249 SCRA 244 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application of Laws Duty of a Judge to

Impose Prescribed Penalty

In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide committed against a seven year old girl. The Presiding judge was Lorenzo
Veneracion.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of the crime of Rape with Homicide,
the penalty imposable shall be death. However, Judge Veneracion refused to impose the
death penalty but instead he sentenced the four accused to reclusion perpetua. The city
prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed
upon the four accused but the judge refused to act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser penalty than
that imposed by law.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an adjudication of guilt,
the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless
of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the judge must impose the death penalty.
This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof) which provides that
no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or
insufficiency of the laws.
Case Digest: Fetalino & Calderon v. COMELEC G.R. No. 191890: December 4, 2012 EVALYN I. FETALINO
and AMADO M. CALDERON, Petitioners, MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR., Petitioner-Intervenor, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to petitioners Evalyn Fetalino (Fetalino) and
Amado Calderon (Calderon) as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years.
Congress, however, adjourned before the Commission on Appointments (CA) could act on their
appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and Fetalino and
Calderon were no longer re-appointed. Thus, Fetalino and Calderon merely served as Comelec
Commissioners for more than four months.
Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the
Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the claims pursuant to its
resolution. However, in its subsequent resolution, the Comelec, on the basis of its Law Departments
study, completely disapproved the Fetalino and Calderons claim, stating that one whose ad interim
appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to fall under the
provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five years salary.
Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. (Barcelona) later joined the petitioners in questioning the
assailed subsequent resolution.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not an ad interim appointment qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to
the full five-year lump sum gratuity; B. Whether or not the resolution that initially granted the five-year
lump sum gratuity is already final and executory; C. Whether or not Fetalino and Calderon acquired a
vested right over the full retirement benefits provided by RA No. 1568.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Term of Office

First Issue: Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1
of R.A. No. 1568, as amended.
The Court emphasized that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are
met: first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable law in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled;
and second, when an actual retirement takes place. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that
retirement entails compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and
jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the
Comelec who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. Fetalino, Calderon
and Barcelona obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed
the full seven-year term of office. While the Court characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag
v. Benipayo as a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn
by the President once the appointee has qualified into office, the Court have also positively ruled in that
case that an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments
does not constitute a term of office.
Second Issue: The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments.
Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads: In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become
final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the
issuance of the assailed resolution do not fall within the coverage of the actions and proceedings under
Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not violate its own rule on
finality of judgments.
Third Issue: No vested rights over retirement benefits.
Retirement benefits granted to Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are
purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. Retirement

benefits as provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension which is a form of
deferred compensation for services performed; in a pension, employee participation is mandatory, thus,
employees acquire contractual or vested rights over the pension as part of their compensation.