G.R. No.

L-2935 March 23, 1909

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.

Bishop and O'Brien for appellant.

Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905. The defendant
appealed. On the 12th day of October, 1905, the appellant filed his printed bill of exceptions with
the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 5th day of December, 1905, the appellant filed his brief
with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 19th day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General
filed his brief in said cause. Nothing further was done in said cause until on or about the 30th day
of January, 1909, when the respective parties were requested by this court to prosecute the
appeal under the penalty of having the same dismissed for failure so to do; whereupon the
appellant, by petition, had the caused placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d
day of February, 1909.

The facts from the record appear to be as follows:

First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois,
in the United States, the defendant, through a respective of the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for a period of two years with the plaintiff, by which
the defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of
the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in
traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of
travel.

Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of
the defendant, he should become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the
Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and one-half
salary paid during such period.

Third. The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th day of April,
1903, and was paid half-salary from that date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the
Philippine Islands.

Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and
refused to make further compliance with the terms of the contract.

Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila to recover from the defendant the sum of 269.23 dollars, which
amount the plaintiff claimed had been paid to the defendant as expenses incurred in traveling
from Chicago to Manila, and as half salary for the period consumed in travel.

Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224
should constitute a part of said contract.

To the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general denial and a special defense,
alleging in his special defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws
No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that he was a
minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law.

To the special defense of the defendant the plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer the court
sustained.

Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause, the lower court rendered a judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for
the sum of 265.90 dollars. The lower court found that at the time the defendant quit the service of
the plaintiff there was due him from the said plaintiff the sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance
due the plaintiff in the sum of 265.90 dollars. From this judgment the defendant appealed and
made the following assignments of error:

1. The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's special defenses.

2. The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendant on the facts.

With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact that the
legislative department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No.
80 and No. 224 by the Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms
of the contract made between the plaintiff and the defendant. The legislative department of the
Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or
changing the terms of the contract. The right which the defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts
No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been
amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said
contract and were enforceable in favor of the defendant.

The defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could
not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into
in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to
contract. The plaintiff [the defendant] claims that, by reason of the fact that, under the laws of the
Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, male persons in said Islands did not reach
their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract,
contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It is not disputed upon the
contrary the fact is admitted that at the time and place of the making of the contract in
question the defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than
that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined
by the law of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S.,
406.) Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
(Idem.)

The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he
arrived at Manila; that he was an adult at the time he made the contract but was a minor at the
time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later, is not tenable.

Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are, therefore:

First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way affected the terms of the
contract in question; and

Second. The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and
time the contract was made, he can not plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract
is being enforced.

We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment of error.

For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor
in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items
have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second
wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In
the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last
Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of
the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court,
on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In
the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if
Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the
law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore
not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the
old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision,
under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of
the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo,
50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void,
for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article
16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1
He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of
the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of
partition; to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred
in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his
sisters but this Court resolved to deny the motion.
2
San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
3
Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.