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4 August 2017
The US advanced estimate shows Q2 real GDP growth of 2.6% q/q saar, while United States
solid July employment supports our growth forecast of 2.5% q/q saar in Q3. Outlook 6
US GDP: Q2 GDP tracking at 2.4% 8
The PMI in China declined slightly, while remaining robust in other emerging Data Review & Preview 9
markets. PMIs indicate slower momentum in EM, relative to DM, economies.
Euro Area
Developed Economies Outlook 11
Data Review & Preview 13
United States: Wage growth is not as weak as it seems 6
The continued decline in the unemployment rate has not translated into strong wage United Kingdom
inflation, suggesting other factors may be behind weak pay growth. Outlook 15
Data Review & Preview 17
Euro area: Well begun is only half won 11
Inflation remains low despite a broad-based economic recovery becoming increasingly Japan
evident in labour markets. Outlook 19
Data Review & Preview 21
UK: Caught on the wrong footagain 15
July PMI largely came in unchanged as services strengthened and construction fell. Australia & New Zealand
Hiring intentions remained remarkably resilient despite uncertainties. Australia: Conflicting signals 22
PLEASE SEE ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES STARTING AFTER PAGE 49
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
GLOBAL FORECASTS
Real GDP Real GDP Consumer prices Consumer prices
% over previous period, saar % annual change % over a year ago % annual change
Weight# 1Q17 2Q17 3Q17 4Q17 1Q18 2016 2017 2018 1Q17 2Q17 3Q17 4Q17 2016 2017 2018
Global* 100.0 3.9 4.6 3.9 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.8 3.9 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.3 1.7 2.2 2.2
Advanced 43.2 1.4 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 0.7 1.7 1.7
Emerging* 56.8 5.7 6.2 5.3 4.4 5.1 4.6 5.2 5.2 2.7 2.6 3.2 3.3 3.3 2.9 3.0
BRIC 38.6 6.6 7.5 5.9 4.6 5.8 5.4 6.0 5.9 2.4 2.0 2.9 3.2 3.7 2.6 3.0
Americas* 27.2 1.7 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 0.9 1.9 2.3 2.9 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.4
United States 19.4 1.2 2.6 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.3 2.1 2.2
Latin America* 7.8 3.0 2.0 1.7 2.5 2.2 -0.7 1.6 2.2 4.9 4.4 3.8 4.0 6.6 4.2 3.8
Argentina 0.9 4.3 6.1 4.1 3.2 1.6 -2.2 3.1 2.5 32.0 24.4 23.2 22.3 40.3 25.1 17.2
Brazil 3.4 4.3 0.4 0.0 1.6 2.2 -3.6 0.5 1.5 4.9 3.6 2.6 3.0 8.7 3.5 4.2
Colombia 0.7 -1.2 2.4 3.8 5.5 0.4 2.0 1.9 3.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.9 7.5 4.3 3.1
Mexico 2.4 2.7 2.4 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 5.0 6.1 6.2 6.1 2.8 5.9 3.4
Peru 0.4 -0.5 1.7 5.9 3.3 5.2 3.9 2.2 4.0 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.5 3.6 3.0 2.3
Venezuela 0.5 26.6 -25.8 2.9 -14.0 34.8 -14.6 -11.1 3.2 432 461 563 657 307 564 592
Asia/Pacific 48.2 5.8 6.8 5.6 4.6 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.6 1.6 1.5 2.3 2.4 1.7 2.0 2.2
Japan 5.5 1.0 2.5 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 -0.3 0.5 0.5
Australia 1.2 1.1 1.6 3.4 3.0 3.2 2.5 2.0 3.1 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.3 2.0 2.2
Emerging Asia 41.5 6.5 7.5 6.2 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.2 1.9 1.8 2.7 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.7
China 22.2 7.3 6.9 6.5 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.8 6.4 1.4 1.4 2.9 2.9 2.0 2.2 2.3
Hong Kong 0.4 2.9 0.8 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.2 0.5 2.5 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.3
India 9.0 7.2 12.9 7.8 2.8 8.2 7.9 7.4 7.9 3.6 2.4 2.7 4.1 4.9 3.2 4.9
Indonesia 3.2 4.3 6.0 5.7 6.0 5.5 5.0 5.3 5.7 3.6 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.8 4.0
South Korea 2.0 4.3 2.4 3.2 2.1 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.0 2.0 1.9
Malaysia 0.9 7.5 4.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 4.2 5.2 5.0 4.3 4.0 3.6 2.6 2.1 3.6 2.5
Philippines 0.8 4.3 7.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 6.9 6.6 6.6 3.2 3.0 3.1 2.8 1.8 3.0 3.0
Singapore 0.5 -1.3 -0.4 3.0 6.2 -0.6 2.0 2.6 2.3 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.8 -0.5 0.8 0.6
Taiwan 1.2 3.8 0.6 2.2 3.0 2.4 1.5 2.3 2.2 0.8 0.6 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.3 2.0
Thailand 1.2 5.2 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.8 1.3 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.6 2.0
Europe and Africa 24.6 2.3 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.2 2.3 1.9
Euro area 14.2 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.2 1.4 1.2
Belgium 0.5 2.6 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.2 1.8 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.8 2.1 1.3
France 2.9 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.7 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.3 1.1 1.0
Germany 4.1 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.4 1.4 1.2
Greece 0.3 1.8 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.5 0.0 0.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.0 1.2 0.8
Ireland 0.3 -10.1 3.5 5.1 6.0 1.8 5.2 2.9 3.6 0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
Italy 2.3 1.8 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.4 -0.1 1.4 1.2
Netherlands 0.9 1.8 2.5 1.7 1.6 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.1 1.2 1.2
Portugal 0.3 4.2 2.4 2.1 1.8 2.1 1.4 2.9 2.0 1.4 1.7 1.1 1.3 0.6 1.4 1.2
Spain 1.7 3.3 3.8 3.4 2.8 2.5 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.1 1.7 1.4 -0.3 2.0 1.5
United Kingdom 2.9 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.3 2.1 2.7 2.6 2.6 0.7 2.5 2.0
EM Europe & Africa 7.5 3.5 3.3 3.9 2.5 2.1 1.2 2.9 2.5 5.2 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.2 4.3
Poland 1.1 4.4 1.0 3.7 5.7 3.6 2.7 3.9 3.5 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.2 -0.7 2.0 1.8
Russia 4.0 2.6 3.6 3.2 1.2 0.8 -0.2 1.8 1.5 4.6 4.2 4.3 4.2 7.1 4.4 4.2
Turkey 2.1 4.9 4.0 5.2 3.2 3.6 2.9 4.2 3.8 10.2 11.5 10.3 10.2 7.8 10.6 7.6
Israel 0.3 1.4 2.3 3.3 3.9 3.4 4.0 3.3 3.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.4 -0.5 0.4 0.8
Note: Arrows appear next to numbers if current forecasts differ from that of the previous week by 0.5pp or more for quarterly annualized GDP, by 0.2pp or more for
annual GDP and by 0.2pp or more for Inflation. Weights used for real GDP are based on IMF PPP-based GDP (5yr centred moving averages). Weights used for
consumer prices are based on IMF nominal GDP (5yr centred moving averages). # IMF PPP-based GDP weights for 2016. * Aggregates for CPI exclude Argentina
and Venezuela inflation rates & aggregates for Real GDP exclude Venezuela Real GDP. Source: Barclays Research
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GLOBAL SYNTHESIS
Real GDP momentum in the euro area, Japan and the US remains strong
EA Q2 real GDP grew 2.3% q/q Euro area Q2 real GDP grew by 0.6% q/q. This was a slight acceleration from the previous,
saar due to domestic demand now revised down value of 0.5%. So far at the national level, just France, Spain and Austria
GDP have been released, posting strong prints of 0.55% q/q, 0.9% q/q and 0.6% q/q,
respectively. While growth will likely remain strong by historical standards, we expect a
slight moderation in H2 2017, as forward-looking indicators such as PMIs and German
quarterly factory orders indicate a slight moderation in H2 GDP growth.
US advanced estimate shows In the US, the advanced estimate of real GDP growth for Q2 was 2.6% q/q saar. But given
GDP growth of 2.6% q/q saar weaker than expected construction data and new home sales for June, together with
downward revisions to the previous months data, we think that the final Q2 GDP figure will
be revised down a little. Our tracker points to 2.4% q/q saar. A narrower than expected
trade balance deficit reduced our estimated drag from trade, likely due to a weaker US dollar
compared with the beginning of the year. Solid July employment supports our growth
forecast of 2.5% q/q saar in Q3 and our call for a 25bp rate hike in December.
In Japan, we expect Q2 real In Japan, we expect Q2 real GDP to grow by 2.5% q/q saar due to strong domestic demand.
GDP growth of 2.5% q/q saar Consumption will likely rise by 2.0 q/q saar, based on recent strong outturns of the monthly
composite index of consumption. In terms of investment, the rapid growth of 4.8% q/q in
shipments of capital goods, a coincident indicator on the supply side, is consistent with
investment growth of 5.2% q/q. Unusually for Japan, we expect net exports to have
contributed negatively to growth, as domestic demand boosts imports growth.
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
Q2 real GDP growth picks up in Japan, the EA and the US The finance neutral output gap explains low EA inflation
4 August 2017 3
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
sovereign debt crisis in 2012. We therefore investigate to what extent statistical output gap
measures can explain the recent evolution of euro area core HICP inflation. We explore four
different techniques: The popular Hodrick-Prescott filter, the Beveridge-Nelson filter, the
which can be explained by a ECBs Kalman filter approach and the BISs finance neutral output gap. Only the latter three
finance neutral output gap are robust to real-time data and end-of-sample issues. However, even among these three
methods, only the BISs finance neutral output gap, which accounts for the financial cycle
as well, can explain a statistically large share of euro area core HICP inflation (Figure 2). This
suggests that, in the euro area, a large output gap is likely the reason behind low inflation.
As documented in the Euro Area Outlook, we view this is as a reflection of substantial spare
reflecting underemployment
capacity in European labour markets, with the unemployment rate at 9.1% and
in European labour markets
underemployment measures of about 18%.
Shunto negotiation wage In Japan, despite labour market tightening, CPI inflation remains low due to moderate wage
outcomes imply a gradual rise growth. This year, the final result of the Shunto wage negotiation implied wage growth of
in Japanese CPI inflation 1.98% percent, slightly below the previous years 2.00%. Wage increases are a function of
the previous years CPI, the labour market situation and corporate profits. But even with
rising CPI, and robust corporate profits, wage growth in next years Shunto negotiation is
likely to only be 2.3%. We thus expect CPI inflation to rise, but at a slow pace (Figure 3).
Asian PMIs remain robust Manufacturing PMIs across North Asia remain robust, yet below the strong levels observed
in advanced economies (Figure 4). While the overall pick-up in export growth that we saw in
Q1 has moderated, we believe that the underlying momentum remains strong.
and the surveys were strong In Russia, Julys manufacturing PMI survey was particularly strong, rising to 52.7 from 50.3
in Russia and Turkey in July too in June. In Turkey, the PMI edged down a little, but it remained at a high level of 53.6. In
both cases the surveys point to robust growth in industry at the start of Q3. Only in CEE did
the manufacturing PMIs drop across the board.
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4
Japanese CPI inflation is forecast to rise gradually PMIs imply weaker momentum in emerging markets
2.0 60
% y/y Barclays
1.5 58
forecasts
1.0 56
0.5 54
0.0 52
-0.5 50
-1.0 48
-1.5 46
-2.0 44
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
BoJ core CPI (ex perishables and energy)
42
Core CPI (ex perishables) Jan-10 Jul-11 Jan-13 Jul-14 Jan-16 Jul-17
Core-core CPI (ex non-alcoholic food and energy) Emerging Market PMI Developed Market PMI
Source: Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Source: IHS Markit
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The rise in the labor share since 2015 and the implied boost to worker bargaining
power could explain why real wages have risen more than productivity.
The fall in the UR has not Wage inflation has been disappointing, especially considering the sharp decline in the
boosted wage growth as much unemployment rate (UR) in recent years (Figure 1) and economists expectations that slack in
as expected labor markets is fast diminishing. One reason for the recent underperformance of wage growth
could be that there is more slack in the labor market than the decline in the UR alone would
suggest. We see two reasons why: either the equilibrium UR is lower than we think, or some
portion of the working age population, which is out of the labor force for reasons other than
demographics, is more attached to the labor market than appreciated, so it could re-enter the
labor force more easily. There has been some research from the Congressional Budget Office1
and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta2 recently providing support for the view that there is
more slack in the labor market. We also believe nominal wage rigidities may have played a role
in the evolution of wages in this recovery. During the downturns, wages did not decline as
much as the surge in the UR would imply; as a result, the pickup in wage growth during the
recovery could be more muted to account for that lack of correction during the recession.
Low productivity growth and Another explanation for the recent weakness in wage growth could be the trend decline in
disappointing inflation explain productivity growth and the persistently low inflation prints. To explore the validity of this
some of the weakness in argument, we look at a simple economic relationship, namely, that nominal wage growth is
wages determined by the rate of inflation and the growth rate of productivity. We find that once
low inflation and productivity growth are taken into account, wage growth does not look so
puzzlingly low. On the contrary, our simple model suggests that between 2015 and early
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
Wage growth remains slow, given the large decline in the UR Recent wage growth stronger than productivity and inflation
imply
Source: BLS, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Source: BLS, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research
4 August 2017 6
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
2017, wage growth has been even stronger than the model estimates and the fundamental
indicators would warrant (Figure 2), although the gap between realized and estimated wage
growth has closed somewhat in the past two quarters as the rates of inflation and
productivity growth have improved.
Realized wage growth appears One reason for the large gap between predicted and realized wage growth is that our simple
stronger that our simple model model does not control for worker bargaining power. A widely used economics metric for
suggests this is the labor share. This trended lower for much of the past two and a half decades
(Figure 3), but this steady decline stabilized in 2012 and actually reversed from late 2014,
the same period in which the gap between realized and estimated wage growth emerges in
our mode. A rise in the labor share is consistent with a larger portion of the returns from
output being allocated to the workforce rather than capital and suggests that workers are
able to extract more profits for themselves and that the capital-for-labor substitution
pattern prior to 2015 has been reversed (at least for now). The substitution of capital for
labor varies during the business cycle and tends to be more intense around recessions.
but controlling for the recent For instance, earlier in this recession, hours worked (and total employment) dropped much
rise in the labor share and faster than output, and the subsequent recovery in output was much faster than the recovery
labor bargaining power in jobs, leading to strong productivity growth. However, since about 2011, output and
employment have been rising at a similar pace, leading to the sluggish productivity
performance. This pattern suggests to us that the replacement of workers with automation or
outsourcing may have come to a pinnacle (at least temporarily) and current job growth is
focused in areas where further capital substitution of labor is not feasible. To control for this
pattern, we introduce the labor share estimate to our model (Figure 4). Once we adjust for the
interaction between labor bargaining power, labor force and their effect on productivity, wage
growth is more closely aligned with the fundamental strength of the economy.
wage growth may not be as Our analysis suggests the weakness in wage growth can be explained to some extent by the
weak as it seems sluggish trend productivity growth, the disappointing performance of inflation and the
interaction between capital and labor. An increase in capital intensity early in the recovery
boosted output and productivity growth, but exacerbated the decline in the labor share.
However, in the past couple of years, it seems the low-hanging fruit has been picked and firms
are seeing less scope for substitution of capital for labor. As a result, the labor share and wage
growth have picked up stronger than productivity and inflation trends alone would justify. Of
course, the big unknown is how the labor force will be affected by the automation of low skilled
services jobs (eg, self-driving cars, self-checkout). If the early years of the recovery are any
indication, the labor share could suffer again and wage growth remain modest.
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4
A recent reversal of the downside trend in the labor share Rising labor share helps close actual versus fitted wage gap
62 5
4
60 3
2
58
1
56 0
67 71 75 79 83 87 91 95 99 03 07 11 15 90 93 96 99 02 05 08 11 14 17
Source: BLS, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Source: BLS, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research
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FIGURE 1
Effect of incoming data on current-quarter GDP tracking
Release date Indicator Period Q2 GDP tracking
FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3
June construction spending dragged lower by public sector Q2 GDP tracking estimate at 2.4% q/q saar
2.0 8.0
2.5
1.0 4.0
0.0 0.0
2.0
-1.0 -4.0
-2.0 -8.0
1.5
Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16 Jan-17 Jul-17
08-May 24-May 09-Jun 25-Jun 11-Jul 27-Jul
Total Private Public, RHS Q2 Advance estimate
Source: Census Bureau, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Source: BEA, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research
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Minneapolis Fed President Kashkari (FOMC voter) speaks: Kashkari is likely to signal his support for balance sheet runoff, which
is likely to be announced in September in our baseline outlook, but we see him as arguing against further rate hikes until there is
more evidence inflation is firming. Kashkari was a dissenter against previous rate increases.
Fed Vice Chairman Dudley (FOMC voter) speaks: We believe Dudley will argue for balance sheet normalization, which we see as
being announced in September, as well as further increases in the federal funds rate. Although inflation has been below
expectations, we see Dudley as pointing to still-accommodative financial market conditions as justifying further front-end rate hikes.
Dallas Fed President Kaplan (FOMC voter) speaks: In recent remarks, Kaplan supported balance sheet normalization as early as
September, but also desired more evidence that inflation was rising to 2.0% before taking further steps to raise the policy rate. We
expect a repeat of these remarks when he speaks in Arlington, Texas.
Minneapolis Fed President Kashkari (FOMC voter) speaks: Kashkari is likely to signal his support for balance sheet runoff, which
is likely to be announced in September in our baseline outlook, but we see him as arguing against further rate hikes until there is
more evidence inflation is firming. Kashkari was a dissenter against previous rate increases.
Source: BEA, BLS, Census Bureau, Federal Reserve, University of Michigan, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research
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Recent currency appreciation adds further short and medium-term downside risks
to our projected profile for tradable goods prices.
The EA economy is on the right The euro area (EA) economy came out of H1 17 on strong footing, but soft data suggest it is
track, yet not strong enough to unlikely to strengthen further. We expect the job-rich recovery will remain on track in the
signal an end to persistent second half of the year, perhaps decelerating slightly. Meanwhile, inflation remains low and
lowflation we expect it to lag throughout the forecast horizon, dragged down by still large labour
market slack and recent currency appreciation. Still, we believe that returning to levels close
to the ECB mandate is a matter of when more than if; hence, we continue to expect the ECB
to go ahead with policy normalisation, albeit very gradually.
The EA economic recovery Growth increased by 0.6% q/q in Q2, accelerating slightly from the downwardly revised Q1
improved in Q2 print (-0.1pp to 0.5% q/q), in line with expectations (Figure 1). So far at the national level,
just France, Spain and Austria GDP have been released, posting strong prints of 0.55% q/q,
0.9% q/q and 0.6% q/q, respectively. German and Italian readings are due on 15 and 16
August, respectively. We expect German growth to remain solid at 0.6% q/q and Italian
activity to slow a little to 0.3% q/q, after temporary factors boosted growth to +0.44% q/q
in Q1; indeed, we do not rule out that the strong print could be revised down somewhat.
but soft data point to slight Composite PMI data for July declined slightly driven by the manufacturing sector, while
deceleration in H2 services sentiment remained stable. Both sectors recorded slightly weaker forward-looking
components, suggesting that confidence is likely to moderate further from the multi-year
high levels recorded earlier in the year. A broadly similar picture was painted by the July
European Commission survey, which showed some consolidation in manufacturing
sentiment, while services confidence improved a little. Consistent with the data, we expect
EA economic growth to slow to 0.5% q/q in both Q3 17 and Q4 17. On an annual basis, we
forecast economic activity to accelerate to 2.1% y/y in 2017 from 1.7% in 2016.
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
A solid and broad-based economic recovery set to stabilise Unemployment rate on a steady decline despite rising LFP
pp GFCF 13 73
1.0 Stockbuilding
Forecast
Net trade
0.8 12
Final consumption
GDP (% q/q) 72
0.5 11
0.3 10 71
0.0
9
-0.3 70
8
-0.5
7 69
-0.8
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
-1.0 Unemployment rate, % (LHS)
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Labour Force Participation rate, % (RHS)
Source: Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Source: Haver Analytics, Barclays Research
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Labour market indicators Strong activity data continue to be accompanied by strengthening labour market
remain strong conditions. The sharp decline in the unemployment rate that started in April 2013
continued, reaching 9.1% in June which was the lowest level since March 2009. The
recovery appears to be solid: not only is it synchronised and widespread across the regions,
but it is also unfolding alongside a steadily rising labour force participation (LFP) rate, which
reached 72.9% in Q2 17 from 69.7% in Q1 05 (Figure 2).
but not all that glitters is Despite solid activity and labour market data, we believe that it is still too early to call for a
gold sustained acceleration in underlying inflation. In July, headline (inflation) was unchanged at
1.3% while core edged up 0.1pp to 1.2%. The improvement in core was driven by fairly
resilient performance of services inflation and improving non-energy industrial (NEIG)
prices, but in both cases we do not expect it to represent a gear shift.
We do not expect wages to We interpret the rise in services inflation as mainly driven by seasonal factors which should
accelerate in the near term as correct in September. Hence, we keep our cautious stance that services inflation remains on
labour market slack remains track but is unlikely to accelerate decisively unless labour markets tighten further to the
ample point that it starts to generate sustained wage inflation pressure (not our near-term
baseline). We believe, in fact, that labour markets may be subject to a greater degree of
slack than the level suggested by the unemployment rate. Combining the estimates of the
unemployed and the underemployed with broader measures of unemployment suggests
that labour market slack currently affects around 18% of the extended labour force, almost
twice the level captured by the traditional unemployment rate measure (Figure 3).
while also flag considerable We believe that the recent resurgence of NEIG inflation does not look strong enough to change
downside risk to tradable our view that ongoing currency appreciation (+7.5% since mid-April in multilateral terms) casts
prices from recent currency a long shadow over both the pace and sustainability of the recovery in tradable prices. Should it
strengthening continue, currency appreciation will likely weigh considerably on the outlook for core goods
prices. The impact along the price chain would be twofold: in the near term, the appreciation
would have a strong impact on extra-euro area import prices (Figure 4); on the other hand over
the medium term, it could extinguish the nascent and long-awaited core goods PPI recovery
despite producer prices having become less effective in transmitting euro NEER swings along
lately (for see Euro area inflation: Story of a broken relationship, 5 October 2016).
Barclays view on EA inflation We continue to forecast headline inflation to average 1.4% in 2017 and 1.2% in 2018 (core:
and the ECB 1.0%/1.2%, respectively) and the ECB to extend QE into 2018 albeit at a slower pace, as
well as two 10bp hikes in the deposit rate, in Q2 18 and Q4 18.
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4
Labour underutilisation as a % of the extended labour force Currency strength casts downside risks on import prices
40 6 -15
%
35
-10
4
30
-5
25 2
20 0
15 0
5
10
-2
10
5
0 -4 15
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Extra-EA import prices, % y/y
EA Germany France Italy Spain Euro NEER, % y/y (Inverted, rhs)
Source: Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Source: Haver Analytics, Barclays Research
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E19: "Flash" HICP, % m/m (y/y) Jul 0.0 (1.3) (1.3) R -0.5 (1.3)
E19: 'Eurostat' core (HICP x fd, alc, tob, ene), % Core improves but does not shift gear
Jul 0.2 (1.1) (1.2) R -0.6 (1.2)
m/m (y/y)
E19: Preliminary GDP, % q/q Q2 0.5 0.6 0.6 Confirming a strong H1
E19: "Final" manufacturing PMI, index Jul 57.4 56.8 56.6
E19: "Final" services PMI, index Jul 55.4 55.4 55.4 Cooling, but from heatwave
E19: "Final" composite PMI, index Jul 56.3 55.8 55.7
Domestic investment supports German
Germany: Factory orders, %m/m (y/y) Jun 1.1 (3.8) R 0.4 (4.2) 1.0 (5.1)
factory orders
Germany IP: We expect Germany IP to contract in June by 0.6% m/m, due to weak factory orders in April.
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While the Bank cut its growth forecasts, it left inflation forecasts unchanged and
maintained that rates would need to increase more than expected by the markets.
Overall, the July PMI print Composite PMI strengthened in July driven by services which contrasted with unconvincing
suggests that Q3 activity could manufacturing data and a fall in construction. The headline gauge remains about 0.4sd
look a lot like Q2. below its long-term average as heightened economic uncertainty as well as fragile
confidence among clients acted as a brake on growth. Hiring intentions continued to
surprise to the upside, signalling that businesses are expanding staff regardless of political
or economical woes, while inflation pressures rebounded to a three-month high.
Stronger services, The improvement in services was broad-based, with prices charged, input prices and new
disappointing manufacturing business the biggest positive contributors. Outstanding business was the only component
and sharp decline in to print lower in July. Employment and price components are the only ones currently above
construction their long-term average. Construction deteriorated as the headline activity index fell
markedly driven by a sharp decline in commercial activity and new orders. In
manufacturing (see UK Manufacturing PMI: Capacity constraints bite, 1 August 2017),
confidence rose as new export orders climbed to their second highest reading on record.
Output, however, was held back by capacity and supply constraints, limiting the upside
from strong demand and price pressures, therefore, continued to ease in July.
Higher confidence amid The July PMI print left a mixed impression as businesses reported as many improvements as
reasons for concern they did reasons to remain cautious. Generally, current activity edged higher on stronger
orders and hiring but output and outlook remained subdued at best. Unless extra jobs are
matched with additional investment, demand will be only partially met and capacity
constraints will continue to cap the upside from weaker currency or fresh global growth
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
July output PMIs only marginally better Reaction of the currency and rates to the MPC minutes
65 1.0 8
0.8 6
0.6 4
60
0.4
2
0.2
55 0
0.0
-2
-0.2
-0.4 -4
50
-0.6 -6
-0.8 -8
45
Feb Mar May Jun Aug
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Manufacturing Composite GBPEUR (%change, lhs) GBPUSD (%change, lhs)
Services Construction 10y Rates (bp, rhs)
Source: IHS Markit/Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Source: Bloomberg. Note: the chart shows the reaction of exchange and interest
rates 30 minutes after the release of the MPC minutes.
4 August 2017 15
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
momentum. The drop in construction or the rebound in services price pressures also raise
questions as to whether this simply reflects monthly volatility or rather a more significant
reversal. For now however, our take on July confidence is that Q3 is likely to look a lot like
Q2, supporting our view of low but stable growth.
MPC shifts to a more dovish Fundamentally, such a dovish / hawkish balancing act reflects the structural unease of central
stance and catches markets banks to respond to negative supply shock. Except for May, markets got caught systematically
wrong-footed wrong-footed by the MPC minutes: in March and June by the hawkish tone, in February and
August on the dovish side (Figure 2). Overall, we believe a dovish interpretation of the August
minutes is justified given the MPC moved away from expecting exports and investment to
make up for slowing consumption and now only expect it to act against it. Also, the Bank
seems increasingly certain about the negative impact of uncertainty (on investment, exports,
wages, etc), and highlights weaknesses in the auto and the housing sectors as reasons to
expect consumption to edge even lower than currently expected.
While growth forecasts are cut, The bank eventually had also to work into its assessment two quarters of lower-than-
inflation forecasts are largely expected growth after pushing back in Q1 by revising less than the extent of the downside
unchanged surprise. The bank also shaved its Q3 forecast down to 0.3% q/q and now expects growth
of 1.7% this year which would require at least 0.5% q/q in Q4. Hence, while the short-term
forecast reflects weaker data, the medium-term outlook remains unchanged with 1.6% and
1.7% growth expected in 2018 and 2019, respectively. The inflation outlook has, however,
been left largely untouched.
Data and policy views needed Nevertheless, many areas continue to raise questions (forecasts for productivity or imports,
more than ever to resolve reliance on internal alternative measures for production, GDP, etc) and we await further
existing inconsistencies and data (in August: Inflation on the 15th, Labour market report on the 16th and Q2 GDP
interrogations expenditure breakdown on the 24th) as well as MPC members policy statements to resolve
some of the inconsistencies. Andy Haldane, for instance, did not make a new statement
after his 21 June speech, while new MPC members, Silvana Tenreyro and Dave Ramsden,
are yet to make their positions known.
November now looks too soon We remain confident that the Bank will maintain the status quo as we expect growth and
to hike or even talk about a inflation to edge lower than in the Banks forecasts. We also highlight that by cutting its Q3
hike growth forecast to 0.3% q/q, November now looks too early to hike or even to prepare
markets for a hike. Indeed, 0.3% q/q growth in Q3 would not be informative regarding
whether the economy is stuck in low gear or gathering momentum. Rather, softer data,
volatile policy statements by MPC members and, in our view, some miscommunication
around the August inflation calls for resetting the MPC communication around some key
and clear messages.
4 August 2017 16
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
4 August 2017 17
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
Trade balance: We expect the trade balance to improve marginally at -2.9 after -3.1bn as goods imports slow and exports
continue to be supported by weaker currency.
4 August 2017 18
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
OUTLOOK: JAPAN
Domestic demand driving GDP We retained our estimate for public investment to rise 4.3% q/q, which would mark the first
growth through Q2 (our increase in four quarters. Based on leading indicators, it appears that the FY16 second
forecast revised to 2.5% q/q supplementary budget has given a boost to such investment. Private inventory investment,
saar from 2.0%) which subtracted from GDP growth in Q1 due to a reduction in oil inventories, could lend
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
Real wages down y/y, albeit slightly Production on track to grow about 1% q/q more in Q3
1.0 115
110
0.0 Aug
105
-1.0
100
Jul
-2.0
Barclays 95
-3.0 forecasts Production
90
Shipments
-4.0 85 Inventory
-5.0 Inventory/shipment ratio
80
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 CY
Note: Our estimates used for CPI ex-imputed rent. Note: METI forecasts used for July (index adjusted for forecasting error) and
Source: MHLW, MIC, Barclays Research August. Source: METI, Barclays Research
4 August 2017 19
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
support in Q2. However, private inventories are a perennial source of uncertainty in the first
preliminary GDP data due to the methods of calculation and thus represent both an upside
and a downside risk.
Private consumption Private consumption always warrants special attention since it accounts for such a large
supported by improving share of the economy. In Q2, we believe consumption may have increased not only for
employment conditions, but services and durables but also non-durables, as discussed in Japan Outlook: Consumption
also weather and subdued drives GDP growth in H1, 28 July 2017. While improving employment conditions set the
downstream inflation stage, good weather may also have provided support in Q2. In addition, sentiment improved,
likely helped by rising share prices, and downstream inflation remained low.
Consumer confidence turned back up in July (to 43.8 from Junes 43.3), with the Cabinet
Office retaining its picking up assessment, based on the Consumer Confidence Survey.
This reflected improvements in all survey categories, with especially large gains in the
assessments of livelihood and willingness to purchase durable goods. This is consistent
with reports of increased appliance sales3.
Falling household inflation The same survey indicated that household inflation expectations, which rose to 2.1% in June
expectations amid high-profile price hikes for such items as potato chips and parcel deliveries, fell back to
1.9% in July. This is consistent with subdued downstream inflation as measured by the CPI.
Although real wages, which heavily influence private consumption, fell a somewhat sharp
0.8% y/y in June (May: 0.0%), this was largely a reaction to last years strong summer
bonuses. Consumer activity has not been undermined as a result (Figure 1).
IP data suggest growth of Even if private consumption slows in Q3 following the strength through H1, the latest IP data
about 1% could continue into suggest growth of about 1% could continue into Q3, with capex and real exports providing
Q3, with capex and real offsets. Production expanded 1.9% q/q in Q2, and METI forecast indices for July (-0.3% m/m
exports lending support based on the index adjusted for forecasting error) and August (3.6% m/m) indicate that
production will be 1.3% stronger on average during those two months than in Q1.
However, machinery orders, a That said, machinery orders, a leading capex indicator, are in a lull, based on the May
leading capex indicator, are in assessment (a downgrade) by the Cabinet Office. We expect core orders to increase 4.5%
a lull; machinery maker m/m in June (May: -3.6%), but to fall 2.7% q/q in Q2 (Q1: -1.4%), marking two consecutive
forecasts for Q3 to be focus of quarters of decline for the first time in about five years. In this context, one focus of the data
next weeks data will be the Q3 forecasts of major machinery makers. At this stage, we do not see any
reasons to lower our outlook for capex in H2 FY17 given the solid machinery orders from
manufacturers, the firm capex plans in various surveys such as the BoJ Tankan, and upbeat
business sentiment.
New Cabinet brings nothing In the political sphere, the Cabinet reshuffle on 3 August came without any major surprises.
new As expected, PM Abe appointed veteran ministers to key portfolios, such as defense,
education and foreign affairs, in a bid to reverse the distrust in politics that triggered a
decline in Cabinet and LDP approval ratings, while allocating ministerial posts to members
outside his own faction in order to build unity within the party. The former implies an
emphasis on stability and the latter on restoring a leadership base within the party, without
any obvious new implications for policy. Whether the reshuffle brings a significant recovery
in support may depend heavily on Diet proceedings during the extraordinary session that
gets underway from end-September. However, the reshuffle does not solve the underlying
political problems, and we expect uncertainty to remain elevated.
3 Consumption heats up with the temperature outside (title translated from Japanese), Nikkei newspaper, 24 August
2017.
4 August 2017 20
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
Bank lending: We look for firm growth in outstanding loans, with a strengthening uptrend in lending by megabanks. Financial
institutions remain accommodative in their lending based on the latest BoJ Tankan survey.
Corporate goods price index: We expect the domestic component of the CGPI (PPI) to rise y/y for a seventh consecutive
month and will focus on the trend in upstream prices of food, where inflation has become more widespread.
Tertiary industry index: We estimate that the index of tertiary industry activity rose m/m in June amid generally firm retail data
during that period.
4 August 2017 21
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
IN FOCUS: AUSTRALIA
Conflicting signals
Rahul Bajoria The Reserve Bank of Australia appears to be getting mixed signals from economic data,
+65 6308 3511 as better employment seems to be driving consumption, but a stronger exchange rate
rahul.bajoria@barclays.com may weigh on prices and possibly economic growth, thus delaying policy normalisation.
Barclays Bank, Singapore
RBA left its inflation forecasts The RBAs inflation forecasts were largely unchanged, although its 2018 projections were
unchanged raised slightly, driven by utility price changes and a slightly higher assumed oil price (to
USD53/bbl from USD51/bbl). The increase in the inflation forecast is a bit surprising,
especially given the AUDs recent appreciation. But as the banks underlying inflation
projection was unchanged, it would appear that the upside is likely to be driven primarily by
utility price increases.
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
RBA downgrades near term outlook but keeps underlying inflation forecasts unchanged
5.5 6
% y/y % y/y
5.0
5
4.5
4.0 4
3.5
3
3.0
2.5 2
2.0
1
1.5
1.0 0
Jun-04 Jun-06 Jun-08 Jun-10 Jun-12 Jun-14 Jun-16 Jun-18 Jun-05 Jun-07 Jun-09 Jun-11 Jun-13 Jun-15 Jun-17 Jun-19
Real GDP Aug-17 May-17 Underlying inflation (% y/y) May-17 Aug-17
Source: Haver Analytics, RBA, Barclays Research Source: Haver Analytics, RBA, Barclays Research
4 August 2017 22
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
improve. We believe this is broadly consistent with the improving trends around full time
employment and aggregate wage bills. But as the RBA continues to expect a very gradual
increase in wage growth, some uncertainty is likely to prevail.
Currency blues...
Strong AUD a constraining In its policy statement, the RBA significantly altered its assessment of the Australian dollars
factor for normalisation appreciation, and its impact on the economy. The bank noted that a stronger currency will
contribute to subdued price pressures, and could weigh on the outlook for output and
employment, resulting in a slower pickup in growth and inflation than what it currently
forecast. As expected, the RBA changed its assumptions for the Australian dollar, with the
trade-weighted index now expected to be almost 5% higher than previously.
If the AUD continues to At the current juncture, our fair value model does not indicate that the AUD is very
appreciate, we believe it could expensive. However, the rapid appreciation seen in the past few weeks has appeared on the
invite more jawboning from RBAs policy radar. As such, we expect the RBA to continue to monitor AUD valuations
policymakers. closely, and may even look to jawbone the markets through verbal intervention to prevent
the currency from strengthening beyond what the bank thinks fundamentals warrant.
Normalisation bias appears intact, but stronger signs needed for a hike
A normalisation bias, but no We believe the latest Statement on Monetary Policy (SoMP) is consistent with the central
urgency to raise rates bank looking to normalise its policy stance, albeit a move that is constrained by conflicting
signals from the economy. While growth in household spending and trade continued in Q2,
this has not necessarily boosted growth in wages and incomes. Although we expect the
ongoing improvement in employment and the aggregate wage bill to eventually support
policy normalisation, we believe the central bank will be watching these trends carefully in
the coming six months before decisively signalling a change in policy stance. We think the
recent downside surprise in inflation and appreciation pressures on the AUD will also likely
make the RBA careful about signalling clearly a change in policy bias. We continue to expect
the RBA to start raising interest rates in Q2 18. We forecast the hiking cycle will begin with a
25bp rate increase at the May 2018 MPC meeting, followed by two more hikes of 25bp each
at the August and November 2018 meetings (see Australia: August Statement on Monetary
Policy - AUD blues, 4 August 2017, and Australia: Growth fears relieved, but 2017 trajectory
to be lower, 7 June 2017).
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4
Consumption likely to improve in Q2 2017 Australian dollar does not look very expensive
2.5
% q/q sa Real exchange rate (% of RBA estimate of fair value)
2.0 15
10
1.5
5
1.0
0
0.5
-5
0.0 -10
-0.5 -15
4 August 2017 23
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
OUTLOOK: CHINA
Trumps honeymoon with We think these latest developments suggest that the short period of sweet relations
China is over between the US and China following the Trump-Xi summit in April has come to an end, with
signs of constructive and cooperative outcomes waning recently. Despite some
achievements since the summit, including positive steps on trade and financial services
under the 100-day Action Plan (Figure 1), Sino-US economic dialogue in mid July seemed to
fail to make new progress on major issues, as signalled by cancelled news conferences and
the absence of a joint statement.
Some achievements so far, but Areas of progress include Chinas lifting of the ban on US beef imports and allowing for the
more work is needed first time rice imports from the US. China has also opened its domestic markets to foreign
credit rating agencies and agreed to grant two US banks onshore bond underwriting and
settlement licenses. The yuan has also been kept on the stronger side against the dollar
(while being broadly stable against a basket of currencies) in recent months, which reflects
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
Achievements after 100-day Action Plan US trade deficit with China
Date Key achievements USD bn US trade deficit with China
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission extends 30 US trade deficit with China (% y/y, RHS) 80
May-17
no-action relief for Shanghai Clearing House till 30 Nov 2017.
25 60
Jun-17 China's imports of LNG from US increased rapidly in H1 2017
China re-started imports of US beef, lifting a ban put in place 40
Jun-17 20
in 2013
20
The PBoC published rules allowing foreign rating agencies to
Jul-17 15
assess the credit risks of the country's bonds 0
China agreed to issue bond underwriting and settlement 10
licenses to both JPMorgan and Citigroup, with JPMorgan -20
Jul-17
already being approved for underwriting coprorate bonds, 5 -40
and Citigroup receiving a bond settlement license in February
0 -60
Jun-13 Jun-14 Jun-15 Jun-16 Jun-17
Source: Reuters, Bloomberg, Barclays Research Source: Bloomberg , Barclays Research
4 August 2017 24
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
Chinas positive response during the dialogue with the US concerning currency policies, in
our view. However, we think these moves will not significantly reduce the US trade deficit
with China, which has continued to grow since the April summit meeting (Figure 2).
Trump likely to initiate While it remains to be seen what new plans President Trump will announce on Friday to
investigations of some trade target Chinas trade practices, he will likely show a tougher stance by ordering probes into
areas, but unlikely to impose certain trade areas. While we do not expect any immediate trade restrictions or sanctions
immediate sanctions before any investigations are completed, we think such investigations will increase trade
friction, including the threats of tariffs/quotas (under the 1974 Trade Acts section 301)
and/or initiating anti-dumping/subsidy investigations, in the near future. Sectors likely to be
targeted by such investigations (ie, those contributing most to the US trade deficit) would
include textiles, steel and other metals, and home appliances (Figure 3).
Limited impact of trade That said, given that no US Section 301 investigation since the WTO was launched in 1995
frictions on China exports, full has led to actual trade sanctions, we think such probes are more likely intended to increase
trade war unlikely to occur leverage for bilateral negotiations. Even if any trade investigations result in sanctions against
China (not our base case), we believe a full-blown US-China trade war is unlikely, as the two
sides would want to avoid the high economic risks from such an outcome. As both sides
agreed in the July dialogue that one of the solutions is for the US to expand exports to
China, rather than simply reducing imports from China, we think the impact of any increase
in trade frictions on Chinas exports would be short-lived and limited in scope. We expect
both sides to continue negotiations at all levels (Figure 4) to make practical progress on
trade rebalancing and financial services openness, with sanction threats and geopolitical
issues (ie, North Korea) likely to be used largely as bargaining chips.
Next week, the focus will be on On the data front, the NBS manufacturing PMI eased to 51.4 in July from the strong print of
trade and inflation data 51.7 in June. The moderation was driven by softer readings for the production and new
export orders indices. We think the softer NBS PMI suggests that GDP growth is likely to
slow after the unexpectedly strong print for Q2. Next week, China will release a series of
data, including trade, inflation, and credit. We forecast export growth moderated in July due
to weaker new export orders and a high base, while import growth edged up given the
rebound in commodity prices. We expect CPI inflation to remain subdued on continued
food deflation, and PPI inflation to have edged higher given the strong rebound in PMI input
prices. On credit, we expect total social financing and new loans to register a decline in July
on seasonal effects and mortgage tightening measures.
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4
Sectors contributing most to the US trade deficit with China China-US dialogue
USD, bn China and US bilateral trade,2016 Dialogue Developments Date
200
China's exports to US Trump accepted invitation for Later this
President level
150 China's imports from US state visit to China year
US trade deficit with China Comprehensive economic dialogue 19-Jul
100
4 August 2017 25
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
We expect the RBI policy to From the discussion of a pre-emptive rate hike in April, subsequently lower inflation
remain data dependent readings, a stronger INR and reduced global risks had re-anchored the MPC debate to hold
versus cut, in our view. However, the guarded policy commentary in August and the
continued emphasis on anchoring inflation close to 4% on a sustainable basis suggest that
the MPC is not pre-committed to further rate cuts. Globally most central banks, in both DMs
and EMs, are following a path of monetary policy normalisation. While that does not
necessarily preclude further easing in India, we think the bar for further RBI cuts will likely
be higher, especially given that the RBI has already delivered 200bp of repo rate cuts and
the repo rate is currently c.100bp lower than its long-term average. We expect monetary
policy to remain data dependent; nevertheless, the innate bias of the MPC will likely stay in
favour of caution despite this weeks rate cut, in our view.
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
India: We expect CPI to average 4.4% over the next 12 India: Real policy rate high; will likely stay high despite
months; adjusted for the base effects, it will average c.4% expected uptick in CPI in H2 FY17-18
CPI Real interest rate (% 3mma, RHS)
% y/y
CPI - adjusted for base effects CPI (% y/y, 3mma)
7 14 Repo rate (%, 3mma) 5
RBI's target band 4%(+/-2%)
6 12 3
10 1
5
8 -1
4
6 -3
3
4 -5
2 2 -7
1 0 -9
Mar-17 Sep-17 Mar-18 Sep-18 Mar-19 Jun-06 Apr-08 Feb-10 Dec-11 Oct-13 Aug-15 Jun-17
Source: GoI, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Source: GoI, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research
4 August 2017 26
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
We expect the tax reform to be The focus appears to have shifted to the likelihood of passage of the revised tax bill reform.
eventually approved, with While we expect the proposed tax bill to encounter pushback, owing to the political standoff
some amendments in the National Assembly, we think it may eventually be approved with some amendments,
given the strong public support. That said, we expect Budget 2018 to see stronger
pushback, if: 1) the pace of proposed fiscal expansion is considered too aggressive; and 2)
the opposition parties disagree with the composition of spending, as a larger share is likely
to be earmarked for welfare and job creation, rather than infrastructure spending. We see a
possibility that the final package could be watered down by opposition parties, with less
aggressive fiscal spending growth of 5-6% eventually agreed by the end of December.
Given 2017s tax revenue is likely to overshoot the governments projection, we see any
financing needs as being manageable.
North Asia continues to In rest of emerging Asia, the performance was more mixed. While export oriented
outperform South East Asia economies such as China and Taiwan continue to report strong PMIs, in South East Asia,
PMIs weakened across the board, albeit slightly. In particular, the weakness in Indonesias
manufacturing PMI appears a bit worrisome, as a nascent recovery appeared to be taking
place given recent real sector data. Nonetheless, this moderation is consistent with our view
that the big pickup in exports is now behind us, and export momentum will slow to more
sustainable levels in H2.
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4
Korea: Strong public support for the proposed tax reform India: PMI weakened sharply after GST implementation
Strongly Unknown
object 4.4% 53
4.1%
Object
5.9%
51
Support
14%
49
Strongly
support 71.6%
47
Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jul-16 Jul-17
EM asia ex India PMI India PMI
Source: Realmeter (released on 24 July), Barclays Research Source: Haver Analytics, Barclays Research
4 August 2017 27
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
China: We expect FX reserves to rise by USD24bn to USD3080bn due to positive valuation effects from a weaker USD in July and
reduced capital outflows.
Indonesia: GDP growth recovery will be gradual as consumption and exports improve. Public sector under-spending likely to
reverse in H2 17.
4 August 2017 28
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
China: We forecast export growth to moderate to 10% y/y in July due to weaker new export orders and a high base, and import
growth to edge up to 18% given the rebound in commodity prices and a low base.
China: We expect CPI inflation to remain subdued at 1.5% on continued food deflation, and PPI inflation to edge higher to 5.8%
given the strong rebound in PMI input prices.
Philippines: We expect BSP to keep the policy rate on hold, despite faster growth in credit and a seemingly weak peso, and
maintain our forecast that the bank will start raising rates in Q4 with a 25bp increase. We expect trade growth momentum to
continue and export growth to edge up, but remain low due to a high base.
Malaysia: Growth momentum is likely to remain supportive amid a strong manufacturing performance.
China: We expect total social financing and new loans to decline in July due to seasonal effects and mortgage tightening
measures. M2 growth is likely to remain low at 9.4%, as financial deleveraging continues.
Indonesia: Seasonal deterioration likely in the current account as dividend payments offset higher trade surplus.
4 August 2017 29
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
Lastly, although the PMI surveys for Central Europe fell back across the board, in general
they still remained consistent with robust expansion in industrial sectors (for details see
EEMENA Manufacturing PMI: July's PMIs point to ongoing recovery in Russia and Turkey, 1
August 2017).
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
Russias manufacturing PMI points to continuing economic While the survey fell back in Turkey, it seems to be merely
recovery at the start of Q3 catching up with actual data
60 20 65 30
Russia PMI & Manufacturing Turkey PMI & Manufacturing
15
60 20
55
10
55
5 10
50
0 50
45 -5 0
45
-10
-10
40 40
-15
-20 35 -20
35
-25
30 -30
30 -30
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Manuf. PMI Manufacturing (% y/y, 3m avg., RHS) Manuf. PMI Manufacturing (% y/y, 3m avg.)
Source: Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Source: Haver Analytics, Barclays Research
4 August 2017 30
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
Turkish inflation had a In Turkey, CPI inflation extended its downward trajectory, slowing to 9.8% y/y in July from
transitory decline to 9.8% y/y 10.9% y/y in June (see Turkey: Lower CPI, higher core, 3 August 2017). However, core
in July, will likely re-accelerate inflation momentum reversed its downward course (rising to 9.6% y/y), due to the weaker
to double digits from August TRY-basket led by EUR strength and inflationary pressures on services driven by growth
seeing its peak close to 11% in acceleration. Based on our core inflation model, we project core inflation will remain above
October 9% on average in H2 2017, before decelerating towards 8% handle in Q1 2018. The CBTs
Quarterly inflation report released yesterday (see Turkey: Hawkish inflation bias was
retained in CBT's Quarterly Inflation Report, 1 August 2017) also revealed CBTs discomfort
which argues for a tight with the underlying inflation trend in the near term. Julys retreat of CPI inflation into single
monetary policy stance digits is likely transitory, and we expect re-acceleration to double digits from August with
the contribution of unfavorable base effects. We expect CPI inflation to hover at double
digits, seeing its peak closer to 11% y/y in October, and then decelerating to single digits in
December (Barclays forecast: 9.3% y/y). This, coupled with de-anchored inflation medium-
term expectations, argues in favour of a tight monetary policy stance.
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4
The headline inflation rate eased back in Russia in July Growth in the Russian economy appears to have accelerated
following Junes surprise pickup further in Q2; we think output expanded by 2% y/y
20 Consumer Prices (% y/y) 15
% y/y
18
10
16
14 5
12
0
10
8 -5
6
4 -10
2
-15
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Leading Activity Indicator GDP
Source: Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Source: Haver Analytics, Barclays Research
4 August 2017 31
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
DATA REVIEW & PREVIEW: EMERGING EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Liza Ermolenko, Durukal Gun, Brahim Razgallah, Tomasz Wieladek
Russia: Consumer spending probably remained in decent shape in July as domestic demand continues to recover.
Poland: We expect the current account and trade balance to rise due to strong exports on the back of real activity in Germany.
Russia: We think that GDP growth accelerated to 2.0% y/y in Q2 helped by a rebound in investment and consumer spending.
Source: Bloomberg, Haver Analytics
4 August 2017 32
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
In the medium term, the political instability of the past months also decreased the already-
low probability of a pension reform being approved by the Congress. With these conditions,
the fiscal spending ceiling has a high risk of being revoked in the next few years. All
together, the imminent fiscal target revision and stalled reforms could lead to rating
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
Primary fiscal balance in Brazil deteriorated in Q2 17 while primary fiscal balance has improved in Mexico
3 % of GDP % of GDP
2 55 4.0
50
1 3.0
45
0 40 2.0
35
-1 1.0
30
-2 25 0.0
20
-3 -1.0
15
-4 10 -2.0
99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
Headline Adjusted Structural Net public debt Primary balance
Source: STN. Barclays Research Source: SHCP, Barclays Research
4 August 2017 33
Barclays | Global Economics Weekly
downgrades in the coming weeks, especially as S&P has had Brazils sovereign rating on
CreditWatch since late May. Given that this status usually lasts for about 90 days, a rating
action could be sooner rather than later.
On the northern side, fiscal Mexicos public finances up to June have shown an important improvement, of 2.6pp of
balance of Mexico improved GDP. In annualized terms, the public balance went to 1.4% of GDP surplus from 1.2% of
even when not accounting for GDP deficit in June 2016. Without considering the sizable Banxico transfer, of around 1.5%
one-off revenues of GDP from its operational surplus, the improvement in the balance year-to-date has been
of 2.2pp of GDP. This has been the result of both stronger revenues (1.2pp of GDP) and
lower expenditures (1.0pp of GDP) during the period.
In particular, the primary balance has reached 2.5% of GDP in H1 17 from 0.1% in June
2016, also without Banxicos revenue. Including all revenues, public net debt has reached
44% of GDP in H1 17 from 50.1% at 2016 year-end. As these are partial results, more
expenditure should be implemented as the year-end approaches, when we expect public
finances to show a primary surplus of 1.9% of GDP with public debt reaching 48.3% of
GDP.
We believe the 2018 fiscal Next years budget is expected to include additional expenditure cuts, but no more than
budget should bring a credible 0.2% of GDP. Revenues should continue improving, thanks to efficiency gains and
expected improvement stabilization of oil prices and production. In this context, the government might propose a
budget with a primary surplus around 0.9% of GDP, which would allow debt to stabilize at
48% of GDP by 2018 year-end. This seems feasible even if Banxico does not provide extra
revenues next year.
At the southern cone, fiscal In Argentina, the primary fiscal deficit was 1.5% of GDP in H1 17, as measured by the
accounts have also been on Treasury on a year-to-date cumulated basis. The print was well within the primary fiscal
track in H1 17, and we are deficit target set for H1 17 of 2.0% of GDP, and it is in line with our expectations that this
more comfortable with 2018s years 4.2% of GDP primary deficit target should be met. Year-to-date, total revenues
fiscal goals in Argentina increased 32% y/y in H1 17, a bit above primary spending, which grew 31% y/y. The
increase in revenues was partly aided by the tax amnesty program. Nonetheless, tax
collection in July when there was no affect from the tax amnesty was also strong: it grew
31.8% compared to July 16. In H1 17, higher pension spending (39% y/y) and capital
spending (31% y/y) were compensated by cuts in all others spending, which grew 21% y/y
below revenues and inflation.
The primary deficit target for 2018 is 3.2% of GDP, which implies a more ambitious targeted
consolidation of 1pp of GDP. The government will need to implement large cuts in energy
and transportation subsidies to meet next years target in a context in which some policy
and pension spending dynamics will be working against fiscal consolidation. However,
given that by now the government has surpassed the target by 0.5pp, next years target can
be met more easily if fiscal accounts continue along their H1 17 trajectory.
In Colombia, revised fiscal Colombia recently revised its fiscal target, and this has revived concerns about a downgrade.
deficit target could be even It is now expecting a fiscal deficit of 3.6% of GDP. The country is particularly exposed to the
wider due to Venezuelas crisis escalating political crisis in neighbouring Venezuela. It is likely to receive a large flow of
migrants that could potentially have an important fiscal cost. If the deficit ends up closer to
last years (4.0% of GDP) or more, the probability of a Colombian downgrade would
significantly increase. Although costs are hard to estimate precisely, in a worst case
scenario, a potential refugee crisis could easily mean a deviation of 0.4% of GDP or more.
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Mexico CPI inflation: We expect a low print in the second half (0.07% 2w/2w), driven by a mild core inflation print and no
pressures coming from the non-core component. Annual inflation should remain at 6.3% y/y, with core inflation at 4.9% y/y.
4 August 2017 35
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% change Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E Q1E Q2E Q3E Q4E 2015 2016E 2017E 2018E
Real GDP (% chg, q/q) 0.9 0.7 -0.4 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9
Real GDP (% chg, y/y) 2.5 3.1 1.8 2.4 1.7 1.4 2.7 2.3 2.8 3.2 3.1 3.3 2.4 2.5 2.0 3.1
Private consumption (% y/y) 3.0 2.8 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.4 3.0
Public consumption (% y/y) 3.9 4.7 4.5 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 3.5 4.0 2.9 2.5
Investment (% y/y) -3.8 -3.0 -3.1 -0.6 -0.4 0.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 -3.0 -2.6 0.9 1.9
Inventories contribution (pp) -0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4
Exports (% y/y) 4.8 10.1 6.6 10.2 5.6 6.0 7.0 8.0 5.5 4.5 5.0 5.0 6.0 7.9 6.7 5.0
Imports (% y/y) -2.8 -0.7 1.3 3.1 7.9 5.5 5.5 6.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 0.2 6.2 3.5
Net exports contribution (pp) 1.6 2.1 1.1 1.4 -0.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.5 0.1 0.4
Nominal GDP (% chg, q/q) 0.8 1.4 0.6 3.2 2.3 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.8 3.6 7.3 5.5
Unemployment rate (end, %) 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.8 5.9 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.3 6.0 5.7 5.6 5.4
CPI inflation (y/y) 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.5 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.5 1.3 2.0 2.2
Underlying inflation (y/y) 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.5 1.9 2.1
Current account (% GDP) -3.5 -3.8 -2.6 -0.8 -0.7 -1.5 -1.8 -2.0 -2.0 -2.5 -2.5 -3.0 -4.7 -2.7 -1.5 -2.5
RBA cash rate (period end, %) 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.00 1.50 1.50 2.25
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Reserve Bank of Australia, Barclays Research
Real GDP -4.0 -1.3 -2.3 -2.2 4.3 0.4 0.0 1.6 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.5 -3.8 -3.6 0.5 1.5
Private consumption -4.7 -4.0 -1.1 -1.9 -0.6 1.1 0.0 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 -3.9 -4.2 -0.6 1.0
Investment -6.1 0.4 -9.3 -6.1 -6.1 8.2 7.8 2.0 3.5 3.8 5.3 4.1 -13.9 -10.2 -1.0 4.3
Net exports (contr, % y/y) 2.9 1.6 0.4 0.4
Industrial output (PA) -9.2 5.2 -1.7 -2.8 4.7 1.3 0.2 1.9 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 -8.2 -6.8 1.1 2.1
CPI inflation (% y/y)* 9.4 8.8 8.5 6.3 4.6 3.0 2.7 3.3 3.7 4.6 4.4 4.3 10.7 6.3 3.3 4.3
CPI inflation (% y/y, PA) 10.1 9.1 8.7 7.0 4.9 3.6 2.6 3.0 3.6 4.2 4.5 4.3 9.0 8.7 3.5 4.2
Unemployment rate % (PA) 10.1 10.9 11.6 12.3 13.1 13.4 13.2 12.2 11.5 10.8 10.6 10.3 8.3 11.3 13.0 10.8
Key central bank rate (EOP)* 14.25 14.25 14.25 13.75 12.25 10.25 8.50 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 14.25 13.75 8.25 8.25
Current account (% GDP)* -3.3 -1.3 -1.2 -1.5
Government balance (% GDP)* -10.2 -9.0 -7.9 -7.5
Gross public debt (% GDP)* 65.5 69.5 75.3 79.1
Gross external debt (% GDP)* 37.0 37.3 36.6 39.4
Note: *End of period for quarters and years. Source: IBGE, BCB, National Treasury, Barclays Research
4 August 2017 36
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% change y/y Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1E Q2E Q3E Q4E Q1E Q2E Q3E Q4E 2015 2016 2017E 2018E
Real GDP 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.4
Real GDP (q/q, saar) 6.6 7.1 6.8 6.6 7.3 6.9 6.5 6.3 6.1 6.6 6.4 6.3
Real GDP (% y/y, YTD) 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.4
Consumption* (pp) 5.6 4.9 4.8 4.3 5.3 4.4 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.0
Investment* (pp) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 1.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.3
Net exports contribution* (pp) -1.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 0.3 0.1
Industrial output 5.9 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.7 6.9 6.3 6.2 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.9 6.2 6.0 6.5 6.0
CPI inflation 2.1 2.1 1.7 2.2 1.4 1.4 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.4 2.0 2.2 2.3
Unemployment rate (%) 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4 4 4
Current account (% GDP) 1.6 2.3 2.4 0.4 0.7 2.1 2.0 0.8 0.5 1.9 1.1 1.6 2.7 1.7 1.5 1.4
Government balance (% GDP) -2.4 -2.9 -3.3 -3.5
General government debt ( % GDP) 42.9 46.3 49.9 52.6
Key CB rate (period end, %) 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35
Note: All numbers are expressed in y/y % change unless otherwise specified. *Contributions by GDP expenditure components are all reported as year to date
numbers officially. Source: Barclays Research
% change q/q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E Q1E Q2E Q3E Q4E 2015 2016 2017E 2018E
Real GDP 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 ... ... ... ...
Real GDP (saar) 2.1 1.4 1.6 2.4 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 ... ... ... ...
Real GDP (y/y) 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 2.1 1.9
Private consumption 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.4
Public consumption 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.1
Investment 0.2 2.7 -0.1 1.4 -0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.9 4.1 2.1 3.7
Inventories contribution (pp) -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Final dom. demand cont. (pp) 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.9 2.4 1.6 1.9
Net exports contribution (pp) 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4 0.6 0.2
Industrial output (ex construct.) 0.8 -0.2 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.0 1.3 1.3 1.3
Employment (q/q) 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.2
Unemployment rate % 10.3 10.1 9.9 9.7 9.5 9.2 9.0 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 10.9 10.0 9.1 8.4
CPI inflation y/y 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.7 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 0.0 0.2 1.4 1.2
Core CPI (ex food/energy) y/y 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2
Nominal GDP (y/y) 3.1 2.6 3.3 3.0
Current account % GDP 3.6 4.0 3.5 2.8 3.3 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.9
Government balance % GDP -2.1 -1.5 -1.3 -1.2
Gross public debt % GDP 92.5 91.3 91.0 89.0
Refi rate (period end %) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: All numbers expressed in % q/q unless otherwise specified. Source: Barclays Research
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% change q/q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3E Q4E Q1E Q2E Q3E Q4E 2015 2016 2017E 2018E
Real GDP 0.6 -0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6
Real GDP (saar) 2.3 -0.3 0.7 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.2
Real GDP (y/y) 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.0 1.1 1.8 1.9
Private consumption 1.3 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.4 2.1 1.1 1.8
Public consumption 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1
Investment (GFCI) 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.5 0.9 2.7 2.8 4.3
Final domestic demand 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.0 1.5 2.2
Inventories (pp) -0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.2 0.7 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.1
Net exports (pp) -0.1 0.3 -0.7 0.1 -0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.1 -0.2
Exports 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.1 -0.7 3.1 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 4.0 1.9 3.9 5.2
Imports 0.4 -0.7 2.8 0.6 1.2 0.2 1.3 0.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 5.5 4.2 3.8 5.3
Employment 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.7 1.1 1.3
Unemployment rate % 10.2 10.1 10.0 10.0 9.6 9.6 9.4 9.2 8.9 8.7 8.4 8.2 10.4 10.0 9.4 8.6
HICP inflation (y/y) 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.1 0.3 1.1 1.0
Core HICP ex food/energy (y/y) 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8
Nominal GDP (y/y) 2.1 1.5 2.5 3.9
Current account % GDP -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.9 -0.2 -0.3
Government balance % GDP -3.6 -3.4 -3.0 -3.0
Government gross debt % GDP 95.3 95.7 96.5 95.7
Note: All numbers expressed in % q/q unless otherwise specified. Source: Eurostat, INSEE, Barclays Research
% change q/q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E Q1E Q2E Q3E Q4E 2015 2016 2017E 2018E
Real GDP 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Real GDP (saar) 2.9 1.9 0.7 1.7 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.2
Real GDP (y/y) 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.8
Private consumption 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.4
Public consumption 1.6 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 2.8 4.0 1.4 1.9
Investment (GFCI) 1.5 -1.3 -0.1 0.4 1.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.1 2.0 2.0 3.3
Final domestic demand 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.9 2.4 1.5 1.9
Inventories (pp) -0.4 0.0 0.3 0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Net exports (pp) 0.1 0.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.6 0.2
Exports 1.6 1.1 -0.3 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 4.6 2.5 4.5 4.3
Imports 1.5 0.2 0.6 2.5 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.1 5.0 3.7 3.7 4.5
Employment 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.2
Unemployment rate % 4.3 4.2 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.6 4.2 3.9 4.1
HICP inflation (y/y) 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.9 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.5 0.1 0.4 1.4 1.2
Core HICP ex food/energy (y/y) 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3
Nominal GDP (y/y) 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.9
Current account % GDP 8.7 8.8 7.9 7.6 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.5 8.3 8.0 7.9 7.9 8.6 8.3 8.4 8.0
Government balance % GDP 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.0
Government gross debt % GDP 71.2 67.9 64.6 61.9
Note: All numbers expressed in % q/q swda, unless otherwise specified. Annual historical data are computed using quarterly aggregation and could therefore differ
from other statistics sources. Source: Eurostat, Destatis, Barclays Research
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Real GDP 7.6 8.0 7.2 9.1 7.9 7.5 7.0 6.1 7.6 7.7 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.1 7.8 7.9
Private consumption 2.8 5.2 6.7 9.3 8.4 7.9 11.1 7.3 7.8 8.0 8.0 8.0 6.1 8.7 8.0 7.9
Public consumption 0.9 4.3 4.2 4.1 16.6 16.5 21.0 31.9 8.0 9.0 9.0 7.0 3.3 20.8 8.3 7.7
Fixed investment 4.3 3.4 10.1 8.3 7.4 3.0 1.7 -2.1 6.0 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.5 2.4 6.3 6.6
CPI inflation (average) 5.1 3.9 5.3 5.3 5.7 5.2 3.7 3.6 2.4 2.7 4.1 5.0 4.9 4.5 3.5 4.8
Current account (% GDP) -1.1 -0.7 -1.2 -1.3
General govt balance
-6.5 -6.2 -6.0 -6.0
(% GDP)
Gross public debt
66.0 66.0 65.5 65.5
(% GDP)
Repo rate (period end, %) 7.25 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.50 6.50 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.75 6.25 6.00 6.00
Cash reserve ratio
4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
(period end, %)
Note: Values expressed in % y/y unless otherwise specified. Indias fiscal year begins in April and ends in March.
Source: Barclays Research
% change q/q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E Q1E Q2E Q3E Q4E 2015 2016 2017E 2018E
Real GDP 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Real GDP (saar) 1.4 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
Real GDP (y/y) 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.2 0.9
Private consumption 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.6 1.3 1.4 0.7
Public consumption 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.7 0.6 1.0 0.4
Investment 0.9 0.4 1.5 1.2 -0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.4 3.1 0.8 1.0
Final domestic demand 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.5 1.2 0.7
Inventories (pp) -0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.1 -0.1
Net exports (pp) 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.4
Exports -0.6 2.2 0.3 1.9 0.7 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 4.1 2.6 4.9 3.0
Imports -1.2 2.2 1.0 2.3 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 6.7 3.1 5.6 1.9
Employment 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 1.3 0.8 0.5
Unemployment rate % 11.6 11.7 11.6 11.8 11.6 11.2 11.2 11.0 10.9 10.9 11.1 10.8 11.9 11.7 11.2 10.9
HICP inflation (y/y) 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.1 -0.1 1.4 1.2
Core HICP ex food/energy (y/y) 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.7 0.5 1.0 1.4
Nominal GDP (y/y) 1.3 1.8 2.2 2.4
Current account % GDP 2.3 2.9 3.0 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.6 2.2 1.8
Government balance % GDP -2.6 -2.3 -2.2 -2.1
Government gross debt % GDP 132.3 132.8 132.8 131.6
Note: All numbers expressed in % q/q unless otherwise specified. Source: Eurostat, Istat, Barclays Research
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% change q/q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E Q1E Q2E Q3E Q4E 2015 2016 2017E 2018E
Real GDP 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4
Real GDP (q/q, saar) 2.5 1.6 1.0 1.4 1.0 2.5 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.7
Real GDP (y/y) 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.2
Private consumption 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.4 1.0 0.5
Public consumption 1.4 -1.2 0.2 0.0 -0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.7 1.3 0.1 0.9
Residential investment 1.2 3.1 2.6 0.2 0.3 0.8 -0.5 0.3 1.6 0.2 -0.4 0.4 -1.6 5.6 2.8 1.8
Public investment -0.3 0.7 -1.3 -3.0 -0.1 4.3 2.4 1.0 -1.8 -1.0 0.0 0.2 -2.1 -3.0 1.7 0.5
Capital Investment -0.1 1.3 -0.2 1.9 0.6 1.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.3 3.7 2.3
Net exports (q/q cont.) 0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.3
Exports 0.5 -1.4 1.9 3.4 2.1 -0.3 1.0 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.5 2.9 1.2 5.7 3.3
Imports -2.0 -1.1 -0.2 1.3 1.4 1.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 -2.3 3.8 1.7
Ch. Inventories (q/q cont.) -0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.6 -0.3 -0.2 0.0
Nominal GDP 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 3.2 1.3 1.2 2.1
Industrial output -0.9 0.2 1.6 1.9 0.2 1.9 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.3 -1.2 -0.2 4.7 4.4
Employment 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.1 1.4 0.9
Unemployment rate (%) 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.7
CPI inflation (y/y) -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.5 -0.3 0.5 0.5
Core CPI ex food/energy (y/y) 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.3 -0.1 0.3
Current account (% GDP) 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.0 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.1 3.7 3.7 3.7
Government balance (% GDP) -3.5 -4.6 -5.0 -4.4
Overnight call rate (% EOP) -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.00
BoJ 10y yield target (% EOP) - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 - 0.00 0.00 0.10
Note: Central bank rates are for end of period, %. Source: BoJ, Cabinet Office, METI, MIC, MoF, Barclays Research
Real GDP 1.8 0.2 4.4 2.9 2.7 2.4 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.8
Real GDP (% y/y) 2.2 2.6 2.0 2.3 2.8 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.5
Private consumption 0.9 1.0 6.5 3.0 2.7 1.7 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.7
Public consumption 0.3 3.9 1.2 0.8 -2.0 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.3 1.2 0.4 1.5
Investment 11.2 -7.2 0.0 0.9 -2.8 1.9 2.3 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.3 0.1 0.4 2.7
Exports -4.3 -8.8 16.8 5.6 18.9 7.1 6.7 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 10.4 1.2 10.0 6.3
Imports -5.7 -1.3 12.2 -2.0 27.4 4.9 5.3 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 8.6 1.1 9.2 5.7
Industrial output 1.1 -2.3 -0.6 1.8 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.4 1.0 0.0 0.9 2.4
Nominal GDP (% y/y) 5.6 6.6 7.1 8.6 11.0 5.0 5.9 5.8 6.8 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.8 7.0 6.9 6.1
CPI inflation (% y/y, avg) 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.2 5.0 6.1 6.2 6.1 4.4 3.3 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.8 5.9 3.4
Unemployment rate (%, avg) 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 4.3 3.9 3.4 3.2
Key central bank rate (%, eop)* 3.75 4.25 4.75 5.75 6.50 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 3.25 5.75 7.00 7.00
Current account (% GDP)* -2.5 -2.1 -1.8 -1.5
Government balance (% GDP)* -3.5 -2.6 -1.4 -1.9
Gross public debt (% GDP)* 46.2 50.8 48.9 48.0
Gross external debt (% GDP)* 36.5 40.5 38.7 37.6
Note: *End of period for quarters and years. Source: INEGI, Banxico, SHCP, Barclays Research
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% change q/q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E Q1E Q2E Q3E Q4E 2015 2016 2017E 2018E
Real GDP 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
Real GDP (saar) 3.1 3.4 2.8 2.8 3.3 3.8 3.4 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2
Real GDP (y/y) 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.7
Private consumption 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.9 3.2 2.3 1.9
Public consumption 0.2 -0.6 0.5 -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 2.0 0.8 0.7 0.9
Investment 0.4 1.4 -0.1 0.5 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 6.0 3.1 4.9 5.1
Final domestic demand 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 3.4 2.7 2.6 2.4
Inventories (pp) 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
Net exports (pp) 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.4
Exports 0.2 3.4 -1.2 2.0 4.0 2.9 2.5 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 4.9 4.4 9.9 6.0
Imports -0.2 2.6 -2.0 1.8 3.8 2.7 2.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.4 5.6 3.3 8.6 5.7
Employment 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.1
Unemployment rate % 20.4 20.2 19.3 18.6 18.2 17.3 16.8 16.5 16.0 15.6 15.2 14.8 22.1 19.6 17.2 15.4
HICP inflation (y/y) -0.8 -1.0 -0.3 0.8 2.7 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.0 1.6 1.8 1.7 -0.6 -0.3 2.0 1.5
Core HICP ex food/energy (y/y) 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.5
Nominal GDP (y/y) 3.7 3.6 4.4 3.9
Current account % GDP 1.8 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.6 1.6
Government balance % GDP -5.1 -4.5 -3.3 -2.9
Government gross debt % GDP 99.8 99.4 97.9 96.9
Note: All numbers expressed in % q/q unless otherwise specified. Source: Eurostat, INE, Barclays Research
% Change Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E Q1E Q2E Q3E Q4E 2015 2016 2017E 2018E
Real GDP (q/q, saar) 2.0 3.7 1.9 2.0 4.3 2.4 3.2 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.4 2.4
Real GDP (y/y) 2.9 3.4 2.6 2.4 2.9 2.7 2.9 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8
Private consumption 2.3 3.5 2.7 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.7
Public consumption 5.0 4.3 4.5 3.6 2.7 3.2 4.8 3.6 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 3.0 4.3 3.6 2.9
GFCF 2.9 5.2 5.3 7.1 10.4 10.0 5.5 4.1 5.0 4.0 2.5 3.0 5.1 5.2 7.3 3.6
Exports 1.3 2.6 3.4 1.2 3.9 -0.1 3.8 3.2 3.5 3.1 3.7 3.5 -0.1 2.1 2.7 3.5
Imports 3.4 4.8 6.5 3.3 9.9 6.5 2.9 1.9 -0.8 -2.0 2.6 1.9 2.1 4.5 5.2 0.4
Industrial output -0.3 0.8 0.5 2.8 3.7 0.6 1.8 1.8 0.6 3.5 2.5 2.4 -0.3 1.0 2.0 2.3
Unemployment rate (%) 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.7
CPI inflation (y/y) 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.5 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.1 0.7 1.0 2.0 1.9
Current account (% GDP) 7.7 6.9 6.0 5.7
Consolidated fiscal balance*
-2.4 -1.4 -1.7 -2.0
(% GDP)
Key CB rate (period end, %) 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.50
Note: All numbers expressed in y/y basis unless otherwise specified. *Consolidated fiscal balance is shown after excluding social security funds.
Source: Barclays Research
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Real GDP 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Real GDP (saar) 0.8 2.4 2.0 2.8 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4
Real GDP (y/y) 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.3
Private consumption 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 2.4 2.8 1.8 0.7
Public consumption 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.3 0.8 1.4 1.8
Investment 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 1.0 -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 3.4 0.5 1.4 1.2
Inventories (pp) -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 0.1
Net exports (pp) -1.1 0.3 -1.4 1.7 -0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.2
Nominal GDP (y/y) 2.9 3.0 3.7 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.2 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.4 2.8 3.6 4.1 3.4
Employment (Mn) 31.6 31.7 31.8 31.8 31.9 32.1 32.0 32.0 32.0 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.3 31.7 32.0 31.9
Employment growth 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.1 1.7 1.4 0.9 -0.2
Unemployment rate (%) 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.4 4.9 4.7 5.0
CPI inflation (y/y) 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.2 2.1 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.9 0.0 0.7 2.5 2.0
Current account (% GDP) -5.4 -4.3 -5.3 -2.4 -3.0 -3.2 -3.0 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.7 -4.3 -4.4 -3.1 -2.8
Government balance (% GDP) -3.8 -2.4 -2.7 -2.5
Government debt (% GDP) 83.5 88.1 90.5 91.6
Bank Rate (EOP) 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25
Note: Government balance is fiscal year forecasts, eg, 2016= FY 16/17, and defined as public sector net borrowing excluding financial interventions. Government debt
is fiscal year forecasts, eg, 2016 = FY 16/17, and defined as public sector net debt. Source: ONS, Barclays Research
Note: All numbers expressed in q/q saar % unless otherwise specified. Bold fed funds indicate quarter of projected rate increase. The budget balance is fiscal year.
Source: BEA, BLS, Federal Reserve, US Treasury, Barclays Research
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August 2017
28-Aug UK Round 3 of EU-UK Brexit negotiations David Davis and Michel Barnier are set to continue discussions on
issues ranging from EU-UK citizens rights, financial settlement and the
Irish border.
September 2017
07-Sep Euro area ECB Governing Council meeting
07-Sep UK Second reading of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill
in the Commons
11-Sep UK The Commons vote on the EU
(Withdrawal) bill
14-Sep UK BoE policy meeting
15-Sep EU Eurogroup meeting (Tallinn)
16-Sep EU ECOFIN meeting (Tallinn)
16-19 Sep UK The Liberal Democrats party holds its
annual party conference in Bournemouth.
18-Sep UK Round 4 of EU-UK Brexit negotiations David Davis and Michel Barnier are set to continue discussions on
issues ranging from EU-UK citizens rights, financial settlement and the
Irish border.
20-Sep US FOMC meeting We expect the Fed to announce balance sheet run-off.
20-Sep UK BoE FPC meeting
24-Sep France Senate elections 170 of the 348 seats of the Senate will be up for grabs. Senate has no
meaningful powers and is already controlled by the centre right.
24-Sep Germany Parliamentary election According to polls, Angela Merkel's CDU/CSU will likely receive the most
votes. While the baseline for our forecasts remains a CDU-SPD coalition,
the probability of a CDU-FDP coalition is rising, and could become more
likely if migration returns to the forefront of the electoral debate.
24-27 Sep UK The Labour party holds its annual party
conference in Brighton
October 2017
01-Oct Portugal Local elections
01-04 Oct UK The conservative party holds its annual
party conference in Manchester
09-Oct EU Eurogroup meeting (Luxembourg)
09-Oct UK Round 5 of EU-UK Brexit negotiations David Davis and Michel Barnier are set to continue discussions on issues
ranging from EU-UK citizens rights, financial settlement and the Irish
border. Barnier will have to assess whether "sufficient progress" has
been achieved ahead of the October 19 EU summit.
10-Oct EU ECOFIN meeting (Luxembourg)
13-15 Oct Global IMF meeting (Washington, D.C)
19-20 Oct EU EU Summit (Brussels) Heads of government will hear EU negotiator Barnier's report and could
already sign off some issues if "sufficient progress" has been achieved.
26-Oct Euro area ECB Governing Council meeting
30-31 Oct Japan BoJ monetary policy meeting GDP and CPI forecasts to be updated as part of quarterly Outlook report.
November 2017
01-Nov US FOMC meeting
02-Nov UK BoE policy meeting
06-Nov EU Eurogroup meeting (Brussels)
07-Nov EU ECOFIN meeting (Brussels)
22-Nov UK BoE FPC meeting
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December 2017
04-Dec EU Eurogroup meeting (Brussels)
05-Dec EU ECOFIN meeting (Brussels)
13-Dec US FOMC meeting We expect the Fed to increase the federal funds target by 25bp.
14-Dec UK BoE policy meeting
14-Dec Euro area ECB Governing Council meeting
14-15 Dec EU EU Summit (Brussels) Heads of government will hear EU negotiator Barnier's report. If progress
is insufficient on the withdrawal issues, moving on the next phase would
be delayed until the Council decides otherwise.
20-21 Dec Japan BoJ monetary policy meeting
January 2018
22-23 Jan Japan BoJ monetary policy meeting GDP and CPI forecasts to be updated as part of quarterly Outlook report.
25-Jan Euro area ECB Governing Council meeting
31-Jan US FOMC meeting
Source: Barclays Research
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Americas
Michael Gapen Alejandro Arreaza Marco Oviedo Bruno Rovai
Head of US Economics Research Economist Colombia, Peru, Venezuela Head of LatAm Economics Research Economist Brazil
+ 1 212 526 8536 +1 212 412 3021 Mexico, CAC +1 212 412 5762
michael.gapen@barclays.com alejandro.arreaza@barclays.com +1 212 526 6840 bruno.rovai@barclays.com
BCI, US BCI, US marco.oviedo@barclays.com BCI, US
BCI, US
Pilar Tavella Blerina Urui
Economist Argentina US Economist
+1 212 412 5564 +1 202 452 4774
pilar.tavella@barclays.com blerina.uruci@barclays.com
BCI, US BCI, US
Africa
Jeff Gable Miyelani Maluleke Ridle Markus Peter Worthington
Head of Africa Non-Equity Research Economist South Africa Head of Sub Saharan Africa Economics Head of South Africa Research
+27 11 895 5368 +27 11 895 5368 Research + 27 21 927 6611
jeff.gable@ barclays.com miyelani.maluleke@ barclays.com +27 11 895 5374 peter.worthington@ barclays.com
Absa, South Africa Absa, South Africa ridle.markus@ barclays.com Absa, South Africa
Absa, South Africa
Asia-Pacific
David Fernandez Rahul Bajoria Jian Chang Krishna Goradia
Chief Economist, Asia-Pacific Economist ASEAN, ANZ Chief Economist China Economist
+65 6308 3518 +65 6308 3511 +852 2903 2654 +65 6308 3211
david.fernandez@barclays.com rahul.bajoria@barclays.com jian.chang@barclays.com krishna.goradia@barclays.com
Barclays Bank, Singapore Barclays Bank, Singapore Barclays Bank, Hong Kong Barclays Bank, Singapore
Angela Hsieh Siddhartha Sanyal Dennis Tan Yingke Zhou
Economist Korea, Taiwan Chief Economist India Economist Singapore Economist China, Hong Kong
+65 6308 2003 +91 22 6719 6177 +65 6308 3065 +852 2903 2653
angela.hsieh@barclays.com siddhartha.sanyal@barclays.com dennis.tan@barclays.com yingke.zhou@barclays.com
Barclays Bank, Singapore Barclays Bank, India Barclays Bank, Singapore Barclays Bank, Hong Kong
Tetsufumi Yamakawa James Barber, CFA Yukito Funakubo Yuichiro Nagai
Head of Research, Japan Japan Research Economist Japan Economist Japan
+81 3 4530 1130 +81 3 4530 1542 +81 3 4530 1068 +81 3 4530 1064
tetsufumi.yamakawa@barclays.com james.barber@barclays.com yukito.funakubo@barclays.com yuichiro.nagai@barclays.com
BSJL, Japan BSJL, Japan BSJL, Japan BSJL, Japan
4 August 2017 49
Analyst Certification
We, Tomasz Wieladek, Blerina Urui, Michael Gapen, Fabio Fois, Antonio Garcia Pascual, Philippe Gudin, Apolline Menut, Fabrice Montagne, James Barber,
CFA, Yukito Funakubo, Yuichiro Nagai, Tetsufumi Yamakawa, Rahul Bajoria, Jian Chang, Yingke Zhou, Angela Hsieh, CFA, Siddhartha Sanyal, David
Fernandez, Dennis Tan, Liza Ermolenko, Durukal Gun, Brahim Razgallah, Alejandro Arreaza, Marco Oviedo, Bruno Rovai and Pilar Tavella, hereby certify (1)
that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect our personal views about any or all of the subject securities or issuers referred to in this
research report and (2) no part of our compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in
this research report.
Each research report excerpted herein was certified under SEC Regulation AC by the analyst primarily responsible for such report as follows: I hereby
certify that: 1) the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about any or all of the subject securities referred to in this
report and; 2) no part of my compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.
Important Disclosures:
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