at bench, it can reasonably be concluded that despite Laojans lack of
physical participation in hauling the items to Tangians truck and bringing them to
the junk shop, he can still be liable for Qualified Theft via conspiracy. All told,
there is no cogent reason for us todisturb the findings of the appellate court,
affirmatory of those of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED

for lack of merit. The CA's January 21, 2013 Decision and September 10, 2013
Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 00549-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 205298 September 10, 2014

EOPOLDO QUINTOS y DELAMOR, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 dated 31 July
2012 and Resolution3 dated 11 January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33776, affirming the Joint Decision4 dated 20 October 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-
8341 and L-8342.

The Facts

Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor (p~titioner) was charged, in conspiracy

with his brothers Pedro, Rolly and Lando, all surnamed Quintos, and Narciso Bni
for frustrated homicide and homicide.

The Information5 in Criminal Case No. L-8341 reads, in part:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused in conspiracywith each other, with intent to kill, did then and there,
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai
Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds, several lacerations and
contusions on the different parts of his body, thus, the accused performedall the
acts of execution which would produce homicide as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention
applied on him that prevented his death, to the prejudice and damage of the said
Robert dela Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Information6 in Criminal Case No. L-8342 reads, in part:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there,
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai
Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds and several lacerations on the
different parts of her body, thus, the accused performed all the acts of execution
which would produce homicide as a consequence but which,nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention applied on him that
prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice and damage of the said Felomina dela
Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case No. L-8340, an Amended Information7 was filed when the victim
Freddie dela Cruz died:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai
Freddie dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on the different parts of his body,
which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Freddie dela
Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner were arrested.
Rolly and Lando evaded arrest and remainat large. Petitioner, Pedro and Narciso
all pled not guilty to the charges brought against them.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Eduardo Oyando, Felomina

dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Police Officer Bernardo Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata V.
Fernandez.

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, petitioner and Pedro Quintos.
Narciso Buni jumped bail before he could testify. Petitioners sister was also
scheduled to testify, but since her testimony would only be corroborative, the
prosecution admitted her testimony.8

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution established that at about 3:30 p.m. of 15 January 2008, Freddie
dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Felomina dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando were
walking along the barangay road of Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan. They were on
their way to the town proper when they were accosted by Pedro Quintos, Rolly
Quintos, Lando Quintos,Narciso Buni and petitioner. Pedro was wielding a samurai,
Lando, Narciso and petitioner were carrying bolos, and Rolly was holding a big
stone. Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando
ran back towards their house, but the five attackers caught up with them.

Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz withthe samurai, but the latter parried the attack
with his left hand. Robert dela Cruz attempted to gain control of the samurai, but
Rolly hit him in the face, near the jaw, with the stone Rolly was carrying. Robert
dela Cruz lost his hold of the samurai and fell to the ground.

Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his head, which caused the latter to
fall face up. Petitioner joined Lando in hacking Freddie dela Cruz, who, while
defending himself with his hands, sustained injuries on his right hand and lost a
few fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed Freddie dela Cruzs chest with the same
stone he usedto hit Robert dela Cruz in the face.

Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as the latter moved towards Robert
dela Cruz. Pedro pulledFelomina dela Cruzs hair, slashed her nape with the
samurai, and then kicked her to the ground.

Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and was prevented from helping the
dela Cruzes because Narciso Buni was aiming a bolo at him. The attackers left
when they were done, and only then was Eduardo Oyando able to approach the
victims and call for help.

Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the
hospital. They were treated for the injuries sustained from the attack.

After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz diedfrom his injuries. Before he died, Freddie
dela Cruz identified Pedro and Lando Quintos as his attackers.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented a different version of the events. In the afternoon of 15
January 2008, Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo
Oyando came to the Quintos house looking for trouble. Pedro, who was in the
front portion ofthe house, went out to try and pacify them. Robert dela Cruz
punched Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert dela Cruz then went to
Felomina dela Cruz and took a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter was holding.
Pedro and Robert dela Cruz grappled for the bolo. Felomina dela Cruz approached
the two and tried to help Robert dela Cruz, and in the process got slashed with the
bolo. The scuffle resulted in Robert dela Cruz falling to the ground and Pedro
gaining control of the bolo.

Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding a bolo, was fighting
with Lando. Pedro hurried over and hacked Freddie dela Cruz to defend his brother
Lando. According to Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not remember how
many times hehacked Freddie dela Cruz. His brothers pacified him, and Pedro
went with them back to the house; while Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all
surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution.
Petitioner was found guilty for the crime of homicide for the death of Freddie dela
Cruz. However, the trial court held that the uncertainty on the nature of the
wounds of Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz warrants the appreciation of a
lesser gravity of the crime from frustrated homicide to attempted homicide.9

The dispositive portion ofthe Joint Decision dated 20 October 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds:

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8340

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for Homicide is reclusion
temporalwhich is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken
from the penalty one (1) degree lower than the imposable penalty which is Prision
Mayorin its full extent, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years. Appreciating no mitigating circumstances in favor of the
accused, the accused is accordingly sentenced from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum.

Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie Dela Cruz, the amounts
of (a) Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as moral damages; (c)
Php 57,286.00 as actual damages; (d) and Php 15,000.00 as attorneys fees.

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8341

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an
indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day of arresto mayoras
minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccionalas maximum.

Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz actual damages in the
amount of Php 1,650.00and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8342

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an
indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day or arresto mayoras
minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccionalas maximum.

Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela Cruz actual damages in
the amount of Php 3,750.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.

In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo Quintos have undergone
preventive imprisonment,they shall be credited in the service of their sentences
with the time they have undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the
conditionsprovided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
alleging that the trial court gravely erred in convicting them despite the
prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of merit, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Joint Decision
dated October 20, 2010of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 39, inCriminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342 is AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.

SO ORDERED.11

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: (1) affirming the conviction, despite the
prosecutions failure to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2)
finding that conspiracy exists, in particular, that a finding of conspiracy should not
be leftto conjecture, in light of the alleged failure of the prosecution to present
evidence that petitioner took part in inflicting injuries on the victims in furtherance
ofa common design to kill.12

The Courts Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Review of Questionsof Fact Improper

The review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions

of law. This Court does not weigh all over again the evidence already consideredin
the proceedings below.13 The narrow ambit of review prescribed under this rule
allows us to swiftly dispose of such appeals. This rule, of course, admits of
exceptions applicable to those rare petitions whose peculiar factual milieu justifies
relaxation of the Rules such as based on speculation or conjectures, or overlooked
undisputed facts which, if duly considered, lead to a different conclusion.14
In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts, alleging that had the said courts given weight to the defense evidence,
conviction would not have been justified. This is clearly an invitation for the Court
to review the probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings below.

A question of law arises when there isdoubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.15 For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants.16 Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.17

Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts by alleging that the courts a quo
indulged in conjectures and surmises. However, a careful reading of the decisions
of the trial and appellate courts shows that such is not the case here. The
discussion of the trial court deals extensively with evidence from both sides,
weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the appellate court evaluated the evidenceof
the prosecution and the defense alike.

Uniform findings of factof the trial and appellate courts deserve grave respect, and
in the absence of any compelling reason to deviate therefrom, are final and
conclusive upon this Court. We thus proceed with our review without disturbing
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Petitioner avers that his conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. His argumentrevolves mainly on self-defense, defense of
relatives and absence of conspiracy.

We are not persuaded. The records of this case show that the prosecution
witnesses Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz positively
and consistently identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events. Their
testimonies are corroborated by the evidence presented by the doctors who
attended the hacking victims, as well as by the police officer who took the
statement ofFreddie dela Cruz before the latter died.

We must emphasize that the trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible.
The assessment ofthe trial court on this point is generally binding on this Court,
and noneof the exceptions to this rule are obtaining here. Further, the trial court
found that the prosecution witnesses did not have any motive to testify falsely
against the accused.

Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert dela Cruz and Freddie dela Cruz, and
hitting Felomina dela Cruz, invoking self-defense. Because of Pedros admissions,
he and his co-conspirators assumed the burden to establish such defense by
credible, clear and convincing evidence;

otherwise, the same admissions would lead to their conviction.18

We held in People v. Nugas:

x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by

independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength
of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the States evidence, because the
existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence ofthe crime, and
establishing selfdefense does not require orinvolve the negation of any of the
elements of the offense itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting
to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming self-
defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed
by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause
of the victims aggression.19

Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked Freddie in defense of
their brother Lando.20 The defense of relatives argument likewise fails in light of
the lack of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. For the accused to be
entitled to exoneration based on defense of relatives, complete or incomplete, it is
essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if there is
no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel.21

The discussion of the Court of Appeals on this point is well-taken:

We are hardly persuaded by accused-appellants allegations that they were acting

in self-defense because the victims were committing unlawful aggression. We
foundthe following loopholes:

First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela Cruzes were shouting for the
brothers of Pedro tocome out of the house. No actual sudden or imminent attack,
however, was performed. It has been ruled that mere intimidating or threatening
words, even if said aloud, do not constitute unlawful aggression. Thus, in People
vs. Cajurao, the Supreme Court held that:

There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless there is clear and

convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the partof the victim. The unlawful
aggression, a constitutive element of self-defense, must be real or at least
imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked
is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means
enough. Unlawful aggressionpresupposes an actual or imminent danger on the life
or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an[d] intimidating or threatening attitude of
the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to
an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly
imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a threatening stance or
posture.

Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were shouting for his brothers to
go out, but then, Pedro was the one who went out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes had
some anger or aggression at that time, it was definitely not directed at Pedro.

Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro and Robert dela Cruz
engaged in a fist fight. Robert turned and ran towards his mother, Felomina to
allegedly get a bolo which was in Felominas possession and concealed under a
towel. Ifthis is true, Robert had already retreated and was trying to arm himself to
level the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from Pedros narration, itcannot be
definitely said that the dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants
with the determined intention to inflict serious harm on Pedro.

Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to defend his brother Lando Quintos who
was lying on the ground and being attacked by the deceased Freddie dela Cruz.
According to him, he hacked Freddie before the latter could stab Lando. Pedro
would like to impress upon the court that Lando was also involved in the fight
against the dela Cruzes. However, in the same testimony, Pedro said that it was
he alone who was fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and that his brothers,
including Lando, were "just there, sir, pacifying."
Third, despite the alleged savagery that transpired, surprisingly, accused-
appellants did not report the incident to the police. During crossexamination,
Pedro admitted that:

Q: After you were threatened and you did not report of the alleged incident that
happened on January 15 as what you are telling now?

A: No sir.

Q: In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the hospital and you were
treated you did not even rel[a]y to the police or even to your barangay the alleged
incident which you are now narrating, am I correct?

A: I was not able to report anymore because after I was treated to the hospital I
was brought directly to the jail, sir.

It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We find it difficult to believe that accused-appellants, who
vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties, did not report the incident tothe
police. Pedros alleged treatment or confinement in the hospital did notprevent
them from doing so. Pedro had at least three brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando;
not to mention his mother and sister, who could have easily gone to the police to
report the alleged attack upon them by the delaCruzes. This omission, therefore,
casts doubt on the veracity of the account of the accused-appellants.

Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased and the other victims
negate[s] the accused-appellants claim of self-defense. According to the medical
certificate of Freddie dela Cruz, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest, septicemia
and multiple hacking wounds. Then, in the death certificate, it was further stated
that Freddie dela Cruz suffered "amputation of left and right hand." Meanwhile,
with respect to Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician, Dr. Saniata V.
Fernandez, testified that the victim suffered lacerated wounds on the forehead,
lower lip and left hand. As for Felomina dela Cruz, she also suffered almost similar
lacerated wounds.

It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the
victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a
determined effort to kill the victim[s]. In the case at bar, as already explained, the
wounds on Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, negate accused-
appellants claim of self-defense.

We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to the evidence presented by the

prosecution and this Court believes that the version of the latter is more credible
and consistent with the truth. As a matter of fact, by simply admitting that they
attacked Freddie dela Cruz and the two other victims, the case against the
accused-appellants had become irrefutable. x x x.22

Existence of Conspiracy

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not present evidence of his participation
in the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz. He also argues that his
mere presence during the said attacks does not by itself show concurrence of wills
and unity of purpose.

Petitioners presence during the commission of the crime was wellestablished as he

himself testified to that fact.1wphi1Assuming that he was merely present during
the attack, inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal
liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission
thereof.23

Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However, neither does it
indicate the lack thereof Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the
acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.24 In fact, the prosecution established
that petitioner was actively involved in the attack on Freddie dela Cruz.

In People v. De Leon,25 we held:.

x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the

execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the
exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve
their. common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or mo[r]ality of participation of each
of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and
Felomina dela Cruz disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the
commission of the felony. The facts, found by the trial and appellate
courts,.establish that petitioner, together with his brothers and Narciso Buni, all of
them armed, accosted the dela Cruzes, and gave chase even as the latter were
retreating towards their house. During the attacks, each conspirator had a
different task. After the attacks, all the accused left the felled dela Cruzes for
dead, clearly showing their united purpose in the felonies committed. The act of
one is the act of all. With the conspiracy proved, the conviction of petitioner was in
order.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 31 July 2012 and the Resolution dated 11 January 2013 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33776.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

G.R. No. 207818 July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALEX DE LOS SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

For review is the Decision1 dated September 17, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03790 which affirmed the Judgment2 dated January 7, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case
No. 1165-T, convicting Alex De Los Santos (accused-appellant) of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

The Facts
Accused-appellant was indicted for killing one Fernando A. Catriz (Catriz) through
an information articulating the following criminal charges, viz:

That on or about April 06, 2004, inthe Municipality of Tuao, Province of Cagayan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused ALEX De LOS
SANTOS y AGINAWAN armed with long bolo with intent to kill, with treachery and
treachery, (sic) did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and hack FERNANDO A[.] CATRIZ, inflicting upon him several hack wounds
on the different parts of his body which caused his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant entered a "not guilty" plea. Pre-trial and
trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution presented the testimonies of Reynaldo
Bayudan (Bayudan), the victims nephew and an eyewitness to the incident, and
Dr. Exuperio Yuaga (Dr. Yuaga), Municipal Health Officer of Tuao, Cagayan. The
prosecution also adopted the testimony of Eduardo Archibido which was presented
during the hearing on the petition for bail. Taken together with documentary
evidence marked as Exhibits A to E, the evidence for the prosecution showed that:

Catriz and the accused-appellant werebrothers-in-law. The formers wife was the
latters sister. At about 4:00 p.m. of April 6, 2004, Catriz and Bayudan were at
BarangayMungo, Tuao, Cagayan, unloading culled cob chickens from a Toyota
Tamaraw vehicle. While Bayudan and Catriz were transferring the chickens into a
cage beside the vehicle, the accused-appellant suddenly appeared behind Catriz
and hacked him on his right shoulder with a tabas(long-bladed bolo). The impact
from the blow caused the handle of the tabasto dislodge thus enabling Catriz to
run towards the nearest house. The accused-appellant, however, drew a "Rambo-
type" knife, pursued Catriz and repeatedly stabbed him until he fell. Pleading for
his life, Catriz kneeled infront of the accused-appellant and asked him to stop. His
pleas were not heeded though and the accused-appellant continued stabbing him
until he fell again on the ground. Upon seeing the lifeless Catriz, the accused-
appellant jumped and exclaimed: "Happy New Year, natayen ni Ferdie!" (Happy
New Year, Ferdie is dead!). The accused-appellant thereafter went to a nearby
pump well and nonchalantly washed his hands.4 Meanwhile, Bayudan ran towards
a nearby house for fear of his life.5

Dr. Yuaga testified that based on his post-mortem examination of the cadaver,
Catriz sustained 11 stab wounds, four (4) of which were in the mid extremity of
the heart area that could cause instantaneous death while two (2) were located at
the back portion ofhis body. Catriz also sustained one (1) incised wound on the left
scapula. His cause of death was "hypovolemic shock, secondary to multiple stab
wounds."6

The witnesses for the defense werethe accused-appellant himself and his uncle,
Joseph Aginawang (Aginawang). According to them, on the night of April 4, 2004,
they had a drinking spree with Catriz. After consuming two bottles of gin, Catriz
asked the accused-appellant if he can till the family lot in Bagumbayan, Tuao,
Cagayan. When the accused-appellant answered that he cannot decide on the
matter since the land is family-owned, Catriz suddenly stood up and slapped the
accused-appellants face.

The accused-appellant did not takeoffense and simply left, while Catriz summoned
his wife and children, and headed home.1wphi1 Catriz, however, returned
between 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. looking for the accused-appellant but didnt find him.
Catriz was again unable to find the accused-appellant when he returned the next
day.

On April 6, 2004, at about 4:00 p.m., the accused-appellant saw Catriz unloading
chickens. He approached him and offered help, but Catriz pushed him away
causing the accused-appellant tostumble down. Catriz then tried to hack the
accused-appellant twice with a bolobut the latter was able to dodge the attacks.
On Catrizs third attempt, the accused-appellant got hold of a knife from the wall
of a nearby house and defended himself by plunging the same on Catriz. When
Catriz again attempted to hack the accused-appellant, the latter shoved the knife
against him once more. The accused-appellant failed to recall how many times he
stabbed Catriz because he got dizzy and lost touch with his senses.

Dazed with what he has just witnessed, Aginawang ran to the back of a house
towards a creek. The accused-appellant, on the other hand, proceeded towards
the road where he met one Abe Ballesil who accompanied him, upon his request,
to the police station to surrender.7

Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision8 dated January 7, 2008, the RTC sustained the testimony of
prosecution witness Bayudan, as corroborated by Dr. Yuagas post-mortem
examination, that the accused-appellant struck a hacking blow on Catriz from
behind. Treachery was also found to have attended the killing because while Catriz
was on a kneeling position begging for his life, the accused-appellant continued to
stabhim. At that moment, Catriz was totally helpless while the accused-appellant
was in no danger from any retaliation.

The accused-appellants allegation of self-defense was rejected because: (1) he

failed to claim it atthe earliest opportunity when he surrendered to the police
station; (2) the number and seriousness of the wounds he inflicted on Catriz
showed a determined effort on his part to kill the victim; and (3) he failed to
surrender the weapon to the police and he instead threw it away. Accordingly,the
RTC ruling was disposed as follows, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
herein accused ALEX DE LOS SA[N]TOS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and hereby sentencing him:

1. To suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua;

2. To pay civil indemnity/damages to the heirs of the victim Fernando

Catriz[;]

2.1 The amount of [P]50,000.00 as death indemnity;

2.2 The amount of [P]25,000.00 as moral damages;

2.3 The amount of [P]20,000.00 as nominal damages in lieu of actual

damages; and

2.4 The amount of [P]25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the conviction and penalty meted upon the accused-appellant
adding that "the attitude and behavior of Catriz at that time certainly did not
constitute the unlawful aggression which the law requires." The CA further found
the defense version of the events unbelievable because the accused-appellants
claim that he was at a disadvantageous position from Catrizs relentless assault is
belied by the fact that the former was actually unscathed.The presence of a knife
which the accused-appellant picked up to repel Catrizs alleged attack was likewise
held highly specious since it seems tosuggest that knives are scattered around the
walls of houses in Mungo, Tuao, Cagayan. Thus, the CA ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by

us DENYING the appeal filed in this case. The Decision dated January 7, 2008
rendered by Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court in Tuao, Cagayan in Criminal
Case No. 1165-T is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.10

The accused-appellant is now before the Court pleading for his acquittal based on
the same and sole argument11raised in his Appellants Brief12 before the CA that
the trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to his claim of self-defense.

Ruling of the Court

The Court affirms the accused-appellants conviction. It is immediately apparent

thatthe argument proffered by the accused-appellant essentially assails the
evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness,
Bayudan, and its ruling that the same satisfactorily repudiatedhis claim of self-
defense.

Basic is the rule that the matter ofassigning values to declarations on the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by
the various indiciaavailable but not reflected on the record. Hence, the corollary
principle that absent any showing that the trial court overlooked substantial facts
and circumstances that would affect the final disposition of the case, appellate
courts are bound to give due deference and respect to its evaluation of the
credibility of an eyewitness and his testimony as well as its probative value amidst
the rest of the other evidence on record.13

The Court sees no compelling reason to depart from the foregoing tenets
especially considering the accused-appellants failure to pinpoint significant details,
which if considered, will alter the outcome of the trial courts judgment and the
affirmation accorded it by the CA.

Even an assiduous examination ofthe records of the case yields a similar finding:
the factual basis of accused-appellants plea of self-defense cannot relieve him
fromcriminal liability. Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that
he was in fact innocent. However, if the accused admits killing the victim, but
pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense
by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal
aggression on his part.14 Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance
implies the admission by the accused that he committed the criminal act.15 Thus,
to escape criminal liability, the accused must prove by clear and convincing
evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second paragraph
of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.16

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance ofself-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked.17 "There is an
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent
danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be
actual physical force or actual use of a weapon."18 "It is present only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life."19

Here, the accused-appellant failed toprove that unlawful aggression was initiated
by Catriz.1wphi1 The physical evidence of Catrizs incised wound on the left
scapula belies the version ofevents adduced by the defense and is more consistent
with the narration of the prosecutions eyewitness Bayudan that the initial blow
came from the accused-appellant who suddenly emerged behind Catriz and hacked
him. The testimony of expert witness Dr. Yuaga further confirmed that such
incised wound could have been inflicted from behind.

The accused-appellantsclaim that Catriz boxed him first and then tried to hack
him with a bolois grounded on contradictory, hence, unreliable testimonies.
According to defense witness Aginawang, he saw Catriz push and then box the
accused-appellant. It is noticeable, however, from the accused-appellants own
narration that the detail relating to the punching is absent. Also, Aginawang
admitted oncross-examination that it was the accused-appellant who delivered the
first aggression by stabbing Catriz.20

Further, the Court agrees with the CAs observation that the presence of a knife in
the wall of the nearby house was highly dubious. The immediate availability of a
knife within the accused-appellants convenient reach in a public place at the exact
moment that he was allegedly being hacked by Catriz is too inconceivable to
warrant trustworthiness. The sequence of the narration of eyewitness Bayudan is
more rational and thus in accord with the spontaneity of a truthful account that
all the while, the accused-appellant had the knife in his possession and he used it
to continue stabbing Catriz when the first weapon he used dislodged from its
handle.

Further, the location, the number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on Catriz
indicate a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend. Based on Dr. Yuagas
post-mortem examination, 4 of the 11 stab wounds inflicted on Catriz were in the
mid extremity of the heart area sufficient to cause instantaneous death. True
enough, Catriz died of "hypovolemic shock, secondary to multiple stab wounds." It
has been repeatedly ruled that the nature, number and location of the wounds
sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense.21

In fine, the courts a quo were correct in finding that the accused-appellant failed
to discharge his burden of proving the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

The Court also upholds the findings of the courts a quo that the killing of Catriz by
the accused-appellant was attended with treachery.

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specifically to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. To establish treachery,
two elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in
a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means of attack employed."22

"The essence of treachery lies inthe attack that comes without warning, and the
attack is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its
accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the
attack madeit impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate."23
It is evident in this case that, astestified by eyewitness Bayudan, the accused-
appellant attacked Catriz whenthe latter was defenseless and unable to retaliate.
The accused-appellantcommenced his attack from behind Catriz and when the
latter eventually fell down to his knees begging for his life, the accused-appellant
continued stabbing him. Clearly, the accused-appellant took advantage of the
vulnerable position of Catriz to ensure the successful execution of the offense
without risk, and deny the victim the opportunity to defend himself.

Treachery qualifies the killing to murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty
for murder is reclusion perpetuato death. The two penalties being both indivisible
and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance to consider, the lesser
of the two penalties which is reclusion perpetuashould be imposed pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 63 of the RPC.24 Hence, the courts a quo correctly
sentenced the accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua.

The accused-appellant shall not beeligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of

Republic Act No. 9346 which states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."25

The award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages were
correct. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim
and the culpability of the accused for such death.26 Despite the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional suffering, the
award of moral damages is also proper in view of the recognized fact that death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of
the victims family.27 The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to exemplary
damages since the killing was attended by treachery.28

However, in conformity with current jurisprudence, the amounts granted by the

courts a quoshall be increased to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity, P75,000.00 for
moral damages, and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages.29

The award of nominal damages mustbe deleted and replaced with temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00.30 Nominal damages are proper when there
is no proof of actual damages; and when it is granted, it is as if there was in fact
no damage at all.31 Temperate damages, on the other hand, are awarded when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot
be proved with certainty.32 There is no doubt that pecuniary expenses were
incurred in the funeral and burial of Catriz and the award of temperate damages
shall answer for the same.33

Lastly, all the monetary awards shall earn an interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annumfrom the date of finality of this Resolution until fully
paid.34

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 17, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03790 finding accused-appellant Alex De
Los Santos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is
herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Alex De Los Santos is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility for parole
and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Fernando Catriz, the amounts
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the
rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.

The accused-appellant shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice