RULE 110, RULES OF COURT

Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to

state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense
may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to
the actual date of its commission. (11a)

G.R. No. L-27825 June 30, 1970

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GERARDO RIVERA and the HONORABLE JUDGE LORENZO RELOVA,
in his capacity as presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, First Branch, respondents.

The clear issue, then, is whether or not under Rule 110, section 13 of the
Rules of Court, 2 the amendment sought after respondent-accused's plea
and during the trial, is merely formal and may be permitted without prejudice
to the rights of respondent-accused.

We hold that the amendment sought by the prosecution merely to state the
true and actual year of commission of the offense charged on March 2, 1964
rather than March 2, 1965 as inadvertently alleged through oversight in the
information is a matter of form which does not prejudice or impair the rights
of respondent-accused.

1. The rule consistently applied by the Court is that after the accused's plea
is entered, amendments that touch upon matters of substance are not
permitted and the information or complaint may be amended only as to
formal matters by leave and at the trial court's discretion, when the same
can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. Thus, an
amendment which neither adversely affects any substantial right of the
accused (e.g. does not deprive him of the right to invoke prescription 3 nor
affects and/or alters the nature of the offense originally charged nor involves
a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused
to undergo any material change or modification in his defense) is an
amendment as to a matter of form. 4

2. Here, all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article
282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 1 thereof were
duly alleged in the original information, viz., (1) that respondent-accused
threatened complainant with the infliction of a wrong on the latter's wife and
daughter (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime, the threat being to kidnap
them and (3) the threat was made in a letter (which calls for imposition of
the maximum penalty). The amendment which sought the correction of an
obviously typographical or clerical error in the last digit of the year alleged
(from 1965 to 1964, the month and day being left exactly the same) did not
affect the nature and essence of the crime as originally charged. Neither did
it involve any change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to cause
surprise to respondent and require him to effect any material change or
modification in his defense.
Any evidence respondent might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the original form as in the amended form. It is obvious from
the stated facts, and respondent makes no contrary assertion, that no
defense of prescription of the offense is available to respondent whether the
original information alleging the commission of the offense on March 2, 1965
stands or the same is amended to allege one year earlier, 1964, as the date
of commission of the crime charged. As in U.S. vs. Ramos, 5 therefore,
where the Court held that "no error was committed by permitting the fiscal
to amend the date of the year of the complaint, by striking out the last word
(1911) and substituting in lieu thereof '1910' (the crime having been
committed on June 16, 1910 and not in June, 1911)," the amendment here
would cause no impairment of prejudice to the rights of respondent-accused.

G.R. No. L-62737 June 29, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CELSO M. GIMENEZ, Acting

City Fiscal of Mandaue City, petitioners,
vs.
JOAQUIN BORROMEO and HONORABLE TEMISTOCLES BOHOLST,
JR., City Judge of Mandaue City, respondents.

Section 10 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that "it is not necessary
to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense
was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but
the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the
actual date at which date the offense was committed as the information or
complaint will permit."

The precise time is not an essential ingredient of the offense of grave

coercion.

In the case of People vs. Rivera (1970, 33 SCRA 746), We ruled that the
amendment of the information as to the date of the commission of the
offense from March 2, 1964 to March 2, 1965, a difference of one (1) year
or twelve (12) months, was merely a matter of form and does not prejudice
the rights of the accused, reiterating the ruling in the case of U.S. vs. Ramos
(1912, 23 Phil. 300) where the Fiscal was permitted to amend the date of
the commission of the offense from June 16, 1910 to June, 1911.

The phrase "on or about" employed in the information does riot require the
prosecution "to prove any precise date but may prove any date which is not
so remote as to surprise and prejudice the defendant. In case of surprise,
the Court may allow an amendment of the information as to time and an
adjournment to the accused, if necessary, to meet the amendment" (U.S.
vs. Dichao, 27 Phil. 420, 423 [1914]).
In the case of People vs. Reyes, supra, on which the respondent Judge
relies, the change sought was from 1964 to 1969, a difference of five (5)
years, which gap of five years "is so great as to defy approximation in the
commission of one and the same offense."

This is not so in the case at bar where the difference is only, as aforestated,
two months and five days, which disparity allows approximation as to the
date of the commission of the offense of grave coercion.

Moreover, as stressed by the Solicitor General, the error as to the date of

the commission of the offense was discovered early and the motion to
amend or correct the same was as immediate as to preclude any surprise
or prejudice on the part of the accused.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDERS OF

RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED JUNE 30,1982 AND JULY 28,1982 ARE
HEREBY SET ASIDE, AND THE RESPONDENT JUDGE IS HEREBY
DIRECTED TO ADMIT THE ADDITIONAL AMENDMENT TO THE
AMENDED INFORMATION FROM "JUNE 24,1981 TO AUGUST 28,1981.
" NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174461 September 11, 2013

LETICIA I. KUMMER, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of
time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would
not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment
would not alter the nature of the offense.

The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the

amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information, as amended.22
In People, et al. v. Borromeo, et al.,23 we ruled that the change of the date
of the commission of the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is a
formal amendment and would not prejudice the rights of the accused
because the nature of the offense of grave coercion would not be altered. In
that case, the difference in the date was only about two months and five
days, which difference, we ruled, would neither cause substantial prejudice
nor cause surprise on the part of the accused.

It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise

time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense.24 The act may be alleged to have been committed
at any time as near as to the actual date at which date the offense was
committed, as the information will permit. Under the circumstances, the
precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of homicide.

Xxxxxxxxx

Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the
case evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19,
1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that
consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above,
the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal
amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the
essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense
under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in
fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with
respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected
amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.

To sum up, we are satisfied after a review of the records of the case that the
prosecution has proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
The constitutional presumption of innocence has been successfully
overcome.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28,

2006, convicting the petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Leticia I. Kummer.

SO ORDERED.