Case Digest for Consti II

GR No. 108461 October 21, 1996

PITC vs Angles

Facts: This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking the decision of Hon. Zosimo Z. Angles of
RTC Makati, upholding the Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Private
respondent Remington and intervenor, Firestone, as well as declaring null and
void the assailed A.O. No. 89-08-01 of PITC.

Private Respondent Remington and Intervenor Firestone are both domestic

corporations. Both are granted authority to import products after satisfying the the
requirement for importers Remington for machineries and Firestone for Calcine
Vauxite, used on making bricks. Subsequently, they were barred from importing
goods to China by PITC for non-compliance on submission of export credits
equivalent to the value of their importations.

It was also argued that PITC has no regulatory authority since LOI 144 of
President Marcos directing that all trade direct or indirect must be regulated by
PITC, was repealed by EO No. 133, reorganizing and empowering DTI as the
primary regulatory arm of government in trade and industry.

Issue: Whether or not PITCs AO No. 89-08-01 is valid.

Held: (1) It was first ruled the PITC is empowered to issue such order. Although by the
virtue of EO No. 133 PITC is now limited to new or non-traditional products and
markets not normally pursued by private business sectors, there is no indication
in the EO of the removal of the regulatory power of PITC in the area of
imporatations from SOCPEC (Socialist and other Centrally Planned Economy
Countries) countries. EO. No. 133 is silent as to the limitation or abolition of such
powers. The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral part to the said
department as one of its line agencies,and was given the focal task of implementing the
departments programs.

(2) AO is invalid due to the non-compliance to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.
AO is issued on August 30, 1989 but it was not published. The case of Tanada
vs Tuvera was cited: ...Admin rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to valid
delegation and if it is punitive in character.
G.R. No. L-11390 March 261918 Banco Espanol vs Palanca

Facts: Engracio Palanca Tangquinyeng y Limquingco mortgage various property with El

Banco Espanol-Filipino on June 16, 1960 as security for the debt he owes to the
bank amounting to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest rate of 8 percent per
annum. After the instrument was executed, he went back to Amoy, China and
died there.

On March 31,1908, El Banco instituted to foreclose various properties in the City

of Manila owned by Palanca. In pursuant to the foreclosure proceeding found in
Section 399 of the Code of procedure, a publication was made in the form of
newspaper in the City of Manila representing as notification for the foreclosure.
Also from an order of the court, a stamped envelope of the summons and
complaints must be sent to his last residence Amoy, China.

Defendant did not appear so a judgment was given against him through default
on July 02, 1908 and a final decision was rendered on July 03, 1908. On July 08,
the court ordered for the sale of the property, which took place on July 30 and the
property was sold to the bank as the highest bidder. The selling price amounted
to P110,200 and the sale was confirmed by the Court on August 07.

Seven years after, on June 25, 1915 Vicente Palanca filed a case for the reversal
of the decision made.

Issue: Whether or not due process of law was observed.

Held: The requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are
present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the
subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

If the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for,
it is rather from tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the
opportunity for a hearing shall not be lost to them. This mode of notification does
not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive
actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to
his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very
slight. Furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice
does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every
event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. Whether
 the clerk has failed to mail the notice is not denial of due process but a mere
irregularity. Notice given through publication is what the law unconditionally
requires and was sustained in this case.

AM No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994 State Prosecutor vs Muro

Facts: On August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Muro was charged by the State
Prosecutors with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules
2.01,3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The complaint was due to
the order issued by Muro dismissing 11 cases against Mrs. Imelda Marcos for
violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions. Judge Muro issued his
order on the basis of two newspaper reports containing the announcement of
Pres. Marcos on the lifiting by the govt. of all foreign restrictions and that such
reports had already repealed C.B. Circular No. 960. Muro contends that the
announcement made by the President has made such facts a public knowledge
and sufficient for him to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.

It was contended that Muro erred in taking judicial notice on matters based
merely on newspaper publication and it constitutes to inexcusable ignorance of
the law no to accord due process to prosecutors and dismissing the case without
hearing the prosecutors.

Issue: |whether or not Muro committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice
on the statement of the President which is published in newspaper as basis for
dismissing the case.

Held: The Court finds Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law and dismissed from
service. It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the
publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the Presidents
announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is absolute
and without qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes a
public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a
mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a
newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. The Presidents statement in
the newspaper is not proper take for him to use judicial notice for it is merely a
personal knowledge and not public, which requisites for judicial notice are:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court
GR No. 121234 August 23, 1995

Webb vs De Leon

Facts: On June 19, 1994, NBI filed with the DOJ letter complaint charging the petitioner
and six other of rape with homicide of Carmela Vizconde and homicide for her
mother and younger sister last June 30, 1991. DOJ formed a panel of prosecutor
for the preliminary investigation of the case.

During prelim NBI presented sworn statements and other evidences. The alibi of
Webb is that he is in America from March 09, 1991 to October 22, 1992. Webb
also filed with DOJ panel a motion for production and examinatyion of evidence
and documents which DOJ agreed. On Augut 1995, DOJ panel issued a
resolution finding a probable cause to the case. Judge De Leon partner of Judge
Escano issued a warrant of arrest. The case was re-raffled to branch 274 of RTC
Paranaque which Judge Tolentino was the one to issue warrant of arrest.

Issue: Whether or not DOJ denied them their constitutional right to due process during
the preliminary investigation.

Held: In arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed
and that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without
any showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that
person's control. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply
provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused. That before issuing warrants of arrest,
judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination
of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence. Notwithstanding the fact that alibi cannot outweigh evidence submitted
by a prosecution witness. The warrant of arrest was rightfully given.

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940 Ang Tibay vs CIR

Facts: Teodoro Turibio is the owner of Ang Tibay which is a a company engaged in
leather production. On September 26, 1938, he temporarily laid off the member
of National Labor Union, Inc. Herein private respondent. NLU contended that
 member of National Workers Brotherhood were not laid off which NWb
dominated Ang Tibay.

In the CIR, Toribio and NWB won thus NLU moved for a motion for
reconsideration which CIR approved. Now, Ang Tibay and NWB is opposing the
motion for new trial of NLU.

Issue: whether or not NLU is entitled for a new trial.

Held: Cir is a special court created by Commonwealth Act No. 103, though it is more
on administrative body and not integrated part of the judicial system. The power
of CIR is passive, and can act only to cases where its jurisdiction is invoked and
deciding only to cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant function of
CIR. It exercises quasi-judicial function in determination of disputes between
employer and employees and has jurisdiction over the entire Phil on matter
related to such controversies. Nonetheless, CIR cannot entirely ignore the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials like 1. Right to a
hearing which includes right to present his own case and submit evidence 2. The
tribunal must consider the evidence presented 3. Decide, if necessary 4.
Substantial evidence for the conclusion 5. Decision must be based on the
evidence presented 6. Admin. Body or its judge must act on his independent
consideration and not from the views of his subordinate 7. Render decision.

Therefore, with the SC finding the evidences made available to NLU which on
their first trial was not available is granted with new trial.

G.R. No. 76353 May 2 1988 Alcuaz vs PSBA

Facts: Petitioners are all bonafide students of PSBA herein referred to as the
Respondent which is a non-stock institution for higher learning. There has been
an agreement between the school and students on certain matters that would
govwern their activities which was executed on March 22, 1986.
However, the students demanded for a new agreement which the school did not
responded to and resulted to mass ASSEMBLIES AND BARRICADES AT THE
SCHOOL ENTRANCE. On Oct. 08, 1896, petitioners received a letter to explain
by the respondent which they answered through their legal counsel. Meantime,
some of the teachers filed a motion to intervene which was granted. Then the
petitioners were not allowed to re-enroll. On Nove. 12, 1986, the Court resolved
to issue a temporary mandatory order and respondent must allow to re-enroll the
petitioner and re-admit the intervenors. Upon which, the respondent requested
 for investigation which resulted to some students are not allowed to re-enroll and
some teachers were not re-admitted.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitutional rights of expression
and assembly and of due process of law of the students who have been barred
from re-enrollment.

Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. It is beyond dispute that a student
once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. Likewise, it
is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college
teachers are for 'one semester." For it is a time-honored principle. The contract
having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot
be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers.
More so, Accordingly, both students and teachers were given three (3) days from
receipts of letter to explain in writing why the school should not take / mete out
any administrative sanction to which records show however that a letter was sent
by Atty. Alan Rollo Yap, in behalf of all PSBA students. investigating committee
found among others that: there were concerted mass assemblies conducted on
October 2, 3, 7 and 8 at PSBA Quezon City, which were participated in by said
students and teachers, and which disrupted classes. The disruption of classes
and the barricades in the school entrances constitute violations of existing MECS
and PSBA rules and regulations.

G.R. No. 81798 December 29, 1989 Lao Gi vs CID

Facts: On September 03, 1958, Sec of Justice renedered Opinion No. 191, Series of
1958 finding Filomeno Chia Jr alias Sia Peing Hui to be Filipino citizen because
of his parents Filomeno Chia Sr or Lao Gi and Maria Layug. However, on Oct.
03, 1980, Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147 Series of 1980 cancelling
Opinion 191 on the ground that it is founded on fraud and misrepresentation. On
March 09, 1981, a charge for deportation was filed with CID against lao gi and
fam. (wife Ong UE, Filomeno Jr., Manuel, Rosita Vicenta anf Dominga Chia.
On Sept. 23, 1982, the CID set the deportation case for hearing and acting
Commissioner Victor G. Nituda gave respondents to move for recon which they
filed a motion but was denied and they were directed to register as aliens.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner were denied by due process in the deportation
proceeding.
Held: The petition is granted. CID has the authority and jurisdiction to hear and
determine the deportation case against petitioners and in the process determine
also the question of citizenship raised by the petitioners. In pursuant to Section
37 (a) (1) of the Immigration Act, before any alien may be deported upon a
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration, there should be a prior
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground as
charged against the alien.In this case it appears that petitioners are charged with
having entered the Philippines by means of false and misleading statements or
without inspection or admission by the immigration authorities at a designated
port of entry.

In a deportation proceeding, although it does not partake a nature of a criminal

action, criminal procedure is applicable because of the consideration of the harsh
and extraordinary administrative proceeding that it constitutes which affect the
constitutional right of a person. Thus, there should be a previous determination
by the CID that they are aliens before the petitioners may be directed and
required to register as aliens and the charge against aliens must specify the acts
and omissions complained. The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It
is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. 1It is a police measure
against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious
to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.

G.R. No. 84818 Decemver 18, 1989, Philcomsat vs Alcuaz

Facts: This is a petition to seek annulment and set aside of the Order by NTC
Commissioner Jose Alcuaz dated Sept. 02, 1988 which directs Philcomsat of a
provisional reduction of the rates in in services to 15% as inhibited in E.O. 546 of
NTC.

BGy virtue of R.A. No. 5514, Philcomsat was granted a franchise to establish,
operate in the Phil., station/s and associated equipments for intl satellite
communications. In pursuant to Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 5514, petitioner is exempt
from the jurisdiction of Public Service Commission, now NTC but by virtue of
E.O. No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the
jurisdiction of respondent.

Issue: Whether or not E.O. No 546 violated procedural due process for having been
issued order on rates without prior notice or hearing.
Held: Delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that
some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a
rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in
the manner prescribed by the legislature and absence of a fixed standard, the
delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. Nonetheless, Pursuant to
Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among
others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public
service communications which exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the
requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and
reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid
delegation of legislative power.

However, it does violates procedural due process. Based on facts presented the
merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation
of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an
explanation and petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its
questioned order. respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of
notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Furthermore,
it mus be in pursuant to Section 16 of Public Service Act, thus, respondent has
no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether
the order be temporary or permanent.

G.R. No. 76118 March 30, 1993 CB and Ramon V. Tiaoqui vs CA and Triumph Savings
Bank

Facts: Based on examination reports submitted by the Supervision and Examination

Sector (SES), Department II, of the Central Bank (CB) "that the financial
condition of TSB is one of insolvency and its continuance in business would
involve probable loss to its depositors and creditors," 3 the Monetary Board (MB)
of CB issued on 31 May 1985 Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure of TSB,
forbidding it from doing business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership,
and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. Tiaoqui assumed office on 3 June
1985. On 11 June 1985, TSB filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, , against Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB
Resolution No. 596, with prayer for injunction, challenging in the process the
constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, otherwise known as "The Central Bank
Act," as amended, insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank to take over a
banking institution even if it is not charged with violation of any law or regulation
Issue: Whether or not CA absence of prior notice and hearing may be considered acts
of arbitrariness and bad faith sufficient to annul a Monetary Board resolution

Held: Under Sec. 29 of R.A. 265, 15 the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, is
vested with exclusive authority to assess, evaluate and determine the condition
of any bank , and finding such condition to be one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or
creditors, forbid the bank or non-bank financial institution to do business in the
Philippines; and shall designate an official of the CB or other competent person
as receiver. Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a bank
may be directed to stop operations. Sec. 29 nor does the constitutional
requirement of due process demand that the correctness of the Monetary Board's
resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation be first adjudged before
making the resolution effective. It is enough that a subsequent judicial review be
provided. This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and
legal considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank's assets and
as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors,
stockholders and the general public. Thus petition is hereby granted.

G.R. No. 151378 March 28, 2005 Jaka Food Proessing Corp. vs Darwin Pacot et al

Facts: Respondents Darwin Pacot, Robert Parohinog, David Bisnar, Marlon Domingo,
Rhoel Lescano and Jonathan Cagabcab were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA
Foods Processing Corporation (JAKA, for short) until the latter terminated their
employment on August 29, 1997 because the corporation was in dire financial
straits. However, written notice upon the employees and the Department of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date of termination
was not complied in by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal is valid without the employers compliance with the
notice requirement under the Labor Code.

Held: The dismissal is herein upheld but the petitioner shall pay P50k for each
respondent. Where the dismissal is for a just cause the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. A
dismissal for just cause under Article 282 implies that the employee concerned
has committed, or is guilty of, some violation against the employer, i.e. the
employee has committed some serious misconduct, is guilty of some fraud
against the employer, or neglected his duties. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. While a dismissal
for an authorized cause under Article 283 does not necessarily imply
delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee, instead, the dismissal
 process is initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative.
that in the first, payment of separation pay, as a rule, is not required, while in the
second, the law requires payment of separation pay.
There was ground for respondents dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one of
the authorized causes enumerated under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to comply with the notice requirement
under the same Article.

G.R. No. 111953 Dec. 12,1997 Corona vs UHPAP