REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES

7TH JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 123, CEBU CITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiffs
Criminal Case No. 14344
---versus--- For: Violation of RA 6713

JOB HUTT
Accused

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OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO QUASH

The People of the Philippines, most humbly and respectfully, file this
Opposition to Motion to Quash for Information filed on March 2, 2016, before this
Honorable Court and states that:

The concept of speedy disposition of cases, like speedy trial, is a relative

term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.1 A mere mathematical reckoning of
the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.2 Moreover, the right to a speedy trial as any
other right conferred by the Constitution or statute, except when otherwise expressly
so provided by law, may be waived. It must therefore be asserted. Thus, if there was
a delay in the trial of the case, petitioner is not entirely without blame.3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mayor Job Hutt was first elected as mayor in Municipality X in 2007. After
serving three terms as Mayor, he is now retired as a private citizen. However, he still
has a pending Ombudsman case. A concerned citizen filed a complaint before the
Ombudsman in 2010 against the mayor for non-filing of his SALN in the years 2009
and 2010.

1 Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987)

2 Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, [June 29, 2001], 412 PHIL 921-933
3
Sumbang, Jr. v. Gen. Court Martial PRO-Region 6, G.R. No. 140188, [August 3, 2000], 391 PHIL 929-940)

1
 After conducting the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman-Visayas graft
prosecutor issued a resolution in 2011 charging Mayor Job Hutt with violation of
Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of RA 6713 for non-filing of his SALN.
Mayor Job Hutt then, through his former counsel, filed a motion for
reconsideration to the Ombudsman-Visayas resolution. Thereafter, Mayor Job Hutts
motion for reconsideration was eventually denied, after review and approval by the
Ombudsman Central Office, only last year, 2016.
January of 2017, Mayor Hutt has already been arraigned at one of the courts
here in Cebu City. In addition, his case is now at the stage of presentation of second
witness for the prosecution.
On 6 March 2016, the new counsel of accused Job Hutt filed a Motion to Quash
seeking the dismissal of the case on the ground of violation of Job Hutts right to
speedy disposition of cases during the preliminary investigation before the
Ombudsman.

ISSUES
1) Whether a delay of six years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the
Ombudsman violated Mayor Job Hutts right to speedy disposition of cases
2) Whether the denial of speedy disposition of cases a ground for filing a Motion to
Quash
ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

Under the 1987 Constitution, the right of every person for the speedy
disposition of cases is guaranteed. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
states that:
Sec. 16
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies4
However, the concept of speedy disposition of cases, like speedy trial, is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.5 A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.6 Moreover, the right to a speedy
disposition of a case is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.7

4 Sec.16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

5 Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987)
6 Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, [June 29, 2001], 412 PHIL 921-933
7 Braza v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, [February 20, 2013], 704 PHIL 476-499

2
 In addition, Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay are considered.8
In Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, the Court denied a petition seeking to quash
the Information holding that the silence of the accused amounted to laches. In the
said case, the investigatory process was set in motion on August 14, 1992 and the
Information was filed on May 6, 1997. After the arraignment was set sometime in
December 1999, the accused filed a motion to quash on December 21, 1999, based
on the violation of his right to due process and prompt disposition of cases. In
sustaining the Sandiganbayan's denial of the motion to quash, the Court ratiocinated
that:
Moreover, it is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999,
after the case was set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the
issue of the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. As
stated by them in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss, "[o]ther than the
counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing." Also, in their petition, they
averred: "Aside from the motion for extension of time to file counter-
affidavits, petitioners in the present case did not file nor send any
letter-queries addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao which conducted the preliminary investigation." They
slept on their right a situation amounting to laches. The
matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those
four years, they showed signs of asserting their right to a
speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some overt
acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they
were not waiving that right. Their silence may, therefore be
interpreted as a waiver of such right. As aptly stated in Alvizo, the
petitioner therein was "insensitive to the implications and
contingencies" of the projected criminal prosecution posed against
him "by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition
of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the
supervening delay seems to have been without his objection, [and]
hence impliedly with his acquiescence.9 (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing doctrine was reiterated in Bernat v. Sandiganbayan.10 In that
case, the claim of denial of the right to a speedy disposition of his criminal case was
brushed aside by the Court considering that the accused waited eight years before
complaining of the delay in the disposal of his case.

8Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991

9Valencia v. Sandiganbayan citing Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165996, [October 17, 2005], 510 PHIL 70-
91)
10 Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158018, [May 20, 2004]

3
 In Sumbang, Jr. v. Gen. Court Martial PRO-Region 6,11 the Supreme Court
ruled that the right to a speedy trial as any other right conferred by the Constitution
or statute, except when otherwise expressly so provided by law, may be waived. It
must therefore be asserted. Thus, if there was a delay in the trial of the case,
petitioner is not entirely without blame.
In the case at bar, the conduct of the preliminary investigation by the
Ombudsman lasted for six years. However, it must be noted that in that six year
Mayor Job Hutt failed to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. The
complaint against Mayor Job Hutt was filed on 2010 and was thereafter resolved in
2016. Prior to the filing of the information in Court, Mayor Hutt did not show any
signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at least file a motion
for early resolution to show that he was not waiving his right. It is only now, after
arraignment had already been conducted, that Mayor Hutt is asserting his right to
speedy disposition of cases. Mayor Hutt could have done that earlier but instead, he
failed to do so. Such failure of Mayor Hutt to assert his right to speedy disposition of
cases should be interpreted as a waiver of his right. The silence of Mayor Hutt in this
case amounted to latches, hence, he is estopped from claiming that he was denied
of this right to speedy disposition of cases for he had a opportunity to do so when the
case was still in its preliminary stages.
Denial of the right to speedy disposition of cases is not a ground to file
a motion to quash
Assuming that Mayor Job Hutt was denied of his right to speedy disposition of
cases, filing a motion to quash on that ground would not prosper for under Rule 117
such ground is not one of the grounds expressly mentioned there in. Sec. 3 Rule 117
of the Rules of Court enumerates the following grounds:
Section 3 Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;

11Supra, Note 3

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(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.12
Rule 117 expressly mentions all the grounds wherein the accused may invoke
to file a motion to quash. The denial of the right to speedy disposition of cases is not
one of the grounds expressly mention under such rule. One of the rules under
statutory construction is the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under
this principle, when the law expressly mentions an enumeration of things, those not
mentioned are deemed excluded. Hence, the exclusion of the denial of the right to
speedy disposition of cases should be interpreted to not include such ground in the
filing of a motion to quash.
Assuming further that the right to speedy disposition of cases may be
considered as a ground for filing a motion to quash, such motion to quash would
necessarily be denied for filing it beyond the period allowed to file such motion.
Section 9 of Rule 117 states that:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore. The
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of
section 3 of this Rule.13
As stated in the rule, a motion to quash must be filed before the accused
please to the complaint or information. At the instant case, Mayor Hutt has already
been arraigned. Moreover, his case is already in the stage of presentation of the
second witness for the prosecution. In addition, there is no showing that the case of
Mayor Hutt falls within the exception under the law to enable him to successfully file
such motion to quash. Hence, it is already too late for Mayor Hutt to file a motion to
quash on the ground of speedy disposition of cases.

12
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
13
Section 9,Ibid

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 PRAYER

The Above Premises Considered, the Prosecution respectfully prays to the

Honorable Court to deny the Motion to Quash the Information for lack of merit and to
allow the trial of Mayor Job Hutt of violation of RA 6713 to proceed

Cebu City, Philippines. March 13, 2017.

Smee Golly,
Assistant Graft Prosecutor Ombudsman-Visayas
Telefax: 123 4567
PTR No. 11111111
IBP No. 88888888
Roll of Attorneys No. 888888880
MCLE Compliance No. 34859224