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ELECTION LAW
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ELECTION LAW
From the evidence adduced, it was found out that Case No. 08
citizenship requirements were not possessed by the Aquino v. COMELEC
petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
running as mayor and, although elected, is not now
qualified to serve as such. Respondent now contend FACTS: Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of
that he should be given the position a he has garnered Candidacy for the position of Representative for the
the second highest vote for said position. new Second Legislative District of Makati City stating
that he was a resident of the aforementioned district
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent, having for 10 months. Thereafter, a petition for disqualification
garnered the 2nd highest number of votes, can replace was filed against him causing him to amend the entry
the petitioner as mayor. regarding his residency, changing it to 1 year and 13
HELD: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the
the second highest number of votes in the election, he petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the
was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio election of 8 May. Aquino won in the said election.
City. The fact that the candidate who obtained the Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above
highest number of votes is later declared to be dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
obtained the second highest number of votes to be Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
declared the winner of the elective office. disqualified for the elective office for lack of
constitutional qualification of residence. Hence, the
Case No. 07 petition before the Supreme Court.
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995 ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is eligible to run
for the position he seeks.
FACTS: Filing a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, HELD: No. Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos provided in the previous (1992) election indicates that he was a
required information that she is a resident for seven resident and a registered voter of San Jose,
months in the constituency where she seeks to be Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that
elected immediately preceding the election. election. Aquinos connection to the Second District
Thereafter, private respondent Montejo filed a Petition of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
for Cancellation and Disqualification, contending that condominium unit in the area. The intention not to
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement establish permanent home in Makati City is evident in
for residency (must have been a resident for not less his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
than one year). Petitioner thus amended her COC, The short length of time he claims to be a resident of
changing seven months to since childhood which Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and
was refused for reason that it was filed out of time. his claims of other residences in Metro Manila)
Hence, petitioner filed her amended COC with indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his
COMELEC in division. physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence
or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the
of the Constitution. Commission on Elections.
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convicted certainly involves moral turpitude drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
Furthermore, petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of stop payment. The presence of the second element
the Local Government Code does not apply to his case manifests moral turpitude. A conviction for violation of
inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on B.P Blg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to
December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of and affects the good moral character of a person."
the judgment of conviction and all other legal
consequences flowing therefrom, rendered Case No. 11
inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. Moreno v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves FACTS: Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno
moral turpitude. from running for an elective position on the ground that
2. Whether or not the grant of probation affects the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime
Section 40 (a)'s applicability. of Arbitrary Detention. Moreno filed an answer averring
that the petition states no cause of action because he
HELD: was already granted probation also arguing that under
1. Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2 of P.D. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law),
1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) is the act of any the final discharge of the probation shall operate to
person who, with intent to gain for himself or restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall for any fine imposed. Moreno argues that the
buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any disqualification under Sec. 40 (a) of the Local
article, item, object or anything of value which Government Code (LGC) applies only to those who
he knows, or should be known to him, to have have served their sentence and not to probationers
been deprived from the proceeds of the crime because the latter do not serve the adjudged
of robbery or theft." Moral turpitude is sentence.
deducible from the third element.
2. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be
the execution of the sentence. Petitioner's disqualified because he did not serve the adjudged
conviction of fencing which we have sentence having been granted probation and finally
heretofore declared as a crime of moral discharged by the trial court.
turpitude and thus falling squarely under the
disqualification found in Section 40 (a), HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that an order
subsists and remains totally unaffected placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but
notwithstanding the grant of probation. is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. The grant of probation to petitioner
Case No. 10 suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
Villaber v. Commission on Elections imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001 suspension from public office. During the period of
probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
FACTS: During an election, Petitioner Villaber and running for a public office because the accessory
respondent Cagas were rival candidates for a penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold
congressional seat. Cagas filed a petition to disqualify for the duration of the probation. During the period of
Villaber and to cancel the latter's certificate of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty
candidacy for the reason that Villaber was convicted imposed upon him by the court but is merely required
by the Regional Trial Court for violation of Batas to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the
Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one probation order.
(1) year imprisonment. Under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, he was disqualified to run for Case No. 12
any public office. Villaber countered mainly that his Grego v. COMELEC
conviction has not become final and executory and that G. R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997
it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral FACTS: Before the subject election, Basco was
turpitude. removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a
finding of serious misconduct in an administrative
ISSUE: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 complaint. Thereafter, he ran as a candidate for
involves moral turpitude. Councilor position three consecutive term. It was this
latest re-election which is the subject of the present
HELD: Yes. The elements of the offense under petition on the ground that he is disqualified under
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are: 1. The accused makes, Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under said section,
draws or issues any check to apply to account or for those removed from office as a result of an
value; 2. The accused knows at the time of the administrative case are disqualified to run for any
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds elective local position. However, the respondent
in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief
the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The because Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank may not be validly applied to persons who were
for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make
been dishonored for the same reason had not the
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it retroactive legislation which would impair vested but of the United States which was granted causing the
rights. cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 40(b) of the Local under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, persons
Government Code of 1991 apply retroactively to those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for
removed from office before it took effect on January 1, any elective position.
1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is qualified
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that its refusal to to hold office as Vice-Mayor on the grounds that he has
give retroactive application to the provision of Section dual citizenship.
40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no
compelling reason for the Court to depart therefrom. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that dual
That the provision of the Code in question does not citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
qualify the date of a candidates removal from office arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
the Court from applying the law prospectively. A simultaneously considered a national by the said
statute, despite the generality in its language, must not states. On the other hand, the latter is a situation
be so construed as to overreach acts, events or where a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or
matters which transpired before its passage. more states. By filing a certificate of candidacy when
he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Case No. 13 Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
Reyes v. COMELEC American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of
G.R. No. 120905, 120940, March 7, 1996 candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
FACTS: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the might have as a dual citizen.
incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong
when an administrative complaint was filed against Case No. 15
him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Lopez v. COMELEC
Ernesto Manalo. A temporary restraining order was G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008
issued by the trial court on February 7, 1995, upon
request by the petitioner, enjoining FACTS: Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay
the case. As a result, the decision of Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo. Days before the election,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition for the
served upon Reyes. After expiration of the temporary disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an
restraining order, an attempt was made to serve the American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any
decision upon petitioners counsel in Manila but it was public office. Petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen,
futile. Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue
certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as
Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong. On March 24, the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
1995, private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as 2003. He returned to the Philippines and resided in
registered voter of Bongabong, sought the Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all
disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor. the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After
the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed,
ISSUE: Whether or not Reyes is disqualified for the petitioner emerged as the winner. On February 6,
position he seeks to be elected. 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution
granting the petition for disqualification, stating that
HELD: Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an petitioner was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship
action to question the decision in the administrative in the manner provided by law. According to the poll
case, the temporary restraining order issued in the body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the
action he brought lapsed, with the result that the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and
decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed This, petitioner failed to do. His motion for
to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of resorted to the present petition, imputing grave abuse
the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for
running for reelection. disqualifying him from running and assuming the office
of Barangay Chairman.
Case No. 14
Mercado v. Manzano ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a certificate of
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999 candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship.
FACTS: Petitioner Mercado and private respondent
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that petitioner
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought
proclamation of private respondent was suspended in American citizenship and renounced his Filipino
view of a pending petition for disqualification alleging citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-
that that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines acquiring Filipino citizenship. More importantly, the
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